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Introduction

LINEAGES OF WAR AND PEACE

On January 1, 1877, a spectacular imperial pageant occurred in India. The Delhi Durbar, as it was called, revived and repurposed a Mughal ceremony bolstering allegiance between the Mughal Emperor and regional authorities. In its new form, the ceremony enthroned Queen Victoria as Empress of India by having hundreds of maharajas, nawabs, and other Indian authorities proceed one by one in an extravagant ritual to pledge allegiance to the Queen's representative, Viceroy Lytton. Figure I.1 provides one artist's depiction of the extravagant event.

As Cohn (1983) notes, the Delhi Durbar was carefully choreographed to embody and thereby strengthen British colonialism in India. It focused on two elements of British rule, which together promoted a particular form of imperial control: colonial pluralism. One aspect of colonial pluralism is the recognition of communal hierarchies within the polity, and the Delhi Durbar exemplified the hierarchical character of colonial authority, especially the seemingly impenetrable division between colonizer and colonized. At the same time, the ceremony recognized the authority of Indian rulers over their subjects and highlighted a hierarchy among Indian rulers, with the number of guns used to salute each ruler varying according to their colonially designated status. The second component of colonial pluralism—and the one that distinguished it most from other forms of colonialism—was the communalization of populations, and the Delhi Durbar showcased the multicultural character of British rule by bringing together hundreds of Indian rulers to represent and speak for their communities. Striking home this point, Viceroy Lytton asked the audience to look around and observe an India “multitudinous in its traditions, as well as in its inhabitants, almost infinite in the variety of races which populate it, and of the creeds which have shaped their character” (Cohn




FIGURE 1.1. The Delhi Durbar of 1877. *Source:* Wheeler (1877). Album / British Library / Alamy Stock Photo.



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1983: 194). The ceremonial representation of India as infinitely varied acknowledged and valorized several colonial policies that recognized, accommodated, and empowered communities. Notable examples include community-based military units, vernacular education, community-specific family law, and communalized indirect rule.

Ideas moved quickly along well-worn colonial networks, and this repurposed Mughal ceremony traveled beyond British India. Frederick Lugard, who began his first colonial commission in India the year after the first Delhi Durbar, subsequently organized a “Durbar” in northern Nigeria to celebrate customary authorities and cement their support for British rule. In British Malaya, Frank Swettenham began Malay “Durbars” as a means of strengthening both the Malay Federation and Great Britain’s power over Malay sultans. In addition to transplanting Durbars, Lugard and Swettenham spread and popularized the form of rule that the Durbars exemplified (Lugard 1922; Swettenham 1907). Many other colonial officials transplanted colonial pluralism to additional colonies, and it quickly became the dominant model of the British Empire (Crowder 1968; Lange 2009b; Mamdani 2012; Mantena 2010).

While colonial pluralism was spreading throughout the British Empire, polities elsewhere were moving in a different direction. The British developed colonial pluralism to limit anticolonial resistance by resurrecting and revamping elements of a defunct land-based empire. During the nineteenth century, however, land-based empires were in decline, and the nation-state was strengthening (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 2019). Instead of dividing populations into distinct communities and bundling them in an imperial state, political leaders increasingly focused on matching Weberian states with Herderian nations to make possible national self-rule. The anachronistic character of colonial pluralism was glaringly apparent as independence approached because global institutions recognized the nation-state as the only legitimate type of polity (Meyer et al. 1997). Many British colonies therefore experienced a double imperial transition: Externally, colonies freed themselves of British control, and, internally, former colonies transformed communalized imperial states into nation-states.

As Wimmer (2013) notes, transitions from empire to nation-state were often violent affairs. Diverse populations did not fit the nation-state model, but postcolonial states forced people into this mold. Nation-state building, in turn, commonly removed the cultural and political autonomy of communities, thereby pitting communities against the new nation-state. One common outcome of contentious transitions to the nation-state was nationalist civil warfare, or wars in which actors fight to increase communal self-rule through either secession or decentralizing reforms. Well-known examples include the nationalist civil wars in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. Importantly, nationalist civil wars were relatively common in places transitioning from empire to

nation-state but far from universal, with one in five former colonies experiencing at least one nationalist civil war.

Given the mismatch between colonial pluralism and the nation-state, nationalist civil wars might have been especially concentrated in the former British Empire. By institutionalizing clear communal divisions and providing communities with power and self-rule, colonial pluralism potentially created strong opposition to nation-state-building efforts that removed communal autonomy and promoted conflict over the communal character of the nation. Yet colonial pluralism might have limited nationalist strife in other ways. A large literature argues that pluralist policies can deter nationalist violence by adjusting nation-states to better fit diverse populations, and colonial pluralism might have eased transitions from colony to nation-state by making postcolonial nation-states more Swiss and less German (Aslan 2015; Kymlicka 1995; Lijphart 1977; McEvoy and O'Leary 2013; Stepan et al. 2011). How, then, did colonial pluralism affect postcolonial patterns of nationalist civil war in the former British Empire? Did it promote nationalist civil war or prevent it?

Through a multimethod and comparative analysis of the British Empire, *Legacies of British Rule* explores this question and offers evidence that British colonial pluralism did both, thereby promoting multiple and competing legacies. On average, however, the positive effects were much more powerful than the negative, and nationalist strife is therefore the main legacy of British colonial pluralism. This helps explain why former British colonies have experienced three times as many nationalist civil wars per country as all other former overseas colonies.

The book's analysis pinpoints the extent of precolonial statehood as determining the effects of colonial pluralism, with high and low levels of historical statehood having opposing effects and colonial pluralism magnifying these effects. High levels of historical statehood increase the risk of nationalist civil war by promoting national chauvinism and, thereby, aggressive and discriminatory nation-state-building efforts that remove the cultural and political autonomy of communities. By itself, however, grievances over national chauvinism and lost autonomy are rarely sufficient for nationalist civil war, and I find that colonial pluralism strengthens these effects in three ways: It makes national chauvinism more abrasive, increases sensitivity to the national chauvinism of others, and provides communities with mobilizational resources. In contrast, low levels of historical statehood reduce the risk of nationalist civil war by limiting national chauvinism, and colonial pluralism further reduces this risk by promoting inclusive postcolonial politics in places with weak national chauvinism.

Through these findings, the book makes important empirical and theoretical contributions, the most direct of which speak to a growing literature on colonial legacies. Whereas most previous works describe British colonialism as

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an omnipotent force that promoted ethnic violence, I recognize that its effects depended greatly on precolonial states, show that it could either promote or deter conflict, and focus on one particular type of ethnic violence: nationalist civil war. Most past analyses, in turn, do not clearly specify the aspects of British rule that promote conflict and the mechanisms through which they do. In contrast, I develop the concept “colonial pluralism,” note the different types of policies that were part of this system of rule, and consider the mechanisms through which these policies affected war and peace.

The book also makes contributions by providing more general insight into the causes of nationalist civil war and plurinational peace. At its heart, the analysis highlights a core process that is a common outcome of transitions from empire to nation-state and that lies at the heart of many nationalist civil wars—communities react to aggressive and chauvinistic efforts to remove their autonomy with nationalist movements. Yet lost autonomy at the hands of a chauvinistic state only rarely promotes nationalist civil war, and the book identifies conditions that determine whether communities accept their forced integration into another community’s nation-state or organize a nationalist movement to struggle against it. Because British colonial pluralism greatly shaped these conditions, an analysis of the British Empire clearly highlights causes of variation in nationalist civil war. And because the level of historical statehood varies greatly among former British colonies, an analysis of the British Empire highlights how the impact of pluralism depends on historical statehood.

Another contribution that makes the previous contributions possible is the book’s rigorous multimethod analysis. The quantitative analysis uses new data on the extent of colonial pluralism and offers a general test of the theoretical framework. The comparative-historical analysis analyzes dozens of nationalist civil wars in 20 countries and uses process tracing and qualitative comparison to highlight mechanisms and processes that promote either nationalist war or plurinational peace. And in combining these analyses to exploit their respective strengths, the book provides an in-depth understanding of both broad patterns and the mechanisms and processes that underly them.

Argument

Nationalism is a principle holding that the nation and state should overlap, and nationalist movements try to improve this match (Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000). National chauvinism commonly inspires nationalist movements that adjust the contours of the nation in ways that—in the eyes of movement supporters—improve the congruence between state and nation. At its core, national chauvinism is a belief that one’s community is the true national community. It therefore dichotomizes populations into ingroups or outgroups, and

national chauvinists either ignore outgroups or attempt to assimilate, marginalize, or eliminate them.

I provide evidence that large and long-standing precolonial states promote national chauvinism in places transitioning from overseas empire to nation-state. Members of communities that controlled precolonial states, which Paine (2019) refers to as *state communities*, commonly supported national chauvinism and tried to assimilate and establish direct control over communities without large and long-standing precolonial states, or *non-state communities*. One factor promoting national chauvinism is that state communities usually made up the majority of the population at independence, and their members accepted the democratic principle that numbers matter. In addition, members of state communities recognized the precolonial period as a glorious past during which they controlled their own state and ruled over other peoples, and they expected the new nation-state to reflect the precolonial state and reestablish their community's dominance after a destructive colonial interlude. In Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Sudan, for example, the Bamar, Sinhalese, and Arab state communities asserted their dominance over postcolonial nation-states by assimilating, marginalizing, and eliminating others.

National chauvinism, in turn, can promote strong grievances that motivate nationalist movements. Because national chauvinists desire their own nation-state, they take control of the state and recognize themselves as the true nation. In so doing, they declare their community superior while disparaging and sometimes attacking other communities. Communities, in turn, are angry about and fear losing political and cultural autonomy at the hands of a discriminatory chauvinistic state and seek to protect or retake both through nationalist movements. In this way, different non-state communities reacted to Bamar, Arab, and Sinhalese national chauvinism in ways that promoted nationalist civil war in Myanmar, Sudan, and Sri Lanka.

Such reactions, however, are more exceptional than normal. When faced with national chauvinism and lost autonomy, many actors assimilate more fully into the state community, and others accept a subordinate national status and reduced power by simply keeping their heads low. Nearly all non-state communities in Thailand, Vietnam, and Botswana, for example, have either accepted the dominance of the state community or assimilated. This book finds that colonial pluralism strengthened the reactions of non-state communities to the national chauvinism of state communities in several ways and that this is the most influential way through which colonial pluralism promoted nationalist civil war. One way in which colonial pluralism intensified reactions was by making the national chauvinism of state communities more assertive and discriminatory. In recognizing, accommodating, and empowering communities, colonial pluralism almost always reduced the power and status of state communities relative to non-state communities, and this readjustment

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caused national chauvinists to target non-state communities as “stooges” who illegitimately benefited from colonialism at their expense. The national chauvinism of state communities was therefore unusually aggressive and vindictive, and this character strengthened the reactions of non-state communities to it.

One reason for the unequal effects of colonial pluralism on the power and status of communities is that state communities posed a much greater anticolonial threat, and colonial officials tried to weaken this threat through divide-and-rule-style policies that benefited non-state communities. In this way, the British actively favored non-Bamar over Bamar, this made Bamar national chauvinism belligerent toward non-state communities, and such belligerence hardened opposition to the national chauvinism of state communities. Even when not explicitly pursuing divide and rule, pluralist colonial policies almost always increased the relative power and status of non-state communities because precolonial states usually ignored and marginalized non-state communities whereas colonial pluralism recognized, accommodated, and empowered them. One sees this in Sri Lanka, where colonial pluralism did not privilege Tamils to squash Sinhalese anticolonialism but increased the relative power and status of Tamils in ways that made Sinhalese national chauvinism aggressive and discriminatory toward Tamils.

Besides making the national chauvinism of state communities more caustic, colonial pluralism increased the sensitivity of non-state communities to reductions in communal autonomy. In recognizing, accommodating, and empowering communities, colonial pluralism politicized communities in ways that caused people to perceive politics in terms of community and focused greater attention on communal power and self-rule. Due to these nationalist frames, non-state communities rarely assimilated into state communities and were more irked by the national chauvinism of others. And by institutionalizing and celebrating communal power and autonomy, colonial pluralism created popular expectations for both after independence, thereby fueling nationalist reactions to lost communal autonomy.

A final way in which colonial pluralism strengthened reactions to national chauvinism was by providing resources that could put grievances into action. To fight nationalist civil wars, anti-state actors require organizational, communication, human, material, and military resources. Colonial pluralism, in turn, provided communities with many mobilizational resources, including their own local governments, parties, associations, schools, and security forces.

Although the colonial state was the main agent of colonial pluralism, other actors also shaped its form and strength. This book highlights the important influence of missionaries—especially Protestants—and offers evidence that they commonly amplified the effects of pluralist colonial states. One way was by strengthening nationalist frames. Missionary standardization of vernaculars, support for vernacular education, and organization of communities all made

communal boundaries more rigid and pushed leaders to pursue communal interests in the political arena. Missionaries also contributed to intercommunal grievances by providing some communities with education and lobbying colonial officials in favor of the communities that worked closely with them. Compounding this contention, many communities viewed missionaries as a threat and were angered by, resented, and feared communities working closely with them. And like colonial officials, missionaries affected non-state communities much more than state communities because state communities resisted missionary influence more vehemently, thereby exacerbating conflict between state and non-state communities in places with precolonial states. Missionaries in Myanmar, for example, worked much more closely with non-state communities than with the Bamar, played a central role constructing communal frames among several non-state communities, contributed to transformations in communal hierarchies, and were a cause of fear and resentment among the Bamar.

While colonial pluralism shaped nationalist civil warfare in these ways, its effects were commonly so dependent on precolonial statehood that it is difficult to separate their impacts. Precolonial statehood promoted national chauvinism, and divisive colonial pluralism made national chauvinism more aggressive and vindictive. Colonial pluralism also greatly intensified nationalist reactions to national chauvinism by strengthening nationalist frames and expectations and providing communities with valuable mobilizational resources. At the same time, precolonial statehood affected the character of colonial pluralism in ways that promoted nationalist conflict: Because state communities posed a severe anticolonial threat, colonial officials employed divide-and-rule policies more frequently in places with precolonial states, and this form of colonial pluralism made the national chauvinism of state communities especially aggressive and exclusionary at the same time that it made non-state communities extremely sensitive to any form of national chauvinism.

When not combined, however, colonial pluralism and precolonial statehood had very different effects: Colonial pluralism either had negative or neutral effects in places with limited historical statehood, and the influence of historical statehood was weaker and less consistent in the absence of colonial pluralism. One reason for the contrasting effects of colonial pluralism is that the British usually used colonial pluralism more universally and nondiscriminatorily in places with limited precolonial statehood, and colonial pluralism therefore had similar effects on all communities. Moreover, national chauvinism is usually weak or absent in places with limited precolonial statehood because no community is numerically dominant or can claim a special place in the nation based on their control of a precolonial state. So when limited historical statehood was combined with British colonial pluralism, all communities had similar interests in colonial pluralism, and postcolonial pluralism

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deterred nationalist civil war by promoting relatively inclusive nation-states in places like Tanzania and Ghana.

Although precolonial states still increase the risk of nationalist civil war in places without a history of colonial pluralism, the analysis provides evidence that their independent effects are weaker and less consistent than their combined effects. This is because colonial pluralism commonly made the national chauvinism of state communities more aggressive, strengthened the nationalist frames and expectations of non-state communities, and provided non-state communities with important mobilizational resources, all of which greatly intensified reactions to the national chauvinism of state communities and their efforts to reduce the autonomy of other communities. Yet colonial pluralism was not the only factor strengthening reactions to the national chauvinism of others, and the book finds that—in the absence of colonial pluralism—communities were most likely to react to national chauvinism and lost autonomy when they themselves were state communities that had been forcibly integrated into a nation-state controlled by another state community. Like colonial pluralism, historical statehood promoted powerful nationalist frames and expectations for self-rule, and both strengthened reactions to the national chauvinism of others. In this way, historical statehood is most likely to promote nationalist civil war on its own when a country has multiple state communities.

Literature Review: States, Pluralism, Colonialism, Missionaries, and Nationalist Conflict

In analyzing the causes of nationalist civil war, this book speaks directly to and builds on distinct literatures on ethnic civil war, states, nationalism and the nation-state, colonialism, and missionaries. This section briefly reviews these literatures to situate the book within them.

ETHNIC CIVIL WAR

Ethnic civil wars are conflicts between states and domestic actors that are motivated in some way and to some extent by ethnic difference. As defined in this book, nationalist civil wars are a subtype of ethnic civil warfare in which the anti-state combatants view their community as a distinct nation and fight for communal autonomy and self-rule. Over the past few decades, the number of analyses of ethnic civil wars has grown exponentially (Cederman et al. 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2002; Wimmer et al. 2009). This literature is dominated by statistical analyses focused on proximate correlates of conflict, and relatively few works consider how macro-historical processes shape nationalist civil war. Wimmer's (2002, 2013, 2018) work, which explores how historical transitions from empire to nation-state contributed to ethnic

civil warfare, provides important and influential exceptions, and I build on his insights. That being said, this book differs in terms of scope and analytic perspective.

Concerning scope, *Legacies of British Rule* focuses exclusively on nationalist civil warfare, whereas Wimmer analyzes all types of ethnic civil war. In addition to nationalist civil war, the other major subtype is center-seeking ethnic civil war over a community's control of the state (Cederman et al. 2009; Hunziker and Cederman 2017; Lange and Jeong 2024). The Lebanese civil wars provide examples of center-seeking conflicts, as they pitted communities against one another over their share of state power, not communal self-rule. This book's more limited scope is potentially important because nationalist wars have different correlates than center-seeking ethnic civil wars (Cederman et al. 2009; Hunziker and Cederman 2017; Lange and Jeong 2024; Wimmer et al. 2009). As such, the broad concept "ethnic civil war" might include subtypes with different causal dynamics, and I focus exclusively on nationalist civil war to limit the risk of causal heterogeneity.

This different focus, in turn, promotes a particular analytic perspective that differs from major works on ethnic civil war. I argue that the main causal dynamic underlying nationalist civil war involves communal opposition to aggressive and discriminatory reductions in communal autonomy, whereas the dominant explanation of ethnic civil warfare is political exclusion (Cederman et al. 2013, 2017; Wimmer et al. 2009). This does not mean that analyses of nationalist civil war can ignore political exclusion, however. Indeed, the processes that remove the cultural and political autonomy of communities usually go hand in hand with the exclusion of these communities from political power. And while lost autonomy strengthens nationalist grievances, people might only act on these grievances after political exclusion highlights the costs of lost autonomy.

My emphasis on lost autonomy is similar to earlier analyses of secessionist conflict that consider how a community's past political autonomy affects nationalist warfare (Bunce 1999; Gurr 1993; Jenne et al. 2007; Suny 1994). These works focus on Eastern Europe and find that the communities that fought wars of secession after the demise of the Soviet Bloc had a history of political autonomy. To explain this pattern, the authors argue that past autonomy motivated nationalist movements by shaping identities. Along these lines, I argue that colonial pluralism commonly contributed to nationalist civil warfare by providing a history of political autonomy. My analysis differs, however, in noting how national chauvinism both promotes efforts to curtail the autonomy of communities and makes lost autonomy more unpalatable. And instead of simply being driven by identity, I find that nationalist reactions to lost autonomy depend greatly on expectations and mobilizational resources.

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Although focusing more on lost autonomy than exclusion, this book is similar to the literature on political exclusion in recognizing that states are a very important cause of civil war, and I draw on the political sociology literature on states, social movements, and revolutions (Amenta and Young 1999; Clemens and Cook 1999; Goodwin 2001; Johnston 2011; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978, 2004). This literature considers the institutional and structural effects of states, with states shaping social environments in ways that affect the form and likelihood of collective action. These works explore how frames, mobilizational resources, opportunity structures, and motives shape social movements and note that states influence all four. In a similar way, I draw on political sociology and analyze how states affect nationalist civil war through their effects on frames, mobilizational resources, and motives.

In addition to focusing on nationalist civil warfare, my approach differs from state-centered literature on social movements in terms of temporality. The social movement literature generally takes an ahistorical perspective in which state characteristics and actions have rapid—although not necessarily immediate—effects on social movements. While acknowledging that rapid effects are influential, I take a historical institutional approach and consider how colonial and precolonial states promote enduring conditions that shape postcolonial nationalist civil warfare (Mahoney 2000a; Steinmo et al. 1992). Different types of long-term effects exist. Structural effects occur when social structures and institutions persist over long periods and shape social processes. Along this line, I argue that large and long-standing precolonial states affect the number and size of communities and that this communal demography persists over long periods and affects nationalist civil war. I also propose that pluralist colonial states promote political institutions, associations, educational networks, and military units that provide communities with mobilizational resources that commonly remain influential after independence.

Historical states can also have long-term effects by shaping cultural views and understandings. For example, states influence the schema that people use to make sense of themselves and the world around them. I argue that historical states—especially precolonial states—shape core elements of what Smith (1986) refers to as myth-symbol complexes, a political schema depicting the nation in particular ways based on select myths, symbols, and understandings. In postcolonial societies, these myth-symbol complexes focus on the precolonial period as the time in which there was a real and unadulterated nation. In a similar way, pluralist colonial states promoted nationalist frames among non-state communities that remained powerful after independence.

Although a historical institutional approach is novel for the literature on social movements, a few historically oriented analyses of ethnic violence and civil war focus on the influence of historical states. Some argue that historical

states limit ethnic conflict by increasing the legitimacy of postcolonial states and promoting more homogeneous populations, the latter of which creates a better match between nation and state (Englebert 2000; Wimmer 2018). In contrast, others claim that historical statehood promotes divisions and conflict between state and non-state communities (Paine 2019; Ray 2019). One potential reason for this disagreement is that the type of ethnic conflict matters. For reasons described by Englebert (2000) and Wimmer (2018), historical states deter ethnic civil wars over the control of states, and center-seeking civil wars are therefore very rare in places with historical states. Yet Paine (2019) and Ray (2019) correctly note that places with historical states commonly experience conflict between state and non-state communities. Although they too focus on ethnic civil war or ethnic violence more generally, I argue that conflict between state and non-state communities is most likely to promote nationalist civil war, as non-state communities focus on increasing communal autonomy because of their limited ability to take over the state. In addition to the type of conflict, my work contrasts with that of Paine (2019) and Ray (2019) in that it focuses on different mechanisms through which precolonial states promote conflict, with national chauvinism and lost autonomy playing central roles. Finally, I pay greater attention to colonial pluralism and the ways this form of rule amplifies the impact of historical states.

THE LITERATURES ON NATIONALISM AND COLONIALISM

In exploring the impact of colonial pluralism on nationalist civil warfare, this book also engages with distinct literatures on nationalism and colonialism. Both literatures focus on transitions from empire to nation-state and the influence of pluralism on conflict. Their views of pluralism differ, however, with the nationalist literature focusing on pluralism as a means of deterring nationalist conflict whereas the colonial literature considers how colonial pluralism contributed to postcolonial ethnic violence. In analyzing how colonial pluralism affected the risk of nationalist civil war, I draw on, expand, and integrate both literatures.

Independence initiated transitions from empire to nation-state, and both the colonial and nationalist literatures pay close attention to colonial transitions (Hall 2024; Kumar 2017; Mazrui 1983; Wimmer 2013). Key works within both literatures note that such transitions were neither smooth nor complete, with war being common during transitions and empires often continuing in modified form or having lingering effects (Hall 2024; Kumar 2017; Laitin 1986; Malešević 2019; Mazrui 1983; Wimmer 2013). The literatures also recognize that transitions to nation-states resulted in a varied collection of nation-states that diverge from the nation-state ideal type of a Weberian state ruling over a Herderian nation (Kymlicka 1995; Laitin 1986; Malešević 2019; Stepan et al.

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2011; Wimmer 2013, 2018). In this book, I engage with these works by exploring how colonialism shaped postcolonial nation-states. Similar to the colonial literature, I focus on the lingering effects of empire. Like the literature on nationalism, I explore how transitions led to nation-states with different characteristics.

Within the literature on nationalism, several works consider the influence of nationalism on war, focusing on how nationalism contributes to geopolitical competition (Mann 1988, 1993; Posen 1993; Tilly 1992). Within this body of work, some note that the relationship goes both ways, as war also promotes nationalism (Hall and Malešević 2013; Hutchinson 2005). While these works focus on international conflict, others note that nationalism commonly contributes to civil war by promoting opposing understandings of the national community, thereby sparking nationalist conflicts (Aslan 2015; Kymlicka 1995; Lijphart 1977; McEvoy and O’Leary 2013; Stepan et al. 2011). Instead of focusing on the link between nationalism and civil war, however, these works analyze how pluralism can limit nationalist warfare by transforming understandings of nations in ways that make nation-states more inclusive. This position is based in liberal political philosophy and suggests that the exclusion of communities from the nation-state—either formally or symbolically—causes resentment and anger, which, in turn, fuels nationalist movements and warfare. These works therefore argue that the risk of nationalist warfare is much lower when political institutions reflect the communal diversity of national population. This literature highlights three ways in which political institutions deal with communal diversity: ethnic federalism, which provides communities with autonomy; consociationalism, which reserves positions for communities; and multiculturalism, which accommodates community.

While making general claims about the impact of pluralism on nationalist civil war, past works recognize that pluralist reforms are not cookie-cutter policies and that their success depends on a variety of conditions. All types of pluralist reforms, for example, require committed politicians, effective institutions, a long-term effort, and support from all communities. The ethnic federalist subtype, in turn, requires communal geographies and the presence of a relatively effective central state controlled by leaders who are willing to decentralize power (Lange 2017). Lijphart (1977) argues that consociationalism requires even more conditions, including clear communal divisions, a balance of communal power, the presence of an external threat faced by all communities, common loyalty to the state, relative socioeconomic equality among communities, a small population, and a multiparty system with community-based parties.

Despite widespread agreement that pluralism deters violence, some disagree. Social identity theory claims that pluralist policies do more harm than good (Lieberman and Singh 2017; Tajfel 1970, 1974). From this perspective,

the categorization of people into different communities—even when random—strengthens or creates social identities and, in so doing, promotes intercommunal discrimination, competition, and antipathy. Social identity theory therefore suggests that pluralist policies are counterproductive and exacerbate contestation.

Although dominated by the pro-pluralism camp, the literature on nationalism and the nation-state is therefore bifurcated. Despite being a popular academic topic, this disagreement shows little sign of being resolved. One reason for the stalemate is that the scholars writing on this topic consider different aspects of conflict and therefore do not engage with one another: The pro-pluralist position focuses on using pluralism to deal with *preexisting* conflict, whereas the anti-pluralist view explores how pluralism contributes to *new* conflicts. Neither, in turn, recognizes that the relationship between pluralism and nationalist violence might be like that between radiation and cancer—able to either treat or cause it. The use of pluralism as a treatment, in turn, creates a severe problem for the empirical analysis of pluralism's effects: Officials implement pluralist policies to limit preexisting conflict, and these conflicts create a heightened risk of warfare regardless of pluralist reforms. As a result, it can be difficult to disentangle the effects of pluralism from the conflict that promoted the pluralist policies in the first place.

Analyses of pluralism focus on noncolonial contexts, but early scholars of pluralism analyzed colonies. Similar to social identity theory, these works argue that colonial pluralism institutionalized communal divisions, competition, and antipathy in ways that contributed to postcolonial contestation. Furnivall (1948) provides an early work and describes colonial Myanmar and Indonesia as plural societies in which diverse communities have a high degree of political and cultural autonomy. Instead of celebrating diversity, he was concerned about how the institutionalization of communal difference affected nation building. In subsequent years, a large literature provided evidence that pluralist colonial policies left a legacy of ethnic violence. While some support social identity theory and claim that the simple act of colonial division contributed to these outcomes (Horowitz 1985; Lieberman and Singh 2017; Mamdani 2012), most argue that colonial officials recognized communal difference as part of divide-and-rule-style policies and focus on the latter as the cause of conflict (de Silva 1986; Idris 2005, 2013; Lange 2012; Mamdani 2001; Newbury 1983; Pollis 1973). These divisive policies physically separated communities to limit contact and collaboration and advantaged communities that posed little threat to colonial rule while disfavoring the communities that posed the greatest risk to colonial control. In so doing, officials sought to weaken anticolonial threats, gain the support of others, and pit colonized communities against one another.

Case studies offer the strongest evidence that divisive colonial pluralism contributed to postcolonial violence (de Silva 1986; Idris 2005, 2013; Mamdani

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2001; Newbury 1983; Pollis 1973). For years, however, scholars have questioned these claims, suggesting that past works exaggerate both the extent to which colonizers employed divisive policies and the effect of these policies (Horowitz 1985; Ray 2018). In fact, Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) argue that colonial policies that recognized and institutionalized communal difference deterred postcolonial violence by promoting inclusive postcolonial politics.

Scholars exploring these claims more generally provide limited and inconsistent evidence about the impact of divisive colonial policies on conflict. Most commonly, researchers claim that the British employed divisive and discriminatory policies more than the French and use the identity of the colonizer as a proxy for these policies. Yet this strategy does not offer evidence that the British were more pluralist and discriminatory and overlooks the presence of intra-imperial variation. It is therefore uncertain what the colonial proxies measure. And even if one accepts that the identity of the colonizer is an appropriate proxy for colonial policies, the results of these analyses are inconsistent, with some finding that communal violence was greater in former British colonies (Blanton et al. 2001; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Collier et al. 2009; Henderson 2000; Lange and Dawson 2009), others that it was more common in former French colonies (Wucherpfennig et al. 2016), and still others that there was no difference in former British and French colonies (Cederman et al. 2015; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Paine 2019). Recognizing the potential problems of using the identity of the colonizer as a proxy for divisive colonial policies, a few works have collected data on particular policies for different sets of British colonies and explored their relationships with the risk of postcolonial ethnic conflict, yet these works offer weak and inconsistent findings (Lange and Balian 2008; Ray 2018; Verghese 2016).

Although the literatures on pluralism and colonialism overlap, they do not engage with one another. This is unfortunate, as each has the potential to highlight and correct problems with the other. For example, the colonial literature provides a potential corrective to the nationalist literature by noting that pluralist policies can be discriminatory and that pluralism can be a source of conflict. This omission is not surprising, as the nationalist literature focuses on pluralism as a means of reducing intercommunal tensions in regions with preexisting conflict and such policy solutions would necessarily focus on equitable pluralist solutions. “Equitable” is a very subjective term, however, and the biggest difficulty devising pluralist reforms is coming up with policies that all parties view as fair, suggesting that conflict over pluralism is common.

The study of colonial pluralism also offers a partial solution to the main empirical problem facing studies of pluralism and nationalist violence. Because politicians usually implement pluralist policies in environments with either ongoing nationalist civil wars or a very high risk of nationalist violence, nationalist conflict is a common cause of pluralist policies, and this makes it very

difficult to assess how pluralism affects nationalist warfare. In colonies, however, favored models and concerns over control were the main determinants of colonial pluralism. As a result, intercommunal conflict had relatively little effect on the degree of colonial pluralism, and an analysis of colonial pluralism limits problems of endogeneity.

While the colonial literature contributes to the nationalist literature on pluralism in these ways, the nationalist literature also provides two important correctives to the colonial literature. First, key works on pluralism consider how the social environment mediates the impact of pluralism, with pluralist solutions only working when matched with key conditions. The literature on divisive colonial policies, on the other hand, focuses on colonialism as an all-powerful, transformative force and therefore pays little attention to social context (Lange 2015). As a result, colonial scholars potentially overstate the impact of colonialism, overlook the possibility of mixed effects, and miss the influence of other factors.

Second, the nationalist literature can help reorient the colonial literature to consider the type of conflict. Overwhelmingly, the colonial literature analyzes how pluralist colonial policies promote ethnic conflict, including both ethnic violence between civilians and ethnic civil wars between a state and ethnic opponents. The nationalist literature, on the other hand, focuses on nationalist conflict and notes that pluralism has particularly important effects on this type of conflict because it deals with communal character of the nation. As such, colonial pluralism might affect nationalist civil warfare more than other types of ethnic conflict, something that potentially explains the mixed findings of previous analyses of colonialism and ethnic violence.

In the pages that follow, I recognize the strengths and weaknesses of both literatures and explore how colonial pluralism affected the risk of violence. Like past works on nationalism, I focus on nationalist civil war instead of ethnic violence more broadly. I also consider how context shapes the character and effects of pluralism, paying particular attention to how the degree of precolonial statehood interacted with colonial pluralism to affect the risk of nationalist civil war. From the colonial literature, I recognize the common finding that pluralism has polarizing effects and therefore explore how pluralism can cause war. And by focusing on colonial pluralism instead of pluralism in noncolonial environments, I limit problems of endogeneity.

THE LITERATURE ON MISSIONARY LEGACIES

This book also engages with a literature that is inherently linked to colonial studies but remains distinct from it: missionary studies. A growing number of works recognize that Christian missionaries shaped social processes in influential and enduring ways, and these works generally focus on the positive

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effects of missionaries (Cogneau and Moradi 2014; Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Lankina and Getachew 2012, 2013; Nunn 2014; Okoye and Pongou 2014; Woodberry 2004, 2012). The most common focus is education, and several works find that missionaries expanded it throughout the world. Not all missionaries had the same effect, however, and past works find that Protestants commonly provided more education, especially to females, and were much more likely to provide vernacular education (Cogneau and Moradi 2014; Nunn 2014; Woodberry 2002). Because missionary influence was usually greatest among marginalized communities, missionary education commonly contributed to a reversal of fortunes, whereby the formerly marginalized became the most educated and thereby gained greater access to resources and power (Abernethy 1969; Okoye and Pongou 2014). Others also note that education was one of multiple mechanisms through which missionaries contributed to postcolonial democratization (Lankina and Getachew 2012; Woodberry 2012).

Like the literature on missionary legacies, I analyze the long-term effects of missionaries and pay particular attention to Protestants. My analysis differs from the main currents of the missionary literature in three ways, however. The first concerns the dependent variable: Instead of desirable outcomes like education and democracy, this book analyzes how missionaries affected nationalist violence, a destructive outcome that negatively affects the livelihoods of entire populations. Second, whereas previous works analyze missionaries as an autonomous force, I accept Abernethy's (2000) claim that missionaries were part of colonial systems and analyze the combined effects of colonial states and missionaries. Finally, past works pay little attention to how the social context shapes missionary effects, but I consider how one contextual factor—the degree of precolonial statehood—mediated their influence.

Methodological Design

In addition to integrating distinct literatures, this book combines different methodological traditions to expand insight into causes of nationalist civil war. I use comparative-historical methods to analyze processes and mechanisms promoting nationalist civil warfare or its absence and statistical methods for insight into general patterns of nationalist warfare among a larger set of cases. And given their contrasting strengths and weaknesses, I combine both methods in a division of labor that seeks to exploit their strengths and limit their weaknesses (Lange 2013).

I use comparative-historical methods to explore causal processes leading to nationalist civil war in individual cases, something commonly referred to as process tracing (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2000b). This qualitative method generally involves a detective-style analysis that traces processes back from the outcome to explore its causes. In this book, I employ process tracing

in a more structured and focused manner, thereby overlooking all causal determinants and focusing on the place of colonial pluralism and precolonial states in the processes leading to nationalist civil war. When structured and focused in this way, process tracing is as forward-looking as it is backward-looking. I therefore trace processes backward from nationalist civil war, trace processes forward from colonial pluralism and precolonial statehood, and explore how both sets of processes connect. As part of this analysis, I use counterfactuals—either implicitly or explicitly—to consider whether nationalist civil wars would have occurred in the absence of colonial pluralism and precolonial states, thereby assessing how central precolonial states and colonial pluralism were to the processes leading to nationalist warfare. Although one cannot turn back history to see if removing colonial pluralism or precolonial states would have prevented nationalist civil warfare, I consider the centrality of each in the processes for evidence into counterfactuals, and these counterfactuals guide my causal assessments.

To strengthen the within-case analysis, I make several qualitative comparisons. These comparisons are qualitative in that they occur in narrative form and focus on complex characteristics—such as processes and mechanisms—that are not easily operationalized (Lange 2013). Similar to Mill's (1843/2012) *Methods of Agreement and Difference*, the comparisons pair cases based on key similarities and differences to maximize insight into the causes of nationalist civil war. Different from Mill's methods, however, my comparisons are neither independent nor deterministic, and their strength depends on the evidence from the case studies. The main way I use these comparisons is to isolate the influence of precolonial states and colonial pluralism, and such comparisons inform counterfactuals by offering insight into what might have happened if precolonial states were absent or colonialism either did not occur or took a different form.

Instead of using them independently, I combine process tracing and qualitative comparison, and both strengthen and are difficult to separate from one another. The qualitative comparisons bolster the within-case analysis by raising issues for the within-case analyses to explore and highlighting key factors within processes that shape the outcome. In contrast, the within-case analysis highlights the factors and processes that the qualitative comparisons subsequently compare, and an understanding of the processes that occurred in the cases is needed to gain insight from the comparisons.

While the comparative-historical analysis offers insight into causal processes and patterns within particular cases, statistical methods highlight general patterns among a larger set while formally controlling for other factors that might influence the outcome. Using this method, I explore how colonial pluralism, the extent of precolonial statehood, and their combinations are related to the odds of nationalist civil war onset. The goal of these analyses is

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to highlight general patterns, and I use statistics to test whether these broad patterns support my hypotheses.

In recent years, there has been growing concern that within-case and statistical methods are distinct methodologies with opposing epistemologies, ontologies, and cultures (Goertz and Mahoney 2013). A major conclusion of this literature is that their differences shape empirical analysis in important ways, and quantitative and qualitative methods can therefore produce incompatible results. One way to mitigate this problem is to better integrate within-case and statistical methods by using within-case methods to supplement and test the statistical analyses (Rohlfing 2008; Seawright 2016). Examples include using the within-case analysis to test variable measurements, the possibility of omitted variable bias, and the direction of causation.

I agree that a better integration of comparative-historical and statistical methods can help prevent incompatible findings. I take issue, however, with simply using comparative-historical methods to supplement statistics, a strategy that places all emphasis on the statistical analysis and overlooks the extremely important insight into causal processes that within-case methods and qualitative comparisons provide. Instead of using one method to supplement the other, I attempt to integrate them by completing both comparative-historical and statistical analyses simultaneously, something that allows a continuous back-and-forth between the two. When doing this, within-case analysis can supplement the statistical analysis by exploring possible measurement error, omitted variable bias, and the like. At the same time, a simultaneous analysis enables researchers to exploit the main benefits of comparative-historical methods—insight into causal processes—while supplementing the comparative-historical analysis with insight from the statistical analysis. For example, if the statistical analysis highlights a particular relationship, the within-case analysis can explore processes and mechanisms that might explain the relationship. And, if the within-case and statistical findings contrast, researchers can explore potential reasons for the discrepancy. In completing this book, I therefore continually compared the findings of the comparative-historical and statistical analyses.

To complete such a back-and-forth analysis, an understanding of each methodological tradition is necessary. Just as people can navigate between different cultures by gaining an understanding of each, an understanding of both comparative-historical and statistical methods is needed to integrate them. If not, one dominates, and the main benefits of the other are discarded. A very important part of this understanding is recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of both methodological traditions and attempting to combine them in ways that minimize the disadvantages while maximizing the advantages. I recognize that comparative-historical methods provide powerful insight into processes and mechanisms that explain social outcomes whereas statistical

analysis provides important insight into patterns that are needed to make general causal claims. I combine both methodologies to exploit their contrasting advantages, thereby promoting a more rigorous analysis than either methodology could provide on its own.

Given this back-and-forth between statistical and comparative-historical findings, a realistic representation of the research process would be excruciatingly complex. For ease of presentation, I only present the outcome of this process. Because it is easier for readers to follow, I generally present the statistical and comparative-historical analyses separately. As a result, the order of presentation does not represent the order in which the analysis occurred.

Another way in which I limit potentially conflicting results from multi-method analysis is by using comparative-historical methods to analyze a relatively large number of cases—dozens of nationalist civil wars in 20 countries. Any single case is unique in a variety of ways, and the risk that the qualitative and quantitative findings conflict are high when including only one or two case studies. By increasing the number of cases, the comparative-historical analysis offers insight into broader patterns, and the match between statistical and comparative-historical findings should improve. And if the findings do not converge, the researcher must explore why they do not.

To analyze how colonial pluralism and precolonial states affect the risk of nationalist civil war, I could analyze any number of former overseas colonies. I focus on the former British Empire because it offers superior insight into interactions between colonial pluralism and historical states: British rule was exceptionally pluralist, and the extent of precolonial statehood varied greatly within the British Empire. More generally, different aspects of the British Empire help highlight common causal dynamics of nationalist civil war. For one, former British colonies have experienced three times as many nationalist civil wars as the former colonies of other European powers, but only one in four former British colonies have suffered nationalist civil wars. As a result, the factors promoting nationalist civil war should be unusually concentrated in some former British colonies but weaker or absent in others. In addition, there are three dozen former British colonies, and this relatively large number makes possible a systematic analysis of the causes of nationalist civil war. And because of the number of British colonies and the concentration of nationalist civil war in them, over one-third of all nationalist civil wars since 1946 have occurred in former British colonies, a share that allows analyses to highlight broader patterns and provide more general insight.

My case-selection strategy for the comparative-historical analysis is to include all nine former British colonies that experienced nationalist civil war (Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Sudan). For comparative purposes, I also select seven former British colonies that have not experienced nationalist civil war (Botswana,




FIGURE 1.2. Nationalist Civil Warfare in Southeast Asia, 1946–2020. Adapted from “The Southeast Asian Massif” by Jean Michaud, *Journal of Global History*, 2010.

Ghana, Egypt, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, and Tanzania), two former French colonies that either did not experience nationalist civil war (Cambodia) or experienced a relatively minor conflict (Vietnam), and two countries that (mostly) avoided European colonialism and experienced either one (Thailand) or seven nationalist civil wars (Ethiopia). I selected these cases based on variation in the focal independent variables, theoretical considerations, their pairing with other cases, and their fit with the statistical analysis.

While analyzing cases in different regions of the world, I pay particular attention to Southeast Asia for different reasons. Most importantly, 22 of the 35 nationalist civil wars in the former British Empire occurred in Southeast Asia, so any analysis of how British colonial pluralism affected nationalist civil war must pay close attention to this region. Similarly, nationalist civil wars are much more concentrated in Southeast Asia than any other region of the world, making the region important for more general understandings of the causes of nationalist civil war. The region is also ideal for testing my main hypotheses because all countries in the region have very high levels of historical statehood and communal demographics characterized by one large state community and several smaller non-state communities. Scott (2009), in turn, notes that conflict in the region is common between lowland states and upland non-state communities, with upland communities fighting to maintain their autonomy from lowland states. Finally, the British colonized three of the eight countries in the region, thereby allowing me to explore how historical statehood affects nationalist conflict with and without histories of colonial pluralism. As highlighted in figure I.2, 22 of the 23 nationalist civil wars in the region occurred in former British colonies, and I explore whether the combination of colonial pluralism and historical statehood explains this pattern.

Book Outline

The remainder of this book includes nine chapters. Chapter 1 presents the book's theoretical framework, which takes a mid-level, mechanism-centered approach that draws on social movement and statist theories. The majority of the chapter describes mechanisms through which colonial pluralism and precolonial statehood potentially affect nationalist civil war, and it ends by considering how these effects can endure after colonialism to shape postcolonial patterns of nationalist conflict. Chapter 2 analyzes the pluralist character of British colonial rule. For this, it provides a brief history of British colonialism, describes the main characteristics and policies of colonial pluralism, explores the prevalence of colonial pluralism in the British Empire, and analyzes the origins of colonial pluralism. For insight into the extent to which British colonialism was uniquely pluralist, the chapter also compares the form of rule in the British Empire with other European overseas empires, focusing primarily on

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the French. Chapter 3 uses statistics to test whether general patterns support chapter 1's theoretical framework. For this, I measure the extent of colonial pluralism and precolonial statehood and test their relationships with the onset of nationalist civil war between 1946 and 2020. Chapters 4 through 8 complete the book's comparative-historical analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze Myanmar and India, respectively. Both regions are extreme cases that had highly pluralist forms of colonialism and subsequently experienced many nationalist civil wars. If colonial pluralism affects nationalist civil warfare, these cases are therefore ideal for highlighting the mechanisms and processes linking colonial pluralism and nationalist conflict (Goertz 2016). Chapter 6 provides more abbreviated analyses of all remaining former British colonies that experienced nationalist civil warfare to see if the findings parallel those of Myanmar and India. For insight into why colonial pluralism did not promote nationalist civil warfare in all cases, the chapter also includes a comparative analysis of Malaysia, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Tanzania. Chapters 7 and 8 turn the attention to the impact of historical statehood on nationalist civil warfare. Chapter 7 returns to cases reviewed in chapters 4, 5, and 6 and analyzes ways in which precolonial statehood interacted with colonial pluralism to affect nationalist civil warfare. By including cases with different levels of precolonial statehood, the chapter explores the different ways in which precolonial statehood combined with colonial pluralism to shape nationalist civil warfare. Chapter 8 explores the independent effects of historical statehood. For this, it analyzes six cases with high levels of historical statehood but limited or no colonial pluralism—Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Botswana, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings and considers their generalizability. For the latter, it investigates whether the book's findings can be applied to noncolonial settings and whether they offer insight into patterns of postcolonial conflict in the former French and Spanish Empires.

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