Contents

INTRODUCTION 9

I “WE SLIP AWAY FROM OURSELVES”: THE DISCOVERY AND INTERNALIZATION OF THE EARTH’S AGE (EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES) 31

Earth: The Long Term 34
Humankind: The Long Term 49
Three Artists: Giorgio de Chirico, Max Ernst, Robert Smithson 79

II RECONSTITUTING THE ANTIQUITY OF HUMANKIND AND OF ART 109

The Age of Man 109
The Indistinction between Man and Nature 117
From the Ground to the Walls of Caves: First Fissures, First Modern Appropriations of Prehistoric Art 134
Fleshing Out Fossils, Objects, and Images 148

III THE ARTIFICIALITY OF PREHISTORY: A DISJUNCTIVE GENEALOGY OF ART 165

At a Distance 165
Why Did Modernity Identify with Prehistory? 177
Joan Miró and Jean Dubuffet 213
IV  THE PARADOX OF THE NEOLITHIC: RUPTURE AND PERMANENCE, ORDER AND DISORDER  241

The Political Uses of the Neolithic:
Revolution and Rootedness
(England, ca. 1930; Denmark, ca. 1960)  243

The Neolithic of Disorder:
Pablo Picasso and Robert Morris  260

V  PREHISTORY IN THE ATOMIC AGE  273

The End of History  273
Caves of the Atomic Age (1949–1959):
Fontana, Kiesler, Pinot Gallizio  309

CONCLUSION: TERRA INCognITA  325

Acknowledgments  337
Notes  339
Bibliography  393
Index  429
Prehistory is an invention of the nineteenth century. In a century famous for its technological daring and accelerated pace, three major narratives of Western thought, one after another, delved into a previously unsuspected past. They concerned the age of the earth, the age of the human species, and the age of art. This does not mean that before the nineteenth century, and despite the biblical account attributing only a few thousand years of existence to the earth, no one had had the intuition, if not the certainty, that the earth’s age was unfathomable. In modern times, when it had become urgent to extract from nature its every secret, a few curious minds were astonished to discover mineral formations that resembled living things, fossils of totally unknown creatures. Later on, the physics experiments Buffon conducted in his forge led him to believe that the time necessary for metals to condense could not have been prodigiously shorter back when the earth formed within the cosmos. As he commented in his notebooks, “the more we extend time, the more we will approach the truth and reality of the use nature makes of it.” But he added that he was determined to “abridge it as much as possible to conform to the limited power of our intelligence.” That limited power — which the skeptical philosophers had also encountered — was the result more particularly of a culturally determined transcendental order: eighteenth-century natural history had to accommodate itself to the creation story found in scripture. Granted, this was becoming less of an obstacle, and when it finally disappeared, a remarkable reversal
could come about. The nineteenth century not only acknowledged the incalculable age of the earth; surreptitiously, by means of a new metaphysics, it was able to use that idea to fill the place left vacant by God. Henceforth, the “limited power” of human intelligence took on the task of grasping that incalculable age, inventing metaphors and analogies, seeking figures that could make the dissimilar similar and the alien familiar. Our species now took the measure of this new infinity and the endless procession of animal species it revealed.

The abyss opened by the new age attributed to the earth soon opened up in Western man himself. Human beings began to internalize the vastness of long-term natural processes, following three different, but nearly contemporaneous and complementary, paths. First, they undertook a search for human fossils in the geological strata, where fossils of extinct mammals had been found; second, they began to see contemporary man himself as a potential fossil; and finally, in granting the human species a specific and limited place within a larger geological and paleontological narrative, they used figures and concepts from this narrative to understand themselves. Concepts such as strata and fossils, thus metaphorized, would make man intelligible to himself not only within the long biological and cultural evolution of his species, but also as a singular individual, a knowing and sentient being. But the invention of metaphors, which had first served to domesticate the alterity and infiniteness of geology, turned back on its inventor and led to the *ensauvagement*, the “becoming wild,” of man himself.

The term “prehistory” (or rather, the adjectival form “prehistoric”) was coined by a few Scandinavian archaeologists in the 1830s to describe both the human era before history and the discipline that studied it. The term quickly migrated to the human sciences — linguistics, ethnology, folklore, and psychology — to explain the Indo-European root of a word, the “survival” of a gesture or technique, a dying or vanished race, even the unconscious. Gradually, especially from the 1870s on, as this metaphor acquired the function of a floating signifier, the imaginary of prehistory, accumulating both human and nonhuman representations, also began to inhabit the imaginary of artists, Odilon Redon and Paul Cézanne, for example. The definitive
evidence of fossil man was discovered in 1859, but earlier finds had also gradually shifted the ground of knowledge—like any discovery that shakes a belief to its very foundations—abolishing forever the hermetic separation between the earth’s history and human history. This was certainly one of the key founding acts of the strange “empirico-transcendental doublet” to which Michel Foucault refers in *The Order of Things*, signifying by that expression the specificity of the modern episteme. The prehistoric traces of human life turned it into an empirical object to be analyzed by a knowing, historically determined subject. But that split between subject and object, that twisting back upon oneself, led to a void and oblivion. When people ceased to look toward the sky and instead looked into the earth, what they found there were vestiges of previous human lives that had been totally forgotten. The abyss of time was no longer outside man—it opened up within his own memory. The hypotheses about these forgotten lives, whether they provided material for the fable of endless progress or instead revealed all the doubts and anxiety of the contemporary world, shaped the discourses and works of moderns, who constantly reflected on their own condition.

In 1860, scarcely a year after the discovery that attested to the antiquity of human beings, Édouard Lartet, a geologist who had gone in search of fossils in a few caves, became the “inventor,” in spite of himself, of the earliest symbolic artifacts of prehistory. As Kant points out, there is a distinction to be made between a discovery and an invention. On one hand, in his example, America, unknown to Europeans before Columbus made landfall there, is a discovery. Similarly, prehistory in its actual materiality (its geological strata, its plant, animal, and human fossils and later symbolic artifacts) can said to have been discovered. On the other hand, the “exemplary originality” of invention lies, again according to Kant, in the perfect coincidence between objectivity and subjectivity. Prehistory, as an “idea” that interprets, names, and renames the strata, fossils, and artifacts found, to the point of shaking Western man’s ontological and gnoseological foundations, is thus an invention through and through. The invention of engraved Paleolithic works was so stupefying that it has
very often gone unnoticed even to our own time. Édouard Lartet barely admitted it to himself: when he published the findings of his excavation, he mentioned these artifacts, but he did so with the same axiomatic neutrality with which he described mandibles. He even provided drawings of the works he found, but only at the very end of his article, after depicting a cross section of the cave, the fossils, and the tools. His colleagues did not highlight his “invention” either, nor have our contemporaries done so. With a few exceptions, they, too, give 1864 as the date of the discovery of Paleolithic mobiliary art. In actuality, 1864 is a “screen memory”: it was in that year that Lartet and Henri Christy jointly published a famous article on a similar discovery of engraved objects from the Paleolithic, this time fully acknowledging and interpreting them. What were the reasons for a repression so radical that its effects can still be felt in our own time?

Art, customarily contemplated from a standing position, suddenly extended out horizontally, mixed with the bones of extinct animals and mute minerals. The taxonomy of the world was shattered by that unexpected contiguity of the symbolic and the geological: human fossils mingled with those of vanished animals, thrown together with microscopic objects, often very skillfully engraved. Yet the subjectivity to which these engravings bore witness was not congruent with the normative narratives about art or with prevailing ideas about the earliest human beings. The discovery of “fossil man” drew modern man closer to the animality of natural history, and the axes exhumed from the quarries of Saint-Acheul brought to mind, at best, only the crude gestures of the first creatures. But the discovery of an imitative art more ancient than antiquity pulled in the opposite direction. No existing periodization could accommodate that art, dating to indeterminate eras, marked by the presence of extinct mammals or by an imperceptible evolution in the size and sharpness of “a few pitiful stones.” Doctrines about the chronology of art collapsed, as did those about its spatial and racial provenance. It was not the Orient or Egypt, even less Greece, that had given birth to Paleolithic art, then buried and forgotten it. The prehistorian John Lubbock immediately amended the famous expression ex oriente lux (“out of the East, light”)

...
that had soothed the Romantics, adding this concise sentence: “Suddenly a new light has arisen in the midst of us.” The fact that this art was discovered in the very heart of progressive Europe increased the stupor it caused while enhancing the power of its later appropriation.

In fact, if the discovery of parietal art — cave art — had not followed shortly thereafter, Paleolithic mobiliary art, the art present in small artifacts, might have long remained out of sight and outside time, in a sort of Arcadia where art was supposedly practiced as instinctively as hunting. That was, in brief, the interpretation Lartet and Christy gave of these objects, still repressing their stupefying aspect. Ultimately, there was no reason to be surprised by them, since they merely attested to the natural spontaneity of their creators, who expressed automatically what they saw before them. Clearly, stupor was now neutralized not through the rhetoric of description, but through interpretation. But this interpretation could hardly be applied to the decorated Cave of Altamira, discovered near Santander in 1879 by an amateur prehistorian named Marcelino de Sautuola. His publication the next year was met with nothing but incredulity and roused keen opposition among professional prehistorians.

This was not, of course, the first time in the modern era that what was discovered under the earth’s soil caused a shock. But it was without a doubt the very first time that such a discovery left people incredulous and at a loss, with no interpretive tools. At the very end of the fifteenth century, when Romans discovered the “grotesques,” mural paintings in the underground rooms of Nero’s Domus Aurea, they were certainly struck by the hybrid creatures who defied both the laws of physics and those of narrative. Nonetheless, certain canonical texts of antiquity soon provided the keys for identifying these “licentious” paintings, which, as Vitruvius wrote, delighted in representing things that “do not exist, cannot exist, and have never existed.” Also, the historian Leonard Barkan wondered why the Renaissance humanists, despite their passion for ancient sculpture, undertook their excavations at random, rather than systematically, even as they set up niches to display objects that had not yet been found. Among the possible reasons, Barkan mentioned the
insurmountable gap between a world ardently read and fantasized about and the materially impoverished world of sixteenth-century Rome: “You cannot travel through symbolic space with a shovel.”

Yet it was the exact opposite situation that for nearly twenty years kept people from exploring the prehistoric caves: even as the mania for archaeology reached its height in the second half of the nineteenth century, no one fantasized about prehistoric art, at least not in the form it had irrupted in the real. Geologists, paleontologists, and amateur prehistorians, equipped with shovels, left in search of bones or a few crude material objects. These items would not disrupt the evolutionist continuum, and they shed light on one another within the regime of empirical equivalence. That regime of drab neutrality was suddenly shattered by the unexpected irruption of the symbolic: engraved objects struck shovels like a thunderclap.

The twenty years that followed the discovery of the decorated Cave of Altamira were marked by silence, scarcely interrupted by a little snickering. In short, it was as if the discoveries of prehistoric art still belonged to what could be called the “thunderstone model.” Until the eighteenth century, “ceraunia” and “thunderstone” were the names given to the flints that surfaced in fields or on paths after rainstorms. The carved stones, indicating an intention and possessing the coherence of repeated forms, were literally “thunderous” objects: they had fallen from the sky, piercing the fabric of the known. But the nineteenth century’s new order of knowledge was incompatible with such metaphysical apparitions. The objects that turned the “order of things” upside down either had to comply with new narratives, more rational and potentially congruent with the historicization of nature, or be reduced to silence.

Prehistory is through and through a matter of astonishment and stupor. In that respect, it reactivates a long philosophical tradition dating back to classical antiquity and recorded in Plato’s Theaetetus. This tradition makes thauumazein (astonishment) the beginning of philosophy: “When I look steadily . . . [it is] as if darkness were coming over my sight,” the young mathematician confesses to Socrates, regarding certain phenomena that unsettle him. This astonishment that obsures
the vision was literally embodied in those who came face to face with
the symbolic figures of prehistory. For a long time, no one even saw
the paintings and engravings on the walls of caves. Then, when the
problem of “prehistorical” was raised, some went so far as quite simply to
deny their existence. In the case of symbolic artifacts from the earliest
times, they developed hypotheses that made the artifacts compatible
with the “known,” even giving them names straight out of classical
antiquity. Those that were carved in the shape of a woman’s nude body
were called “Venuses,” sometimes described as “immodest,” a familiar
fantasy that blocked the disconcerting forces of a discovery that lay
beyond all fantasizing. Descartes, charting the troubled waters of the
soul as it reacts to “rare and extraordinary things,” made admiratio the
most primitive of the soul’s primitive passions.15 “Admiration,” which
corresponds to “astonishment” in its current sense, was a “sudden sur-
prise” at objects that seem “rare and extraordinary.” But that “admi-
ration” was measured. A subject, overcome by stupidity and dullness
remained indifferent to the world and incapable of thought; but the
“excess of admiration” that Descartes called “astonishment,” and that
corresponds to what we know as “stupor,” was just as negative. “This
makes the whole body remain immobile like a statue, and renders
one incapable either of perceiving anything of the object but the first
face presented or, consequently, of acquiring a more particular knowl-
edge of it. This is what is commonly called ‘being astonished.’” And
astonishment is an excess of admiration that can never anything but
be bad.”16 The two extremes meet: stupor verges on stupidity, and a
subject who seeks the extraordinary at all costs finally becomes as
insensitive to the world as the dull-witted subject. So it was for the first
witnesses to the invention of prehistory: thunderstruck by the exces-
sively new, they turned into statues. The moderns were transfixed by
prehistory, initially in the sense of being petrified by shock.

In and of itself, parietal art encapsulated the stupor of prehistory by
its excesses, its secret locations, and the jumble of its formal composi-
tions. But it was no doubt because the enigma it posed was so opaque
that it could eventually be appropriated by moderns at the turn of the
twentieth century. Sealed up in caves for millennia, these images
bore witness in the first place to a gaping hole in human memory. When modernity was finally ready to see these paintings, it was because it recognized its own enigma in them: Where did it come from? What was its origin, and what would its posterity be? What art was it capable of “in the age of its technological reproducibility,” and to what end?

The monumental paintings in caves also offered modernity the possibility of collective identification. So long as prehistoric art existed only as minuscule objects, it alluded to individual and spontaneous gestures and could be incorporated into the fable of pastoral innocence. It thus remained caught up in the enchanted circle of nature. It was only when modern consciousness took note of the existence of parietal art that prehistory could be seamlessly assimilated to human history, understood as action and as the production of the new. Only then did prehistoric peoples become our fellow creatures. Their collectivities, mere figments to us, were embodied in monumental and serial works suggesting struggles and beliefs that required rites and a minimal social organization. Such speculations fissured the resistance of modernity, which from then on could appropriate the works into the fabric of its historicity. Sometimes modernity came up with evolutionist narratives that conceived of the magic culture of primitive times as a very early stage in the march of progress begun long ago; sometimes it wove more dialectical and more complex narratives, making prehistory less a period that had reached its conclusion than an entirely subjective plastic force that could be linked to the present and thereby produce the possibility of history or, on the contrary, its end.17

Prehistory, once it was periodized and objectified, could not escape a historicist reification and reconstitution of the past. But it could just as easily be understood and experienced thanks to its temporal plasticity, for which there was no real equivalent in history. Not circumscribed by a place or a date, prehistory could return anywhere, anytime, and an indeterminate number of times. Universal, global, incomplete, and forever opaque, it lent itself perfectly to the negative or critical side of modernity, as well as to its utopianism. Because prehistory had no chronology, because it was composed of a time that
was not clearly delimited, it flouted the orders of time and the natural kingdoms and was always prepared to slip into the present. Finally, because it entailed beginning, change, and end all at once, prehistory in and of itself could encompass common perceptions of history.

In this book, I propose to write the history of a modernity that, in forever reinventing prehistory, constantly invents itself. In its conceptual and artistic ramifications, “prehistoric modernity” has been strangely overlooked. Somewhat like Edgar Allan Poe’s “purloined letter,” it lies in plain view and is nevertheless invisible, as if, in the end, any reflection on prehistory had to pay tribute to the repression of which it was the object. Any consideration of the conceptual and artistic uses of geological, paleontological, and artistic prehistory by moderns also requires that we understand why historians have misconstrued these practices, whether by overlooking them, or by confusing them with primitivism and archaism, or by focusing on the concepts of progress, tabula rasa, and the future as the exclusive driving forces of modernity. The continuous invention of prehistory is well suited to demonstrate that the way in which “we have never been modern” is not as monolithic and univocal as Bruno Latour suggests. We have learned to consider modernity through the prism of a few solid and unequivocal dualisms. At a time when the discourse on the Anthropocene receives a great deal of media attention, we are rather too quick to find the foundations of modernity in Bacon’s instrumental philosophy and in the Cartesian dualism that separates nature from the human cogito and thus postulates the extension and domestication of the world. In the same spirit, the historian Reinhart Koselleck maintained that Enlightenment notions such as acceleration, progress, and utopia constituted the singularity of the modern historical regime. As for art history, even thirty years ago, we were taught that modernity was the era of the tabula rasa: headed straight for the future, it “shatter[s] against daily life.” This narrative allowed for a few exceptions: fin-de-siècle decadentism, primitivism, and the return to order were seen as quasi-mechanical “reactions” against the progressive spirit of modernity. We need to counteract the neutralizing effect of dualist symmetries — action and reaction, avant-garde
and rear guard, modern and antimodern, revolutionaries and reactionaries. Such dualism has found a paradoxical, yet all the more striking expression in the disappearance pure and simple of the word “moderns”: “we have never been modern.” That assertion, of course, implies that we have never been the moderns we believed we were, since we were also fetishists, as much if not more so than the colonized peoples. Granted, but what exactly do we understand by the term “moderns”? Were moderns always monolithic, and are we so even now?

It would be absurd to deny the existence of these oppositions, but the extreme tension between them and the aporias inherent in modernity now have an infinitely greater heuristic value, because they further defamiliarize our view of history and break through the opacity of the present. The “great divide” Latour speaks of has had a necessary critical function, but if we take it simply as our line of sight, we risk allowing it to persist without problematizing it. We must therefore reshape somewhat the identity of moderns, and rather than assign ourselves the role of those who know better than the ancients, rather than impose our critical spirit on the past, rather than see our present as the tail of the comet, we must acquire the means to engage increasingly in the self-critique that every past present has undertaken. Modernity is composed of regression as much as progress, doubt as much as certainty, deceleration as much as acceleration, the longue durée as much as change. It is this contradictory historicity that I wish to explore in this book by immersing myself in some of its structuring themes and revelatory moments from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present. It is my wish to recount the project of grasping onto everything, in the aim, secret, perhaps, of releasing at least some things from our grasp.

Prehistory, having broken with the fundaments and codes of the ancient world (both human and nonhuman), forces moderns to place their existence and their historicity over an abyss. As in the Renaissance, nature, continually “reinvented,” generates ever more shocks, surprises, and enigmas. “We slip away from ourselves,” Edgar Quinet wrote in 1870, in the first wide-ranging reflection on what the
long term, in its ramifications, and its tangle of human and nonhuman has done to modern subjectivity. Although evolutionism, positivism, and their present-day cognitivist and genetic incarnations posit that every question has an answer, every enigma its solution, regression in time cannot reconstitute the entire past: the deeper you dig into the past, the thicker its mystery becomes; the farther back you go, the more disturbing the indetermination of types and behaviors. In the “anthropological sleep” Foucault spoke of, there is always the same dream of a finite being, both object of knowledge and knowing subject, who bumps up against the unthought, “the inexhaustible double that presents itself to reflection.”

Man, caught up in the historicity of his physical being, his material activity, and his language, “can be revealed only when bound to a previously existing historicity.” He is never contemporary with an origin; he always exists “against a background of the already begun.” That is why, in several ways, we imitate the original stupor of the invention of prehistory: we repeat the same lapsus and the same silences; we are astonished at the blindness of the first witnesses; and we can also take that very “stupor” as the object of our reflection. Transfixed by prehistory, held in its grasp, moderns themselves grasped onto it so as to continue to make art, to write, to think, to live. In this book, I analyze that two-stage process and that reversal.

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the “thunderstone” gradually became an instrument for taking one’s distance from everyday life. Prehistory, simultaneously similar and dissimilar to the present, human, nonhuman, and inhuman all at once, turned out to be a formidable machine for producing “defamiliarization.” In the end, it remains the only terra incognita on this earth left for moderns to explore. As temporality, it constitutes the human while at the same time exceeding it; as a reservoir of material traces of nature’s and man’s past, it reveals, now as before, a disconcerting diversity of forms that obscures the divide between words and things. In that sense, the invention of prehistory is a perfect materialization of what Hans Blumenberg, describing the specificity of modern times, has called “the essentialization of the contingent.”

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But prehistory is also one of the most powerful vectors of the phenomenon Koselleck called the “temporalization” of history, which began in the late eighteenth century. In substance, he was designating the process by which history, as events and as memorable and normative acts, disintegrated in favor of History as a “collective singular” whose meaning is realized in and by time. Koselleck, a historian of semantics, pointed out the decisive role in that process of the utopian thought of the Enlightenment and of the philosophy of history through such concepts as revolution and progress and the sense of acceleration derived from them. All these notions were tied up with the subject’s projection into the future and with the idea that his connection to the past and tradition was now broken. Yet the temporalization of history has occurred in both directions, as an absorption in the past and as a projection into the future. Why? In a certain manner, prehistory was invented by an excess of historicism. Modern man, in his desire to draw up a list of everything, to set down in writing the historical narrative of all that exists around him, ran up against the wall of prehistory. Historicist excess ultimately led to the pulverization of history. From the time of its invention, prehistory produced a continuous expansion of time, eroding known historical forms and pulverizing their normative power, blurring the divide between natural kingdoms and the semantic regimes associated with them. In that sense, prehistory put the final nail in the coffin of historia magistra vitae — history as life’s teacher.

The expansion of time that prehistory produced affects human beings in their very constitution: they lose the distinctive signs and boundaries that separate them from other species and also from their own prosthetic inventions. If we stop thinking about modern acceleration as moving exclusively toward the future and see it as also headed simultaneously toward the most remote past, we will easily grasp a regressive acceleration that, even now, leads moderns back to ever more ancient and unexpected paleontological and artistic forms. This ultimately produces a temporal vertigo similar in its intensity to that caused by the feats of science and technology.
The sense of dispossession and rupture is not purely negative, however; it is not purely a privation of the ontological substratum and horizon that human beings need in order to exist. Fundamentally, what characterizes modern subjectivity in its most intimate being is a contradictory dispossession, both destructive power and unsuspected creativity. In this respect, nothing is more revealing than the recurrent prehistoric metaphors in Marcel Proust’s *In Search of Lost Time*. From the first pages, he describes the relinquishment of his being whenever he drifts in the limbo of sleep after awakening during the night. Delivered from immediate memory, he then projects himself, in a formidable regressive acceleration, into an ontological state identical to that of the primitive being in the depths of the cave:

But for me it was enough if, in my own bed, my sleep was so heavy as completely to relax my consciousness; for then I lost all sense of the place in which I had gone to sleep, and when I awoke at midnight, not knowing where I was, I could not be sure at first who I was; I had only the most rudimentary sense of existence, such as may lurk and flicker in the depths of an animal’s consciousness; I was more destitute of human qualities than the cave-dweller; but then the memory, not yet of the place in which I was, but of various other places where I had lived, and might now very possibly be, would come like a rope let down from heaven to draw me up out of the abyss of not-being, from which I could never have escaped by myself: in a flash I would traverse and surmount centuries of civilisation, and out of a half-visualised succession of oil-lamps, followed by shirts with turned-down collars, would put together by degrees the component parts of my ego.\textsuperscript{29}

Prehistoric time, in breaking with the immediate past — impoverished because so familiar — offers a different past, all the more precious because it must be extracted from oblivion or even reinvented. And that prehistoric past allows one to reconcile the reputedly antithetical notions of end and beginning, rupture and rootedness, novelty and reminiscence, dissimilarity and resemblance, difference and repetition. If the present then retreats into the prehistoric past to “slip away from itself,” it does so the better to project onto that past its own anxieties, sometimes warding them off and sometimes pursuing them to their definitive conclusion. Artists, philosophers, and
writers can all be found there.

Prehistory extends the mirror of the fossil to reflect the ever-new commodities produced by capitalism (Max Ernst, Walter Benjamin). Rather than the ideal of political engagement, it may provide the model of the very longue durée of entropy (Robert Smithson). At the dawn of the atomic age, which created the sense that the geological era and the cultural era were changing simultaneously, a simple change of prefix marked prehistory as evidence of a “posthistory” (Arnold Gehlen, Lewis Mumford, Pier Paolo Pasolini, and others). As constant as capitalism itself, that negative use of prehistoric times reminds us that all human history, founded on the subjugation of nature and of human beings, remains within the horizon of natural history and the extinction of species. This critical function, however constant it may be, was marked by three moments of extreme intensity: after the “total mobilization” of World War I, after the atomic bomb and the onset of the “Great Acceleration,” and in the present, with the era that has come to be known as the “Anthropocene.” This book, therefore, which opens with the history of the symbolic exploration of nineteenth-century fossils, ends with “posthistory” as artists, writers, and philosophers have conceived it since World War II.

But there is also a positive use of the time of prehistory, the source of many symbols of consolation, creativity, and even utopia. For example, Henri Matisse saw the very recent discovery of parietal art as proof that the only Arcadia possible is that provided by art, now as in prehistoric times. For others, less concerned with preserving the autonomy of art, prehistory exemplifies the contrast between the dearth of material resources and a symbolic surplus. Joan Miró and Georges Bataille took inspiration from the prehistoric in their attempts to remedy a materially abundant, but symbolically impoverished modernity. Clearly, the more one imagines a harsh and dangerous prehistory, the more it confirms the chances for modernity to create its own symbolic universe by bearing witness to the vital role that falls to art. At certain critical moments, when it was a question of denying the obsolescence of painting as a medium or, on the contrary, of inventing as yet unknown artistic objects, prehistoric art offered
invaluable suggestions. Far from corroborating the duality of form and function or the antithesis between aesthetics and pragmatism, the earliest art argues for their interdependence. Detached from its material and utilitarian context, the symbolic efficacy attributed to the paintings on the walls of caves was easily transposable to the needs of the present, becoming pure form. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that there was a sharp divide between inert fossils and symbolic processes in the uses that artists, philosophers, and writers made of prehistory. There was no divide between death and life.

It should be pointed out that the indetermination of the natural kingdoms and of semantic regimes is constitutive of the successive inventions of prehistory. End and beginning, inertia and action, renunciation and appropriation of the world, sovereignty of the object that recognizes no master and lyrical affirmation of subjectivity were often combined to express the experience of modern time. Modernity is both belated and premature, hypermnesiac and forgetful. For example, Giorgio de Chirico’s “metaphysical” paintings, though they almost never quote prehistoric objects or signs, give the sense of a second prehistory, similar in spirit, but not in form, to the first. Just as the earliest human beings lived within a natural world that was incomprehensible to them, moderns live in a world so saturated with history that it has become illegible. Joan Miró, in transforming images of commodities into vaguely ossiform elements floating against a background suggestive of a clay wall, indicates in turn that it is possible to convert fossils into images and to substitute the liberating enchantment of art for the alienating enchantment of capitalism. Claes Oldenburg would also practice a paleontology of the contemporary world by assembling cast-offs somewhat similar to one another in form. These senseless forms bear no likeness to anything, but their juxtaposition in vitrines inspired by those in museums of natural history constructs a mutual resemblance, transforming the most ordinary prose into poetic rhymes. None of these artists claims that his art could save the world or change the direction of history. What they all say, however, is that art, which creates fictions, has a vital role in the long history of human beings, of which their own art
is only a moment. Therein lies its force, but also its relativity.

In this book, the idea of “prehistoric modernity” is organized along both a horizontal and a vertical axis. On the horizontal axis, this idea is shaped by constants, that is, by themes that run through the long span of modernity. These include: the dialectic between human history (its end and its beginning) and artistic media; the conjunction between prehistory and the present; the articulation of time scales as the only means available for mastering formless geological time; the formal techniques that artists have borrowed from prehistory and the theories developed over time to interpret them; the magic efficacy of art, as opposed to its reification; the embrace of history or its rejection; the elaboration of questions common to art and the human sciences, such as the *longue durée*, or a “second nature”; the tension between the universality of origins and the urgent need to root art in a soil and a race. On the vertical axis, the idea of prehistory is regularly determined by variables such as historical specificity and the contingency of individuals and events. Precisely because prehistoric art is stupefying in its supposed naturalism and resourcefulness, it did not interest artists — with the notable exception of Matisse — before the 1920s. Then, for various reasons, artists turned to the mineral world, somewhat as they do today, when the stones and places devastated by brutal domestication imperiously appealed to the artist’s imagination. To take another example: very early on and then without interruption, caves dominated the imaginary of prehistory, but they were not taken up by artists until the end of World War II and the nuclear cataclysm in Japan. At the same moment, the idea of “posthistory” was articulated as such, though its conceptual apparatus had existed since the invention of prehistory. And though anachronisms are inextricably bound up with prehistory, it was only after 1960 that they were explicitly embraced, affirmed, and defended.

Of course, this array of constants and variables, of long series and disruptive events, is inherent in the way the temporality of prehistory is rooted in the present. As such, “prehistoric modernity” relativizes or even invalidates the legendary rivalry between anthropology and history while clearly differentiating itself from the various
forms of primitivism. True, prehistory was enlisted in the merciless indictments of the historical mindset, like those undertaken—at nearly the same time but in different registers—by the artist Jean Dubuffet, the media theorist Marshall McLuhan, and the writer Ernst Jünger. Even so, the invention of prehistory allowed history as a discipline to undergo a metamorphosis. As I have already noted, prehistory is itself a product of the historical mindset, at once its culminating point and its dialectical sublation. But because prehistory is without events, names, and written documents, some could claim that Western man, historical by definition, is finite, while others were able to conceive of a different history that took no heed of the memorable actions of one individual or another whose name might have been preserved in writing. Historicians find prehistory such a faraway land that they exclude it from their domestic domain.

In the twentieth century, history writing moved in the opposite direction, away from written documents. For those who introduced material culture into the study of history, breaking the exclusive connection to texts, the line between prehistory and history became more porous. According to Lucien Febvre, for example, “history is undoubtedly done with written documents. When there are any. But it can also be done, and every attempt must be made to do it, without written documents if none exist. In the absence of known and classified flowers, the historian must make his honey with everything his ingenuity may afford him.” In turning all available natural and cultural traces into historical materials, Febvre would speak ironically of the historian’s limits: “Stop pestering him about the masterpieces Father Breuil found in the caves. ‘Painting? No. Archaeology! Let’s not cavalierly cross the sacred line: History over here, prehistory over there.’ . . . But ultimately, prehistory is one of the most comical notions imaginable.” Febvre’s student Fernand Braudel would in fact radicalize that principle, making the geological milieu—the incarnation of the longest longue durée—an active factor in human history. But the possibility of a conjunction between prehistory and history is also one of the consequences of the fact that history in its modern form is “doable,” as Koselleck argues. Insofar as history is no longer a completed form, but a series of actions
unfolding in time, its stupefying encounter with prehistory becomes conceivable. Rather than being “done,” that is, consolidated in the past, prehistory remains to be done—not in the sense of a “project” to be carried out, a secular teleology to be realized, but as an enigma from the past to be interpreted in terms of the present’s needs.

The present appears in this book in two principal forms that in no way exclude a multitude of intermediate positions. In the first place, the present, in the service of the past, “actualizes” it—makes it a contemporary reality—with the greatest possible force, to the point of merging with it and disappearing. Second and conversely, the present is made actual with the assistance of the past, whose material traces establish its present historicity. This opposition between the two forms conceals major differences in the possible uses of prehistory.

Like geology and the discipline of prehistory, art devotes a considerable share of its energy to “actualizing” what was lost. Actualist geology observes the present in order to imagine a past, which, all things considered, is not as irrevocably finite as the catastrophist Cuvier thought. Prehistory is quick to explain cave paintings by analogy, transposing onto them the rites of Stone Age survivors still scraping by in the Australian deserts or the South African forests. In the same way, realist art, now as in the late nineteenth century, attempts to body forth fossils, to reconstitute their daily lives, to give images of them a voice. And because neither science nor history can resuscitate the prehistoric dead, art as “organon,” both ideal and perceptible to the senses, readily takes on that task, appealing paradoxically to the tenet of historicism: to tell “what actually happened.” Of course, the present cannot avoid projecting its own ideas and affects onto prehistory. Hidden behind František Kupka’s anthropoids are males dressed in black, engaged in a struggle of sexual selection; and smoldering in the stricken, wrinkled, emaciated bodies of Fernand Cormon’s horde is the artist’s obsession with the degeneration of his own era. In both cases, however, the present’s interference with the representation of prehistory takes the form of a lapsus. In a rudimentary sacrificial gesture, the present breathes life into the past before expiring.

In contrast to that actualist approach, certain practices point to
the artificiality of both prehistory and its use. Here again, the methods of certain artists coincide with those of a number of prehistorians, anthropologists, and philosophers. Beginning in the 1950s, the prehistorians Annette Laming-Emperaire and André Leroi-Gourhan fought against the direct application of ethnology to prehistoric art and proposed hypotheses based on the internal coherence between series of images and the vestiges found on the ground adjacent to them. Rather than look for answers about the meaning of parietal art in a mimetically reproduced “outside” (in the natural world or among “primitive peoples” living today), they considered the syntactical coherence of the images themselves and the distance between that syntax and life, since the images did not represent realistic scenes. Similarly, artists such as Miró, Picasso, and Dubuffet were as interested in prehistoric forms as in the symbolic procedures used at the time. But when they used identifiable forms, they never did so to “complete” and restore them. Rather, they pointed out their transhistorical or even resolutely contemporary character — in the choice of materials, techniques, and the arrangement of signs. Finally, because the prehistoric world was revealed through a disconcerting multitude of symbols, procedures, and forms, the way these artists used them depended on their own particular needs — they opted sometimes for one, sometimes for another. As a result, prehistory and the present proved to be anthropologically similar, but historically dissimilar, closely related, but forever distinct.

That is also the best way to grasp the difference between primitivism and the modern invention of prehistory: only the reactivation of prehistory allows for a conjunction between anthropological constants and historical variables, because only prehistory could make historical claims within the conceptual world of Western thought. Both phenomena obeyed the modern subject’s imperious need to escape a present considered prosaic and a normative past experienced as despotic. In each case, this deliberate disappropriation set in motion a process of projection: primitivism and the use of prehistory were intellectual and psychological constructs of modern man. But what he finds in prehistory is a temporalization, a surplus of historicity, to which primitivism
cannot aspire, because it works within a sphere that is at best timeless, at worst governed by the idea of an endless degeneration or a meteoric decline. As I said, the discovery of Paleolithic art in the subsoil of the European continent increased both the stupefied moderns and the intensity of their appropriation of prehistory. Similar finds in colonized territories could not have been attributed to such a remote past: the winds of history had never blown through these regions, considered to be timeless, if not in a state of degeneration. Such images from outside Europe could have been made ten thousand years ago, or they could have been made today: that in fact was the interpretation of the German ethnologist Leo Frobenius in the late nineteenth century. In the West, however, the contrast between the very ancient and the modern was so sharp that it necessarily produced meaning and history. In other words, history lay between prehistory and modernity, and this gap was necessary for the modern dialectization of prehistory, that is, its historicization. At the same time, and this is hardly a contradiction, the awareness of moderns that they walked the same earth as the men and women of prehistory brought a sense of continuity that guaranteed their own identity.

By contrast, primitivism always bore the mark of alterity. After 1912, Picasso discovered conceptual processes in the symbolic world of primitive peoples, rather than the primary drives seen by Emil Nolde and Maurice Vlaminck. Even so, the aestheticization inherent in Picasso’s formalist approach effaced any particular or historical sign. He was immediately led to an occasional, temporally circumscribed use of the “primitive,” embraced as such, that afterward continued to enrich his practice more discreetly. Nevertheless, references to the “primitive” were not only circumscribed in time, they were also deeply rooted in a place and culture, no less than in a specific race. Because its roots in the particular never totally disappeared, the category of the primitive remains forever marked as anticlassical, anti-European, antimodern. As Frances Connelly demonstrated in her classic study of primitivism, that category was constructed primarily in opposition to Western aesthetic thought.

Compared with primitivism, prehistory is much less likely to serve as
a negation of Western aesthetics. Its ambiguity takes a different form: as origin or beginning, it is sometimes universal and sometimes “autochthonous.” In other words, when the particularism of prehistory is asserted as a positive fact, it becomes the proper identity of one or another European people; this particularism must then be constantly proven, reactivated, protected. That is true for the interpretation of the Neolithic by German theorists (Herbert Kühn, Max Verworn, and others), by English artists of the 1930s (Paul Nash, Barbara Hepworth, and others), and by the Dane Asger Jorn. References to prehistory take a completely different form when artists assert its universality, as Picasso and Miró regularly did, appropriating all the formal techniques of prehistory in all its manifestations and inscribing the marks of their own time on them. Finally, Max Raphael and Georges Bataille fought against a primitivism they judged repetitive and sterile, but they did so in the name of a prehistory they understood to be the “indeterminate birth” 39 of history.

In this attempt to interpret the modern experience of time, I had to reactivate the very object of the investigation: the stupor caused by the invention of prehistory. Because prehistory has made the boundaries between disciplines porous and sowed confusion in the classification of knowledge, the guiding ideas in this book come from various types of discourses and forms: works of art, literary writing, the human and social sciences, scientific images, caricatures. Even more important, the defamiliarization of the known produced by the invention of prehistory requires a defamiliarization of the history of modernity. Like the artists, I have made use of the forms and procedures bequeathed by “prehistoric modernity,” attempting to reveal the blind spots of history and making the discursive and formal objects function as “sources of stupor.”

An inquiry into our present condition runs through this book, while the many “ends” announced produce a mesmerizing effect. Scarcely sixty years after the first atomic bombs exploded, the advent of yet another new age, simultaneously geological and cultural, is turning our world upside down. In returning to the foundation of human history over the abyss of the past, we may be better able to think about what is happening to us.
Index

Abstraction, 246, 249, 250, 271.
Abyss metaphor, 57, 120–21, 132, 245, 329.
Academic painters (artistes pompiers), 136, 161, 179.
Acceleration of time, 22, 70–72, 95, 192, 329.
Actualism, 26, 45, 159, 230, 239.
Adaptation, 133, 179, 293, 386 n.57.
Ades, Dawn, 266.
Admiration, 15.
Adorno, Theodor, Aesthetic Theory, 152.
Aerial photography, 88, 90, 93, 169.
Aestheticism, 166–68, 169, 171, 176, 205, 222, 228, 327.
Africa, 188, 189, 209, 215; Bushmen and “primitive peoples,” 142, 148, 151, 153, 178, 278.
Agamben, Giorgio, 305.
Ahistoricity, 145, 304.
Aït-Touati, Frédérique, 46.
Aldiss, Brian, 224, 266.
Animals: distinguished from humans, 112, 289, 291; human relationship with, 290–91; as metaphor, 305; representations of, 153, 286, 297, 312, 326; worship of, 148. See also Hunting.
Animism, 43, 208, 222, 302, 319.
Annees School, 273, 337, 346 n.47. See also Braudel, Fernand.
Anning, Mary, 356 n.1.
Antarctica, 335.
Anthropocene, 13, 22, 70, 308, 328, 329.
Anthropomorphism, 292.
Anthropopithecus, 122.
Apes, 290–92, 291, 38 n.53.
Apollinaire, Guillaume, 79, 81, 88, 264; Picasso’s monument to, 264, 276; Rotting Wizard, 265.
Arcadia, 130, 131, 161, 246; and Matisse’s Joy of Life, 172, 174, 176, 177.
Archaeology, 53, 110, 227.
Archer, W. G., 40,000 Years of Modern Art, 202.
Architecture, 268–69, 292.
Aristotle, 39.
Armory Show, 178.
INDEX

Arp, Hans, 353 n.161.
Art: as apprenticeship, 202, 208–209; collective and personal aspects of, 170–71; cultural value of, 204–205; end of, 314; as magic, 219, 221–22, 224, 228, 238, 327, 325 n.135; as "organon," 26; as skeuomorphic or biomorphic, 224.
Art history: anthropological turn, 124, 360 n.42; Fontana's view of, 312–14; genealogical narrative of, 124, 157.
Artificiality, 167–68.
Artistes pompiers (academic painters), 156, 161, 179.
Artistic environments, 309–11.
Ashton, Dudley Shaw, 260.
Astronomy, analogies and fictions, 46–47. See also Outer space.
Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Nina, 60.
Baudelaire, Charles, 216.
Beche, Henry de la, 356 n.1.
Beckert, Samuel, The Unnamable, 100.
Beer, Gillian, 44.
"Beginnings," 46, 48.
Begouën, Henri, 147, 157, 153.
Behn, Friedrich, 153.
Bell, Clive, 246.
Benn, Gottfried, "Geology of the Ego," 197.
Benner, Emmanuel, 165–64; Hunters in Wait, 162.
Bergson, Henri, 58–59, 74, 84, 168.
Bernal, Desmond, 250.
Bernstein, Michèle, 319.
Bible: and age of the earth, 9–10, 32, 110; and catastrophism, 44; geology and, 34, 40, 96; and human origins, 110.
Bibliotheka Paedagogica, 91.
Biran, Maine de, 133.
Barthes, Roland, 165.
Baudelaire, Charles, 216.
Begouën, Henri, 147, 157, 153.
Behn, Friedrich, 153.
Bell, Clive, 246.
Benn, Gottfried, "Geology of the Ego," 197.
Benner, Emmanuel, 165–64; Hunters in Wait, 162.
Bergson, Henri, 58–59, 74, 84, 168.
Bernal, Desmond, 250.
Bernstein, Michèle, 319.
Bible: and age of the earth, 9–10, 32, 110; and catastrophism, 44; geology and, 34, 40, 96; and human origins, 110.
Bibliotheka Paedagogica, 91.
Biran, Maine de, 133.
Blanckaert, Claude, 327–38.
Blok, Ernst, 195.
Blumenberg, Hans, 19, 46, 49, 168–69.
Body memory and social memory, 169–70.
Bois, Yve-Alain, 375 n.142.
Borges, Jorge Luis, "Pascal's Sphere," 105.
Boucher de Perthes, Jacques, 30, 114, 115–16, 118, 282, 344 n.3; "figure stones," 219, 234, 284.
Brancusi, Constantin, 200, 222.
Branzetti, Andrea, 330.
Braque, Georges, 180.
Brassaï (Gyula Halász): in conversation with
INDEX

Picasso, 185–87, 222; Graffiti, 185, 186, 222; photography of Picasso, 185, 187.

Braudel, Fernand: and the longue durée, 25, 45, 38, 91, 73; Man before Writing, 273; Memory and the Mediterranean, 45.

Breuil, Henri: and Altamira, 139, 144; and Font-de-Gaume and Les Combarelles, 140, 141, 142, 362 n.83; in front of Lascaux entrance, 298; on the origin of art, 153, 155, 199; “Origins of Art,” 140–44, 143, 175; 400 siècles d’art pariétal, 282.

British modernists, 206, 208–209, 250, 266; formalism, 246, 261.

Brixham Cave, 115.

Brunel-Deschamps, Eliette, 391 n.1.

Bruniquel (Courbet Cave), 122, 123, 133.

Buckland, Reverend William, 40, 41, 68.

Buffon, Georges, 9–10, 120, 328; Les époques de la nature, 33, 35, 89, 339 n.2.


Bushmen, 142, 151, 157, 178.

Busts, 156–57. See also “Venuses.”

Butler, Samuel, Erewhon, 71, 89–90.

Byron, Lord, Cain, 345 n.38.

Caillebois, Roger, 297.

Camouflage, 90, 153.

Canguilhem, Georges, 341 n.21.

Capitalism, 266, 330; critiques of, 22, 87, 94, 98, 197, 345 n.32; Lyell’s critique of, 44–45, 70–71.


Caves, 275, 330–31; decorated, 139–40. See also Altamira; cave art; Chauvet-Pont-d’Arc Cave; Font-de-Gaume; Lascaux.

Caylus, comte de, 242.

Céline, Louis-Ferdinand, 236.

Cézanne, Paul, 10, 42, 338; bathers, 57, 176; Bibémus Quarries, 58, 59, 231; The Eternal Feminine, 66; geological sketches, 60–61; human figures, 57, 60, 64–66; and impressionism, 61, 350 n.106; In the Bibémus Quarries, 64–66, 65; landscapes of Aix-en-Provence, 57–66, 79, 351 n.136; The Millstone, 58; Mont Sainte-Victoire motif, 57–58, 61–62, 66, 351 n.136; Morris on, 66–67, 270; repressed sexuality of, 59, 66; sketchbooks, 60, 62–63, 349 n.102; Smithson and, 101, 355 n.189; still lifes, 59.

Chabot Cave, 139.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 328–29, 330.

Charleton, Walter, 241–42.

Chauvet, Jean-Marie, 391 n.1.

Chauvet-Pont-d’Arc Cave, 375, 375, 391 n.1; The Ride, 226.

Chirico, Giorgio de: “antianthropic remedies,” 84, 86, 378; comparisons to, 37, 81, 87, 171, 174, 208, 218; defamiliarization in, 86–87; The Fatal Temple, 81, 82; geological metaphors, 83, 85–86, 87, 107; interest in fossils, 78–79; The Melancholy of Departure, 80; as observed by Nash, 256; and Picasso, 81, 351 n.137; pit-tura metafisica, 33, 79, 81–84, 94, 352 n.148; Portrait of Guillaume Apollinaire, 81; on prehistoric art, 83, 85, 180; on regression to prehistory, 83, 352 n.144; on role of art, 79–81; use of contradictory perspectives, 88.

Chiron, Léopold, 139.

Christianity, 96–99, 296; the Fall, 40, 68, 164, 296, 386 n.67; the flood, 114, 115. See also Bible.
INDEX

Christy, Henri, 12, 13, 122, 125, 127; “Cavernes du Périgord,” 127–30, 128.
Churches, 147–48, 194.
Clottes, Jean, 125–27.
CoBrA movement, 249, 250.
Coins, 110, 279, 280.
Collingwood, Robin G., 328.
Combarelles, Les, 140.
Condorcet, Nicolas de, 68–69, 110, 131.
Connelly, Frances, 28.
Conze, Alexander, 365 n.131.
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 32, 46.
Cormon, Fernand, 26, 163–64, 296; Cain, 163.
Cornwall, 260.
Courbet, Gustave, 66.
Courbet Cave (Bruniquel), 122, 123, 133.
Cournot, Antoine Augustin, 73.
Croce, Benedetto, 328.
Cro-Magnon man, 119, 289.
Crystal Palace (Sydenham Park), 73–76, 74, 75, 279.
Cubism, 81, 86, 189, 198, 199, 220, 351 n.138.
Cubo-futurism, 355 n.186.
Cult value of art, 204–205.
Culture, 249–50; nature and, 116, 117, 118–19, 169, 329.
Cuvier, Georges, 115, 225; as catastrophist, 26, 32, 70, 345 n.32; contrasted with Lyell, 41–47, 43; on geology and human history, 39–40, 51, 144–45 n.31; referenced by Byron, 345 n.38.
Cyrano de Bergerac, 46.
DADA, 87, 88, 93, 223, 353 n.161.
Daleau, François, 135, 136.
Dalí, Salvador, 323.
Dannisch, Hubert, 229, 376–77 n.159.
Darwin, Charles, 33, 120. See also Natural selection.
Dawn, Virginia, 266.
De La Beche, Thomas, 68, 69.
De Landa, Manuel, 347 n.73. De Man, Henri, 301, 304, 388 n.95.
De Mortillet, Gabriel, 243, 319; The Prehistoric, 244.
De Sautuola, Marcelino Sanz, 13, 135–37; Brief Notes on Some Prehistoric Objects from. . . Santander, 137–38.
Dean, Dennis, 345 n.38.
Dean, Tacita, Trying to Find the Spiral Jetty, 355 n.187.
Death, 91, 106, 117, 285, 289, 293, 386 n.61; Dubuffet and, 234, 238; of God, 107; Picasso and, 264, 266.
Debord, Guy, 319.
Defamiliarization, 19, 29, 86–87, 90–91.
Deforestation, 308.
Delphi, Temple of, 113.
Deonna, Waldemar, 184, 198–99.
Derrida, Jacques, 177, 366–67 n.8.
Descartes, René, admiratio, 15.
Dinosaurs, 43, 50, 74, 76, 89, 309, 331; machines as, 90, 105.
Documents, 253, 276. See also under Bataille, Georges.
Dombrowski, André, 349 n.102.
Domus Aurea, 13.
Dordogne, 235. See also Les Eyzies; Font-de-Gaume.
Drouin Gallery (Paris), 225–26, 319, 321.
Dualism, 17–18, 23, 180, 344, 248.
Duchamp, Marcel, 219.
Durkheimian school, 144, 377.

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INDEX

Eckhart, Meister, 315.
Ehrenzweig, Anton, 206; *Hidden Order of Art*, 204.
Einstein, Carl, 85, 197, 199, 220, 375 n.135.
England. See British modernists; Megaliths and menhirs.
“Engrams,” 51, 54, 348 n.88. See also Recapitulation, theory of.
Ensauvagement, 10, 85. See also Savages.
Entformung, 315.
Entropy, 95–96, 105.
“Eolithic period,” 121, 319.
Epimetheus, 169.
Ernst, Max: and art as magic, 222; and de Chirico, 87, 102, 218, 352 n.148; compared with Benjamin, 22, 268; *The Cormorants*, 88–89, 89, 90, 91–92, 93; defamiliarization in, 90–91; depiction of death, 91; *Frau Wir- tin an der Lahn*, 93; interest in fossils, 78–79; mineral metaphor and geology, 87–88, 90–91, 94, 107, 171; overpaintings, 92–95, 217; *Physiomythologisches Diluvialbild*, 353 n.161; use of aerial photography, 88, 90, 93.
Ethnology, 49, 53, 148, 150, 152.
Evans, John, 10, 113, 279; coins of the ancient Bretons, 280.
Evolution, 54, 119, 120–21. See also Natural selection.
Evolutionism, 192, 194, 197, 201, 203, 293, 327.
Expressionism, 180–81, 223, 224.
Fabre, Daniel, 296.
Falconer, Hugh, 112, 114.
Fall, the, 40, 68, 164, 296, 386 n.67.
Fascism, 197, 205, 209, 235, 276, 304–305; followers of, 92, 303, 304, 388 n.95; opponents and resisters, 277, 320.
Faure, Élie, 117.
Febvre, Lucien, 21.
Ferenczi, Sándor, 54.
Figuier, Louis, *Earth before the Flood*, 130, 352 n.145.
Figuurines, 156–57, 158. See also “Venuses.”
Film, 206, 207.
“First artists,” 153, 165–68, 171. See also Richer, Paul: *First Artist*.
Flem, Jack, 175.
Flammarion, Camille, 43, 51.
Floods, 40, 344 n.29; biblical, 114, 115.
Fontcillon, Henri, 153, 184, 189–97, 199.
Folklore, 182, 221.
Font-de-Gaume, 140, 195, 390–71 n.77; brown bison, 142; frescoes and engravings, 141.
Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de, 39, 46, 79.
Form and function, 23, 341 n.31.
40,000 Years of Modern Art (exhibition), 202–204, 211–13.
Fossils: artists’ interest in, 78–79; dinosaurs, 331; human, 10, 11, 17, 32–33, 40, 52, 113, 114–16, 157; linked to strata, 35; “living,” 148–49; metaphors for, 39; and photography, 76–78, 109–110, 115; as sole remnants of past, 41. See also Fossilization.
Fossils and Shells (daguerreotype), 76–77, 77.
Foucault, Michel, 11, 19, 305.
Fraenkel, Béatrice, 134.
Franceschi, Gérard, 251, 252.
Frazer, James, 54.
Fredi, Sig mund: “death drive,” 91; *Totem and Taboo*, 222; use of recapitulation theory, 54, 55, 182.
Friedrich, Caspar David, 242.
Frobenius, Leo, 28, 50, 342 n.37; collection of, 204, 209–212, 211, 212; copies of prehistoric images, 206, 209–10, 278; exhibitions, 209, 210, 373 n.109; on prehistoric art and art of “savages,” 150, 151–52.
Fry, Roger, 178–79, 246.
Future, 67–68. See also Posthistory.
Futurists, 178, 199.
INDEX

GALLIZIO, GIUSEPPE-PINOT. See Pinot-Gallizio, Giuseppe.
Gargas, Cave of, 134.
Garrigou, Félix, 134, 135.
Gaudier-Brzeska, Henri, 194–95, 370 n.77.
Gauguin, Paul, 172, 176.
Geertz, Clifford, 169.
Geological time, 34–37, 359; and astronomical analogy, 46–47; periodization of, 38, 116; Quartz on, 47–48; Smithson's view of, 96–97. See also Earth: age of; Time.
George, Waldemar, 217–18.
Giedion, Sigfried, 200, 324; The Eternal Present, 201.
Giedion-Welcker, Carola, 199–201, 208.
Haddan, Alfred C., Evolution in Art, 224.
Haeckel, Ernst, 122, 183.
Hamy, Ernest-Théodore, 112.
Hara, Kenya, 330.
Hauser, Arnold, 243, 247.
Hawkes, Jacquetta: Figures in a Landscape, 260; A Land, 258–60, 380 n.54.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 121, 296, 308; notion of tragedy, 165, 370 n.63; Phenomenology of Spirit, 301; view of history, 165, 244, 301, 312, 314.
Helmholtz, Hermann von, 34.
Hepworth, Barbara, 29, 246, 250, 258, 260, 265.
Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 168, 188.
Herodotus, 305, 306.
Herr, John, Hiroshima, 299.
Hillaire, Christian, 391 n.1.
Hiroshima, 277, 297–300.
Hirschborn, Thomas, 330–31; Cavemanman, 331, 332.
History: Bataille on, 29, 274, 277–78, 281, 287–89, 292–94, 301–302; as cyclical, 98–101, 230, 274, 301; end of, 273–75, 301–302, 306, 324; forgotten history of modernity, 328; Hegel's view of, 105, 244, 301, 312, 314; human and natural, 37–39, 49–50, 112–16, 302, 318; as "nightmare," 75, 79, 99, 131 n.129; physical and political, 344–45 n.31; and prehistory, 24–26; Smithson's view of, 97–98; subaltern, 328; temporalization of, 26, 72; as transition from prehistory to posthistory, 307; universal, 166, 182, 273, 276, 287, 299, 301, 384 n.30; use of written documents in, 25. See also Posthistory; Prehistory.
Hitchcock, Edward, 40.
Hoellering, George, 213.
Hoernes, Moritz, 155.
Hooke, Robert, 39.
Human brain, 52.
Human head, 281–82.
"Human innervation," 207, 268.
Human species: childhood of, 39, 178, 183, 279–80; Cro-Magnon man, 159, 289; distinguished from animals, 125, 289; extinction of, 68–71, 76, 166–167, 274, 302, 329; fossils of, 10, 11, 12, 40, 57, 113, 114–16, 157; history of, 32–33, 49–50, 112–16; primitive man, 132–33; of the Quaternary Period, 112, 114–23, 156, 192; precursors, 121–22; and regression theories, 51–52; resemblance to apes, 290–91; as thinking mountain, 57.
Hunting, 153–54, 155, 206, 249, 290, 293; scenes of, 161–64.
Hutton, James, 41, 48.
Huxley, Thomas, 33, 120–21.
Huysmans, Joris-Karl, 196.
Ichthyosaurs, 329.
Ichnology, 40.
Ideoplastic art, 154, 181, 214.

434
INDEX

Imitative art, 12, 145–46, 221.
Impressionism, 61, 179–81, 350 n.106.
Indo-European language, 53.
Industrial Revolution, 72, 73–74, 259. See also Capitalism.
Infinite spaces, 30, 32, 102.
Ingold, Tim, 169.
Ingres, Jean-Auguste-Dominique, 175, 176.
Inheritance of acquired characteristics, 348 n.88. See also “Engrams.”
Institute of Contemporary Art, 40,000 Years of Modern Art exhibit, 202, 206, 211–13, 373 n.109.
Intermediate” creatures, 31, 32–34, 64, 84. See also Redon, Odilon.
Jamin, Jules, 78.
Jamin, Paul, 171; Portrait of the Aurochs, 161.
Jorn, Asger, 29, 249, 250–51, 252, 323.
Joyce, James, 200, 355 n.182.
Jullian, Camille, 244, 248, 253.
Jünger, Ernst, 25, 97, 273, 274, 305–308.
Juritzsky, Antonin (Juva), 234.
Kawara, On, 42.
Kendall, Stuart, 386–87 n.73.
Kepler, Johannes, 32, 46.
Kiesler, Frederick, Endless House, 315–19, 316, 321, 324; Magic Architecture, 316–19, 318.
Klee, Paul, 335.
Klein, Yves, 269.
Kojève, Alexandre, 276, 283, 301–302, 305.
Koselleck, Reinhart, 17, 20, 25–26, 72.
Krauss, Rosalind, 315 n.142.
Kühn, Herbert, 29, 154, 181, 247, 251–53.
Kupka, František, 26.
Ladder of time metaphor, 36, 37, 46, 48, 101.
Lady with the Hood, 156–57, 158.
Laffitau, Joseph-François, 132–33, 150.
Laming-Emperaire, Annette, 27, 155, 175, 376 n.149.
Lamprecht, Karl, 182–83.
Land Art, 55, 95.
Lang, Andrew, 145–46, 221.
Language, 53, 106–107, 122, 155.
Lascaux I, 147, 193–94, 196, 279, 284–85, 288–90, 292–96; discovery of, 204, 277, 279, 294–95, 296, 298; entrance of the axial gallery seen from the back, 286; in 40,000 Years exhibit, 204; “invention” of, 376 n.149; modern art, 297; preservation of, 294; underground artifacts, 286, 297; wall paintings, 191–94, 227, 228, 284, 285, 286, 297, 342 n.36.
Lascaux II, 330.
Lastic Saint-Jal, Louis Marie, 122; engraved antler discovered by, 123.
László Lattha, 213.
Latour, Bruno, 17, 18.
Laurence, William L., 276.
Laval, Leon, 298.
Le Bon, Gustave, 41–42.
Le Mas-d’Azil figurine, 156–57.
Lebensztejn, Jean-Claude, 60, 350 n.106.
Leiris, Michel, 314, 215, 261–64.
Leroi-Gourhan, André; critiqued by Bataille, 286, 384 n.30; on earth as a book, 335; view of prehistoric art, 27, 155, 168, 169–70, 176, 206, 372, 376 n.149.
Les Eyzies, 50, 128, 185. See also Font-de-Gaume.
Linguistics, 10, 49, 53.
Linnaeus, Carl, 113.
Littré, Émile, 35, 41.
Locke, John, 110, 118.
Long, Richard, 266, 267.
Longperier, Adrien de, 122–24.
Longue durée, 24, 34, 88, 106, 239, 266; Braudel and, 25, 45, 38, 91, 723; entropy as, 22; and fiction, 330; and modernity, 18; as motif, 61; and “survivals,” 184.
Lonzi, Carla, 371.
Loys, François de, 292.
INDEX

Lubbock, John, 12–13, 51; on archaeology and geology, 53–54; distinction between Paleolithic and Neolithic, 121, 243; on Paleolithic art, 113; on savages, 150; view of the future, 67–68.

Lucifer, 345 n.38.

Lucretius, 112.

Lukács, Georg, 207; *History and Class Consciousness*, 94; *Theory of the Novel*, 94.


Lyell, Charles: on age of humans, 112, 120; on beginnings, 46, 48; carved artifacts excavated by, 115; diurnal geology of, 42–43, 45; eternal present, 48, 345 n.34; and extinction of species, 69, 70; on geological time, 32, 44–45, 46–47, 48, 66, 100; Gould on, 41, 345 n.34; *Principles of Geology*, 34; three types of illusions, 44–45; use of analogy, 45, 46; view of astronomy, 46–47.

Machines, 71, 78, 89–90, 105; Masson’s *Revolt of the Machines*, 91. See also Technology.

Magic: art as, 219, 221–22, 224, 228, 238, 250, 322, 375 n.135; caves and, 319; Frazer on, 54; as function of parietal painting, 146–48, 152, 206; and hunting, 152–53, 155; in Nash’s *Equivalents for the Megaliths*, 256; prehistory and, 307, 320, 321–22; and totemism, 144.

Malevich, Kazimir, 179.

Mallarmé, Stéphane, *Afternoon of a Faun*, 172.


Manet, Édouard, 147, 149.

Mantell, Gideon A., 72, 104; *The Medals of Creation*, 76.

Marc, Franz, *Fate of the Animals*, 181.

Marion, Antoine-Fortuné, 60–61, 349 n.102.

Marsal, Jacques, 298.

Marsala, cave of, 140.

Marx, Karl, 94; “nightmare” of the past, 35, 351 n.29.

Marx, Roger, 166.

Marxism, 197, 224, 247; interpretations of, 147, 155, 243, 250.

Masson, André, 277.

Masson, André, 277.

Masson, André, 277.

Max, Gabriel von, 209 n.38.

McLuhan, Marshall, 101–104.

Megaliths and menhirs, 242–43, 244, 251–53, 255, 260; Avebury, 254, 256; of Picasso, Nash, and Hepworth, 264–65. See also Stonehenge.

Melville, Herman, “Two Sides to a Tortoise,” 37–38.


Memory, 183, 184; in Cézanne’s landscapes, 57, 60; geological metaphors for, 182; loss of, 57; regression theories of, 347 n.74.

Mercati, Michele, 359 n.28.

Merijan, Aria, 352 n.145.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 355 n.189.

Metaphors: abyss, 57, 120–21, 122, 244, 370; animal, 305; Blumenberg on, 46, 49, 169; caves as, 66, 169; of earth’s “childhood,” 39–40, 46; geological, 43, 52, 57, 83, 85–86, 87, 107, 116, 182, 226; of humanity, 49; invention of, 169, 330; ladder of time, 26, 37, 46, 48, 101; light and heat, 341 n.21; Lyell’s use of, 42, 45; mineral, 86, 87–88, 90–91; prehistory as, 10, 21, 86–89. See also Analogy; Fictionality.


Michelangelo, 132, 259.

Mimesis, 157, 204, 207, 208.


Minturn, Kent Mitchell, *Contre-histoire*, 236.


Mobiliary art, 144, 145, 189, 391 n.3; discovery of, 12, 13, 125; interpretation of, 137–38, 176. See also Paleolithic art; Prehistoric art.
[index]

Modern art: 40,000 Years of Modern Art (exhibition), 202–204, 211–13; impressionism, 61, 179–81, 350 n.106; regression in, 50, 178, 200–202. See also Modernity; and names of artists.


Montandon, Dr. Georges, 290–91, 292, 385 n.51.

Montelius, Oscar, 251.

Montespan, cave of, 312.

Moore, Henry, 246–47, 258, 259.


Moureu, Gustave, 172.

Mouthe, Caver de la, 139.

Müller, F. Max, 53.

Mumford, Lewis, 22, 274, 301.

Mural paintings, 169, 227; Altamira, 135–37, 137; Chauvet Cave, 325–26; Domus Aurea, 13; Lascaux, 193–94, 223, 228, 286, 285, 297, 342 n.36. See also Cave art.


Museum of Natural History, 103.

Myths, power of, 216–37.

NADAILLAC, JEAN-FRANÇOIS DE, 118.

Napoléon Bonaparte, Louis, 50.

Narrativization, 38–42, 44, 155.


Native Americans, 76, 150, 153.


Naturalism, 78, 131, 133, 140, 147, 178, 179, 204; antinaturalism, 176; hunting and, 152–54, 249; and modern realism, 156, 161.

Nature, La, 140, 175.


Nazism, 197, 250.

Negative theology, 316.

Neo-Prehistory—100 Verbs (exhibition), 330.

Neolithic art, 152, 154, 178, 199, 274; abstraction, 246, 249, 250, 271; as communal language, 250; contrasted with Paleolithic, 246–47, 251, 253; English views, 323; as expressionism, 180, 253; Northern origins of, 251–53.


Neutra, Richard, 275.


Newton, Isaac, 102.

New worlds, 46, 132, 266. See also America.

Niaux, Cave of, 134–35, 144, 146.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 52, 84, 182, 379, 341–47 n.33.

Nolde, Emil, 28.

Nora, Pierre, 377.

OLDENBURG, CLAES, 23, 341 n.32; Store, 309, 389 n.114.

Orientalism, 51, 161.


Ovid, Metamorphoses, 132, 196.

Ozenfant, Amédée, 198.

PAILLET, PATRICK, 340 n.7.

Pair-non-Pair, Grotte de, 135; excavation notebook, 136.

Paleolithic art: communicative function of, 135; contrasted with Neolithic, 154, 178, 246–47, 248, 251, 253; disappearance of, 144; discovery of, 11–14, 28, 125–29, 340 n.7; and hunting, 153–54; and impressionism, 150, 179–81; late-nineteenth-century views of, 122–24, 130–33; Magdalenian period, 123,
INDEX

139–40, 141; mobiliary and parietal, 137–39, 140, 144–45, 189, 391 n.1; narrative function of, 155; naturalism of, 78, 130–31, 133, 140, 152–54; as “physioplastic,” 154, 180–81. See also Cave art; Mobiliary art; Neolithic art.

Paleolithic era. See Prehistory.

Papapetros, Spyros, 319.

Parergons, 117.

Parietal art. See Cave art.


Pasolini, Pier Paolo, 22, 274; La rabbia, 303, 387–88 n.92.

Patočka, Jan, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, 303–304.

Paulcke, Wilhelm, 181.

Paulhan, Jean, correspondence with Dubuffet, 227, 229, 230, 234, 236.

Penrose, Roland, 181, 211–12.

Pentre Ifan dolmen, 240.

Perec, Georges, 377 n.173.

Perry, Rachel, 227, 237.

Peyrony, Denis, 140, 141.

Pharmakon, 47, 100.


Picasso, Pablo: Boisgeloup sculpture, 189, 191; Cannes drawings, 261, 262, 264; and Cézanne, 81, 331 n.116; Dinard drawings and bathers, 189, 190, 261, 262; engraved animal head, 191; exchange with Braussi, 185–87, 222; megaliths, 360–61, 264–66, 331; monument to Apollinaire, 264, 265; paintings exhibited in Russia, 86; prehistoric forms, 27, 28, 29, 171, 189, 271, 370 n.66; sylvan world, 81; Three Women, 189, 261; Wounded Minotaur, 187–88, 187.

Pictet, Adolphe, 53, 112, 348 n.81.

Pierre, Arnauld, 196.

Piette, Édouard, 156–57, 158, 159, 245; Notes to Serve the History of Primitive Art, 124–25.


Pithecanthropus, 122.

Pitt Rivers, Augustus Lane-Fox, 118–20, 132, 151.

Plato, Theaetetus, 14.

Platonic logic, 44.

Poe, Edgar Allan, 17.


Pop art, 224.

Posthistory, 22, 24, 70, 275, 302–304; Fascist theorists’ view of, 304–305, 388 n.95; Smithson’s view of, 95–96, 102–104. See also Anthropocene; Great Acceleration.

Postminimalist art, 266, 267, 270. See also Morris, Robert.


Prehistoric creatures, 43–44, 89, 345 n.38, 353 n.161; Galapagos tortoises, 37–38; machines and, 105; Redon’s intermediate creature, 31–34, 44, 64, 81–82, 84. See also Prehistoric peoples.


Prehistory: as antediluvian, 53, 71, 75, 110, 265; and the end of history, 275–76; evolution of the term, 10–11, 112, 120; geological, paleo-ontological, and symbolic, 335; as invention, 11, 17, 19, 22–23; as matter of astonishment and stupor, 14–15, 28, 89; and modernity, 24–25, 29, 177, 196–97, 201–204; and the present, 16–17, 26–27, 238–39; and regressism, 178–79, 182, 188, 197–98, 200–202, 203–204; and the temporalization of history, 20–21, 24–25, 27–28, 188; universality of, 188–89, 330; as world without God, 296. See also Geological time.

Prestwich, Joseph, 110, 111, 115.

Primitivism: contrasted with prehistoric,
INDEX

25, 27–29, 188–92; of moderns, 378; moderns’ view of, 189–92. See also Prehistoric peoples; Savages.

Protolanguage, 53.

Proust, Marcel: “involuntary” memory, 50; In Search of Lost Time, 21.


Psychology, 49, 53.

Public art, 270.

Pygmies, 151.

Quaternary period, 112, 114, 124–27, 156, 192.

Quatrefages, Armand de, 120, 150, 159.

Queneau, Raymond, 301.

Quinet, Edgar, 18–19, 32, 72, 84, 120, 329; on art, 43–44; The Creation, 47; exile in the Alps, 50–51; on human species and extinction, 52, 69–70; on time as abyss, 47–48, 50–51, 100, 120.

Railroad, 72.

Raphaël, Max, 29, 155, 192–93, 247, 248.

Rattier y Josse, Paul, The Ceiling of Bisons in Altamira, 137.

Ravidat, Marcel, 298.

Raymond, Paul, 139.

Read, Herbert, 152, 246; 40,000 Years of Modern Art exhibition and catalogue, 202–204, 202, 206; Icon and Ideal, 249.

Realism, 156–61. See also Naturalism.


Redon, Odilon: Eternal Silence of These Infinite Spaces Frightens Me, 30, 31–33, 46; “first creature,” 325; imaginary of prehistory, 10; intermediate creature, 31–34, 44, 64, 81–82, 84.


Reinach, Salomon, 132, 144, 147, 148, 196; on art and magic, 146, 148, 212–27; on art as luxury, 130; on savages, 149–50; totemist hypothesis, 155.

Reindeer Age, 112, 131.

Renan, Ernest, 133, 150; The Future of Science, 53.

Ribot, Théodule, 52, 183, 198, 347 n.34.

Richer, Paul, 171; First Artist, 157–61, 160, 166.

Ricoeur, Paul, 288.

Riegl, Alois, 150–51; Kunstgeschichte, 289;

Kunstwollen, 154.

Rivera, Diego, 274.

Rivière, Émile, 139–40.

Roberts, Jennifer, 96.

Rodin, Auguste, 219.

Rolland, Romain, The Revolt of the Machines, 89.

Romantic artists, 242–43.

Roosevelt, Theodore, 178.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 39, 131, 155, 288, 379 n.18; Discourse on Inequality, 111, 131, 357 n.7.

Ruskin, John, 34, 96.

Sahlins, Marshall, 361 n.54, 386 n.67.

Saint-Acheul, 12, 110, 111, 115, 279, 308.

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 98, 106–107, 216, 370 n.67.

Savages, 179, 180, 181, 219; and prehistoric peoples, 152–53, 192–94; savagery narrative, 10, 144, 149–51, 159, 161, 178, 244.

Savinio, Alberto, 352 n.145.

Scandinavian Institute of Comparative Vandalism, 121, 123.


Schelling, F. W. J., 370 n.63.


Schmitt, Carl, 301, 387 n.85.

Schwab, Raymond, 52.

Science fiction, 104.

Sculpture, 200–201; figurines, 156–57, 158; of Hepworth, 260; of Moore, 259; of Picasso, 189, 191. See also Megaliths and menhirs; “Venuses.”


Seidenberg, Roderick, 275; Posthistoric Man, 302–303.

Semon, Richard, 348 n.88.

Semper, Gottfried, 124, 131, 224, 289.

“Sensorism” (Kühn), 181.

Serres, Michel, 328.

Shakespeare, William, 216.

Shklovsky, Viktor, 86.

Simond, Louis, 48.

Simplicity, 83, 119, 199–201.

Situationists, 251, 320, 323. See also Pinot-Gallizio, Giuseppe.

439

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INDEX

Sloterdijk, Peter, 305.
Smith, William, 35.
Smithson, Robert, 204, 233, 266, 171; and British reactionary modernism, 99; and Cézanne, 61, 101, 102; critique of “-isms,” 97; on dialectics, 102; and entropy, 22; and freedom, 98–99; and geology, 99–101, 107; Land Art, 55, 95; “monumental vacancies,” 55–57; relationship to Christianity, 96–99; “ruins in reverse,” 328; Spiral Jetty, 96, 97, 100–102, 105–106, 267, 329; Strata, a Geophotographic Fiction, 56; and the “surd” zone, 100, 103; A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey, 104–105; view of history and time, 95–96, 97–98, 102–104.
Somme, 113–14, 284. See also Saint-Acheul.
Sonsbeek exhibition (Netherlands), 268.
Space-time, 311, 314.
Spencer, Walter Baldwin, 146.
Starobinski, Jean, 90.
Statues: astonishment and, 15; Dubuffet’s “Barbus Müller,” 229–30. See also Figurines; “Venuses.”
Steinberg, Leo, 351 n.136, 375 n.142.
Steinen, Karl von den, 155, 365 n.131.
Steno, Nicolaus, 35.
Stoczkowski, Wiktor, 114.
Stonehenge, 200, 200, 241–42, 267; study by Nash, 257.
Subaltern, 328.
Superposition, 34–35.
Suprematism, 179.
Surrealism, 204, 220, 223.
Survivals, 148–49, 183–84, 188, 293.
Sydenham Park (Crystal Palace), 73–76, 74, 75.
Sydow, Eckhart von, 114.
Symonds, W.S.: frontispiece from Old Stones, 36, 101; Old Stones, 35–37.
Talbot, William Henry Fox, 351 n.117.
Tapié, Michel, 228.
Tasmanians, 151.
Technology, 95, 274–75, 305–306, 319; Benjamin on, 267–268; and extinction, 68, 71; Jünger on, 307–308. See also Atomic bomb; Outer space.
Temporal vertigo, 20, 47–48, 50, 100.
Temporalization of history, 20–21, 24–25, 27–28, 188.
Terra incognita, 46, 51, 335.
Thaumazet (astonishment), 14–15.
Time: acceleration of, 70–72, 95, 192; ladder of, 36, 37, 46, 48, 101; man as carcass of, 94; natural and human, 51; periodization of, 38, 116, 314; space-time, 311, 314; as terra incognita, 46, 335; “thickness” of, 113, 223–24. See also Geological time.
Tolstoy, Leo, 166.
Totemism, 140–42, 144, 146, 155.
Tourjoul, Paul, 114.
Tragedy, 188, 370 n.63.
Trois-Frères, Cave of, 147.
Truman, Harry, 297, 300–301.
Tuc d’Audoubert cave, 147.
Turner, J. M. W., 43; dinosaurs and dragons, 43, 50, 331; The Garden of the Hesperides, 43.
Tylor, Edward, 150, 152; Primitive Culture, 149.
Uhl, Ralph, 92.
Uniformitarianism, 41, 48.
Unit One circle, 250.
Van den Velde, Henry, 179–80, 224.
Venice Biennale (1954), 260.
Verne, Jules, 352 n.145.
Véron, Eugène, 360 n.44.
Verworn, Max, 29, 80–81, 231; On the Psychology of Primitive Art, 164.
Vico, Giambattista, 51, 180, 200, 300, 328; Scienza nuova, 33, 343 n.3.
Vilanova, Juan de, 137.
Vitruvius, 13.
INDEX

Vlaminck, Maurice, 28.
Von Scheltema, Frederik Adama, 253
Vorticist movement, 194–95.

WALLACE, ALFRED, 67, 121.
Watteau, Antoine, 176.
Wells, H. G., 68.
Weyersberg, Maria, Gottesan-beterinnen, 211.
White, Hayden, 194.
Wilde, Oscar, 166, 168, 171.
Wilson, Daniel, 150.
Winckelmann, Johann, 157.
Woolf, Virginia, Between the Acts, 55.
Work, 287, 384 n.35.
World War I, 22, 79, 87, 88, 90, 304.
World War II, 203, 204, 273.
Worringer, Wilhelm, 179, 204, 249.
Wundt, Wilhelm, 155.

XINGU, 155.

“ZAHM,” 355 n.186.