

Contents

Translator's Preface 5
*Introduction: The Role and Importance of
Expression* 13

PART ONE THE TRIADS OF SUBSTANCE

Chapter I *Numerical and Real Distinction* 27
II *Attribute as Expression* 41
III *Attributes and Divine Names* 53
IV *The Absolute* 69
V *Power* 83

PART TWO PARALLELISM AND IMMANENCE

VI *Expression in Parallelism* 99
VII *The Two Powers and the Idea of God* 113
VIII *Expression and Idea* 129
IX *Inadequacy* 145
X *Spinoza Against Descartes* 155
XI *Immanence and the Historical Components
of Expression* 169

PART THREE THE THEORY OF FINITE MODES

XII	<i>Modal Essence: The Passage from Infinite to Finite</i>	191
XIII	<i>Modal Existence</i>	201
XIV	<i>What Can a Body Do?</i>	217
XV	<i>The Three Orders and the Problem of Evil</i>	235
XVI	<i>The Ethical Vision of the World</i>	255
XVII	<i>Common Notions</i>	273
XVIII	<i>Toward the Third Kind of Knowledge</i>	289
IXX	<i>Beatitude</i>	303
	<i>Conclusion: The Theory of Expression in Leibniz and Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy</i>	321
	<i>Appendix</i>	337
	<i>Notes</i>	351
	<i>Translator's Notes</i>	403
	<i>Index</i>	429
	<i>Index of Textual References</i>	437

CHAPTER ONE

Numerical and Real Distinction

Expression presents us with a triad. In it we must distinguish substance, attributes and essence. Substance expresses itself, attributes are expressions, and essence is expressed. The idea of expression remains unintelligible while we see only two of the terms whose relations it presents. We confuse substance and attribute, attribute and essence, essence and substance, as long as we fail to take into account the presence of a third term linking each pair. Substance and attribute are distinct, but only insofar as each attribute expresses a certain essence. Attribute and essence are distinct, but only insofar as every essence is expressed as an essence of substance, rather than of attribute. The originality of the concept of expression shows itself here: essence, insofar as it has existence, has no existence outside the attribute in which it is expressed; and yet, as essence, it relates only to substance. An essence is expressed by each attribute, but this as an essence of substance itself. Infinite essences are distinguished through the attributes in which they find expression, but are identified in the substance to which they relate. We everywhere confront the necessity of distinguishing three terms: substance which expresses itself, the attribute which expresses, and the essence which is expressed. It is through attributes that essence is distinguished

THE TRIADS OF SUBSTANCE

from substance, but through essence that substance is itself distinguished from attributes: a triad each of whose terms serves as a middle term relating the two others, in three syllogisms.

Expression is inherent in substance, insofar as substance is absolutely infinite; in its attributes, insofar as they constitute an infinity; in essence, insofar as each essence in an attribute is infinite. Thus infinity has a nature. Merleau-Ponty has well brought out what seems to us now the most difficult thing to understand in the philosophies of the seventeenth century: the idea of a positive infinity as the “secret of grand Rationalism” – “an innocent way of setting out in one’s thinking from infinity,” which finds its most perfect embodiment in Spinozism.¹ Innocence does not of course exclude the “labor of the concept.” Spinoza needed all the resources of a novel conceptual frame to bring out the power and the actuality of positive infinity. If the idea of expression provided this, it did so by introducing into infinity various distinctions corresponding to the three terms, substance, attribute and essence. What is the character of distinction within infinity? What sort of distinction can one introduce into what is absolute, into the nature of God? Such is the first problem posed by the idea of expression, and it dominates Part One of the *Ethics*.

At the very beginning of the *Ethics* Spinoza asks how two things, in the most general sense of the word, can be distinguished, and then how two substances, in the precise sense of that word, must be distinguished. The first question leads into the second, and the answer to the second question seems unequivocal: if two “things” in general differ either by the attributes of their substance, or by its modes, then two substances cannot differ in mode, but only in attribute. So that there cannot be two or more substances of the same attribute.² There is no question that

Spinoza is here setting out from a Cartesian framework, but what must be most carefully considered is just what he takes over from Descartes, what he discards and, above all, what he takes over from Descartes in order to turn it against him.

The principle that there are only substances and modes, modes being in something else, and substance in itself, may be found quite explicitly in Descartes.³ And if modes always presuppose a substance, and are sufficient to give us knowledge of it, they do so through a primary attribute which they imply, and which constitutes the essence of the substance itself. Thus two or more substances are distinguished and distinctly known through their primary attributes.⁴ From this Descartes deduces that we can conceive a real distinction between two substances, a modal distinction between a substance and a mode that presupposes it (without in turn being presupposed by it) and a distinction of reason between a substance and the attribute without which we could have no distinct knowledge of the substance.⁵ Exclusion, unilateral implication and abstraction correspond to these as criteria applicable to corresponding ideas, or rather as the elementary data of representation^a which allow us to define and recognize these varieties of distinction. The characterization and application of these kinds of distinction play a crucial part in the elaboration of the Cartesian system. Descartes no doubt drew on the earlier efforts made by Suarez to bring order into this complicated area,⁶ but his own use of the three distinctions seems, in its very richness, to introduce many further ambiguities.

An initial ambiguity, admitted by Descartes, concerns the distinction of reason, modal distinction and the relation between them. The ambiguity comes out in the use of the words “mode,” “attribute” and “quality” themselves. Any given attribute is a quality, in that it qualifies a substance as this or that, but also a mode, in that it diversifies it.⁷ How do primary attributes appear

in this light? I cannot separate a substance from such an attribute except by abstraction; but as long as I do not make it something subsisting by itself, I can also distinguish such an attribute from the substance, by considering it just as the substance's property of changing (of having, that is to say, various different shapes or different thoughts). Thus Descartes says that extension and thought may be distinctly conceived in two ways: "insofar as one constitutes the nature of body, and the other that of the soul"; and also through distinguishing each from their substance, by taking them simply as "modes" or "dependents."⁸ Now, if in the first case attributes distinguish the substances that they qualify, then it surely appears, in the second case, that modes distinguish substances with the same attribute. Thus different shapes may be referred to this or that body, really distinct from any other; and different thoughts to really distinct souls. An attribute constitutes the essence of the substance it qualifies, but this doesn't prevent it from also constituting the essence of the modes which it links to substances sharing the same attribute. This dual aspect generates major difficulties in the Cartesian system.⁹ Let it suffice here to note the conclusion that *there exist substances sharing the same attribute*. In other words, *there are numerical distinctions that are at the same time real or substantial*.

A second difficulty concerns real distinction considered alone. It is, no less than the other forms, a datum of representation. Two things are really distinct if one can conceive one of them clearly and distinctly while excluding everything belonging to the concept of the other. So that Descartes explains the criterion of real distinction to Arnauld as the completeness of the *idea* alone. He can quite rightly claim never to have confused things conceived as really distinct with really distinct things; and yet the passage from one to the other does appear to him to be perfectly legitimate – the question is, where to make this passage. In the prog-

ress of the *Meditations* we need only proceed as far as a divine Creator to see that he would be singularly lacking in truthfulness if he were to create things differing from the clear and distinct ideas he gives us of them. Real distinction does not contain within it the ground of things differing, but this ground is furnished by the external and transcendent divine causality that creates substances conformably to our manner of conceiving them as possible. Here again, all sorts of difficulties develop in relation to the idea of creation. The primary ambiguity attaches to the definition of substance: “A thing that can exist by itself.”¹⁰ Is there not a contradiction in presenting existing-by-itself as itself being simply a possibility? Here we may note a second conclusion: God as creator effects our passage from substances conceived as really distinct to really distinct substances. *Real distinction*, whether between substances with different attributes, or those with the same attribute, *brings with it a division of things, that is, a corresponding numerical distinction.*

The opening of the *Ethics* is organized around these two Cartesian conclusions. Where lies the error, Spinoza asks, in supposing several substances sharing the same attribute? He refutes the error in two ways, using a favorite style of argument: first through a *reductio ad absurdum*, and then through a more complex proof. If there were several substances with the same attribute, they would have to be distinguished by their modes, which is absurd, since substance is in its very nature anterior to its modes, none of which it implies (this is the short way, taken at I.5). The positive demonstration comes further on, in a scholium to Proposition 8: two substances with the same attribute would be only *numerically* distinct – and the character of numerical distinction is such as to exclude the possibility of making of it a real or substantial distinction.

According to the Scholium, a distinction would not be numer-

ical if the things distinguished did not have the same concept or definition; but in that case the things would not be distinct, were there not an external cause, beside the definition, which determined that they exist in such a number. So that two or more numerically distinct things presuppose something outside their concept. Thus substances could only be numerically distinct through the operation of some external causality that could produce them. But only by holding conjointly a number of confused ideas can we claim that substances are produced. We say they have a cause, but that we do not know how this cause operates; we imagine that we have a true idea of these substances, since they are conceived in themselves, but we are unsure of the truth of this idea, because we do not know, from the substances themselves, whether they exist. This amounts to a criticism of the odd Cartesian formula “what *can* exist by itself.” External causality does make sense, but only in relation to the existence of finite modes: every existing mode may be referred to another, precisely because it *cannot* exist by itself. To apply such causality to substance is to make it operate outside the terms that legitimate and define it – to propose its operation in a sort of void, and quite indeterminately. In short, external causality and numerical distinction share the same fate of applying to modes, and to modes alone.

The argument of Scholium 8 has, then, the following form: (1) Numerical distinction requires an external cause to which it may be referred; (2) But a substance cannot be referred to an external cause, because of the contradiction implied in such a use of causal principles; (3) So two or more substances cannot be distinguished *in numero*, and there cannot be two substances with the same attribute. The structure of the argument here differs from that of the first eight proofs, which runs: (1) Two or more substances cannot share the same attribute, for they would then

have to be distinguished by their modes, which is absurd; (2) So that a substance cannot have a cause external to it, for to be produced or limited by another substance it would have to share the same nature or the same attribute; (3) So that there cannot be numerical distinction in any substance, of whatever attribute, and “Every substance must be infinite.”¹¹

On the one hand, one deduces from the nature of numerical distinction that it is inapplicable to substance; on the other, one deduces from the nature of substance its infinity, and thus the impossibility of applying to it numerical distinctions. In either case, numerical distinction can never distinguish substances, but only modes that involve the same attribute. For number expresses in its own way the character of existing modes: the composite nature of their parts, their limitation by other things of the same nature, their determination from outside themselves. Number thus goes on *ad infinitum*. But the question is, can it ever reach infinity itself? Or, as Spinoza puts it: even in the case of modes, is it from the multitude of parts that we infer their infinity?¹² When we make of numerical distinction a real or substantial distinction, we carry it to infinity, if only to ensure the convertibility that then becomes necessary between the attribute as such and the infinity of finite parts which we distinguish in it. Great absurdities then follow: “If an infinite quantity is measured by parts equal to a foot, it will consist of an infinitely many such parts, as it will also, if it is measured by parts equal to an inch. And therefore, one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another.”¹³ The absurdity does not, as Descartes thought, lie in hypostatizing extension as an attribute, but rather in conceiving it as measurable and composed of finite parts into which one supposes it convertible. Physics here intervenes to support the principles of logic: the absence of a vacuum in nature means simply that division into parts is not real distinction. Numerical

THE TRIADS OF SUBSTANCE

distinction is division, but division takes place only in modes, only modes are divisible.¹⁴

There cannot be several substances with the same attribute. From which one may infer: from the viewpoint of relation, that one substance is not produced by another; from the viewpoint of modality, that it belongs to the nature of substance to exist; and from the viewpoint of quality, that any substance is necessarily infinite.¹⁵ But all these results are, so to speak, involved in the argument relating to numerical distinction, and it is the latter that brings us back around to our starting point: “There exists only one substance of the same attribute.”¹⁶ Then, from Proposition 9 on, Spinoza’s objective seems to shift. It is no longer a question of demonstrating that there is only one substance for each attribute, but that there is only one substance for all attributes. The passage from one theme to the next seems difficult to grasp. For, in this new perspective, what implication should be assigned to the first eight propositions? The problem is clarified if we see that the passage from one theme to the other may be effected by what is called in logic the conversion of a negative universal. Numerical distinction is never real; then conversely, real distinction is never numerical. Spinoza’s argument now becomes: attributes are really distinct; but real distinction is never numerical; so there is only one substance for all attributes.

Spinoza says that attributes are “conceived to be really distinct.”¹⁷ One should not see in this formulation a weakened sense of real distinction. Spinoza is neither suggesting that attributes are other than we conceive them, nor that they are just conceptions we have of substance. Nor indeed should we think that he is making a purely hypothetical or polemical use of real distinc-

tion.¹⁸ Real distinction, in the strictest sense, is always a datum of representation. Two things are really distinct when they are so *conceived* – that is, “one without the aid of the other,” in such a way that we *conceive* one while denying everything belonging to the *concept* of the other. In this respect there is no disagreement whatever with Descartes: Spinoza accepts both his criterion and his definition. The only thing at issue is whether real distinction thus understood is, or is not, attended by a real division among things. For Descartes, only the assumption of a divine creator sustained such association. According to Spinoza, one can only make division correspond to a real distinction by making of the latter at least a potential numerical distinction, that is, by confusing it with modal distinction. But real distinction cannot be numerical or modal.

When Spinoza is asked how he comes to the idea of a single substance for all attributes, he points out that he has put forward two arguments: the more reality a being has, the more attributes must be ascribed to it; and the more attributes we ascribe to a being, the more we must accord it existence.¹⁹ But no such argument would suffice were it not supported by the analysis of real distinction. Only that analysis, in fact, shows it to be *possible* to ascribe all attributes to one being, and so to pass from the infinity of each attribute to the absoluteness of a being that possesses them all. And this passage, being possible, or implying no contradiction, is then seen to be necessary, as in the proof of God’s existence. Furthermore, it is the same argument over real distinction which shows that *all* the attributes amount to an infinity. For we cannot pass through just three or four attributes without bringing back into the absolute the same numerical distinction which we have just excluded from infinity.²⁰

If substance were to be divided according to its attributes, it would have to be taken as a genus, and the attributes as specific

differences. Substance would be posited as a genus which would tell us nothing in particular about anything. It would differ from its attributes, as a genus from its differentia, and the attributes would be distinct from corresponding substances, as specific differences are distinct from the species themselves. Thus, by making of the real distinction between attributes a numerical distinction between substances, one carries over mere *distinctions of reason* into substantial reality. There can be no necessity of existence in a substance of the same “species” as an attribute – a specific difference determines only the possible existence of objects corresponding to it within the genus. So substance is once more reduced to the mere possibility of existence, with attributes being nothing but an *indication*, a *sign*, of such possible existence. The first critique to which Spinoza subjects the notion of sign in the *Ethics* appears precisely in relation to real distinction.²¹ Real distinction between attributes is no more the “sign” of a diversity of substances than each attribute is the specific character of some substance that corresponds, or might correspond, to it. Substance is not a genus, nor are attributes differentia, nor are qualified substances species.²² Spinoza condemns equally a thinking that proceeds by genus and differentia, and a thinking that proceeds by signs.

Régis, in a book in which he defends Descartes against Spinoza, invokes the existence of two sorts of attributes: “specific” ones which distinguish substances of different species, and “numerical” ones which distinguish substances of the same species.²³ But this is just what Spinoza objects to in Cartesianism: according to him, attributes are never specific or numerical. It seems we may sum up Spinoza’s thesis thus: (1) In positing several substances with the same attribute we make of numerical distinction a real distinction, but this is to confuse real and modal distinctions, treating modes as substances; and (2) in positing as many substances

as there are different attributes we make of real distinction a numerical distinction, confusing real distinction not only with modal distinction, but with distinctions of reason as well.

In this context *it appears difficult to consider the first eight propositions as having only a hypothetical sense*. Some proceed as though Spinoza began by arguing on the basis of a hypothesis that he didn't accept, as if setting out from a hypothesis that he intended to refute. But this misses the categorical sense of the first eight propositions. There are not several substances of the same attribute, and numerical distinction is not real: we are not here confronting a provisional hypothesis, valid up to the point where we discover absolutely infinite substance, but have before us, rather, a development that leads us inevitably to posit such a substance. And the categorical sense of the initial propositions is not merely negative. As Spinoza says, "there exists only one substance of a certain nature." The identification of an attribute as belonging to an infinitely perfect substance is, in the *Ethics* as in the *Short Treatise*, no provisional hypothesis, but should be interpreted positively from the viewpoint of *quality*. There is one substance per attribute from the viewpoint of quality, but one single substance for all attributes from the viewpoint of *quantity*. What is the sense of this purely qualitative multiplicity? The obscure formulation reflects the difficulties of a finite understanding rising to the comprehension of absolutely infinite substance, and is justified by the new status of real distinction. It means: substances as qualified are qualitatively, but not quantitatively, distinct – or to put it better, they are "formally," "quidditatively," and not "ontologically" distinct.

One of the sources of Spinoza's Anticartesianism is to be found in the theory of distinctions. In the *Metaphysical Thoughts* he sets

out the Cartesian conception: “There are three kinds of distinction between things, real, modal, and of reason.” And he seems to give his approval: “For the rest, we pay no attention to the hodgepodge of Peripatetic distinctions.”²⁴ But what counts is not so much the list of accepted distinctions, but their meaning and precise application. In this respect Spinoza retains nothing Cartesian. The new status of real distinction is fundamental: as purely qualitative, quidditative or formal, real distinction excludes any division. Yet isn’t this just one of those apparently discredited Peripatetic distinctions returning under a Cartesian name? That real distinction is not and cannot be numerical appears to me to be one of the principal themes of the *Ethics*. This thoroughly upsets the other distinctions. Not only is real distinction no longer referred to numerically distinguished *possible* substances, but modal distinction, in its turn, is no longer referred to accidents as *contingent* determinations. In Descartes a certain contingency of modes echoes the simple possibility of substances. It’s all very well for Descartes to insist that accidents are not real, but substantial reality still has accidents. To be produced, modes require something other than the substance to which they relate – either another substance that impresses them in the first, or God who creates the first along with all that depends on it. Spinoza’s view is quite different: there is no more a contingency of modes in relation to substance than a possibility of substance in relation to attributes. Everything is necessary, either from its essence or from its cause: Necessity is the only affection of Being, the only modality. And the distinction of reason is, in turn, thereby transformed. We will see that there is no Cartesian axiom (Nothing has no properties, and so on) that does not take on a new meaning, hostile to Cartesianism, on the basis of the new theory of distinctions. The theory has as its fundamental principle the qualitative status of real distinc-

NUMERICAL AND REAL DISTINCTION

tion. Detached from all numerical distinction, real distinction is carried into the absolute, and becomes capable of expressing difference within Being, so bringing about the restructuring of other distinctions.

Index

- ABRAHAM, 51.
absoluta cogitatio, 118, 120.
Absolute, 20, 22, 70, 80, 89, 118ff., 177, 325.
Abstraction, 29, 30, 46, 48, 64, 158–59, 160, 197–98, 277, 287, 319–20.
Accidents, 38, 147, 166–67, 169, 238–39, 265, 277, 289.
Action, *see* Power of action.
Adam, 51, 149, 247–48, 263.
Adequacy, 15, 132ff., 139ff., 148ff., 151ff., 160, 181–82, 220–21, 240, 273, 274, 277, 279ff., 290ff., 298, 300, 304ff., 311, 315, 325, 330.
Affections, 93–94, 102, 110–11, 146ff., 149–51, 167, 217ff., 231, 233–34, 239ff., 252, 258, 260, 267, 279, 282ff., 306–07, 308, 312, 317ff.; active, 93–95, 219, 222ff., 245–46, 252, 256, 262, 269, 274, 305, 307, 310, 315, 316, 317ff.; joyful, 241, 243–44, 261, 267, 272, 282; passive, 93, 219–20, 221ff., 230–31, 239ff., 245–46, 252, 256, 272, 273, 282, 289, 301, 307, 310, 311, 315, 317ff.; sad, 242–44, 260, 282.
affectus, 220.
Affirmation, 53–55, 59–60, 61, 67, 80, 82, 90, 142, 165, 167, 172, 178, 230, 272, 310, 333.
Agrippina, 250.
Alquié, Ferdinand, 227, 292.
Amoralism, 251, 253–54.
Analogy, 46–49, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 72, 79, 103–04, 109, 142, 143, 162–65, 167, 172, 173, 178, 181–82, 232, 275, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332.
Anthropomorphism, 46, *see also* Eminence.
Anticartesianism, 17, 37–38, 66, 73, 83, 152–54, 155ff., 227ff., 321ff.
Antiquity, 115, 258.
Apophysis, 181.
Apostles, 291.
aptitudo, 93.
Aquinas, Thomas, 46, 54, 163.
Arcana, 322.
Aristotelianism, 49, 101, 115, 133, 157–59, 160–61, 258, 278, 292, 323; biology, 278.
Aristotle, 101, 115, 117, 157–59, 160.
Arnauld, 30, 162, 164.
Artist, 99, 169–70.
Atheism, 253.
Atoms, 204.
Attributes, divine, 44, 46–47, 49–50, 51, 55, 63, 64, 66, 70, 74, 76, 78, 102, 142, 143, 213ff., 218–19, 253–54, 300, 325, 332, *see also*

- Attributes (continued)
 Extension, *propria*, Thought.
Augustine, 179, 180.
Ausdruck, 18.
Authority, 259, 260.
Automata, 131, 335, *see also* Spiritual automaton.
Avicenna, 193–94.
Axiom of powers, 86–87.
- BEATITUDE, 130, 308ff.
Being, 21, 38–39, 50, 63, 64, 67, 70, 74, 75, 76, 78, 81, 89, 136, 159, 162, 163, 166, 167, 173, 174ff., 227, 253, 310, 321, 324, 325, 327, 333, 334.
Bergson, Henri, 118.
Bible, 44–45, 56–59, 72; *Genesis* 2:16–17, 58, 247–48, 263; *Exodus*, 58.
Blind man, 251–52.
Blood, 210–11, 237.
Blyenbergh, Willem van, 248, 250–52.
Bodies, complex, 210–11, 326, *see also* Object; external, 146ff., 150, 219, 239ff., 257, 276, 279, 306; simple, 191–92, 201, 205, 206, 208, 210, 230.
Body, 15, 30, 106, 109, 114, 142–43, 145ff., 150, 157, 201ff., 219–20, 222, 229, 237, 239ff., 247ff., 255–57, 264, 266, 269, 276, 279, 285–86, 305–06, 311ff., 324, 326–27, 331, 335.
Boehme, R., 18.
Bonaventure, 179.
Boyle, Robert, 228.
- CARTESIANISM, 15, 17, 29, 36, 38, 60–61, 66, 132, 151ff., 155ff., 194, 227–28, 292, 323ff., 332; Method, 134–35, 155, 157.
Caterus, 162.
causa fiendi, 281, 299.
Causality, 31, 110–11, 115, 166, 170, 212, 298, 324, 328, 334–35; external, 32, 167; ideal, 107, 109; immanent, 109, 171, 174, 177, 232; occasional, 107, 109; real, 106–07, 111, 324, 326–27, 335.
Cause, 48, 50–51, 53, 54, 84, 85ff., 94, 103, 107–08, 115, 133ff., 137, 140ff., 145, 149–50, 151, 154, 155ff., 162ff., 165ff., 170ff., 184, 192, 193–94, 212, 219, 221, 241, 249, 283–84, 298, 305, 312, 316, 327, 328, 331, 332, 334, *see also* Occasionalism; efficient, 70, 81, 115, 162–65, 194, 259; emanative, 19, 171ff., 177, 179, 179–80; eminent, 70; external, 32, 33, 81, 88–89, 90, 94, 167, 201, 219, 245, 263; formal, 115, 141, 146–47, 148, 159, 160–61, 162–65, 305, 308; immanent, 19, 67, 166, 171, 174, 233; material, 147, 148, 158–59, 221, 305, 308; occasional, 282, 307–08; proximate, 21, 133, 184; real, 159; remote, 137, 184, 298, 299.
Childhood, 219, 222, 262–63.
Christ, 123, 291, 301, *see also* Logos, Word.
Christianity, 123, 177–79, 228, 259, 263, 291, 323, *see also* Theology.
Cicero, 258.
Citizen, 259ff., 266, 267.
City, 265–68, 272, 273.
Clarity and distinctness, 15, 30–31, 71ff., 83, 131–32, 134, 142, 143, 151ff., 155ff., 228, 282–83, 285, 323–24, 325, 326.
Clytemnestra, 250.
Commandments, 51, 56ff., 264, 289–90, 291, *see also* Law, Sign.
Common forms, 48, 50, 59, 63, 92, 103–04, 142, 173–74, 181, 183, 332.
Common notions, 48, 143, 150–51, 275–88, 290ff., 307, 308–09, 310–11, 316, 19–20, 330, 332.

INDEX

- Complication, 119, 175–76, 185, 198, 213, 214–15; *complicare*, 175; *complicatio*, 16, 18.
- Composition of relations, *see* Nature, order of.
- conatus*, 230–31, 233, 240, 243, 249, 258, 261, 284.
- concatenatio*, 107–08.
- connexio*, 107.
- Consciousness, 73, 132, 152, 153, 181, 231, 255, 324, 326.
- Contract, 260, 264, 266.
- Convertibility, 42, 47, 50.
- Creation, 67, 79, 104, 178, 180, 183, 322–23, 329, 330, 333, *see also* Production.
- Creator, 31, 34, 44, 103, 178.
- Creatures, 17, 46–48, 51, 63, 79, 91–92, 103, 142, 163, 165, 199, 226–27, 264.
- Culture, 262, 270.
- DAMASCIUS, 175.
- Darbon, 19.
- Death, 202, 249, 261, 271, 315ff.
- Definition, 22, 32, 100, 101, 135, 141, 158–59; causal, 158–59; formal, 139; material, 139, 141; real, 20, 73, 76, 77–78, 79, 325, 326.
- Demon, 169.
- Descartes, René, 17, 29ff., 34, 38, 55, 60–61, 65, 66, 70ff., 83ff., 132, 136, 142, 143, 151ff., 155ff., 194, 226, 227–28, 255, 282, 313, 323–25, *see also* Cartesianism; *Meditations*, 31, 71; proof *a posteriori*, 71ff., 83ff., 85ff., 323; ontological proof *a priori*, 71ff., 76–77, 82, 85ff., 154, 323.
- designatum*, 62, 105.
- Desire, 231, 240, 243, 259, 283, 284–85, 304–05.
- Differentia, 36.
- Distinction, extrinsic, 195–96, 197, 214; formal, 64–67, 82, 124–25, 182, 185, 332; intrinsic, 196ff., 213; modal, 29, 36, 38, 65, 183, 203, 324; objective, 124; real, 29, 30–31, 33, 34–39, 60–61, 64–65, 66, 75, 80, 81, 82, 106, 124–25, 143, 185, 193ff., 213, 324, 325, 335; of reason, 29, 36, 38, 61, 64–65, 126, 139, 183, 274, 324; substantial, 33.
- Duration, 148, 196, 213, 220, 238, 249, 310ff.
- Duty, 255, 258–60, 268.
- Dyads, 334.
- ECKHARDT, JOHANNES, 176.
- Effect, 84, 115, 133–35, 137, 154, 155ff., 166–67, 172, 173–74, 184–85, 249, 279, 289, 327, 328, 331, 334.
- Emanation, 17, 18–19, 170ff., 174ff., 179–80, 182ff., 322–23, 330, 333.
- Eminence, 46–47, 48–49, 51, 54–55, 57, 59–61, 63, 70, 72–73, 79, 103–04, 108–09, 142, 163, 165, 167, 172, 178, 182, 186, 255, 331.
- Empiricism, 149.
- ens absolutum*, 81.
- ens necessarium*, 81
- ens perfectissimum*, 73, 81.
- ens realissimum*, 95.
- Equivocation, 46, 49, 61, 103–04, 162–63, 165, 167, 329, 330, 333.
- Erigena, John Scotus, 177–78, 180.
- Eternity, 13, 15, 304–05, 306–08, 312ff., 317.
- Evil, 229, 246ff., 253–54, 261, 281–82.
- Evolution, 16–17, 18, 334.
- Explication, 15–16, 18, 62, 92, 102, 130, 133, 174, 175–76, 177, 185, 214–15, 234, 305, 309–10, 333; *explicare*, 15–16, 175; *explicatio*, 18.
- Expressionist tradition, 17ff., 80, 169ff., 181–82, 322ff.
- Extension, 30, 46, 50, 55, 59, 81,

- Extension (continued)
106, 114, 118–20, 142–43, 145,
191ff., 196, 201, 205–06, 208, 210,
226, 235, 257, 276, 281, 292, 296–
97, 300, 301, 315.
- Eye, 80.
- FABRICA, 218.
facies totius universi, 206, 235, 236.
Facility, 83, 85ff., 323, 325.
Falsity, 130–31, 141, 150.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 136, 325.
Fiction, 21–22, 134ff., 138, 161, 308.
fortuitus occurus, 238, *see also*
Accidents.
fortuna, 134.
Freedom, 149, 261ff., 271, 324.
- GENUS, 35–36, 42, 45, 64, 65, 67,
69, 119, 160, 161, 174, 182, 199,
257, 277, 292, 327.
- Geometry, 20–22, 46, 100, 108,
134–35, 137, 158, 176, 202, 317.
Gift, 170–71, 174.
Gilson, Etienne, 64.
Good, 54, 172, 247, 253–54, 261.
Grammar, 104–05.
- HABITUS, 328.
Harmony, 232, 233, 255–56, 328,
329, 331, 332.
Hatred, 243–44, 245, 260, 271.
Hegel, G. W., 20, 21, 325.
Hobbes, Thomas, 73, 258–60, 266.
homo, 64.
humanitas, 64, 263.
Hypostasis, 174, 175.
- IDEA, 15, 27, 29, 30–31, 32, 85ff., 90,
91, 101, 113, 114–17, 120, 122ff.,
127, 129ff., 133–35, 137ff., 145ff.,
151ff., 156, 161, 169, 178–79, 185,
193, 195, 202, 220–21, 231, 279,
297, 299–300, 304ff., 310ff., 317,
334–35, *see also* Adequacy, Clarity
and Distinctness; of an idea, 125–
26, 130ff., 315; kinds of, 305ff.,
315.
- Ideal, 118.
Identity of being, 107–09, 113, 117; of
connection, 107–08, 111, 113, 117;
of order, 106–07, 110, 113, 117.
- Image, 80, 147, 148, 150, 173, 220,
250, 261, 278, 294.
- Imagination, 51, 147, 148, 150, 203,
220, 240, 289–90, 291, 294–96,
297, 311, 317, *see also* Power of
imagining.
- Imitation, 169–70, 178–81, 183.
- Immanence, 53, 67, 109, 166, 167,
169–70, 171–73, 174, 213, 227–28,
269, 322, 326, 333.
- Immortality, 313ff.
- Implication, 16–17, 29, 175, 184.
- Impotence, 103, 224, 231, 240, 245,
269, 278.
- Individuation, 195ff., 236, 331.
- Infinity, 15, 22, 28, 33, 35, 46, 64,
70, 85, 102, 118ff., 127, 140, 142,
164, 176, 197, 203, 205, 207, 218,
324; modal, 192, 202, 203ff.,
207–09, 212, 218.
- Inherence, 175–76, 179, 227–28.
- Intelligible, 170, 174.
- Intelligence, 174, 177.
intensio, 191.
- Intensity, *see* Power, degrees of.
- Intuition, 158–59.
- Involution, 15–16, 133, 147, 148, 181,
279, 315; *involvere*, 15–16.
- Isonomy, 108.
- JACOB, 44–45, 61.
- Joy, 244, 245, 263, 270, 272, 274,
283, 285, 286, 299, 304, 305ff.;
active, 274–75, 285, 287, 288,
297, 301, 304ff.; passive, 240–41,
274–75, 284, 286, 287, 288, 297,
307, 311; second kind, 305ff.,
310–11; third kind, 305ff., 311,

INDEX

- 315, 316, 320.
Judaism, 57, 100–01, 105, 128, 323.
- KANT, IMMANUEL, 128, 136, 214.
Kantianism, 55.
Kaufmann, 19.
Knowledge, 14–15, 17, 56, 58, 72, 78, 100–01, 118, 121, 122ff., 129ff., 132, 133ff., 140, 141ff., 146, 147–48, 149, 152–53, 155ff., 159–60, 181–82, 224, 271, 279, 280, 289ff., 303ff., 326; first kind, 181, 289–90, 293–94, 303ff.; order of, 159–60; second kind, 290ff., 296–97, 299, 300, 301, 303, 305–06, 307, 308–09, 318; third kind, 141, 299–301, 303–05, 308ff., 313, 315, 318.
Koyré, Alexander, 177.
- LANGUAGE, 289, 333.
Law, 258, 266–67, 268, 290, 292–93, 294; moral, 56–57, 58, 247–48, 253–54, 263, 268, 290, 291, 294, 330; natural, 58, 247–48, 253–54, 258–60, 263–65, 268, 291.
Leibniz, G. W., 17–18, 42, 71, 73–74, 77–79, 83, 92, 107–09, 152, 153–54, 193, 198, 203, 205, 223, 226–30, 232–33, 253, 317, 321ff.; “Quod ens perfectissimum existit,” 77–78.
Logic, 33, 129.
Logos, 61, 323, *see also* Word.
Love, 243, 283, 291, 297, 304, 309, 310; three kinds of, 309ff.
Lucretius, 270.
- MALEBRANCHE, 179.
Man, 91, 183, 227, 261, 277, 322.
Many, 16, 174–75, 328, 331.
Materialism, 93, 257, 321.
Mathematics, 20–22, 135, 136, 155, 192, 227, 278, 317.
Mechanism, 209ff., 227–29, 230, 232–33, 325.
Memory, 311, 317.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 28.
Metaphor, 80, 180.
Metaphysics, 158–59.
Method, 20–22, 129ff., 135, 139–40, 155ff.; analytic, 138, 155, 159ff.; synthetic, 155, 157ff., 166.
Metonymy, 54, 57.
Middle Ages, 17, 18, 62, 63, 175, 177.
Mirror, 80, 180, 322–23.
Model, 169, 179, 180–81, 277.
modus intrinsicus, 191.
Monad, 42, 327, 329, 331, 334.
Monism, 163.
Moses, 51.
Movement, 205–06, 208, 210, 228, 230, 235–36, 276, 281, 292, 296–97.
Multiple, 174–75, 176, *see also* Many.
Myth, 263, 271.
- NAMES, 44–45, 61, 62–63, 103, 105; divine, 53ff., 61, 63, 64, 323.
natura naturans, 14, 49, 80, 99–100, 122–23.
natura naturata, 14, 49, 99–100, 122, 123.
Naturalism, 227ff., 232, 272, 321.
Nature, 15, 16–17, 58, 59, 60, 72, 81–82, 87, 93, 101, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137–38, 146, 173, 176, 195, 205, 227–29, 232–34, 237ff., 242, 245, 247–48, 251, 253–54, 258, 261, 263–65, 270, 271, 273, 275, 276, 278, 281, 286, 291, 294, 300, 317, 321, 322; Common Order of, 238, 245, 289; state of, 258, 259ff., 265ff., 289.
Nature, order of, 58–59, 237ff., 257–58, 264, 286, 291, 294; composition of relations, 58, 211–12, 218, 236ff., 247ff., 253, 264, 275–76, 281, 286, 290, 291, 293, 299, 300,

- Nature, order of (continued)
303, 311; essences, 212, 238,
249ff., 264–65; passions, 238.
- Necessity, 38, 44, 45, 79, 88–89, 100–
01, 104, 122–24, 127, 149, 165,
212, 219, 253, 287, 296, 312, 333.
- Negation, 53–55, 59, 142, 172, 245–
46, 251, 252.
- Neoplatonism, 16–17, 18–19, 63,
170ff., 176–78, 182, 235.
- Nero, 250, 251.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 254.
- OBJECT, 15, 18, 20–21, 62, 73, 75,
79, 86, 101, 105, 113, 115–17,
124–25, 127, 131–32, 133ff., 146,
153–54, 158, 193, 214, 241, 243–
44, 257–58, 274, 277, 289, 295,
334–35, *see also* Bodies, external.
objectum ideae, 113.
- Occasionalism, 226–27, 229, 256,
282.
- Offenbarung*, 18.
- One, 16, 81, 117, 171–73, 174ff., 182,
328, 331–32; above Being, 171,
172–73, 177, 178, 322.
- Optimism, 253.
- Orestes, 250.
- ostendere*, 15.
- PANTHEISM, 16, 18, 66–67, 101, 163,
177, 322, 330, 333.
- Parable, 57.
- Parallelism, 107ff., 113–14, 115–17,
126–28, 133, 160, 256–57, 312,
331.
- pars intensiva*, 198.
- pars totalis*, 198, *see also* Part.
- Participation, 18, 87, 92, 105, 122,
124, 142, 169ff., 174ff., 178–79,
183, 227, 270.
- Part(s), extensive, 191–92, 201ff.,
206ff., 212–13, 217, 219, 230, 235,
236, 237, 238, 249, 311–13, 314ff.;
extrinsic, 205; intensive, 191–92,
314, 318ff.
- Passions, 218ff., 223, 228–29, 231,
239ff., 244–45, 256, 257–58, 259,
263, 265, 271–72, 273–74, 284–
85, 294–95, 296, 310–11, 328, 331;
joyful, 240, 246, 262, 273–74,
282–84, 285, 287, 294, 298, 307,
311, 319; sad, 241, 262, 267, 270,
271, 272, 273, 283, 287, 311, 320.
- Saint Paul, 59.
- Perception, 101–02, 137, 147, 156,
158, 162, 330.
- Philosophy, 22, 56, 129–30, 180, 229,
255, 270, 321; Arab, 54; Jewish,
55; political, 260.
- Physics, 33, 206–07, 229, 233.
- pietas*, 268, 272.
- Plato, 169–70, 253, 257, 313;
Parmenides, 172, 174.
- Platonism, 117, 169–70, 235, 258, 317.
- Plotinus, 170, 171–72, 174, 176–77,
178.
- plurimae*, 201ff., 207, 217–18.
- Poison, 211, 237, 247–48, 250.
- “Possibles,” 38, 101, 104, 194, 212,
230; possibility, 88–89, 100, 121,
123–24, 127, 193, 197, 330, 333.
- potentia*, 88, 93, 102, 122–24, 218,
227–28.
- potestas*, 93, 102, 218.
- Power(s), 85ff., 255–57, 260; of act-
ing, 86ff., 90ff., 93–94, 117, 118ff.,
123, 124, 125, 181, 222, 223–26,
229, 231, 232, 233, 239–41, 243,
244–47, 251, 253, 254, 260, 261,
262–63, 264, 268, 269–70, 272,
273–74, 280, 281, 282ff., 287–88,
297, 304–05, 307–08, 310, 315,
316, 355; comparison of, 255–57;
degrees of, 92, 191ff., 196, 197,
199, 202, 203, 205–06, 207, 208ff.,
213, 217, 218, 225–26, 230, 232,
237, 239–42, 244, 246, 303, 305,
312, 313, 314–15, 317; of existing,
86ff., 89ff., 94, 117, 118ff., 123,

INDEX

- 124, 125–26, 130, 185, 335; equality of, 86–88, 117ff., 121, 126; of imagination, 161, 222, 224, 311; of knowing, 86ff., 90ff., 118, 120–21, 130, 131, 139, 140ff., 146, 148, 161, 222, 267, 335; of thinking, 86ff., 90ff., 117, 120–21, 122ff., 130, 132, 140, 141–42, 146, 150, 153, 162, 181, 185, 267, 278, 279, 280, 304–15, 335; of suffering, 93–94, 221ff., 229, 232, 245, 311; of understanding, 86, 129–30, 140, 141ff., 153, 162, 222, 274, 280, 282ff., 287, 299, 304, 305–07, 313, 314, 316.
- Prime Mover, 117
- Privation, 55, 59, 61, 148, 149, 251, 252, 253.
- Proclus, 171, 172–73.
- Production, 14, 51, 94–95, 99ff., 104ff., 110–11, 113, 118, 123, 124, 127–28, 137, 138, 161, 165, 170ff., 181ff., 198, 211, 303–04, 310, 316, 332.
- Prophets, 58, 290, 291, 294.
- propria*, 49–51, 55ff., 61, 66–67, 70, 71–74, 75, 78, 81, 82, 103, 153–54, 164, 181, 290, 323, 325.
- Pseudo-Dionysius, 180.
- RAPIDITY**, 83, 136–37, 139, 161, 297–98, 323.
- ratio boni*, 253.
- ratio cognoscendi*, 321–22.
- ratio essendi*, 321–22.
- ratio fiendi*, 322.
- Rationalism, 28, 149, 263.
- Real, 118, 136.
- Reason, 259, 262–64, 265ff., 271–72, 274, 280, 283, 294–96, 297, 298; state of, 263–64, 270, 290ff.
- Recognition, 147, 153, 264.
- Reformation, 177.
- Régis, 36.
- religio*, 268, 272.
- Religion, 229, 259–60, 270, 290; of second kind, 291, 297.
- Renaissance, 17, 18, 175, 177.
- Representation, 29, 30, 34, 125, 132, 133, 139–40, 152, 153, 181, 334–35.
- res ideata*, 113.
- res physica*, 192ff., 303.
- Resemblance, 180, 275, 278, 333.
- Rest, 205–06, 208, 210, 228, 230, 235–36, 276, 281, 292, 296–97.
- Revelation, 51, 56ff., 259, 263, 290; *see also* Sign.
- Rights, 149, 260, 261, 268; natural, 257–58, 260, 264, 266, 267.
- Rivaud, A., 206.
- SADNESS**, 241–44, 245, 257–58, 260, 263, 270, 274, 282, 287, 210–11, *see also* Passions.
- Saint-Hilaire, Geoffroy, 278.
- Salvation, 317ff.
- Schelling, F. W. J., 18, 118, 325.
- Scholasticism, 50, 163, 191.
- Schuller, 124.
- scientia*, 100–01.
- Scotism, 65 *see also* Duns Scotus.
- Scotus, John Duns, 49, 63–65, 166, 193–94, 196.
- Seed (tree, branch), 80, 180, 322–23.
- Shaddai, 58.
- Signs, 36, 56ff., 143, 147, 181–82, 233, 289–90, 291, 294, 328, 329, 330, 333; imperative, 51, 57, 181, 289–90, 294, 330; indicative, 181, 289, 330; revelatory, 181–82, 330.
- Similitude, 180–81.
- Sin, 263.
- Solomon, 291.
- Soul, 30, 67, 106, 109, 114, 115, 120, 132, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145ff., 157, 160, 201ff., 222, 255–57, 264, 266, 273, 280, 311, 313ff., 324, 326–27, 329, 331.
- Sovereign, 266, 309.

EXPRESSIONISM IN PHILOSOPHY: SPINOZA

- Species, 36, 42, 45, 64, 65, 67, 152, 161, 182, 199, 257, 277, 327.
- Spiritual automaton, 115, 132, 140, 152–53, 160, 322, 324, 326, 335.
- State, 265–66; civil, 259ff., 266–67, 289–90, 294.
- Stoicism, 62, 174, 258.
- Structure (anatomical), 278.
- Suarez, 29, 65.
- Sufficient reason, 72, 73–74, 81, 85, 99, 119, 134, 135, 139, 152, 228, 321–22, 323.
- summum bonum*, 51.
- Sun, 148, 149–50.
- Superstition, 270–71.
- Symbolization, 232, 233, 234, 331, 332; symbolism, 54, 57, 79, 178, 328, 329.
- TETRAGRAMMATON, 58.
- Theism, 101, 253.
- Theology, 55ff., 63, 66, 93, 259, 322–23; negative, 53–54, 165, 172, 173, 178.
- Thomism, 63, 163.
- Thought, 14, 30, 46, 50, 55, 59, 81, 87, 90, 106, 113, 114, 115, 118–21, 122ff., 127, 130, 131, 133, 136, 142–43, 145, 153, 177, 192, 257.
- Transcendence, 53, 109, 172, 176, 177–78, 232, 256, 269, 277, 322.
- Triads, first (modal), 19, 27ff., 43–44, 82, 111; second (absolute), 81–82; third (power), 95.
- Truth, 130ff., 140ff., 149, 151–52, 161, 321; *see also* Adequacy.
- Tschirnhaus, Ehrenfried Walther von, 20–21, 114.
- Tyranny, 270.
- UTILITY, 239, 240–41, 243, 248, 261, 263–64.
- uytdrukken, uytbeelden*, 15.
- VACUUM, 33, 204.
- vertoon*, 15.
- Violence, 169–70, 249–50, 268.
- vis*, 88–89.
- Voice of God, 44–45, 123.
- WISDOM, 123.
- Word, 44, 45, 49, 50, 56, 57, 123, 176, 177, 179, 185, 323.
- UNITY, 16, 173, 182, 329, 331.
- Universals, 161, 277, 279, 281–82, 286–87, 289, 292–93, 298–99; negative, 34.
- Univocity, 48–49, 59, 63–64, 66–67,

Index of Textual References

Works by Spinoza

ETHICS

- | | | | |
|----------|--|----|--|
| Part I | 20-22, 28ff., 95, 296 | 15 | schol, 355n13, 363n28 |
| Def 1-5 | 75 | 16 | 20-22, 364n6
enunc, 364n7
proof, 352n4, 364n7,
365n9 |
| 1-6 | 358n11 | 17 | 364n11
cor 2, 356n8
schol, 356n11, 364nn8, 9,
376n4, 379n10 |
| 3 | 19-20 | 19 | 352n2
proof, 352n1, 353n12 |
| 4 | 19-20 | 20 | proof, 352n2, 353n12,
361n19, 375n21
cor 1, 361n19
cor 2, 361n19 |
| 6 | 13, 19-20, 75-76, 77-78,
81-82, 325 | 21 | 364n13, 385n1 |
| Axiom 4 | 369n13 | 22 | 64n13, 385n1 |
| Prop 1-8 | 32ff., 37, 75 | 23 | 364n13, 385n1 |
| 1-10 | 75-76, 78, 79, 325 | 24 | 378n8, 385n1
enunc, 378n8
proof, 378n8
cor, 378n8 |
| 3 | enunc, 356n11 | 25 | 379n8, 385n1
enunc, 378n7
schol, 364n3, 375n20
cor, 352n3, 356n12 |
| 5-7 | 354n2, 355n15 | 26 | 370n26 |
| 5 | 31, 354n2 | | |
| 6 | 76 | | |
| 8 | 31-33
enunc, 355n15
proof, 360n1
schol 2, 31-33, 353n11,
355n16, 378n5 | | |
| 9-10 | 75-76 | | |
| 9 | 34, 355n19 | | |
| 10 | cor, 352n1
schol, 352n1, 355nn17, 21,
361nn15, 24 | | |
| 11 | 75, 76
proof 1, 361n14
proof 2, 361n14 | | |
| | | | proof 3, 362n13
schol, 355n19, 362nn12,
14 |

EXPRESSIONISM IN PHILOSOPHY: SPINOZA

Ethics, Part I (continued)		389nn1, 4, 6
28	enunc, 380n1	axiom 1, 381n12
	proof, 380n1	axiom 2, 381n12
	schol, 377n21	lemmata 1–3, 381n12
30	enunc, 365n8	lemmata 4–7, 382n15
31	enunc, 366n20	post 3, 382n1
	proof, 365n11, 366nn17, 20	15 399n22
33	enunc, 364nn9, 11	enunc, 378n3, 380n3
	proof, 364nn10, 11	proof, 378n3, 380n3
	schol 2, 364n10	16 proof, 372n8
35	363n26	cor 2, 372nn7, 8
36	proof, 352n3, 363n23	17 enunc, 372n8
		proof, 372n8
Part II	8, 115, 281, 286	cor, 372n8
Prop 1	356n7	schol, 365n18, 372nn7,
	proof, 352n5	17, 384n19
	schol, 366n18	18 schol, 372nn7, 13, 395n3
2	356n7	19 371n5
3	enunc, 365n10	proof, 380n2
	proof, 364n6, 365n10	21 schol, 365n3, 367nn29,
	schol, 364nn2, 3, 5, 6	31, 368n10
4	enunc, 366n15	22 372n16
	proof, 366n15	23 371n5, 372n16
5	365n6	24 372n11
	proof, 363n17, 366nn18,	25 372n11
	19	26 371n5
6	365n6	27 372n11
	proof, 364n14	28 372n11
7	113, 114–17	proof, 372n10, 382n1
	proof, 369n13	29 372n11
	schol, 126, 364nn4, 12,	cor, 386n7
	365n19, 365n1	schol, 392n10
8	enunc, 378n5, 379n12	30 372n11
	cor, 378n5, 379n13,	31 372n11
	382nn21, 22	33 enunc, 372n14
	schol 1, 379nn12, 13,	proof, 368n7, 372n14
	381n9, 382n22	35 enunc, 372n9
9	proof, 371n1	proof, 372n9
	cor, 371n3	schol, 372nn12, 14
10	cor schol, 356n9	36 proof, 371n2
11	cor, 371n1	37 392n9
12	proof, 371n4	enunc, 398n10
13	381n12	38 393n21, 398n13
	enunc, 365n2	enunc, 392n9, 393n17
	schol, 363n26, 383n14,	proof, 393n17

INDEX OF TEXTUAL REFERENCES

39	393n21		proof, 387n30
	enunc, 392n8, 393n16	51	enunc, 382n2
	proof, 393nn16, 22,		proof, 382n2
	398n13	54	enunc, 385n33
40	373n18	56	385n31
	schol 1, 392nn7, 11,	57	proof, 362n15,
	393nn13, 20, 395n3,		385n34, 386n10
	396n12		schol, 382n2
	schol 2, 395n3, 397nn30,	58	enunc, 392nn3, 4
	33		proof, 392n3
41	proof, 395n1	59	enunc, 392n2
42	enunc, 395n5		proof, 392nn1, 2
43	enunc, 368n8		Def of
45	353n13, 396n24		Desire 384n20, 385n31,
	enunc, 370n30, 393n18		398n12
	schol, 393n18		Def of
46	396n24		Sadness 388n39, expl, 388n43
	proof, 353n13, 371n39,		Gen Def 362n15, 363n27, 372n8,
	393n19, 397nn26, 32		of Affects 383n11
47	396n24		Part IV 224, 262, 271–72, 294–95
	schol, 396n14, 397nn25,		Preface 364n3, 387n34, 393n12
	32		Def 1 386n8
			Prop 1 enunc, 372n14
Part III	294–95		proof, 372n14
Defs 1–3	383n5		schol, 372nn7, 8, 14
Post 1	363n26	4	enunc, 383n7
Prop 1	enunc, 383n13		proof, 363nn20, 21, 22,
	proof, 371n1, 394n26		377n20, 382n24,
2	schol, 383n4, 388n1,		383n7, 384n23
	389n5, 393n14		cor, 383n7
3	enunc, 383n13	5	enunc, 386n12
	schol, 384nn18, 21	8	386n9
8	enunc, 387n34		enunc, 386nn11, 19
9	enunc, 385n30		proof, 367n31, 386n19
	proof, 385n30	15–16	386n22
	schol, 385n31	17	386n23
13	enunc, 386n20	18	proof, 386nn14, 21
17	386–87n23		schol, 390nn22, 24,
20	enunc, 387n24		391n38
23	enunc, 387n24	20	schol, 387n27
28	enunc, 386n20	24	enunc, 385n34, 389n15
37	proof, 385n32, 386nn15,	28	proof, 397n28
	16, 386n20	29	enunc, 393n23
44	proof, 387n29		proof, 362n15
47	enunc, 387n29	30	enunc, 394n24

EXPRESSIONISM IN PHILOSOPHY: SPINOZA

Ethics, Part IV (continued)			
31	enunc, 386n8	70	schol, 390n21 389n18
32	387n25, 390n26 enunc, 394n34 schol, 394n34	71	389n18
33	387n25, 390n26	72	389n18
34	387n25, 390n26	73	389n18
35	389n16, 390n25 schol, 391n37		enunc, 391n37 proof, 391n37 schol, 389n17
37	schol 1, 391nn30, 38 schol 2, 391n30, 387n26, 389n13, 390n29	App. 13	392n44
38	385n29, 386n8 enunc, 383n14	Part V	130, 282, 285, 286, 309 389n1
39	385n29 enunc, 386n8 proof, 382n3 schol, 383n15	Preface	389n1
43	387n28	Prop 2	enunc, 394n28 proof, 394n28
45	391n39 schol 2, 392n42	3	enunc, 394n27 proof, 367n31, 392n5
46	391n39	4	enunc, 394n33 cor, 394n33
47	391n39 proof, 391n33 schol, 392n46	5	schol, 373n18, 194nn28, 30 396n15
49	396n15	6	enunc, 396n16 proof, 396n16 schol, 383n8, 394n35
50	391n39 schol, 392n42	7	enunc, 396n18 proof, 396nn14, 17
51	proof 1, 392n6 proof 2, 392n6	8	enunc, 396n19 proof, 396n19
53	391n39	9	396n21
54	391n39 schol, 392n45	10	394n37 enunc, 386n17, 394n31 proof, 386n17, 394n25 schol, 392n42, 394n37
59	proof 1, 386n13, 392n3 proof 2, 386n13, 392n3 schol, 387nn35, 36	11	396nn20, 21
63	schol, 392n42 proof, 394n29	12	396n20 enunc, 396n14
66	schol, 389n17	13	396n20
67	389n18 enunc, 392n42	14	395n6, 396n24, 399nn14, 18
68	389n18, 390n19 enunc, 388n44 proof, 388n46	15	395n6, 396n24, 397n32, 399nn14, 18 proof, 397n27
69	389n18	16	395n6, 397n32, 399nn14, 18
		17	395n6, 397n29, 399nn14, 18

INDEX OF TEXTUAL REFERENCES

18	395n6, 399nn14, 18 schol, 394n36		proof, 399n21, 400n35 schol, 400nn34, 36
19	395n6, 397n29, 399nn14, 18	39	363n26 proof, 400n32
20	395n6, 399nn14, 18 schol, 378n8, 383n9, 394n32, 397n32, 399n21		schol, 383n8, 400nn32, 34
21	296, 298, 380n4 enunc, 399n28	40	proof, 399n22 cor, 380n4, 399nn22, 29, 400n31
22	proof, 398n4, 399n24, 399n25	41	391n38 proof, 398n10, 399n27
23	schol, 354n24, 399n23, 399n27	42	schol, 384n22, 389n17
25	398n3 proof, 397n33	THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE*	
26	398n3	Preface (II.85), 391–92n40 (II.87), 392n41	
27	398n3 proof, 398n8	Chap i (II.95), 358n6 (II.98–99), 398n36	
28	enunc, 395n5, 397n31	ii-iii	358n8
29	370n30 enunc, 353n8, 398n6, 399n26 proof, 353n8, 398n11, 399n23, 399n26 schol, 382n21	ii	(II.113), 357n3 (II.115), 357n19 (II.191), 357n2 .21, 391n32
30	398n5 proof, 370n28	iii	.8, 391n32
31	enunc, 371n36, 398n7 schol, 399n15	iv	(II.136), 353n6 (II.139), 358n7, 387n31 (II.140–41), 395n6 (II.142–44), 395n6 (II.144), 358n10 .4, 391n32
32	399n18 cor, 398n9	v	.1, 391n32
33	399n18 schol, 399nn16, 17	vi	(II.159), 371n40, 396n22 note 6 (II.315), 371n40, 396n22
34	380n4, 399n18 enunc, 400n30	vii	(II.176–77), 393n21 (II.176), 392n7 (II.185), 357n2
35	399n18	viii	(II.191), 357n2
36	399n18 enunc, 398n54, 399n19 cor, 399n19 schol, 396n23, 398nn1, 5, 399n20	xi	395n6
37	399n18 schol, 386n18, 398n2	xii	358n5
38	enunc, 400n36		

*All numbers in parentheses refer to the page number of vol. II of the Van Vloten and Land edition.

EXPRESSIONISM IN PHILOSOPHY: SPINOZA

Theologico-Political Treatise (continued)	76	353n10, 362n9, note 2, 362n9
xiii (II.239-40), 358n9 (II.240), 354n24 (II.241), 357n18	85	365n5, 370n33, 374nn5, 15
xiv (II.247-48), 395n6 (II.258-59), 389n9 “dogmas of faith,” 357n4	91-94 91 92 94	368n1 368n2 369n14, 374n7 368n2, 369n22, 374n13
xvi 389n8, 390n29 (II.258), 389n7 (II.259), 390n27 (II.262-63), 391n32 (II.266), 389n12, 395n4	95-96 95 96 99	368n13 353nn11, 22, 369nn15, 18 358n14 366n16, 370n25
xvii 390n29 (II.274), 391n29	101-02 101 105	395n10 382n18 368n6
xx (II.306-07), 391n36	106-10 106 108	369n18 367n1, 368n4 353n7
TREATISE ON THE CORRECTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING	110	369n21, 395n10
10 396n11		
19-21 395n9		
19 369n16, 373n21, 395n2 § 3, 374nn4, 14 note 2, 373n21		
20 374n4		
21 369n16, 372n15, 373n21, 374n4 note, 373n21		
31 368n9		
33 368n9		
34-35 367n30, 368n8		
37 368n3		
38 368n5		
39 367n1, 368n9		
40-41 370n31		
42 370n29		
44 369n24		
46 369n24		
49 370n25		
54 370n27		
58 374n16		
70-71 371n34		
71 371n35		
72 353nn22, 23, 369nn17, 19		
75 370n25		
		SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING
		Preface § 7-14, note, 381n14
		Chap I. i, 358n14
		i.1, 361n16
		i.1n2, 361n18
		i.2, 361n17
		i.3-9, 362n7
		i.9n4, 356n13
		ii, 355n2
		ii.1, 353n20
		ii.2-5, 360n1
		ii.2n2, 360n1, 375n22
		ii.5n, 358n16
		ii.5n3, 360n1, 375n23
		ii.6, 360n3
		ii.17, 356n3
		ii.17n5 (=nf.), 355n2, 356n5
		ii.19-22, 355n14
		ii.19n, 377n1, 385n4
		ii.22-25, 363n28
		ii.23, 384n18
		ii.24, 376n4
		iii.-vi, 357n16

INDEX OF TEXTUAL REFERENCES

- iii.1n1, 356n13
 iii.2, 376n4, 377n21
 iv.1-5, 364n9
 iv.7-9, 364n10
 vii, 357n17
 vii.1n1, 357n14
 vii.6, 356n13, 357n15
 vii.9-10, 355n22
 vii.10, 353n9
 ix.3, 366nn20, 22
 8.s4, 366n13
 First Dialogue 9, 355n2
 II.12, 353n9
 Second Dialogue 5, 363n1
- II. i.2-3, 395n8
 xv.2, 368n11
 xix.5, 358n13
 xix.7f., 365n15
 xix.8n, 384n28
 xx.3n3, 362nn8, 16,
 365n16, 365n7, 379n11
 xx.4-5, 365n15
 xx.4, 353n9
 xxii.4n1, 366n23
 xxiv.7-8, 383n6
 xxiv.9-11, 358n5
 xxiv.9-13, 371n41
- App I. p. 385n3
 4c2, 355n2
- II. 7, 383n10
 9, 366n14
 11, 360n2, 379n11
- POLITICAL TREATISE
 91, 391n29
- I.7 Lemma 1, 362n11
 Lemma 2,p, 362n11
 i.1, 392n43
 ii, 389nn8, 9, 391n30
 ii.2-3, 363n19
 ii.6, 390n20
 ii.8, 389n13
 ii.15, 389n14
 iii.2, 391n31
 iii.3, 391nn34, 35
- iii.8, 391n34
 iii.10, 391n36
 iv, 389n8, 398n35
 v, 389n9
 v.2, 389n11
 vi.1, 390n28
 x.8, 391n33, 392n47
 xviii, 391n30
 xix, 391n30
 xxiii, 391n30
- PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES'S
 PHILOSOPHY
 I.7s 362n2
- METAPHYSICAL THOUGHTS
 I.ii 37-38, 213, 382n20
 II.v 354n3, 355n24
- LETTERS*
 2 (to Oldenburg), 353n20
 [III.5], 354n11, 355n1, 361n25
 4 (to Oldenburg), 353n20
 [III.10-11], 361n25
 [III.10], 358n12
 [III.11], 356n12
 6 (to Oldenburg), 384n26
 [III.21], 381n11
 [III.22], 381n10
 [III.25], 356n10
 9 (to De Vries) [III.32], 355n19,
 356n6
 [III.32], 358n17
 10 (to De Vries) [III.33]
 [III.34], 356n4
 12 (to Meyer), 192, 194, 202,
 203-04, 223
 [III.40-41], 380n7
 [III.41-42], 380n5
 [III.41], 354n12, 381n10
- *All numbers in brackets refer to the page number of vol. II of the Van Vloten and Land edition.

Letters (continued)

- [III. 42], 378n4, 381n9
13 (to Oldenburg) [III.45], 384n26
19 (to Blyenbergh) [III.65], 358n7, 387n31
20 (from Blyenbergh) [III.72], 388n40
21 (to Blyenbergh) [III.86], 363n18 [III.87–88], 388n41
22 (from Blyenbergh) [III.94], 388n42 [III.96], 387n32, 388n38
23 (to Blyenbergh) [III.99], 388n37 [III.101], 388n38
24 (from Blyenbergh) [III.107], 380n3
30 (to Oldenburg) [III.119], 382n19
32 (to Oldenburg) [III.120–21], 382nn16, 17
35 (to Hudde) [III.129–30], 361n25
36 (to Hudde) [III.131–32], 361n25
37 (to Bouwmeester) [III.135], 368nn4, 9, 369n15, 370n32, 372n6, 372–73n18
40 (to Jelles) [III.142], 362n10
43 (to Osten) [III.161], 376n4
50 (to Jelles) [III.172], 391n35
56 (to Boxel) [III.190], 356n8
60 (to Tschirnhaus) [III.200], 361nn13, 26, 368–69n13
63 (from Schuller) [III.203], 367n33
64 (to Schuller) [III.205], 371n38 [III.206], 355n20, 356n12, 365n11, 385nn2, 5
65 (from Tschirnhaus) [III.207], 365n4
66 (to Tschirnhaus) [III.207], 367n27 [III.208], 367n28
70 (from Schuller) [III.221], 367n26
73 (to Oldenburg) [III.226], 366n22
75 (to Oldenburg) [III.228], 364n5
81 (to Tschirnhaus), 354n12 [III.241], 380n6
82 (from Tschirnhaus), 353n21
83 (to Tschirnhaus) [III.241], 353n21

Works by Descartes

Arguments Drawn Up in a Geometrical

- Fashion*, 362n5
Critique of Pure Reason, 382n23
Letter to Mesland, 362n6
Passions of the Soul, 389n2
Principles, 88–89, 91, 354nn3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 358n16, 362nn3, 4, 375n19, 384n28
Replies to the First Objections, 360n5, 371n37, 375n18
Replies to the Second Objections, 360nn7, 8, 9, 10, 368n12, 373n1, 374nn 8, 9, 11
Replies to the Fourth Objections, 354n10, 371n37, 375n18
Rules, 373n2
Third Meditation, 360nn4, 11, 362nn3, 4, 373n2, 373–74n3
Fourth Meditation, 371n37

Works by Leibniz

- “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 373n20, 401n3
“Elementa calculi,” 361n23, 401n9
“Elementa verae pietatis,” 401n9
“Ad Ethicam,” 361n21
“Introductio ad encyclopaedium arcanum,” 361n23, 401n9
Letter to Arnauld, 373n19, 401nn6, 7, 8
Letter to the Landgrave of HesseRheinfels, 400n33
Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 360n12, 361n22, 361n1
“Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas,” 360–61n12, 361n22, 373n20
“On Nature Itself . . .,” 384nn25, 26, 27
“New System,” 370n33
“Plan de la science générale,” 361n23
“Quod ens perfectissimum existit,” 360n6, 361n22
“On the Radical Origination of Things,” 378n6
“Reflections on the Doctrine of a

INDEX OF TEXTUAL REFERENCES

Universal Spirit,” 365n17

Works by Other Authors

- Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 374nn6,
10
- Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*,
376n12
- Bonaventure, *De Scientia Christi*,
377n17
- Bruno, *On Cause, Principle, and Unity*,
363n24
- Caterus, *First Objections*, 359n27,
375n17
Fourth Objections, 375n17
- Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*,
359nn19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 360n29,
379n14
- Hobbes, *De Corpore*, 363n25
- Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 367n32
- Nicholas of Cusa, *On Learned
Ignorance*, 377n13
The Game of the Spheres, 377n18
- Plotinus, *Enneads*, 375nn1, 2, 376nn5,
6, 9, 10, 11, 377nn15, 16
- Suarez, *Metaphysicarum disputationem*,
354n6, 359n26