

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements · ix

Abbreviations · xi

	Introduction	1
PART I	THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY	
CHAPTER 1	Self-Clarification Through the Transcendental Deduction	43
CHAPTER 2	The Transcendental Dialectic as Philosophical Therapy	78
PART II	MORAL PHILOSOPHY	
CHAPTER 3	The Sources of Autonomy	115
CHAPTER 4	Moral Judgement and Moral Experience	140
CHAPTER 5	Archetypal Philosophy and Ectypal Religion	180
PART III	RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY	
CHAPTER 6	Kantian Theology	219
CHAPTER 7	The Kantian Church	250
PART IV	RECEPTIONS	
CHAPTER 8	The Lutheran Reception of Kantian Philosophy	293
CHAPTER 9	Kantianism and Absolute Idealism at Tübingen	333
CHAPTER 10	The Eclipse of Jesuit Scholasticism and the Catholic Reception of Kantian Philosophy	373

CHAPTER 11	“New Philosophies” at the Universities of Dillingen and Ingolstadt-Landshut	397
CHAPTER 12	The Early Jewish Reception of Kantian Philosophy	435
	Conclusion	478

Bibliographies · 489

Index · 517

Introduction

THE WORK THAT lies before the reader is a historical enquiry into Kantian philosophy as a form of philosophical religion. The author understands that such an undertaking will strike some readers as anomalous, perhaps even foolhardy. After all, except for some notable countercurrents to be discussed below, Kant is still overwhelmingly regarded as the paragon philosopher of a secular *Aufklärung* or Enlightenment.¹ The ground for this view lies in an understanding of reason that was propagated by Kant himself. On this understanding, reason is a free, a priori and hence universal capacity in which the human mind retrieves from within itself the principles of knowledge and morality. It is by identifying it with this conception of reason that his followers understand Kant's philosophy to be secular. In doing so, they distinguish it from all forms of knowledge and morality that are grounded in the inculcation of "positive" doctrines, especially the revealed scriptural teachings of the ecclesiastical religions, which are presented as the paradigm instance of the non-secular. So powerful is this conception of philosophical reason, that Kantians hold it capable of providing a secular foundation for religious faith itself, where belief in God is viewed as necessitated only to make reason effectual.² Some commentators also view philosophical reason as secular by virtue of its putative role as the foundation of the natural sciences. Here, the secularity of Kantian philosophy is warranted by treating it as accessing the a priori or transcendental conditions of ordinary empirical experience on which scientific knowledge is supposedly based.³

To view Kant as a thinker whose conception of reason made his philosophy intrinsically secular and scientific, however, turns out to be a distinctively

1. For a compact classic statement of this view of Kant, see L. W. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 426–30. For a recent formulation, see Guyer, "Mendelssohn, Kant".

2. See L. W. Beck, *Six Secular Philosophers*, 61–78.

3. For a recent statement of this view, see Ameriks, "Kant on Science"; also Guyer, *Kant*, 178–99.

modern approach, deriving from dominant streams of twentieth-century Kant commentary. In the period with which we are concerned, ca. 1780–1820, most of Kant’s closest followers and almost all his opponents viewed his philosophy in a different light. For both groups, Kantian philosophical reason had penetrated so deeply into the human mind or soul that it promised or threatened to provide an extra-ecclesial path to two goals customarily assigned to religion: spiritual self-clarification, and moral regeneration. In appearing to fulfil these key aspirations of religious thought and observance, Kantian philosophy was itself ascribed a religious disposition and standing and was frequently characterised as a philosophical religion.⁴ The present study is a historical enquiry into how this state of affairs came about and what it means for our understanding of Kantian philosophy and its relation to religion and the humanistic and natural sciences.

This does not mean, however, that our study is aligned with a recent school of Christian Kant scholarship. For this school, Kant’s philosophy is religious or “theologically affirmative” in the sense of providing a way of knowing and revering Christianity’s transcendent God.⁵ This approach grounds itself in a figure of thought that is indeed central to Kant’s philosophy and was largely effaced by twentieth-century Kant commentary, as this school rightly complains. This figure is the Christian-Platonic conception of the archetype (*Urbild*) or “prototype”. Understood as referring to an idea the thinking of which brings its object into existence, the language of archetype and ectype provides the members of this school with a means of conceiving and knowing God as the *intellectus archetypus*, or archetypal intellect.⁶ They thus regard Kantian philosophy as an archetypal or “prototypical” theology through which humans come to know and revere God as the “divine prototype” via the “transcendental incarnation” of an archetypal “Son of God”.⁷

In arguing that Kantian philosophy is theological and religious because it permits access to a transcendent divinity, however, this approach also finds little echo in the way that Kant’s philosophy was received by his contemporaries. For Kant and his followers, rather than arising from its putative role in granting redemptive knowledge of a transcendent divinity, the religious

4. For positive characterisations of this kind, see Reinhold, *Letters*, 1–27; Rätze, *Betrachtungen*, iii–xxii, 187–226; Zwanziger, *Religion des Philosophen*, v–xlv, 10–13, 138–68. For negative ascriptions, see Schulze, *Einige Bemerkungen*, 2–64; Alethophilus, *Ueber die Perfektibilität*, 43, 47, 64.

5. For an overview of this approach, see the Introduction to Firestone, Jacobs and Joiner, *Kant and the Question*, 1–10.

6. See Firestone and Jacobs, *In Defense*, 152–80. For a different but parallel view, treating the archetype of the “Son of God” as a “transcendental ideal” immanent to moral reason, yet still promising transcendent regeneration, see Palmquist, *Comprehensive Commentary*, 161–78. See also Palmquist, *Kant’s Critical Religion*, 140–88.

7. Here, I am summarising N. Jacobs, “Kant’s Prototypical Theology”, 136.

disposition of Kantian philosophy came solely from the immanent practice of the philosophy itself. We will see that the doctrine of archetypal intellection did indeed play an important part in this practice. This was not, however, because it supplied theological knowledge of a holy being. It was rather because it formed part of a philosophical practice through which the philosopher sought to make himself holy. Kant thus did not regard his philosophy as a “prototypical theology” through which humans could know and revere a transcendent Christian divinity. To the contrary, he regarded the Christian God as an idea invented by humans as a means of knowing and revering philosophical reason and its holy source, the philosophical self.⁸

For the same set of reasons, however, we are not characterising Kantianism as a philosophical religion in the sense in which Carlos Fraenkel uses this term. For Fraenkel, a philosophical religion is a form of philosophy that delivers through reason the spiritual perfection of human beings that supposedly lies at the heart of the great world religions. Fraenkel focuses this form of philosophy in a broadly Platonic and Averroistic conception of a divine form of reason in which intellection brings forth the thing that is intelligised and thus allows man to become a kind of god.⁹ Kantianism is not a philosophical religion in this sense, however, because while Kant does indeed make use of the concept of a godlike archetypal intellect, his philosophy is not grounded in it. Rather, Kant uses this conception as an ascetic device through which the Kantian philosopher establishes a certain way of relating to and acting on a philosophical self: namely, as a “sensibly affected rational being” in whom the higher archetypal intellect is concealed.¹⁰ This provides the philosopher with the motivation and the means to suspend the self-evidence of empirical experience by treating it as the defective or ectypal image of archetypal intellection, to which he now aspires in order to realise his higher self. But, as a way of attending to and acting on the self, this conception of archetypal intellection is nothing more than a historical ethical exercise, sitting alongside such ethical exercises as the neo-Stoic cultivation of strength of mind in the face of adversity, or the neo-Epicurean calming of the passions in pursuit of *ataraxia*, or inner calm. And while Kant did indeed attempt to position archetypal intellection of the moral law as the concealed core of the Christian religions, this was only a trojan-horse strategy that leading theologians detected and rejected out of hand, as we will see below.

It is the transformative role of Kantian philosophical reason that holds the key to its religious disposition and standing, justifying its characterisation as a philosophical religion. On the one hand, this role means that Kantian philosophy cannot be secular in the sense of being grounded in the mind’s free

8. For an emphatic declaration of this position, see *MM*, 599; *AA* VI, 487.

9. See Fraenkel, *Philosophical Religions*, 1–37.

10. See *GMM*, 106; *AA* IV, 460.

reflection on its a priori operations. That is because Kantian reflection is a way of acting on the self that is itself dependent on the inculcation of such positive doctrines as that of archetypal intellection. On the other hand, this same ascetic role means that Kantian philosophy cannot be religious in the sense of being grounded in theological knowledge of a transcendent God. And that is because Kantian holiness is only a name for the higher self pursued through the entirely immanent exercises transmitted in Kantian philosophy.

It is the role of Kantian philosophy in forming a higher holy self that sits at the centre of the present enquiry into its religious disposition. It is indeed true that Kant's philosophy provided his followers with new theories of knowledge, morality and religion. What made these theories magnetically attractive, however, is that they promised these followers a new path to intellectual clarity and moral regeneration. This would allow them to arrive at the higher self of the Kantian philosopher, spiritually clarified and morally autonomous, purely through the performance of various "acts of the self on the self". We should begin, then, by listening to what Kant's first followers themselves had to say about this.

A First-Generation Kantian

As a Lutheran teacher and writer on philosophical and theological topics, Johann Gottlieb Rätze (1760–1839) was typical of the first generation of Kant disciples.¹¹ Rätze initially had doubts about Kant's moral philosophy. He had balked at the hurdle that sent many potential converts tumbling back into Christianity: namely, Kant's teaching that the will of sensuous beings could be governed through a philosophical idea of the moral law, in the absence of divine command and without the reward of divine beatitude promised by Christianity.¹² What converted Rätze to Kantianism was his sudden insight, obtained through the reading of Kant's *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, that Kant's philosophy could provide the same kind of spiritual transformation and elevation as religion.

In 1794 Rätze recorded his conversion in the following terms:

But through *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, my respect for the author involuntarily rose to the highest level. I saw and felt that the author of this work was one of the greatest religious teachers. [. . .] Should someone ask, Why do I call Kant a religious teacher and not just a philosopher? [. . .] I would say, That's precisely why he is a great philosopher, because he is a great religious teacher. From now

11. For a brief overview of Rätze's life and works, see Prantl, "Rätze".

12. See Rätze, *Beilage*, iii–xxiii. This was the doctrine that Schulze characterised as "moralische Schwärmerei" (moral fanaticism). See, Schulze, *Einige Bemerkungen*, 59–64.

on, the true philosopher will or at least should be the best religious teacher, and religion and everything that is sacred to humanity has nothing to fear from him, but everything good to hope for.

Rätze went on to provide the following characterisation of the religion that Kant was teaching:

The pure moral religion [*reine moralische Religion*] is and remains good without any restrictions. It is and remains everywhere beyond all disputation. Whether it appears in a sensory garment or without one, whether it comes from mere reason or from the mouth of a supernatural messenger, in either case it remains above all worthy of reverence. Whether one regards her as the immediate daughter of heaven or of reason, she walks in heavenly splendour and inexpressible beauty.

Finally, this pious Lutheran Kantian concludes with a powerful evocation of the way in which Kantian philosophical reason was assuming the tasks of illumination and regeneration previously fulfilled by Christian teaching. If this meant that Kantian philosophy was inheriting Christian sublimity, then it was simultaneously supplying the latter with a rational ground:

The salvation that the genuine doctrine of Christ intends is also what the moral philosopher means, and no other. Pure practical reason as such is just as divinely disposed as all things that have descended from heaven in an extraordinary way. What no eye sees in the world of sense [*Sinnenwelt*], what no inclination desires, she [pure practical reason] recognises through her heavenly light, and wills with her impeccable will. The sublime objects that she contemplates and firmly wills are God, immortality and virtue. Even if we suppose that reason owes its perfect insight into the divine and invisible goods to a special teaching sent down directly from heaven, it must have had within itself beforehand an a priori capacity to determine the form and matter of an extraordinary revelation to be able to recognise and accept it as divine.¹³

Here, we can see a full symptomatic expression of the way in which Kantian philosophy had moved into the cultural space that had been previously dominated by ecclesial Christianity. True to Kant's basic teachings, Rätze declares that philosophical reason itself now provides access to sublime objects that had been the preserve of the Christian religion: to the invisible world lying beneath or above the world of sense, and to the impeccable purity of a will grounded in reason to the exclusion of all sensuous desires. In providing an extra-ecclesial path to these sublime objects, Kantian philosophy should itself be regarded as divinely disposed and heaven-sent and thence as harmonious

13. Rätze, *Betrachtungen*, iii–vi.

with Christ's teaching.¹⁴ At the same time, Rätze leaves his readers in no doubt that, rather than Christ, it is philosophical reason that is the ultimate source of holiness. That is because it is reason that provides the a priori criteria for recognising Christ's own divinity, which will itself turn out to be philosophical.

Rätze's view of the sublimely religious character of Kantian philosophy and of Kant himself was anything but eccentric. In the emotional intensity with which he superimposed philosophical regeneration on Christian salvation, in the audacity with which he treated Kantian reason as the criterion for recognising the divinity of Christianity and in the fundamental figure of thought in which he separated sensible knowledge of the "world of sense" from the supra-sensible or a priori insight of pure practical reason, we will see that Rätze was unfailingly representative of Kant's early followers.¹⁵ That Kantian philosophy was understood to be a kind of religion by its enemies no less than its friends can be seen in works by those for whom "philosophical religion" was a pejorative. For these anti-Kantians, philosophical religion signified a philosophy that was attempting to supplant Trinitarian confessional Christianity by a philosophical doctrine that falsely claimed to be the true meaning of Christianity and to possess the power of moral regeneration.¹⁶

Religion and Philosophy

Before proceeding further, however, we must negotiate a significant obstacle to understanding the religious disposition of Kantian philosophy. This arises from the fact that the terms "religion" and "philosophy" have never been anchored in agreed meanings and that the boundary between them has only ever been drawn to suit the purposes of sundry religious movements and philosophical schools. This difficulty is particularly acute in the various attempts to differentiate and relate religion and philosophy by grounding them in distinct faculties of faith and reason. Since what has counted as "faith" and "reason" has itself been captive to competing theological and philosophical schools, we cannot investigate the religious disposition of Kantian philosophy by appealing to some kind of essential difference (or similarity) between them. Not only was there no agreement about the meaning of these terms in Kant's time, but Kant's use of them is internal to his philosophy whose purposes it

14. In claiming this, Rätze had been anticipated almost word for word by another Lutheran Kantian, Johann Tieftrunk. See Tieftrunk, *Einzigmöglicher Zweck Jesu*, 60–96.

15. For further examples of Kant's early followers who shared Rätze's view of his philosophy as imbued with a spiritual sublimity that rivalled or even eclipsed that of ecclesiastical Christianity, see, inter alia, Reinhold, *Letters*, 28–49; Fichte, *Attempt*, 69–107; Sintenis, *Kleines Lehrbuch*, 17–31; Tieftrunk, *Versuch*, 67–111, 302–36; Heydenreich, *Propaedeutick*, 108–46; Zwanziger, *Religion des Philosophen*, 10–13, 93–96.

16. For a typical pejorative characterisation of Kantian philosophy as a "philosophische Religion", see Alethophilus, *Ueber die Perfektibilität*, 10–11, 14, 61–64.

serves. A historical enquiry into the religious disposition of Kantian philosophy thus cannot begin by defining the concepts of religion and philosophy and then ask which of them is the better fit. It must begin instead by investigating how Kant himself drew the border between philosophy and religion—how he circumscribed religion “innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft” (within the bounds of mere reason)—and for what purposes.

Kant’s circumscription of religion within the limits of philosophical reason was an artefact of specifically Kantian constructions of religion and philosophy. These constructions themselves provide a key to understanding the religious disposition of Kantian philosophy, or to what it means to characterise Kantianism as a philosophical religion. To understand Kant’s own conception of religion, it must be understood that for him and his followers, rather than referring to Germany’s three main Christian confessions—Lutheran, Catholic and Reformed—“religion” signified something quite different. In the first instance, Kant used the term to refer to a subjective attitude or disposition. This is the reverential attitude that the philosopher should adopt, not to God, but to a moral law found in his own reason. In relation to this law and its duties, God is an “idea” invented by reason to form the required attitude. This reverential attitude was to be adopted by treating the law of one’s own reason as if it were a divine commandment.

If these were its borders, however, then it would seem odd to characterise philosophical reason as “bare” or “mere” (*bloß*), as if part of religion exists beyond the borders of philosophy. In fact, these borders would seem to be coextensive with the territory of religion itself, apart, that is, from a residue of superstition. In Kant’s central formulation of this conception of religion in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, we thus find him declaring that

[i]n this way the moral law, through the concept of the highest good as the object and final end of pure practical reason, leads to *religion*, i.e., to the cognizance of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions—i.e., chosen and in themselves contingent ordinances of another’s will—but as essential laws of every free will for itself, which must nevertheless be regarded as commands of the supreme being.¹⁷

He would subsequently provide a more succinct formulation in his *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in 1793: “Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands”.¹⁸ And in the *Metaphysics of Morals* in 1797 he polished it a little further:

The *formal aspect* of religion, if religion is defined as (*instar*) “the sum of all duties as divine commands”, belongs to philosophical morals,

17. *CPrR*, 163–64 (trans. mod.); *AA* V, 129.

18. *RbR*, 177; *AA* VI, 153–54.

since this definition expresses only the relation of reason to the *idea* of God which reason makes for itself; and this does not yet make a duty of religion into a duty *to* (*erga*) God, as a being existing outside our idea, since we still abstract from his existence.¹⁹

Here, Kant treats the Christian God as an idea invoked or invented by philosophical reason or the Kantian philosopher as a means of shaping the attitude of reverence toward a law that in fact arises from within reason itself. For Kant, human beings must adopt this disposition of “respect” (*Achtung*) or “reverence” (*Ehrfurcht*) towards the moral law. For this disposition is the condition of obeying the law merely by thinking its idea, which is in turn the condition of true morality.²⁰ As a product of the practice of Kantian philosophy itself, the adoption of a reverential attitude towards the moral law points directly to the religious disposition of this philosophy. For Kant, “religion” signifies the reverential attitude that ought to be adopted towards philosophical reason. For the historian, however, the adoption of this reverential attitude is an instrument and effect of the practice of Kantian philosophy as a philosophical religion.

In constructing religion as a revering of moral reason achieved through the analogical or symbolic idea of the Christian God, Kant produced two opposed but mutually dependent conceptions of religion. In the first instance, this allowed him to conceive a form of religion as arising solely from moral reason or “pure practical reason” itself. Kant identified this “holiness” of practical reason with its putative capacity to determine the will solely through thinking the idea of the moral law. This was to the exclusion of all “external” desires, commands, rewards and punishments, whose determination of the will Kant ascribed to a different and “lower” faculty, “sensibility” (*Sinnlichkeit*). He called “rational faith” in this capacity the “pure moral religion” (*reine moralische Religion*)²¹ and the “pure religion of reason” (*reine Vernunftreligion*).²² This is the form of religion to which Rätze had converted, leading him to view Kant as an exalted religious teacher and Kantian philosophy as capable of the same kind of sublimity as Christianity; indeed, as expounding a form of philosophy that was itself divine or holy.

Kant’s second conception of religion was the one that he applied to the German Empire’s official or constitutional Christian confessions: Lutheranism, Catholicism and Reformed. He called these “faiths” rather than “religions”, on the grounds that there could only be one (true) religion. He distinguished

19. *MM*, 599; *AA* VI, 487.

20. For Rätze’s faithful exposition of this dispositional doctrine, see Rätze, *Betrachtungen*, 187–227.

21. For typical uses of the phrase by Kant, see *RbR*, 136–40; *AA* VI, 103–7, and *MM*, 599; *AA* VI, 487.

22. For examples of Kant’s usage, see *RbR*, 64, 142–46; *AA* VI, 12, 110–14.

these confessional faiths from the pure religion of reason by characterising them as grounded in positive historical doctrines and teachings, specifically in the biblical-ecclesiastical stories of human sin, divine incarnation and Christ's vicarious atonement for sin. Kant viewed these doctrines as having been invented by humans to express their reverence for the pure moral religion during the period in which it had been obscured by the man's unrefined sensibility and sensuous inclinations. As we will see in chapter 7, on this basis, Kant developed a theory and history of religion according to which biblical-ecclesiastical Christianity had served a beneficial purpose as the analogical historical "vehicle" for the pure religion of reason during the period of man's sensuous infancy. It became malignant and superstitious, however, when its positive doctrines and rites were themselves treated as the "means of grace". For the true source of moral regeneration lies only in "pure practical reason" and its capacity for governing the will by thinking the idea of the moral law to the exclusion of all "external" commands, rewards and punishments.

In brief, for Kant, Christianity as a "historical" religion could be accepted to the degree that it was the form in which humans revered the regenerative power of philosophical reason or the pure religion of reason. But this historical religion corrupted humanity as soon as its positive doctrines and rites were treated as the source of regeneration or salvation, as they were by Germany's Christian confessions. This militant attitude is a further pointer to the religious disposition of Kantian philosophy and the Kantian philosopher.

We will return to this double-sided construction of religion in Part III of this study. Our immediate concern, however, is to set it alongside Kant's construction of "philosophy", on which it is entirely dependent. Philosophy too, Kant claims, has a historical and a rational form. The reason for this, he declares, in a statement that is foundational for his entire philosophy, is that "the general root of our cognitive power divides and thrusts forth two stems"—namely, sensibility and reason.²³ According to his dualistic construction, sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) is a passive faculty for receiving sensible impressions from external sources, while understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*) constitute an active faculty of thought that brings its objects into existence.²⁴ On the basis of this double-sided spiritual anthropology, Kant then draws a distinction between two kinds of knowledge that runs through the "architectonic" of his entire philosophy. On one side, there is knowledge that is "historical" in the sense of being grounded in the passive human sensibility and hence reliant on temporal data and positive teachings being presented to it. On the other side, there is "rational" knowledge that Kant characterises as "arising initially only from a human being's own reason", with this making it independent of all temporal data and positive instruction.

23. *CPR*, A 835/B 863.

24. *CPR*, A 51/B 75.

From this distinction, Kant draws the remarkable conclusion that, while philosophy too can be historical knowledge when it is taught and learned as a body of erudite doctrine (he gives the example of the Wolffian philosophy in which he had himself been trained), as rational cognition, derived through reflection on the inner principles of reason, true philosophy can neither be taught nor learned:

The cause of this is the fact that the sources of cognition from which alone the teacher can draw his cognition do not lie anywhere but in the essential and genuine principles of reason; and hence the learner cannot obtain these cognitions from anywhere else, nor indeed dispute them. And this is so because here the use of reason, although performed *in concreto*, occurs nonetheless a priori, viz., by reference to pure and precisely therefore faultless intuition [*Anschauung*], and thus excludes all delusion and error. Hence among all the (a priori) rational sciences, solely mathematics can be learned. But philosophy can never be learned (except historically); rather, as far as reason is concerned, one can at most learn only *to philosophize*.²⁵

This conception of philosophy as an indisputable form of knowledge that arises from reason's pure reflection on its own a priori operations, and hence as something that cannot be acquired through the teaching and learning of positive doctrine, lies at heart of Kant's differentiation of philosophy from all positive *Wissenschaften* and historical disciplines. It holds the key to his subordination of the latter to the former. In the first instance, it is how he distinguishes "historical" religion from "rational" philosophy. Kant thus treats the "positive" doctrinal and scriptural character of confessional Christianity as indicative of the fact that it can be taught and learned, and thence as symptomatic of its status as a merely historical knowledge of God grounded in the passive sensibility or man's lower sensible self. This is what divorces historical religion from rational moral knowledge arrived at through philosophical reason's reflection on its own transcendental operations.

On this basis, Kant can construe philosophical morality or "pure practical reason" as a capacity to determine the will solely through the philosophical exercise of thinking the idea of the moral law. It is this capacity to determine the will by thinking a philosophical idea or principle independently of all positive religious teachings and rites that Kant calls "holy". This allows him to locate the true source of holiness in philosophical reason rather than confessional religion, and thence arrogate to philosophy the right to decide what can count as holy or "divine" in the Christian religion itself, as we saw Rätze claiming.

The strategic, not to say militant, character of Kant's way of differentiating and relating religion and philosophy is now clear. On the one hand, in

25. *CPR*, A 837/B 865.

arguing that he discussed religion only within the boundaries of philosophical reason, understood as the retrieval of a priori principles in the human mind, Kant could declare that he did not interfere with the historical teachings of the Christian theologians and churches. This disingenuous declaration was intended to buy him immunity from the ecclesiastical and judicial supervision of his teachings. On the other hand, in treating the historical teachings of Christianity as analogical or symbolic inventions designed to revere a regenerative moral philosophy during the period of man's sensuous immaturity, Kant could simultaneously treat these teachings as corrupting to the extent that they claimed to be salvific. This meant that they were destined to be superseded by his own pure moral religion once humanity attained rational maturity or *Aufklärung*. Kant's way of differentiating religion from philosophy was thus a means of exercising philosophical hegemony over the domain of intellectual self-clarification and moral regeneration previously occupied by religion. This provides a key pointer to the religious disposition and role of Kantian philosophy as a philosophical religion.

A Turning Point

There would seem to be something wonderfully paradoxical, however, in Kant's claiming that philosophy could not be learned in a massive book, his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that was entirely dedicated to teaching it. That, at least, is how his argument struck the Lutheran humanists and historians whose disciplines were founded on the gaining of knowledge by reading books and examining documents. In coming to understand Kant's philosophy by reading his own books, the humanists regarded his claim that true philosophy could not be taught and learned as misguided; indeed, as faintly ridiculous. In response to Kant's claim that while biblical or "scholarly" religion had to be taught and learned, rational or "natural" religion was universally accessible through reason without instruction, the Lutheran humanist theologian Johann Georg Rosenmüller expressed blank disbelief:

Really, without instruction? [. . .] But where does one find these people who, without instruction, convince themselves of the truth of natural religion through their own reason? Such people are not found in our part of the world. Rather, we note with sadness that those living here who grow up without instruction, have neither natural nor revealed religion, know almost nothing about God and their duties, and are not much better than irrational animals living in accordance with their sensual impulses.²⁶

The humanists had a point. For if we examine Kant's central claim—that since philosophising consists in reason's retrieval of its a priori operations it

26. Rosenmüller, *Einige Bemerkungen*, 179.

cannot be taught as positive historical doctrine—then this claim would itself seem to be dependent on a deeply embedded yet indelibly positive historical doctrine. This is the doctrine or figure of thought that runs through Kant’s entire discussion, and indeed his entire philosophy: namely, that man is a double-natured being, consisting of a passive sensibility that is subject to sensible impressions and inclinations, and an active reason or understanding that brings order to these through a priori operations. In one of his most well-known presentations of this doctrine, Kant thus declares that

[w]e can give the name *sensibility* [*Sinnlichkeit*] to our mind’s *receptivity*, that is, to its capacity to receive presentations [*Vorstellungen*] insofar as it is affected in some manner. On the other hand, the mind’s capacity to produce presentations from itself, that is, the *spontaneity* of cognition, is called *understanding* [*Verstand*]. Our nature is such that our *intuition* [*Anschauung*] can never be other than *sensible*; i.e., it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, that enables us to *think* the object of sensible intuition is the *understanding*.²⁷

It is only through this figure of thought that Kant could present philosophy in terms of the unteachable retrieval of the a priori conditions of rational cognition. That is because it was only by accepting this doctrine that Kant’s followers came to think of themselves as swept by chaotic sensations and inclinations arising from their sensibility. This is what drove them to look inwards to find the a priori or suprasensible operations of the mind that could render their sensations intelligible and their desires governable.

In other words, the doctrine of man’s double-natured sensible and rational being may be regarded a positive device that permits Kantian philosophers to attend to and act on themselves to achieve a certain kind of self-transformation. Through this learned device, they could seek to transform their intellectual insight and moral disposition. It promised philosophical apprentices a way of overcoming the cognitive and moral limitations of a lower sensible self through the philosophical retrieval of the “pure” cognitive and moral principles of a higher, suprasensible self hidden within them. This was the self of the philosopher. Kant’s strategy for distinguishing between an unlearnable a priori philosophy and a learned doctrinal religion was thus dependent on his followers learning the philosophical doctrine of double-natured rational and sensible man. Indeed, in distinguishing between “rational” and “historical” knowledge, Kant’s entire philosophical architectonic was dependent on the learning of this doctrine.

By learning to conceive of themselves as “sensibly affected rational beings”, Kantians acquire the desire and ability to suspend acceptance of various

27. *CPR*, A 51/B 75 (trans. mod.).

aspects of their “external” experiential world, treating these as arising from a passive sensibility that is subject to chaotic sensations and uncontrolled sensuous inclinations. This act of sceptical suspension in turn incites the Kantian desire to turn inwards to seek the means of controlling the sensible intuitions and inclinations through concealed principles and laws of reason. In the case of religion, for example, the teaching of this doctrine allowed Kantians to view doctrinal Christianity as having arisen from the sensibility’s incapacity for insight into the true source of holiness, which lies in reason’s capacity to conform the will to the idea of the moral law. In viewing their own sensibility as the source of a “deluded” belief in the saving power of merely “external” religious doctrines and rites, Kantians act on themselves to suspend this belief. This permits them to form a new religious disposition, namely reverence for the idea of the moral law itself, whose putative capacity to determine the will through its thinking they now ascribe to a higher moral self within them.

Our introductory discussion has now reached a turning point. In treating Kant’s doctrine of man the double-natured sensible and rational being as a means of acting on the self to transform its intellectual disposition and conduct, we have begun to reconstruct the usual understanding of the relation between philosophy and religion. Like most philosophers and many theologians, Kant presumes that there is an essential difference between philosophy and religion that is grounded in an even more fundamental difference between “reason” and “faith”. We have seen that Kant presents this as the difference between an unteachable philosophical reason grounded in the mind’s transcendental reflection on its own operations and a historical religion dependent on revealed or inculcated positive doctrines. If, however, Kantian reflection on the transcendental grounds of knowledge is itself programmed by the positive doctrine of double-natured sensible and rational man, then, in this regard, Kantian philosophy is no different in kind from the positive doctrines taught in biblical-ecclesiastical Christianity, although it may of course differ in operation and purpose. Indeed, we will show that Kant’s doctrine of double-natured man was itself derived from the seminal Christian doctrine of the double-natured Christ. For it was the redemptive mediation or “exchange of properties” (*communicatio idiomatum*) between the human and divine natures of the Eucharistic Christ that supplied the model for the regenerative mediation between the sensible and rational natures of Kant’s humanity.

For the moment, then, let us propose that, rather than being opposed through their grounding in fundamentally different faculties—reason and faith, rationality and sensibility—in eighteenth-century Germany, philosophy and religion overlapped uneasily within a shared cultural-political domain. They both transmitted doctrines and exercises for acting on the self with a view to transforming its intellectual and moral disposition into those of a higher form. With this hypothesis, which is fundamental to the entire study that follows, we mark the transition from philosophical and theological

approaches to philosophy and religion to an approach that is purely historical. For our hypothesis is that the means of acting on the self that are transmitted in philosophy and religion are executed in concrete practices of self-attention and self-transformation. These practices are themselves regarded as purely historical activities that are not grounded in transcendental reflection, since transcendental reflection may itself be seen as one of these practices, in Kant's case programmed by the doctrine of double-natured sensible and rational man.

Rather than entailing that philosophy and religion are the same thing, or that Kantian philosophy is “really” a disguised religion, however, this approach views certain forms of philosophy and religion as transmitting overlapping practices of self-transformation.²⁸ This means that the difference between philosophy and religion must itself be viewed as a historical one, being drawn by those operating in the overlap between them to mark a difference for certain purposes. Kant thus drew the distinction between a transcendental rational philosophy and a historical positive Christianity in order to immunise his radical criticisms of biblical-ecclesiastical Christianity against religious and political counterattack, for this allowed him to claim that his criticisms were grounded in the free use of universal reason and thence fell within philosophy and under the jurisdiction of the philosophy faculty, rather than within religion and the jurisdiction of the theology faculty.²⁹ If, however, Kant's “universal reason” itself consists of particular practices of intellectual self-transformation, aimed at the formation of a higher kind of self, then Kantian philosophy continued to share a common cultural form and function with ecclesiastical Christianity.

By treating Kantianism as a philosophical of religion, then, we do not mean that it is grounded in “faith” as opposed to “reason”, still less that it contains an irrational religious core that betrays its rational calling as philosophy, or, conversely, a rational religious core that destines it to supplant the ecclesiastical faiths. Rather, characterising it as a philosophical religion constitutes a hypothesis that is intended to open for historical investigation four key features of Kantian philosophy itself. First, such a characterisation provides a pointer to the fact that this philosophy shares a culture of ascetic self-transformation with the Christian religions. In this culture, technical philosophical arguments work as exercises for eliciting and crafting a spiritually higher form of self: for Kantians, the self of the philosopher. Second, it also alerts us to the fact that Kant drew the intellectual materials for these exercises from sources supplied by Christian academic theology and early modern metaphysics. In subjecting these sources to a brilliant adaptation and

28. For a parallel approach to Spinoza's moral philosophy, viewing it as devotional practice containing an ensemble of exercises in spiritual self-transformation, see the illuminating study by Carlisle, *Spinoza's Religion*, 1–34. For an argument regarding the overlapping of (Wolffian) philosophy and Protestant theology in Spalding's *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*, again considered as a devotional work, see Printy, “Determination”.

29. See *CF*, 250–51, 257–64; *AA VII*, 21–23, 29–38.

repurposing, Kant retained the religious goals of spiritual self-clarification and moral regeneration but transposed them into a philosophical practice, thence permitting them to be pursued outside the church. Third, it draws our attention to the fact that Kantian philosophy was elaborated and propagated within the academic institutions of the Christian confessions, Lutheran in the first instance, where it was aimed at serious-minded young men pursuing spiritual vocations. Fourth, it allows us to see that in providing an extra-ecclesial means of moral self-transformation, focused on the crafting of a morally autonomous philosophical self, Kantianism came into in direct competition with the redemptive ecclesiastical confessions, where it was viewed as a rival religion.

To the extent that this study does have critical implications, then, they do not flow from an attempt to convict Kantian philosophy of being something that it should not be: a religion. To the contrary, it is argued that the cultivation of spiritual clarity and moral purity through the practice of philosophy imbues Kantianism with a genuine and ultimately indefeasible ascetic core. Where this approach brings Kantianism down to earth, or into history, is in its treatment of this cultivation as grounded in contingent ascetic exercises rather than transcendental reflection. For, in treating it as a concrete exercise, this approach allows transcendental reflection to be investigated as a historical phenomenon rather than accepted as an a priori foundation. At the same time, in clarifying the fact that these exercises are undertaken as a result of existential desires and emotional decisions rather than pure rational reflection, this approach makes it possible to see that, like the fundamental doctrines and observances of confessional Christianity, so too those of Kantian philosophy are transmitted through initiation, conversion and inculcation. In this regard, Kantian philosophy was also similar to the ambient Cartesian, Spinozan and Leibnizian philosophies in which Kant was steeped. And we will see that this imbues Kantian philosophy with a tendency towards sectarianism and proselytising, or the teaching of ungrounded existential practices of intellectual and moral life as if they are absolute truths superior to the teachings of other such ways of life. It will become clear, however, that while Kantianism does not escape this tendency, it is no worse (and no better) in this regard than the rival philosophies that it sought to vanquish and the confessional religions that it sought to supersede.

The Ascetic Function of Philosophy

We can now formulate the central difference between this historical approach and the more usual philosophical approaches to Kantian philosophy. Approached philosophically, the self or “subject” is presumed to already exist, universally. The role of Kant’s exercises in transcendental deliberation and moral self-reflection is, then, to reveal a priori principles of cognition and morality that are presumed already universally present in this self. When

Kantian philosophy is approached historically, however, by attending to its ascetic function, the philosophical self is regarded quite differently. It now appears as something that the exercises in transcendental deliberation and moral self-reflection bring into existence as a higher form of self, but only for and among those intellectual athletes who achieve the difficult mastery of these exercises.

The scale of the reorientation involved in this approach to Kantian philosophy now becomes clear. Far from being the hallmarks of its secular and universal character, reflection on the transcendental principles of knowledge and the transcendent principle of morality come to be seen as the core of the ascetic function and disposition of Kantian philosophy. For these forms of reflection are the instruments and effects of intellectual exercises in which Kantians act on themselves to bring a higher form of the self into existence: the self of the Kantian philosopher. To the extent that these exercises in spiritual self-clarification and moral regeneration were regarded as rivalling those found in the confessional religions and academic metaphysics—as they were by Kant’s followers and opponents alike—they were responsible for Kantianism being regarded as a philosophical religion.

Even though this historiographical approach is alien to Kant studies and Kantian philosophical history, it is well attested in the humanist historiography of philosophy, theology and religion, and particularly in studies of classical and late antiquity and early Christianity. Thus scholars of early Christianity have investigated the ascetic role of philosophical and religious teachings in transforming and elevating the self through dietetic and sexual regimens designed to etherialise the person and bring them spiritually closer to God.³⁰ For their part, historians of Stoic, Epicurean and Platonic philosophy have used the term “psychagogy” to characterise the use of philosophical teaching as a means of guiding the conduct of the intellect or soul: for example, to control anger, manage grief or steel the self against misfortune.³¹ Understood thus as the guidance or leading of the soul (*Seele*), the notion of psychagogy is captured in a web of German synonyms, including *Seelenleitung* and *Seelenführung*—the guiding or conducting of the intellect or soul—and *Lebensführung*, the conducting of life.³²

That said, it cannot be ignored that this approach has not been brought to bear on Kantian philosophy, nor indeed on German idealism more broadly. The exception that proves the rule is provided by Christopher Insole’s

30. See Brown, *Body and Society*.

31. See, for example, Sellars, *Art of Living*; Sorabji, *Emotion*; Garrett, “Seventeenth-Century Moral Philosophy”; Schofield and Striker, *Norms*. For an overview, see Sharpe and Ure, *Philosophy*.

32. For clarifications of these terms, see Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 15–22; I. Hadot, *Seneca*, 1–9.

important theological research into Kantian philosophy, for this is indeed alert to the ascetic function of Kantian teaching, in particular Kant's Platonic philosophemes. In discussing the role of the distinction between noumena and appearances in Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Insole thus makes this acute observation:

At this point, we can see how Kant's *Groundwork* can be read, provocatively but suggestively, as a faithful variant upon a perennial Platonic discipline of spiritual exercises, whereby we perform a type of *askesis*, stripping the self of false consolations and distorting passions, as we aspire toward a form of rational self-transcendence. Through the exercise of reason, we purify our will and intelligence of passions, distractions, and obsessions. The aspiration is to transcend the self, and to join a harmonious community with other rational agents and with the cosmos as a whole.³³

It is no reflection on Insole's illuminating study that he tags this approach to Kant as something to be followed up in future research. In any case, this perhaps helps to mitigate the hubris of claiming that the present study is the first full-scale investigation of the Kantian "asceticism". To the extent that this claim turns out to be justified, however, it is possible to identify three main reasons for this surprising state of academic affairs. First, there is the obstacle to such an approach posed by a Christian philosophical historiography that has sought to exclude modern philosophy from the sphere of ascetic self-transformation and arrogate this largely to the Christian religion. In Pierre Hadot's version of this history, in late antiquity the ascetic and transformative functions of ancient philosophy were taken over by Christian religious worship and spiritual practice. This supposedly left modern philosophy as an abstract theoretical "method", bereft of ancient philosophy's ascetic role as a "way of life".³⁴

The second factor placing the ascetic function of Kantian philosophy outside the reach of historical enquiry has been the undoubted success of Kant and his followers in presenting the model of double-natured sensible and rational man as the unquestionable and unsurpassable condition of philosophical reflection on human cognition and morality. By studiously ignoring the possibility that Kant had invented this model as a device through which philosophers could attend to and act on themselves, Kantians have been able to treat the retrieval of a priori cognitive and moral principles as a necessary and universal operation of the human mind or reason; rather, that is, than as a contingent philosophical rite performed to transform the self into a higher form.

33. Insole, *Intolerable God*, 141. For my discussion of the *Groundwork* in these terms, see Hunter, "Morals of Metaphysics"; also Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments*, 274–363.

34. For this view, see P. Hadot, *Philosophy*, 264–76. For a nuanced presentation of Hadot's argument, see Sharpe and Ure, *Philosophy*, 127–50, 315–20.

The final reason for the absence of historical studies of Kantianism as an ascetic philosophy is the formidable way in which academic Kantians, having been inducted into this crafting of a higher philosophical self, have waged a series of unremitting culture wars against humanist historiography. That is the significance of Kant's treatment of "historical" philosophy and religion as symptoms of a lower sensible self's failure to retrieve the pure a priori principles concealed in a higher rational self. Kantians have thus managed to ward off historical investigation into the ascetic means by which they acquired such a self by inhabiting it in a sectarian and combative manner.

Considering this, for a historian proposing to investigate Kantian philosophy as an *askēsis* for crafting a higher philosophical self, it would be unwise to underestimate the difficulty of the undertaking or indeed the force of the resistance that it might generate. It will be helpful, then, to reinforce Insole's pointer with a passage from the premier historian of late-ancient philosophy and early Christianity, Peter Brown, cited on this occasion for methodological rather than substantive purposes. In this passage, Brown recounts how, having made their peace with their bodies through various renunciatory practices, late-ancient polytheistic philosophers turned to the ascetic powers of philosophy to transform their minds into the seat of a higher self:

For the ascetic in the philosophical tradition of polytheism, the greatest pain lay in the mind. The disruptive consequences of embodiment were neutralized by the physical renunciations we have described. These renunciations left the philosopher's true self free to engage with as little distraction as possible from the adventitious body, in the unremitting labour required to awaken the dormant energies of the mind. Contemplation of the order of the universe; analysis of the principles of human knowledge; heartfelt and prolonged engagement in the practice of the Platonic dialectic; often, the slow and subtle labour of scholarship and exegesis: these activities were frankly intellectual and assumed continued dependence on a learned tradition in its fullness—libraries full of books and an intense study-circle of well-born disciples. But they were activities engaged in with deep religious reverence. They were solemn rites of the mind, performed so as to arouse to action the great god that *was* the philosopher's self.³⁵

Despite their highly intellectual character, the activities that Brown itemises—contemplation of the cosmic order, reflection on the principles of knowledge, engagement in the Platonic dialectic, scholarship, and exegesis—are not viewed as modes of a priori reflection through which the mind recovers its own operations. Evocative though they are of similar exercises in Kant's philosophy, Brown treats them as ascetic devices for attending to and acting

35. Brown, "Asceticism", 622–23.

on the self, governed by the telos of awakening it to a higher form and order of existence.³⁶ One could do worse as a shorthand for the present study than to say that, in elucidating the religious disposition of Kantian philosophy, it seeks to provide an account of the “solemn rites of the mind” through which the godlike Kantian philosophical self is awakened and roused to action.

These “rites” or exercises for crafting a philosophical self are precisely what was obscured by a militantly anti-historical twentieth-century Kant commentary. Considering the formidable role played by American Kant commentary in this regard, it is fitting to retrieve an example of the ascetic or transformative role of Kantian philosophy from the headwaters of American Kantianism itself. William Torrey Harris was a child of Connecticut Congregationalism, graduate of the Andover Academy and Yale University, founder of the Kant Club and the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* and, finally, commissioner of education under the Harrison administration (1889–1906). In 1888, in his preface to an American edition of Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*, Harris recorded the rousing of his own Kantian self in the following terms:

By the study of the Kantian writings we came to acquire by degrees the new faculties of introspection. We acquired some power of seeing internal processes without the aid of mental pictures and images. Then the words and apparent statements of progressive insights began to have precise and reasonable meaning to us, and a new realm of knowledge arose before our souls with continually increasing clearness. Its clearness in fact was of such a character that all previous knowledge seemed quite dim in comparison. We found ourselves learning to see truths that are universal and necessary—“apodictic,” as Kant calls them. Previous views of truth had not seemed exhaustive. [. . .] But now with the newly acquired power of introspection we could see glimpses of the final and exhaustive truth. We felt it now to be in our power to make indefinite progress in this new inventory of the world.³⁷

The central hypothesis of the present study is that when approached historically, Kant’s philosophy can be understood as a repository of ascetic intellectual exercises of the broad kind studied by Brown and the specific kind enacted by Harris. In tracking this hypothesis through a sequence of exegetical and contextual investigations, the study shows that this ensemble of Kantian intellectual exercises, constitutive of Kant’s theoretical no less than his moral philosophy, gave rise to a philosophical religion. This was both filiated to and

36. In addition to Brown’s pathbreaking research into the ascetic dimension of philosophy and theology in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, see the papers collected in Wimbush and Valantasis, *Asceticism*. For studies of Christian hermeneutics as an ascetic practice, see, Wiedemann, *Asceticism and Exegesis*. See also, more generally, Graiver, *Asceticism of the Mind*, 1–27.

37. Harris, “Preface”, iv.

in competition with Germany's confessional religions, and was received as such by its adherents and opponents.

Philosophy and Humanism

Before outlining the book's argument, and to obviate misunderstandings, to the extent that this is possible, it will be useful to briefly situate this unusual approach to Kant in the context of a broader historical understanding of philosophy and historiography. We need to clarify what it means to argue that rather than retrieving a priori principles from the mind, Kantian philosophy consists of an ensemble of intellectual devices and exercises through which those inducted into them acquire new capacities for philosophical self-reflection and moral self-transformation. Needless to say, this approach does not preclude these devices and exercises being composed of technical philosophical arguments of great intricacy, sophistication and (sometimes) daunting complexity. Nor, if we adopt an appropriately pluralistic conception of knowledge, does it preclude these arguments giving rise to objects of knowledge: specifically, the transcendental categories and forms of intuition, the moral law and the "pure moral religion". The book's central argument does mean, however, that the governing purpose of these arguments is ascetic or therapeutic; that is, aimed at guiding and transforming the intellect to realise a higher form of self. As will be shown in detail in the following chapters, the nature of this guidance and transformation is such that, while it results in self-knowledge of a certain kind, it does not result in objective or "public" knowledge. For the moment, objective knowledge can be understood in terms of a capacity for impartiality, while impartiality can in turn be understood as a historical intellectual deportment of a certain kind. This involves the suspension of "private" moral and metaphysical commitments and the cultivation of a "stance" of openness towards some kind of phenomenal field. This in turn is attained through the "public" mastery of discipline-specific methods of investigation—calculative, observational, experimental, philological, historical—in which access to objects of knowledge does not take place through transcendental introspection.³⁸

We are thus enabled to adopt a different stance towards the fundamental claim with which Kant announces his "Copernican revolution" in philosophy at the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: that is, his claim that rather than assuming that "our cognition must conform to objects" we should assume instead that "objects must conform to our cognition".³⁹ For it now

38. Compare this with John Rawls's exclusion of Kantian philosophy as a "comprehensive doctrine" from the domain of "public reason" in which all citizens should be able to participate. See Rawls, "Justice as Fairness"; Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 212–54.

39. *CPR*, B xvi.

becomes possible to see that this claim cannot be an object of impartial, objective or public knowledge. That is because, before this claim can be acceded to, the reader must have first been inducted into Kant's doctrine of man the double-natured being: only someone who has been taught that they have a sensibility that delivers "scattered" intuitions to an intellect that synthesises them into intelligible objects can think that "objects must conform to our cognition". Acceding to Kant's "Copernican" claim is conditional on performing the sceptical exercise programmed by this doctrine, in which the apprentice philosopher is required to suspend the self-evidence of empirical experience. This performance is driven by the intense desire to attain the higher form of self whose elevation is understood precisely in terms of the "purity" or freedom of its intellect from empirical determination. Philosophical "knowledge" that the experience of the temporal world depends on timeless operations taking place a priori in the mind is thus only available to a select cohort of the philosophically educated: the group whose members have learned to act on themselves using philosophical arguments to craft a self whose beholding of this knowledge is a mark of spiritual purity. This raises them above all the "lower selves" who presume to have direct knowledge of the empirical world, or who simply take no interest in the question at all.

For this reason, the Kantian claim that empirical experience depends on timeless a priori operations of the mind cannot be an object of impartial investigation in the relevant sense. In other words, this claim cannot be assented to conditionally, on the basis of evidence gathered from a field of phenomena formed by techniques of investigation that are independent of the ascetic cultivation of a higher philosophical self—the reason being that the claim that empirical experience depends on a priori intellectual synthesis is itself an instrument and effect of just such ascetic cultivation. It is a central doctrine of the Kantian philosophical religion, in fact. This difference between philosophical self-elevation and humanist impartiality remains in place even though impartiality is itself a cultivated intellectual deportment. That is because the mastery of humanist investigative methods—of philology, source criticism, historical contextualisation—is designed to open the self to an external evidentiary field. This differentiates them from the philosophical methods of transcendental deliberation, which are designed turn the self inwards to timeless archetypes and laws that render it holy.

It must be made clear that here "impartiality" and "objective knowledge" are not being used to signify a privileged (meta)philosophical or epistemological theory of true cognition; for example, one grounded in a model of truth derived from the physical sciences and experimental method. In this study, rather than being grounded in a philosophical or epistemological theory, impartiality is approached as an object of historical investigation. Impartiality emerges not as a claim to philosophical truth, but as an alternative to it. In keeping with recent research in the history of science, philosophy, theology and "erudition",

impartiality and objectivity can be understood as ways of conducting the intellect that arose from a variety of loosely related early modern intellectual movements aimed at transforming the social and cultural organisation of knowledge.⁴⁰ While these movements took different forms and developed in different directions depending on their disciplinary domains, they shared a common background and animating drive. This lay in the sixteenth-century humanistic recovery of ancient learning and the will to use this against “scholastic” forms of philosophy by developing new practical disciplines from the ancient sources. Jill Krave is undoubtedly right to point out that since they both made use of ancient classical texts, the border between humanism and scholastic philosophy was porous and fluid. She is even more right to remind us, though, that while the humanists viewed these texts as records of historical ways of thought and life, the philosophers treated them as the source of “timeless answers to universal questions” to be gathered from the “rational demonstrability of the arguments presented in the writings of Aristotle”.⁴¹ To the extent that it arose from various ways of rejecting and combating metaphysical philosophical orders of knowledge, then, impartiality too was informed by will and decision and by the emotion of fighting for new, non-philosophical regimes of knowledge.

In his discussion of the transition from “truth to impartiality” in the domain of natural philosophy, Stephen Gaukroger thus focuses on Francis Bacon’s humanistic programme for a “reform of learning”.⁴² This was a programme aimed at nothing less than transforming the conduct of the scientific intellect by expelling various “idols” of the mind or modes of intellectual conduct deposited by Aristotelian scholasticism. Bacon’s aim was to shape a conduct of the intellect that was impartial in the sense of approaching nature as an object of technical access and control, independently of theological and metaphysical commitments. Unlike truth, impartiality could never be absolute. To the extent that it was a stance towards objects of enquiry that depended on the practical mastery of technical methods for conducting the intellect, impartiality would always be a matter of degree, and so too would objectivity. Further, to the extent that it was dependent on the gathering of evidence from technically determined phenomenal fields, impartial investigation and objective knowledge remained permanently provisional and open to disconfirmation, sidelining apodictic philosophical truth in favour of merely probable empirical hypotheses.

40. For a collection of essays exploring this approach, see Murphy and Traninger, *Emergence*; also Daston and Galison, *Objectivity*.

41. Krave, “Reconfiguring”, 97.

42. For a succinct presentation of his research on Bacon in this regard, see Gaukroger, “Autonomy”; for a more detailed account, Gaukroger, *Francis Bacon*.

In his monumental reconstruction of European intellectual history, Dmitri Levitin has used the humanistic recovery of ancient learning to prosecute an even more wide-ranging decentring of philosophy in intellectual history. In the case of natural philosophy, Levitin argues that from the Renaissance onwards this field was progressively colonised by humanist physicians and mathematicians who used ancient sources to develop technical methods to constitute various fields of investigable phenomena. In doing so, they relegated all concern with ultimate laws, essences and substances to the scorned domain of the “philosophers”.⁴³ In the case of theology, Levitin argues that here too humanistic erudition worked a profound transformation. It provided the means of expelling philosophical or natural theological explications of faith from the domain of theology, supplanting them by philological and historical investigations into the Bible and the Christian churches.⁴⁴ Here too the effect was gradually to transform biblical revelations and religions into phenomena open to impartial investigation by humanists whose goal was to obtain historical knowledge of them independent of their claims to truth. In this, the biblical philologists and historians were remarkably successful, even though they were frequently driven by the conviction that such knowledge would serve the interests of their particular confessions.⁴⁵

An exemplification of Levitin’s argument that brings us closer to Kant is provided by Gottfried Arnold’s massive *Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie* (Impartial history of the church and heresy) of 1699.⁴⁶ In this remarkable work, Arnold laid out a self-consciously “impartial” agenda by suspending the question of the truth or error of the theological doctrines and religious movements that he was investigating.⁴⁷ He declared that he would approach them instead in the humanistic manner: through copious citation of original documentary sources, careful summary of their central teachings, and contextual investigation of the times, places and circumstances in which they had arisen.⁴⁸ If the context for interpreting religious documents thus lay in the ecclesiastical practices that gave rise to them, and in the condition of the churches under circumstances of religious and civil conflict or peace, then Arnold was no less clear about what context consisted of: namely, historical acts and events. But he applied the same optic to the theological doctrines themselves, arguing that the key to viewing them impartially, without regard to their normative truth or falsity, was to approach them too as historical

43. See Levitin, *Kingdom of Darkness*, 25–119.

44. See Levitin, *Kingdom of Darkness*, 120–64.

45. See Levitin, “Introduction”.

46. Arnold, *Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie*.

47. For an illuminating discussion of Arnold’s work, see Lehmann-Brauns, *Weisheit*, 266–307.

48. Arnold provided a detailed account of his method and agenda in an unpaginated foreword, consisting of fifty-three numbered paragraphs.

acts and events. In the thirteenth paragraph of his Foreword, Arnold thus declared that

[t]hese and all other matters pertaining are now to be treated one and all solely as certain acts or events [*gewisse facta oder geschehene dinge*]. And even if they contain many controversial questions and doctrines (especially the heresy histories), here, in keeping with the proper manner of a history, they will not be regarded as such, but will be viewed, narrated and judged as certain past actions [*gewisse vergangene actiones*]. Therefore, although a sincere reminder of this or that error (which may of course creep in) is gratefully acknowledged and even requested [by the author], a solemn protest is nevertheless made against all and sundry who take pleasure in quarrelling and who would wish to raise a dispute over this or that doctrinal point, in which one has no intention of taking part or undertaking to engage. (§ 13)

In his discussion of Socinianism, Arnold thus begins by drawing on various secondary sources to outline the circumstances of its development in Poland, ca. 1550–1650, as a persecuted minority religion. In providing an outline of Socinian doctrines and worship, it is striking that Arnold neither criticises the religion as a heresy nor endorses it as a precursor to a rational unitarian Christianity. Instead, by citing copiously from the central Socinian confession, the Racovian Catechism (1574), he provides a lucid account of the movement’s anti-Trinitarian theology, its treatment of Christ as a human teacher, its rejection of vicarious atonement, and its eschatological view of Christ as King in judging the “quick and the dead” in the last days.⁴⁹ Arnold thus approaches Socinianism as a historical religious movement characterised by a body of positive doctrinal teachings that can be known through documentary sources and described without regard to its truth or falsity. This is what he means when declaring his history to be “impartial”.

As we will see in chapters 6 and 7 below, in all these regards, Arnold’s humanistic approach to Christian doctrine and worship differs starkly from Kant’s philosophical approach. For, in declaring that the Christian Bible contained a “pure moral religion”, or “pure religion of reason” concealed within it, Kant provides no contextual evidence and cites no textual sources that might show this to be the case. Instead, by making knowledge of the moral religion dependent on an ascetic hermeneutics that imbued the Kantian philosopher with a higher moral insight, Kant’s approach to Christianity could not be impartial in Arnold’s sense: that is, open to anyone trained to decipher and

49. See Arnold, *Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie*, Pt. 2, ch. 13 (557–74). It is worth noting that in his assemblage and use of these primary and secondary sources Arnold’s account sits comfortably alongside modern scholarship on the Socinians. See, for example, Deane, “Racovian Catechism”.

contextualise the relevant historical sources, such as the Racovian Catechism. And, of course, Kant made no bones about elevating his philosophy above historical Christianity, treating the latter as a tissue of superseded superstitions.

Surely one of the most striking things about the late eighteenth-century context in which Kantianism appeared, is that, despite all talk of “the Enlightenment”, this rift between humanistic and philosophical approaches to knowledge remained more entrenched than ever. By this stage, the humanistic historiography of theology and philosophy had become a formidable cultural force, finding its German headquarters at the Lutheran university of Göttingen. Here, it was exemplified in the ecclesiastical historiography of Johann Lorenz Mosheim and the biblical philology and history of Johann David Michaelis and his student, the classical humanist Johann Gottfried Eichhorn. Typifying the kind of research undertaken at Göttingen in the 1790s was the “synoptic gospels” problem.⁵⁰ This consisted of various attempts to explain similarities among the gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke, for example, by treating Matthew as the (Aramaic) source text or, alternatively, by positing a lost Hebrew “ur-gospel” that had been transformed by later interpolations. Here, various currents of conjectural biblical history, philology and text-criticism and theological argument all flowed into the investigative field. Meanwhile, the Kantian philosophy that was emerging in the Lutheran seminary at Tübingen and in the philosophy and theology faculties at the Protestant universities of Jena, Königsberg and Halle, also in the 1790s, was fixated on a quite different object of intellectual concern: namely, the extent to which the Kantian moral philosophy that the young seminarians found within themselves could be reconciled with the biblical erudition and confessional doctrines the academic mastery of which determined their religious vocation.⁵¹ Lulled by a soothing conception of universal reason and its historical unfolding, modern intellectual history has proved singularly incapable of grasping the deep historically grounded incomprehension and hostility that separated these cultural movements. That is because this conflict arose not from disputes within a singular and universal (philosophical) reason, but from radical differences between the instituted intellectual activities that counted as reason, and between the kinds of knowledge to which these activities gave access.

In subsequent chapters, we will see that Kant regarded the “scriptural scholarship” of Michaelis and his colleagues as at best useful for refurbishing the Bible as the external historical vehicle of a timeless philosophical religion. At worst, he viewed it as prone to substituting the historical vehicle for the true moral religion, thereby transforming Christianity into a merely “scholarly religion” with no regenerative moral power. For their part, the Göttingen humanists viewed Kant’s philosophy and biblical hermeneutics as an

50. Here, I am relying on the discussion of this problem in Levitin, “From Palestine”.

51. On the emergence of this problem, see Brecht, “Anfänge”.

attempt to supplant impartial biblical philology and history by a disguised apologetics for a philosophical religion. They did so by approaching Kantian philosophy itself in the Arnoldian humanist manner: in terms of “certain acts and events”, independently of its truth or falsity, and thus as a historical phenomenon capable of being known impartially or objectively. This impartial historical investigation of it was premised on the willed adoption of a scholarly stance and persona designed to combat Kantianism’s claims to timeless a priori foundations. From here we can draw the sobering conclusion that no position adopted today in relation to this conflict can rise above it. But this at least makes clear what is involved in the decision to approach Kantian philosophy in the manner adopted in this study. For it lays bare the historical stake in deciding not to approach Kantianism philosophically, in terms of the recovery of timeless a priori ideas from the mind, but instead historically, via an account of the ascetic acts for crafting a philosophical self that aspires to think timeless a priori ideas.

Two Historiographies

So steeply does this changed historical approach depart from existing histories of Kantianism, it will be helpful to provide a brief outline of the contrasting historiographies: the one philosophical and the other contextual or circumstantial.

PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY

The dominant historiography of Kantian philosophy is philosophical in the sense of treating it as the emergence of a priori reason in historical time. Here, Kantian philosophy is regarded as having been called into historical existence for a philosophical purpose: typically, to solve a refractory philosophical problem, or to supersede prior erroneous philosophies, or, more generally, to manifest timelessly true and universal principles of knowledge and morality in particular historical circumstances. There are three variant forms of this philosophical history, developed respectively for Kant’s theoretical, moral and religious philosophy. In dominating Kant studies during the latter part of the twentieth centuries and up to the present, these variant philosophical historiographies share a common narrative form. They present the emergence of Kantian philosophy in terms of the surfacing of a timeless transcendental reason in historical time through the overcoming of a series of dialectical oppositions.

In the first variant, dedicated to the history of Kantian metaphysics or theoretical philosophy, this surfacing is presented as driven by a series of exemplary epistemological oppositions or antinomies. These are the oppositions between rationalism and empiricism, dogmatism and scepticism, idealism and

materialism, or reason and experience. Kant's historical role is to reconcile the oppositions by discovering the transcendental conditions of empirical experience in his own mind, thereby showing that empirical experience is conditioned by transcendental reason.⁵² In the second variant, dealing with the history of moral philosophy, Kantianism is again treated as emerging in historical time to reconcile a series of disabling oppositions. Here the oppositions are between rationalism and voluntarism, formalism and eudaemonism, (Wolffian) rationalism and Pietism, "duty ethics" and "consequentialism", and sometimes between an ethics of rational feeling and an ethics of moral feeling. Kant again steps into history to overcome the oppositions by retrieving a principle or idea the mere thinking of which determines the will: the principle of moral freedom or autonomy.⁵³ In the third variant, dedicated to the history of religion and the *Aufklärung*, the central opposition is that between a free, universal and timeless human reason and the imposed, positive, historical doctrines of the biblical-ecclesiastical religions. This time it is Kant's religious philosophy that is presented as having been called into historical existence to overcome these oppositions. This is supposed to have taken place when Kant invented a philosophical hermeneutics through which a timeless "pure religion of reason" was uncovered within the historical "vehicle" of the positive biblical religions.⁵⁴

If it can be shown, however, that Kantian "reason" consists not of timeless operations of the mind, but of an ensemble of ascetic devices and exercises, then we must prepare ourselves to depart from this entire field of dialectical philosophical historiography. There are two fundamental reasons for forging a new historiographical path. First, if Kantian reason consists of concrete exercises in self-attention and self-transformation then it cannot be viewed as universal and a priori, and thence as opposed to other forms of philosophy deemed merely "positive", empirical or historical, nor indeed to confessional religions relegated in a similar way. To the contrary, Kantian philosophy must be treated as having the same purely historical mode of existence as the philosophical schools and ecclesiastical religions that it sits alongside: namely, the mode of existence of ascetic practices dedicated to intellectual and moral formation in a jostling field of such practices. This makes the emergence and fortunes of Kantian philosophy circumstantial and contingent, just like the other schools and religions.

52. For a classic mid-century example of this historiography, see L. W. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*. For more recent examples, see Pinkard, *German Philosophy*; Pippin, "Kantian Aftermath"; Guyer, *Reason and Experience*, 12–37.

53. See, for examples, Schneewind, *Invention of Autonomy*, 508–30; Wood, "Rational Theology"; Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom*, 3–42.

54. For an exemplary instance, see Wood, "Rational Theology". For similar uses of the template, see Wood, *Kant and Religion*, 1–26; Beiser, "Moral Faith"; Pasternack, *Kant on Religion*, 1–16; DiCenso, *Kant, Religion*, 1–26; Höffe, "Holy Scriptures"; Moors, "Fate of Religion", 539–64.

Second, it will become clear that in treating the history of Kantian philosophy in terms of the disclosure of a timeless transcendental reason concealed within the “vehicle” of empirical history, the three philosophical historiographies are variant forms of Kant’s own philosophical hermeneutics. As such, they are themselves ascetic exercises assuming the form of a “hermeneutics of the self” for philosophical historians. These historiographies thus engage in the antinomic exercise by staging the history of Kantian philosophy in terms of the exemplary oppositions between the “rational” and “empirical”, or “ideal” and “material”, sides of history. At the same time, they also enact the entrance of reason into time by narrating a series of cathartic breakthroughs. These include the transcendental insight that supposedly roused Kant from his “dogmatic slumber”, his sudden transformative vision of the sublime “fact of reason”, and his “glimpsing” of an archetypal world of intelligences through the translucent analogy of ecclesiastical Christianity. In operating as exercises in philosophical hermeneutics, the three variant philosophical historiographies are thus themselves extensions of Kantian philosophy, and hence radically incapable of providing an account of its historical emergence and fate.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL OR CONTEXTUAL HISTORY

To signal the required historiographical reorientation, let us declare that, rather than signifying the necessary surfacing of reason in time, the emergence and fate of Kantian philosophy was entirely circumstantial. It was, we will show, the unpredictable outcome of two interacting contexts or sets of historical circumstances, one religious and academic and the other political and juridical.

The religious and academic circumstances in which Kantian philosophy emerged were formed by Germany’s Christian churches and by the network of seminaries, monasteries and faculties of theology and philosophy that surrounded them. Linked by a connective tissue of books, journals and letter-writing, this academic network was responsible for forming the intellectual elite—the theologians, philosophers, clergy and teachers—on which Germany’s territorial churches and states depended. The fact that Kantian philosophy first emerged in Germany’s dominant Lutheran philosophy and theology faculties, whence it migrated to other Protestant and then Catholic academic institutions, with varying degrees of success, is a pointer to three key features of its intellectual form and historical mode of existence.

First, it points to the fact that Kant improvised the figures of thought and spiritual exercises that formed the core of his philosophy from intellectual materials that were supplied by academic metaphysics and theology.⁵⁵ As already mentioned in passing, Kant derived the model of double-natured

55. For a helpful overview of these sources, see Kanterian, *Kant, God*.

sensible and rational man that sits at the centre of his entire philosophy from the figure of double-natured Christ. In ecclesiastical Christology, Christ's opposed divine and human natures impose the necessity of mediation between them—the *communicatio idiomatum*, or communication of properties—as they key to human moral regeneration or salvation.⁵⁶ In transposing this double-natured Christology from Christ to man, Kant supplied his philosophy with its fundamental ascetic exercise: the mediation between sensibility and reason. He also provided the framework within which other such exercises, drawn from a variety of metaphysical and theological sources, could be added. Kant's exercises in transcendental deliberation, antinomic dialectic, cathartic philosophical *ēros* and philosophical hermeneutics thus have deep roots not only in Christian theology, but also in ancient philosophy, particularly in Neoplatonism.

Second, the emergence of Kantian philosophy within the institutions of Christian spiritual pedagogy or psychagogy is a pointer to a kind of person on whose formation the existence and spread of Kantianism depended. For Kantianism only took root among cohorts of spiritually self-concerned young academics such as the junior lecturers or *Repetenten* at the Lutheran Tübingen seminary during the 1780s and 1790s.⁵⁷ These were young men whose concern with their own intellectual deportment and moral calling had been aroused by the pious literacy of family life and then intensified by life in pedagogical communities such as Tübingen—forcing houses designed to incite just this concern. Awakened by such psychagogic devices as the double-natured person, this self-attention was shaped by an academic culture of spiritual guidance, emulation, competition, exercises, disputations and prayer. This culture formed a distinctive “university piety” within the philosophical and theological faculties of hothouse seminaries and universities. It was from here that Lutheran Kantians such as Johann Gottlieb Rätze, Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk and Wilhelm Traugott Krug emerged as Kant's early disciples.⁵⁸

Third, its emergence within the institutions of confessional academic spiritual pedagogy (or psychagogy) provides a pointer to Kantian philosophy's sectarian context and thence to the sectarian tendency of Kantianism itself. The doctrines and pedagogies of Lutheran, Calvinist and Catholic higher education institutions had been delineated and honed to razor-sharpness through three centuries of mutual antagonism and conflict.⁵⁹ This issued in tightly

56. On Kant's model of subjectivity as a “rational analogon” of theological Christology, see Sparr, “Kant's Doctrine”. Also useful is Holmes, “Asymmetrical Assumption”. So too Haga, *Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics?*

57. See Brecht, “Anfänge”; also Onnasch, “Rezeption Kants”.

58. For a rare and informative account of this psychagogic culture, see Kaufmann, *Universität*, 251–433.

59. See Schindling, “Schulen”, 561–70.

policed articles of faith that were crucially focused in rival doctrinal accounts of Christ and the relation between his two natures, which were themselves anchored in mutually opposed Eucharistic liturgies.⁶⁰ Adherence to the “one true” account was the condition of salvation within the church, and supplied the incentive and means of anathematising those adhering to other accounts and belonging to other churches.⁶¹

Fashioned within this intensely rivalrous Christological setting, Kant’s model of double-natured sensible and rational man imbued his philosophy too with a sectarian complexion. As already noted, the ascetic role of this model meant that access to the core objects of Kantian thought—the transcendental categories, the moral law, the pure moral religion—was restricted to those who had transformed their intellectual and moral dispositions by acting on themselves in accordance with the model: acting, that is, to overcome the limits of the sensibility through the retrieval of a suprasensible practical reason supposedly concealed within it. For Kantians, in failing to undertake this practice of intellectual and moral self-transformation, non-Kantians were not only philosophically mistaken, but also morally delinquent. This made non-Kantians objects of correction, certainly, but also of moral censure. For this censure was the instrument and effect of Kantians defending the purity of the transcendental philosophy and the moral religion against contamination by impure empiricists and superstitious believers, as the Berlin Jews would find out to their cost. Even the young Schelling, who would himself grow into one of German philosophy’s great haters, took note of the rise of sectarian Kantian moral reprobation: “Give me the old honest Wolffian! Whoever had no faith in [Wolff’s] own demonstrations was regarded as lacking all philosophical sense. That was little! Now, whoever has no faith in the demonstrations of our latest philosophers bears the anathema of *moral* depravity.”⁶²

If the institutions of Christian religious and philosophical pedagogy provided the most immediate conditions for the emergence and fortunes of Kantian philosophy, then a second and no less important set of circumstances was provided by the political and judicial order that governed the existence of these institutions. As the means of forming the religious identities of warring confessional communities, the sharply honed articles of faith transmitted in rival higher education systems were tightly policed by princely territorial states and supra-territorial religious authorities.⁶³ This combined exercise of civil and religious authority took place through territorial religious consistories: governing councils composed of senior juridical and ecclesiastical officials.⁶⁴

60. For an overview, see Cross, *Communicatio Idiomatum*.

61. See Heckel, *Deutschland*, 210–37; Trusen, “Rechtliche Grundlagen”.

62. Schelling, “Philosophical Letters”, 162; *SWI*/1, 292.

63. See Schindling, “Schulen”.

64. For the case of the Württemberg consistory, responsible for maintaining doctrine and discipline at the Tübingen seminary during the Kantian insurgency, see Ehmer,

(continued...)

INDEX

- “a = a” incantation, 414–15
Abraham, 467
Absolute, 413–15, 418–19
absolute being, 93, 95–97
absolute I: access to, 417; as ascetic device, 362; disagreements regarding, 362; double-natured humanity to, 343–45; formation of, 478; goal of, 354–55; as instrument, 346; intellectual intuition and, 350; intelligibility of, 352; intuition of, 417; origin of, 334, 346; overview of, 334; recovering from, 335
absolute idealism: broader context of, 340–43; in Catholicism, 379; as competitor to Christianity, 365; double-natured humanity to absolute I in, 343–45; historical development of, 362; introduction to, 333–34; Lutheran humanism and, 361–70; morality and, 353–55; *Naturphilosophie* and, 355–58; negative impacts of, 366; overview of, 370–72; religion and, 353–55; as rival to Kantianism, 333; of Schelling, 347–53; as spiritual practice, 365; at Tübingen, 334–40, 345–61. *See also* idealism
absolute idealists, 51, 346, 358–61.
See also specific persons
absolute philosophy, 413, 418–19
acquiescentia, 130
allegoresis, 309
Allison, Henry, 73
American Kantianism, 19, 43, 121, 251
Ammon, Christoph Friedrich, 317, 324, 331, 423
anamnesis, as ascetic exercise, 186–89, 195
anathema, pronouncement of, 432
Anti-Kant (Stattler), 388
anti-Kantianism, 6, 388–95
antinomy of practical reason, 194–95, 198, 206
antinomy of pure reason: cultural purposes of, 99–102; defined, 99; first antinomy of, 93–94, 100; fourth antinomy of, 97–99, 100; function of, 99, 101–2; history of, 92; introduction of, 90–93; second antinomy of, 94–95, 100; third antinomy of, 95–97, 100
antinomy or antinomic dialectic: as ascetic exercise, 194, 224, 253; function of, 229; hermeneutic, 266–69; as intellectual therapy, 323; overview of, 33, 479–80; purpose of, 234; rehearsal and repetition of, 93–94
anti-Semitism, 475
apostasy, Beck’s, 72–76
Apostles, 327, 328, 473
Apostolic creed, 337–38
apperception, 52, 66, 68, 84
a priori cognition, as task of intellectual conduct, 17, 45, 73–76
a priori power, 56–57
Aquinas, Thomas, 97n52, 102n64
archetypal-ectypal: being, 182; intellection, 116–17, 140; morality, 137–38
archetypal ideal/ideas, 103–4, 151
archetypal intellection: defined, 121; higher self as, 180; as historical ethical exercise, 3; human understanding comparison with, 126; as inaccessible, 142; and the *intellectus archetypus*, 103–10, 133, 346, 359–60; in Kantian philosophy, 2–3; moral law and, 159; overview of, 123–31; Platonic model of, 225–26
archetypal philosophy: divine existence and, 200–207; highest good and, 191–200; immanent mediation and, 182–91; introduction to, 180–82; moral theology and, 207–12; postulates of immortality and, 200–207
archetypal theology, 127, 444
archetypal willing, 123–31. *See also* will/willing
archetype (*Urbild*), 2, 123. *See also specific aspects*
archival research, 284
Aristotelian Thomism, 383
Aristotle, 22

- Arnold, Gottfried, 23–24, 285
ascetic device, 3
ascetic exercises: and the ascetic function of philosophy, 15–20; in Kantian philosophy, 33–37, 194. *See also* anamnesis, as ascetic exercise; antinomy of practical reason; philosophical *eros*; philosophical hermeneutics; philosophical history; transcendental deduction; Transcendental Dialectic
Ascher, Saul, 39, 441, 465–77, 488
Ashkenazic Judaism, 444. *See also* Judaism
ataraxia (inner calm), 3
Athanasian creed, 338
atonement, 224, 238–39, 245. *See also* vicarious atonement
Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (Fichte), 306
Augsburg, treaty of, 31, 287–88, 436
Augsburg (archbishopric), control of, 397
autonomy: and archetypal, intellect and willing, 123–31, 180; historical sources of, 115–17; as task of spiritual conduct, 394, 481–82. *See also* freedom

Bacon, Francis, 22
Bardili, Christoph Gottfried, 334, 339
Baumgarten, Alexander [Gottlieb]: on *acquiescentia*, 130; annotation to, 205; on divine intellect, 127; *Elements of First Practical Philosophy*, 125, 132; on God's motivation, 128–29; influence of, 132; Kant's engagement with, 441; *Metaphysics*, 132; scholastic method of, 52; on the soul, 47–48, 51; tenet of, 125; theorematic philosophy of, 123–24
beatitude, 129, 150, 152, 196, 197
Beausobre, Isaac de, 285, 303–4
Beck, Jacob Sigismund, 63, 72–76, 121, 333, 458, 478
Beck, Lewis White, 197–98
Beiser, Frederick, 471
Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publikums über die französische Revolution (Fichte), 469
Bemerkungen über Kant's philosophische Religionslehre (Storr), 308
Bendavid, Lazarus, 441, 455–58
Benedictines, 382, 386, 387, 394, 395, 396
Berlin Jews, 30
Betteljuden, 443
Bible: access to meaning of, 311; cultural disposition of, 485; forced interpretations of, 264; grammatical-historical investigation of, 311, 327–28; historical authentication of, 328; historical faith in, 327; historical or doctrinal meaning of, 264, 312; as historical vehicle, 262, 308, 311, 312, 316, 342, 364; in humanism, 303; interpretation methods of, 312; in Judaism, 447–48; in Kantian hermeneutics, 316; Kantian rigourists and, 318; Kant's presentation of, 262–63, 463; knowledge of God through, 463; literalism of, 263; moral religion in, 262–63, 282–83, 316; as necessity for moral religion, 263; as revelation, 318; scholar role regarding, 310; supernatural interpretation of, 306; symbolism of, 263; as textual archive of revelations, 318; truth and, 485; as work of literature, 304. *See also* New Testament; scripture
biblical exegesis, 302–18
biblical hermeneutics, 304–7, 343, 363
biblical history and philology, 261–62
biblical literacy, 259
biblical scholarship, 307–18
biblical theology, 294, 307–18, 362–63
Biblishe Hermeneutik (Seiler), 363
blessedness, divine, 150, 281, 345
Blum, Paul, 383
body, 86, 87
Bohemian Brethren, 288
Book of Concord, 337–38
Brecht, Martin, 335–36
Breuer, Edward, 442
Brown, Peter, 18–19, 32, 148–49, 479
Brucker, Jacob Johann, 124, 127
Burschenschaften, 475

calculation, 57, 69
calculative investigation, 20
Calov, Abraham, 214, 444
Calvinism, 31, 244, 288
Calvinist institutions, 29
Carlisle, Clare, 130
Cartesian philosophy, 15, 89, 441
Casaubon, Isaac, 285
Casel, Odo, 377
Catholic Christian philosophy, 374
Catholic Enlightenment: assumptions regarding, 375; borrowings in, 384; discovery of, 439; historiography of, 374–78; human reason in, 375–76; introduction to, 373–74; liberal history of, 378; presumption in, 376
Catholic humanism, 424

- Catholicism: absolute idealism in, 379, 405–9, 411–15; banning of Kantian philosophy in, 32; conflicts in, 379; devotion in, 379; doctrine and pedagogies of, 29; doctrines of, 379–80; ecclesiastical states of, 380–81; ecclesiastical status of, 31; factional character of early Catholic Kant receptions and, 378–82; factions in, 439–40; *Fürstbischöfe* (prince-bishops) in, 380–81; in Germany, 337; governance in, 381; individual philosophising in, 382–85; Jesuit teaching order in, 382–83; Kantian philosophy differences to, 7; Lutheranism as compared to, 380–81; *magisterium* of, 379, 383; modernity of, 376; naturalist philosophy into, 377–78; rationalist philosophy into, 377–78; reception of Kantian philosophy in, 372, 373–74, 377, 378–82, 395–96, 402, 420–28, 437, 482; religion of, 8–9; religious teaching in, 31; reputation of, 375; Roman Curia in, 381; salvation in, 223–24, 244; scholastic philosophy in, 382–85; secularisation of jurisdiction and property, 411; spiritual, academic and juridical authority in, 429; spiritual practices in, 379; supervision of philosophical and theological teaching in, 380–81
- Catholic universities, reception of Kantian philosophy in, 376
- causation, 63, 120, 185–86
- celibacy, 272
- change of heart, 237, 248
- Charakter des Philosophen und Nichtphilosophen* (Weber), 400–401
- Charles Eugene, Duke of Württemberg, 336
- children, 325
- choice, power of, 47
- Christian Hebraism, 286
- Christianity: absolute idealism *versus*, 365; accommodating of, 365; as analogical form of pure moral religion, 319; as analogical or ectypal reflection, 416; analogical representation of human beings in, 210; as analogical symbol, 353; as arising from sensibility's incapacity, 13; beatitude or blessing in, 150; biblical-ecclesiastical, 319; as common morality, 220; communal worship in, 223–24; conversion from, 222–23; conversion to, 457, 488; corruption of, 278; degeneration of, 278; *Deutschtum* (Germanness) and, 475; doctrines of, 9, 37, 219, 221, 317; double repurposing of, 214; as ectypal images or analogues, 191; everlasting life in, 203; evil's origins in, 233–35; fall in, 224–30; fissure of, 285–86; good in, 152; hatred in, 436; hermeneutic work regarding, 222; highest good in, 192; historical continuity with Judaism and, 286; historical positive, 14; as historical religion, 9, 219, 297, 328; holiness in, 207, 213; as in human nature, 321; Judaism's relation with, 472–73; Kantian philosophy as compared to, 13; Kantian theology's relation with, 222; Kant's disregard for, 221; love of the true church in, 436; moral law in, 472; moral philosophy's relation with, 222; mysteries of, 392; as natural, 276; as necessary, 211, 212; pastoral care in, 223; philosophical sectarianism from, 435–36; popular theology and, 314; practices of, 280; as pure moral religion, 24; pure practical reason and, 213; as pure rational faith, 277–78; pure rational religion in, 276; reconciliation in, 208; reconfiguration of doctrines of, 191; as religion of freedom, 321; religion of reason and, 221, 285; religious sectarianism in, 435–36; revealed biblical, 365; as revealed faith, 277–78; revelation in, 471; roles of, 207, 211; as scaffolding for Kant's philosophical religion, 182; as scholarly, 276–77; scriptures of, 34; self-transformation in, 14; soteriology of, 244; statues of, 277–78; symbolism of, 346; synoptic gospels in, 25; as threat, 271; threat to, 32, 364; transformation of, 213; as universal moral religion, 473; as vehicle for pure religion of reason, 9, 220; worship in, 173, 435–36
- Christian kabbalists, 445
- Christian Kant scholarship, 2, 122, 243
- Christian moral theology, 181, 182
- Christian philosophy, 441, 444–45
- Christian rationalism, 448
- Christological theology, 297
- Christology: Cappadocian, 242, 246; Eucharistic, 437; Kantian, 243–49, 320–25; Lutheran, 300, 321–22, 325–31, 341–42, 354

- church: archetypal and ectypal, 254–55; defined, 256; as human institution, 285; as invisible and visible, 254–57, 268–69, 277; obligation in, 256; radical historicisation of, 285. *See also* Kantian church
- circumcision, 467
- circumstantial history, 28–32
- civil authority, 30
- civil law, 464
- civil philosophies, 150, 152
- civitas Dei* (city of God), 194
- Clerc, Jean Le, 285
- cognition, 65, 118, 119–20, 126–27, 401. *See also* intellection; knowledge
- Colleredo, Hieronymus von, 382
- communicatio idiomatum* (communication of properties), 29, 226, 244, 296, 482. *See also* immanent mediation
- compositeness, 85
- concepts, 67, 68
- conceptual understanding, 454. *See also* understanding
- conditioned appearances, in time, 98
- confessional religion, 274
- The Conflict of the Faculties* (Kant), 458
- congregation, defined, 254
- consciousness: of external bodies, 86; illu- sional, 78; inspecting, 362; of the mind, 70; moral law in, 148–49; of thinking self, 86, 87; transcendental unification of, 72, 73, 75; unification of, 69, 70; *Vorstellungsvermögens* (representational capacity) and, 362
- constitutional pluralism, 435–38
- contextual history, 28–32, 284, 479
- contradiction, function of, 389
- conversion: to Christianity, 488; double- natured man and, 54, 55; of looking, 60, 61, 64, 91, 95, 102, 280, 479; punish- ment for evil in, 245; as single timeless exchange, 245–46
- Conz, Carl Philipp, 174–75, 339, 345
- “Copernican revolution” (in philosophy), 20–21, 53–54
- Coreth, Emerich, 374
- corporeal world, 364–65. *See also* world
- cosmology, 81
- Coulomb, Charles-Augustin de, 409
- counting, technique of, 69
- Cranz, August Friedrich, 446, 458
- creation, 100, 306, 418
- critical philosophy, 50, 391, 403
- critique, defined, 132
- Critique of All Revelation* (Fichte), 406, 469
- Critique of Judgment* (Kant), 210
- Critique of Practical Reason* (Kant): con- duct of rational beings in, 120; connec- tions in, 126; on Copernican revolution, 20; on highest good, 193; influence of, 321; Introduction of, 117; introduc- tion to, 115; lectures regarding, 456; on mediation, 226; model of reason in, 121; moral and immoral conduct in, 156–57; on moral good, 150–51; on moral law, 7, 34; on noumenal free- dom, 120; overview of, 36; perfect and imperfect willing in, 131–38; Preface of, 117–18; psychagogic challenge of, 143; reception of, 315; on religion, 7; transcendental deliberation in, 33; on transcendental self-clarification, 184
- Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant): central thesis of, 53; circularity of, 72–76; conduct of rational beings in, 120; on freedom, 121; Maimon on, 454; on noumenal freedom, 120; overview of, 36; on pure mathematics, 56; reception of, 315; role of model of man in, 121; self-reflection in, 43; on sensibility, 53; Stattler’s engagement with, 389. *See also* transcendental deduction; Transcendental Dialectic
- cult, religion as compared to, 219
- culture wars, 284, 290
- Descartes, René, 86, 89, 124, 130
- desire, 118, 136, 481
- determinism, 100, 184, 186
- Deutschtum* (Germanness), 475
- devotional exercises, 424–26
- Diez, Immanuel Carl, 299, 300, 339, 343, 344, 367
- Dillingen university: commission of inquiry at, 403–5, 423, 430; culture wars and, 400; curriculum of, 398; Dillinger Kleeblatt and, 398–400, 404, 430, 433; in ecclesiastical state, 397; electrical experiments at, 408; establishment of, 397–98; factional truth and, 428–33; Johann Michael Sailer and, 420–28; Joseph Weber and, 400–409; Kantian philosophy as spiritual midwife at, 401; mathematics at, 408; metaphysics at, 406; overview of, 38; Patriz Benedict Zimmer and, 409–20; philosophers’ philosophy at,

- 399; physics at, 407–8; reception of Kantian philosophy at, 32, 404–9, 430; reception of new philosophies at, 399; reform at, 398; Society of Jesus at, 398; spiritual jurisdiction and, 428–33; suspension of Jesuit scholasticism at, 399
- Dillinger Kleeblatt, 398–400, 404, 430, 433
- disposition, 246, 247
- dissemination of Kantian philosophy, 250
- divine blessedness, 281
- divine intellect, 125, 127. *See also* God
- divine legislation, 461–62. *See also* God
- divine revelation, 317, 471. *See also* God; revelation
- divine will/willing, 128, 130. *See also* God; will/willing
- doctrine. *See also specific religions*
- doctrine, faith and revelation and, 468–69
- documentary source criticism, 479
- dogmatic philosophy, 391, 403
- dogmatism, 26, 44, 102
- Dohm, Christian Wilhelm von, 446
- double-natured man, Kant's: and the absolute I, 343–45; acceptance of, 320–21, 342, 456; as archetypal and ectypal, 183; as ascetic device, 77, 345–46; as ascetic portal, 479; conversion to, 54, 55; dependence on, 351; and double-natured Christ, 242–46; governance of will by, 323; as human nature, 115; and idealism's single-natured man, 51, 301–2, 334–35, 345–56; inexplicability of, 52–55; Kant's invention of, 46–55; in Lutheranism, 300; sensibility and, 183, 320; as sensibility and understanding, 301, 350–53; spiritual formation and, 296; superseding of, 334, 346, 353. *See also* Christology
- doxography, 124, 125–26
- Dubno, Solomon, 442
- duty, sense of, 34, 138, 168–70, 171, 172, 175–76, 179
- duty ethics, 171–72, 394
- ecclesiastical faith, 254–57, 266–67, 270, 272, 273, 281
- Eckermann, Jacob Christoph Rudolph, 311n53, 316
- eclecticism, 314
- ectypal intellection, 123–31, 321
- ectypal religion: divine existence and, 200–207; highest good and, 191–200; immanent mediation and, 182–91; introduction to, 180–82; moral theology and, 207–12; postulates of immortality and, 200–207
- ectypal theology, 127
- ectypal willing, 123–31. *See also* will/willing
- ectype (*Nachbild*), 2, 123
- effects of grace, 236, 247
- Eichhorn, Johann Gottfried, 25, 285, 304, 311–12, 315, 316, 318, 371, 485, 488
- Eisenmenger der Zweite* (Ascher), 469–70
- electromagnetic physics, 409
- Elektrophor*, 408–9
- Elements of First Practical Philosophy* (Baumgarten), 125, 132
- Elieser, Rabbi, 451
- empirical character, 97
- empirical experience, 1, 3, 21, 33, 44–45, 479
- empirical objects, 122, 143
- empirical psychology, 47
- empirical science, 356–57
- empiricism, 26, 64–65, 102
- “empty formalism,” Kant's, 163–66
- Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*): blocking of, 289; Catholic, 373–78; championing of, 387; characterisation of, 433; defined, 282, 314, 371, 481; Jewish, 439–42; Judaism and, 468; Lutheranism and, 315; measure of, 319; modern hermeneutics in age of, 306; obstacle to, 283; overview of, 481–82; progression of timeless reason in, 396; Romantic history of, 378
- ens realissimum* (supremely real being), 105–6, 108. *See also* God; supreme being
- enthusiasm, religious, 279
- Epicurean philosophy, 16, 150, 152, 207
- epistolary exchange, 364
- Eschweiler, Karl, 388
- esoteric philosophy, 414
- ethical commonwealth, 251
- ethical state of nature, 251, 252
- ethico-civil society, 251, 252, 253. *See also* Kantian church
- ethicotheology, 210, 213
- Eucharist: Christ's presence in, 332; as commemoration, 324; conflicts regarding, 379; God's presence in, 189; Kant's repurposing of, 296; in Lutheran moral theology, 300; mediation and, 214; replacement of, 190; sermon regarding, 324
- Eucharistic worship, 38, 77
- eudaemonism, 27

- evil, radical: Bible's absence in Kant's construction of, 232–33; Christianity's origins of, 233; Genesis story of, 233–35; introduction to, 224; moral redemption from, 236, 267; original sin and, 224; overview of, 224–30; propensity for, 226–30; punishment for, 245; as *unerforschlich*, 235
- evil deed, 232–33
- evil nature, 234
- evil propensity, 228, 231
- exchange of letters, 364
- ex nihilo* creation, 100
- experimental investigation, 20
- extreme idealists, 365
- factional truth, 428–33
- fact of reason: critical rationalism, 144; deduction and, 146; defined, 142, 186, 480; formula for, 148; meaning of, 147; moral law as, 34, 36–37, 142, 143–44, 145–47, 148, 154; overview of, 142–49; role of, 147; viewpoints regarding, 144
- faith: articles of, 469; as condition for revealed truth, 467; defined, 277; in doctrine, 468; dogmatism and, 44; ecclesiastical, 254–57, 266–67, 270, 272, 273, 281; historical, 308–9, 327, 464; in Jesus Christ, 266, 267–68; knowledge and, 44; moral, 308, 327; morality and, 330; popular, 264, 265; practical, 322, 323–24, 326; in priests, 273; psychotherapeutic approach to, 428; rational, 8, 247, 272, 277; reconciliation of, 375; regulative, 467; revealed, 277
- fanaticism, 64, 173
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: on absolute I, 362; *Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation*, 306, 406, 469; *Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publikums über die französische Revolution*, 469; on the Bible, 306; Christian kabbalism of, 441; criticism of, 470, 471; on faith, 427; on Germany, 475; idealism of, 333; influence of, 315, 328, 331; reconstruction by, 353; on revelations, 470; Schelling and, 351, 361, 362
- Fides existentis Dei* (Zimmer), 410
- Fingerlos, Matthäus, 428, 430
- First Vatican Council, 378, 431
- Flatt, Carl Christian, 344
- Flatt, Johann Friedrich, 344
- Flügge, Christian Wilhelm, 285–86, 313–18, 371
- formalism, 27, 163–64
- formal law, 151
- Formula of Concord*, 189, 294, 338
- Foucault, Michel, 479
- Fraenkel, Carlos, 3
- Francke, August Hermann, 302
- Franks, Paul, 440, 453n65
- free choice, 230, 231
- freedom: as absolute norm and right, 289; antinomy of, 95–97, 117; antinomy of reason and, 118; beatitude and, 196; causality of, 120; central model of, 129–30; in Christianity, 321; consciousness of, 196; defined, 47, 115, 145, 340; fractures regarding, 371; as independence from determination by natural causality, 121; as independence from determination by sensuous inclinations, 121; intellectual, 340; irresolvable conflict regarding, 343; justification for, 116; in the Kantian church, 255, 340; Kant's conception of, 43, 115–21, 141, 145, 446, 460; law of, 160; morality and, 151–52; moral law and, 142, 143; nonexistence of, 95; noumenal, 118, 120–21, 183, 186, 188, 189, 209; as philosophical self-determination, 343; as problematic theoretical concept, 120; problem regarding, 118; pursuit of, 145; of religion, 289, 340, 343, 446, 460, 488; subject of, 117; suprasensible, 119; theoretical and practical uses of, 117–18; in third antinomy, 95–97, 100; transition between, 117–18; unity through, 255. *See also* autonomy
- Friedländer, David, 444, 446–47
- Fries, Jakob Friedrich, 474, 475
- Fritsch, Matthias, 421, 424
- Fröhlich, Wolfgang, 386
- Fürstbischof* (prince-bishop), 31, 380–81
- Gaukroger, Stephen, 22
- Geist* (spirit), 408–9
- geometry, 51, 56–57
- Georgian Seminary, 430
- German Empire/Germany: Christian churches in, 28; constitutional religious order of, 287–89, 340–43, 446, 460, 488; destabilisation of political order in, 474; dismantling of, 474; freedom of religion in, 289; Judaism in, 437–38;

- public law constitutionalism of, 31;
religious toleration in, 228, 437
- German idealism, 335, 440, 441,
469–76, 487
- Germanomanie* (Ascher), 474–75, 476
- God: as Absolute, 415 (*see also* Absolute);
as absolute I, 351 (*see also* absolute
I); access to, 435–36; actions of, 190;
adoration of, 428; archetypal ideal of,
105; archetypal self-understanding
of, 128; belief in, 1; cognition of, 125;
commands of, 328; communication
by, 467; cosmological proof of, 108; as
creator, 184–85, 203, 206, 210, 330,
354; divine blessedness and, 281; divine
existence of, 200–207; divine legisla-
tion from, 461–62; as divine prototype,
122; as *ens realissimum* (supremely
real being), 105–6; in the Eucharist,
189; existence of, 204–5, 390, 404,
410; goal of philosopher as to become,
354–55; grace of, 247; as highest good,
204, 205; honoring of, 256; as idea
invented by humans, 3, 7, 8, 275; as
ideal, 415; intellectual intuition of, 183;
as intellectus archetypus (archetypal
intellect), 2, 135, 241, 360; intelligence
of, 103; Jews and, 448, 467; justifica-
tion for, 243; justification with, 279;
kingdom of, 127; knowledge of, 127,
211, 308, 453, 463; love of, 173, 192, 301;
metaphysical concept of, 110; moral-
pathological love of, 301; moral proof
of, 107; as moral ruler, 253; motivation
of, 128–29, 134; natural knowledge of,
463; as noumenal intelligence, 327; as
object of historical faith, 327; as object
of moral faith, 327; ontological proof
of, 108; paths to, 461–62; perfection
of, 391; physicotheological proofs of,
108; Platonist conception of, 321, 354,
355; practical faith in, 326; as pure
intelligence, 241; rational faith in, 206;
reflection of, 416; self-consciousness of,
129; as self-grounding intelligence, 321;
as self-legislating intelligence, 321;
self-sufficiency of, 196, 205; service of,
282; as suprasensible being, 210; teach-
ings of, 467; theology of, 127; theoret-
ical and practical uses of, 117–18; theo-
retical cognition of, 391; theoretical
God proofs of, 108; therapeutic theol-
ogy of, 106–11; as transcendent, 369;
transcendental theology and, 102–11;
transition between, 117–18; veneration
of, 256, 281; will of, 461, 462. *See also*
supreme being
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 224
- good: as an end, 192; defined, 152; dispo-
sitions to, 226–27; doctrines of, 150;
immanent, 193; moral, 149–53, 394;
restoration of, 236–37. *See also* highest
good
- good predisposition, 226–30
- Gospels (Luke, Mark, Matthew), 25
- Göttingen, 25, 294
- Göttingen humanist historiography and
philology, 25, 285, 304, 362–63
- grace, 236, 247, 280, 330
- grammatical-historical method, 308, 310,
312
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*
(Kant), 17, 36, 192, 251, 388
- Gründe des Glaubens* (Süskind), 367
- Guide of the Perplexed* (Maimonides), 444,
450
- Guyer, Paul, 43, 53, 144, 145
- Habermas, Jürgen, 440, 445
- habitual desire, 228
- Hadot, Pierre, 17
- Halle university, 294
- happiness: conduct from, 393–94; defined,
129; desire for, 152–53, 194, 329; in
Epicurean philosophy, 207; intellectual,
197; from material goods, 181; moral-
ity and, 131, 196–97, 198, 199, 207,
329, 456, 466; motivation from, 181;
pursuit of, 330; as reward, 198; self-
contentment and, 196; spiritual, 301;
virtue and, 195; will and, 136; worth-
iness of, 193, 194
- Harris, William Torrey, 19
- Heckel, Martin, 287, 289, 436, 486
- Hegel, Georg, 163, 270–71, 334, 335,
423
- Heinroth, Johann Christian
August, 428
- Henrich, Dieter, 334–35
- Herder, Caroline, 224
- Herder, Johann, 224
- heresy, 303–4, 417
- hermeneutic antimony, 266–69
- Herrnhuter, 288
- Herz, Markus, 62, 453n63, 454
- heterodoxy, 319
- heteronomy, 137, 151
- Heydenreich, Carl Heinrich, 161, 325

- highest good: antinomy of, 194–95; complete, 193, 194; construction of, 128, 226; God and, 204; morality and, 207–8; overview of, 191–200; realization of, 201, 204, 296; reason and, 203; rejection of, 330; supreme, 193
- historical faith, 308–9, 327, 464.
See also faith
- history: circumstantial, 28–32; contextual, 28–32; of Kantian philosophy, 35; philosophical, 26–28; purpose of, 334; unification of, 270; universal, 270
- Hobbes, Thomas, 459
- Hofbauer, Clemens Maria, 430–31
- Hölderlin, Friedrich, 169–70, 171, 298, 331, 334, 335, 339, 344, 348, 353
- holiness: in Christianity, 207; ecclesiastical, 257; of Jesus Christ, 322; of morality, 208, 275; of moral law, 149, 208–9; of philosophical reason, 6, 10; in philosophical self, 415; of practical reason, 8; pursuit of, 297; striving for, 202; transformation of, 213; virtue and, 207; of the will, 123, 135–36, 148–49, 320
- Holy Ghost, 415
- holy moral-philosophical way of life, 214
- hope, 202–3
- human beings: as absolute I, 334; active understanding of, 45; amphibian analogy of, 305; anchor of, 152–53; as automata, 184; becoming of, 416; capacity of, 177; change of heart of, 237, 248; characteristics of, 178; in Christianity, 210; creation of, 184–85; deficiency of cognitive insight of, 107; as devolved, 368; as discordant with himself, 55; disobedience of, 394; disposition to, 226; as ectypes, 355; faculties of, 45; faculty of reason of, 55; fall of, 224–30, 394; formula of, 177–78; happiness of, 152–53, 393–94; incarnation of, 415–17; as intellectual being, 70; as intelligible beings, 187; as monistic intelligence, 334; moral nature of, 228–29, 329; motivation of, 180; as noumenal beings, 184–85, 186; original sin of, 416–17; passive sensibility of, 45; personality and, 175–79; as pleasing to God, 267, 268, 281; pursuing various ends or goods by, 180; redemption of, 395 (*see also* redemption); rules of conduct of, 227; as sensible being, 186, 187; as single-natured, 51; spiritual nature of, 320; as thinking beings, 185; universal history of, 270; weakness of understanding by, 221.
See also double-natured man
- humanism, 20–26, 303, 308
- humanist biblical history and philology, 261–62
- humanist historiography, 18, 20–26, 284–87, 303, 317, 371
- human nature, 115, 229–30, 231–32, 321, 329, 332
- human reason, 225, 375–76, 428, 446.
See also reason
- human understanding, 125, 126
- Hume, David, 64
- Hutcheson, Francis, 165
- “Ich = Ich” incantation, 414–15
- idea/ideal, 104
- idealism: emergence of, 333; forms of, 364–65; malign form of, 364–65; moderate form of, 364–65; morality and, 370; negative impacts of, 366; omniscognitive claim of, 366; treatment of, 102. *See also* absolute idealism; Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph
- idealists, characteristics of, 365
- ideal of pure reason, 102–11, 468
- identity philosophy, 413
- identity system, 367. *See also* absolute idealism
- imagination, 66, 67
- immanent mediation, 182–91, 296, 300, 342, 346, 454
- immorality, 136
- immortality, 90, 117–18, 200–207, 308, 453
- impartiality, 20, 21, 22
- Inaugural Dissertation* (Kant), 47, 50, 52, 103–4, 458
- incarnation, 239–40, 242–43, 301, 316, 321, 390, 415–17
- incomprehensibility, as higher insight, 230–38
- Ingolstadt/Ingolstadt-Landshut University: factional truth and, 428–33; introduction to, 397–98; Johann Michael Sailer and, 420–28; Joseph Weber and, 400; metaphysics at, 407; overview of, 38; Patriz Benedict Zimmer at, 409–20; reception of Kantian philosophy at, 386, 396, 430; rivalry of, 430; spiritual jurisdiction and, 428–33; transplanting of, 411
- inner sense (time), 87, 89

- Insole, Christopher, 16–17, 18, 129n41
intellection: as allowing man to become a kind of god, 3; conduct of, 109; corruption of, 225; divine archetypal, 126–27; sensible inclinations and, 225; shaping conduct of, 22; in spiritual nature, 320; transcendental idealism and, 108–9
intellectual disposition, 352
intellectual good, 394
intellectual intuition, 183, 350, 351, 356, 359
intellectualist philosophers, cultural programme of, 101
intellectual pleasure, 195–96
intellectual sectarianism, 435–38
intelligence: as absolute I, 367 (*see also* absolute I); archetypal, 109, 116, 146, 147, 177–78, 188, 194, 213, 221, 223, 240, 322, 346; archetypal-ectypal, 117; of God, 103, 241, 321, 327, 346; immanent mediation and, 193; incarnation of, 122; and the intelligible world, 49, 95–96, 126, 143, 365; man as, 305; nature as devolved from, 204, 367–68, 369–70; noumenal, 80–81, 89, 96, 98, 110, 121–22, 184–85, 189, 199, 327, 351–52; power of, 115; pure, 17, 118, 120, 121, 134, 135, 136, 137, 144–45, 147, 150, 151, 166, 183, 213, 220, 225, 229, 232–34, 251; remembering, 351; self-determining, 121–22, 123, 184; self-intuition of, 365; suprasensible, 86, 96, 99, 122, 127, 135, 136, 138, 141–42, 145, 147, 158, 200, 210, 221, 329; supreme, 204, 209; timeless, 191, 201, 203, 223, 232–34; wills of, 160, 194, 209
intelligible character, 97
intelligible deed, 229
intuition, 12, 53, 54, 68, 86, 369
investigation, methods of, 20
invisible church, 254–57
Israelites, 461–62

Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 428, 441, 445
Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 475
Jansenists, 382
Jena, as Kantian reception centre, 293–94, 344, 383–84
Jerusalem (Mendelssohn), 458–65
Jesuit scholasticism: Benedikt Stattler and, 385–95; as curriculum, 398; defence of, 385, 387; at Dillengen, 398, 399; doctrine of, 384; as dogmatic, 384; eclipse of, 433; function of, 399; individual philosophising in, 382–85, 401; introduction to, 373–74; Kantian philosophy as threat in, 384–85; model of, 398; overview of, 395–96; scholastic philosophy in, 382–85; suppression of, 382.
See also Society of Jesus (Jesuits)
Jesuit Thomism, 38, 384
Jesus Christ: access to, 435–36; adoration of, 436; as advocate, 246; command of, 305; creation of, 330; criticism of, 287; as dispensable symbol, 418; doctrines regarding, 317; as double-natured, 13, 29, 77, 189, 190, 194, 214, 242, 294, 296, 300, 321–22, 330, 332, 478; as ectype of archetypal intelligence, 322; as example, 322, 323, 332; faith in, 266, 267–68; historical authentication of, 328; as historical symbol, 248; holiness of, 322; incarnation of, 238–40, 242–43, 321, 390; Kantian philosophy as compared to, 5–6; of Kantian theology, 242; last supper of, 324; as mediator, 29, 189, 214, 330, 332, 352, 395; miracles of, 328, 405; moral capacity of, 330; moral law and, 305; as naturally begotten man, 330; not the Son of God, 239–40, 241, 242, 246, 248, 268, 277, 321, 330; practical faith in, 322, 323–24; purity of, 246; as real, 415; as redeemer, 189, 194, 246, 330; rejection of, 344, 470; salvation through, 296; as schematism of analogy, 242–43; self-transformation through, 345; sensibility of, 321–22; spiritual nature of, 321; teachings of, 277, 296, 309, 322, 328; testimony regarding, 327; transformation through, 301; will of, 330. *See also* God; vicarious atonement
Jewish Enlightenment (*Haskalah*), 439–42, 445
Jewish intellectuals, 38
Jewish philosophy, 440
Jewish reception of Kantian philosophy: as alien to Kantianism, 435; constitutional pluralism and, 435–38; intellectual sectarianism and, 435–38; introduction to, 435; and the Jewish Enlightenment, 439–42; Lazarus Bendauid and, 455–58; Moses Mendelssohn and, 458–65; overview of, 447–49, 476–77; in Prussia, 443–47; Salomon Maimon and, 449–55; Saul Ascher and, 465–76; strategy of, 440

- Jews: criticism of, 470; God's dealings with, 467; God's will for, 461, 462; hatred of, 469-71; Kant's view of, 30, 39, 271-73, 278, 286-87; rules of conduct for, 463
- Judaism: absence of grammar schools and universities in, 443-44, 447; Ashkenazic, 444; *Aufklärung* and, 468; Biblical viewpoint of, 447-48; ceremonial law in, 463-64; Christianity's relation with, 472-73; concept of time in, 464; as constitutional religion, 467; criticism of, 460; cultural and political dangers for, 474; doctrines of, 463; Enlightenment in, 439-42; exclusion of, 38-39; factions in, 440; German, 437-38; German idealism and, 469-70; higher education in, 444; historical continuity with Christianity and, 286; historical revelation in, 461-62; history of, 467; influence of, 317; *Judenedikt* for, 446; Kantian philosophy in, 482; Kant's hostility towards, 271-72, 277, 286-87, 297, 448, 460, 469, 472-73, 474, 488; learning in, 443-44; liturgical view of history in, 464; metaphysics and, 444; as minority, 438; New Testament Christianity *versus*, 487-88; oral tradition in, 467; persistence of, 446; as political theocracy, 271-72; public campaign for, 445-46; rabbinical, 448; rabbinical schools (*hederim*) of, 443-44; reform of, 457, 467-68; renewal of, 465; revealed positive laws of, 462; as revealed religion, 392-93; Sabbath in, 460; as scriptural religion, 438; Second Temple of, 463-64; sense of time in, 448; settlement policies for, 438; statutory law in, 472; threat to, 447; universal reason and, 439
- Judenedikt*, 446
- Judenhaß* (Jew-hatred), 469-71, 475
- juridico-civil society, 251
- justice, 198
- just society, 198
- Kabbalah, 441, 444-45
- Kant, Immanuel: charismatic wonderment of, 237-38; Copernican revolution of, 20, 21; disciples of, 134, 483; as exemplar for philosophical apprentices, 36, 62, 81, 134, 148-49; factional cultural-political interest of, 101-2; influence of, 28; moral disposition of, 180; as religious teacher, 4-8; as spiritual guide, 62, 240. *See also specific works*
- Kantian biblical hermeneutics, 304-7
- Kantian church: attributes of, 255; congregation in, 254; conversion to, 264; freedom in, 255; historical situation of, 282-89; as immutable, 255; as institution, 252, 253; introduction to, 250; as invisible and visible, 254-57; Kantian religion in, 274-82; kingdom of ends and, 251; laws of virtue for, 250; moral religion as taught and learned in, 260; overview of, 250-54; philosophical hermeneutics in, 260-69; philosophical history in, 270-74; as pure, 255; regeneration in, 250-51; scripture and, 257-61; as universal, 255
- Kantian metaphysics, 26-27. *See also* metaphysics
- Kantian moral philosophy, 182. *See also* moral philosophy
- Kantian philosophy: as alternative to Eucharistic worship, 38; argument regarding, 32-35; as ascetic exercise, 33; ascetic function of, 15-20; as assemblage of ascetic philosophical exercises, 333; banning of, 32; Christianity as compared to, 13; Christianity as subordinate level of, 233; in Christian Kant scholarship, 2, 122; in Christian spiritual pedagogy, 29; Christological structure of, 38, 243-49; as competing philosophical religion, 484; conflicts regarding, 25; controversy of, 32; core discipline of, 447, 455, 483; critical reception of, 315-16, 412; criticism of, 423, 471; as cultural-political tendency, 37, 87, 89, 92, 101-2, 109, 342; development of, 37-38; exercises in, 20, 376, 384; extracurricular character of, 337; failures of, 412; hermeneutic transformation of, 484-85; higher holy self-forming by, 4; historical circumstances surrounding, 482; historiography of, 35; as inaccessible to untutored person, 310; intellectual devices in, 20; as intellectual exercises, 19; origin concealing of, 486-87; philosophical history of, 26-28; as philosophical religion, 1-4, 6-7, 14-15; practical reception of, 315-16; public sphere of, 484; reception of, 482, 487; reconciliation of oppositions by, 27; as religion, 212; religious disposition of, 2-3, 6-11; sectarian context of, 29; sectarianism of, 483-84; as secular, 1;

- sources for, 14–15; spiritually transformative and regenerative role of, 479; strategy of, 439–40; sublimity of, 8; success of, 35; as threat to Christianity, 32, 364; as threat to Judaism, 447; as transcendental rationality, 487; transformative role of, 3; viewpoints regarding, 2. *See also* philosophy; *specific aspects*
- Kantian reason, 27. *See also* reason
- Kantian religion, 274–82. *See also* religion
- Kantians, 4–6, 12–13. *See also specific persons*
- Kantian theology: academic philosophy and, 223; Christianity's relation with, 222; Christology in, 243–49; doctrines of, 225; good predisposition in, 226–30; hermeneutic exercises in, 221–22; incomprehensibility as higher insight in, 230–38; introduction to, 219–20; Jesus Christ in, 242; overview of, 223–24; philosophical fall in, 224–30; philosophical redemption in, 238–43; propensity for evil in, 226–30; radical evil in, 224; as superseding Christianity, 236; vicarious atonement in, 224. *See also Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (Kant)
- kingdom of ends, 251, 252
- kingdom of God, 127, 207, 208, 210, 268–69, 273–74
- Kirchenrat/Consistory of Tübingen, 338
- knowledge: construction of, 368; desire in, 452; faith and, 44; form of, 43; of God, 127, 211, 308, 453, 463; historical, 9, 12; illusional objects of, 79; limits of, 43, 44, 49, 98; metaphysics of, 390; motivation for, 452–53; natural *versus* revealed, 392; natural *versus* supernatural, 392; objective, 20, 21; perceptual, 454; pure mathematics and, 57; rational, 9, 12; reflection on, 15; self-perfecting, 453; transcendental principles of, 15, 390; true nature of, 58–59; unconditioned condition of, 80; understanding of, 456
- Königsberg, 293, 383–84
- Kraye, Jill, 22
- Kritische Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Geist oder das höhere Erkenntniß- und Willensvermögen* (Maimon), 452
- Krug, Wilhelm Traugott, 29
- Kurzer Entwurf der unausstehlichen Ungereimtheiten der Kantischen Philosophie* (Stattler), 403–4
- Landshut University. *See* Ingolstadt/Ingolstadt-Landshut University
- last supper, 324. *See also* Eucharist
- law, 135. *See also* moral law
- law of freedom, 160. *See also* freedom
- laws of nature, 43, 159–60
- laws of virtue, 250, 252, 253, 254–55
- Lebensführung*, 16
- Lectures on the Method of Academic Study* (Schelling), 353–54
- legality, 171–72
- Lehmann-Brauns, Sicco, 284
- Lehner, Ulrich, 373–74, 387–88
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 58, 64, 90, 100, 124
- Leibnizian philosophy, 15, 34, 58, 89, 294, 441
- Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 266, 445–46
- Letters on Kantian Philosophy* (Reinhold), 93, 300
- Leviathan* (Ascher), 466–69
- Levitin, Dmitri, 23, 284
- limits of human reason, as instrument, 44
- Lipsius, Justus, 174
- liturgical movement, 377, 433
- Locke, John, 58, 64, 459
- love, 173, 192, 301, 305
- love ethic, 174
- Ludwig I, King of Bavaria, 431
- Luther, Martin, 442
- Lutheranism: academic culture in, 294; biblical scholarship in, 307–18; biblical theology in, 294, 307–18, 362–63; Catholicism as compared to, 380–81; characteristics of, 293; clash with, 341; Concordial/orthodox, 338; constitutional toleration of, 288; crisis in, 314–15; doctrine and pedagogies of, 29; doctrine of, 189, 321, 338; *Formula of Concord*, 189, 294, 338; history of philosophy and, 307–18; Kantianism within, 7, 295–99, 314–15, 337, 482–83; liturgies of, 297; and Lutheran humanism, 361–70; moral theology reconfiguration in, 299–300; Pietist movement and, 338; religion of, 8–9; religious teaching in, 31; salvation in, 223–24, 244; theological factions within, 295; theology in, 294; training in, 293, 295–96, 302, 325–26; Trinitarianism within, 341–42; worship in, 332

- Lutheran Pietism, 294
- Lutheran reception of Kantian philosophy: decisions regarding, 343; introduction to, 293–95; Kantian Christology and, 320–25; Kantianism within Lutheranism in, 295–99; lines of engagement in, 299–302; Lutheran Christology and, 325–31; moral philosophy and, 319–25; moral theology and, 319–25; overview of, 331–32; philosophical hermeneutics and biblical exegesis in, 302–18; soteriology and, 325–31
- Lutheran Zittau Gymnasium, 324–25
- lying, 155, 159, 160
- Magazin für christliche Dogmatik und Moral* (Magazine for Christian dogmatics and ethics) (Süskind), 366
- Maimon, Salomon, 441, 449–55
- Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon), 444, 450, 451–52, 469
- man. *See* double-natured man; human beings
- Mansfeld, Jaap, 124
- materialism, 26–27, 87, 88, 102
- mathematical quantification, 357
- mathematics, 56–57, 284, 408
- Maximilian III, Elector of Bavaria, 386
- mediation, 29, 182–91, 199–200, 201–2, 226, 407, 454
- Mendelssohn, Moses: on ceremonial law, 463–64; on church and state, 459–60; comparison to, 392; criticism of, 190; on *Critique of Pure Reason*, 63; *Haskalah* and, 445; on historically revealed doctrines, 462; history of religion of, 464; on human morality, 465; influence of, 444, 450, 476–77; *Jerusalem*, 458–65; on Jewish conversion, 458; and the Jewish reception of Kantian philosophy, 458–65; kabbalism and, 441; Kantian philosophy presented to, 39; Kant's view of, 184–85, 458; on natural knowledge of God, 463; Pentateuch translation of, 442; protection of Judaism by, 488; on reason and sensibility, 460–61; on religious freedom, 460
- Mennonites, 288
- Merkle, Sebastian, 373
- metaphysical psychology, 86
- metaphysical theology, 407
- metaphysics: in Christian philosophy, 441, 444–45; as confused and unclear, 51; curriculum of, 406, 407; development of, 440; in Judaism, 444; Kantian-idealist, 440; Kant's engagement with, 441
- Metaphysics* (Baumgarten), 132
- Metaphysics of Morals* (Kant), 7–8
- Metaphysik des Sinnlichen und des Übersinnlichen* (Weber), 407
- Meyer, Gottlob Wilhelm, 312
- Michaelis, Christian Friedrich, 147, 157, 171, 304, 318, 328, 442
- Michaelis, Johann David, 25, 285, 485, 488
- Mill, John Stuart, 163
- mind: active power in, 66; capacity of, 12; consciousness of, 70; intuition of, 359; perfection in, 125; a priori power of, 118; reflection of, 393; as seat of higher self, 18; solemn rites of, 18–19, 190; space as faculty of, 48; stages of, 60; time as faculty of, 48; timeless operations in, 21; unity in, 71–72
- miracles, of Jesus Christ, 328
- Mohammed, 405
- Monadology* (Leibniz), 100
- moral: action, 181, 198, 229; apprentices, 237, 238; attitude, 138, 172–75; authority, 161–62; autonomy, 139, 151, 196, 481–82; conduct, 97; consciousness, 140, 141; disposition, 241, 264; experience, 140–53, 164; faith, 308, 327; fanaticism, 173, 175; feeling, 164–68; good, 149–53, 394; improvement, 317; nature, 322, 329; perfection, 240, 241, 283–84, 394–95; persona, 163; personality, 162; phenomenology, 161–70, 171–79; philosophy, 133–34, 138, 184, 190, 212, 222, 319–25; principles, 17; proofs, 410; reason, 8; regeneration, 214, 269, 319, 331, 394–95; self, 140, 141; self-redemption, 267; self-sufficiency, 208; sense, 164–65; telos, 150; testing, 158–61; theology, 207–12, 319–25, 364; universalism, 474
- moral judgement: as ectypal, 155; fact of reason and, 142–49; introduction to, 140–42; moral examples in, 156–57; moral good and, 149–53; moral testing and, 158–61; overview of, 154–56; theoretical judgement as compared to, 155; universality of, 158–59, 160–61
- moral law: accessing, 359; action and, 181; archetypal willing of, 161; as archetype, 146, 147, 159; as binding, 209; blessedness through obedience in, 345; as categorical imperative, 135, 138;

- Christianity and, 207, 472; consciousness of, 188; defined, 141, 154; determination of will through the idea of, 13; as divine command, 211; ectype of, 155; as fact of reason, 34, 36–37, 142, 143–44, 145–47, 148, 154; formula for, 142, 149; freedom and, 142, 143; holiness of, 149, 208–9; human capacity for, 328; as incapable of deduction, 141; justification for, 116; kingdom of God and, 208; laws of virtue and, 252, 253; moral attitude and, 173–74; moral conduct and, 155; moral feeling and, 166–67; noumenal freedom and, 188; in our consciousness, 148–49; philosophical self and, 456; proving, 404; pure practical reason and, 144–45; religion and, 7, 211–12, 317, 319; respect and reverence to, 8, 13, 166–67, 168–69, 179, 227–28, 301; revelation and, 317; self-acting suprasensible, 165–66; self-conception and, 141; self-manifestation of, 227–28; sense of duty for, 179; strengthening of, 166; testing, 159; in thought, 457; as unconditional command, 135; will and, 147, 203, 322
- moral religion: archetypal, 259; Bible and, 262–63, 282–83, 316; Christian ordinances and rituals in, 280; communication of, 269; concealment of, 282–83; concept of virtue in, 281–82; false confessional religion *versus*, 274; historical situation of, 282–89; in history, 271; predisposition to, 264; teaching of, 260, 261, 262, 263; worship in, 280. *See also* pure moral religion; religion
- morality: absolute idealism and, 353–55, 370; alternate forms of, 162; archetypal-ectypal, 137–38, 150; authority of, 141; Christianity and, 207; in Christian moral theology, 181; corruption of, 322; defined, 199, 322, 395; desire in, 452; elevation of, 329; faith and, 330; freedom and, 151–52; as the good, 193; happiness and, 131, 196–97, 198, 199, 207, 329, 456, 466; highest good and, 207–8; holiness of, 208, 275; independence from action, 181; inward relation to higher self and, 138–39; Kant's construction of, 131–38; Kant's core model of, 131; legality and, 171–72; moral attitude and, 173; moral law as archetype of, 146, 147, 159; moral phenomenology and, 171–72; motivation for, 456; noumenal freedom and, 209; opposing constructions of, 181; pleasure of, 454; principle of, 188–89; pure intelligence and, 225–26; qualifications for, 151; of rational beings, 165; reconstruction of, 150; religion and, 207–8; sectarianism in practice of, 342; self-interest and, 329–30; self-love and, 136; sense of duty regarding, 168; sensibility and, 131; transcendental ideas and, 82; will and, 131, 162, 163
- mortality, 116
- Moser, Johann Jacob, 287, 337
- Moses, 448, 461–62, 463, 472
- Mosheim, Johann Lorenz von, 25, 285, 304
- motivation of God, 128–29, 134.
See also God
- mystery theology, 377
- mysticism, 419
- naturalist philosophy, 377–78
- natural laws, 95, 120
- natural philosophy, 284, 369–70, 407.
See also *Naturphilosophie* (philosophy of nature)
- natural religion, 275, 276, 309–10, 392, 461.
See also religion
- natural sciences, 356, 357
- natural theology, 109
- Naturphilosophie* (Schelling's philosophy of nature), 355–58, 369, 409
- Nauen, Franz, 336
- Neology movement, 35, 294, 295, 303, 328
- neo-Platonism, 314
- Neo-Scholasticism, 388
- neo-Stoicism, 174–75
- New Testament, 257–61, 311, 353, 485
- New Testament Christianity, 487–88
- Newton, Isaac, 284
- Nicean creed, 337–38
- Nicolai, Friedrich, 446
- Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel, 307, 348
- Noah, 467
- non-philosophers, characteristics of, 400, 401
- noumenal archetype, 241
- noumenal causality, 95–97, 120, 209
- noumenal freedom, 95–97, 120–21, 183, 186, 188, 189, 209. *See also* freedom
- noumenal virtue, 237
- noumenon/noumena (things in itself), 17, 49–50, 81, 87, 119, 185–86, 349

- Nova Dilucidatio* (Kant), 47
number, concept of, 70
- observational investigation, 20
Ogden, Mark, 336
O'Neill, Onora, 201
Opus metaphysicum (Scheibler), 89–90
Order of Illuminati, 404
original sin, 224, 347, 416, 417. *See also*
 radical evil
orthodoxy, 295
Ott, Michael, 419–20
- Palais Harrach, 456
pantheism, 346, 412, 415, 418–20
Pantheismusstreit, 100
paralogisms of pure reason, 83–90
Passover, 324, 467
Pasternack, Lawrence, 231
pastoral theology, 386–87, 394, 422–24
Penzenkuffer, Christian Wilhelm Friedrich,
 317
personality, 86, 175–79, 226–27
Peutinger, Ulrich, 394
Pharisees, 467
phenomenal virtue, 237
philology, 20–21, 25–26, 221, 261–62,
 283–84, 485
philosopher-priest, 400
philosophers' philosophy (and "school phi-
 losophy"), 382–85, 396, 399
philosophical: incomprehensibility,
 236; Kant's conception of, 9–11;
 liturgy/rite, 415; morality, 10;
 politics, 473; rationality, 375; reason,
 1, 5, 6, 8, 10; redemption, 238–43;
 regeneration, 238, 269; religion,
 3, 6, 222–23, 478; sectarianism,
 417–20; self, 352; therapy, 424–26; as
 unteachable, 11–14
philosophical *eros*: as ascetic exercise, 29,
 33–34, 148, 154, 161, 164, 167–68, 214–15,
 224, 237–38, 281–82, 419; concept of
 virtue in, 281–82; defined,
 148; overview of, 33–34, 480; as prac-
 tice of the self, 213–14; process
 of, 237
philosophical fall, 224–30
philosophical hermeneutics: as ascetic
 exercise, 261–66, 283; Bible and,
 307–18, 485; in conflict with biblical
 scholarship, 265–66, 302–18; criticism
 of, 316–17; defined, 342; develop-
 ment of, 484; function of, 342; and
 the hermeneutic antinomy, 266–69,
 484–88; as hermeneutics of the self,
 28, 190–91, 223, 242, 481–82; in/as
 the Kantian church, 261–69, 274–82;
 in Lutheran reception of Kantian phi-
 losophy, 302–18; overview of, 34, 37;
 rejection of, 486; support for, 317; as
 unconstitutional, 486
philosophical history: as ascetic exercise,
 260–61, 270–74, 283; development of,
 484; in/as the Kantian church, 270–74;
 overview of, 26–28, 37, 270–74; as
 unconstitutional, 486
Philosophie und Religion (Schelling), 368
Philosophische Religionslehre (Zimmer),
 412, 415
Philosophische Untersuchung (Zimmer),
 415–16, 418
philosophy: absolute foundation of, 359;
 ascetic function of, 15–20; as histori-
 cal activity, 313; historical and rational
 form of, 9; humanism and, 20–26;
 incapacity in, 329; as means of perfect-
 ing the mind or soul, 452; moral purity
 through, 15; practice of, 452; rational,
 10; rational cognition and, 12; religion
 and, 6–11, 13; scholastic model of, 372;
 spiritual clarity through, 15; transcen-
 dental rational, 14; truth or falsity in,
 74. *See also* Kantian philosophy
Physical Monadology (Kant), 47, 100
Pietism: characteristics of, 174, 302, 330–
 31; conventicles in, 331; ethical prac-
 tices of, 175; Lutheranism and, 294,
 295, 338; oppositions of, 27; rejection
 of, 328; salvific rites in, 224
Plato, 78
Platonism/Platonic philosophy, 16, 125,
 127, 148, 213, 233, 303
pleasurable good, 394
pluralism, 314, 435–38
Pocock, J. G. A., 285
Poland, 24
Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, 443
Pölitz, Karl Heinrich Ludwig, 29, 55, 317
polytheism, 18
popular faith, 264, 265
postulates of immortality and divine exis-
 tence, 200–207. *See also* God
practical faith, 322, 323–24, 326
practical philosophy, 118, 119, 122, 220.
 See also moral philosophy
practical reason, 205–6, 225, 410
preaching, 422–23, 424

- predisposition, good, 226–30
Priestley, Joseph, 88n25, 100
priests, faith in, 273
Printy, Michael, 374, 375, 377
Probe rabbinischer Philosophie (Maimon), 450
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Kant), 52
propensity, 228, 229, 231, 234
Protestant Enlightenment, 373, 439
Protestantism, 439–40
prototype, Christian-Platonic conception of, 2. *See also* archetypal-ectypal
prototypical theology, 3
Prussia, 443–47, 457
Prussian Religious Edict, 31, 288, 289, 438
psychagogy, 16, 29, 36, 79, 83, 166, 295, 425, 433, 480
psychosomatic disorders, 428
public law, 31, 283, 288, 338, 436, 478, 483
Pufendorf, Samuel, 459
pure mathematics, 56–57. *See also* mathematics
pure moral faith, 266–67, 270. *See also* faith
pure moral religion: blocking of, 262; Christianity as historical vehicle for, 9, 25–28, 34, 37, 221–25, 261–64; Christian scriptures in, 34; *Deutschtum* (Germanness) and, 475; development of, 297; dissemination of, 259; holy book for, 258; interpolation of, 335; moral autonomy and, 481; as rival, 440; as supreme principle, 265; in true visible church, 257. *See also* religion
pure practical reason: approach to, 143; as capacity to determine the will, 10; defined, 183; discovery of, through self-reflection, 341; formula for, 149; influences to, 213; as intellectual gymnastic, 201; moral law and, 144–45; moral regeneration and, 9; opening to, 121; as portal to faith, 83; postulate of, 200–201; power of, 132, 144–45; rejection of, 329; religion and, 8; as self-validating, 132–33. *See also* reason
pure rational being, 121, 123
pure religion of reason: apologetics for, 222; defence of, 275; Germany's ecclesiastical religion *versus*, 279; in Kantian theology, 219; rejection of, 220; transformation of, 355. *See also* reason
pure religious faith, 254–57, 266, 270. *See also* faith
Pütter, Johann Stephan, 287
rabbinical schools (*hederim*), 443–44
Racovian Catechism, 24
radical evil: Bible's absence in Kant's construction of, 232–33; Christianity's origins of, 233; Genesis story of, 233–35; introduction to, 224; moral redemption of, 236, 267; original sin as, 224; overview of, 224–30; propensity for, 226–30; punishment for, 245; as *unerforschlich*, 235
Rapp, Gottlob Christian, 300–301, 329, 339, 345
rational: faith, 8, 247, 272, 277 (*see also* faith); nature, 115, 325, 335; origin, 231–32; psychology, 81, 84; religion, 309–10, 392, 460; theology, 109
rational being: as ascetic device, 345–46; imperfect will of, 123; kingdom of God and, 210; moral action of, 181; reason as, 135; sensible nature of, 137
rationalism, 26, 27, 50
rationalist philosophy, 377–78
Ratio studiorum, 338, 382–83
Rätze, Johann Gottlieb, 4–6, 8, 29, 317
Ratzinger, Joseph, 432
Rawls, John, 20n38, 144, 198, 251
reason: antinomy of, 118; characteristics of, 27; defined, 1, 376; differing models of, 122, 368; as ensemble of ascetic devices and exercises, 27; exercise of, 17; fact of, 480; ideas of, 480; illusions of, 80, 91; limits of, 44, 122; misuse of, 84; modification of, 369; moral idea of, 267; philosophical, 1, 5, 6, 8, 10; philosophical religion and, 3; practical use of, 82, 83; as pure intelligence, 135; as rational being, 135; reconciliation of, 375; role of, 198–99; sensibility and, 46; universal, 14, 439. *See also specific elements*
Reath, Andrews, 141, 144
redemption, 236, 238–43, 344–45, 395
Reflexionen (Kant), 51, 52, 103, 124, 125
Reformed religion, 7, 8–9, 223–24, 244, 337
Reichshofrat (Imperial Aulic Court), 31, 341
Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber Court), 31

- Reinhold, Karl Leonhard, 75–76, 93, 300, 320, 328, 333, 351, 362, 455
- religion: absolute idealism and, 353–55; access to, 11; biblical-ecclesiastical, 283, 286, 297, 308–10; construction of, 253; cult as compared to, 219; defined, 7–8; freedom of, 289, 340, 343, 460, 488; historical, 10; learned (scholarly), 275–82; morality and, 207–8; moral law and, 7, 211–12, 317, 319; moral-philosophical construction of, 253; moral reason and, 8; natural, 275, 276, 309–10, 392, 461; philosophy and, 6–11, 13; pluralism of, 437; rational, 309–10, 392, 460; revealed, 275–76, 375, 392–93; rivalries in, 436; toleration of, 437; transcendental ideas and, 82
- religion of pure reason (*Vernunftreligion*), 8–11, 37, 219–23, 263–64, 365, 437, 463, 472, 473, 474
- Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (Kant): censorship of, 288–89, 371; criticism of, 406, 470; hermeneutical structure of, 222; historical understanding of, 222; hostile responses to, 220; influence of, 4; introduction to, 219; overview of, 37; reception of, 315–16; on relation between Christianity and Judaism, 472; on religion, 7; significance of, 289–90. *See also* Kantian theology
- religious authority, 30
- religious constitution, 341, 486
- religious delusion, 279
- religious Enlightenment, 375
- religious enthusiasm, 279
- religious fanaticism, 173
- religious freedom, 289, 340, 343, 460, 488
- religious law, 464
- religious philosophy, 481–82
- religious rationalism, 437
- religious teaching, political and ecclesiastical supervision of, 31
- Renaissance, 284
- Renz, Magister, 344
- Reuß, Matern, 387, 390, 393, 396
- revealed religion, 275–76, 375, 392–93. *See also* religion
- revelation: Bible as, 318; Christian and Jewish conceptions of, 463, 471; determination of, 471; in doctrine, 468; faith as condition for, 467; necessity of, 470
- Roman Curia (Congregations of the Faith and the Index), 381, 386, 430–32
- Romanticism, 377, 421
- Rosenmüller, Johann Georg, 11, 285, 312, 316
- Rühs, Friedrich, 475
- Sabbath, 460, 464
- sacred hermeneutics, 410–11
- Sadducees, 467
- Sailer, Johann Michael, 363–64, 386, 398, 399–400, 406, 420–28, 429, 430–33
- salvation, 5, 244, 259, 296, 461, 463
- Scaliger, Joseph Justus, 284–85
- sceptical method, 92–93, 101
- sceptical self-problematisation, 121
- sceptical suspension, 13
- scepticism, 26, 64
- Scheibler, Christoph, 89–90
- Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph: on absolute I, 362; as absolute idealist, 321, 333, 334, 335; comparison of, 328; conversion to, 411–15; criticism of, 369, 419; doctrines of, 412–13; followers of, 406; historical work of, 441; idealism of, 346–53; identity system of, 367, 427–28; influence of, 399, 409; Joseph Weber and, 406–7; on Kantian moral reprobation, 30; *Lectures on the Method of Academic Study*, 353–54; master's thesis of, 339; on monistic philosophical ascesis, 362; on natural sciences, 356–58; *Naturphilosophie* of, 356–58; and the persona of the absolute idealists, 358–61; *Philosophie und Religion*, 368; on religion and morality, 353–55; in speculative physics, 367; theoretical philosophy of, 367
- Schmid, Johann Wilhelm, 315
- Schmidt-Biggemann, Wilhelm, 426
- scholastic philosophy, in Catholicism, 382–85
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, 78
- Schulmetaphysik*, 459
- Schulz, Johann, 458
- Schulze, Gottlob Ernst, 328
- scriptural interpretation, 284, 308, 312, 317
- scriptural interpreter, 265–66
- scriptural scholar, 265–66
- scriptural scholarship, 284, 316
- scripture: authority of, 265; interpretation of, 264; in the Kantian church, 257–61; scholar and interpreter of, 265–66, 284. *See also* Bible; New Testament
- Second Vatican Council, 373, 377, 433, 434

- sectarianism, 275, 342, 343, 360, 417–20, 435–38
- Seelenführung*, 16
- Seelenleitung*, 16
- Seiler, Georg Friedrich, 363–66, 371
- Selbstdenken* (individual self-reflection), 421
- self (subject): as archetypal intellect, 180; attending to, 143; governance of, 199; higher, 163, 180, 199; as higher philosophical, 18–19; hope for, 202; inner sense of, 89; of the Kantian philosopher, 3–4, 16, 34–35, 45, 60–62, 109–10, 140–42, 199, 206–7, 213, 220, 263, 294–95; lower, 162, 188, 296; rational principles for, 199; relations of, 162; rites or exercises for, 19; transcendental idealism and, 88; transformation of lower, 188; universal existence of, 15; work of, on, 295. *See also* human beings
- self-atonement, 323
- self-attention, 376–77
- self-attunement, 378
- self-clarification: Beck's apostasy and, 72–76; desire for self-reflection and, 58–60; double-sided character in, 71; exercise in, 480; intellectual, 50; introduction to, 43–45; invention of sensibility and, 46–57; means of, 260–61; purpose of, 66; role of model of man in, 121; spiritual, 15, 53, 66; as spiritual exercise, 184; transcendental, 184; transcendental deduction 1781 version and, 60–72
- self-consciousness, 89, 351, 359
- self-contentment, 129, 130, 195–96
- self-determination, 50, 92
- self-intellection, 198, 354
- self-interest, 329–30
- self-intuiting (divine) intellect, 116, 368
- self-knowledge, 428
- self-love, 136
- self-purification, 366
- self-redemption, 323
- self-reflection, 58–60, 341, 378, 401
- self-regeneration, 247, 346
- self-scrutiny, 331
- self-sufficiency, 208, 355
- self-transformation: achieving, 36–37; in Christian religions, 14; exercise in, 153, 240, 378; initiation into, 376–77; intellectual, 206; in Jesus Christ, 345; in Lutheran moral theology, 300; means of, 260–61; moral, 331; moral autonomy through, 457; philosophical, 190; in philosophy and religion, 14; practice of, 296; spiritual, 202, 431; through conversion, 222
- Semler, Johann Salomo, 305
- sense, faculty of, 66
- sense of duty, 34, 138, 168–70, 171, 172, 175–76, 179
- sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*): defined, 46, 47, 118–19; epistemic use of, 47, 49; as feature of nature, 55; as feeling, 183; function of, 48–49, 320, 335, 478; inner sense and, 67; of Jesus Christ, 321–22; Kant's invention of, 46–57, 119; manifold from, 66; as misguided, 349; moral use of, 47, 49; observations from, 76–77; role of, 182; scattered intuitions and, 54; soul and, 47–48, 51; as source of sensible feelings and desires, 121; understanding (*Verstand*) and, 9, 12, 47–48, 301, 349–50, 355–56; will and, 131
- sensible world, 191, 199
- sensory perceptions and images, 46
- sensuous beings, will of, 4
- sensuous desires, 47
- sin: debt of, 243; fall into, 224–30; introduction to, 224; in nature, 394; original, 224, 347, 416, 417
- Sintenis, Karl Heinrich, 324–25, 331
- Sirovátka, Jakub, 421
- skeptical method, 91
- sociability, 150
- social life, 251
- social peace, 150
- Society of Jesus (Jesuits): and the Catholic *magisterium* (teaching authority), 382–83; at Dillingen, 397–98; and scholastic philosophy, 382–85, 398; suppression of, 32, 382, 386, 433
- Socinianism, 24, 437
- solemn rites, 93
- soteriology, 325–31
- soul: as basis of personal identity, 84, 86; building model of, 52; care for, 420; characteristics of, 90; cognition of, 84, 85; communication of, 88; defined, 83; freedom of, 49; hierarchical model of, 47–48; illusional attributes of, 84, 85; as immaterial substance, 84, 85, 89; immortality and, 90, 200–207; Kant's sources for, 89–90; malady of, 79; as not composite (simple), 85; a priori power of, 118; psychosomatic disorders

- soul (*Continued*)
of, 428; in relation to material bodies, 84; scrutinising of, 89; sensibility and, 47–48, 51; simplicity of, 85; as thinking substance, 86, 88, 89; transcendental doctrine of, 83–90; transcendental idealism and, 88; transcendental ideas of, 81; as unified and identical, 84; unity of, 83, 89
- source criticism, 284
- space, 48, 52, 63, 119
- Sparn, Walter, 328
- speculative physics, 357
- Spener, Philipp Jakob, 46, 302
- Spinoza, Benedict, 124, 130, 161, 185, 190
- Spinozan philosophy, 15, 34, 100, 294, 303, 437
- spiritual athleticism, 157, 205, 224, 269
- spiritual conduct, 143
- spiritual guide, 62
- spiritual happiness, 301
- spiritual jurisdiction, 428–33
- spiritual nature, 320, 321
- spiritual practice, 297. *See also* ascetic exercises
- spiritual self-clarification, 15, 53, 66. *See also* self-clarification
- spiritual transformation, 245
- Staatskirchenrecht* (constitutional church law), 287
- static electricity, 409
- Stattler, Benedikt, 385–95, 403–4, 425
- Stäudlin, Carl Friedrich, 307, 315
- Stoic philosophy, 16, 150, 152, 173–75, 207, 303
- Stölzle, Remigius, 405
- Storr, Gottlob Christian: *Bemerkungen über Kant's philosophische Religionslehre*, 308; biblical theology of, 307–9, 485–86; influence of, 316, 338; on Jesus Christ, 296, 332; Lutheran biblical theology of, 363; Lutheranism of, 300; as professor, 339; reception of Kantian philosophy and, 319, 326–31, 380; Süskind and, 366–67
- suicide, 159, 160
- Summa theologica*, 393–94
- supreme being, 81, 83, 108. *See also* God
- Süskind, Friedrich Gottlieb, 299, 300, 339, 344, 366–70, 371, 380
- synthesis of presentations, 65
- Talmudic texts, 438, 467
- Tauler, Johannes, 46
- Teller, Abraham Wilhelm, 446–47
- Ten Commandments, 448, 461
- theism, symbolic, 323
- Theologiae christianae* (Zimmer), 411–12
- theorematic philosophy (Baumgarten), 124
- theorems (tenets), defined, 132
- theoretical philosophy: harmonizing with practical philosophy and, 119; history of, 26–27; realist/ontological conception of, 390; relation to moral philosophy, 184; transcendental cognition and, 480; transition from, 122
- theoretical reason, 119. *See also* reason
- Theory of Justice* (Rawls), 251
- therapeutic theology, 106–11
- thinking (distinct from knowing), 451–52, 453–54
- thinking *I* concept, 71, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88
- Thomasius, Jakob, 284
- Thomism, 181, 192, 393, 398, 429–30
- Thomist Aristotelianism, 314
- Thomist scholasticism, 374, 383, 432, 433–34
- Tieftrunk, Johann Heinrich, 29, 53, 294, 305–6, 315, 317, 319–23, 329, 331, 344
- time: as cycle, 464; explanation of, 52; as faculty, 48; as inner sense, 65; in Judaism, 448; sensible world and, 185–86; thinking *I* and, 86; as transcendental form of intuition, 119
- toleration, religious, 288–89, 437–38
- Torah, 438, 442, 467
- transcendence of God, 369
- transcendental apperception, 68, 70, 87
- transcendental cognition, 480
- transcendental cosmology, 90–102
- transcendental deduction: as ascetic exercise, 116; approach to, 44–45; Beck's apostasy and, 72–76; circularity of, 70–71; counting in, 69; defining feature of, 76; desire for self-reflection and, 58–60; first stage of, 61; introduction to, 43–45; invention of sensibility and, 46–57; overview of, 76–77; performance of, 65–72; preparing the self for, 61–65; 1781 version of, 60–72; Transcendental Dialectic as compared to, 79
- transcendental deliberation: defined, 33, 59; function of, 34; as optional, 116–17; overview of, 479; practice of, 453–54; replacement of, 346; role of model of man in, 121
- Transcendental Dialectic: aim of, 80–81, 480; antinomies of pure reason and,

- 90–102; approach to, 44–45; destination of, 81; ideal of pure reason in, 102–11; introduction to, 78–79; overview of, 480; paralogisms of pure reason of, 83–90; philosophical therapy and, 79–83; programme of, 81; psychagogic design and structure of, 79; purpose of, 83; transcendental deduction as compared to, 79
- transcendental idealism, 88, 108–9
- transcendental ideas: as archetypes, 81; defined, 81; human reason and, 82; as indispensable, 82; morality and, 82; non-cognitive thinking of, 81–82; religion and, 82; types of, 83
- transcendental illusion, 79, 80
- transcendental object, 87–88
- transcendental reason, 82–83
- transcendental self-clarification, 184
- transcendental self-reflection, 68, 401
- transcendental theology, 102–11
- transcendental unity of apperception, 68
- transcendent archetype, 241
- Tridentine decrees, 382
- Tridentine theology, 398, 411
- Trinitarianism, 325
- Trinity, 415
- Truchseß, Otto, Prince-Bishop of Augsburg, 397–98
- truth, 22, 432
- Tübingen seminary: absolute idealism at, 334, 345–61; broader context of, 340–43; clash at, 341; conditions of, 29; crises at, 371–72; culture of, 339; curriculum of, 338–39; elite at, 335–36; entrance requirements for, 336; features of, 345; governance in, 343; imperial constitutional church law and, 337; introduction to, 333–34; moral-pedagogical order of, 336; philosophy curriculum in, 338, 339; prestige from, 336; purpose of, 335–36, 337; reception of Kantian philosophy at, 32, 38, 293–94, 297–98, 336–37, 339–40, 342, 343, 383–84; religion and morality in, 353–55; requirements within, 338; residential accommodation of, 338; situation at, 334–40; theology curriculum in, 338–39; training at, 335–36
- Ueber Religion als Wissenschaft* (Niethammer), 307
- Uebungen des Geistes zur Gründung und Förderung eines heiligen Sinnes und Lebens* (Sailer), 424–25
- understanding (*Verstand*): conceptual, 454; construction of faculty of, 49; defined, 12; as misguided, 349; observations from, 76–77; reconfiguring of, 47; sensibility and, 301, 350, 355–56
- Unitarianism, 437
- universal history, 270
- universalization (test), 158, 159–61
- universal reason, 14, 439. *See also* reason
- university piety, 224
- Unparteyische Kirchen- und KetzerHistorie* (Impartial history of the church and heresy) (Arnold), 23–24
- Unphilosophie* (ordinary philosophy), 414
- useful good, 394
- Vernunftlehre für Menschen, wie sie sind* (Sailer), 424–25, 427
- Vernunftvorstellungen*, 232, 285–86
- Versuch, die harten Urtheile über die Kantische Philosophie zu mildern* (Weber), 401–3, 406
- vicarious atonement: antinomy of, 323; introduction to, 224; as justification, 243; Kantian Christology and, 322; moral regeneration through, 269; moral self-redemption *versus*, 267; reconciliation of, 323; redemption through, 344–45; rejection of, 322, 330–31; superstitious belief in, 323; as symbolic, 238–39, 316
- Vienna university, 456
- virtue: concept of, 281–82; defined, 192, 193; happiness and, 195; holiness and, 207; laws of, 250, 252, 253, 254–55; in Stoic philosophy, 207
- virtue ethics, 153, 163, 393
- visible church, 254–57, 268–69, 277
- Völkreligion*, 314
- Vom Verhältniß des Idealismus zur Religion* (Sailer), 363–64
- Vorlesungen aus der Pastoral-theologie* (Sailer), 422–24
- Vorstellungsvermögens* (representational capacity), 362
- Wallnig, Thomas, 374–75, 377
- Weber, Joseph, 336, 385–86, 391–92, 398, 399, 400–409, 430
- Weiller, Cajetan, 419
- Wenceslaus, Clemens, Prince-Bishop of Augsburg, 32, 398, 399, 403, 405
- Wesen* (being or essence), 413–14
- Wessely, Naphtali Herz, 445

- Westphalia, treaties of, 31, 288, 436
Westphalian settlement, 340–41
Wette, Wilhelm de, 475
will/willing: archetypal, 123–31; autonomy and, 177; conforming of, 322, 330; defect in, 153; desire and, 136; determination of, 10, 13, 151–52, 180, 301; divine, 128; ectypal, 123–31; as falling short, 137; of God, 461, 462; goodness in, 151, 152; governance of, 323, 395, 481; happiness and, 177, 198; heteronomy and, 151; higher, 138; highest good and, 192; holiness of, 123, 135–36, 148–49, 320; human, 128, 136, 137; immorality and, 136; as imperfect, 131–38; inner purity of, 153; of Jesus Christ, 330; law in, 135; lower, 138; mediation of, 199; morality and, 131, 162, 163; moral law and, 147, 161, 203, 322; perfect, 131–38; rules or maxims of, 137; self-perfecting, 453; sensibility and, 131; in sensible world, 201; of sensuous beings, 4; of suprasensible being, 138; as telos for human morality, 135–36
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 57
Wolff, Christian, 124, 385–86, 403, 459
Wolffian philosophy, 10, 27, 34, 51, 389, 441, 459
Wolffian Thomism, 386, 390, 403
Wood, Allen, 141, 144, 154, 166, 201, 231, 263
world: as appearance of God, 418; beginning of, 92, 100; corporeal, 364–65; creation of, 354; dependence of, 93, 97–99; as *ex nihilo* divine creation, 352; first antimony of, 93–94; God as transcendent of, 369; intellection of, 367; intelligible, 95–96, 126–27; material, 126–27; natural, 367; necessary being of, 92; as not-I, 407; as quantifiable, 71–72; self-determination in, 92; sensible, 96, 116, 126–27; simple and invisible parts of, 92, 100; suprasensible, 126–27; as totality of conditioned appearances, 91; transcendental ideas of, 81; unconditioned condition of, 83; as universe of appearances, 98
worship, Christian, 173, 279–80, 282, 435–36
worship, Lutheran, 332
Württemberg consistory, 32, 293–94, 335–36, 337
Württemberg Lutheranism, 337–38
Zallinger, Anton, 398, 403
Zimmer, Patriz Benedict, 385–86, 399, 409–20, 430
Zöllner, Johann Friedrich, 446, 458