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Surviving Sexual Violence

CHAPTER ONE
On July 4, 1990, at 10:30 in the morning, I went for a walk along a peaceful-looking country road in a village outside Grenoble, France. It was a gorgeous day, and I didn’t envy my husband, Tom, who had to stay inside and work on a manuscript with a French colleague of his. I sang to myself as I set out, stopping to pet a goat and pick a few wild strawberries along the way. About an hour and a half later, I was lying face down in a muddy creek bed at the bottom of a dark ravine, struggling to stay alive. I had been grabbed from behind, pulled into the bushes, beaten, and sexually assaulted. Feeling absolutely helpless and entirely at my assailant’s mercy, I talked to him, calling him “sir.” I tried to appeal to his humanity, and, when that failed, I addressed myself to his self-interest. He called me a whore and told me to shut up.

Although I had said I’d do whatever he wanted, as the sexual assault began I instinctively fought back, which so enraged my attacker that he strangled me until I lost consciousness. When I awoke, I was being dragged by my feet down into the ravine. I had often, while dreaming, thought I was awake, but now I was awake and convinced I was having a nightmare. But it was no dream. After ordering me, in a gruff, Gestapo-like voice, to get on my hands and knees, my assailant strangled me again. I wish I could convey the horror of losing consciousness while my animal instincts desperately fought the effects of strangulation. This time I was sure I was dying. But I revived, just in time to see him lunging toward me with a rock. He smashed it into my forehead, knocking me out, and eventually, after another strangulation attempt, he left me for dead.

After my assailant left, I managed to climb out of the ravine, and was rescued by a farmer, who called the police, a doctor, and an ambulance. I was taken to emergency at the Grenoble hospital where I underwent neurological tests, x-rays, blood tests, and a gynecological exam. Leaves and twigs were taken from my hair for evidence, my fingernails were scraped, and my mouth was swabbed for samples. I had multiple head injuries, my eyes were swollen shut, and I
had a fractured trachea, which made breathing difficult. I was not permitted to drink or eat anything for the first thirty hours, although Tom, who never left my side, was allowed to dab my blood-encrusted lips with a wet towel. The next day, I was transferred out of emergency and into my own room. But I could not be left alone, even for a few minutes. I was terrified my assailant would find me and finish the job. When someone later brought in the local paper with a story about my attack, I was greatly relieved that it referred to me as Mlle M. R. and didn’t mention that I was an American. Even by the time I left the hospital, eleven days later, I was so concerned about my assailant tracking me down that I put only my lawyer’s address on the hospital records.

Although fears for my safety may have initially explained why I wanted to remain anonymous, by that time my assailant had been apprehended, indicted for rape and attempted murder, and incarcerated without possibility of bail. Still, I didn’t want people to know that I had been sexually assaulted. I don’t know whether this was because I could still hardly believe it myself, because keeping this information confidential was one of the few ways I could feel in control of my life, or because, in spite of my conviction that I had done nothing wrong, I felt ashamed.

When I started telling people about the attack, I said, simply, that I was the victim of an attempted murder. People typically asked, in horror, “What was the motivation? Were you mugged?” and when I replied, “No, it started as a sexual assault,” most inquirers were satisfied with that as an explanation of why some man wanted to murder me. I would have thought that a murder attempt plus a sexual assault would require more, not less, of an explanation than a murder attempt by itself. (After all, there are two criminal acts to explain here.)

One reason sexual violence is taken for granted by many is because it is so very prevalent. The FBI, notorious for underestimating the frequency of sex crimes, notes that, in the United States, a rape occurs on an average of every six
minutes. But this figure covers only the reported cases of rape, and some researchers claim that only about 10 percent of all rapes get reported. Every fifteen seconds, a woman is beaten. The everydayness of sexual violence, as evidenced by these mind-numbing statistics, leads many to think that male violence against women is natural, a given, something not in need of explanation and not amenable to change. And yet, through some extraordinary mental gymnastics, while most people take sexual violence for granted, they simultaneously manage to deny that it really exists—or, rather, that it could happen to them. We continue to think that we—and the women we love—are immune to it, provided, that is, that we don’t do anything “foolish.” How many of us have swallowed the potentially lethal lie that if you don’t do anything wrong, if you’re just careful enough, you’ll be safe? How many of us have believed its damaging, victim-blaming corollary: if you are attacked, it’s because you did something wrong? These are lies, and in telling my story I hope to expose them, as well as to help bridge the gap between those who have been victimized and those who have not.

Sexual violence and its aftermath raise numerous philosophical issues in a variety of areas in our discipline. The disintegration of the self experienced by victims of violence challenges our notions of personal identity over time, a major preoccupation of metaphysics. A victim’s seemingly justified skepticism about everyone and everything is pertinent to epistemology, especially if the goal of epistemology is, as Wilfrid Sellars put it, that of feeling at home in the world. In aesthetics, as well as in philosophy of law, the discussion of sexual violence in- or as- art could use the illumination provided by a victim’s perspective. Perhaps the most important issues posed by sexual violence are in the areas of social, political, and legal philosophy, and insight into these, as well, requires an understanding of what it’s like to be a victim of such violence.

One of the very few articles written by philosophers on violence against women is Ross Harrison’s “Rape: A Case
Study in Political Philosophy.” In this article Harrison argues that not only do utilitarians need to assess the harmfulness of rape in order to decide whether the harm to the victim outweighs the benefit to the rapist, but even on a rights-based approach to criminal justice we need to be able to assess the benefits and harms involved in criminalizing and punishing violent acts such as rape. In his view, it is not always the case, contra Ronald Dworkin, that rights trump considerations of utility, so, even on a rights-based account of justice, we need to give an account of why, in the case of rape, the pleasure gained by the perpetrator (or by multiple perpetrators, in the case of gang-rape) is always outweighed by the harm done to the victim. He points out the peculiar difficulty most of us have in imagining the pleasure a rapist gets out of an assault, but, he asserts confidently, “There is no problem imagining what it is like to be a victim” (Harrison 1986, 51). To his credit, he acknowledges the importance, to political philosophy, of trying to imagine others’ experience, for otherwise we could not compare harms and benefits, which he argues must be done even in cases of conflicts of rights in order to decide which of competing rights should take priority. But imagining what it is like to be a rape victim is no simple matter, since much of what a victim goes through is unimaginable. Still, it’s essential to try to convey it.

In my efforts to tell the victim’s story—my story, our story—I’ve been inspired and instructed not only by feminist philosophers who have refused to accept the dichotomy between the personal and the political, but also by critical race theorists such as Patricia Williams, Mari Matsuda, and Charles Lawrence, who have incorporated first-person narrative accounts into their discussions of the law. In writing about hate speech, they have argued persuasively that one cannot do justice to the issues involved in debates about restrictions on speech without listening to the victims’ stories. In describing the effects of racial harassment on victims, they have departed from the academic convention of speaking in the impersonal, “universal,” voice and relate
incidents they themselves experienced. In her groundbreaking book, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights* (1991), Williams describes how it felt to learn about her great-great-grandmother, who was purchased at age 11 by a slave owner who raped and impregnated her the following year. And in describing instances of everyday racism she herself has lived through, she gives us imaginative access to what it’s like to be the victim of racial discrimination. Some may consider such first-person accounts in academic writing to be self-indulgent, but I consider them a welcome antidote to scholarship that, in the guise of universality, tends to silence those who most need to be heard.

Philosophers are far behind legal theorists in acknowledging the need for a diversity of voices. We are trained to write in an abstract, universal voice and to shun first-person narratives as biased and inappropriate for academic discourse. Some topics, however, such as the impact of racial and sexual violence on victims, cannot even be broached unless those affected by such crimes can tell of their experiences in their own words. Unwittingly further illustrating the need for the victim’s perspective, Harrison writes, elsewhere in his article on rape, “What principally distinguishes rape from normal sexual activity is the consent of the raped woman” (Harrison 1986, 52). There is no parallel to this in the case of other crimes, such as theft or murder. Try “What principally distinguishes theft from normal gift-giving is the consent of the person stolen from.” We don’t think of theft as “coerced gift-giving.” We don’t think of murder as “assisted suicide minus consent.” Why not? In the latter case, it could be because assisted suicide is relatively rare (even compared with murder) and so it’s odd to use it as the more familiar thing to which we are analogizing. But in the former case, gift-giving is presumably more prevalent than theft (at least in academic circles) and yet it still sounds odd to explicate theft in terms of gift-giving minus consent (or coerced philanthropy). In the cases of both theft and murder, the notion of violation seems built into our conceptions of the physical acts constituting the crimes, so it is incon-
ceivable that one could consent to the act in question. Why is it so easy for a philosopher such as Harrison to think of rape, however, as "normal sexual activity minus consent"? This may be because the nature of the violation in the case of rape hasn't been all that obvious. Witness the phenomenon of rape jokes, the prevalence of pornography glorifying rape, the common attitude that, in the case of women, "no" means "yes," that women really want it.5

Since I was assaulted by a stranger, in a "safe" place, and was so visibly injured when I encountered the police and medical personnel, I was, throughout my hospitalization and my dealings with the police, spared the insult, suffered by so many rape victims, of not being believed or of being said to have asked for the attack. However, it became clear to me as I gave my deposition from my hospital bed that this would still be an issue in my assailant's trial. During my deposition, I recalled being on the verge of giving up my struggle to live when I was galvanized by a sudden, piercing image of Tom's future pain on finding my corpse in that ravine. At this point in my deposition, I paused, glanced over at the police officer who was typing the transcript, and asked whether it was appropriate to include this image of my husband in my recounting of the facts. The gendarme replied that it definitely was and that it was a very good thing I mentioned my husband, since my assailant, who had confessed to the sexual assault, was claiming I had provoked it. As serious as the occasion was, and as much as it hurt to laugh, I couldn't help it, the suggestion was so ludicrous. Could it have been those baggy Gap jeans I was wearing that morning? Or was it the heavy sweatshirt? My maddeningly seductive jogging shoes? Or was it simply my walking along minding my own business that had provoked his murderous rage?

After I completed my deposition, which lasted eight hours, the police officer asked me to read and sign the transcript he'd typed to certify that it was accurate. I was surprised to see that it began with the words, "Comme je suis sportive . . ." ("Since I am athletic . . .")—added by the police to explain what possessed me to go for a walk by
myself that fine morning. I was too exhausted by this point to protest “No, I’m not an athlete, I’m a philosophy professor,” and I figured the officer knew what he was doing, so I let it stand. That evening, my assailant was formally indicted. I retained a lawyer, and met him along with the investigating magistrate, when I gave my second deposition toward the end of my hospitalization. Although what occurred was officially a crime against the state, not against me, I was advised to pursue a civil suit in order to recover unreimbursed medical expenses, and, in any case, I needed an advocate to explain the French legal system to me. I was told that since this was an “easy” case, the trial would occur within a year. In fact, the trial took place two and a half years after the assault, due to the delaying tactics of my assailant’s lawyer, who was trying to get him off on an insanity defense. According to article 64 of the French criminal code, if the defendant is determined to have been insane at the time, then, legally, there was “ni crime, ni délit”—neither crime nor offense. The jury, however, did not accept the insanity plea and found my assailant guilty of rape and attempted murder.

As things turned out, my experience with the criminal justice system was better than that of most sexual assault victims. I did, however, occasionally get glimpses of the humiliating insensitivity victims routinely endure. Before I could be released from the hospital, for example, I had to undergo a second forensic examination at a different hospital. I was taken in a wheelchair out to a hospital van, driven to another hospital, taken to an office where there were no receptionists and where I was greeted by two male doctors I had never seen before. When they told me to take off my clothes and stand in the middle of the room, I refused. I had to ask for a hospital gown to put on. For about an hour the two of them went over me like a piece of meat, calling out measurements of bruises and other assessments of damage, as if they were performing an autopsy. This was just the first of many incidents in which I felt as if I was experiencing things posthumously. When the inconceivable happens, one
starts to doubt even the most mundane, realistic perceptions. Perhaps I’m not really here, I thought, perhaps I did die in that ravine. The line between life and death, once so clear and sustaining, now seemed carelessly drawn and easily erased.

For the first several months after my attack, I led a spectral existence, not quite sure whether I had died and the world went on without me, or whether I was alive but in a totally alien world. Tom and I returned to the States, and I continued to convalesce, but I felt as though I’d somehow outlived myself. I sat in our apartment and stared outside for hours, through the blur of a detached vitreous, feeling like Robert Lowell’s newly widowed mother, described in one of his poems as mooning in a window “as if she had stayed on a train / one stop past her destination.”

My sense of unreality was fed by the massive denial of those around me—a reaction I learned is an almost universal response to rape. Where the facts would appear to be incontrovertible, denial takes the shape of attempts to explain the assault in ways that leave the observers’ worldview unscathed. Even those who are able to acknowledge the existence of violence try to protect themselves from the realization that the world in which it occurs is their world and so they find it hard to identify with the victim. They cannot allow themselves to imagine the victim’s shattered life, or else their illusions about their own safety and control over their own lives might begin to crumble. The most well-meaning individuals, caught up in the myth of their own immunity, can inadvertently add to the victim’s suffering by suggesting that the attack was avoidable or somehow her fault. One victims’ assistance coordinator, whom I had phoned for legal advice, stressed that she herself had never been a victim and said that I would benefit from the experience by learning not to be so trusting of people and to take basic safety precautions like not going out alone late at night. She didn’t pause long enough during her lecture for me to point out that I was attacked suddenly, from behind, in broad daylight.
We are not taught to empathize with victims. In crime novels and detective films, it is the villain, or the one who solves the murder mystery, who attracts our attention; the victim, a merely passive pretext for our entertainment, is conveniently disposed of—and forgotten—early on. We identify with the agents’ strength and skill, for good or evil, and join the victim, if at all, only in our nightmares. Although one might say, as did Clarence Thomas, looking at convicted criminals on their way to jail, “but for the grace of God, there go I,” a victim’s fate prompts an almost instinctive “it could never happen to me.” This may explain why there is, in our criminal justice system, so little concern for justice for victims—especially rape victims. They have no constitutionally protected rights *qua* victims. They have no right to a speedy trial or to compensation for damages (although states have been changing this in recent years), or to privacy vis-à-vis the press. As a result of their victimization, they often lose their jobs, their homes, their spouses—in addition to a great deal of money, time, sleep, self-esteem, and peace of mind. The rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” possessed, in the abstract, by all of us, are of little use to victims who can lose years of their lives, the freedom to move about in the world without debilitating fear, and any hope of returning to the pleasures of life as they once knew it.

People also fail to recognize that if a victim could not have anticipated an attack, she can have no assurance that she will be able to avoid one in the future. More to reassure themselves than to comfort the victim, some deny that such a thing could happen again. One friend, succumbing to the gambler’s fallacy, pointed out that my having had such extraordinary bad luck meant that the odds of my being attacked again were now quite slim (as if fate, although not completely benign, would surely give me a break now, perhaps in the interest of fairness). Others thought it would be most comforting to act as if nothing had happened. The first card I received from my mother, while I was still in the hospital, made no mention of the attack or of my pain and
featured the “bluebird of happiness,” sent to keep me ever cheerful. The second had an illustration of a bright, sum-
mer scene with the greeting: “Isn’t the sun nice? Isn’t the
wind nice? Isn’t everything nice?” Weeks passed before I
learned, what I should have been able to guess, that after she
and my father received Tom’s first call from the hospital they
held each other and sobbed. They didn’t want to burden me
with their pain—a pain that I now realize must have been
greater than my own.

Some devout relatives were quick to give God all the
credit for my survival but none of the blame for what I had
to endure. Others acknowledged the suffering that had been
inflicted on me, but as no more than a blip on the graph of
God’s benevolence—necessary, fleeting, evil, there to make
possible an even greater show of good. An aunt, with whom
I had been close since childhood, did not write or call at all
till three months after the attack, and then sent a belated
birthday card with a note saying that she was sorry to hear
about my “horrible experience” but pleased to think that as
a result I “will become stronger and will be able to help so
many people. A real blessing from above for sure.” Such
attempts at a theodicy discounted the horror I had to
endure. But I learned that everyone needs to try and make
sense, in however inadequate a way, of such senseless vio-
lence. I watched my own seesawing attempts to find some-
thing for which to be grateful, something to redeem the
unmitigated awfulness: I was glad I didn’t have to reproach
myself (or endure others’ reproaches) for having done some-
ting careless, but I wished I had done something I could
consider reckless so that I could simply refrain from doing it
in the future. For some time I was glad I did not yet have a
child, who would have to grow up with the knowledge that
even the protector could not be protected, but I felt an inex-
pressible loss when I recalled how much Tom and I had
wanted a baby and how joyful were our attempts to con-
ceive. It was difficult to imagine getting pregnant, because it
was so hard to let even my husband near me, and because I
felt it would be harder still to let a child leave my side.
It might be gathered, from this litany of complaints, that I was the recipient of constant, if misguided, attempts at consolation during the first few months of my recovery. This was not the case. It seemed to me that the half-life of most people’s concern was less than that of the sleeping pills I took to ward off flashbacks and nightmares—just long enough to allow the construction of a comforting illusion that lulls the shock to sleep. During the first few months after my assault, my close friends, my sister, and my parents were supportive, but most of the aunts, uncles, cousins, and friends of the family notified by my parents almost immediately after the attack didn’t phone, write, or even send a get well card, in spite of my extended hospital stay. These are all caring, decent people who would have sent wishes for a speedy recovery if I’d had, say, an appendectomy. Their early lack of response was so striking that I wondered whether it was the result of self-protective denial, a reluctance to mention something so unspeakable, or a symptom of our society’s widespread emotional illiteracy that prevents most people from conveying any feeling that can’t be expressed in a Hallmark card.

In the case of rape, the intersection of multiple taboos—against talking openly about trauma, about violence, about sex—causes conversational gridlock, paralyzing the would-be supporter. We lack the vocabulary for expressing appropriate concern, and we have no social conventions to ease the awkwardness. Ronald de Sousa (1987) has written persuasively about the importance of grasping paradigm scenarios in early childhood in order to learn appropriate emotional responses to situations. We do not learn—early or later in life—how to react to a rape. What typically results from this ignorance is bewilderment on the part of victims and silence on the part of others, often the result of misguided caution. When, on entering the angry phase of my recovery period, I railed at my parents: “Why haven’t my relatives called or written? Why hasn’t my own brother phoned?” They replied, “They all expressed their concern to us, but they didn’t want to remind you of what happened.”
Didn’t they realize I thought about the attack every minute of every day and that their inability to respond made me feel as though I had, in fact, died and no one had bothered to come to the funeral?

For the next several months, I felt angry, scared, and helpless, and I wished I could blame myself for what had happened so that I would feel less vulnerable, more in control of my life. Those who haven’t been sexually violated may have difficulty understanding why women who survive assault often blame themselves, and may wrongly attribute it to a sex-linked trait of masochism or lack of self-esteem. They don’t know that it can be less painful to believe that you did something blameworthy than it is to think that you live in a world where you can be attacked at any time, in any place, simply because you are a woman. It is hard to go on after an attack that is both random—and thus completely unpredictable—and not random, that is, a crime of hatred toward the group to which you happen to belong. If I hadn’t been the one who was attacked on that road in France, it would have been the next woman to come along. But had my husband walked down that road instead, he would have been safe.

Although I didn’t blame myself for the attack, neither could I blame my attacker. Tom wanted to kill him, but I, like other rape victims I came to know, found it almost impossible to get angry with my assailant. I think the terror I still felt precluded the appropriate angry response. It may be that experiencing anger toward an attacker requires imagining oneself in proximity to him, a prospect too frightening for a victim in the early stages of recovery to conjure up. As Aristotle observed in the Rhetoric, Book I, “no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power.” The anger was still there, but it got directed toward safer targets: my family and closest friends. My anger spread, giving me painful shooting signs that I was coming back to life. I could not accept what had happened to me. What was I supposed
to do now? How could everyone else carry on with their lives when women were dying? How could Tom go on teaching his classes, seeing students, chatting with colleagues . . . and why should he be able to walk down the street when I couldn’t?

The incompatibility of fear of my assailant and appropriate anger toward him became most apparent after I began taking a women’s self-defense class. It became clear that the way to break out of the double bind of self-blame versus powerlessness was through empowerment—physical as well as political. Learning to fight back is a crucial part of this process, not only because it enables us to experience justified, healing rage, but also because, as Iris Young has observed in her essay “Throwing Like a Girl,” “women in sexist society are physically handicapped,” moving about hesitantly, fearfully, in a constricted lived space, routinely underestimating what strength we actually have (Young 1990, 153). We have to learn to feel entitled to occupy space, to defend ourselves. The hardest thing for most of the women in my self-defense class to do was simply to yell “No!” Women have been taught not to fight back when being attacked, to rely instead on placating or pleading with one’s assailant—strategies that researchers have found to be least effective in resisting rape (Bart and O’Brien 1984).

The instructor of the class, Linda Ramzy Ranson, helped me through the difficult first sessions, through the flashbacks and the fear, and showed me I could be tougher than ever. As I was leaving after one session, I saw a student arrive for the next class—with a guide dog. I was furious that, in addition to everything else this woman had to struggle with, she had to worry about being raped. I thought I understood something of her fear since I felt, for the first time in my life, like I had a perceptual deficit—not the blurred vision from the detached vitreous, but, rather, the more hazardous lack of eyes in the back of my head. I tried to compensate for this on my walks by looking over my shoulder a lot and punctuating my purposeful, straight-ahead stride with an occasional pirouette, which must have made me look more whimsical than terrified.
The confidence I gained from learning how to fight back effectively not only enabled me to walk down the street again, it gave me back my life. But it was a changed life. A paradoxical life. I began to feel stronger than ever before, and more vulnerable, more determined to fight to change the world, but in need of several naps a day. News that friends found distressing in a less visceral way—the racism and sexism in the coverage of the trials of the defendants in the Central Park jogger case and in the trial of the St. John’s gang-rape defendants, the rape and murder of Kimberly Rae Harbour in Boston in October 1990 (virtually ignored by the media since the victim was black), the controversy over *American Psycho*, the Gulf War, the Kennedy rape case, the Tyson trial, the fatal stabbing of law professor Mary Joe Frug near Harvard Square, the ax murders of two graduate students at Dartmouth College (also neglected by all but the local press since the victims were black and from Ethiopia)—triggered debilitating flashbacks in me. Unlike survivors of wars or earthquakes, who inhabit a common shattered world, rape victims face the cataclysmic destruction of their world alone, surrounded by people who find it hard to understand what’s so distressing. I realized that I exhibited every symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder—dissociation, flashbacks, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, sleep disorders, inability to concentrate, diminished interest in significant activities, and a sense of a foreshortened future. I could understand why children exposed to urban violence have such trouble envisioning their futures. Although I had always been career-oriented, always planning for my future, I could no longer imagine how I would get through each day, let alone what I might be doing in a year’s time. I didn’t think I would ever write or teach philosophy again.

The American Psychiatric Association’s *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* defines post-traumatic stress disorder, in part, as the result of “an event that is outside the range of usual human experience.” Because the trauma is, to most people, inconceivable, it’s also unspeakable. Even when I managed to find the words and the strength to describe my
ordeal, it was hard for others to hear about it. They would have preferred me to just “buck up,” as one friend urged me to do. But it’s essential to talk about it, again and again. It’s a way of remastering the trauma, although it can be retraumatizing when people refuse to listen. In my case, each time someone failed to respond I felt as though I were alone again in the ravine, dying, screaming. And still no one could hear me. Or, worse, they heard me, but refused to help.

I now know they were trying to help, but that recovering from trauma takes time, patience, and, most of all, determination on the part of the survivor. After about six months, I began to be able to take more responsibility for my own recovery, and stopped expecting others to pull me through. I entered the final stage of my recovery, a period of gradual acknowledgment and integration of what had happened. I joined a rape survivors’ support group, I got a great deal of therapy, and I became involved in political activities, such as promoting the Violence against Women Act (which was eventually passed by Congress in 1994). Gradually, I was able to get back to work.

When I resumed teaching at Dartmouth in the fall of 1991, the first student who came to see me in my office during freshman orientation week told me that she had been raped. The following spring, four Dartmouth students reported sexual assaults to the local police. In the aftermath of these recent reports, the women students on my campus were told to use their heads, lock their doors, not go out after dark without a male escort. They were advised: just don’t do anything stupid.

Although colleges are eager to “protect” women by hindering their freedom of movement or providing them with male escorts, they continue to be reluctant to teach women how to protect themselves. After months of lobbying the administration at my college, we were able to convince them to offer a women’s self-defense and rape prevention course. It was offered in the winter of 1992 as a physical education course, and nearly a hundred students and employees signed up for it. Shortly after the course began, I was informed that the women students were not going to be allowed to get P.E.
credit for it, since the administration had determined that it discriminated against men. I was told that granting credit for the course was in violation of Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination in education programs receiving federal funding—even though granting credit to men for being on the football team was not, even though Title IX law makes an explicit exception for P.E. classes involving substantial bodily contact, and even though every term the college offers several martial arts courses, for credit, that are open to men, geared to men’s physiques and needs, and taken predominantly by men. I was told by an administrator that, even if Title IX permitted it, offering a women’s self-defense course for credit violated “the College’s non-discrimination clause—a clause which, I hope, all reasonable men and women support as good policy.”

The implication that I was not a “reasonable woman” didn’t sit well with me as a philosopher, so I wrote a letter to the appropriate administrative committee criticizing my college’s position that single-sex sports, male-only fraternities, female-only sororities, and pregnancy leave policies are not discriminatory, in any invidious sense, while a women’s self-defense class is. The administration finally agreed to grant P.E. credit for the course, but shortly after that battle was over, I read in the New York Times that “a rape prevention ride service offered to women in the city of Madison and on the University of Wisconsin campus may lose its university financing because it discriminates against men.” The dean of students at Wisconsin said that this group—the Women’s Transit Authority—which has been providing free nighttime rides to women students for nineteen years, must change its policy to allow male drivers and passengers. These are, in my view, examples of the application of what Catharine MacKinnon refers to as “the stupid theory of equality.” To argue that rape prevention policies for women discriminate against men is like arguing that money spent making university buildings more accessible to disabled persons discriminates against those able-bodied persons who do not benefit from these improvements.

Sexual violence victimizes not only those women who
are directly attacked, but *all* women. The fear of rape has long functioned to keep women in their place. Whether or not one agrees with the claims of those, such as Susan Brownmiller (1995), who argue that rape is a means by which *all* men keep *all* women subordinate, the fact that all women’s lives are restricted by sexual violence is indisputable. The authors of *The Female Fear*, Margaret Gordon and Stephanie Riger, cite studies substantiating what every woman already knows—that the fear of rape prevents women from enjoying what men consider to be their birthright. Fifty percent of women never use public transportation after dark because of fear of rape. Women are eight times more likely than men to avoid walking in their own neighborhoods after dark, for the same reason (Gordon and Riger 1991). In the seminar on Violence against Women that I taught for the first time in the spring of 1992, the men in the class were stunned by the extent to which the women in the class took precautions against assault every day—locking doors and windows, checking the back seat of the car, not walking alone at night, looking in closets on returning home. And this is at a “safe,” rural New England campus.

Although women still have their work and leisure opportunities unfairly restricted by their relative lack of safety, paternalistic legislation excluding women from some of the “riskier” forms of employment (e.g., bartending)\(^\text{16}\) has, thankfully, disappeared, except, that is, in the military. We are still debating whether women should be permitted to engage in combat, and the latest rationale for keeping women out of battle is that they are more vulnerable than men to sexual violence. Those wanting to limit women’s role in the military have used the reported indecent assaults on two female American prisoners of war in Iraq as evidence for women’s unsuitability for combat.\(^\text{17}\) One might as well argue that the fact that women are much more likely than men to be sexually assaulted on college campuses is evidence that women are not suited to post-secondary education. No one, to my knowledge, has proposed returning Ivy League colleges to their former all-male status as a solution to the
problem of campus rape. Some have, however, seriously proposed enacting after-dark curfews for women, in spite of the fact that men are the perpetrators of the assaults. This is yet another indication of how natural it still seems to many people to address the problem of sexual violence by curtailing women’s lives. The absurdity of this approach becomes apparent once one realizes that a woman can be sexually assaulted anywhere, at any time—in “safe” places, in broad daylight, even in her own home.

For months after my assault, I was afraid of people finding out about it—afraid of their reactions and of their inability to respond. I was afraid that my professional work would be discredited, that I would be viewed as biased, or, even worse, not properly philosophical. Now I am no longer afraid of what might happen if I speak out about sexual violence. I’m much more afraid of what will continue to happen if I don’t. Sexual violence is a problem of catastrophic proportions—a fact obscured by its mundanity, by its relentless occurrence, by the fact that so many of us have been victims of it. Imagine the moral outrage, the emergency response we would surely mobilize, if all of these everyday assaults occurred at the same time or were restricted to one geographical region. But why should the spatiotemporal coordinates of the vast numbers of sexual assaults be considered to be morally relevant? From the victim’s point of view, the fact that she is isolated in her rape and her recovery, combined with the ordinariness of the crime that leads to its trivialization, makes the assault and its aftermath even more traumatic.

As devastating as sexual violence is, however, I want to stress that it is possible to survive it, and even to flourish after it, although it doesn’t seem that way at the time. Whenever I see a survivor struggling with the overwhelming anger and sadness, I’m reminded of a sweet, motherly, woman in my rape survivors’ support group who sat silently throughout the group’s first meeting. At the end of the hour she finally asked, softly, through tears: “Can anyone tell me if it ever stops hurting?” At the time I had the same question,
and wasn’t satisfied with any answer. Now I can say, yes, it
does stop hurting, at least for longer periods of time. A year
after my assault, I was pleased to discover that I could go for
fifteen minutes without thinking about it. Now I can go for
hours at a stretch without a flashback. That’s on a good day.
On a bad day, I may still take to my bed with lead in my
veins, unable to find one good reason to go on.

Our group facilitator, Ann Gaulin, told us that first
meeting: “You will never be the same. But you can be bet-
ter.” I protested that I had lost so much: my security, my
self-esteem, my love, and my work. I had been happy with
the way things were. How could they ever be better now? As
a survivor, she knew how I felt, but she also knew that, as
she put it, “When your life is shattered, you’re forced to pick
up the pieces, and you have a chance to stop and examine
them. You can say ‘I don’t want this one anymore’ or ‘I
think I’ll work on that one.’” I have had to give up more
than I would ever have chosen to. But I have gained impor-
tant skills and insights, and I no longer feel tainted by my
victimization. Granted, those of us who live through sexual
assault aren’t given ticker-tape parades or the keys to our
cities, but it’s an honor to be a survivor. Although it’s not
exactly the sort of thing I can put on my résumé, it’s the
accomplishment of which I’m most proud.

Two years after the assault, I could speak about it in a
philosophical forum. There I could acknowledge the good
things that came from the recovery process—the clarity, the
confidence, the determination, the many supporters and sur-
vivors who had brought meaning back into my world. This
was not to say that the attack and its aftermath were, on
balance, a good thing or, as my aunt put it, “a real blessing
from above.” I would rather not have gone down that road.
It has been hard for me, as a philosopher, to learn the lesson
that knowledge isn’t always desirable, that the truth doesn’t
always set you free. Sometimes, it fills you with incapacitat-
ing terror and, then, uncontrollable rage. But I suppose you
should embrace it anyway, for the reason Nietzsche exhorts
you to love your enemies: if it doesn’t kill you, it makes you stronger.

People ask me if I’m recovered now, and I reply that it depends on what that means. If they mean “am I back to where I was before the attack?” I have to say, no, and I never will be. I am not the same person who set off, singing, on that sunny Fourth of July in the French countryside. I left her in a rocky creek bed at the bottom of a ravine. I had to in order to survive. I understand the appropriateness of what a friend described to me as a Jewish custom of giving those who have outlived a brush with death new names. The trauma has changed me forever, and if I insist too often that my friends and family acknowledge it, that’s because I’m afraid they don’t know who I am.

But if recovery means being able to incorporate this awful knowledge into my life and carry on, then, yes, I’m recovered. I don’t wake up each day with a start, thinking, “This can’t have happened to me!” It happened. I have no guarantee that it won’t happen again, although my self-defense classes have given me the confidence to move about in the world and to go for longer and longer walks—with my two big dogs. Sometimes I even manage to enjoy myself. And I no longer cringe when I see a woman jogging alone on the country road where I live, although I may still have a slight urge to rush out and protect her, to tell her to come inside where she’ll be safe. But I catch myself, like a mother learning to let go, and cheer her on, thinking, may she always be so carefree, so at home in her world. She has every right to be.
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