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Introduction

DECOLONIZATION UNFINISHED:
IN SEARCH OF A JUST POSTCOLONIAL
WORLD ORDER

DECOLONIZATION IS BACK. Not that it had ever left the agenda for those living under the long shadow of colonialism or for those resisting ongoing settler colonialism. But following the wave of postcolonial state founding that spread across the world in the middle decades of the twentieth century, many in the West saw decolonization as a largely accomplished feat. For some, it had been a triumph of moral enlightenment and the beginning of the era of self-determining nation-states. For others, it was good riddance—from now on, the colonies would be responsible for their own troubles.

This story of colonialism coming to an end has become harder and harder to maintain. Not only do we live in a world marked by myriad unrectified colonial legacies, but global politics continue to feature hierarchies that resemble colonial relations. Accusations of global political domination, economic exploitation, and cultural imperialism have persisted. Across the postcolonial world, politicians and activists are re-centering the language of resisting colonialism to protest ecological destruction, linguistic and cultural decline, exploitative foreign investment and corporate land grabs, and to demand reparations and the repatriation of cultural objects.[1] Moreover, following long-standing critiques of European and American imperialism, similar charges are now made against China as a rising global hegemon.[2] The sun may have set on the British empire but not on empire itself.

Yet if empire has remained a persistent feature of global politics, it is less clear what decolonization offers as a counterpoint for reimagining global relations. After all, decolonization has not resulted in the radical transformations that many who fought for it had envisioned. The promise of the independent, self-determining, postcolonial nation-state was largely dead upon arrival into a deeply unequal and globalizing world. Today, citizens across the postcolonial

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world fight on two fronts—continued encroachment from transnational corporations and foreign powers on the one hand, and authoritarian regimes that seize the mantle of decolonization in service of a militant nationalism on the other.[3] At the same time, the myth of national self-determination after decolonization has allowed former colonial and neocolonial powers to wash their hands of past and ongoing exploitation and domination and to instead blame poor postcolonial governance for persistent poverty, inequality, and conflict. Moreover, across former metropoles, decolonization is increasingly synonymous with efforts to promote "diversity" and "inclusion" in cultural representation, thus becoming rather detached from the radical institutional changes that first-wave anticolonial thinkers envisioned. In short, in a world of resurgent empire, postcolonial disillusionment and long-lasting colonial legacies, what decolonization as an emancipatory vision amounts to has become rather obscured. As Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò argues in his forceful critique of decolonial politics, "The term [decolonization] has become so slippery that it no longer offers a sure handle on what success would look like in a decolonized world."[4]

This book recovers anticolonial aspirations toward equality as a resource for thinking about overcoming the neocolonial present. Engaging with the writings of four influential anticolonial thinkers and activists—Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, and Jawaharlal Nehru—I argue that an important theme that runs through anticolonial critique is an ideal of relating to others as equals and the rejection of hierarchy. This reading of the anticolonial tradition departs from a long-standing tendency in academic and popular discourse that treats anticolonialism as just another form of ethnocultural nationalism and therefore reduces the ambitions of decolonization to building nation-states through which postcolonial peoples can exercise collective self-determination. Instead, as I argue this book, at its most ambitious, the anticolonial tradition gives us tools to contest political, economic, and cultural hierarchies to pave the way for an egalitarian cosmopolitan world, as well as reject forms of postcolonial nationalism more concerned with policing group boundaries than realizing the equal freedom of its members. Drawing from the *egalitarian face of decolonization*, as I call it, the first part of the book develops an account of postcolonial global justice as social equality in which individuals and the groups of which they are members enjoy equal standing. Although philosophers and political theorists have traditionally articulated social equality as an ideal within shared societies, I argue that taking up an anticolonial perspective of the world compels us to see both the relevance and importance of realizing such an ideal between members of different societies. Equipped with this philosophical account of postcolonial global justice, the rest of the book then investigates objectionable hierarchies in three areas of contentious global politics and shows how they are systematically interlinked:

international investment, cultural globalization, and global governance. In each area I show that, first, anticolonial critiques that have traditionally been understood in a nationalist frame actually have deeper roots in the value of equality, and that this enables us to detach decolonial projects from the institution of the nation-state when alternative political forms are better for resisting objectionable hierarchy. Second, persistent global hierarchies that directly and indirectly perpetuate the domination and exploitation of marginalized populations justify significant reforms to international law and policy at the expense of former colonial and presently neocolonial powers. Third, the cosmopolitan tendency to celebrate global integration and universal rights must be qualified by remedial rights that specifically and disproportionately empower subordinated groups, including (but not limited to) rights to property expropriation, cultural protectionism, and counterhegemonic power-building. The aim is to develop an account of global justice that takes seriously the legacies of European colonialism and the urgency of resisting neocolonialism in global politics—in short, an account of *postcolonial* global justice.

Colonialism, Decolonization, and Global Justice

Investigating new and enduring forms of colonialism in global politics is not new. From different disciplinary angles, scholars have written prolifically on these questions. As I will discuss shortly, this book draws on their insights even as my aim of developing normative principles is one not usually shared by these critical traditions.

Among philosophers interested in global justice and international political theory, however, the question of empire and persistent global hierarchy has until recently received little attention.[5] Broadly, global justice thinking consists of trying to work out what members of different territorial groups (nations, states, societies) owe to each other as a matter of justice—how they should interact in war, what are fair terms of trade, what gives a group a claim over a piece of territory, when it might be permissible to exclude nonmembers, and so on. Global justice thinking in this broad sense has a long history and can be traced within different cultural traditions.[6] But philosophical interest in global justice largely began from a debate among Anglo-American liberals regarding whether principles of egalitarian social justice as articulated by John Rawls in the 1970s are applicable at the global level. While some argued that the same institutional or human features that demand domestic egalitarianism can also be found at the global level—such as political and economic structures that determine the distribution of advantage and disadvantage, or the mere fact of sentience—others have insisted that such talk was overblown or had misunderstood the nature of social justice.[7] This debate, taking place in

the era of formal decolonization, was not merely intellectual: its primary initiator Charles Beitz was originally partly prompted by demands from postcolonial countries to argue for egalitarian reform of the international order.[8] Yet, like its domestic counterpart on social justice, the philosophical debate over global distributive justice quickly took on an ahistorical and abstract turn as competing camps grappled over the scope of democratic inclusion, the grounds for egalitarian redistribution, and the moral basis of national borders.[9]

Over time, each side ran into tricky problems now familiar to those writing about global justice. On the one side, those who argue that the demands of egalitarian justice stop at, or at least are significantly modified by, national borders risk neglecting the real-world hierarchies of domination and exploitation that continue to structure international interactions in a "postcolonial" world. John Rawls, perhaps the most prominent statist, famously attributed societies' level of wealth as largely the result of the self-determination of nations, and in particular due to "the political culture, the political virtues and civic society of the country, its members' probity and industriousness, their capacity for innovation, and much else."[10] Even more moderate statists such as David Miller who acknowledge the existence of unfair global economic arrangements tend to theorize global justice from the assumption that people belong to independent national communities.[11] This leads him to argue that a nation's culture and self-determining choices—such as models of economic development—can explain, to a significant extent, why some countries have been able to lift their citizens out of poverty while others continue to suffer.[12] The normative upshot of these statist imaginaries of the world tends to be minimalist accounts of global justice that emphasize duties of humanitarian assistance over the need for significant global redistribution, even when Western affluent states' responsibility for past injustices is sometimes acknowledged.[13] Such accounts, however, are difficult to maintain when we fully appreciate the many constraints on postcolonial countries cast by the long shadow of colonialism.

On the other side, cosmopolitans have been criticized as unwitting handmaidens of neocolonialism and global capitalism. In advancing the argument that state borders are morally arbitrary from the point of view of egalitarian justice, critics argue that cosmopolitans give too little weight to the importance of collective self-determination. Instead, cosmopolitans end up supporting global institutions that have undermined oppressed and marginalized groups' capacity to resist foreign and corporate encroachment.[14] The human rights regime, for example, and the practice of humanitarian intervention deployed to enforce such rights, have been widely criticized for enabling Western imperialist ambitions and facilitating the rise of corporate rights under international law.[15] Moreover, cosmopolitans have also been criticized for trying to extend parochial Western values to the rest of the world.[16]

Finally, both statists and cosmopolitans have focused almost exclusively on (relatively affluent) citizens in Western countries as the moral agents to whom duties of global justice are ascribed. While it is undoubtedly important to ask what the advantaged owe to the disadvantaged, reducing the question of global justice to this unidirectional relationship risks portraying the developing world as passive recipients of justice, and it neglects projects of global justice advanced by oppressed agents throughout history.[17]

The silence on race and empire in much of early global justice inquiries has been diagnosed from different angles. Broadly, most early theories of global justice were primarily developed out of a liberal framework. Yet the relationship between liberalism and imperialism is historically fraught, to say the least. As Duncan Bell notes, scholars disagree on whether the relationship is rejectionist, where imperialism is antithetical to liberalism; necessary, where imperialism is a central feature of liberal political thought; or contingent, where imperialism is not inherent to liberal commitments, but the latter have nonetheless been historically deployed to justify the former.[18] While this book is also premised on the idea that liberalism—a "complex ideology whose exemplars share family resemblances rather than any strict doctrine," as Jennifer Pitts puts it—need not inevitably end up supporting imperialist ambitions, my approach to theorizing global justice aims to be alert to and resist the tendencies of liberal political philosophy to idealize and abstract away racial oppression.[19] I return to these points in the next section.

Aside from a close association with liberalism, the general absence of race and empire in global justice theory has also been attributed to more specific factors. For example, Katrina Forrester argues that the widespread rejection of libertarianism by liberal egalitarianism in the 1960s and '70s also led the latter to turn away from questions of corrective justice, including attending to the implications of slavery and empire for contemporary distributive justice. Charles Mills points to the whiteness of analytic political philosophy as one reason for the widespread neglect of race and racism as philosophically important issues.[20] Finally, as I will discuss later, it seems likely that the long-standing Western academic reception of anticolonialism—perhaps the most significant challenge to global injustice in modern history—also played a role in occluding resources contained within anticolonial political thought for pushing theorists of global justice to take race and empire seriously.[21]

The past two decades have seen the emergence of "third wave global justice."[22] Broadly, third wave global justice theory shares several features: first, these theories tend to center the problem of domination in global politics and therefore tend to combine insights from statists and cosmopolitans. Laura Valentini, for example, argues that once we appreciate the coercive relationships that structure the global order, the value of collective self-determination

grounds demanding principles for global distributive justice.[23] Lea Ypi argues that political associations such as the state are not always hindrances to cosmopolitan justice (and can be crucial for advancing it), and that the more minimal duties to alleviate global poverty endorsed by statists can ground cosmopolitan principles.[24] Neorepublicans such as Cécile Laborde and Miriam Ronzoni have argued that a just global order is one in which states enjoy freedom from domination.[25]

Relatedly, third wave global justice theorists have increasingly moved from abstract theorizing to home in on specific parts of the global order and the normative questions raised in areas such as migration, finance, trade, climate change, global governance, sweatshop labor, and so on.[26] This "applied turn" in global justice theory is undoubtedly an important and refreshing shift in a literature criticized for having little of relevance to say to people actually living under global injustice. By attending to specific problems as they arise in global interactions, such as domination in global finance, unfair trade deals that capital-poor countries have had to accept, or the failure of affluent states to give migrants what they are due, third wave global justice theorists have yielded important action-guiding insights for policymakers and ordinary citizens in a non-ideal world. Moreover, the concomitant rise of "practice-dependent" theorizing has enabled normative theorists to make progress on specific issues without first having to construct a comprehensive theory of global justice.[27]

Yet specificity also comes at a cost. The compartmentalized nature of third wave global justice theory has meant that we lack a critical diagnosis of the global order as a whole and therefore an understanding of how seemingly disparate instances of global injustice relate to and mutually reinforce one another. To name a few examples: How might a global racial hierarchy that places less value on the lives of nonwhite populations reinforce exploitation in supply chains? If unfair trade and investment deals exist in part because Western countries have dominated international lawmaking since the colonial era, how might these power asymmetries be addressed so that a fairer global economy or a "new global deal"[28] has a chance to come about?

In other words, with a few exceptions, the contributors to the philosophical literature on global justice have yet to grapple with the *neocolonial* nature of the global order and, more specifically, the racialized nature of a neocolonial global order.[29] Such is the broad background against which specific issues like trade and climate injustice arise. How should we characterize this background? Charles Mills calls it global white supremacy, by which he refers to "the racialised distributions of economic, political and cultural power that we have today" as a result of "the European domination of the planet for the past several hundred years."[30] Once we see the world this way, Mills argues, we appreciate

that Black and Third World political thought are indispensable sources for mapping the contours of global power, as well as the need to go beyond color-blind diagnoses of global domination and inequality. Building on Mills, Olúfémi O. Táíwò describes our present global order as a *global racial empire*.[31] He argues that this global order, forged in the era of colonialism and transatlantic slavery, is one we still live with today. Global racial empire places white people at the top, but it can also capture a shifting global political landscape where predominantly nonwhite countries like China are becoming increasingly powerful and problematic in their dealings in Southeast Asia and Africa.[32] From an international law perspective, TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) scholar B. S. Chimni argues that the existing network of international institutions constitute a "global imperial state" whose function is "to realize the interests of transnational capital and powerful states in the international system to the disadvantage of third world states and peoples."[33] This conception captures the overlapping importance of race and class in reinforcing the subjection of disadvantaged populations and is able to make sense of the existence of postcolonial capitalist elites. Central to all three descriptions is the idea that the world is constituted by a set of mutually reinforcing racialized hierarchies that perpetuate the subjugation of some populations for the benefit of others. This is the international system I call neocolonial: where political domination is backed by racial hierarchy to facilitate economic exploitation.

Grappling with neocolonialism opens important avenues of investigation for theorists of global justice. First, it enables us to analyze the systematicity of global injustice: identifying where global problems overlap and how they reinforce each other. Like colonialism, which developed into a full-blown international system, neocolonialism is constituted by a set of interlocking power relations in global governance, economic exchange, and cultural and knowledge production. As a result of the systematic nature of neocolonialism, the harms faced by racialized and marginalized postcolonial groups are compounded. Therefore, solutions to global injustice also need to empower them along multiple dimensions. In other words, zooming out to a critical diagnosis of the world order as neocolonial encourages us to think of global justice as a program—indeed, as worldmaking[34]—where different aspects of an oppressive system need to be accounted for and resisted simultaneously. Without a systematic diagnosis of global injustice, practice-dependent or area-specific theorizing risks generating principles of justice that take for granted deeper background inequalities.[35] Adopting this comprehensive approach, however, need not mean sacrificing concrete problem-based normative theorizing. As I show throughout the book, we can grapple with specific areas of global politics while also appreciating how a common problem, that of racialized hierarchy, ties them together.

Relatedly, it pushes us to go beyond attending to the material, structural basis of global injustice and engage with what Glen Coulthard, drawing from Fanon, has called the "subjective, psycho-affective" basis of colonial oppression, by which he refers to the human attitudes and dispositions cultivated to reproduce colonial relations.[36] These attitudes and dispositions are cultivated in both colonial subjects and colonizers. For the former, an internalized sense of what Aimé Césaire calls an "inferiority complex"[37] gradually takes hold; for the latter, a distorted set of beliefs regarding the world and racialized others, or what Mills calls white ignorance—"a pervasively deforming outlook"[38] causally linked to white people's situation within a racialized social system— becomes entrenched. These dispositions are produced by and help prop up oppressive political and economic structures. They are also fostered in a global culture dominated by Western epistemic production and appropriation. Hence anticolonial thinkers often argue that resisting colonialism is not only a matter of resisting political and economic structures, but also, as Césaire puts it, a matter of soul-making through cultural production, or, as Fanon similarly argues, the making of a new human through practices that restore self-respect.[39] Yet, like early work in global justice, recent work has also largely been silent on issues of race and racialization, self-respect, and unequal status. Nor have third wave theorists attended to inequality and domination in global cultural and knowledge circulation. And yet, unequal power in global cultural and knowledge production may itself be a site of global injustice as well as contain important implications for agents' abilities to make progress in other areas of global justice.

Third, if the denial of equal agency (as I will argue) was central to colonial oppression, tackling the neocolonial nature of global injustice cautions us to center the agency of the subjugated in theorizing solutions and transitions to global justice. With a few recent exceptions, however, neither early nor third wave global justice theory has said much on the roles of the dominated or subjugated in resisting global injustice and bringing about global justice and what these groups might be entitled to do for these ends.[40] Throughout the book, I defend institutional changes and extrainstitutional practices whose aims are to resist neocolonial investment, cultural imperialism, and global political domination.

This book develops an account of global justice that foregrounds questions of empire, race, and hierarchy in a neocolonial global order. In doing so, we will draw on insights from disciplines beyond political theory. Critical scholars of international relations and international law, for example, have shown how legal principles that were developed and evolved in European colonial encounters serve the interests of colonizing powers, and how contemporary international law has inherited features that continue to constrain and undermine

postcolonial sovereignty. The contributions of TWAIL scholars have been particularly valuable in shedding light on how international practices and norms such as the human rights regime, international development, the idea of good governance, and so on have been used by corporations and hegemonic states to erode the rights of individuals and their capital-poor states.[41] Second, work in postcolonial studies has historically taken the lead in interrogating the legacies of colonialism in cultural and social discourse, literary work, and knowledge production.[42] Following thinkers such as Fanon, Foucault, and Gramsci, postcolonial theorists such as Edward Said have exposed and deconstructed the workings of power in shaping dominant frames of references and perceptions of the foreign "other," and questioned how subaltern agency might be uneasily recovered or forever erased.[43] Finally and more recently, renewed interest in the concept of racial capitalism has led to an outpour of scholarship in sociology, history, and critical theory on the nexus between racialization and capital accumulation. Building on the work of Cedric Robinson, Eric Williams, and Walter Rodney, these scholars argue that the historical development and contemporary operation of global capitalism cannot be understood without considering the role of race and racialization in creating nonwhite bodies for ownership, exploitation, disposal, and removal.[44]

This book learns from these critical traditions where they are relevant for diagnosing our neocolonial present, but our focus is ultimately different. In their emphasis on critique, these traditions do not usually take developing a normative account of postcolonial justice as their primary or explicit aim. This book is an effort to do just that. Our central question is: What values ought to animate a just postcolonial world order? I draw on anticolonial thought to develop *one* answer to this question: the elimination of global hierarchy and the realization of global social equality.

In developing this view, the book brings together two literatures that have largely remained separate: anticolonial political thought and contemporary global justice theory. While recent work by historians and political theorists such as Frederick Cooper, Gary Wilder, Adom Getachew, and others has begun to recover anticolonial internationalist and federative projects that have important normative implications for thinking about global justice, these works do not develop a full-blown account of global justice for thinking about contemporary global politics.[45] In contrast, I employ what I call historically inflected normative theorizing, which treats specific historical actors as interlocutors in developing normative principles for the present.[46] Bridging normative and critical traditions is not without complications, as I discuss in more detail in the next section. And yet the potential payoffs are significant. Anticolonial thinkers struggled against one of the greatest forms of global injustice in modern history, and their situated perspectives are indispensable for

understanding the different interlocking dimensions of global injustice as well as what resistance might look like. What's more, anticolonial thinkers were not only engaged in situated critique, but also offered visions of a just postcolonial world that lies beneath the critique. Focusing exclusively on recovering critique risks missing subaltern resources to construct alternative norms of justice to those dominant in the neocolonial present.

By bringing together the anticolonial political tradition with normative analysis, this book takes up recent calls for an "insurgent" or a "postcolonial" cosmopolitanism as a fresh way of theorizing global justice.[47] As Catherine Lu, one of the few global justice theorists who has grappled directly with the colonial origins of the modern international order in their work, states, "The project of constructing a just global order is inseparable from the project of decolonizing contemporary international order."[48] My aim is to approach long-standing questions in global justice by critically engaging with the perspectives of those who theorized and resisted one of the most significant forms of global injustice in modern history—in other words, to take up a postcolonial perspective on global justice. Rather than signifying the end of colonialism, as Stuart Hall puts it, "*postcolonial* means after the epoch when imperial power was exercised by direct colonization, but it also means an era when everything still takes place in the slipstream of colonialism and hence bears the inscription of the disturbances that colonization set in motion."[49] To think about questions of global justice without keeping these disturbances in view is therefore to ignore the very epoch in which we live.

Global Justice from a Postcolonial Perspective

Once we start seeing global justice as a project in decolonization, we begin to see that the issue of neocolonial hierarchy touches upon many, if not all, aspects of global social life, and dismantling them or preventing their formation is not at all straightforward. One reason for this is that sustained interactions between unevenly situated agents are always at risk of becoming entrenched hierarchies of domination and exploitation, a risk made even more heightened at the global level due to the lack of a world state. Another reason is that history casts a long shadow.[50] Colonial legacies such as structural poverty, economic dependency, global ideologies of white supremacy, and so on remain largely unaddressed, and it is not difficult to see how these intertwine with many topics of concern in global politics.

Centering these issues in theorizing global politics means approaching questions of global justice from a postcolonial perspective. Here, I follow Leela Gandhi's definition of postcolonialism as "a theoretical resistance to the mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath."[51] As a mode of public intellectual inquiry,

postcolonialism is committed to the "task of revisiting, remembering and, crucially, interrogating the colonial past."[52] This interrogation is not only an exercise in understanding how the colonizer maintained—and maintains—his power (although that is important), but also a study into how the colonized opened up spaces of resistance. In Gyan Prakash's words, postcolonialism needs also "to fully recognize another history of agency and knowledge alive in the dead weight of the colonial past."[53] Understood this way, a postcolonial perspective signifies both a refusal to forget the imperial histories that made the world today, and an insistence on grappling with the hierarchies that remain by drawing from an archive developed by the oppressed. Specifically, in developing an account of global justice, taking up a postcolonial perspective entails at least two methodological commitments. First, *to take a fully decolonized world as a normative aspiration*. This invites the further question of what a decolonized world is, and this book attempts to provide *part* of an answer by investigating what values ought to inform global relations. Without getting into that here, the thought is that a postcolonial perspective focuses on dismantling the kinds of unjust structures and relations that constituted colonialism. It necessitates, therefore, charting a different path from the "historical amnesia" that has underpinned much of Anglo-American analytic global justice theory.[54] In thinking about what global justice demands, someone committed to a postcolonial perspective would take this to be a central aim of her view.

Second, in both critical diagnosis and normative prescription, *a postcolonial perspective is informed by the thinking of those who have lived through and struggled against colonial oppression*. Instead of a view from nowhere, a postcolonial perspective on global justice is derived from situated knowledge. There are at least two reasons why this is important. First, as feminist standpoint epistemologists have argued, members of oppressed groups plausibly acquire valuable insight into situations of oppression and marginalization through their lived experience, and their reflections on the causes of and solutions to injustice ought to be accorded some special weight.[55] Second, an important part of decolonization *is* to recover and recenter the agency of the colonized and to deprovincialize marginalized perspectives while provincializing dominant ones. By engaging seriously with the former's political thought, the moral imperative to decolonize is built into the exercise of theorizing global justice.

However, insofar as the resulting normative view primarily aims to be action-guiding, committing to a postcolonial perspective cannot mean simply taking onboard everything that is recovered from anticolonial actors. These texts were written in a different context and for a different time, and it would be a mistake to think they can be straightforwardly transposed to the present. More importantly, anyone thinking about norms of justice has a responsibility to defend views that are valuable and attractive, and not only because great

historical figures held them. While it is important to accord special weight to the views of those writing from situations of oppression, this does not mean uncritical acceptance. Insisting on uncritical acceptance would not signify respect for these thinkers as equal interlocuters with whom one can reasonably disagree, and instead treats them as objects beyond the pale of critique, and at worst amounts to a kind of patronization or fetishization. Equally problematic is the other end of the extreme, where the theorist imposes and channels her own preconceived normative commitments through the voices of these thinkers, without allowing their views to challenge and alter hers, and failing to take seriously where they may genuinely part company.

Hence this exercise in historically inflected normative theorizing is far from straightforward and, in addition to the two pitfalls above, there is at least one more challenge that needs to be grappled with: insofar as the selected thinkers are not primarily philosophers, but activists, politicians, and revolutionaries, recovering their normative commitments requires paying attention to the different registers in which they wrote and the different audiences they had in mind.

In the book, I attempt to develop a view of global justice for the present by engaging with a set of anticolonial thinkers who struggled against colonialism at the height of the decolonization movements of the twentieth century. My hope is to avoid the pitfalls above by thinking of the exercise as a dialectic between reconstruction and normative query. Through close readings of the key writings of these thinkers, I extract what I judge to be the most morally defensible and appealing set of anticolonial commitments, and I supplement these with my own arguments to form a single, distinct view of global justice. The resulting view, I hope, is recognizably guided by the core values and aspirations of these thinkers, but at the same time cannot be simply ascribed to any one thinker as a view that they actually held.

This attempt to excavate and build a normative theory from anticolonial thought raises some important questions. Specifically, there are at least three points of apparent methodological tensions between the anticolonial tradition and the normative analytic tradition. Roughly, we might call these (1) moral theory vs. political critique; (2) individualism vs. collectivism; and (3) universalism vs. particularism. Insofar as particular methods can lead to different focuses, result in blind spots, bring on certain assumptions, and so on, methodological tensions can have substantive implications. Anyone attempting to excavate normative theory from critical thought will, therefore, need to grapple with them. While I do not pretend to fully resolve all the tensions here, the following discussion attends to each in an effort to persuade skeptics that a project bridging anticolonial thought with normative theory offers a valuable approach to political theory and need not be a nonstarter.

Moral Theory vs. Political Critique?

Much of normative theory uses the language and reference points drawn from moral philosophy. For example, what justice demands is often couched in the language of claim-rights and duties, and critiques of injustice are commonly expressed in terms such as moral wrongness. This can seem deeply at odds with the anticolonial archive, the majority of which consists not of academic papers debating principles of morality, but manifestos, autobiographies, pamphlets, speeches, and critiques aimed at instigating political change. The worry here is not primarily of genre, however, as the latter can, with careful interpretive effort, be fruitfully read as political philosophy. Rather, the worry is that reconstructing the political philosophy of anticolonial activists with the normative analytic method reduces the former's political projects to moral suasion.

To assuage this worry, we should first avoid assuming that anticolonial thinkers were not engaging in moral discourse (i.e., making moral judgments and moral claims) simply because they were also political actors.[56] In their painstaking efforts to detail the injustices and human misery wrought by colonial rule, thinker-activists could not take for granted their various audiences' (including fellow colonial subjects) rejection of colonialism. Instead, like any other political movement responding to moments of crises, anticolonial thinkers were engaged in live debates with their contemporaries of different stripes on what a meaningful alternative to the status quo should amount to. What *was* wrong with the colonial situation? And could it be overcome with reformist solutions? Or did the problem of colonialism require, indeed demand, "shatter[ing] the colonial structures in definitive fashion," as Césaire put it?[57] If so, what would that entail as a matter of concrete policy and practice? Did it mean the redistribution of land and capital? Did it mean democratizing the colony? And for whom would the projects and imperative of decolonization be? In other words, who are the postcolonial demos, the India that Nehru set out to "discover"?[58] Why ought the boundaries of the postcolonial collective self-determination be drawn in this particular way? And so on.

Beneath each thinkers' responses to these questions lie their understandings of what was objectionable about colonialism as a mode of political governance and set of social-economic arrangements, and, correspondingly, what demands ought to be pressed against their oppressors *and* each other long after the colonizers had gone. These are *moral* claims insofar as they invoke ideas of right and wrong, fairness and unfairness, and not merely considerations of who has power and how to most effectively get it. To be sure, it is not always straightforward to read these moral arguments from an anticolonial text. That, indeed, is the interpretive challenge of drawing from a critical tradition to construct normative theory, a challenge taken up in this book. But like any

other challenges in textual interpretation, our focus should be on discerning how differences in interpretation result in substantively different normative theories rather than on denying the possibility of excavating from critical texts any normative theory altogether.

What is clear, however, is that discerning the moral claims is only the first step; the second is to attend to the political practices needed to bring about change. This brings us to a second point: constructing normative theory need not and ought not imply that political change happens through getting moral principles right. For example, as we criticize the contemporary investment regime as an instance of racialized exploitation and explore what an investment regime consistent with the aims of decolonization might look like, we should also consider the obvious fact that none of these changes will happen without political contestation. Thus, unlike earlier waves of global justice theory, questions of political agency and how to build it are just as important to a theory of postcolonial global justice that emerges from sustained engagement with anticolonial political thought.

Individualism vs. Collectivism

Normative theory often relies on an individualist framework that can come into tension with the group-based nature of colonial oppression and the collective rights that are arguably needed for resisting it. In *Not Enough*, Samuel Moyn criticizes early theorists of global justice such as Peter Singer, Onora O'Neill, Charles Beitz, and Henry Shue for their "ethical individualism." The focus on individuals as the moral agents to whom global justice (whatever its content) is owed, Moyn argues, betrayed the "collectivist claims of third-world nationalism" encapsulated in decolonial projects such as the New International Economic Order. He traces this as at least one of the reasons why global justice theory became deradicalized. The deeper worry here is that bridging anticolonial thought with normative theory will result in an objectionable form of deradicalization when the focus becomes shifted to individuals as the units of moral and political analysis.

To better understand and grapple with this concern, let us zoom in on the different forms of individualism at play here. Following Charles Mills, we can draw a distinction between normative individualism and individualist ontology.[59] Add to this a third kind of individualism: what we might call political individualism. Normative individualism is the idea that *individuals*, and not social collectives, are the locus of value. In other words, social collectives do not have independent moral value over and above individuals. Their value derives from whatever value they might have for individuals. On the other hand, individualist ontology (or ontological individualism) denies that

individuals are largely socially molded, constrained, and positioned, and in-
stead understands individuals as decontextualized, rational beings whose char-
acters, beliefs, and behavior are independent of the social reality that shapes
them. Finally, political individualism emphasizes individual rights and indi-
vidual empowerment over group rights and group empowerment.

The first observation from this disaggregation is that endorsing normative
individualism need not entail also endorsing ontological and political indi-
vidualism. We can hold that membership in social collectives such as nations
or racial groups is an important constitutive feature of individual subjectivities
(hence denying ontological individualism), without also thinking that the
former have independent moral value beyond their value for individuals such
that when the interests of the two come into apparent conflict, the group
ought to take precedent over the individual.[60] Likewise, we can hold that
political empowerment for individuals (say, in the form of human rights, for
example) is an inadequate response to the problem of a neocolonial world
order, and that collective empowerment of some form is instead essential for
contesting neocolonial exploitation, cultural imperialism, and global political
disenfranchisement. Yet that need not commit us to the further thought that
national sovereignty has independent moral significance even when it is de-
ployed against the very individuals in whose name it is exercised.[61]

Whether normative individualism is in tension with specific anticolonial
thinkers' views will depend on how we interpret those views. To take an ex-
ample where these might collide, consider Léopold Senghor's and Aimé Cés-
aire's arguments for universal suffrage based not on "one person, one vote," but
rather, as Kevin Duong put it, the "corporate, collective voice that centuries of
colonialism had repressed: the voice of Black folk."[62] At times, some of these
arguments—and certainly Senghor more so than Césaire—seem to be moti-
vated by the claim that there is an African collective subject with a "voice"
whose moral significance is independent of the individuals who make up that
subject. This is certainly in tension with normative individualism. At other
times, however, their resistance against merely enfranchising individuals
within French imperial institutions can be seen as a rejection of *political* individu-
alism. Here, the worry is that political rights for individual African colonial
subjects would mean drowning out their voice vis-à-vis other Europeans and
other non-European subjects.[63] This reading of the demand for collective en-
franchisement is perfectly compatible with the idea that the freedom and well-
being of individual persons are ultimately what matter, even if the route to
securing these is inevitably collective.

Parsing out the three kinds of individualism enables us to bring back the
importance of collectives into theorizing global politics, while *also* taking seri-
ously the problem of ruling elites seizing the mantle of anticolonialism to

dominate their own citizens. Accordingly, the account of postcolonial global justice defended in this book endorses normative individualism. Specifically, I argue that nations do not have independent moral standing over and above individuals—that the moral value of the nation is dependent on its potential to contribute to individuals' emancipation, which is itself a historically contingent fact that can change in different contexts. As we shall see in chapter 1, in the historical struggle against colonialism, the nation *was* instrumentally important, and yet, as the later chapters seek to demonstrate, we can no longer rely exclusively—or even primarily—on the nation-state to further the project of decolonization today. This understanding of the value of nations and nationalism is compatible with and indeed inspired by our four anticolonial thinkers' qualified endorsements of nationalism, their openness to internationalism, their critiques of national elites who work within and for colonial and neocolonial regimes, and finally, their incessant warnings that rule by co-nationals ought not be conflated with full and genuine decolonization.

However, nothing in the account developed in this book implies or necessitates ontological and political individualism; on the contrary, the account explicitly rejects both. Adopting a relational or social understanding of equality, for example, is important precisely because *relations*, i.e., the social, matter in constituting the individual's freedom and subjectivity. This insight echoes Fanon's analysis of the colonial situation and the ways in which the colonizer creates the colonized, which I will draw on in chapter 2 to develop an account of relational or social equality. Moreover, chapters 3–5 each defend a different kind of group-based empowerment for overcoming neocolonial exploitation, cultural imperialism, and global disenfranchisement. Each of these strategies is drawn from a different thinker's insights: Nkrumah's argument for political unity against "the last stage of imperialism"; Césaire's diagnosis of cultural imperialism as creating a hierarchy of agency between racialized collectives; and finally, Nehru's early attempts at alliance-building between social movements across the world.

Universalism vs. Particularism

Normative theorists often make moral claims whose scope is implicitly understood as universal. At its crudest, critics complain, normative theory gives off the impression that its goal is to develop an ideal of justice from abstract reasoning and apply it across time and space with little or insufficient regard for either the specific situation from which said ideal emerged or the particularities of the contexts to which it is applied. This invites a worry about universalism that can be further broken down into two versions. In one version of the worry, call it the historicity problem, normative theory ignores histories of

how the world got to where it is and thus often arrives at universal ideals of undifferentiated justice that are premature at best and concealing oppression at worst.[64] As Sundhya Pahuja argues in her critique of normative global justice theory, "Although [the] claim to universality is asserted as a virtue which carries the promise of inclusion and universal access to moral rights, when combined with power, it has the effect of dominating those who are included within it."[65] In a second version, call it the totalizing problem, normative theory's claim to universalism is also a claim to epistemic authority over others: that a theory of justice developed in dominant societies can be applied straightforwardly to other contexts. As Jeanne Morefield argues, in assuming that abstract moral principles are "universally germane and entirely modular" for the rest of the world, normative theory risks neglecting or dismissing "alternative ethical responses" to injustice, responses that have been developed from subjects of past and ongoing colonialism themselves.[66]

We should be careful to avoid either mistake as we develop an account of postcolonial global justice. Ultimately, all ideas are particular in the sense that they come from somewhere with certain motivations, for certain people, performing certain social and political functions. We should indeed be suspicious of normative theory that tries to disguise this by portraying itself as somehow above the social and political fray. And yet we should also avoid making the opposite assumption: that responses to injustice developed by oppressed actors in particular contexts cannot also have universal content. It bears remembering that these actors often see their struggle against tyranny as not only for their immediate group but for "the whole world."[67] To borrow from Césaire, in developing a different kind of normative theory that draws from the resources of the oppressed, the trick is to neither get trapped by "walled segregation in the particular" or end up in "dilution in the 'universal.'"[68]

The anticolonial thinkers considered in this book provide resources for developing such an account. While they seldom explicitly laid out a systematic normative vision for what a decolonized world looks like, I contend that we can find glimpses of that world in their critiques of colonial domination, exploitation, and racial hierarchy: that is, a world in which relations between societies and between groups are structured to enable freedom, nonalienation, and robust self-respect. Put together, these glimpses of equality allow us to generate an account of postcolonial global justice that has critical implications for existing global political, economic, and cultural relations and that points to certain directions of necessary change and action that remain sensitive to history, context, and circumstances of power. In this sense, postcolonial global justice as social equality aims to be what Serene Khader calls a non-ideal universalism—a universalism whose content is defined by opposition to injustice (in this case, objectionable hierarchies) in a non-ideal world, rather than a

universalism that idealizes away the histories and complexities of unequal power in making claim on the rest of the world.[69] Following Gary Wilder, anticolonial thinkers can also make normative claims that, although perhaps short of universal, are applicable beyond their own immediate situation.[70] As Wilder puts it, "What is the analytic and political cost of assigning to Europe such categories or experience as self-determination, emancipation, equality, justice, and freedom, let alone abstraction, humanity, or universality? Why confirm the story that Europe has long told about itself?"[71] Moral and ethical claims are not the exclusive province of Europe, and it is this assumption that underlies our exercise.

The methodology used in this book can therefore be understood as an attempt to pursue what Adom Getachew calls another kind of universalism, which starts from specific problems that political actors face and reconstructs the political ideas that come out of their responses to those problems.[72] To take an example, in chapter 3 we will start from the specific problem of economic dependence that postcolonial societies faced upon independence, and then turn to how Nkrumah responded to this problem both in terms of critical diagnosis and also in terms of the normative values that underpin his diagnosis. From there, we bring this to bear on the contemporary investment regime, which is a problem not only for the postcolonial Global South but also a problem for citizens everywhere who want to pursue domestic social equality but are prevented from doing so by corporate empowerments. In this sense, Nkrumah offers us an account of neocolonial exploitation that is universal but also particular.

Still, avoiding the trap of a totalizing universalism also means acknowledging and having in one's view important qualifications to the resulting account of justice. To illustrate this point, this book focuses on anticolonial thought produced in former overseas colonies, or, to employ a common distinction, extraction colonies as opposed to settler colonies.[73] Our account of global justice will primarily focus on the international order that structures interactions between groups that are no longer subjects of the same state. To be sure, we should not draw too strong a distinction between postcolonial global justice for citizens of postcolonial states and subjects of ongoing settler colonialism, if only because Indigenous peoples' struggles also exist in the postcolonial Global South, and their campaigns often aim to push postcolonial governments along the unfinished path of decolonization. Moreover, Indigenous peoples have campaigned to reform an international order that only recognizes states and corporations as legal entities.[74] As such, there are overlapping concerns between Third World anticolonial thought and Indigenous political thought that are worth noting. First, both traditions complicate the distinction between the global and domestic, or the external and the internal, which

global justice theory has tended to rely on. As Robert Nichols argues, the struggles of Indigenous peoples in countries like the United States show that focusing only on justice between North and South countries while treating countries as internally homogenous units is deeply inadequate.[75] On the other hand, as we will see, Third World anticolonial thinkers also saw a close connection between global and domestic justice, in many cases arguing that one cannot fully decolonize the colony without also decolonizing the international order as the latter places significant constraints on domestic transformative projects. In this sense, Indigenous and Third World anticolonial thought both challenge the distinction of the global versus the domestic.

Second, and relatedly, both traditions prompt global justice theory to question the place of the nation-state in a just postcolonial world order. As Catherine Lu argues, Indigenous peoples' struggles in cross-border situations like the US-Canada border demonstrate that a decolonial cosmopolitanism ought not construe territorial states as the exclusive or even primary agents of global justice, as the institution of the nation-state is often the very object of anticolonial struggle.[76] In Lu's words, "Ultimately, the quest for global justice may entail truly revolutionary structural transformations of world order that involve pluralizing the agents that can have political standing in domestic, international, and transnational institutions and structures."[77] As I hope to show in the following chapters, Third World anticolonial thinkers were also less committed to the institution of the nation-state than we commonly think. Grounded in the need to overcome objectionable hierarchy as it is, my egalitarian account of postcolonial global justice empowers nonstate collectives and endorses the devolution of sovereignty in ways that promote social equality.

Finally, there are shared strategies of resistance that Indigenous peoples and postcolonial societies have adopted, such as asserting collective rights over land and natural resources and demanding the equal freedom to develop and sustain one's culture.[78] In defending a right to popular appropriation or a right to cultural protectionism, this book defends claims that Indigenous activists and thinkers have also advanced.

Notwithstanding these commonalities, there are obvious and undeniable differences between colonial oppression in extraction colonies and settler colonies. For one, as Nichols and other theorists of racial capitalism have pointed out, racialization in the former consisted mainly of creating nonwhite bodies for coerced labor. For the latter, the interest in land meant that racialization took the form of portraying Indigenous peoples as "outdated savages" to pave way for genocide rather than exploitation.[79] Moreover, as Jodi Byrd and Michael Rothberg (and others since then) have pointed out, while there are commonalities between the postcolonial project of contesting neocolonialism and the project of indigeneity in challenging ongoing colonialism, there are

also tensions between the two that should not be erased.[80] As such, one can expect that an account of postcolonial global justice that draws primarily from Third World anticolonial thought will be different from one that emerges from close engagement with Indigenous political thought. The latter is undoubtedly an important and urgent project, but not one that I can engage in here.[81] Therefore, I do not claim that this is *the* postcolonial view of global justice, but merely that this is *one* view that someone taking up a postcolonial perspective may plausibly come up with. To claim that this is *the* postcolonial view of global justice would be to commit a version of what Serene Khader calls "justice monism"—the idea that justice can only be realized through one particular set of social or political forms.[82] This book will attempt to persuade the reader that postcolonial global justice as social equality is a normatively attractive view for our present and has critical purchase across settler colonial and neocolonial contexts. Yet depending on the selection of thinkers and one's own normative precommitments, one could construct very different and potentially competing views using the same method I employ here, i.e., historically inflected normative theorizing.

Decolonization beyond the Nation-State

As discussed above, despite global justice theory's origins in the decolonial moment, questions of empire and race have so far been largely neglected. The long-standing reception of anticolonial political thought in the broader Western academy would seem at least partly responsible for its neglect as a source for global justice thinking. Up until recently, anticolonial thinkers (and the movements they represented) have been narrowly received as nationalists. As I discuss in chapter 1, Cold War politics combined with Eurocentric frameworks of engaging with the Third World meant that Anglo-American political science tended to neglect or dismiss radical egalitarian and socialist currents within anticolonial movements and instead reduce them to ethnocultural nationalism, or what Isaiah Berlin infamously called "pagan self-assertion."[83] Following this trend, the few global justice theorists who make reference to anticolonial movements in their work have tended to treat them as synonymous with demands for national self-determination, with little else to say about the global order beyond that.[84]

Recent work in the history of political thought and empire has begun to correct this narrative by recovering anticolonial projects that do not easily fit into or cannot be subsumed under the framework of nationalism. At the end of World War II, as empires became increasingly untenable, anticolonial politicians, intellectuals, and activists saw an opening in which dramatic reforms to the world order could be made. This period of "anticolonial worldmaking"

raised questions beyond how colonies might attain national independence.[85] For anticolonial leaders and thinkers, this historic moment also represented a chance to reshape global and political structures. Kwame Nkrumah urged for the creation of an "all-union government" to unite Africa, as well as transnational organizations of solidarity with Asian and Latin American peoples, to guard against neocolonialism.[86] Jawaharlal Nehru advocated for the creation of a "World Union" in which nation-states would devolve their sovereignty and collective issues would be resolved democratically instead of resorting to war.[87] Anticolonial activists and thinkers thus looked beyond the nation-state for sites of solidarity and developed what Inés Valdez has called a "political craft" in fostering new political subjectivities to resist global injustice.[88] As Frederick Cooper reminds us, the nation-state was not a predetermined end.[89] Anticolonial resistance comprised a diverse political spectrum, and an exclusive focus on nationalism obscures other questions that were important to anticolonial actors at the time and remain relevant for us in a neocolonial world today.

The recent recovery of anticolonial internationalism poses two related questions important for a theory of postcolonial global justice. First, at a theoretical or philosophical level, how might we understand anticolonial nationalist and internationalist commitments as compatible (if, in fact, they are)? While Adom Getachew and others have compellingly traced what Michele Louro calls a "blend of internationalism and nationalism"[90] in anticolonial thought, in practice these often proved contradictory. To be sure, the failure of anticolonial internationalism can hardly be attributed solely or even primarily to a theoretical or practical tension between internationalism and nationalism. Historical circumstance—most obviously an increasingly bipolar world hostile to multilateralism under the Cold War—is important for understanding the constraints and pressures on anticolonial worldmaking in the '60s and '70s. But it is hard to say there was no tension at all. Analyzing debates over a federal Africa, for example, Getachew shows that anticolonial leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe were concerned about the loss of national autonomy that a strong African federal state implied and therefore resistant to Kwame Nkrumah's proposals of continental political and economic integration.[91]

Second, and even more pressing for the normative purposes of this book, in theorizing global justice for the neocolonial present, what is the place of the nation-state? Is the nation-state compatible with a postcolonial cosmopolitanism that takes individuals as ultimate units of moral concern?

This book contributes to ongoing efforts to broaden academic and popular imaginations of anticolonialism and decolonization. By focusing on egalitarian themes within anticolonial writings, I put forth a reading of anticolonial critique that emphasizes social hierarchy as a central injustice of colonial oppression and (relational) equality as a guiding value in decolonization. My analysis

suggests that we can understand anticolonial internationalism and nationalism better by shifting our attention to the more fundamental value of equality. That is, anticolonial projects at different levels can be understood as different ways of resisting colonial and neocolonial hierarchy. While some of these projects were emancipatory in specific historical circumstances, they can also be detrimental to the broader goal of attaining relations of equality in other contexts, especially in an age of disillusionment with many postcolonial states.

This suggests an account of postcolonial global justice that endorses certain constraints on national sovereignty by empowering other kinds of subnational and transnational groups, while also recognizing that global institutions are more often than not instruments of the powerful. In the book, as we analyze neocolonial hierarchies in different domains of global politics, one of my underlying contentions is that we can abandon the notion that empowering the nation-state is always the best instrument for securing equality and freedom without also abandoning arguments for collective rights that serve as bulwarks against neocolonial exploitation and domination. Ultimately, as I suggest in chapter 5 and in the concluding chapter, postcolonial global justice relies on building credible threats to power from organized groups and citizenries everywhere.

Anticolonial Thinkers

In developing an account of postcolonial global justice, we will engage primarily with the writings of Nehru, Nkrumah, Césaire, and Fanon. These thinkers are undoubtedly some of the most influential intellectuals and politicians in their time (and beyond). While they in no way exhaust the diverse currents of twentieth-century Third World anticolonial thought, we can nonetheless say they have a certain degree of representativeness. Geographically, the four are dispersed throughout the imperial world: Nehru in British Asia, Nkrumah in British Africa, and Césaire and Fanon in the French Antilles (and, for Fanon, also French Algeria). They also had different versions of the institutional vehicle through which decolonization would occur. While Césaire spent much of his political career advocating for departmentalization within France rather than national independence, seeing that as an important way to make claims on the wealth accumulated in the metropole, the other three focused more on state- and nation-building for overcoming the legacies of colonial oppression. Moreover, they opted for different strategies of resistance. Nkrumah, inspired by Gandhi, endorsed nonviolent "positive action" campaigns such as strikes.[92] On the other hand, Fanon famously supported violent resistance against the French in Algeria.[93]

Despite these differences, they also had similarities. Most obviously, all four share socialist leanings and were at one time or another involved in Marxist

and socialist politics. Relatedly, as I aim to show, they shared an egalitarian critique of hierarchy that remains undertheorized. Finally, for the purposes of this book, each thinker's writings help illuminate a different dimension of decolonization that will prove to be important for our systematic account of postcolonial global justice. Fanon provides the clearest exposition of social inequality, and we will engage closely with his writings in outlining our philosophical account in chapter 2. Nkrumah is, of course, a pioneer in theorizing neocolonial economic relations, and his work is important for our analysis of international investment. As a poet and leader of the anticolonial cultural movement Negritude, Césaire's reflections on cultural imperialism are valuable for thinking about the objectionable dynamics at play in global cultural exchange today. Perhaps the least well known among the four for his political thought, Nehru's transnational activism and writings on global governance provide an important vantage point into the problem of global democracy.

As mentioned previously, Third World anticolonial thinkers encompassed a wide political spectrum, and this book makes no claim on capturing the whole of this tradition. At least two strains of anticolonial thought are not included in my selection: first, anti-state and antimodernist views. Gandhi is an exemplar of this strain of anticolonial thought. Arguing that colonialism was inherently rooted in European civilization and industrialization, Gandhi criticized the modernist developmental projects of the postcolonial state and instead advocated for self-sufficient village economies that relied on traditional methods of production.[94] By contrast, although the thinkers discussed in this book also condemned capitalistic European modernity and argued that postcolonial Asia and Africa should not simply "imitate Europe,"[95] as Fanon puts it, they also thought that some form of industrialization was needed to secure freedom for both the postcolonial state and its citizens. As we shall see, all four thinkers advocated for a blending of European and Indigenous practices, and none saw decolonization as the straightforward rejection of the West. Also excluded from my selection are communist revolutionary views, as exemplified by figures like Mao Zedong, who advocated for a sweeping (and often violent) uprooting of society from top to bottom.[96] Instead, the three thinkers I draw from in chapters 3 through 5 for looking at transitions to postcolonial global justice in specific topic areas—Nkrumah, Césaire, and Nehru—tended to favor what André Gorz calls nonreformist reforms.[97] Put simply, these are political and economic reforms that pave the way for more radical change in the long run instead of either working within the broader status quo of global and domestic capitalism or trying to do away with existing frameworks in one fell swoop. As Steven Metz states, even as Nkrumah began to advocate more openly for revolution to achieve socialism after the 1966 coup that deposed him, he was "much closer to a reformist than a revolutionary" for most of his political life, and certainly as

prime minister of Ghana.[98] Occupying this complex and nuanced middle ground meant that criticism would and did come from multiple sides for these thinker-leaders, especially for Nehru and Nkrumah, who became leaders of government and therefore practitioners of their own political theory. Yet I submit that this search for a so-called third way amid significant political and practical constraints is also what makes them helpful and relevant for thinking about transitions toward a just world order in our deeply non-ideal world.

Looking Ahead: Postcolonial Global Justice as Social Equality

This book defends a view of postcolonial global justice as social equality. This view is developed in conjunction with a particular reading of the anticolonial tradition. Chapter 1 engages primarily with the key writings of Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, Frantz Fanon, and Aimé Césaire. There is a long-standing tendency to read these thinkers as nationalists, and their struggle for decolonization as a struggle for independent nation-states. Moving away from this standard reading, I argue that an important set of themes within antico-lonial thought can be theorized as a critique of relations of inequality, and decolonization understood as the construction of egalitarian global and do-mestic relations. By recovering equality as a central value within the anticolo-nial tradition, I call our attention to the *egalitarian face of decolonization*, which suggests interaction on terms of relational equality as an ideal of postcolonial global justice. In this view, the nation-state was primarily a historically contin-gent instrument to achieve equality rather than an end in itself.

It should not surprise us that the value of equality, understood relationally, can be found within the anticolonial tradition. Since the publication of Eliza-beth Anderson's 1999 essay "What's the Point of Equality?" there have been attempts among contemporary egalitarians to turn away from increasingly abstract debates about distributive equality to political and social movements that have demanded equality throughout history.[99] These social or relational egalitarians take inspiration from antiracist, feminist, and left-wing move-ments to theorize what it means to be equal.[100] Though the specific implica-tions differ, a common thread that runs through accounts of social equality is the idea that the point of equality is to stand in relations of nondomination, mutual respect, and reciprocity with others, rather than having equal amounts of the morally relevant currency.

At the same time, social egalitarians have focused almost exclusively on theorizing social inequality within societies. While Anderson has pointed in her recent work on social equality to its possible global applicability, others

such as Thomas Scanlon and Niko Kolodny have either argued that certain kinds of inequality are not (as) morally salient outside of shared societies, or said little on the topic altogether.[101] One oft-cited reason for thinking that social inequality is irrelevant at the global level is that unequal status (often seen as the quintessential example of social inequality, if not social inequality itself) is only objectionable if persons are situated in a social context in which status signifiers and norms are shared.[102] At the global level, it is often said, this condition does not obtain.

Yet once we take seriously our thinkers' critique of interlocking colonial hierarchies from chapter 1, it becomes apparent that the legacies of empire are not only economic or political but also cultural and discursive.[103] Most obviously, empire and transatlantic slavery gave birth to a global racial ideology that continues to operate not only in former metropoles but, crucially, in the postcolonial Global South today.[104] In chapter 2, I question prevailing domestic articulations of social equality and argue that the shared social contexts and institutions inherited from empire give us reason to think that relational inequalities that are objectionable within societies are also objectionable at the global level. Drawing on Fanon's analysis of the colonial situation, I analyze three kinds of global racialized hierarchies—of political authority, esteem, and moral standing—and show how they are both objectionable in themselves, as well as objectionable as constraints on citizens' capacity to pursue domestic social equality. Postcolonial global justice as social equality, I argue, requires that persons across the world enjoy *equal status as authoritative social agents whose interests are owed equal concern.* This account, though expressed in analytic terms, is designed to encapsulate the normative core of the egalitarian face of decolonization recovered from our four anticolonial thinkers. And yet it is a distinctive view of postcolonial justice built for the present age of neocolonial world order. The view, I contend, has important implications for what those historically denied social equality can justifiably press against dominant actors, including former colonizing powers, transnational corporations, and their own governments.

These implications are fleshed out in the rest of the book. I bring postcolonial global justice as social equality to bear on three areas of global politics that remain understudied in the global justice literature: international investment, patterns of cultural globalization, and political justice in trade governance. In each, I engage more closely with the political thought of a specific thinker to investigate the distinctive manifestations of global social inequality, and the remedial (collective) rights and reforms each area calls for.

Despite their ambitions for decolonization, anticolonial leaders, upon attaining formal independence, were immediately faced with the paradox of depending on external capital for realizing that very agenda. As former colonies faced increasing encroachment from foreign corporations and capital-exporting

states, Nkrumah developed an account of neocolonialism that became widely influential across the Third World. While much attention has been given to Nkrumah's account of neocolonialism as foreign infringement, in chapter 3 I draw attention to parts of his critique that emphasize neocolonialism as (racial) exploitation.[105] In this reading, neocolonialism is primarily an effort to impose onto vulnerable states an economic model that advantages the neo-imperialist state and international capitalists at the expense of vulnerable states' abilities to escape persistent vulnerability. I argue that neocolonialism as (racialized) exploitation remains an important framework for understanding contemporary global economic relations. Through an extended analysis of contemporary international investment law, this chapter shows how disadvantaged groups in postcolonial (and often even Global North) countries are constrained by the terms of investment from pushing for measures that rectify structural inequalities, even as those same terms enable investors to pursue self-enrichment. Emphasizing neocolonialism as exploitation rather than merely foreign interference suggests that responses to neocolonial economic relations are insufficient if they only aim to strengthen the postcolonial state against the predations of foreign powers. Instead, I argue that responses should also aim to constrain the postcolonial state (and foreign investors) to a practice of international investment that facilitates rather than hinders the pursuit of decolonization as egalitarian transformation.

Yet, as Nkrumah presciently reminded us, neocolonial exploitation does not only work through international treaties. Its operations cannot be fully understood without an analysis of global cultural production and dissemination. Chapter 4 turns to the question of cultural decolonization by focusing on the global trade in cultural goods. Engaging with Césaire's critique of cultural imperialism, I argue that decolonizing cultural globalization can be understood as a project in overcoming a global racial hierarchy inherited from colonial discourses of civilization. Historically oppressed groups should be empowered to engage in cultural production so as to reclaim their equal status as value-makers. To this end, I argue for reforms to the global communications infrastructure along the lines first proposed by the anticolonial project of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). These reforms would oblige dominant culture-exporting countries to engage in tech transfer and contribute to funds that support postcolonial cultural and knowledge production, as well as prioritize the import and distribution of cultural goods from peripheral countries. On the other hand, I also defend a remedial right to cultural protectionism for postcolonial societies so long as participation in global communications remains deeply unequal. Importantly, this defense of cultural protectionist rights is grounded on egalitarian rather than nationalist commitments.

If the previous two chapters addressed two aspects of substantive change that postcolonial global justice as social equality demands—i.e., economic and cultural empowerment through a nonexploitative investment regime and a democratized global communications regime—chapter 5 addresses the question of decision-making at the global level through the case of undemocratic trade governance. As such, it also indirectly considers the question of how the substantive reforms that I have argued for (as well as other kinds of just decolonial ends) might be pursued. A persistent criticism of contemporary proposals for global democracy claims that a functioning democracy requires a shared solidarity. Skeptics argue that it is both undesirable and impossible to build a cosmopolitan solidarity because of global cultural pluralism. Turning to Nehru's writings and speeches on internationalism, this chapter suggests a different approach to global democracy, one that neither forecloses its possibility nor denies the importance of solidarity. While Nehru is often regarded as India's foremost anticolonial nationalist, lesser known is his lifelong support for what he called a "democratic world union." But for Nehru, the primary obstacle to global solidarity was not cultural pluralism but persistent subordination of historically oppressed populations within a global political hierarchy. The primary challenge of building global democracy was cultivating an internationalist outlook among the very agents who had good reason to retreat from global political integration and cooperation. Nehru's response was to foster transnational solidarity in the very process of contesting subordination.

Drawing from these ideas, I argue for a recharacterization of the problem of global democracy: from vertical deficit in democratic control between individual citizens and global institutions, to horizontal deficit in political equality between groups. This shift enables us to see more clearly that resisting political marginalization ought to be the first task of the global democrat. Instead of settling for modest reforms of accountability that skeptics of global democracy tend to propose, or aiming for idealistic proposals of world parliament, I argue that the path to global democracy depends on creating counterhegemonic power for marginalized states as well as nonstate actors, and on cultivating a transnational solidarity in the practice of resistance.

Many postcolonial regimes ultimately took an authoritarian and neocolonial turn. As anticolonial thinkers had feared, the social revolution was often betrayed once national independence was attained. Moreover, as new global hegemons gradually form, the moral and political dilemmas of engaging in cross-border anticolonial resistance remain as urgent today as they did in the time of our four thinkers. The book concludes by anticipating future work on the ethics of political action at the global level. In resisting injustice, especially where revolutionary practices might be called for, a key question that anticolonial thinkers grappled with was how political agents might avoid creating

new hierarchies that enable domination and exploitation. Was it possible for anticolonial practices of resistance to lead to a decolonized world after all?

Before answering those questions, however, we need to know what decolonization as a normative vision amounts to. This book argues that decolonization ought to be understood as an egalitarian transformation that aims to construct global and domestic relations governed by respect, solidarity, and reciprocity. If the historical moment for realizing this vision was once open and then closed, perhaps we might see the gaps again once we reimagine this ambitious political project of living in the company of one another.

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