

Contents

	<i>Acknowledgments</i>	7
	<i>In Praise of Fragments: History in the Comic Mode</i>	11
I	<i>Women's Stories, Women's Symbols: A Critique of Victor Turner's Theory of Liminality</i>	27
II	<i>The Mysticism and Asceticism of Medieval Women: Some Comments on the Typologies of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch</i>	53
III	<i>The Body of Christ in the Later Middle Ages: A Reply to Leo Steinberg</i>	79
IV	<i>Women Mystics and Eucharistic Devotion in the Thirteenth Century</i>	119
V	<i>"... And Woman His Humanity": Female Imagery in the Religious Writing of the Later Middle Ages</i>	151
VI	<i>The Female Body and Religious Practice in the Later Middle Ages</i>	181
VII	<i>Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the Resurrection of the Body: A Scholastic Discussion in Its Medieval and Modern Contexts</i>	239
	<i>Notes</i>	299
	<i>Index</i>	419

INTRODUCTION

In Praise of Fragments: History in the Comic Mode

In the early years of the twelfth century, the monk Guibert of Nogent wrote a treatise on relics that has been lauded by historians as the beginning of scientific hagiography, a precursor of Valla or Erasmus or Mabillon. Guibert criticized credulous veneration of remains simply because miracles happened there. He insisted that relics be properly documented and that miracles be approved by church authorities. But Guibert is not, in fact, a forerunner of source criticism, of scientific history, of modernism or of ecclesiastical centralization. His concern was not with methods of research and authentication and control. What disturbed Guibert was the practice of moving and dividing the bodies of the saints. Fragmentation was, to Guibert, the ultimate insult and scandal; aiding and abetting it by translating and mutilating holy cadavers struck him as obscene.¹

The occasion for Guibert's *De pignoribus* was the claim of the monastery of St. Médard to possess the tooth of Christ. Against this claim, Guibert's fundamental argument was theological. He expressed horror and outrage at the notion that any part of Christ (tooth, umbilical cord or foreskin) could be left on earth to suffer decay. Christ's resurrected body is the paradigm for ours, wrote Guibert; if so much as a drop of his blood or a hair of his

head is left behind, how shall we believe that we will rise again at the sound of the trumpet? The martyrs bear up under unspeakable tortures (splittings of fingernails, hanging by genitals, flaying and severing) because they know every particle will return in the end. The eucharistic host, fragmented by human teeth and digestive processes yet in every minute crumb the whole body of Christ is, argued Guibert, the guarantee that wholeness – non-partibility and non-passibility – is God's ultimate promise to humankind. So crucial to salvation was wholeness for Guibert that he used rhetorical theory to argue that synecdoche, *pars pro toto*, must be literally true.²

Later in the twelfth century, the abbess Herrad of Hohenbourg directed the compilation of a vast compendium of theological and scientific information, the *Hortus deliciarum*. Herrad collected with care passages from Peter Lombard and Honorius Augustodunensis concerning the reassembling of human bodies at the end of time. Fascinated, as was Guibert, by matters that appear decidedly odd to modern taste, Herrad queried whether aborted fetuses, severed limbs and pared fingernails will rise from the dead.³ To illustrate such questions she, or her artist-collaborators, chose an iconographic program historians have called the Byzantine Last Judgment (see Figures 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.12).⁴ The wonderful miniatures of the *Hortus deliciarum* have survived only through the drawings made by scholars who studied them before the destruction of the manuscript in the bombardment of Strasbourg in 1870.⁵ But even the recent scholarly reconstruction makes it clear that, just as the *Hortus deliciarum* pieces together somewhat incongruous elements from the Lombard and Honorius in order to discuss exactly how bodies will appear at the Last Judgment, so it uses available artistic motifs to depict a resurrection in which part returns to wholeness without losing its individuality. The miniatures show resurrection as three distinct moments:

body parts are vomited up from the depths of the sea and the craws of birds and beasts; bodies, drawn enfleshed but labeled “*ossa mortuorum*,” emerge whole from their tombs; the saved appear before God shining with the specific characteristics of their religious accomplishments – that is, as martyrs, monks, virgins and so forth.

In the writings and pictures of Guibert and Herrad, the torture and fragmentation to which these authors were drawn with prurient horror are redeemed by a vision of last things in which not just wholeness but reassemblage is the ultimate promise. In this vision, Herrad and Guibert were not alone. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries in western Europe saw renewed debate over dozens of theological matters (such as the eucharist, the transmission of original sin, the nature of the body-soul nexus) in which the relationship of part to whole is crucial, and a new emphasis on miracles (such as stigmata, bleeding hosts, miraculous fasting, incorrupt cadavers) in which bodies are the mediators between earth and heaven. It was a period in which the overcoming of partition and putrefaction – either through reunion of parts into a whole or through assertion of part *as part to be* the whole – was the image of paradise.⁶

Guibert and Herrad can serve to introduce this volume because the essays that follow are all, in some sense, about bodies, and about the relationship of part to whole. Moreover, the essays themselves are fragments, parts. Any author faced with the possibility of assembling her recent essays for publication necessarily confronts a problem of parts and whole.

The introduction to a collection must speak of underlying themes and connections – must, that is, unite the fragments into something larger. In musing here briefly about these essays I shall inevitably, therefore, suggest that common patterns and concerns undergird them. But I also wish to assert that none of the *partes*

here stands *pro toto*. I assert this not so much because these essays are only a partial view of the high Middle Ages – because they are not a survey of women’s religious practices or of attitudes toward the body or of theological debates concerning eschatology and the human person – although that is true. Rather, I assert this because my understanding of the historian’s task precludes wholeness. Historians, like the fishes of the sea, regurgitate fragments. Only supernatural power can reassemble fragments so completely that no particle of them is lost, or miraculously empower the part to *be* the whole.

The seven essays republished here were written between 1982 and 1989. They fall naturally into three groups. First, there are three occasional pieces, written at the request of conference organizers or journal editors, and addressing directly a major theoretical position in a field outside history. Second, there are three essays in women’s history, all of which treat women’s piety not in isolation but in such a way as to reformulate also our understanding of men’s religious practices and beliefs. Third, there is a long essay on religious conceptions of the body, substantially rewritten for this volume and drawn from two independently published pieces. The seven essays are, as I shall explain, closely related.

The three methodological pieces all use major twentieth-century intellectual figures as means to better understand late medieval religion. None has as its aim an attack on the thinker, an application of the thinker’s ideas, or a general evaluation of the thinker’s place in his discipline. I have tried to understand each thinker fairly and fully, but basically I have used their works as I use other theoretical material in other essays – not as a key but as one tool among many. The later essays in the volume make essentially similar reference to theory: the seventh, for example, uses contemporary philosophy of mind to raise new questions about medieval philosophical debate; the fifth is stimulated by,

yet in certain ways disagrees with, recent feminist writing in the field of religion. All the essays in the volume, therefore, arise fundamentally from medieval material, not from contemporary theoretical perspectives. Behind whatever smooth surface they may present to the modern reader lies the hard grappling with texts – reading them, dating them, ascribing them – that is the ordinary work of the medievalist.

If I do not adopt the method or the conclusions of any of the theorists I consider, there are nonetheless several general points that might be made about my use of disciplines outside history. Victor Turner, Max Weber and Leo Steinberg – the subjects of the first three essays – provide fundamental stimuli to historians. Turner (and Clifford Geertz, with whom his approach is allied) challenges historians to consider how symbols function to give cohesion to community, yet how, given their many facets, they cannot be reduced to function. Weber and Troeltsch suggest to students of religion that they must pay more attention to the forms of association characteristic of certain basic religious impulses, such as asceticism or mysticism. Steinberg has made it abundantly clear to both his fellow art historians and to students of literature that an artistic object is not an illustration of a written text but is itself a text in its own right. My discussion of Turner implies a fairly standard critique of functionalism; my criticism of Weber suggests that he in some ways reduces religion to sociology; my examination of Steinberg argues that he sometimes violates his own understanding of the relationship of art object and text. But the three essays also surely suggest how much historians have to learn from recourse to the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and art history, all of which provide interpretations of the nature and context of human creativity.

Moreover, each of the three essays makes its point by adducing material concerning gender ignored by the theorist in question.

A consideration of texts written by women and rituals attractive to them leads to a critique of Turner's notions of liminality and reversal; attention to recent research on nuns, beguines, tertiaries and laywomen suggests not only that Weber's application of his ideal types to the period before the Protestant Reformation is faulty, but also that the types themselves should be reformulated in certain ways; Steinberg's reading of the significance of genitality and body in art is radically revised by my argument that medieval devotional writers and natural philosophers did not think as we modern folk do about biological sex and culturally constructed gender. When even the small bit we are able to retrieve about medieval women's experience is taken into account, each modern theorist appears less universal in conclusion and implication. The course of history seems more complex. Periodization must be revised, influences reassessed. Although modern historians such as Gertrude Himmelfarb have argued that consideration of gender and social status derails historians from their fundamental task of organizing narrative, diagnosing decisive events and assessing the nature and consequences of power, this does not seem to me to be so.⁷ My essays would indeed suggest that generalizing from the experience of one gender is far more likely to reduce history writing – as well as art history, sociology and anthropology – to a monochromatic *longue durée*. This is a point to which I shall return.

In subject matter as well as method, these essays thus have much in common. The last four all address directly the subject of gender raised in the first three as an aspect of methodological critique. Several of the essays describe women's surprisingly "experiential" literary voices; all underline the somatic quality of women's piety. None treats women simply as dominated or repressed by men. All assume, with social scientists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau, that marginal and disadvantaged

groups in a society appropriate that society's dominant symbols and ideas in ways that revise and undercut them. But none of the essays ignores the cultural construction of categories such as "female," "heretic" or "saint"; and none denies the asymmetrical power relations between men and women or clergy and laity.

Each essay therefore acknowledges that – in the creation of ideas of "maleness" and "femaleness," "heroine" or "heretic" – those with greater access to means of communication and to raw power contribute in disproportionate ways. Female creativity must be facilitated by men; female saints are not canonized or revered unless they are in some way religiously useful to men; female rejection of family and fertility must be conceptualized by men as acceptance of other communal and generative possibilities. Each one of these essays – no matter how explicitly focused on women – thus deals with the men who permitted and aided female cultural expression and, by placing women's ways of writing and behaving alongside men's interpretation of them, makes the point that men's understanding of women's piety and of their own has certain specific characteristics not necessarily generalizable as "medieval religion." There is no such thing as *homo religiosus* and no such thing as "the medieval attitude toward women." Every one of these essays turns us back toward questions about men as well as women. The study of gender is a study of how roles and possibilities are conceptualized; it is a study of one hundred percent, not of only fifty-one percent, of the human race.⁸

Yet these essays are also about the creativity of women's voices and women's bodies. They discuss how some women manipulated the dominant tradition to free themselves from the burdens of fertility yet made female fertility a powerful symbol; how some women extricated themselves from family yet served society in the stinking streets of medieval towns; how some used Christian

dichotomies of male/female, powerful/poor to facilitate their own *imitatio Christi*, yet undercut these dichotomies by subsuming all dichotomy into *humanitas*.

In their confidence in female creativity these essays are, in a sense, animated by hindsight. The Western tradition that has made possible in the twentieth century such powerful and effective female self-confidence and female anger has deep roots. Late medieval women spoke little of inequality and little of gender, yet there is a profound connection between their symbols and communities and the twentieth-century determination to speak of gender asymmetry and to study women. Modern social structure and religious sensibility do not descend directly from the convents, beguinages and female friendship groups of the later Middle Ages, although, as Hajnal has pointed out, late medieval institutions and demographic patterns make a place for the first time in history for the single woman.⁹ The determination of medieval women writers to speak of themselves more as human than as female, while nonetheless also utilizing rich domestic and female imagery, has no direct connection with current feminism, although the late Middle Ages may be the first time in history when we have large enough numbers of women's voices to be sure we are hearing characteristically female concerns. Reformation and Counter Reformation reacted against as well as drew upon the female religious movement of the later Middle Ages. My point here is that our dissimilarity from women in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries should not lead us to suggest, as some feminists have, that they were mere victims of patriarchy. This is so, first, because the dissimilarity is far from total. More importantly, it is so because no voice – past or present – is more than partially empowered or partially distinctive. We hear women of the past speaking exactly as (and only to the extent that) we hear ourselves. If we have confidence in the righteousness of our own rage

and in the diagnosis of our own oppression, how can we deny the power of female communities and female visions that, different from our own, are nonetheless our heritage?¹⁰ My essays are all undergirded by the conviction that we do hear creative female voices – not merely literary genres or male superegos – speaking from the past.¹¹ They are also, in their recognition of the partial, committed to the proposition that women in every age speak in a variety of accents.

In Chapters 6 and 7, my focus appears to shift away from gender. Yet, in fact, the last two essays move explicitly to the topic implicit in the earlier discussions: the cultural construction of body itself. In these essays, the body in which we are all either male or female is taken not merely as a biological given, understood by experiencing subjects; it is seen to be actually created as what it is – to behave as it does – because of the categories in which it is conceptualized. These two essays therefore make clear why gender must always be an aspect of the history of attitudes and behavior. They also, however, attend to a duality in the Western tradition more profound even than gender: a tension between body as locus of pain and limitation, and body as locus not merely of pleasure but of personhood itself.

Body as allegory for community has recently been studied by historians such as Natalie Davis, under the influence of the symbolic anthropology of Clifford Geertz;¹² body as culturally constructed has been explored by scholars and critics such as Michel Foucault, Peter Brown and Thomas Laqueur.¹³ Such approaches are surely in the background of my own essays. But my point is in some ways an altogether simpler one. However we construct it and whatever it stands for to us, body is what we've got. Thus, all these essays circle back to a point made by the earliest article anthologized here – back, that is, to what Victor Turner calls the “orectic” (sensory) quality of symbols. All evidence for the doing

of history opens out beyond itself to an intractible physicality. My final essay undercuts all the others even as it affirms them: what we study – what we can study – is culturally constructed. But we know we are more than culture. We are body. And, as body, we die. This is also a point to which I shall return.

These essays were not written with any thought of publication as a whole. Nor were they conceived in discipleship to any particular methodological dispensation. They were simply the work of a younger historian who found, as she grew older, that there was around her an increasing interest in the sort of issues she had always found fascinating.¹⁴ But because the seven years during which the essays were written saw great changes in the historical enterprise in America, it is worth a few words to say how these essays relate to those changes.

In the seventies, medievalists still had a modest but important place in shaping the discipline of history. Although the great Marc Bloch, cofounder of the journal *Annales*, was long dead, some thought the so-called *Annales* paradigm remained dominant within the new social history.¹⁵ Readers of the lively English journal *Past and Present* found articles by medievalists prominent in its pages. In my essay on Victor Turner, the earliest piece collected here, I could still write as if medievalists were in the forefront of the use of anthropological models, although by the seventies the most-often cited practitioners of such use were early modern historians, such as Natalie Davis, John Bossy and Keith Thomas, not medievalists. In the eighties, two changes occurred. The historical profession turned increasingly to explicit discussion of method, as the available methodologies proliferated; and, simultaneously, medieval historians departed from the fray.

In the past few years, literary theory has joined anthropology and quantitative methods as a challenge to what historians earlier in the twentieth century understood their task to be. Articulate

scholars such as Jim Clifford, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Dominic LaCapra, Joan Scott, Lawrence Stone, John Toews and Judith Walkowitz have turned increasingly to writing about method. Every article in a recent issue of the *American Historical Review* is devoted to controversy – which sometimes degenerates into acrimonious and inattentive polemic – over what historians ought to be doing. Two large issues are at stake. They are not mutually exclusive; neither are they quite the same issue, although some recent polemic has asserted that they are. First, there is debate over how far the subject matter of history should shift away from great thinkers and powerful leaders, from war and philosophy, toward the marginal and dispossessed, toward daily life and folk wisdom. Second, there is debate over the nature of historical analysis: Can historians determine causes for events and ferret out the intention of actors and writers? Or do causation and intentionality remain impenetrable, because we, left with only texts from the past, can do no more than read those texts from our own twentieth-century perspective?¹⁶

Students of medieval literature have welcomed the new questions; literary specialists such as Stephen Nicols, Howard Bloch and Eugene Vance have charged ahead, waving the banners of Foucault, deconstruction and the “new historicism.”¹⁷ But, aside from a few mavericks among intellectual historians, Americans who study medieval history have folded their tents and slunk away. Absent from contemporary debates, they seem unaware of trends and novelties. No medievalist is referred to in the *American Historical Review* symposium or anthologized in Lynn Hunt’s *New Cultural History*; no scandal or triumph of medieval scholarship is reported in the pages of Peter Novick’s recent history of the historical profession in America: *That Noble Dream*.¹⁸ Today there is war between the practitioners of new historical methods and the guardians of the old order. Some of the rhetoric is

unattractive, to be sure – especially where the goal seems to be to exclude certain social groups from the practice of history – and some of the research done under the new dispensation is silly. (Silly scholarship has been done under the aegis of every dispensation.) But by and large the war is a rather cheerful, noisy one, in which the casualties (even among the professionals) are few. Some of the debate is stimulating and productive. But medievalists play no role.¹⁹ It seems a shame to miss the fun.

Whatever else my seven essays do, they don't miss the fun. They engage subjects – such as sexuality, gender, the body and death – that are often seen as typical of the new history. They have been both criticized and praised by feminists. They have been anthologized as “the new social history,” published under the rubric “the new historicism,” and edited in the company of writers seen as representing a new approach to religion.

In fact, I have not aligned myself explicitly with any current dispensation. In all my work I have struggled first with medieval texts, and discovered only subsequently that my formulation of their significance has resonances with (although also differences from) such theoretical positions as postmodern feminism, deconstruction or poststructural symbolic anthropology. Nonetheless it would be churlish not to admit that what I am doing in this volume fits many of the prescriptions of the “new cultural history.”²⁰ My approach is focused on texts; it comes to events obliquely, sure that we know them not in themselves but only as they are presented in some record or other from the past. My sense of subject matter is pluralistic. While I have not spent a great deal of time combing medieval records for information about groups and experiences simply because those groups and experiences are important in the modern world or neglected in the medieval, I have also not assumed that history has, by definition, a particular subject matter (for example, war or politics or

oppression) or that only the unique, the accomplished, the influential is historical. I have also implicitly rejected certain forms of intentionality without rejecting causal analysis or context. I have assumed we can know the context of texts, because we can find groups of texts written and preserved and read together. I have assumed we can and must determine both chronological order and social structure – surely two elements of what we mean in common parlance by “cause.” But I have also assumed that – while we can see how one text borrows from another and how actors assert themselves to be guided, even forced, by texts – we can never know what an author or an actor “really meant.”²¹ We can only, from our own text-surrounded vantage point, read the texts in context (i.e., with other texts among which they belong both chronologically and by self-ascription). Our readings will change because we change, both as individuals and as a culture. No one of us will ever read more than partially, from more than a particular perspective. Indeed, it is exactly because we admit that we are particular individuals, at a particular historical moment, using and affirming our own standards, that we move with confidence to speak of the beautiful, the cogent, the intellectually courageous and the moral in past writings and events. We know that what significance or nobility we find is significant or admirable to a particular “us.”²² But we also learn from texts, and the events they describe and incite, because we find in them the ignoble, the insignificant, the self-contradictory and paradoxical. In the inconsistencies and ironies of texts – judged as such by our standards – we learn things the past did not understand about itself. If we are humble, we learn something as well about our own capacity for self-contradiction. As the philosopher Thomas Nagel has recently said: “Sometimes, in the philosophy of mind but also elsewhere, truth is not to be found by travelling as far away from one’s personal perspective as possible.”²³

I thus agree with Lynn Hunt when she suggests, in a flash of humor all too rare in current polemic, that the mode of the new cultural history may be comic.²⁴ If tragedy tells a cogent story, with a moral and a hero, and undergirds our sense of the nobility of humanity, comedy tells many stories, achieves a conclusion only by coincidence and wild improbability, and undergirds our sense of human limitation, even our cynicism about our motives and self-awareness.²⁵ Comedy is about compromise. In comedy there is resolution for only a moment. Although the traditional comedy ends with a wedding, we all know there is, in reality, no “happily ever after.”

Yet comedy is fun. Perhaps the practitioners of the “new cultural history” are beginning to teach us that history – exactly because it too is about compromises and partialities and improbabilities – is fun as well. What gives me pleasure in perusing recent issues of the *American Historical Review* is a clear sense that – despite occasional lapses of civility and fairness – the participants in the debate are enjoying themselves and invigorating the profession by even their most irresponsible assertions. The doing of history is chaotic and pluralistic as never before. It is not so much a war as a tournament. Surely it is time for medievalists to reenter the fray.

Yet I myself have turned to dark topics. These essays move from body as ecstasy to body as decay and fragmentation. Why then do I assert the comic mode? Why stress the pleasure of doing history and minimize the acrimony of those scholars who feel excluded and those who would exclude them, while simultaneously thrusting our noses into torture and putrefaction? Why concentrate on aspects of the body that are surely, in some sense, ahistorical and, in all senses, not much fun? There seems something perverse in entitling the introduction to a set of essays on oppression and death “history in the comic mode.”

The answer is that the comic is not necessarily the pleasant, or at least it is the pleasant snatched from the horrible by artifice and with acute self-consciousness and humility.²⁶ In comedy, the happy ending is contrived. Thus, a comic stance toward doing history is aware of contrivance, of risk. It always admits that we may be wrong. A comic stance knows there is, in actuality, no ending (happy or otherwise) – that doing history is, for the historian, telling a story that could be told in another way. For this reason, a comic stance welcomes voices hithertofore left outside, not to absorb or mute them but to allow them to object and contradict. Its goal is the pluralistic, not the total. It embraces the partial as partial. And, in such historical writing as in the best comedy, the author is also a character. Authorial presence and authorial asides are therefore welcome; methodological musing – even polemic – is a part of, not a substitute for, doing history.

So I see my approach in these essays not as a new method but as a new voice or a new mode in history writing: the partial or provisional voice, the comic mode. I see the topic to which I have turned most recently in my research as comic too. The last essay below reproduces pictures, such as those of the *Hortus deliciarum*, in which animals regurgitate body parts for reassembly at the general resurrection. It explores medieval debates over the resurrection of aborted fetuses and modern controversy over reanimation of corpses and the beaming of bodies to the planet Mars. Such pictures and texts are surely comic in the common sense meaning of the word as well as in the more literary meaning I have employed above. They evidence what Henri Bergson sees as crucial to the comic: a moral response to the “recalcitrance of matter.”²⁷

I find our human capacity to tell such stories, to hide horror from ourselves while allowing it to peek through, profoundly comforting. The very implausibility of the restoration of pared

fingernails and amputated limbs at the end of time underlines, for me, the despicableness of human beings, who in fact torture and mutilate their fellow human beings. Yet the implausible, even risible, doctrine of the resurrection of the body asserts that – if there is such a thing as redemption – it must redeem our experience of enduring and even inflicting such acts.²⁸ If there is meaning to the history we tell and the corruption (both moral and physical) we suffer, surely it is in (as well as in spite of) fragmentation. Bodily resurrection at the end of time is, in a technical sense, a comic – that is, a contrived and brave – happy ending.

Thus, I find a comic stance empowering both as a historian and as a human being. Why not take the notion of digested and regurgitated fragments as a metaphor of the historian's subject matter? And why not – whatever despair we may feel concerning resurrection and reassemblage – find comic relief in the human determination to assert wholeness in the face of inevitable decay and fragmentation?

I

**Women's Stories, Women's Symbols:
A Critique of Victor Turner's
Theory of Liminality**

Victor Turner's Theory

Before considering the usefulness of Victor Turner's "processual symbolic analysis" or "social drama approach" to my work as a historian of the religion of the western European Middle Ages,¹ I should begin by stating what I do *not* intend to do.² First, I do not intend to address the general relationship of history and anthropology as academic disciplines or methods. Much has, of course, been written on this topic. Traditional historians are fond of the cliché that anthropology seeks to delineate general laws, history to describe particular events. But the more venturesome in both fields have sought a marriage of the two disciplines. The anthropologist Evans-Pritchard repeatedly argued that good history *is* good anthropology and vice versa, and dubbed eminent medieval historians such as Marc Bloch and F.W. Maitland the best of anthropologists.³ The British historian Keith Thomas wrote recently that in the history departments of the eighties the last vestiges of the innovations of the sixties may lie in the use of certain insights from cultural anthropology.⁴ I cannot, on the basis of study of a single figure, launch a new theory of the relationship of the disciplines. But my sympathies have always lain with those in each camp who make use of the other. And it seems clear

to me that Victor Turner's own sense of what he is up to, taken very broadly, is appealing to any historian of religion. Turner's notion of the fundamental units of social reality as dramas builds temporality and change into all analysis;⁵ Turner's sense of dominant symbols as multivocal requires that symbols and ritual be understood in their social context;⁶ Turner's emphasis on the "orectic" (sensory) pole of meaning enables students of religion to talk of emotional, psychological and spiritual elements that psychohistory has tried, woefully unsuccessfully, I fear, to introduce into historical analysis.⁷ Therefore, in concluding that certain of Turner's theories seriously misrepresent the complexity of religious experience, I shall *not* be suggesting that anthropology and history are incompatible. Rather, I shall be arguing both that some of Turner's generalizations violate the subtlety of his own methodological commitments and that Turner's theory of religion is inadequate because it is based implicitly on the Christianity of a particular class, gender and historical period.

Second, I do not intend to provide a critique of Turner's own application of his theory to the European Middle Ages, particularly in his well-known essays on Thomas Becket and Francis of Assisi.⁸ It would be easy to show that, compared to the richness of Turner's analysis of Ndembu ritual, his sense of twelfth- and thirteenth-century symbols is thin. "Poverty" to Francis, the *imitatio Christi* or *via crucis* to Becket, become in Turner's own hands almost "signs" rather than "symbols"; they lose much of the multivocality they unquestionably have in their own historical context. For all Turner's effort to use a social drama analysis, his history of the Franciscan order sounds remarkably like the history of the institutionalization and, therefore, corruption of a dream that was the standard interpretation of Francis until recently.⁹ His discussion of Becket does not advance much beyond the picture of radical conversion from one ideal to another, which has always

been seen as the crux of the matter – in legend and literature as well as in the work of historians.¹⁰ It is not surprising that Turner uses Turner's model best when he knows the society under study most deeply. And indeed, one is struck by the fact that even in his most recent writings, the Ndembu examples are the most powerful – the clearest, most precise, most analytical and cogent – whereas the modern examples are often tossed in without the care or the elaboration necessary to make the analysis convincing.¹¹ But for me to suggest simply that Turner could sometimes do a Turnerian analysis better than he does would contribute nothing to a study of Turner's model.

What I want to do, therefore, is to apply to my own research in the later Middle Ages Turner's notion of social drama as underlying both narrative and ritual. I want to focus especially on two aspects of Turner's notion of social drama, namely his understanding of "dominant symbols" (particularly as elaborated in the *Forest of Symbols* [1967]) and his notion of the central place in what he calls "liminality" of images of status reversal or status elevation (particularly as elaborated in *The Ritual Process* [1969] and in subsequent works).¹² I understand Turner to be arguing at his most general (and he is frequently quite general) that human experience, at least a great part of the time, occurs in units Turner calls "social dramas" (a subset of what he calls "processual units") – namely, that it takes a four-stage form: breach between social elements, crisis, adjustment or redress, and, finally, either reintegration of the group or person or "element" into the social structure or recognition of irreparable breach.¹³ This social drama, to Turner, underlies both narrative (that is, the way we tell our important stories) and ritual (that is, the way we behave when we perform or enact certain formal, prescribed patterns that not only express but also move us into and elaborate our shared values). It is in the third stage that we find what Turner calls, bor-

rowing the idea from van Gennep, “liminality” – a moment of suspension of normal rules and roles, a crossing of boundaries and violating of norms, that enables us to understand those norms, even (or perhaps especially) where they conflict, and move on either to incorporate or reject them.¹⁴ In the specific form of social drama called ritual, we find that rituals of life-crisis (that is, change in life-status: for example, puberty or election as chief) often use images of inversion in the liminal stage (for example, the initiate becomes a “fool” or a “woman”). Calendrical rituals (that is, those that celebrate the recurring pattern of the year: for example, harvest rituals) often use images of status elevation (for example, children wear masks of adults or of monsters at Halloween). Especially central in the liminal stage of ritual are what Turner calls “dominant symbols” – symbols that “condense” and “unify” into a moment disparate *significata* and bring together two poles of meaning: normative and emotional. A dominant symbol (for example, the Ndembu milk tree) can, therefore, only be understood in the context in which it is experienced. There it has meaning that includes as much the sensory, natural and physiological facts to which it refers (for example, milk, food, nurture, nursing, breasts, etc.) as the disparate social values for which it may stand (for example – in the case of the milk tree – both tribal custom and matriliney, on the one hand, and, on the other, conflict between mother and daughter, men and women).¹⁵ From such fine and multitextured analysis of symbol and story, Turner sometimes moves on – quite a bit less successfully – to general cultural critique, calling for the liminoid (that is, the liminal-like) in modern life and cautiously praising *communitas*, his term for that feeling of union with one’s fellow human beings which in preindustrial societies was released in the liminal phase of ritual.¹⁶

There are some obvious problems with applying Turner’s writings to historical research, not least among them the fact that

Turner does not have a complete and coherent theory to the extent that Geertz and Lévi-Strauss do. As I indicated above, all Turner's ideas involve in some way the insight that, in explaining human experience, one is explaining process or drama rather than structure, and that liminality or suspension of social and normative structures is a crucial moment in the process. But the very fact that periods of liminality provide escape from roles and critiques of structures (in a functionalist sense of "structure") indicates that Turner has in certain ways never left the functionalist anthropology in which he was trained. And Turner himself, however quick he may have been to provide commentary on modernity, has said repeatedly that for the industrialized world "liminality" is only a metaphor.¹⁷ It is, therefore, not certain either how far Turner's insights fit together into a system or how many of Turner's own insights Turner himself thinks applicable to the European Middle Ages, a society between "primitive" and industrial. I do not, however, want either to create a single "Turner theory" or to criticize such a theory by doing an exegesis of Turner. Others can do that better than I – Turner himself among them. Rather, I want to apply what clearly *are* some of Turner's insights – his notions of narrative, of dominant symbol and of the imagery of reversal and elevation – to my work on later medieval piety. Since Turner himself has extrapolated from analysis of ritual in "primitive" societies to more general theories about symbols and stories, I feel free to test his ideas against the religious texts that are the major source for historians of the Middle Ages. I want to show how certain of Turner's ideas, especially his sensitive and subtle notion of dominant symbols, enable me to describe aspects of European religiosity for which scholars have long needed terms. But I also want to argue that there are places where Turner's notions fail to describe what I find in my research, that those places fit into a pattern, and that this

pattern suggests a fundamental limitation in the Turnerian idea of liminality, at least in the extended or metaphorical sense of Turner's later writings.

In evaluating Turner's social drama model and his theory of symbol, I want to concentrate on a major form of medieval narrative, the saint's life, and on a major Christian ritual or dominant symbol, the eucharist. I chose these initially because they seem to be the most obvious illustrations of Turner's ideas. Although many historians of religion and literature have pointed out that saints' lives as a genre are *not* chronologically or linearly arranged – the goal of the biographer being to depict the saint as static model – conversion *is* often the climax of the story that lies behind and generates the literary life.¹⁸ And the eucharist is not only obviously a dominant symbol, condensing, unifying and polarizing meaning; it is also the central symbol in a clearly processual ritual, one that recapitulates what is certainly a social drama – the crucifixion – and one in which the moment of reception of sacred food was frequently accompanied by the extreme liminality of ecstasy or possession. Moreover, although the eucharist is not in any simple sense either a calendrical or life-crisis ritual, the imagery of this liminal moment is obviously imagery of reversal: omnipotent God becomes dying man; the receiving Christian gains eternal life by eating and becoming the moment of death.¹⁹ But as I have explored more closely the relationship of Turner's models to these medieval stories and symbols, a curious fact has emerged. Turner's ideas describe the stories and symbols of men better than those of women. Women's stories insofar as they can be discerned behind the tales told by male biographers are in fact less processual than men's; they don't have turning points. And when women recount their own lives, the themes are less climax, conversion, reintegration and triumph, the liminality of reversal or elevation, than continuity. Moreover, women's

images and symbols – which, according to Turner's model, should reflect either inversion (for example, poverty) insofar as women are superior (for example, of aristocratic status), or elevation (for example, maleness, military prowess) insofar as women *qua* women are inferior – do not quite do either. Rather, they continue or enhance in image (for example, bride, sick person) what the woman's ordinary experience is, so that one either has to see the woman's religious stance as permanently liminal or as never quite becoming so.

These observations suggest to me that Turner's theory of religion may be based, more than he is aware, on the particular form of Christianity (with its strong emphasis on world denial and inversion of images) that has characterized elites in the Western tradition – educated elites, aristocratic elites and male elites. We will, however, understand this only if we use the category of gender very carefully. For my examination of Turner in no way implies that he fails to look at women either in his theory or in his fieldwork (where surely his analysis of women's rituals has been both extensive and subtle).²⁰ In many places he suggests that women are liminal or that women, as marginals, generate *communitas*.²¹ What I am suggesting is exactly that Turner looks *at* women; he stands with the dominant group (males) and sees women (both as symbol and as fact) as liminal to men. In this he is quite correct, of course, and the insight is a powerful one. But it is not the whole story. The historian or anthropologist needs to stand *with* women as well.²² And when Turner attempts to stand with the inferior, he assumes symmetry – that is, he assumes that the inferior are exactly the reverse of the superior. If the superior in society generate images of lowliness in liminality, the inferior will generate images of power. To use Turner's own example, ghetto teenagers in Chicago have first and second vice presidents in their street gangs.²³ My research indicates that such things are very rare

and that the images generated by the inferior are usually not reversals or elevations at all. Thus, liminality itself – as fully elaborated by Turner – may be less a universal moment of meaning needed by human beings as they move through social dramas than an escape for those who bear the burdens and reap the benefits of a high place in the social structure. As recent liberation theologians have pointed out, it is the powerful who express imitation of Christ as (voluntary) poverty, (voluntary) nudity and (voluntary) weakness. But the involuntary poor usually express their *imitatio Christi* not as wealth and exploitation but as struggle.²⁴

Male and Female Stories

Let me now turn to the later Middle Ages to illustrate the strengths and limitations of Turner's notion of liminality. First, then, the stories and symbols of men.

Male lives from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries – both as lived and as told – may be nicely explicated as social dramas. As one would expect for religious virtuosi, charismatic figures and saints, the liminal phase usually issues in breach with previous role and previous group – that is, in conversion. Images of reversal and inversion are dominant in the converted life, particularly at moments of transition. If we take as an example one of the most famous of all medieval biographies, Bonaventure's life of Francis, we find that the story is not only told as a series of successful crises, breaches with former status and life, but also that Francis, the wealthy merchant's son, adopts images of poverty, nudity, weakness, even of femaleness, at key moments. At the two most decisive breaches of a life filled with crisis – that is, when he renounces his earthly father and when he dies – Francis takes off all his clothes.²⁵ These two moments are each accompanied by adoption of disease and suffering (in the first case, dwelling among lepers; in the second, union with the crucifix in stigmata).²⁶ And

the moment of conversion is a moment of womanly fertility: Bonaventure tells us that Francis took off his clothes and his shoes, renounced his father, threw away his money, prayed to Mary, and like her gave birth to his first child (his first disciple).²⁷ When the pope first rejects and later accepts Francis, Francis tells the story of a poor woman (by implication himself) who bears children of the Holy Spirit;²⁸ three women meet Francis and address *him* as “Lady Poverty”;²⁹ Bonaventure suggests that ministers are fathers and preachers, but Francis, who insisted on remaining layman rather than cleric, is a mother, laboring for her children by example – that is, by suffering birth pangs.³⁰ Francis is described as cradling all creation – from a rabbit to the baby Jesus – in his arms as a mother.³¹ But Francis’s renunciation of his earthly father is decisive; real change occurs. And, in Bonaventure’s prose, the Francis who returns from being crucified in the stigmata is now a “knight,” a captain of Christ’s army, sealed (for all his lay status) by the seal of Christ the High Priest.³² In death Francis is described as founder and leader, model and exemplar, and father of his friars.³³ The life is a drama. The story told of it is a drama. From the liminality of weakness, nudity and womanliness comes the leader and model who changes the religious life of the thirteenth century.

Not only are male lives social dramas; men themselves use images of reversal to express liminality. And chief among these images is woman – as fact and as symbol. As Simone Roisin has shown, recourse to and comfort by the Virgin is a more common theme in the visions of men than in those of women.³⁴ Men frequently describe not only themselves but even Christ and God as female and, as I have argued in *Jesus as Mother*, such descriptions are frequently part of their anxiety over administrative responsibilities. Abbots and novice masters in the throes of self-doubt about their leadership talk of themselves and their God as ten-

der and maternal.³⁵ “Woman” was clearly outside medieval European notions of social structure, as Georges Duby repeatedly emphasizes in his study of the “three orders” of society;³⁶ and male writers clearly saw the image of the “female” (virgin, bride or mother) as an image for the male self when it escaped those three orders. In a very common metaphor, the monk Gueric of Igny wrote of the advancing soul as the “mother of Christ.”³⁷ Bernard of Clairvaux not only elaborated the notion of the soul as bride and of the religious leader as mother but even suggested that monks, who fled the world, were women, whereas bishops, who led the world, were men.³⁸ To Bonaventure, not only the soul but also the illumined mind is bride, daughter, friend, sister and member of Christ.³⁹ Monks and friars, whose status as set-apart was what Turner calls institutionalized liminality, also spoke of themselves as “fools,” “acrobats” and “children” – all images of reversal – and even in their clothing adopted the child’s hood as a distinctive feature.⁴⁰ In a particularly vivid fourteenth-century example, Richard Rolle underlined his conversion and his rejection of family by fashioning hermit’s clothing for himself out of two of his sister’s dresses.⁴¹

To the well-known fact that men described themselves as women in moments or statuses of liminality, we can add the less commonly observed fact that men had recourse to actual women as liminal. Hildegard of Bingen, Birgitta of Sweden, Catherine of Siena and Joan of Arc are only the most obvious examples of women whose visions, attained while they were in a state of radical apartness (underlined by virginity or illness or low social status), were *for men* a means of escape from and reintegration into status and power.⁴² Two important biographers of the early thirteenth century, Thomas of Cantimpré and James of Vitry, created, through a number of lives, the image of the holy woman as critique of, reproach to, and solution for male pride, ambition

and irreligiosity.⁴³ The biographers of two Franciscan tertiaries, Angela of Foligno and Margaret of Cortona, see these women as “mothers” who have only “sons” – that is, the local friars for whom they provide healing, visions, advice, rebuke and comfort.⁴⁴ John Coakley in his study of fifteenth-century saints’ lives points out that, in sharp contrast to male saints who often hold power and office in the world, all women saints from this period are known through the eyes of their male confessors and are depicted by these confessors as models of interiorized spirituality.⁴⁵ The woman is thus, to the man, a retreat from the world into inner, often mystical repose. What she says (and her rhetoric is sometimes strident) and what she is, is a criticism of male power and an alternative to it. Contact with her is, for the male, an escape from the world; after recourse to her he returns to that world girded with information and consolation. The male biographers of Christina of Markyate in the twelfth century, Juliana of Cornillon in the thirteenth, and Angela of Foligno in the fourteenth century stress explicitly that God chose to act through the weak vessel, the woman, as a condemnation of male religious failure, so that the last becomes the first, the first last.⁴⁶ Turner himself expresses this sense of woman as liminal for man in his recent work on pilgrimage when he refers repeatedly to the Virgin as expressing the affective, emotional side of human character, holding up to society that escape from and evaluation of status and wealth which those who possess power apparently need in order to survive psychologically.⁴⁷

Moreover, in the Middle Ages as today, men tended to assume that reversal was symmetrical. In other words, men writing about women assumed that women went through sharp crises and conversions and that their liminal moments were accompanied by gender reversal (in this case, of course, elevation). The twelfth-century biographer of Christina of Markyate tells a highly dra-

Index

- ABELARD, PETER, 166, 384 n.107.
Achler, Elsbeth, 189.
Adelheid Langmann, 130.
Aelred of Rievaulx, 158–59.
Agnes of Montepulciano, 130, 170.
Albert the Great, 127, 191, 226, 241, 396 n.16, 407 n.75.
Aldobrandesca of Siena, 162.
Alice of Schaerbeke, 69, 128, 133, 139, 188.
Alpaïs of Cudot, 142, 188, 189.
Ambrose, 401 n.46.
Angela of Foligno, 37, 45, 90–91, 129, 130, 132, 136, 138, 142, 162, 168, 176, 184–85, 192–94, 197, 222, 310–11 n.44, 334 n.30.
Anna Selbdritt, *see* Devotional objects.
Anna Vorchtlin of Engelthal, 129–30.
Annales, 20, 302 n.15.
Anne, saint, 80, 82.
Anorexia, 56, 140, 142, 186, 194, 350–51 n.84, 352 n.92.
Anselm of Canterbury, 205.
Anthropology, use of by historians, 15–16, 27–32.
Aquinas, Thomas, 77, 144, 157, 210, 226, 230–31, 234, 240–41, 244, 255, 260, 387–88 n.129, 388 n.139, 390 n.140, 396 n.16, 401–02 n.47, 402 n.49, 404 n.55, 406 n.70, 407 n.75; modern interpretations of, 254–56.
Aristotle, 100, 109, 114, 214, 220, 222–23, 227, 241, 255, 260, 383 n.96, 401 n.45, 405 n.63.
arma Christi, iconographic motif of, 271, 278–79.
Asceticism: analyzed by Weber, 54, 66–78; ascetic practices, 131–34, 184–89, 231, 256, 349 n.55.
Augustine, 84, 127, 241, 242, 256, 257, 258, 261.
Augustinus Triumphus, 391 n.149.
Austin, J.L., 246.
Averroism, 255.
Avicenna, 214, 227.
BACON, ROGER, 269.
Barbara, saint, 270.
Beatific vision, 229, 231, 241, 267, 392 n.154.
Beatrice of Nazareth, 39, 132, 134, 145, 188, 190.
Beatrice of Ornacieux, 38–40, 130, 132.
Becket, Thomas, 28.
Beguines, 16, 46, 47, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 74, 75, 78, 119, 122, 136, 139, 156, 167, 198, 316 n.82, 317–18 n.2, 327 n.70.

- Bell, Rudolph, 56, 75, 186, 351–52
n.84. *See also* Weinstein and Bell.
- Bellegambe, Jean, 285, 293.
- Benedetta Carlini, 333 n.27.
- Benedictus Deus*, 392 n.154.
- Benevenuta of Bojano, 136.
- Benz, Ernst, 131, 188.
- Bergson, Henri, 25.
- Bernard of Clairvaux, 36, 72, 93, 103,
108, 109, 145, 157–60, 165, 190–
92, 218, 256–57, 408 n.85.
- Bible, moralized, 97, 99, 206.
- Birgitta of Sweden, 36, 137, 186.
- Blannbekin, Agnes, 122, 126, 139, 186.
- Bloch, Marc, 20, 27.
- Bloemardine, 59.
- Blood: as basic body fluid, 100, 109,
114, 214–15, 220–21; as symbol,
87, 91–92, 101–03, 108, 172, 383
n.99; miracles, 101–02.
- Bodily Assumption, 210.
- Body: as matter, 228–29; history
of, 19–20, 182–83, 194–95, 366
nn.4–7; relationship to soul, 182,
222–35 *passim*; women especially
associated with, 98–102, 146–50,
171–75, 203, 204–05, 206–22,
236–38, 332 n.25. *See also* Resur-
rection of the body.
- Bonaventure, 36, 49, 212, 218, 229,
257; *Life of Francis*, 34–35.
- Boniface VIII, 269, 270.
- Bossy, John, 20.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 16.
- Brizio chapel, *see* Signorelli.
- Browe, Peter, 122–23.
- Brown, Elizabeth, 261.
- Brown, Peter, 19.
- Bücher, Karl, 57.
- Burial practices, 266–72, 280, 295,
417 n.148; burial *ad sanctos*, 269,
270, 272.
- Butler, Joseph, 248.
- Byzantine Last Judgment, icono-
graphic program of, 12–13, 280–84,
286–87, 414 nn.127, 129.
- CADAVER, 259, 266, 270–72, 295,
408 n.87. *See also* Dissection,
Incorruptibility of cadaver.
- Caesarius of Heisterbach, 123–24, 146,
234, 265, 275, 276.
- Campin, Robert, *Madonna and Child
before a Firescreen*, 103, 104.
- Cannibalism, 185, 243–44, 260.
- Carozzi, Claude, 187.
- Cathars, 39, 63, 143, 195–96, 240,
387 n.125.
- Catherine of Genoa, 66, 69, 188.
- Catherine of Siena, 36, 39, 54, 62,
66, 69, 87, 96, 97–98, 167–69,
172–73, 185–86, 189, 212, 222,
363 n.57; and care of sick, 197;
and eucharist, 98, 141; nursed by
Christ, 162, 206, 211, 380–81 n.87.
- Certeau, Michel de, 16.
- Chalcidius, 255.
- Charroux, abbey of, 272.
- Chauliac, Guy de, 220.
- Chodorow, Nancy, 43.
- Christ and St. John Group, *see*
Devotional objects.
- Christchild, statues of, *see* Devotional
objects.
- Christina Ebner, 126.
- Christina of Markyate, 37–38, 42, 137.
- Christina *Mirabilis* of St. Trond, 141,
142, 236–37.
- Circumcision, 84, 87ff., 114.
- Cistercians, 47, 59, 63, 71, 121, 128.
- Clare of Assisi, 42, 124, 153, 176.
- Clement VI, 270.
- Colette of Corbie, 181.
- Columba of Rieti, 153.
- Comedy, as model for writing history,
24–26, 304 n.24, 305 n.26.
- communitas*, Victor Turner's theory
of, 47, 49.
- Conception, theories of, 214, 226–
27, 337 nn.49–50, 382 n.93.

INDEX

- Condemnations: of 1270, 260–61; of 1277, 240, 260–61; of Durandus of St. Pourçain, 261–62.
- Cornelisz, Jacob, 207.
- Corpus Christi, feast of, 41, 122, 143.
- Cosmas and Damian, saints, 270.
- Councils: Fourth Lateran, 240; Second Lyon, 240.
- Cross-dressing, 36, 38, 39, 169, 170, 311 n.49, 312 n.53.
- Cryonics, 250, 268, 400 n.36.
- Cullmann, Oscar, 397 n.18.
- DAUPHINE OF PUIMICHEL, 174.
- David of Augsburg, 134, 191.
- Davis, Natalie, 19, 20, 170.
- Detestande feritatis*, 269, 270.
- Devotional objects, 198–200, 320 n.10, 329 n.2, 355 n.120; Anna Selbdritt, 80, 198, 200; Christ and St. John Group, 378 n.73; Christchild, statues of, 40, 198, 378 n.71; Liturgical cradle, 198–99; Monstrance, 212, 216; Pietà, 198; *Vierges ouvrantes*, 101, 217; Visitation group, 198, 200–01.
- Dinzelbacher, Peter, 60, 323 n.27.
- Disputacion Betwyx the Body and Wormes*, 203, 237.
- Dissection, 270–72, 280, 371 n.29.
- Dominicans, 121, 125, 229.
- Dorothy of Montau, 38, 42, 44, 62, 146, 173, 188.
- Double Intercession, iconographic motif of, 106, 113, 115, 208, 340–41 n.71, 380 n.86.
- Douceline of Marseilles, 126, 138, 149, 155.
- Dowries, 151–52; (*dotes*) of the glorified body, 229, 243, 257, 390 n.146, 404 n.56.
- Dronke, Peter, 147, 218.
- Duby, Georges, 36, 77.
- Durandus of St. Pourçain, 258, 259, 261, 405 nn.66, 67.
- Durandus, William, 101, 355 n.120.
- ECCLESIA, allegorical figure, 93, 95, 98, 176, 210, 222.
- Eckhart, 48, 72, 88, 109, 157, 191, 192, 218.
- Ecstasy, 125–39 *passim*, 193; as empowerment for women, 45–46, 60, 134–40, 195; as characteristic of women, 124–29, 133–40, 191–95; and eucharist, 125–29.
- Elizabeth of Hungary, 137, 197.
- Elizabeth of Schönau, 98, 137, 171, 210, 337 n.47.
- Embryology, 226, 227, 260. *See also* Conception.
- Equivocality, *see* Form, debate over unicity or plurality of.
- Ernst, Max, 79, 81.
- Eucharist: as especially important to women, 44–46, 48, 61–62, 119–50 *passim*; changes in celebration of, 127–29, 144–45; miracles related to, 122–25; and resurrection, 353 n.96.
- Eusebius, 267–69, 410 n.95.
- Eustachius of Arras, 260.
- Eva of St. Martin, 122.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 27.
- Eyck, Jan van, *Lucca Madonna*, 103.
- FARNE, MONK OF, 153, 159, 163.
- Fasting, 40, 140–41, 352 n.92; and Eucharist, 124.
- Febvre, Lucien, 77.
- Fly, The*, 250.
- Foreskin, Holy, devotion to, 84, 185–86, 243, 330 n.11.
- Form, debate over unicity or plurality of, 228–29, 241, 255–63, 407 nn.75, 78; of the body (*forma corporeitatis*), 228–29, 257, 261, 262.
- Foucault, Michel, 19, 21.
- Francis of Assisi, 28, 34–35, 42, 43, 47, 49, 56, 77, 101, 145, 155, 157,

- 158, 165, 184, 186–87, 191, 212, 229, 256, 342 n.80.
Franciscans, 28, 34, 47, 77, 229, 256.
Free Spirit, heresy of, 48.
- GALEN, 100, 214, 227, 382 n.93. *See also* Conception.
- Geertz, Clifford, 15, 19, 31.
- Gender, mixing of, in imagery, 108–14, 215–22; recent study of, 16–19, 58–59, 222–23, 300 n.8, 301 n.14, 318 n.95, 319 n.5; reversal of, in imagery, 34–37, 92, 156–60, 165–67, 170–71, 301 n.14; symbols of, 98–108, 151–79, 205–22. *See also* Cross-dressing.
- Gennep, Arnold van, 30, 50.
- Gerson, John, 66, 88, 109, 191, 196, 218.
- Gertrude of Delft, 190.
- Gertrude the Great of Helfta, 39, 45, 74, 132, 138, 147, 161, 167, 174, 188, 198.
- Gervase of Mt.-St.-Eloi, 269.
- Gherardesca of Pisa, 144.
- Giles of Lessines, 407 n.75.
- Giles of Rome, 214, 226, 227, 240–41, 258, 260, 406 n.69.
- Godfrey of Fountains, 269.
- Golden Legend*, 204, 290, 294, 379 n.81, 415–16 nn.136–44.
- Gossaert, Jan, 206, 213, 381 n.88.
- Gregorian reform, 63, 77, 135, 195.
- Gregory the Great, 242; mass of, iconographic motif of, 209.
- Grosseteste, Robert, 276.
- Grundmann, Herbert, 47, 50, 57, 196.
- Guerric of Igny, 36, 159, 205.
- Guglielmites, 59, 138.
- Guiard of Laon, 124.
- Guibert of Nogent, 11–12, 13, 243, 299 nn.1, 2.
- HADewIJCH, 39, 62, 73–74, 86, 120, 132, 134, 147, 161, 169, 173, 191, 193, 222, 228.
- Hagiography, 34–43, 231, 285, 290, 308 n.18. *See also* *Golden Legend*.
- Hamburger, Jeffrey, 198.
- Hans Holbein the Elder, 106.
- Hedwig of Silesia, 122.
- Helfta, nuns of, 122, 129, 130, 153, 160. *See also* Gertrude the Great of Helfta, Mechtild of Hackeborn, Mechtild of Magdeburg.
- Helinand of Froidmont, 165.
- Henry of Ghent, 229, 257, 262.
- Heresy, 143–44, 224, 276; and women, 56–57, 144, 195–96. *See also* Cathars, Free Spirit.
- Herlihy, David, 73, 197.
- Hermaphrodites, 221, 253, 381 n.88, 385 n.110.
- Herrad of Hohenbourg, 12–13, 25, 243, 282, 299 n.3, 300 n.5, 412 n.112.
- Hildegard of Bingen, 36, 98, 134, 138, 143, 147, 148, 155–56, 169, 171–72, 190, 197, 206, 210, 222, 284, 334 n.33, 337 n.47.
- Hilton, Walter, 192.
- Himmelfarb, Gertrude, 16, 21.
- Honorius Augustodunensis, 12, 94, 240, 243.
- Hortus deliciarum*, *see* Herrad of Hohenbourg.
- Host, 123, 127, 128, 130–31, 139, 144–45. *See also* Eucharist.
- Hugh of Lincoln, 185.
- Hugh of St. Victor, 243, 258–59.
- Huizinga, Johan, 92, 181.
- humanitas Christi*, devotional motif, 94, 129–34, 147–50, 177–79, 357–58 n.7.
- Hunt, Lynn, 21, 24.
- Hussites, 63.
- Hylomorphism, 144, 228, 255, 263.
- IDA OF LÉAU, 128.
- Ida of Louvain, 71–72, 125, 129, 130,

INDEX

- 134, 136, 139, 141, 146, 170, 173, 348 n.41.
- Ida of Nivelles, 122.
- Illness: and women, 48, 60, 173–75, 188–90, 373 n.37; as religious symbol, 69, 131, 173–75, 188–90; medieval attitudes toward, 188–90, 197–98, 373 n.38, 377 nn.69–70.
- Image of God, creation in, 144, 155.
- Imelda Lambertini, 128.
- imitatio Christi*, 18, 34, 38, 54, 125, 131, 143–46, 153, 166, 174, 191, 218, 221.
- imitatio Mariae Virginis*, 149.
- Immaculate Conception, 80, 100, 210, 226.
- Incorruptibility of cadaver, 187, 234, 266, 276, 286, 353 n.96, 372 n.32, 413 n.120.
- insania amoris*, 134, 188, 373 n.36.
- Invasion of the Body Snatchers*, 246.
- JAMES OF VITRY, 36, 49, 119, 138, 143, 157, 196.
- James of Voragine, *see Golden Legend*.
- Jane Mary of Maillé, 197.
- Jerome, 243.
- Jesus as Mother, devotional motif, 35, 93–100, 102–08, 157–65, 205–06, 380–81 nn.86–88.
- Joan of Arc, 36, 38, 54, 137, 169; and cross-dressing, 170.
- John of Damascus, 258.
- John Quidort of Paris, 258, 259, 262, 407 n.75.
- Julian of Norwich, 66, 96–97, 163–64, 167, 169, 171–72, 188, 196, 205, 206, 222, 361 n.37, 365 n.74.
- Julian of Toledo, 242.
- Juliana of Cornillon, 37, 40–41, 122, 136, 138, 139, 141, 143.
- Juliana Falconieri, 130.
- KATHARINENTAL, convent of, 198.
- Kieckhefer, Richard, 75, 188.
- Kinship, Holy, iconographic motif of, 200.
- Koch, Gottfried, 57.
- Kübler-Ross, E., 248.
- LACTATION: BY CHRIST, 93–97, 106–08, 205–206; by Church, 95; by mystical women, 184, 194, 295; by the Virgin, as iconographic motif, 86, 101–14 *passim*, 115, 212; medical theories of, 100–01, 109, 114, 214–21 *passim*.
- Laqueur, Thomas, 19, 109, 218.
- Last Judgment, 224, 228, 230, 237, 242, 259, 269, 280, 284, 286; iconography of, 213, 280–87, 291–93. *See also* Byzantine Last Judgment.
- Le Goff, Jacques, 202, 241.
- Lepers, 276.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 31.
- Levitation, 60.
- Liberation theology, 34.
- Lidwina of Schiedam, 62, 69, 188, 190.
- Liminality, Victor Turner's theory of, 27–51.
- Liturgical cradle, *see* Devotional objects.
- Locke, John, 247.
- Lollards, 63.
- Lombard, Peter, 12, 240, 241–43.
- Lukardis of Oberweimar, 45, 86, 121, 129, 130, 131, 145, 155, 181, 190–91.
- Lutgard of Aywières, 69, 122, 128, 129, 130, 137, 162, 170.
- MALOUËL, JEAN, 89, 331–32 n.20.
- Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, The*, *see* Sacks, Oliver.
- Margaret, saint, 290.
- Margaret of Città di Castello, 197.
- Margaret of Cortona, 37, 120, 136, 138, 145, 176.

- Margaret of Faenza, 86, 130, 138, 190-91.
- Margaret Porete, 48-49, 88, 124, 192.
- Margaret of Ypres, 38, 124-25, 130, 132, 145.
- Margery Kempe, 38, 40-41, 42, 44, 167-68, 197, 222.
- Marguerite of Oingt, 91, 97, 130, 144, 148, 153, 160, 162, 192, 205.
- Marrow, James, 101.
- Martyrs, 230, 231-33, 235, 263, 267, 290, 392 n.158, 379 n.81, 409 n.90, 416 n.137.
- Mary Magdalen, 58, 185, 342 n.80.
- Mary of Oignies, 38, 49, 54, 56, 68, 119, 130, 131, 132, 141, 145, 174, 176, 276, 285.
- Material continuity, as criterion for identity, 228-29, 240, 252, 253-63, 296-97.
- Matter, 25, 210, 214, 227-28, 255, 256, 259, 391 n.151.
- Max Headroom*, 297, 400 n.36.
- Mechtild of Hackeborn, 144, 155, 161, 167, 168, 177, 196.
- Mechtild of Magdeburg, 39, 73-74, 101, 126, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 144, 148, 168, 172, 196.
- Medieval studies, current state of, 20-22, 303 n.19.
- Mendicants, 68, 144. *See also* Dominicans, Franciscans.
- Menstruation, 100, 114, 165, 215, 220, 226, 227, 383 n.99.
- Mind, philosophy of, 244-52, 304 n.22.
- Minucius Felix, 267.
- Miracles: Aquinas's discussion of, 226; eucharistic, 61, 102, 123; miraculous cures, 188-89, 270, 286; relating to food, 72, 129-30, 140-43.
- Misogyny, 151-53, 155-57, 200-05, 383 n.100.
- Mondeville, Henri de, 220, 392-93 n.163.
- Moneta of Cremona, 387 n.124, 391 n.149.
- Monstrance, *see* Devotional objects.
- Moore, R.I., 276.
- Mystical Mill, iconographic motif of, 103, 105.
- Mystical pregnancy, 146, 187, 194, 354 n.108.
- Mysticism: analyzed by Troeltsch, 61-66; analyzed by Weber, 66-78; and eroticism, 119-40 *passim*, 193; modern interpretations of, 139-40, 324 n.46, 333 n.26; and women, 119-50 *passim*, 190-94.
- NAGEL, THOMAS, 23, 304 n.22.
- National Enquirer*, 297.
- Ndembu, Victor Turner's discussion of, 29, 30, 49, 307 n.11.
- Nero, 272, 281.
- "New cultural history," 21, 24.
- Newman, Barbara, 218.
- Nonnenbücher*, 132, 346 n.18, 374 n.47.
- Novick, Peter, 21.
- Nozick, Robert, 246, 248.
- ONG, WALTER, 196.
- Organ transplants, 245-52, 253, 414 n.124.
- PADRE PIO, 187.
- Paramystical phenomena, 65, 140-42, 184-89, 191, 230-31, 295, 370-72 nn.24-32. *See also* Incorruptibility of cadaver, Lactation, Mystical pregnancy, Stigmata.
- Paré, Ambrose, 220.
- Parfit, Derek, 248.
- Perry, John, 245, 252.
- Peter of Auvergne, 258.
- Peter of Capua, 254.
- Peter the Venerable, 263-65.
- Petroff, Elizabeth, 188, 196.
- Pietà, *see* Devotional objects.

INDEX

- Pilgrimage, 38, 40, 42, 60.
Pisano, Giovanni, 95.
Platonism, 223, 254–56, 401 n.46, 403 n.52.
Pouchelle, Marie-Christine, 218, 272.
Premonstratensians, 47.
Priesthood of the Virgin, iconographic motif of, 101, 212, 219.
Purgatory, 62–63, 102, 231, 267.
- QUASI-RELIGIOUS STATUS, 46–48, 59, 64. *See also* Beguines, Tertiaries.
Quirizio of Murano, *The Savior*, 106, 110.
Quodlibetal disputations, 224, 241.
- RAYMOND OF CAPUA, 39, 167–69, 185.
Recluses, 121, 122.
Reformation, relation to Middle Ages, 18, 77–78.
Regurgitation: as iconographic and literary motif, 11–13, 267–68, 280–89; as metaphor for writing history, 14, 24–26.
Relics, 183–84, 185, 230, 254, 261, 272, 276, 367–68 n.9, 371–72 n.30, 391 n.151, 412 n.112, 414 n.124.
Reliquaries, 145, 273–75, 277, 295, 355 n.120.
Resurrection of the body, 11–13, 204, 224, 227–31, 234–35, 239–97 *passim*; and persecution, 410 n.95.
Richard I, 272.
Richard of Middleton, 226, 257.
Robert of Melun, 240, 255.
Roger of Wendover, 272.
Roisin, Simone, 35, 153.
Rolle, Richard, 36, 124, 153, 157, 163, 191, 345 n.13.
Rothkrug, Lionel, 101, 410 n.95.
Rupert of Deutz, 86.
Ruysbroeck, Jan van, 124, 191, 345 n.13.
- SACKS, OLIVER, 249.
Sacred Heart, devotion to, 122.
Saints' lives, *see* Hagiography.
Science fiction, as evidence of modern attitudes toward body, 245–52, 398 nn.22, 25.
Scott, Joan, 21.
Sect, Troeltsch's theory of, 61–65.
Sexuality, 41, 43, 204, 333 n.26; of Christ, 82–88, 92, 114; expressed in religious ecstasy, 133–34.
Sigal, Pierre-André, 189.
Siger of Lille, 125.
Signorelli, 285, 292.
Song of Songs, 44, 93, 106, 124, 159–60, 190.
Soul: Aristotelian theory of, 227; between death and resurrection, 242; female images for, 165–70; relationship to body, 182, 222–35 *passim*. *See also* Form.
Southern, R.W., 47.
Sperry experiments, 252.
Star Trek, 245, 297.
Steinberg, Leo, 15, 16, 79ff., 185, 195.
Stigmata, 34, 56, 60, 102, 125, 131, 132, 133, 173, 186–87, 231, 370 n.25.
Suso, Henry, 101, 124, 153, 157, 158, 165–66, 184, 191, 345 n.13.
Sylvestris, Bernard, 256.
- TABERNACLES FOR RESERVATION OF HOST, 144–45.
Tauler, John, 66, 67, 70, 72, 124, 153, 157, 190, 191, 345 n.13.
Teresa of Avila, 66.
Tertiaries, 16, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65, 68, 71, 74, 78, 120, 122, 128, 156.
Tertullian, 239, 260, 267–68.
Thomas, Keith, 20, 27.
Thomas of Cantimpré, 36, 138, 143, 157, 196, 226, 237, 388 nn.130–31.
Thurston, Herbert, 55–56, 187.
Tiedala of Nivelles, 130.

- Torcello, *Last Judgment*, 286–87.
Torture, 271, 272, 276, 305 n.28, 411 n.111, 412 n.118. *See also* Martyrs.
Töss, nuns' book of, 128–29; convent of, 189.
Trances, 60, 186, 191, 195, 230.
Transfiguration, the, 231.
Transubstantiation, 143, 146.
triduum (the three days between the Crucifixion and the Resurrection), 261–62.
Trier Apocalypse, 284, 289.
Troeltsch, Ernst, 15, 53–78, 325 n.67.
Tuchman, Barbara, 181.
Turner, Victor, 15, 16, 19, 27–51, 137, 307 nn.10, 11, 13.
- UMILIANA CERCHI, 176.
Umiltà of Faenza, 42.
Unterlinden, nuns' book of, 42, 132, 144.
Ursula, saint, 271, 277, 285.
- VAUCHEZ, ANDRÉ, 44, 137.
Vernacular literature, emergence of, 196, 286.
Victorines, 324 n.45.
Vierges ouvrantes, *see* Devotional objects.
Villana de' Botti, 174, 188.
Virginity, 41, 43, 204.
Visions, 60, 61, 70, 86, 88, 91, 122, 127, 155, 167, 192, 195, 196, 358–59 n.15, 376 n.62.
Visitation group, *see* Devotional objects.
vita apostolica, 145.
- WALBURGA, MIRACLES OF, 189.
Waldensians, 63.
Weber, Marianne, 318–19 n.2, 327 n.70.
Weber, Max, 15, 16, 53–78, 325 n.55, 396 n.16.
Weil, Simone, 130, 140, 334 n.26.
- Weinstein, Donald, and Rudolph Bell, 42–43, 153, 154, 176, 177, 188, 202, 204.
Weyden, Goswyn van der, 115.
William of Auxerre, 259.
William of St. Thierry, 93, 161.
Williams, Bernard, 246.
Wine, and women, 384 n.107.
Witz, Konrad, 113.
Wounds of Christ, iconographic motif of, 271, 278–79.