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1

Sandwichness wars

1.1 A sandwich is a sandwich is a sandwich

Brooklyn, New York. November 10, 2015. The doors of The Bell House, a music and comedy venue, open at 7 p.m. for a momentous debate. The debaters are Judge John Hodgman and Dan Pashman. Hodgman is a comedian, author, and host of the Judge John Hodgman podcast. Pashman is a food critic and host of the podcast The Sporkful. The moderator: journalist Brooke Gladstone, of WNYC’s On the Media. The issue: whether a hot dog is a sandwich, and, by extension, what makes a sandwich a sandwich.¹

In 2014, Judge Hodgman had ruled that hot dogs weren’t sandwiches—as he explained in his column in the New York Times Magazine, Judge John Hodgman Rules.² Ever since, Hodgman has argued for this view multiple times in multiple settings, from Time Out magazine to The Late Show with Stephen Colbert. He courageously stands by his ruling, despite threats to his and his family’s safety: “It has been years since I offered a ruling on sandwich-ness. As you know, a hot dog isn’t one, and none of your angry letters or FedExes of poisonous vipers will change that fact.”³

The thrust of Hodgman’s argument rests on the property of “cut-in-halflability,” which he claims to be essential to sandwiches. That’s the essence of sandwichness:

Cut-in-half-ibility. Genial share-ibility! Eat some now and save some for later-ibility! Divide and serve with a cup of soup-ibility! Are all intrinsic to sandwiches. Even subs! Heroes. Hoagies. Grinders. Wedges. Sure, you can physically cut a hotdog in half. And maybe you would do so under the tyranny of a child. But one would never routinely cut a hotdog in half, in a public setting, without expecting and deserving some looks.4

Cut-in-half-ibility isn’t a sufficient condition. That something can be cut in half doesn’t imply it’s a sandwich. But it’s a necessary one. If you can’t cut it in half, then it’s not a sandwich. Once Hodgman’s metaphysical claim is on the table, epistemology and methodology have to step up. How can it be shown that hot dogs lack this property? He asks you to imagine what “you will feel” if you cut one in half. This test yields strong evidence in favor of his argument: “All of right-thinking humanity is on my side. Sandwiches are meant to be cut in half. You would never, unless under extreme duress or madness cut a hot dog in half. Picture yourself at a ball park, or even at a restaurant, cutting a hot dog and you will feel an instinctive, entire repulsion at the very thought of it.”5

In more vehement terms: “Let me apply the wisdom of Solomon: If your friend’s hot dog is a sandwich, why doesn’t he just cut it in half? HE CAN’T, CAN HE? Because it is not a sandwich, but a hot dog, indivisible and sui generis.”6

Dan Pashman would have none of it. Hodgman’s argument was plain wrong. While Pashman’s field of expertise is gastronomy, he availed himself of jurisprudential doctrines to make his case: “I am the [Antonin] Scalia of Sandwiches, a strict constructionist: I believe that we must look to the Earl of Sandwich, to the framer’s original intent, to understand the definition of a sandwich. The Earl wanted to be able to eat his dinner with his hands without


his hands getting all messy, so he put a piece of meat between two pieces of bread, and the sandwich was born."7

John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich (1718–92), is widely credited with the culinary innovation. Rumor has it that he "wanted to eat his dinner with his hands" because of his gambling addiction. The rumor originates in French traveler and writer Pierre-Jean Grosley: "[An English] minister of state passed four and twenty hours at a public gaming-table, so absorpt in play, that, during the whole time, he had no subsistence but a bit of beef, between two slices of toasted bread, which he eat without ever quitting the game."8 It's doubtful that this traveler can be trusted, and apparently there aren't any other sources to back him up. But his account does make for a good story (which is reason to have more doubts). The invention of the sandwich makes for a good story.9

Pashman underscores that "the original intent of the framer of sandwiches, the Earl of Sandwich" was twofold: "1. You must be able to pick up a sandwich and eat it with your hands without your hands touching the fillings," and "2. The fillings must be sandwiched between two discrete food items."10 Importantly, Pashman argues that "there is one notable exception to having two separate halves to a sandwich: the hinged bun."11 Therefore, a hot dog is a sandwich. A burrito is not.

Historians might worry about Pashman's evidence for the Earl of Sandwich's mental states. Legal scholars would deny that Scalia was a strict constructionist.12 Philosophers might object to the very idea of intent. Metaphysicians might grill Pashman about the discreteness of the discrete food items between which fillings are sandwiched: what it amounts to and what its significance is.13 I'll set these worries aside and ask who's right about sandwiches and hot dogs: Hodgman or Pashman? How to determine who's right about sandwiches and hot dogs: Hodgman or Pashman?

7. T. Wright, "Case against Hot Dogs."
8. Grosley 1772, 149.
12. Scalia (1995, 79, 98) referred to his "philosophy" as "statutory construction in general (known loosely as textualism) and ... constitutional construction in particular (known loosely as originalism)." "Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism.”
According to dictionary publisher Merriam-Webster, it’s Pashman. Indeed, Merriam-Webster made a point of it on its webpage Words at Play—A Fun Look at Language, Word Histories, and More. The beginning of the post, “Sandwich History: 10 Words You Can Chew On,” was predictable: “Definition: 1) two or more slices of bread or a split roll having a filling in between[,] 2) one slice of bread covered with food.” This definition is a premise. Then, hot dogs must be in, just like a meatball sandwich and a peanut butter sandwich: “We know: the idea that a hot dog is a sandwich is heresy to some of you. But given . . . the definition of sandwich . . . there is no sensible way around it. If you want a meatball sandwich on a split roll to be a kind of sandwich, then you have to accept that a hot dog is also a kind of sandwich.”¹⁴

Merriam-Webster’s definition of ‘sandwich’ forces you to conclude that a hot dog is a sandwich: you’re just logically applying it to the case at hand. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg played a deductive logic card, too, in a 2018 exchange with comedian Stephen Colbert. Colbert asked RBG if a hot dog was a sandwich. RBG cunningly retorted: “you tell me what a sandwich is and then I’ll tell you if a hot dog is a sandwich.”¹⁵

Merriam-Webster was spot-on concerning the heretical character of its definiens. The heresy wouldn’t go unremarked or unpunished. “Merriam-Webster Discredits Itself by Declaring a Hot Dog Is a Sandwich.”¹⁶ “Users took to Twitter with the hashtag #hotdogisnotasandwich to voice their disagreement. Numerous Twitter polls showed that anywhere from 75 to 90 percent of respondents agreed that the hot dog is not a sandwich.”¹⁷

According to New York State’s tax law, Pashman is right, too. The Department of Taxation and Finance’s 2019 Tax Bulletin ST-835 is titled “Sandwiches.” Under the heading “What is considered a sandwich,” it reads:

Sandwiches include cold and hot sandwiches of every kind that are prepared and ready to be eaten, whether made on bread, on bagels, on rolls, in pitas, in wraps, or otherwise, and regardless of the filling or number of layers. A

sandwich can be as simple as a buttered bagel or roll, or as elaborate as a six-foot, toasted submarine sandwich.\textsuperscript{18}

This passage doesn’t offer a definition, as a dictionary would. Nor a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. Plus, it uses the word ‘sandwich’ to explain what’s considered a sandwich. It wouldn’t help a Martian, or an Earthling who didn’t speak any English and had never heard the word ‘sandwich’ before. To be fair to the Department of Taxation and Finance, though, seldom do foreigners and Martians consult its tax bulletins. For the New York public, especially for restaurant owners, this bulletin’s long list of “examples of taxable sandwiches” is helpful. The list does include “hot dogs and sausages on buns, rolls, etc.”

On Pashman’s side, too: what are presently called ‘hot dogs’ used to be called ‘hot-dog sandwiches’ and ‘frankfurter sandwiches.’ They were a type of sandwich, subsumable under the broader category. Eventually, the word ‘sandwich’ got dropped, and we ended up with hot dogs. A noun rather than an adjective. For instance, in 1922 the \textit{New York Times} reported that there was a “novel method of peddling narcotics by placing a small envelope containing drugs in the slit of a hot frankfurter sandwich.” In 1934, President Roosevelt and his family enjoyed an “alfresco luncheon” at a “‘hot-dog’ stand.” Two attendants “[prepared] a tray for the President and Mrs. Roosevelt, on which were two ‘hot-dog’ sandwiches and a glass of beer for Mr. Roosevelt.” Five years later, King George VI was President Roosevelt’s guest, and he was treated to “the favorite American snack.” “Later it was ascertained that the King . . . came back for more hot-dog sandwiches.”\textsuperscript{19} Better known than the monarch’s penchant for hot dogs is the 1927 song “Frankfurter Sandwiches” (Harry Pease/Al Dubin/Ed G. Nelson), which several artists have performed and recorded.\textsuperscript{20}

By contrast, the magazine the \textit{Atlantic} would declare Hodgman to be the winner. The \textit{Atlantic} “developed a grand unified theory of the sandwich: a


\textsuperscript{19} “‘Hot Dogs’ in Atlantic City Carry Drugs to Addicts,” \textit{New York Times}, July 10, 1922; “President Meets Daughter-in-Law,” \textit{New York Times}, June 24, 1934; “King Tries Hot Dog and Asks for More,” \textit{New York Times}, June 12, 1939. As the articles’ titles show, the shorter form ‘hot dog’ was already acceptable. It’s also noteworthy that in 1922 and 1934 ‘hot dog’ is in quotation marks, but not anymore in 1939.

\textsuperscript{20} h/t Katha Pollitt. For example, Harry Rose and Al Lentz and His Orchestra recorded “Frankfurter Sandwiches” in the late 1920s, and Peggy Lennon and the Streamliners with Joanne (Rosemary Squires) in the 1960s.
FIGURE 1.1. Every night I bring her frankfurter sandwiches.
simple test to determine whether a given composite food product does indeed operate in the tradition of the peckish earl”:

The Sandwich Index we created consisted of four points:

1. To qualify as “a sandwich,” a given food product must, structurally, consist of two (2) exterior pieces that are either separate or mostly separate;
2. Those pieces must be primarily carbohydrate-based—so, made of bread or bread-like products;
3. The whole assemblage must have a primarily horizontal orientation (so, sitting flush with a plate rather than perpendicular to it); and
4. The whole assemblage must be fundamentally portable.21

Hence, a burger “qualifies” as “a sandwich.” Oreo cookies and ice cream sandwiches do, too. But “the drastically misnamed open-faced ‘sandwich’” doesn’t. Burritos and hot dogs don’t either.

Like the Atlantic, celebrity chef Anthony Bourdain would concur with Hodgman’s judgment: “No. I don’t think [a hot dog] is a sandwich. I don’t think a hamburger is a sandwich either.” Bourdain’s rationale consists in anticipating the reaction of experts. One sort of expert anyway: hot dog vendors. “I mean, if you were to talk [to] any vendor of fine hot dogs, and ask for a hot dog sandwich, they would probably report you to the FBI. As they should.”22

The National Hot Dog and Sausage Council of the United States (NHDSC) felt obligated to weigh in as well. This trade association views the hot dog as a sui generis category. A category of its own kind: “Just as politics and religion can both unite and polarize, the question of whether a hot dog is a sandwich has stirred its followers’ fury, and unless settled soon, may go down has one of American history’s most polarizing disagreements. […] [A hot dog] is truly a category unto its own.”23

The sui generis account of hot dogs is likewise


22. Anthony Bourdain (iamAnthonyBourdain), “I’ve noticed this question coming up again and again,” Reddit, September 20, 2016, comment on CheesyMightyMo, “Is a hot dog a sandwich?,” https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/53p6kb/i_am_anthony_bourdain_and_im_really_good_at/d7y5fs7/.

championed by comedian Jimmy Kimmel: "By my definition, a hot dog is a hot dog. It’s its own thing, with its own specialized bun." 24

An objector may interject that NHDSC represents the interests of the hot dog and sausage industry. Its whole point is to “[celebrate] hot dogs and sausages as iconic American foods.” 25 Obviously, its views aren’t impartial; it has skin in the game; it has an axe to grind. It doesn’t care about getting things right, be it the nature of hot dogs, the nature of sandwiches, or the distinction between sandwiches and hot dogs. Why listen to this organization? What can be learned from it?

No doubt, this objector is on the mark about NHDSC. If you work for it, partiality is your duty. You were hired to promote hot dogs. Combat their foes in society, culture, and government. Help increase their sales. You don’t have to have a theoretical perspective on hotdogness. It’d be ridiculous to demand detachment from you.

Bringing NHDSC into the picture is thought-provoking precisely because of the overt partiality of trade associations, pressure groups, and lobbies. It makes you wonder. To what degree and in which ways are its staff members’ job descriptions unique? Who can be impartial and detached? Who’s unconcerned about the real-world consequences of these disputes? Perhaps nobody who participates in them is. Neither about ‘sandwich’ nor about ‘genocide’ and ‘gender.’ Neither about ‘hot dog’ nor about ‘intelligence’ and ‘digitalization.’ Neither about food words nor about social science words. Neither in courts of law nor in social science departments, conferences, and journals.

1.2 Criteria

Who’s right: John Hodgman or Dan Pashman? Merriam-Webster or Jimmy Kimmel? They disagree about what a sandwich is, or about the definition of ‘sandwich.’ Their disagreement should be adjudicated somehow. But how?

For starters, whence the criteria to assess definitions and arguments? By ‘criterion’ I mean a standard according to which definitions of ‘sandwich’ are


evaluated, compared, and ranked (definitions or, as I’d prefer, proposals as to how ‘sandwich’ should be used). These criteria would determine who’s right, which argument is better, which argument is the best. Ideally, we’d have clear and well-grounded criteria, which Hodgman, Pashman, and everyone else can agree to. Since it’s criteria in the plural, we’d ideally have a clear and well-grounded way to combine and weigh them, which everyone can agree to.

My point isn’t rocket science. Imagine a committee charged with coming up with a ranking of some sort. A ranking of restaurants, movies, museum exhibits, universities, contributions to scientific knowledge, soccer teams, or soccer players. No agreement will materialize about the best restaurant in town, or the best soccer player in history, or the most significant contribution to scientific knowledge in the twenty-first century, if committee members’ criteria patently diverge. No agreement will materialize about what a sandwich is if criteria patently diverge.

Table 1.1 summarizes seven criteria that are apparent in the sandwichness wars.

Hodgman, Pashman, Merriam-Webster, Jimmy Kimmel, the Atlantic—along with most people who’ve passionately chimed in on the web—are missing something. They don’t seem to properly appreciate that two levels (or more) are involved. At a first-order level, they express strong opinions about what a sandwich is and whether a hot dog is a sandwich. ‘It definitely is!’ ‘It’s definitely not!’ ‘It kinda is!’ To support these claims, they provide various kinds of reasons. But they haven’t given enough thought to their justification vis-à-vis possible rivals. What kinds of reasons should (and shouldn’t) be accepted? Which ones should be given more weight? What kind of criteria should (and shouldn’t) be used? This second-order level doesn’t have to do with sandwichness itself, but with the evaluation of sandwichness reasons and the adjudication of sandwichness disagreements.

1.3 A burrito is a burrito is a burrito

‘Judge’ John Hodgman wasn’t the first judge to rule on what a sandwich is. Judge Jeffrey Locke confronted the same question some eight years earlier. The case was White City Shopping Center, L.P. v. PR Restaurants, L.L.C., heard by the Worcester County Superior Court in Massachusetts. PR Restaurants “d/b/a” (doing business as) Panera Bread, a “café style restaurant chain that sells sandwiches, coffee, and soup.”

The story begins in 2001. On March 14, White City Shopping Center, located in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, “entered into a ten-year lease . . . with PR for retail space to operate a Panera restaurant in the Shopping Center. Lease negotiations lasted several months partly because of PR’s request to include
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Critical response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inventor What the inventor of the sandwich said or believed. That’d be the Earl of Sandwich’s intentions in the eighteenth century.</td>
<td>An eighteenth-century earl doesn’t get to oversee twenty-first century societies. Social things change. It’s good that social things change. They develop their potential, adapt to new contexts, and fulfill new needs. History isn’t destiny.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Genealogy Cultural and institutional genealogies of the practice of eating sandwiches.</td>
<td>Cultural and institutional genealogies aren’t destiny either.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Etymology Words’ etymology and past uses. (If a word has a coiner, what they said or believed, too.)</td>
<td>Etymology and past uses aren’t destiny either. Present-day uses of a word aren’t accountable to its roots in Latin, Greek, or Quechua.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dictionary What the dictionary says: how it defines the word ‘sandwich.’</td>
<td>There’s no such thing as the dictionary. Which dictionary? Which dictionaries? What to do if two dictionaries’ definitions don’t fully overlap? (More on this below.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Essence Essential properties, which are “intrinsic to sandwiches.”</td>
<td>How can you demonstrate that a property is essential? That “you will feel an instinctive, entire repulsion” isn’t proof of anything. And who are you to begin with?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Expertise What contemporary experts, like chefs, say or believe. Just like you’d ask an astronomer what a planet is or you’d ask a psychiatrist what schizophrenia is.</td>
<td>Who’s an expert in this case? Is a chef an expert on sandwiches? Do they have to be employed at a sandwich restaurant? (More on this below.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Consistency If A is a B, then C must be a B as well. If D isn’t a B, then E can’t be a B either. Accepting this definition of ‘sandwich’ logically commits you to these consequences.</td>
<td>None that I’m aware of (but see Borges [1977] 1989). None to consistency itself, but what you’re logically committed to can get controversial.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
an exclusivity clause in the Lease. [...] The exclusivity clause that both parties initially agreed to restricted White City from entering into new leases with businesses that primarily sell sandwiches.26 To be more precise: White City agreed “not to enter into a lease, occupancy agreement or license affecting space in the Shopping Center . . . for a bakery or restaurant reasonably expected to have annual sales of sandwiches greater than ten percent (10%) of its total sales or primarily for the sale of high quality coffees or teas.” Panera Bread pushed hard for this monopolistic clause. Five years later, however, its privileged position would come under threat. Qdoba, “a Mexican-style restaurant chain that sells burritos, quesadillas, and tacos,” was gearing up to set up shop in the shopping center. “On or around August 22, 2006, White City executed a lease with Chair 5 ['a Delaware limited liability company and franchisee of Qdoba'] for 2,100 square feet of retail space in the Shopping Center.”

PR/Panera Bread tried to legally prevent White City and Qdoba from moving forward with the lease. It “asserted that tacos, burritos, and quesadillas fell within [the] meaning of ‘sandwiches.’” While you won’t find ‘sandwiches’ on Qdoba’s menus, it does have ‘burritos.’ Burritos are a kind of sandwich; they fall under the extension of ‘sandwich.’ Therefore, the exclusivity clause kicks in. Or so Panera’s argument went.

Is a burrito a sandwich? This became a difficult legal question, because the lease “contained no definition of ‘sandwiches,’” which could have settled the dispute.27 PR Restaurants’ attorneys, Demeo & Associates, noted that “under Massachusetts law, the meaning of a term used in a contract” was its “common meaning.” Then, they quoted a dictionary definition of ‘sandwich’:

Sandwich is defined in the dictionary as, “food consisting of a filling placed upon one slice or between two or more slices of a variety of bread or something that takes the place of bread (as a cracker, cookie, or cake).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2326 (2002). [...] In the last 350 years, sandwiches have evolved with the result that today, “sandwiches take so many forms in the modern world . . . that a catalog would be a book.” Id. The term sandwich now includes items such as wraps, gyros, and in this case, burritos, tacos, and quesadillas. Qdoba’s offerings—tacos, burritos, and quesadillas—are all sandwiches because they are all food that consists of bread folded around fillings. . . . For Qdoba’s tacos, burritos, and

26. “Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,” White City Shopping Center, L.P. v. PR Restaurants, L.L.C., d/b/a [doing business as] Panera Bread, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Worcester, ss. Superior Court Civil Action, October 30, 2006, at 2. Subsequent quotations are also from this source.

27. Florestal 2008; Madison 2006; Park 2019; Posner 2012; Scalia and Garner 2012.
quesadillas, the bread is the tortilla. […] All authorities recognize tortillas as a form of bread.28

In support of their claim about the breadness of tortillas, PR’s attorneys cited a 1998 case, Sabritas v. United States (on which more below); “Webster’s New Word [sic] Dictionary of Culinary Arts”; and, again, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Whether “all authorities” are in accord, and who are “all authorities,” they didn’t discuss.

PR’s attorneys wrote “defined in the dictionary,” not “defined in a dictionary.”29 Nor did they write “defined in a controversial dictionary,” let alone “defined in the most controversial dictionary ever published.”30 No surprise there. In courts of law dictionaries are used selectively and strategically


29. Moon (1989, 60): “collections of lexical information come to be referred to as ‘the dictionary’: in the singular, with a definite article used as if there was only one extant dictionary, in a single edition and single version.”

to bolster your claims and undermine your opponents’. Which has led legal scholars to reflect on the source and scope of dictionaries’ authority, and how divergences across dictionaries can be legally decisive, insofar as the outcome might hang on the meaning of a word. They’ve also decried the Supreme Court’s overreliance on dictionaries and “dictionary shopping”—that is, choosing “which dictionary and which definition to use.”

What transpired in the White City case was ‘within-dictionary definition shopping.’ *Webster’s Third* was also quoted by Judge Locke in his ruling. But he didn’t quote the same definition of ‘sandwich’ PR Restaurants’ attorneys had:

This court applies the ordinary meaning of the word. The New Webster Third International Dictionary describes a “sandwich” as “two thin pieces of bread, usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory mixture) spread between them.” Merriam-Webster, 2002. Under this definition and as dictated by common sense, this court finds that the term “sandwich” is not commonly understood to include burritos, tacos, and quesadillas, which are typically made with a single tortilla.

One and the same dictionary can give support to conflicting claims, since some entries have several senses and subsenses, distinguished by Arabic numerals and lowercase letters. In *Webster’s Third*, ‘sandwich’ has this subsense, “1 a”: “two slices of bread usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory mixture) spread between them.” And then it has this subsense, “1 b”: “food consisting of a filling placed upon one slice or between two or more slices of a variety of bread or something that takes the place of bread (as a cracker, cookie, or cake).” Panera Bread quoted the latter subsense, which is consistent with its claim that a burrito is a sandwich. Judge Locke quoted the former subsense, which is consistent with his ruling that a burrito is not a sandwich.

Neither Panera Bread nor Judge Locke took the trouble to mention that in the very dictionary whose authority they summoned, *Webster’s Third*, there’s another subsense of ‘sandwich’—much less that this other subsense contradicts
their argument. Both cherry-picked the subsense that was favorable to their argument and concealed its partial character.  

________

Addressing the legal question ‘what is a sandwich?’ is a special case of addressing the general, metaphysical question ‘what is a sandwich?’ The former must be answered and it must be answered as soon as possible. Either Qdoba will open a restaurant in the shopping center or it won’t. It involves legal considerations, aims, and tools, as well as particular contractual and regulatory elements. Special legal procedures must be followed. The issue isn’t metaphysical or linguistic per se, but practical. There’s a conflict between parties’ interests, often pecuniary interests. Everyone wants to get their way.

Given the legal context and the contract at the heart of White City v. PR Restaurants, the ordinary meaning of ‘sandwich’ and dictionary definitions of ‘sandwich’ were sure to turn up. Yet, other criteria were also brought into play. Expertise, for instance. Three “expert affidavits” emphasize their authors’ experience and understanding. Christopher Schlesinger wrote:

I have been in the food service industry since the age of 18. Following my graduation from the Culinary Institute of America in 1977, I have worked in 35 different restaurants, working with New England’s most innovative chefs. [. . .] I am presently the chef and owner of All Star Sandwich Bar in Cambridge, Massachusetts. I am co-author of five cookbooks. . . . I have taught culinary students at the Culinary Institute of America and was the winner of the James Beard Award in 1996 for “Best Chef of the Northeast.”

33. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged was published in 1961, under the editorship of Philip Gove. What’s the exact wording of subsense “1 a”? Judge Locke, quoting “Merriam-Webster, 2002,” writes “two thin pieces of bread.” I’ve consulted three earlier reprints, 1966, 1981, and 1993, and they all read “two slices of bread.” So, in 2002 the pieces of bread needn’t be slices anymore and had to be thin. Or did Judge Locke misquote this phrase? Regrettably, I couldn’t get ahold of the 2002 reprint. Thanks to Annika Henrizi (Zentral- und Hochschulbibliothek Luzern) and Michael Sauder (University of Iowa and Olio Township) for their help with this source.

34. Judith A. Quick: “I have worked in the food safety, labeling, science and technology industry for over thirty years. . . . I have served as the President of Judith Quick & Associates, a consulting firm specializing in food labeling and regulatory issues for the food industry. Prior thereto . . . I held various positions at the Food Safety and Inspection Service (‘FSIS’) at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (‘USDA’).” Kerry J. Byrne: “I have been a food and drinks writer for the Boston Herald since 1998. . . . I consider myself to be an expert on culinary issues.”
Schlesinger isn’t merely a chef, but the chef at a sandwich restaurant. Why
does this make a difference? Does it matter how long someone has been in the
food industry? If you claim that experts have unique access to and knowledge
of the nature of a thing, two additional issues come up. First, what makes an
expert an expert in the relevant domain—for example, whether having worked
for twenty years as a Thai restaurant’s chef would suffice; whether having made
sandwiches is necessary to know what a sandwich is, and if so, why having
made sandwiches for your children is epistemically deficient.

Second, what sort of thing this is, such that only experts grasp its nature.
What is a planet? What is schizophrenia? What is an offside in soccer? What
is a stalemate in chess? What is zirconium? Not anyone can tell you. By con-
trast, you arguably know what a newspaper is just as well as a journalist or a
newsstand vendor, and you know what an airport is just as well as a pilot or a
flight attendant. Is sandwich more like newspaper and airport or more like
zirconium and stalemate?

Admitting both experts’ expertise and ordinary meaning necessitates that
they be integrated. An expert’s definition of ‘sandwich’ may be at odds with a
dictionary’s definition (assuming there’s one dictionary only and it provides
one definition only). An expert’s definition may be at odds with another ex-
pert’s definition. Would you then need a meta-expert’s view on which of the
two experts’ views should be taken into account? What if meta-experts are at
odds with one another?

In the Panera Bread case, experts also acted as meta-experts. They reported
on other experts’ views—that is, people they consider experts. “Credible”
chefs or culinary historians. “I know of no chef or culinary historian who
would call a burrito a sandwich. Indeed, the notion would be absurd to any
credible chef or culinary historian”—wrote Schlesinger. “I know of no one in
the culinary industry who would consider a burrito to be a sandwich”—wrote
Byrne. To establish what a sandwich is, one method would be a survey of ex-
erts, even if informally conducted.

Schlesinger’s affidavit mobilized cultural genealogy, too. A shared gene-
alogy makes sandwiches sandwiches, so this is a good criterion to appraise bur-
ritos’ sandwichness. “A sandwich is of European roots,” while a “burrito . . . is
specific to Mexico.” (Schlesinger was empirically wrong. Burritos are a typical
‘Mexican’ food in the United States, but not a typical food in Mexico.) For its
part, Byrne’s affidavit put forward the sui generis argument. Like the theory of
hot dogs of Jimmy Kimmel and NHDSC: “A burrito . . . is, simply put, a bur-
rrito. It is a separate and distinct product.”
Judge Locke ruled that “burritos, quesadillas, and tacos are not commonly understood to mean ‘sandwiches.’ Because PR failed to use more specific language or definitions for ‘sandwiches’ in the Lease, it is bound to the language and the common meaning attributable to ‘sandwiches.’” Which doesn’t include burritos. “For the foregoing reasons stated, it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant’s [PR Restaurants] motion for preliminary injunction be DENIED.” Panera Bread lost. Qdoba won.

“We were surprised at the suit because we think it’s common sense that a burrito is not a sandwich,’ said Jeff Ackerman, owner of Qdoba franchise group. ‘We’re just delighted that the experts and judge saw it the same way we did.” Ackerman was happy qua businessperson, not qua metaphysician or lexicographer. His delight at the judge's decision wasn’t metaphysical. He wasn’t happy because the judge got the nature of reality right. Lo and behold, his claim about “common sense” about sandwichness is consistent with Qdoba's interests.

Metaphysics, shmetaphysics . . .

1.4 Bread

There are several competing definitions of ‘sandwich.’ Their differences notwithstanding, one common denominator is bread. The word ‘bread’ is in all of them. However, this common denominator may not be common after all, because there are several competing definitions of ‘bread,’ too.

In its legal dispute with White City Shopping Center, Panera Bread maintained that tortillas were “a form of bread.” Indeed, it maintained that “all authorities recognize tortillas as a form of bread.” If these assertions were true, one of burritos’ ingredients would be bread, which is required for something to be granted sandwich status. Besides their sheer authority, what warrants authorities’ views about the breadness of tortillas? Panera Bread’s attorneys referred to Sabritas, a United States Court of International Trade case. “Plaintiffs, Sabritas, S.A. de C.V. and Frito-Lay, Inc. (collectively ‘Frito-Lay’), challenge the United States Customs Service’s (‘Customs’) classification of its import taco shells . . . as ‘other bakers’ wares: other: other.” Instead, they argued, taco shells are a kind of bread: “Frito-Lay contends its import taco shells are properly classified as ‘bread, pastry, cakes, biscuits and similar baked products’ under HTSUS 1905.90.10, which carries duty-free status.” As ever, taxes make the world go round.

Judge Nicholas Tsoucalas's decision went in Frito-Lay’s favor:

The Court begins its analysis by noting that tortillas are unquestionably commonly and commercially accepted as bread in the United States. [...] Evidence was introduced at trial demonstrating that the tortilla undergoes certain changes when fried. Namely, as Dr. Pintauro [Customs’ expert, ‘food scientist’ Dr. Nicholas Pintauro] testified, and Frito-Lay’s witness admitted, the introduction of oil and high temperature necessary to create a hard taco shell from a tortilla alters the flavor, color and texture of the original tortilla. [...] Nevertheless, relying on the testimony presented at trial and, more importantly, on several definitions and descriptions in food dictionaries and treatises, the Court concludes that the common and commercial meaning of bread encompasses flat, fried bread and, therefore, the taco shells at issue.36

What did Judge Tsoucalas base his conclusions on? “Several definitions and descriptions in food dictionaries and treatises,” such as “John F. Mariani, The Dictionary of American Food [and] Drink” and “Jonathan Bartlett, The Cook’s Dictionary and Culinary Reference.” While both “The Oxford English Dictionary” and “Webster’s Third New International Dictionary” were mentioned once in his opinion, these specialized dictionaries were more important in his ruling. Also: the judge spoke of a word’s “common and commercial meaning.” Common and commercial.

For my purposes, court cases are most valuable if they explicitly analyze the appropriateness and inappropriateness of criteria to adjudicate disputes. Why isn’t this criterion, consideration, or method apropos? For example, Judge Tsoucalas’s dismissal of this US Customs’ argument: “The Court is unpersuaded by defendant’s testimonial and photographic evidence purporting to demonstrate that the taco shells at issue are not bread because they were not found in the ‘bread aisle’ at a supermarket Dr. Pintauro visited.” Not being placed in the same place, not being in physical proximity in the grocery store, doesn’t entail that taco shells and bread aren’t of the same kind. In terms of evidence, as the judge observed, a supermarket isn’t enough. Moreover, just like you could cherry-pick the dictionary that strengthens your case and that’d be ‘dictionary shopping,’ you could cherry-pick the grocery store that strengthens your case and that’d be ‘grocery store shopping.’ Shopping among grocery stores, not to be confused with shopping at the grocery store.

The judgment that taco shells are bread might have raised some eyebrows back in 1998. The 2020 judgment that “Subway bread is not bread” certainly did.37

The news was widely reported: “Ireland’s Supreme Court Rules Subway Bread Is Not Technically Bread.”38 The Subway chain claims to be in the sandwich business, especially submarine sandwiches, or subs. Yet, at least in Ireland as of 2020, this claim is false. Sandwiches must contain bread. If Subway ‘bread’ isn’t bread, then Subway ‘sandwiches’ aren’t sandwiches.

Again, it’s all about taxes. The Subway franchisee in Ireland argued that it’s not liable for value-added tax (VAT) on certain products. Although the case had several dimensions and complications, a central question was: “Did the bread used in the appellant’s [Subway’s] sandwiches fall outside the statutory definition of bread?”39 The VAT Act 1972 exempts bread from VAT. For something to be bread, “the weight of ingredients such as sugar, fat and bread improver shall not exceed 2 per cent of the weight of flour in the dough.” As Supreme Court Justice Donal O’Donnell pointed out: “the Act contains a complicated definition of an everyday product. The intention of the Act in making such a detailed definition is reasonably clear: it seeks to distinguish between bread as a staple food, which should be 0% rated, and other baked goods made from dough, which are, or approach, confectionery or fancy baked goods.”40

This baked good may look like bread and may get called ‘bread,’ but it fails to meet that bread standard. It looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, but it’s not a duck. As reported in the Irish Times, “the five-judge court ruled the bread [Subway’s] falls outside that statutory definition because it has a sugar content of 10 per cent of the weight of the flour included in the dough.”41 As you’d expect, Subway didn’t agree with Justices Clarke, O’Donnell, MacMenamin, Charleton, and O’Malley. A spokesperson said, tautologically: “Subway’s bread is, of course, bread. We have been baking fresh bread in our restaurants for more than three decades and our guests return each day for sandwiches made on bread that smells as good as it tastes.”42 “Of course” was of course unwarranted rhetoric.

40. Bookfinders Ltd., at 45.
The Irish Supreme Court’s decision might have been legally impeccable, given the facts of the case, statutory definition, and pertinent laws. Its assignment wasn’t to reveal the essence of bread. Still: why “fat, sugar and bread improver . . . shall not exceed 2 per cent” of the weight of flour? Why is this the correct definition of ‘bread’? I grant that I might be raising trick questions. Perhaps there can’t be a non-arbitrary percentage of flour. The law’s cut-off point must be to some extent, or wholly, arbitrary. While justifications pretend to be well-grounded, they’re actually just that: justifications. Legal institutions’ face-work.43

In any case, Subway wasn’t in a position to say. Like any firm, it was driven by its business interests. Like any capitalist firm, it must always act in its business interests, lest it be outcompeted and go bankrupt. And these Irish bread wars were legal wars, whose mechanics and rules are specific to the legal domain. Discussions about the properties of bread, what counts as bread, and how to define ‘bread’ reflected economic and legal forces.

While we’re on the subject of baked goods, what is a cake? Are ice-cream cakes and chocolate teacakes cakes? Surely Jaffa Cakes, “Britain’s greatest invention after the steam engine and the light bulb,” are cakes. Or are they? As a matter of fact, Jaffa Cakes used to be biscuits. But they did become cakes in 1991. Under UK law, VAT is levied on biscuits, whereas cakes are a staple food, and therefore they’re zero-rated:

The manufacturer, McVitie’s, had always categorised Jaffa Cakes as cakes and to boost their revenue the tax authorities wanted them recategorised as biscuits. A legal case was fought in front of a brilliant adjudicator, Mr D C Potter. For McVitie’s, this produced a sweet result. The Jaffa Cake has both cake-like qualities and biscuit-like qualities, but Mr Potter’s verdict was that, on balance, a Jaffa Cake is a cake.

Potter took into account several “facts and considerations,” such as name (‘cakes’—“a very minor consideration indeed”), ingredients, texture, size, packaging, marketing, and the fact that a “Jaffa Cake is moist to start with and in that resembles a cake and not a biscuit; with time it becomes stale, and last becomes hard and crisp; again like a cake and not like a biscuit.” At the end of the day, he concluded that Jaffa Cakes “have sufficient characteristics of cakes to qualify as cakes.” Cakes have definite properties, even essential properties. That’s how you can tell whether something is a cake. Subway’s subs aren’t. Jaffa Cakes are.

You may or may not agree with Potter’s approach and with his verdict. Some commentators have qualms about the underlying dichotomous taxonomy, which everyone’s claims presupposed. Why only two values? Paleontologist Adam S. Smith has advanced the argument, “based on a scientifically sound cladistic methodology,” that “the implementation of a three-way classification


British department store Marks & Spencer’s chocolate teacakes were treated as biscuits and hence subject to VAT between 1973 and 1994. These “dome-shaped marshmallow thingys” might be depicted as “half cake, half biscuit, and this is where things have gone wrong” (Farrer 2007).

45. Edmonds 2017. Thanks to Nigel Pleasants for bringing Jaffa Cakes’ cakeness to my attention.


is necessary.” There needs to be “a new group of biscuit-cake intermediaries, the pseudobiscuits.” Jaffa Cakes are pseudobiscuits.

Even if you’re sympathetic to Potter’s approach and adhere to the underlying dichotomy, you might not be at one with him concerning a cake’s properties. Which ones are common and essential, and which ones are common but accidental? What warrants these classificatory judgments?

1.5 Meat and dairy

The issue is, what is chicken?

—Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp. (1960)

Sandwiches, burritos, and bread bring to the fore some issues I’ll bring to bear, mutatis mutandis, on the practice of social science. Sandwiches, burritos, and bread are illustrative, maybe exceptionally illustrative, but not illustrative due to exceptional reasons. Many other things are contentious in these cultural and legal ways. Many meat and dairy products, for example. It’d take you only so far to know that a sandwich consists in “two slices of bread usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory mixture) spread between them” (one of the subsenses of Webster’s Third). It’s got bread, butter, meat, and cheese. You might not be sure about the extension of ‘bread.’ Nor about the extension of ‘cheese,’ ‘butter,’ and ‘meat.’

In August 2013, the “world’s first lab-grown burger [was] eaten in London.” On live television. The alimentary revolution was indeed televised. ‘In-vitro meat’ (or ‘cultured,’ or ‘clean’) was hailed as a scientific breakthrough. The research project was led by Mark Post, a University of Maastricht professor, and funded by Sergey Brin, one of Google’s founders. To produce it, scientists take an animal’s “‘myosatellite’ cells, which are the stem cells of muscles”:

When we want the cells to differentiate into muscle cells, we simply stop feeding them growth factors, and they differentiate on their own. The muscle cells naturally merge to form “myotubes.” [...] The myotubes are then placed in a gel that is 99% water, which helps the cells form the shape of muscle fibres. The muscle cells’ innate tendency to contract causes them to start putting on bulk, growing into a small strand of muscle tissue. [...]

When all these strands are layered together, we get what we started with—meat.\textsuperscript{50}

At the 2013 televised event, cultured burgers, also referred to as ‘stem cell burgers,’ were cooked by a chef and tasted by food critics. They were judged to approximate “the real thing,” though they weren’t exactly like it.\textsuperscript{51} Seven years later, in 2020, lab-grown chicken started to be commercialized. The Israeli startup SuperMeat opened the world’s first cultured chicken restaurant in Ness Ziona, a suburb of Tel Aviv. Per one report, its chicken burger “tastes . . . like a chicken burger.”\textsuperscript{52} In another significant first, the Singapore Food Agency approved the sale of lab-grown chicken “as an ingredient for chicken nuggets, making it the first lab-grown meat to earn regulatory approval.”\textsuperscript{53}

In addition, there’ve been impressive technological advances to get plant-based products to better reproduce the look, texture, feel, and flavor of animal meat. Not only burgers and sausages, but also chicken, turkey, and fish. They’re becoming more and more commercially successful—and hence more socially, economically, and politically significant than older generations of veggie burgers, and tofu and seitan ‘meat substitutes.’ While lab-grown meats promise to transform the market in the not-too-distant future, plant-based meats are already a substantial market reality.

Both plant-based and in-vitro meats have been afforded much public attention, so it’s hardly surprising that the standard metaphysical questions would be broached. Are they really a kind of meat? Or, rather, are they another kind of thing altogether, which is masquerading as true meat, trying to pass off as true meat? Nor is it surprising that metaphysics would blend into legal-cum-semantic conflicts, in which powerful organizations and corporations have a stake (no pun intended).\textsuperscript{54} Are the words ‘meat’ and ‘burger’ being misused? Can they legally appear in products’ packaging and marketing? Thorny questions multiply: whether ‘Impossible Burger,’ ‘Beyond Sausage,’ ‘THIS Isn’t Chicken,’ and ‘Tofurky Roast’ are covered by legislation and regulation of ‘meat’ production, sale, and consumption; whether ‘Impossible Pork’ is kosher and halal; whether ‘kosher bacon’ is truly kosher.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{51} Hogenboom 2013.
\textsuperscript{52} Holmes 2020.
\textsuperscript{53} Aridi 2020. The producer is Eat Just, a San Francisco–based startup. Its brand is called ‘GOOD Meat.’
\textsuperscript{54} Salisbury 2020; Tai 2020.
This much is certain: this is all bad news for cattle ranchers and meat lobbyists and trade associations. They don’t like what they’re seeing. So, they call dibs on “nomenclature associated with protein sourced from livestock production.”\(^{56}\) They claim historical and etymological ownership of the word ‘meat’—even though it used to refer to food of any sort, not just the flesh of animals. They lobby legislatures to pass draconian laws that “impose fines of up to $1,000 for every plant-based and cell-based meat product, such as ‘veggie burgers’ and ‘tofu dogs,’ marketed or packaged with a ‘meat’ label.” They run ads depicting ‘fake meat’ as unhealthy and unnatural.\(^{57}\) Not real meat.

Things can get surreal. To put its point across, the European Union’s umbrella agricultural interest group turned to surrealism. Its campaign paraphrased René Magritte: ceci n’est pas un burger; ceci n’est pas un steak.

‘This isn’t a cheeseburger’ might express skepticism about any of its essential ingredients. The burger patty doesn’t seem to you to be a real burger patty. The bread doesn’t seem to you to be real bread. The slice of cheese doesn’t seem to you to be real cheese. Disputes over dairy products have a long history, as exemplified by the US Oleomargarine Act of 1886, and the butter industry’s all-out war on margarine. Fast-forward to the present and “non-dairy milk alternatives are experiencing a ‘holy cow!’ moment.”\(^{58}\) The popularity of non-dairy milk, cheese, yogurt, cream, and butter (or, non-dairy ‘milk,’ ‘cheese,’ ‘yogurt,’ ‘cream,’ ‘butter’) is growing. Up to a point, the dairy industry didn’t feel threatened by a bit of soy milk here and a bit of almond milk there. But now things are going too far. ‘Cow-nteufs’ ought to be crushed. “Big Dairy is after your almond milk.”\(^{59}\) Ceci n’est pas du lait.

\(^{56}\) The quotation is from the 2019 Policy Book of the US National Cattlemen’s Beef Association.

\(^{57}\) O’Connor 2019.

\(^{58}\) Kateman 2019.

\(^{59}\) M. Roberts 2018.
As usual, the dairy wars have a semantic front. Dairy lobbies will push for bans on “dairy-style names” for plant-based products, as the European Court of Justice did in June 2017 and the European Parliament reaffirmed and extended in October 2020. They banned any reference or parallel to dairy—for example, yogurt-style, cheese-style, cheese substitute, dairy substitute, milky taste (excepting the well-established ‘peanut butter’ and ‘coconut milk’). These lobbies can thereby attempt to control and police the extension of the words ‘Milch,’ ‘leite,’ ‘formaggio,’ ‘queso,’ ‘beurre,’ and so on. Attempt to legally control and police it, that is, because ordinary language isn’t so docile. As a consequence, vegan products are forced to get creative and come up with alternative names: ‘cheeze,’ ‘drink’ (instead of ‘milk’), or ‘block’ (instead of ‘butter’).

The dairy industry and trade associations intend to harm plant-based companies’ bottom line and market share. The excuse, or at least doubtful empirical claim, is that innocent consumers are confused. They’re being misled. Grocery store customers are incapable of understanding that ‘vegan cheese’ isn’t ordinary cheese and ‘almond milk’ isn’t ordinary milk.

Again, this is all predictable. Companies are always looking to increase their profits. They form associations and hire advertising agencies and lobbyists to

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60. Sandis 2019.
represent their interests. Simple capitalist dynamics. While my examples have been foodstuffs, similar stories could be told about any class of products or businesses, and their efforts to be defined and classified in an advantageous fashion. Legally, but also socially defined and classified. Businesses, but also other organizations, groups, and ideas. In order to avoid taxes or regulation, to get public funding and support, or to get another sort of practical benefit, prestige, recognition, attention, or good publicity.

Bread, burritos, and cheese are just like motorcycles, casinos, and the distinction between bolts and screws. Beauty salons, luxury goods, and medical devices. Sport, religion, and educational institutions. Art, music, and concerts.

1.6 Law and social science

To the legal profession . . . words and their meanings are a matter of supreme concern. [. . .] [O]ne of the chief functions of our Courts is to act as an animated and authoritative dictionary.

—LORD MACMILLAN (1937)

What is an F? What is F-ness? What does the word ‘w’ refer to? How should ‘w’ be defined and used?

These are the questions I’ve been looking at, in their general form. The capital letter F stands for any thing, entity, object, phenomenon. The letter ‘w,’ in single quotation marks, stands for any word or expression.

The debate between John Hodgman and Dan Pashman was at a Gowanus venue. There were no legal implications, no legal context, no judge or jury. Even if Hodgman is a ‘judge’—and has been sympathetically called “America’s preeminent fake jurist.” For the most part, though, I’ve been considering

— LORD MACMILLAN (1937)


62. See also the US Supreme Court’s decisions in 1889 that beans are vegetables (Robertson v. Salomon) and in 1893 that tomatoes are vegetables (Nix v. Hedden) (the Tariff Act of 1883 imposed a tax on vegetables, but not on fruit); and the British Supreme Court of Judicature’s decision in 2009 that Pringles are potato chips (i.e., ‘crisps’) (A. Cohen 2009).

63. “Is techno really music? Is it a concert when a DJ plays music?” (Radomsky 2020; my translation). In 2020, the German Federal Finance Court (Bundesfinanzhof) answered ‘yes’ to both questions. Concert halls get a tax break; so do clubs.

64. Macmillan 1937, 147, 163.

actual legal wrangles, which have legal—and dollars-and-cents—consequences. Asking what $F$ is, or how to define ‘$w$,’ isn’t an end but a means. It’s an argumentative tool, which lawyers don’t value in itself. Instead of metaphysical or semantic truths, they seem to be thinking about worldly, material interests. Their clients’ and their own. Money, power, and status. Getting a tax break, being awarded damages, or being acquitted. This is so across the board, be it about food labeling, private contracts, taxation, patents, or the Constitution.66

Be it about the definition of ‘sandwich,’ ‘chicken,’ or ‘terrorism.’

What is an $F$? What is $F$-ness? What does ‘$w$’ refer to? How should ‘$w$’ be defined and used?

These questions ineludibly arise in the formulation, interpretation, and application of the law. Whatever a law says about a kind of thing, there’ll be disputes over what it does and doesn’t comprise; where borderline cases fall. Think of the legal history and vicissitudes of marriage, life and death, person, rape, sex, and consent.67 Think of art, pornography, manslaughter, insanity, religion, nightclub, and book.68 Their construal in courtrooms and legislatures might be ontological—that is, what those things are. Or it might be semantic—that is, what those words refer to. In either case, higher-order, methodological, philosophy-of-law problems await.69

Who’s to say what a sandwich is (and whether burritos and hot dogs are included)? Who’s to say how to determine what a sandwich is (and whether burritos and hot dogs are included)? Do professionals and experts outweigh dictionaries and ordinary or plain meaning, or vice versa?70 Do metaphysicians’ reflections on sandwichness matter?71 To decide what a problematic word picks out, should you focus on the text itself (e.g., a statute or a contract) or on authors’ intentions and purposes?72 Is ‘I know it when I see it’ a defensible method?73 Do departments of taxation have ontological powers to rule that hot dogs are sandwiches?


70. Slocum 2015; Tobia 2020. Ordinary or plain meaning has many synonyms in the law, as documented by Slocum (2015, 287–88). On ‘original public meaning’ and ‘original intent’ as camps of originalism, see Kay (2009) and McGinnis and Rappaport (2019).


Legal arguments depend on claims about what $F$ is or what ‘$w$’ means. This is so across the board, be it about food labeling, private contracts, taxation, patents, or the Constitution. Be it about the definition of ‘sandwich,’ ‘chicken,’ or ‘terrorism.’ In this sense, legal cases pave the way for what I have in store. Yet, in other ways, the law is peculiar. It’s peculiar what’s at stake and how these cases can be tackled. Natural language, dictionaries, and common sense may be consulted and may have the last word. Parties’ interests are so obvious, so conspicuous, they’re so much at the forefront, and they’ll be directly advanced, or not, by a legal judgment. Not to mention that lawyers are playing their own litigation game, which has its own rules. They unequivocally set out to win the case, no matter what.

In light of these prima facie peculiarities, you might wonder if my legal examples generalize to other domains. Aren’t these processes specific to the workings of the law and legal institutions in contemporary capitalist societies?

In the respects I’m interested in, I think they aren’t peculiar. What they suggest isn’t tied to any particular domain, field, or locus. Outside the law, legal/dollars-and-cents consequences may be replaced by status/social/cultural consequences. There are causal relations between the former and the latter, but they aren’t the same thing. Take the countless clashes on the internet and social media about sandwichness, hotdogness, and burritoness. People argue, passionately, about what these things really are, what their nature or essence is. It matters to them. They want to be right. But their ardent posts make no difference whatsoever to the law, regulatory agencies, or public policy (thank goodness).

Sometimes you and your friends butt heads over what is and isn’t a sport. You care about the status of chess, darts, fishing, breaking, Barbie Jeep Racing, or esports. Their social recognition and attention, among your coworkers, family, acquaintances, and elsewhere. You’d psychologically enjoy their achieving higher status. In your opinion, they absolutely are sports, real sports, and you’re ready to argue for this. But you aren’t thinking about the pecuniary effects of recognition and attention, which will accrue to leading practitioners, associations, brokers, and media companies. You aren’t thinking about tax breaks, public support, and other legal and political benefits. Being a sport has positive social and cultural consequences. What matters to you and motivates you are these consequences, in and of themselves. You may go even further. To you and many of your friends, the fact that breaking will become an Olympic sport, starting in Paris 2024, isn’t a valuable means but a valuable end. It’s true and it’s right.
The topic of this book isn’t food. It’s science. Especially, but not exclusively, social science. I’m going to look at F and ‘w’ in scientific research and arguments. As ever, concerns about scientific exceptionalism may surface. Aren’t scientists’ words and concepts governed by objective scientific methods, an airtight scientific logic, or something along these lines? Isn’t science unique? I’ll argue that in some respects it is, but in other respects it isn’t.

‘Terrorism’ can illustrate the road down which I’d like to go. Politicians and lawyers make arguments about what terrorism is, or the correct definition of ‘terrorism.’ They do so in legislative chambers, courts, international meetings, and rallies. Press conferences and interviews. These aren’t contributions to metaphysics, semantics, or lexicography. They aren’t intended to be perceptive accounts and novel additions to the social science literature on terrorism. Rather, it’s political and legal practice. Politicians and lawyers have practical aims: scoring political points, increasing their popularity and power, weakening rivals, persuading judges, juries, and public opinion. They want to see the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Antifa, or Robespierre delegitimized (or not). Ineffective (or not). Outlawed (or not). Obliterated by the police and counterterrorist units (or not). To punish organizations and individuals you hate, get them to be considered terrorists. By public opinion and by the law. Like Israel’s president accused Ben & Jerry’s of “a new kind of terrorism.” Plan B: get them to be considered communists or Nazis. Or, even better, both. (In the United States, communism would be overkill. Socialism is enough of a bogeyperson.)

Meanwhile, in the remote confines of the ivory tower, social scientists keep busy writing learned papers about the nature, causes, and history of terrorism. They organize academic conferences on the multiple definitions of ‘terrorism.’ They argue that science helps resist the spread of terrorist ideologies, so research funding organizations aren’t misspending their money. For their part, lexicographers are working on clear and concise definitions of ‘terrorism’ for their dictionaries. They’re hard at work finding out how English speakers use this word, how many senses it has, its etymology, and how its meaning or meanings might have changed over time.

Scientists and lexicographers are engaged in scholarly research. Some of their work has good applications, which are profitable to society, from education

reform to bilingual dictionaries. Aren’t they unlike lawyers who’ll do anything to win a case, anything so their client gets off scot-free, and who’d laugh society’s welfare out of court? Aren’t they unlike politicians who must worry about reelection, fundraising, partisan politics, public opinion, and the childish tweets of their country’s president?

Scientists and lexicographers try to get it right. Their job is to make true knowledge claims. Proven true by looking at reality. Not shaped by people’s preferences, wishes, or taste. By contrast, socialist, social-democratic, conservative, and libertarian views are dissimilar political orientations. They correspond to people’s dissimilar preferences, priorities, values, and worldviews. Therefore, they aren’t capable of truth or falsity, are they? You may like the red party better than the white party, you may endorse conservative social policies, you may be convinced that Chicago should elect a socialist mayor, but that’s just your subjective preference, isn’t it?

In sum, aren’t scientists the polar opposite of politicians and lawyers? Isn’t politics antipodal to science?

Not so fast, buckaroo.
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