

CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xi
<i>Selected Abbreviations and Editions</i>	xiii
<i>Map of Places Mentioned</i>	xx–xxi
CHAPTER 1 Introduction: The Origins of <i>Philosophia</i>	1
ORIGINS	
CHAPTER 2 Heraclitus against the <i>Philosophoi</i>	37
CHAPTER 3 What <i>Philosophos</i> Could Have Meant: A Lexical Account	66
CHAPTER 4 Pythagoreans as <i>Philosophoi</i>	107
DEVELOPMENT	
CHAPTER 5 Fifth-Century <i>Philosophoi</i>	127
CHAPTER 6 Socrates’s Prosecution as <i>Philosophos</i>	157
CHAPTER 7 Non-Academic <i>Philosophia</i>	194
ACADEMY	
CHAPTER 8 Plato’s Saving of the Appearances	221
CHAPTER 9 Aristotle’s Historiography of <i>Philosophia</i>	260
CHAPTER 10 Ambivalence about <i>Philosophia</i> beyond the Discipline	288
EPILOGUE Contemporary Philosophy and the History of the Discipline	317
<i>Appendix: Versions of the Pythagoras Story</i>	321
<i>Classical Uses of Philosoph- Discussed in This Book</i>	331
<i>Phil- Prefixed Words Appearing in This Book</i>	335
<i>Bibliography</i>	337
<i>Index</i>	371
<i>Index Locorum</i>	393

Introduction: The Origins of *Philosophia*

A History of *Philosophia*, Not of Philosophy

This book tells a new story of the origin of *philosophia*—the Greek name, and the discipline that it came to name. It begins around 500 BCE, with the coinage not of a self-lauding “love of wisdom” but with a wry verbal slight, and concludes a century and a half later, in the maturity of an institution that is continuous with today’s departments of philosophy. This phenomenon—accommodating a name-calling name and consolidating a structured group around it—recurs through history, as the cases of the Quakers, Shakers, Freaks, and queer activists illustrate.¹ A norm-policing name, at first distasteful, gets appropriated, facilitates a new and ennobling self-understanding, and then governs a productive and tight-knit social enterprise. I argue that such is the origin of *philosophia*.

The name *philosophos* seems to have begun as “sage-wannabe,” a bemused label for a person’s repetitive and presumed excessive efforts to join the category of *sophoi*, the political advice-giving sages of the Greek world. The label stuck. Eventually, a fashion for etymological invention glossed *philosophos* as “lover of wisdom.” The gloss caught on, but not because it had recovered a historical truth; rather, it sounded good, and provided a happy construction on what those called it were feeling. In this way, every philosophy instructor’s class-opening exhortation to philosophy anachronizes, retrojecting fourth-century BCE linguistic play onto the term’s coinage many generations earlier. Relatedly, most historians of ancient philosophy, guilty not of anachronism but of partiality to the fourth century, ignore the word’s early years, treating it as an unremarkable term meaning “cultivator of one’s intellect,” a word that on

¹ For the Shakers, see Evans 1859, ch. 1, ¶26 (with ¶¶15–22): “Sometimes, after sitting awhile in silent meditation, they were seized with a mighty trembling, under which they would often express the indignation of God against all sin. At other times, they were exercised with singing, shouting, and leaping for joy, at the near prospect of salvation. They were often exercised with great agitation of body and limbs, shaking, running, and walking the floor, with a variety of other operations and signs, swiftly passing and repassing each other, like clouds agitated with a mighty wind. These exercises, so strange in the eyes of the beholders, brought upon them the appellation of Shakers, which has been their most common name of distinction ever since.”

their reading happened to catch Plato's fancy, who then singlehandedly made it a technical term and a distinctive life-defining goal. Neither view—"lover of wisdom" or "intellectual cultivator"—squares with the evidence from the first century of the expression's use, and neither attends to the way reflection on the expression contributed to the very thing to which the fraught term applied. Just as a sand grain irritates the oyster into making a pearl, a once-irritating word, *PHILOSOPHOS*, helped bring about the discipline of *philosophia* among the pearls of fourth-century BCE Athens.

In its focus on the origin of *philosophia*, this book differs from studies that seek the origin of philosophy, whether in Greece or elsewhere. Such studies must start by deciding what counts for us moderns as philosophy, then figure out what kind of ancient evidence would justify our finding philosophy in some early practice, and finally gather whatever evidence is available and explain how this evidence could identify the origin of such practices.² These studies have cogent goals, to be sure, tracing back our distinctive reason-giving enterprise, studying the conditions under which it arose, and reconstructing the dialectical process by which familiar concepts, distinctions, and problems became salient. Their work is genuinely philosophical, because recognizing reasons *as* reasons means acknowledging and evaluating the normative force of various claims. But they confront serious methodological challenges when they encounter the equivocal evidence on which the issue of origins must rely. The basis on which we are to ascertain the existence of some "philosophy" way back when seems undecidable. After all, what counts as philosophy *now* is hardly obvious, given the complexity of our practices, not to mention the diversity and disagreements within the field. What counts as ancient evidence for (our idea of) philosophy is no easier to decide. Some might look for explicit dialectical engagement, others for explicit argumentative inference, and yet others for non-theistic explanation. Adding to the difficulty, our evidence for the earliest candidate philosophers comes to us pre-interpreted by later philosophers, such as Aristotle, who might perhaps have to take responsibility for *making* them philosophical in our sense. To be sure, the best such studies confront these methodological challenges explicitly and provide deep insight into the nature of philosophy, whatever it may be, in the ancient world. Yet none avoids a fealty to present-day ideas. Perhaps a rational demonstration is a rational demonstration, in 500 BCE as much as now. But was any particular case of rational demonstration philosophy? Was anything nondemonstrative or

² Sassi 2018 provides one of the clearest recent examples of this approach (see p. 277n50 below for her application of this method to Thales). Frede 2000 and Palmer 2009 contain subtle reflections on the historiography of the development of ancient philosophy. See also Lloyd 1970, "Preface" and 1–15; Collins 2000, 82–92.

nonrational philosophy? How many people had to share in this demonstrative practice for “philosophy” to become recognizable or count as a practice, institution, and discipline? These are intractable questions, and there is no ready criterion to which one might appeal.

Fortunately, there is a criterion for *something*, when we shift approaches. Rather than struggle to apply our own complicated concepts to a complicated past, we might study the concepts that our forebears used. This is the contextualist or historicizing approach. Unable to decide on the first “philosophers,” we can still decide on the first “*philosophoi*.” Whereas for historians of philosophy, the earliest known philosophers may have been Thales and Anaximander, for historians of *philosophia*, the earliest known *philosophoi* were those called *philosophoi* in the earliest attestations of the term: as it seems to turn out, people associated with Pythagoras or early fifth-century BCE Ionians. The history of *philosophia* eventually includes Thales and Anaximander, but only once early Academic (fourth century BCE) authors strove to identify and baptize precursors. The evidence we have allows us to see the development of a cultural phenomenon that the Greeks could themselves see, reflect on, react to, and consciously or unconsciously modify, one that may have begun in Magna Graeca rather than Asia Minor.³ The Greeks certainly talked about *philosophia*; why they did so, and what effect on *philosophia* came about as a result, is the concern of this book.

A new approach to the origins of the discipline is encouraged not just by the desire to track ancient rather than modern concepts, to discuss social rather than purely rational phenomena. It is also encouraged by a puzzling feature of ancient histories of philosophy. Over more than a millennium of accounts, and with provocative regularity, ancient authors advert to the origin of the very word *philosophos*. No other discipline pauses with such care to reflect on the introduction of its name—not astronomy, not poetics, not mathematics. Not only that, but from at least the fourth century BCE, these historians, otherwise impresarios of disagreement, partisans of some school, or skeptics about all factions, took a single and unwavering view of that origin; we know of no rejections, suspicions, or alternative accounts.⁴ The story they told of that lexical origin, the analysis of which provides a narrative thread for my book, took varied forms, and differences among them are important; but the striking consensus about the core claim is even more important. We find the account in Aristotle, and in his once-famous colleague Heraclides Ponticus; in a rig-

³ Ionia may have had the conditions for coinage of the term (see Emlyn-Jones 1980, 97–111, 164–77), but we lack any evidence for the coinage of the term there.

⁴ We do of course know of differing accounts of the *development* of the discipline; see, for example, Laks 2018.

orous second-century BCE historian of philosophers, Sosicrates of Rhodes; in the (conjectured) first-century CE encyclopedist of philosophy Aëtius; in the Roman philosopher-rhetorician Cicero and rhetorician-philosopher Quintilian; in the omnivorous historians Valerius Maximus and Diodorus Siculus; in the Platonist intellectuals Apuleius and Maximus; in the neo-Platonist scholars Iamblichus and Hermias; in the Christian-philosophical apologists Augustine and Clement; in the Church Fathers Ambrose and Isidore; and in two biographers of Greek philosophers who may have read more sources than anyone else, Diogenes Laertius and Eusebius.⁵

The version attributed to Sosicrates (fl. < 145 BCE) provides a conveniently compressed starting place.⁶ We find it in Diogenes Laertius's *Life of Pythagoras*, one of the late chapters of his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (ca. third century CE), a sequence of biographies of earlier Greek thinkers and the essential extant source for ancient philosophy anecdotes. In his work, Sosicrates sets out the history of philosophical teacher-student relationships, and Diogenes generally relies on him for his rigorous historical skepticism.⁷ Here he quotes or paraphrases Sosicrates's work on academic lineages, called *Successions*:

[Pythagoras], being asked by Leon tyrant of Phlius what he was (τίς εἶη), said [he was] a *philosophos* (φιλόσοφος).⁸ And he likened life to a festival, since some come to it to compete, some for business, some, indeed the best, as spectators; thus in life some are slavish, he said, born (φύονται)⁹ as hunters after reputation and excess, but *philosophoi* [are hunters] after truth (ἀληθείας).¹⁰ (DL 8.8)

⁵ Aët. 1.3.7; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.3.8–9; Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.19; Val. Max. 8.7 ext. 2; DS 10 fr. 24; Apul. *Apol.* 4.7; *Flor.* 15.22; Max. Tyr. 1.2a; Iambl. *VP* 12 with *Pro.* 9; Hermias *In Phdr.* 278a; August. *De civ. D.* 8.2; *De trin.* 14.1.2; Clem. *Strom.* 1.61.4; Ambrose *De Abr.* 2.7.37; Isid. 8.6, 14.6; DL 1.12, 8.8; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 10.14.3; *Chron.* 14.2–4 Helm. See the Appendix for all texts.

⁶ For the date, see Strabo 10.4.3, with discussion in Giannattasio Andria 1989 and *BNJ* 461.

⁷ Contrarian views on life-dates: 1.38 (Thales), 1.49 and 1.62 (Solon), 1.68 (Chilon), 1.95 (Periander), 1.101 (Anacharsis); contrarian views on literary authenticity: 2.84 (Aristippus), 6.80 (Diogenes), 7.163 (Ariston of Chion); precise anecdotes: 1.75 (Pittacus), 1.106–7 (Myson's father), 6.82 (Monimus, a student of Diogenes), 6.13 (first cloak-doubler). See also Ath. 4.163f (a Pythagorean's fashion innovations), 10.422c (Crates, cf. DL 6.90). This Sosicrates may have written a famously rigorous *History of Crete* (DS 5.80; Ath. 6.263f; Σ Eur. *Hipp.* 47; Σ Ar. *Av.* 521).

⁸ One version of this text (Φ, the Vatican excerpt) prints φιλόσοφος as direct speech; this presents Pythagoras as having actually used the term, and might present this brief account as abstracting from a longer dramatic version.

⁹ Marcovich 1999 conjectures φαίνονται (“appear”) for φύονται, against all manuscripts. The verb one chooses determines the degree of Pythagorean doctrine of soul-transmigration found in this passage, and may affect one's view of its sources.

¹⁰ For the Greek of this passage, see Appendix, p. 321.

On the surface, this two-sentence tale is simple; but it also has important implications. Pythagoras calls himself a *philosophos*; uses an analogy to describe *philosophoi* and to differentiate them from other kinds of people; and says that *philosophoi* strive after an elusive truth. That Leon, from a city neighboring Corinth between the Peloponnese and Attica, has to ask what Pythagoras takes himself to be suggests that Pythagoras acts or speaks in an unfamiliar way. That the story takes place during Pythagoras's life, around the end of the sixth century or early in the fifth century BCE, and that Leon does not know the word *philosophos*, or at least not when applied to oneself, implies the word's coinage in that period. That Pythagoras has to provide an elaborate analogy to explain the term tells us that the meaning of *philosophos* is not transparent or apparent from its putative parts even to elite Greek speakers. That Pythagoras does not find it appropriate to define the word *philosophos* in terms either of love or of wisdom, but only in the rhyming terms of observation (*theatai*) and hunting (*thêratai*),¹¹ implies that he did not coin the term himself: were the implausibility of describing oneself with a private neologism not enough, he would need to explain why he created and used the word *philosophos* in particular. That *philosophoi* are compared as a group to Olympic athletes and traveling salespeople suggests that they could be recognized as a type.¹² Finally, that Pythagoras is the protagonist of this story means that Pythagoras was viewed as an archetypal *philosophos*.

Already we see reasons against accepting the standard accounts of “philosopher” as meaning (etymologically) “lover of wisdom” or (initially) “intellectual cultivator”; other versions of the Pythagoras story provide similar reasons. If the former meaning were obvious, Pythagoras would not have needed to explain who *philosophoi* are; at most he might have discussed the way his actions or speeches reveal his love of wisdom. If the latter were valid, again he would not have needed to explain who *philosophoi* are; Leon would have to be obtuse not to appreciate the basic idea of cultivating one's intellect. Nothing said here precludes people from *later* saying that *philosophos* means “lover of wisdom” or using it to mean “intellectual cultivator.” In fact, we find both in the fourth century BCE, as early as the work of Plato and Alcidamas, and then more prominently in Aristotle. But calling *philosophoi* “lovers of wisdom” is

¹¹ One might wonder, given Sosicrates's late date, whether this metaphor relies on Plato's “hunting for what's real” (τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν, *Phd.* 66c2; cf. *Iambl. Pro.* 13.64,2 and 20.99,15), but since the metaphorical use of hunting for a quasi-abstract object exists from the fifth century BCE, this cannot be determined. Other important fourth-century BCE hunting references are at *Xen. Cyn.* 12–13; *Pl. Soph.* 218d–223b.

¹² It may be worth noting that Pythagoras's adopted hometown, Croton, enjoyed amazing success at athletic festivals (Dunbabin 1948, 369–70), and that Pythagoras's contemporary Xenophanes also vaunted his intellectual *sophia* over athletic glory (B2/D61).

a conscious achievement; of course, using the term to mean “intellectual cultivator” in a broad and undifferentiated sense is another achievement, though this one is perhaps less deliberate.¹³

This book’s argument has two parts. The first concerns the coinage of the word *philosophos*. *Phil*-prefixed terms in the sixth and early fifth centuries BCE, at the time *philosophos* was coined, tend to be name-calling names. They tend to call out those so named for excessive activity related to a social practice referred to synecdochally by the word’s second element; there is no evidence that the *phil*-prefix indicated the affection of “love.” For example, *philaitios*, with the second element *aitia*, “cause,” or in its social context, “legal motion,” means excessive activity in lawsuits, or “litigious.” This word has pejorative rather than laudatory valence, and it does not impute an *affection* for causes or legal motions.¹⁴ The second element in *philosophos* is *soph*-, the root of *sophos*, which, as I argue later, referred at the end of the sixth century BCE particularly to “sages,” culturally prominent, socially elite, intellectually wide-ranging civic and domestic advisers typified though not exhausted by the “Seven *Sophoi*” of the early sixth century BCE. So calling someone *philosophos* would seem to impute an excessive tendency to act like sages or to seek after the status of sages (broadly construed), presumably through advice-giving and study, where this practice or aspiration would seem dubious, problematic, or even ridiculous. Word invention would satisfy the impulse to label certain people who act in ways that are not adequately described by any other label. The political, intellectual, and religious circle of Pythagoreans in late sixth-century and early fifth-century BCE Magna Graeca provides the most plausible agent for occasioning this linguistic creation and subsequent diffusion (whatever the nature of that group’s constitution).

The second part of my argument concerns the trajectory of the term *philosophos*. Through the fifth century BCE it was applied to people acting like those Pythagoreans: giving sage advice about ethical and existential

¹³ The earliest extant Greek use known to me of *philein sophian*, “loving wisdom,” is in the Septuagint *Prov.* 29.3 (second century–first century BCE); the earliest use of *philian sophias*, “love of wisdom,” in Nicomachus’s *Introduction to Arithmetic* 1.1.1.2 (60–120 CE—John Philoponus attributes to Nicomachus this definition of philosophy [*In Nic. Isag. Arithm.* 1.8; cf. 1.52, 15.2, 21.20]); and the earliest use of *philos sophias*, “lover of wisdom,” in Euseb. *Vit. Const.* 4.2.8 (fourth century CE). Pl. *Lys.* 212d8 (. . . ἄν μὴ ἢ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλή) admittedly gets close.

¹⁴ Aesch. fr. 326a.14 (attributed to the poet’s voice); *Supp.* 485; there is a maxim, Μὴ φιλαίτιος ἴσθι (“Don’t be litigious”), found in an addendum to the (fourth-century BCE) list attributed to Sosiades (Stob. 3.1.173, in the Brussels codex).

issues, making arguments that are grounded in hypotheses about the nature of the *kosmos*, and talking with erudition and precision about political matters of no immediate relevance. In time, the word could sometimes shake off the pejorative sense, becoming a sort of neutral label, for example for the self-constituting group of people who practiced formal debate about important matters for the sake of the debate, as an exercise of dialectical skill, rather than for political or forensic purposes, as an expression of Sage wisdom. As a neutral label, it could be self-applied, as increasingly it was around the turn of that century—but not universally so, since its original negativity had not yet been, and may never have been, entirely eradicated. Those being called *philosophoi* or calling themselves *philosophoi* sought to vindicate the appellation, and did so in various ways. Some gave new explanations for the very actions that led to the scornful name; some invented alternative etymologies of the term *philosophos*; and some looked backward and assembled a noble lineage of great thinkers, with whom they could carry on current debates, calling them the first and paradigmatic *philosophoi*. It is worth noting that a story of similar structure could perhaps be told about the *sophistai*, another group of people whose name is formed from the *soph-* root, perhaps around the same time and in parallel, though probably without significant interchange with the *philosophoi* until the end of the fifth century BCE.¹⁵

In brief, past scholarship has treated the word *philosophos* as definable by a phrase. I think we should treat it as defined rather more by application—“those people are akin to those we call *philosophoi*”—and the choice of word a result of name-calling name conventions. Treated this way, *philosophos* is defined, at the start, as in a family resemblance with the Pythagoreans, and the specific word *philosophos* serves to denote this family resemblance because the Pythagoreans were, in effect, *sophos*-wannabes. Only later could processes of abstraction liberate the term *philosophos* from its archetype.

Though this account of the origin of *philosophia* differs from an account of the origin of philosophy, it complements rather than replaces it. The name is reactive, not motivating. What got philosophy going may indeed have been wonder, or the leisured pursuit of scientific understanding, or the appreciation

¹⁵ The word *sophistês* first appears in Pind. *Isthm.* 5.28 (after 480 BCE), and must have been in circulation before that. The *-istês* ending denotes a professional status, referring initially to clever advice-giving and musical instruction. There develops a canonical set of practitioners certainly by the early fourth century BCE (cf. Pl. *Prt.* 316c5–317c2), though probably by the late fifth century BCE, and gains a technical meaning by the time of Aristotle’s works. Much more ought to be said, but space does not allow it here. See Edmunds 2006; Billings and Moore forthcoming, “Introduction.”

of and confidence in large-scale claims defended by reasons.¹⁶ Perhaps it was the moral seriousness that drove Socrates to avoid wrongdoing by learning what he could learn. Perhaps it was the fear of death and the Empedoclean quest for self-purification and psychic health. Perhaps nautical astronomy, or agricultural meteorology, or genealogical grandstanding played a role; perhaps it was influence from Egypt or Babylon or Chaldea.¹⁷ Scholarship on ancient philosophy has learned much from pursuing these hypotheses. But none alone explains why people got called *philosophoi*, and none explains the development of an enduring discipline—a mutually self-aware group of coordinated practitioners with a historical consciousness of their forerunners—named precisely *philosophia*. What they do aim to explain is why people like the Pythagoreans did what they did, what they did, and why and how others after the Pythagoreans did what they did. An account of the origins of philosophy takes an internal perspective, asking why, for example, Thales put water at the center of a unified cosmic account, whereas an account of the origins of *philosophia*, which I attempt to provide in this book, takes an external perspective, asking why someone would ever call Thales *philosophos*.

Internal and external accounts of origins both rely on thinner evidentiary bases than we would hope for. We no more have independent statements of Pythagoras's self-descriptions than we do of the reasoning that brought him to theorize the soul, life, or the *kosmos*. Our interpretation of the patterns of *phil-* prefixed names depends on infrequent uses at somewhat indeterminate moments after their coinage. My primary theses, which are my best explanations for the broad range of evidence that is mustered here, must still count ultimately as open to doubt and revision. In light of this weak evidentiary tissue, the story I tell may be judged a merely likely story. Even if so, it should appear likelier than the alternatives. My methodology is to study the meaning of a compound name by reconstructing the morphosemantic limitations and the historical occasions for its coinage; track the changes to its meaning with an eye to patterns of diffusion; and treat its ascendancy to discipline-name on a parallel with other reappropriated names. At the book's conclusion, I reflect on the relevance of this study to our understanding of philosophy today. What I think seemed most incredible to contemporary observers of Pythagoreans or their look-alikes was their commitment to the precise discussion of (seemingly) background issues—issues that amount neither to urgent decisions nor to salacious social gossip—as instrumental for, even constitutive of, the good life.

¹⁶ For the latter, see, e.g., Barnes 1982, 3–12; Osborne 2004, 133–35.

¹⁷ For an ancient perspective on the non-Greek origins of or influences on *philosophia*, see, e.g., DL 1.1–11; for a more recent perspective, see West 1971.

The same incredulity, I believe, characterizes present-day popular attitudes toward philosophy.

Heraclides Ponticus's History of *Philosophia*

Sosicrates's version of the story about Pythagoras's self-appellation as *philosophos* provides key evidence about the origins of *philosophia*, with respect to both the word and the origin of the discipline it eventually came to name. To the extent that something about the story is true or plausible, we learn something important and distinctive about the earliest uses of the term *philosophos*. To the extent that people told the story—as we will see, by the fourth century BCE, just when we also see the formation of a recognizable discipline—we learn something important and distinctive about the uses of the term *philosophos* at the time that the discipline eventually came to be. Thus, this book addresses three questions about the story. What about it is historically reliable? Why would the term *philosophos* still be worth discussing in the fourth century BCE? And how did this story come to be told in this form?

The earliest name associated with the authorship of the Pythagoras story is Heraclides Ponticus, a member of Plato's Academy. Born around 390 BCE, Heraclides grew up in Heraclea, a town on the Pontus, the Black Sea. Now a city named Karadeniz Ereğli and Turkey's leading steel town, classical Heraclea forged intellectuals, including the mythographer Herodorus and his Socratic-aligned son Bryson.¹⁸ Like many others, Heraclides moved to Athens in his youth, and rose to prominence; his school of choice was the Academy, by then a decade old.¹⁹ Early school histories tell us that he served as acting director during one of Plato's sojourns to Sicily, and at Plato's death he was deemed a candidate for the permanent post.²⁰ The esteem may speak to his administrative skill or social graces, but it probably also reflects the breadth of his interests and his literary flair, insofar as he wrote philosophical dialogues and treatises with a Platonic vigor.²¹ Dozens in number, they ranged from argumentative engagements with Heraclitus and Democritus to literary criticism of Homer, Hesiod, Euripides, and Sophocles, and from histories of invention

¹⁸ On Heraclea's intellectual scene, see Burstein 1976, 5, 39–66; Desideri 1991, esp. 8–11, 14–15. Famous names include the Academic Chion, the Pythagorean Zopyrus, the Peripatetic Chamaeleon, and the Stoic Heracleotes.

¹⁹ DL 3.46, 5.86; see Gottschalk 1980, 2–6; Mejer 2009.

²⁰ Acting director: *Suda* η 461, though doubt is expressed by Guthrie 1978, 483, and the claim is denied by Voss 1896, 11–13. Candidate for post: *PHerc.* 1021 col. vi.41–vii.10.

²¹ Vigor: DL 5.89.

and discovery to political, legal, and ethical studies.²² Cicero treated the dialogues in particular as vital models of the genre,²³ and others expressed their appreciation as well.²⁴

Heraclides gave special attention to the history of Pythagoreanism. Diogenes Laertius attributes to him works of historical research (ιστορικά), one of which is called *On the Pythagoreans*, and says that he studied with Pythagoreans.²⁵ In Porphyry's study of vegetarianism, Heraclides provides his earliest source for the gustatory and sacrificial practices of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, their most prominent and telling idiosyncrasies.²⁶ Clement of Alexandria cites Heraclides for Pythagoras's core ethical beliefs.²⁷ And the fact that several doxographers of philosophy cite Heraclides's remarkable cosmological view that each star is its own *kosmos* as a view of the Pythagoreans suggests that Heraclides himself cited the sharing and did so with approval.²⁸

A version of the story of Pythagoras's self-naming elsewhere attributed to Sosicrates appears in Heraclides's work called variously *On Diseases*, *Causes of Diseases*, or, from a famous episode, *On the Woman Not Breathing*.²⁹ The work is lost, but Diogenes Laertius quotes or paraphrases parts of it throughout his *Life of Empedocles*; we also have secondhand citations in Galen, Pliny, and Origen.³⁰ None gives a plot summary, and none gives the context for the Pythagoras-as-*philosophos* episode. Nevertheless, these fragments hint at a work concerned with Empedocles and Pythagoras, and so (presumably) Pythagoras as an essential predecessor of Empedocles. This context provides clues to the provenance or plausibility of the Pythagoras story, and thus about the origin of the term *philosophia*. We begin with the material about Empedocles.

²² List of works: DL 5.86–88.

²³ Cic. *Att.* 13.19.4, 15.4.3, 15.13.3, 15.27.2, 16.2.6, 16.11.3, 16.12; *QFr.* 3.5.1.

²⁴ E.g., Gell. *NA* 8 fr. xv; the extent of the reception of his work through antiquity is powerful evidence.

²⁵ DL 5.88, 5.86 (διήκουσε). *Suda* ε 1007 probably suggests that Heraclides wrote about Pythagoras himself.

²⁶ Porph. *Abst.* 1.26.2–4.

²⁷ Clem. *Strom.* 2.21.130.3 (~ Theodoret *Graec. aff. cur.* 11.8), namely, “knowledge of the perfection of the numbers of the soul is happiness” (or “. . . of the numbers is happiness of the soul”).

²⁸ Aët. 2.13; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 15.30.8; ps-Gal. *Hist. phil.* 52; Theodoret *Graec. aff. cur.* 4.20.

²⁹ Source: Cic. *Tusc.* 5.3.9 with DL 1.12. Names: Αἰτίαι περὶ νόσων: DL 5.87; Περί νόσων: DL 8.51, 8.60; Περί τῆς ἄπνου: DL 1.12; Ἄπνου: Gal. *De loc. aff.* 6.5, *De diff. R.* 1.8. None are sure to go back to Heraclides.

³⁰ Fragments collected in Schütrumpf 2008, fr. 82–95 (A–D); Wehrli 1969, fr. 76–89; Voss 1896, fr. 67–78.

Diogenes treats *On Diseases* as historically authoritative about Empedocles's life.³¹ As for its details of Empedocles's pyroclastic death in Mt. Aetna, he treats it as a plausible contender. In the dialogue, he says, Heraclides narrates what happened after Empedocles cured an intractable patient (the "woman not breathing"). Empedocles held a sacrifice and feast on the land of Peisianax, the patient's father. The attendees then left for the night's sleep, leaving Empedocles by himself. When they returned in the morning, nobody could find him. A servant reported having heard, in the middle of the night, an exceedingly loud sound calling to Empedocles, and then saw a heavenly light and the illumination of torches. Pausanias, a special friend of Empedocles's, started to tell people to resume their search, but then reversed himself, telling them rather to pray and to sacrifice to Empedocles "as to one having become a god" (καθαπερεί γεγονότι θεῶ, DL 8.67–68). In this way, Heraclides describes the origins of Empedocles's apotheosis and cult following. The fact that Timaeus of Tauromenium, a fourth-century BCE historian, is said to have taken issue with aspects of the story shows the extent to which contemporaries and successors took Heraclides's detailed account as a basically valid position in biographical debate. It also shows the centrality of Empedocles's death in understanding the sort of person—and thus perhaps what sort of philosopher—he really was.

As *On Disease's* colloquial title, *On the Woman Not Breathing*, implies, a therapeutic marvel captured the attention of an audience—and, structurally, it led directly to Empedocles's disputed apotheosis. Heraclides says that Empedocles explained to Pausanias what was going on with the unbreathing woman (τὴν ἄπνου), presumably at the feast celebrating his success in saving her (DL 8.60). He had preserved the body of this woman, Pantheia of Acragas, for thirty days despite a lack of breath or pulse (8.61). Other doctors had failed to understand the case.³² It is on these grounds (ᾄθεν), Diogenes says, that Heraclides calls Empedocles both a doctor and a seer, but also from the following lines (λαμβάνων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν στίχων, 8.61), which are ten of the first twelve lines of Empedocles's poem (or one of them):

Friends, you who dwell in the great city beside the yellow Acragas 1
On the lofty citadel and who care for good deeds

³¹ DL 8.51. In the following paragraph (8.52), Diogenes may attribute to Heraclides Empedocles's death at 60 (the manuscripts print "Heraclitus," but F. W. Sturz conjectured "Heraclides" in 1805, and Dorandi 2013 thinks this may be right). That Diogenes actually first attributes the view to Aristotle, "and also" (ἔτι τε) to Heraclides, suggests that Aristotle may have cited Heraclides for the information.

³² Gal. *De loc. aff.* 6 (they were greatly puzzled); DL 8.69 (citing Hermippus: the other doctors had given up hope).

...
I greet you! I, who for you am an immortal god, no longer mortal
I go among you, honored, as I am seen, 5
Crowned with ribbons and with blooming garlands.
Whenever I arrive with these in the flourishing cities,
I am venerated by men and by women; they follow me,
Thousands of them, asking where is the road to benefit:
Some of them desire prophecy, others ask to hear, 10
For illnesses of all kinds, a healing utterance,
...³³ (Empedocles B112/D4, trans. Laks and Most)

Empedocles says that people ask him to heal and predict the future (10–11). Diogenes seems to say that Heraclides includes these lines in his work—how else could he know that Heraclides relied on them?—but whether put in Empedocles’s or another character’s mouth, or presented by the narrator (Heraclides?) himself, we do not know. In any event, Diogenes treats the Pantheia episode as clinching the claim that Empedocles rather than other doctors knew both how to bring the woman back alive and how to foresee that she would return to the living. Diogenes does not, however, indicate why Heraclides wanted to show Empedocles’s superiority, which he may well have taken to be factual.³⁴ We must turn to the two extant Pythagoras passages for information.

In his *Life of Pythagoras*, Diogenes says that Heraclides presented Pythagoras telling the following detailed story about himself.³⁵ He had been born a

³³ DL 8.62. See DS 13.83.1 for line 3: “Respectful harbors for strangers, inexperienced in wickedness,” and Clem. *Strom.* 6.30.1 for line 12: “Pierced for a long time by terrible <pains>.”

³⁴ As Origen (*C. Cels.* 2.15.40) observes, Plato’s Myth of Er presents a similar situation; more convincingly, Aristotle speaks of suspended animation in his lost *Eudemus*, or *On the Soul* (frs. 9 and 11 Ross), and the phenomenon is not unknown in the contemporary world. In 2014, a Polish woman was declared dead, as having no pulse or breath, and left in a body bag for eleven hours (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30048087>). Heraclides may have been inspired by Democritus’s work, which was eventually called *Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου* (DL 9.46; *Suda* τ 1019; Procl. *In R.* 2.113.6–9; a work by the same name is attributed to Protagoras at DL 9.55, and Socrates in Pl. *Ap.* 29b4–5 says that he does not know sufficiently “about those [things] in Hades” [περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου], apparently a topic appropriate for *sophoi* to know), a collection of reports about seemingly dead people who came back to life. The symptomatology had recurrent interest (Tert. *De anim.* 43; Aët. 5.25.3 [Leucippus], 4.4.7 [Democritus]), and assertions of death remained challenging (Celsus *Med.* 2.6). For details see Leszl 2006.

³⁵ DL 8.4–5. Though Diogenes does not cite the work, all editors attribute this story to *On Diseases* (even if with reservations; Gottschalk 1980, 14, does not use it in his reconstruction of the dialogue) rather than to the book the title of which alone we know, *On the Things* [or: *Those*] *in Hades*; though Pythagoras is *said* to have narrated about Hades, this quotation or paraphrase includes no such narration itself, and this passage points to a work concerned with Pythagoras’s retained memory and metempsychosis rather than with the events in Hades themselves.

man named Aethalides and was believed to be a son of Hermes. When Hermes came to him to grant him any wish he desired except for immortality, he chose to retain all his memories through both life and death. So when, having died, he ended up reincarnated as, or, literally, “came into” (εἰς . . . ἐλθεῖν) Euphorbus—the Trojan hero eventually struck by Menelaus—he reported his earlier experiences as human, as flora, and as fauna, both on Earth and in Hades. When he died as Euphorbus he went into (μεταβῆναι . . . εἰς) Hermitimus, who wished to make the curious history of his soul credible, and did so by identifying a relic from his run-in with Menelaus. Then he became a Delian fisherman and finally Pythagoras, who remembered everything. This story serves to prove Pythagoras’s theory of metempsychosis, for Pythagoras’s divine memory allows him to remember the transfers of his soul.

One passage definitively known from *On Diseases* tells of Pythagoras’s self-application of the name *philosophos*. We have seen what looks like a loose abridgment in Sosicrates; also, we know a closer version with an explicit attribution, translated into Latin, from Cicero.³⁶ It comes in the final quarter of the preamble to Book 5 of his *Tusculan Disputations*. Cicero is explaining that philosophy does not get the credit it deserves because its benefits predate its naming. Cultural benefactors were once called “wise men” rather than philosophers, he says; only with Pythagoras did this change.

This name [sc. *sapientes*] for them [sc. the descendants of the wise men] spread all the way to the time of Pythagoras. People say that he went to Phlius, as Heraclides Ponticus writes, the pupil of Plato and a man foremost in learning (*quem, ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, uir doctus in primis, Phliuntem ferunt uenisse*), and discussed certain issues learnedly and at length with Leon, the ruler of the Phliusians. When Leon marveled at his talent and eloquence, he asked him to which profession (*arte*) he most dedicated himself. He in turn said that it was not a profession that he knew, but that he was a “philosopher.” Leon, astonished at the novelty of the term, asked what kind of people philosophers were and what the difference was between them and the rest of mankind. Pythagoras answered that he thought human life was similar to the kind of festival which is held with a magnificent display of games in a gathering from the whole of Greece. For there some people seek the glory and distinction of a crown by training their bodies, and others are drawn by the profit and gain in buying or selling, but there is a certain class of people, and this quite the most free, who look for neither applause nor gain, but come for the sake of seeing and look

³⁶ On differences between Cicero’s and Sosicrates’s versions that are irrelevant to the present argument, see YC 1.320n10.

thoroughly with great attention at what is being done and how. In the same way, he said, we have arrived into this life from another life and nature (*ex alia uita et natura*), as if from some city into some crowd at a festival, and some devote themselves to glory and others to money, but there are certain rare people who count all matters for nothing and eagerly contemplate the nature of things (*rerum naturam studiose intuerentur*). These people call themselves students of wisdom (*sapientiae studiosos*)—that is, philosophers (*philosophos*)—and just as there it was most fitting for a free character to watch while seeking nothing for oneself, so in life the contemplation and understanding of things (*studiis contemplationem rerum*) far surpasses all other pursuits.³⁷ (*Tusc.* 5.3.8–9, trans. Schütrumpf 2008, modified)

So, Heraclides (in *On Diseases*; see below) has Pythagoras travel to Phlius, display to Leon his intellectual wares, attribute his acumen to his being a *philosophos*, differentiate *philosophoi* from profit- and honor-seekers with an “Olympic games” analogy, and say that *philosophoi* “have come into this life from another life and nature” to study the nature of things. Because this closing language reflects the “coming into” language found in the metempsychosis passage (reflected in Sosicrates’s φύονται; see p. 4 above), the passages fit well together. Perhaps for Heraclides it is Pythagoras’s telling his life story to Leon that incites Leon’s astonishment, and since that story does not advance Cicero’s account, Cicero glosses it as a “learned” discussion of “certain issues.” Alternatively, Pythagoras’s story of his soul’s adventure might follow the description of *philosophoi* in the conversation with Leon, perhaps as a personal justification; in this case, the learned and lengthy conversation might have been about the soul more generally.³⁸ The apparent unity of the Empedocles story (cure, explanation, and apotheosis) suggests unity here as well.

In *On Diseases*, Pythagoras explains what *philosophoi* do: they understand the world as befits free people, which includes recognizing the immortality and peregrinations of the soul. Empedocles, elsewhere assumed to belong in the Pythagorean tradition (see chapter 5, pp. 140–42), understands the relation between immortal soul and mortal body from a medical and prognostic perspective. Empedocles surely is himself being treated as a *philosophos*. What

³⁷ For the Latin of this passage, see Appendix, pp. 321–22.

³⁸ The Academic Dicaearchus reports that the three best known Pythagorean doctrines (the rest being mysterious) were soul-immortality and transformation of living things, a universal life cycle, and kinship of all living things (Porph. *VP* 19); these were publicly known around the time of Pythagoras’s life (Xenophanes B7/D64; Hdt. 4.95) (see chapter 4). If the conversation occurred at an athletic event, maybe Pythagoras’s dietetics are at issue (see Guthrie 1962, 187–95, for references). Or might he be giving leadership advice (cf. Hdt. 1.30–32)?

we have in Heraclides's work, then, is a celebration of *philosophia*. This celebration asserts the following: *philosophia* befits noble people, seeks knowledge on its broadest construal, gives insight into the nature of death and the soul, cures otherwise hopeless patients, and contributes in a fashion to one's own immortality—as a recognition of it, or the purification that is a prerequisite to it. Given the vibrant prose formulation, the fascination of the episodes, and their historical relevance, this work appears to be a wholehearted exhortation to *philosophia*, an early instance of the *protreptikos logos* genre.

Admittedly, not all readers of the fragmentary *On Diseases* have judged it to be an exhortation to philosophy. Its most recent commentator, Philip van der Eijk, follows an interpretative tradition that puts it in the history of medicine.³⁹ He allows that it is an unusual medical text, one mixed with the lives and sayings of famous healers, and spiced by stories of the miraculous, but one that still asserts an intriguing physiological view. Galen treated the section on the unbreathing woman seriously as an analysis of seizures. Yet van der Eijk's view, like those of his predecessors, takes almost no account of the Pythagoras story.⁴⁰ Nor does his view show how many lines of the dialogue those who later cited it actually knew. I suspect that they had only brief excerpts or paraphrases, the latter suggested by their disagreement over basic facts.⁴¹ The putatively medical sections of philosophical works were sometimes excerpted by later authors; if one should rely on the ancient citations of Plato's *Charmides*, for example, that dialogue would appear basically medical, even though it is in fact a protreptic to Socratic philosophizing.⁴² A further point is

³⁹ Van der Eijk 2009, 239–40, 244–48; earlier, Lonie 1965, 133–43; Mayhew 2010, 460–61.

⁴⁰ Van der Eijk gives it only about a page, 243–44; neither Lonie 1965, Guthrie 1978, 483–90, nor Mayhew 2010 mention the *philosophos* story at all; and it plays no real role in Dillon 2003, 204–15. Seeing no clear relevance to the overall dialogue, though admitting that Pythagoras and Empedocles had medical interests, citing Celsus's *On Medicine* (proem 7–9), van der Eijk wonders whether the *philosophos* passage even comes from a different work, e.g., *On the Pythagoreans* or *On Those in Hades*.

⁴¹ There is no evidence that sources other than Diogenes Laertius actually read the work (and he himself may not have). Origen (*C. Cels.* 2.16) cites Heraclides's story, along with Plato's myth of Er, about those who spend twelve days in Hades, as an example of resurrection that non-Christians believe, and Pliny (*HN* 7.52.175) cites Heraclides's "celebrated book" about the woman who revived after not breathing for seven days as an example of the curability of the feminine disease of "a turning of the womb." Galen cites Heraclides or his work (τὸ βιβλίον ἄπνους) three times: at *De trem.* 6 as a familiar reference point about shivering; at *De diff. R.* 1.8 for the unbreathing woman representing the condition, as opposed to fever, where breathing (and by parallel the pulse) slows so much as to make the person look dead; and at *De loc. aff.* 6 for one kind of hysteria, in which Heraclides's woman experiences the most puzzling kind of condition, having effectively no breath or pulse, only some core warmth. All these accounts could come from very short excerpts or paraphrases.

⁴² The densest set of ancient references to the *Charmides* are to the "Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis" section (156d3–157b1), which we know was excerpted (at least in Stob. 4.37.23, under

that the excerpts suggest authorship for a lay audience rather than for technical practitioners.

The more plausible view, that *On Diseases* is a protreptic to philosophy, is found in H. B. Gottschalk's 1980 book, *Heraclides of Pontus*. He argues persuasively that Heraclides sought "to make propaganda for the contemplative life by drawing an idealized portrait of one of its greatest exponents [sc. Empedocles], who was shown on the last day of his life on earth which was also the day of his ultimate triumph."⁴³ He sees Heraclides's dialogue as combining the banquet format of Plato's *Symposium* with the death and exaltation format of the *Phaedo*: people talk about Empedocles's resurrection of the unbreathing woman at a festal celebration, and then Pausanias or others talk about Empedocles's disappearance at its conclusion. Both parts of the dialogue reflect on the nature of soul, as immortal and independent from the body, and present philosophy as the right way to understand it. The Pythagoras scene in particular "contains a statement of the ideals underlying Empedocles's way of life": the superiority of *philosophia*, as a reflection on the nature of things, over the mere medical skill of non-philosophical doctors.

What matters here is that Pythagoras's self-appellation fits a historical narrative about philosophy's power, and the story is read by Cicero and Diogenes Laertius as historically reliable about the sorts of things Pythagoras said as well as about the last days of Empedocles. The consequence is that the Pythagoras self-appellation story appears to be part of an ennobling account of the history of philosophy that, whatever poetic license Heraclides must have taken for *his* account to become read over the ensuing centuries, seemed basically true.

From Sosicrates's précis of this story, we have inferred a late sixth- or early fifth-century BCE coinage date for the term *philosophos*, the term's opacity, and Pythagoras's archetypal role in the image of the *philosophos*. Cicero's Heraclidean version confirms and expands these inferences. The word *philosophos* entered the vernacular around the time, and even the place, of Pythagoras; the word is new to Leon, but Heraclides appears not to say that Pythagoras invented it. Pythagoras's surprising self-labeling is occasioned by, and apparently explains, his talented and eloquent discussion of questions of interest to a political leader like Leon. Pythagoras does link the word *philosophos* to something

the chapter heading "On Health and Considering One's Survival," immediately following a citation from Hippocrates): Apul. *Apol.* 26.4; Clem. *Strom.* 1.15.58.3; Jul. *Or.* 8.244a; *Caesars* 309c; Max. Tyr. 28.4; Hermias *In Phdr.* 274c, Maximus Planudes *Compendia e Platonis dialogis* 143. On the dialogue, see Moore and Raymond 2019.

⁴³ Gottschalk 1980, 32 (this quotation), 13–22 (structure of dialogue), 23–33 (Pythagoras passage).

like its roots, which may be expressed in Latin as *sapientiae studiosus*. And this apparently plausible story was told in the middle of the fourth century BCE, when Heraclides wrote *On Diseases*. Thus we have a reasonable account of a founding moment in the history of *philosophia*.

A Related Account of Pythagoras's Self-Appellation

A surprising fact about Diogenes Laertius's inclusion, in Book 8 of his *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, of the story about Pythagoras's self-naming that he takes from Sosicrates, is that he had already included a different version of the story in Book 1.⁴⁴ More remarkable again is that the Book 1 version, found in the treatise's Preface, mentions Heraclides's story—which Sosicrates's must ultimately have relied on—but then rejects it in favor of another source of information. The functions of the two versions of the story differ, to be sure: in the Book 8 *Life of Pythagoras*, Diogenes gathers anecdotes about Pythagoras, whereas in the Book 1 Preface he argues that *philosophia* began in Greece, on the grounds that *philosophia* is a Greek word. This is his evidence:

Pythagoras first called *philosophia* by its name and himself *philosophos*, in Sicyon when talking to Leon tyrant of the Sicyonians, or of Phliusians as Heraclides Ponticus in the *Woman Not Breathing* says; for nobody is wise (σοφόν) but god. Previously (θᾶρτον δέ),⁴⁵ people spoke of *sophia*, and a *sophos*

⁴⁴ The magnitude of the *Lives*, and the importance of the present story in two distinct contexts, perhaps excuses Diogenes here; the basic historical compatibility of the two stories (identified below) perhaps does too. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he is drawing from distinct archives at these two points, and he may not have completed an overall consistency-ensuring revision of his treatise; see Most 2018.

⁴⁵ There has been confusion about θᾶρτον δέ. Hicks 1925 translates: "All too quickly the study was called wisdom and its professor a sage, to denote his attainment of mental perfection; while the student who took it up was a philosopher or lover of wisdom"—but it would be absurd to write that as soon as Pythagoras started calling *sophia* "*philosophia*," it started being called *sophia* again. Similarly Caponigri 1969, 5; YC 1.1, 1.318 ("rapidly"); Mensch 2018, 8 ("before very long"). Reale 2005, 17: "too readily [*troppo facilmente*] was the name 'wisdom' given," but this would need to be better relativized to the time of Pythagoras's self-naming. Reich 1967 argues for "all too quickly [*allzu schnell*]," which he then glosses "all too hastily [*allzu voreilig*]," in explicit contrast to "formerly [*ehedem*]," on the grounds that, from Pythagoras's perspective, people spoke of wisdom too hastily, without thinking enough about what they are doing; but this is overly nuanced and without evidence. Nor can θᾶρτον δέ here mean "often," since it would not make sense of the linguistic advance marked by Pythagoras's self-appellation. θᾶρτον [δέ] means "earlier, sooner, before," at DL 2.39, 2.120, 2.139, 5.39, 6.56 (Mericus Causobonus translating as *antea*, according to Dorandi 2013 ad loc., who refers to 1.12), and LSJ s.v. ταχύς C.i.2. The adverb is correctly translated by Anonymous 1758; Zevort 1847; and Yonge 1901.

as the promulgator (ἐπαγγελλόμενος) of it—he who has a perfected soul in the highest degree—but [now in Pythagoras’s time] the one eagerly welcoming (ἀσπάζόμενος) *sophia* is [called] a *philosophos*.⁴⁶ (DL 1.12)

The similarities with Heraclides’s version are apparent. Pythagoras calls himself *philosophos* but does not invent the term, he does so famously in a conversation with Leon, he has to explain his use of the term, and the meaning of the term is basically the same: being receptive of truth and wisdom (though Sosicrates’s telling provides a more active emphasis). The key difference with Heraclides’s version is also clear. Aside from the geographical dispute, to which we will return, Pythagoras gives a different explanation for calling himself *philosophos*, using no festival analogy or reference to athletes, merchants, and spectators. Leon might have expected him to call himself *sophos*, presumably because people in the past treated those who spoke from and lived with *sophia*—as Pythagoras appeared to do—as *sophoi*.⁴⁷ But Pythagoras has come to find the name inappropriate, as befitting only a god. The name *philosophos* works better; it means “eagerly welcoming” or “following” *sophia*, which makes no epistemically hazardous claims about the possession of wisdom.⁴⁸ Heraclides’s version emphasizes the *philosophos*’s differential objects of pursuit—truth rather than glory and profit—whereas this version emphasizes differential orientations toward one object—invitation rather than embodiment.

This story is obviously not the Heraclidean one we know from Cicero and Sosicrates. Nor should we assume it is from an otherwise unquoted section of *On Diseases*. Tiziano Dorandi’s recent edition of Diogenes’s *Lives*, adopted by the editors of the Loeb Classical Library’s *Early Greek Philosophy*, rightly punctuates the passage such that Heraclides is cited only for the alternative citizenry over whom Leon might be tyrant, the “Phliusians.”⁴⁹ Many earlier editors did not include a comma after “Sicyons,” however, which leaves Heraclides saying, absurdly, that Leon was tyrant “over the Sicyonians or Phliu-

⁴⁶ For the Greek of this passage, see Appendix, p. 324. Indicating the importance ascribed to this passage, *Suda* σ 806 replicates this passage verbatim from καὶ σοφός (“and a *sophos* . . .”).

⁴⁷ By the fifth century BCE, the verb ἐπαγγέλλω, which here in the middle I translate “promulgate,” can mean “offer willingly” (LSJ s.v. A.4); only in the fourth century BCE can it also mean “profess” or “make a profession of,” especially in description of Sophists (A.5). The story does not clarify which connotation is meant—the latter implies presentation of oneself as lecturer or even as professional, whereas the former does not—though perhaps Pythagoras himself could only have used the earlier connotation.

⁴⁸ Before the fifth century BCE, ἀσπάζομαι means “greet, welcome” (LSJ s.v. A.1); only in the late fifth and early fourth century BCE can the term mean “eagerly follow, cling to” (A.3); again, the story does not clarify which connotation is meant, and again perhaps Pythagoras himself could only have used the earlier connotation.

⁴⁹ See Dorandi 2013 ad loc. and LM 4.374.

sians.” Yet Heraclides does not in fact say this according to Sosicrates or Cicero, and such ambivalence would quite gainsay the vibrancy and determinate detail of Heraclides’s famous story.⁵⁰ Diogenes often cites authorities only for divergent details, even when there are major narrative differences between his sources (typified by his uses of Sosicrates, cited in note 3 above).

The existence of this non-Heraclidean version of the Pythagoras story has a fundamental consequence. There must be a core story shared by both versions, in which Pythagoras calls himself *philosophos* to Leon and has to explain its use. We see that for some reason Diogenes prefers the non-Heraclidean version, the one that includes the “not-*sophos*” explanation, since he quotes or paraphrases it and not Heraclides’s in his Preface, even though both would support his claim about the Greek origin of *philosophia*. (As we will see in chapter 3, other fourth-century BCE authors follow the non-Heraclidean version rather than that of Heraclides.) There is no reason to believe that the non-Heraclidean version—whose author I will call the “Sicyon author” (i.e., “Sicyon-version author”)—derives from Heraclides. There might even be reason to believe that Heraclides took a credible pre-existing story and adapted Pythagoras’s reasons to suit his protreptic goals.⁵¹ The Sicyon author’s version emphasizes continuity with *sophoi*; as we will see in later chapters, the ambition to assemble lineages of *sophoi* dates back to the mid-fifth century BCE, and so we would expect some attempts to fit Pythagoras, Pythagoreans, and similar *philosophoi* into such “*sophos* lineages,” as we might call them.⁵² The disagreement about Leon’s place of tyranny is not surprising: Phlius and Sicyon share borders near Corinth; political upheaval struck Sicyon during the relevant period, perhaps making the determination of rulership confusing; associates of Aristotle and Heraclides engaged in new research into Sicyon in the fourth century BCE; and Phlius played an important role in early Pythagoreanism.⁵³ The overwhelming sense is that Heraclides’s version of the

⁵⁰ For the debate, see, e.g., Joly 1956, 21–28; Malingrey 1961, 30–31; Guthrie 1962, 164–45. Editors who attribute the disjunction to Heraclides rather than Diogenes include Cobet 1878a; Long 1964; Marcovich 1999; Schütrumpf 2008 ad fr. 84. Anonymous 1833 puts commas on either side of ἡ Φλιασίων, with unclear meaning. Genaille 1965 hides behind modern citation conventions, translating “. . . Leon, tyran des Sicyoniens, *appelés parfois* Phliasiens (cf. Héraclide du Pont, livre sur l’*Apnon*)” (my italics).

⁵¹ Riedweg 2004 and 2005, 94–96, describes the sufficient fifth-century BCE materials available to such a historian; see note 67 below for fuller assessment.

⁵² This is not especially controversial; see the opening paragraph of *OCD* s.v. “philosophy, history of.”

⁵³ Leon is not otherwise known. The controversy over Phlius and Sicyon has much to do with Pythagorean history (similar controversies: Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 10.3.4.5–9), but in no simple way. The cities were neighbors on the Corinthian Gulf (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.20; Skalet 1928, 26–27; Lolos 2011, 22), whence settlers to Croton departed (Dunbabin 1948, 250, 269). Phlius

Pythagoras story is neither the only nor the first, even as his account is the longest, is the most detailed, and is distinguished as the only one attributed to an author. Because of the conflation in latter-day scholarship of all versions of the Pythagoras story to his account, the historical reality of any version—and thus any evidence about the origins of the discipline we might infer from one—tends to stand on the plausibility of Heraclides’s exposition.⁵⁴

Burkert against Heraclides: An Academic Fiction?

From the fourth century BCE to the sixth century CE, Heraclides’s story was taken as fact. Now, however, it has little currency, and thus plays almost no role in attempts to understand the origins of *philosophia*. This is not altogether

had also sent settlers to Pythagoras’s home island of Samos, among whom were Hippasus, a purported great-grandfather of Pythagoras (Paus. 2.13.2; DL 8.1; cf. Delatte 1922, 148; Burnet 1930, 87n5; Minar 1942); Porphyry also cites early views that Phlius was Pythagoras’s hometown (*VP* 5). Phlius was the home place of at least four fifth-century BCE Pythagoreans, including Echeocrates (Iambl. *VP* 35.251, 267; DL 8.46; *BNP* s.v. “Leon [2]”; Zhmud 2013, 148; this does not require, as Riedweg 2004 asserts, that any Pythagoras story must postdate their establishment there). Sicyon was Greece’s oldest city (Euseb. *Chron.* 62), and in the early sixth century BCE it hosted the “best of the Greeks,” in the form of the suitors of Agariste, daughter of its tyrant Cleisthenes, leading Greek of his generation, and mother of Athens’s democratizer Cleisthenes (Hdt. 6.126–30; see Hammond 1956, 46; Griffin 1982, 52–56, 97; Parker 1994, 423–24). In the following decades, the city supported Greece’s most consequential musical innovators (Skalet 1928, 178–80; Griffin 1982, 57, 158–62), a lineage of which appeared in Heraclides’s history of music (Barker 2014, 50). Despite the cultural knowledge we have of these cities, we know nothing of their political histories at the time of Pythagoras, and thus cannot resolve the controversy. Sicyon might have had a tyrant after Cleisthenes’s death around 569 BCE and before its last tyrant, Aischines, had the latter, in fact, been deposed by the Spartans at the end of the sixth century BCE; our source, *Rylands Papyrus* 18 (see BNJ 105 ad F1), is unclear. This possibility has its supporters (e.g., Cavaignac 1919; White 1958; Parker 1992; *BNP* s.v. “Sicyon”; Leahy 1968, 4n12, includes older bibliography), though others support an earlier date for the last tyrant, which would make a Pythagorean meeting with one impossible (e.g., Hammond 1956; Leahy 1968; OCD s.v. “Sicyon”). *BNJ* 105 ad F2 takes Aristotle to assert in the *Politics* that Cleisthenes was Sicyon’s last tyrant (*Pol.* 1316a30–31), but this passage marks instead only a regime change between Myron and Cleisthenes. For general histories of the pertinent (“Orthagorid”) period, see Skalet 1928, 52–62; Andrewes 1956, 54–61; Griffin 1982, 37–61; Lolos 2011, 61–65. Should Sicyon have had a tyrant during the maturity of Pythagoras, this fact would presumably have been recorded in Aristotle’s lost *Constitution of the Sicyonians* (Poll. *Onom.* 9.77; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1315b10–21), though there were other likely sources for Sicyon’s political history by the later fourth century (*POxy.* 1365, containing a work possibly by Ephorus of Cyme [ca. 400–330 BCE]). Should Sicyon not have had a tyrant during that time—if Aischines had been deposed in the mid-sixth century BCE, as some interpretations prefer—it still must have had rulers anyway, and they might still have been called “tyrants.” If they were not, then Leon must have been tyrant not of Sicyon but of Phlius.

⁵⁴ Such conflation is found in, e.g., Burkert 1960 and Riedweg 2004; contrast Gottschalk 1980, 23–36.

surprising. The loss of almost all Heraclides's works except some fantastical excerpts establishes him as an impresario of myth.⁵⁵ His Pythagorean partisanship hardly helps, given the disfavor into which the man from Samos, demoted to cult leader, at best a symbol of mystical magniloquence and ostentatious erudition, has fallen, especially for philosophers proud of their discipline's modest rigor.⁵⁶ The decisive moment in the rejection of Heraclides's account of Pythagoras came in 1960. Walter Burkert (1931–2015) was at that time writing the century's most important book on Pythagoras, published as *Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon* in 1962, and in a revised translation as *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* in 1972. Burkert took as his task the reassessment of all ancient testimony for Pythagoras's philosophical acumen, attitudes, and endeavors—especially his purported mathematical, cosmological, and psychological discoveries—from the classical and Hellenistic periods through the Neopythagoreanism of Nicomachus of Gerasa (ca. 60–120 CE) and Iamblichus of Chalcis (ca. 245–325 CE). Burkert debunked practically all of it as mere retrojecting and idealizing fictions by later Pythagoreans. Among the lore he sought to reassess was Heraclides's Pythagoras story. Was it true, he asked, or pure hagiographical invention?

As a kind of advanced guard for his book, Burkert published, in 1960, an article titled “Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes ‘Philosophie,’” arguing unqualifiedly for invention.⁵⁷ In this masterpiece of breadth, concision, and acuity, Burkert vindicates suspicions about the story that had occupied philosophers and philologists since Eduard Zeller's monumental *Philosophy of the Greeks in Its Historical Development* (1844–52), and had come to a head in Werner Jaeger's *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*.⁵⁸ Having assumed that the version discussed above, found in Diogenes Laertius's Preface (DL 1.12), also comes from Heraclides but in a part of his work not quoted in Sosicrates or Cicero, Burkert makes two interlocking claims: we have a strong reason against believing that Pythagoras could or would ever have defined *philosophos* as either “one spec-

⁵⁵ Ancient negative evaluations are found in the hypercritical Timaeus, who accuses Heraclides of “always being such a paradoxologist” (DL 8.72), though Polybius states that Timaeus was overly critical (Polyb. 12.4a6, 12.14, 25c2); in Plutarch (*Cam.* 22.2–4); and in Cicero (*Nat. D.* 1.13.34), though not in his own voice: in the voice, rather, of an Epicurean given to reviling Academics. Guthrie 1978, 484, redeems Heraclides's supposed “weakness for fantasy and superstition” by noting that Plato, too, tells far-fetched tales though always in appropriate contexts.

⁵⁶ Burnyeat 2007 captures the present-day tone.

⁵⁷ “Plato or Pythagoras: On the Origin of the Word ‘Philosophy’”: this contribution was never translated into English nor included in the book, though Burkert cites its results at 5n11, 8, 65, 74, 77, and 106 (in the 1972 edition).

⁵⁸ Jaeger 1923, 2nd ed. 1948; Engl. in 1934, 2nd ed. 1962; see esp. 1962, 97–98, 432.

tating the universe” (from the Cicero version) or “one lacking but striving for *sophia*” (from the DL 1.12 version); and yet, by contrast, we have a strong reason in favor of believing that Heraclides could or would have concocted his story on inspiration from Plato’s *Phaedrus* (for example), which in effect includes both definitions (at *Phdr.* 278d and 249b5–d3). I will address these claims in turn.

According to Burkert, a range of reasons tell against Pythagoras’s defining the *philosophos* in either way. First, the biographical reasons. Pythagoras, full of self-conceit, would never have called attention to an abyss between himself and *sophia* or divinity—after all, as his successor Empedocles did, he vaunted his own immortality—and yet this is what the “not-*sophos*” definition would require.⁵⁹ Nor would it have been relevant for him to treat himself as a lover of observation or hunter after truth, for this would explain only his calling himself *theôrêtikos* or *philotheamôn*, not *philosophos*. Second, the evidentiary reasons. There is no independent evidence that Pythagoras invented the word *philosophos*, even if classical authors suggest that Pythagoreans used the term. And what evidence may exist for the fifth-century BCE use of *philosophos*, for example by Zeno and Heraclitus, has its own problems of authenticity and proves neither gloss on *philosophos* (as striving for an as-yet-unpossessed *sophia* or spectating the universe). Third, the linguistic reasons. A survey of the earliest *phil-* prefixed terms shows that *phil-* never meant “lacking and desiring *x*,” but rather its (almost) exact opposite, “close acquaintance and familiarity, or habitual dealings, with *x*.”⁶⁰

In favor of a fourth-century BCE confabulation of Heraclides’s Pythagoras story, Burkert has another set of assertions. Every version of the Pythagoras story goes back to Heraclides, he claims; Aristotle cannot be a source. The Academy and Lyceum actively debated Pythagoras’s commitment to the practical or contemplative life, both as a historical/theoretical matter and in the context of broader ethical/metaphysical debates, familiar to all readers, from Plato’s *Gorgias* and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Heraclides’s story looks suspiciously like a tendentious contribution to that discussion. Indeed, Burkert conjectures the coinage of the term *philosophos*, or at least its dissemination and popularization, in the (late) fifth century BCE, at a time when *phil-* prefixed terms (as illustrated by Aristophanes’s *Wasps*, of 422 BCE, and Plato’s *Lysis*, of the early fourth century BCE, discussed below, in chapters 3 and 8) proliferated to capture favorite pastimes, hobbies, and even

⁵⁹ Others are doubtful that Pythagoras would ever have said that he lacked wisdom: Morrison 1956, 136–38; Chroust 1964a, 427n17, 432–33; Kahn 2001, 2, 5–6; Riedwig 2005.

⁶⁰ Burkert 1960, 176–77, 161 (biographical reasons); 169–71 (evidentiary reasons); 172–73 (linguistic reasons).

life-determining passions. An expanding democratic middle class sought the former trappings of the elites and formulated *sophia* for itself—hence the idea of the *philosophoi* as amateur seekers of wisdom. Plato sharpened the idea of this “striving while lacking” to contrast the *philosophoi* with conceited “Sophists” and to describe Socrates’s incessant questioning as phenomenologically akin to love.⁶¹

Burkert rejected Heraclides’s account decisively,⁶² and appeared to have put to rest a deep puzzle—what sense to make of an instance of philosophy’s discussing its own essence at its very foundation—that engaged not only Zeller and Jaeger but also many other prominent scholars of philosophy’s founding, including Erwin Rohde, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Isidore Lévy, Robert Joly, Augusto Rostagni, Fritz Wehrli, John Burnet, and J. S. Morrison. To a large extent his argument has been accepted, most notably in two of Andrea Nightingale’s books, *Genres in Dialogue* (1995) and *Spectacles of Truth* (2004), which have been cited more times than any other work that addresses the early history of the word *philosophos*.⁶³ In her 1995 book, for example, Nightingale argues that “Plato appropriated the term ‘philosophy’ for a new and specialized discipline,” which before him “did not have a technical sense that indicated a specific group of thinkers practicing a distinct discipline or profession,” but instead “was used to designate ‘intellectual cultivation’ in a broad and unspecified sense.” Nightingale allows that, even were Heraclides’s “rather dubious claim” about Pythagoras true, it would not show that Pythagoras used the term in a “technical” way. Nor, looking at the other fifth-century BCE uses of *philosophos* and cognates, does Nightingale see any instance of a “special subgroup of intellectuals that had appropriated the title of ‘*philosophoi*’” or a “specific group of professional thinkers.”⁶⁴ I qualify Nightingale’s claim about Plato in chapter 8 and her claims about fifth-century BCE uses in chapter 5. What is particularly relevant here is her reaction to Heraclides’s story, as assessed by Burkert: she takes it to be useless for understanding the early history of *philosophia*, and treats pre-fourth century BCE usage as having neither complexity, traceable origin, nor semantic diffusion. Burkert’s claim that Heraclides’s history of *philosophia* is a fourth-century BCE fantasy

⁶¹ Burkert 1960, 166n1 (Heraclides as sole source); 166–69 (Aristotle not a source); 159–60 with Burkert 1972, 106–9 (Heraclides’s tendentious contribution); 174–76 (Plato sharpened the sense).

⁶² Burkert 1960, 175.

⁶³ See Burkert 1960 for older references and Riedweg 2004, 148nn6–8, for more recent ones. Notable doubters include Havelock 1963, 306n8; Chroust 1964a, 427–28; Kahn 2001, 68; Hadot 2002, 14n1. Guthrie 1962, 164–66, 204–5, not having seen Burkert’s article, takes a mixed attitude; Lloyd 2009, 9n1, remains agnostic.

⁶⁴ Nightingale 1995, 14–15.

has had the effect of inaugurating the history of *philosophia* in the fourth century BCE.

Before evaluating this claim, we must determine precisely what Burkert has demonstrated. He says that Pythagoras would not have expounded *philosophos* as the one “striving after wisdom,” whereas Heraclides, by contrast, could or even would have. True enough. But we also have reason to doubt that Heraclides himself attributed the “not-*sophos*” definition to Pythagoras. It looks rather as if Heraclides tells a version of a pre-existing story. Even if we grant Burkert’s conflation of the two stories, contrary to evidence, we can see that Burkert’s bolder move is to reject the whole of Heraclides’s Pythagoras story because he can reject a part, the speech Pythagoras gives in response to Leon’s question. Yet we can reject the part without rejecting the whole. The speech, indeed, has the least cause for acceptance: speeches are notoriously difficult to preserve or remember, and might provide the best occasion for invention, as Thucydides famously implies (Thuc. 1.22).

Even with the rejection of Pythagoras’s speech of explanation, however, much remains untouched from Heraclides’s account. I will mention three items. First, the dramatic context: a meeting between Pythagoras and Leon the tyrant. Burkert never doubts the plausibility of such an interaction; and while the tale may loosely fit the generic structure of the “sage advisor of tyrants” trope, it is no less likely for that.⁶⁵ Second, the historical claim: Pythagoras was the first to call himself *philosophos*. Burkert never doubts the possibility of the self-application, though he does think that Pythagoras is being said to “invent” the word and that he does so by explaining what it means. But the story need not imply invention of the adjective/noun, only its self-application (and, in some versions, invention of the abstract noun); the historical implication could be that the term was already used for other people, and that Pythagoras innovated with his self-application. Nothing holds him to applying it to himself to “mean” either of the things Burkert believes Heraclides put into his mouth. What remains after abandoning Pythagoras’s speech, third, is a more general historical implication: fifth-century BCE Pythagoreans had good reason to allow themselves to be called *philosophoi*. They could, with truth or fiction, retroject this appellation onto their only slightly earlier representative, Pythagoras.⁶⁶ In sum, then, much of Heraclides’s story of Pythagorean (redemptive) self-ascription might still be taken seriously.

⁶⁵ On the story’s structure and on the wise advisor trope, see Hdt. 1.30, with Bischoff 1932; Lattimore 1939; Joly 1956; Gottschalk 1980, 23–27; Martin 1993; Sharp 2004; Riedweg 2005, 94; YC 1.113–18. Nevertheless, our fragments do not indicate that Pythagoras *advises* Leon.

⁶⁶ On such retrojection, see Burkert 1972, 91. I assume nothing in particular about the delineation of “Pythagorean,” following the caution of Zhmud 2013.

The Structure of This Book

Why did Heraclides propound the Pythagoras story in particular, and why did so many ancient historians of philosophy find him believable? My answer is that the general historical implications that accompany the story may well be true. I thus break with Burkert and the past sixty-some years of scholarship on the origins of *philosophia*.⁶⁷ The two main implications of my answer are the following:

1. The word *philosophos* existed early in the Pythagorean movement;
2. That the Pythagoreans had reason to call themselves *philosophoi* and presented an explanation of their doing so suggests they were already being called it and that the name was neither obvious in meaning nor laudatory in application.

There are, then, secondary implications that one might expect. If these are sound, they would support the main implications.

3. The earliest non-Pythagorean uses of *philosophos* would develop from this original Pythagorean-derived meaning;
4. The uses of *philosophos* would show negative valence in the earliest cases, and then instances of neutral and redemptive valence later;
5. Plato's works themselves can be treated as instances of saving the appearances and redeeming the practices theretofore called *philosophia*.

These fifth- and early fourth-century BCE phenomena provide a context for the mid-fourth century BCE trends:

6. Heraclides's story contributes to ongoing protreptic efforts to redeem *philosophoi* by explaining their positive value, and does so, in part, in a way familiar from Aristotle, by displaying a historical disciplinary consciousness.

⁶⁷ The most thorough response to Burkert heretofore is, as I mentioned above, Riedweg 2004, an article that argues persuasively for the fifth-century BCE existence of all of Heraclides's story elements (meaning that the story *could* predate Heraclides's version), but who does not treat closely of the etymology, coinage, or fifth-century BCE uses of *philosoph-* words, etc. Mallan 2005 also argues for the Pythagorean heritage of the ideas found in Heraclides's version. I note that Aristophanes, by 423/17 BCE, could speak of "desiring wisdom" (ὃ τῆς μεγάλης ἐπιθυμίας ἀνθρώπε, *Nub.* 412).

By this book's end, my hope is that the reader may see what allowed Heraclides to write the Pythagoras story in a way that convinced his readers. The result will be a clearer understanding of the origin of the word *philosophos* (and *philosophia*) and of the discipline called *philosophia*. The structure of the narrative falls into three parts.

Part One: Origins

The first part of the book, chapters 2–4, focuses on the origins of the term *philosophos*. In chapter 2, I argue for what we might call the “lexical precondition” for Heraclides's story: the existence of the word *philosophos* at the time of Pythagoras or at least in the period of the early Pythagorean generations. The evidence is a fragment from Heraclitus, quoted by Clement: “philosophical men really quite ought to be researchers into much” (B35/D40). Burkert accepted the familiar and casual skepticism about Heraclitus's authorship of this—after all, it predates the next earliest attestation of the word by at least several decades, and seems in conflict with Heraclitean fragments that decry polymathy (e.g., B40/D20, B129/D26)—and claimed that, even were it authentic, it would not support either definition of *philosophia* found in the Pythagoras stories.⁶⁸ I argue, first, that we have no reason to doubt Clement's accuracy of quotation for either source-critical or epistemological reasons. I show, second, that while Heraclitus's use does not support the “explanations” of *philosophos* found in the Pythagoras stories, it in fact supports the view that I have said the stories imply: that the term was applied, and perhaps with pejorative implication, to the Pythagoreans. Both positions have had their proponents in earlier scholarship, but with a full defense of those positions we can better see their centrality not just for Heraclitean epistemology but for the history of *philosophia*.

In chapter 3, I show what the term *philosophos* could have meant at the time for which it is attested, and thus what meaning Pythagoras or his followers would have sought to spin in accepting the term for themselves, had they done so. Burkert rejected the analysis of *phil-* prefixed terms as “striving for *x* which one lacks,” suggesting instead “familiar with *x*.”⁶⁹ For his purposes, that analysis sufficed, but it does not suffice for us. He did not pay close enough attention to the peculiar archaic use of *phil-* prefixed names, their normative valence, their application, or the contribution of their second element to the overall meaning. Nor did he pay close enough attention to the meaning of that

⁶⁸ Burkert 1960, 171; Burkert 1972, 131, 209–10.

⁶⁹ Burkert 1960, 172–74; confirming his negative argument, see Landfester 1966 and Cipriano 1991.

particular second element, *soph-*, at the end of the sixth century BCE. This chapter begins by turning again to Cicero's version of the Pythagoras story, and in more detail to a non-Heraclidean but probably still fourth-century BCE version, found in Diodorus Siculus, which in effect dramatizes the thesis of this book: that the word *philosophos* was formed in reference to *sophoi* considered as "sages." Important support for this ancient perspective comes from Aristotle's analysis, written in Heraclides's prime, of *phil-* prefixed names as usually having a negative valence; from the *phil-* prefixed names that surely predate the coinage of the term *philosophos*; from the precursors of those names in *Pi-ro-* prefixed Mycenaean (Linear B) names; and from, quite importantly, the sense of the term *sophos* in sixth-century BCE Greek.

In chapter 4, I pick up a claim made in the previous chapter, that a term like *philosophos* would have been coined in response to certain sorts of unusual activity. I accumulate the earliest evidence that the Pythagoreans would have been excellent targets of this term. This is because their public face was politically notorious and influential, with their cohesion and even efficacy seeming to depend on their pedagogical and research exercises. I thereby develop Burkert's acknowledgment of the organized political side of their existence.⁷⁰ Additional evidence comes from what looks to be Aristotle's support of Heraclides's account, if we can reconstruct Iamblichus's late citations of Aristotle correctly. Burkert asserts that Pythagoras was not really a philosopher; what concerns me is only the beliefs that observers had about him and the names that they had reason to call him—since, for his contemporaries, *philosophos* hardly meant what academic philosophers now mean by "philosopher."

Part Two: Development

The next part of the book, chapters 5–7, focuses on the development of uses of the word *philosophos* before and outside of Plato's Academy. In chapter 5, I draw on the fifth-century BCE uses of *philosophos* and cognates for two purposes: as corroboration for the coinage meaning set out in chapter 3 and the connection to Pythagoreans set out in chapter 4, and as description of the drift in meaning the term underwent across several generations of use. I focus on six authors, each of whom use the term once: Herodotus, Thucydides, the Hippocratic author of *On Ancient Medicine*, Gorgias, Aristophanes, and Lysias. (An appendix to the chapter assesses some less reliable but still possible evidence for early usage.) Burkert already referred to these authors in his observation that *philosophos* did not first mean "lacking

⁷⁰ Burkert 1972, 113–19, 132.

wisdom” or “spectating the universe.”⁷¹ Treated, however, in their respective literary and rhetorical contexts, they provide significant information about the fifth-century BCE career of the idea of being *philosophos*. It appears that at the end of that century, we see the term sometimes losing its wry implication and naming a quite specific mode of dialectic exchange about matters of abstract or broad significance.

In chapter 6, I turn to a fifth-century BCE figure as yet unmentioned, but whose importance to the later understanding of *philosophia* cannot be underestimated: Socrates. Many scholars, including Burkert and Nightingale, believe that Socrates’s students inaugurated new thinking about *philosophia*; presumably Socrates’s life, or at least his death, galvanized them to do so. This would be a central ingredient in the recipe for the redemptive story told by Heraclides, a grand-student of Socrates’s. In fact, at least Xenophon and Plato, for whom we have the most evidence, never or only rarely call Socrates *philosophos*, even if we now think that, for both, Socrates modeled the philosophical life. This chapter makes this observation in part by focusing on both authors’ attitude toward Socrates’s connection to Anaxagoras, considered by later historicans to be the first to philosophize in Athens, and by focusing on Xenophon’s hesitation to use the word *philosophos* with respect to Socrates. This suggests again that the term *philosophos* had a negative valence during Socrates’s life and even, in some quarters, after his death. Plato and other Socratics do use the term *philosophia* positively, even putting it in Socrates’s mouth. Their doing so in the fourth century BCE tracks the neutralizing trend we saw in chapter 5; it may also, however, reflect conscientious efforts to redeem a term that had been applied to Socrates. Socrates’s discussion circles, which is what Plato most recurrently calls *philosophia*, were probably formalized in the “schools” of the so-called Minor Socratics and as the Academy, where Heraclides matured in his understanding of *philosophia*.

In chapter 7, I address non-Academic uses of *philosophia* in the fourth century BCE, which provides the background against which we can understand Heraclides’s use of the term. We can see how *philosophia* became a discipline in the Academy only by understanding how the term *philosophia* was being used elsewhere. The key context comes from the educators Alcidas, Isocrates, and the author of the *Dissoi Logoi*. I show that we have less reason to say that these educators competed over “ownership” of the term *philosophos* (even

⁷¹ Burkert 1960, 173. Nightingale 1995, 14–15, treats the uses only as evidence that the authors did not know of *philosophia* as a professional discipline.

if at times they may have) or its true and universal meaning than that they gave varying retrospective reconstructions of the term's usage, differing, for example, in the relative emphases they give to practical teaching over the defensibility of research outcomes. To the extent that the Academic view of *philosophia* "won," this is not because that view was truer or more convincing, but because the Academy instigated a continued *discipline* that called itself *philosophia* more than Alcidas or Isocrates did, neither of whom appear to have had success or interest in developing the sort of well-populated discipline crucial for maintaining a name.

Part Three: Academy

The final part of the book, chapters 8–10, focuses on the disciplinary development of the word *philosophos* in Plato's Academy. In chapter 8, I confront the use of *philosophia* by Heraclides's teacher, Plato. Burkert—and many others—views Plato's appropriation of *philosophia* as part of his effort to contrast Socrates's and his own practice with that of Sophists, rhetoricians, and other claimants to wisdom; he describes the etymological play, defining *philosophia* as "love of wisdom," as Plato's attempt to fit Socrates's interrogative approach. This may be so. Nightingale and, for example, John Cooper argue in particular that Plato creates a technical and professional formulation of *philosophoi* and *philosophia*, as though *ex nihilo*. This is less certain. I show that across his dialogues, Plato treats *philosophia* as a term in common parlance, and thus that he is, in effect, saving the appearances (of Thucydides and Gorgias, among others) when he presents it as conversations that conduce to virtue and flourishing. The dialogues dramatize or narrate just those conversations. Plato's reconstruction of past usages differs from Isocrates's, for example, in emphasizing the conversationality and the tendency to self-consciousness of its logic and argumentative rigor; but this is not expressly new—it is just a plausible interpretation of the past. Plato does provide something new, but it is not a new "meaning" of *philosophia*. It is, rather, a new explanation for the possibility that *philosophia*-style conversations could actually conduce to their end, human happiness. The epistemological and metaphysical considerations mooted in the dialogues concerning knowledge and universals do not determine what *philosophia* is (namely, conversations) but how *philosophia* could actually work (namely, by getting clearer about what is really true). Given how unappealing *philosophia* has been made out to be, a proponent needs to vindicate this apparently lazy pursuit. The Academy, an institution devoted to this pursuit, needed a defense. Yet, in most of Plato's dialogues—from the *Charmides* to

Protagoras, *Phaedrus* to *Republic*, *Lysis* to *Symposium*, and even from the *Parmenides* to the *Philebus*—*philosophia* still refers to person-to-person interactions, not to anything beyond those conversations; *philosophia* is not yet a discipline, a historically extended, increasingly distributed, and impersonal, concerted enterprise.

In chapter 9, proceeding from the belief that Heraclides's Pythagoras story implies a historical account of the development of the discipline of *philosophia*, I describe the rise of this historiography of philosophy, one that materializes only in the Academy. Aristotle's writings provide the clearest evidence. When in the intellectual-historical mode, Aristotle circumscribes *philosophia* as an engagement with the ideas of others, living or dead, whom one takes also to be or have been engaged in *philosophia*. This includes Thales's views, for example, since Aristotle can reconstruct them as addressing certain questions and open to critique by successors, including himself in particular, but not those of Hesiod, Orpheus, or other admittedly wise authors, who are not as amenable to this kind of virtual conversation. Aristotle does not explain his departure from Plato's interpersonal picture of *philosophia* to a disciplinary one, but the density of conversations, memories, texts, and positions found in the Academy probably prompted his new view. Since progress in philosophy matters, and is possible, one should bring to bear everything of relevance to any possible question, not just the ideas of one's immediate interlocutors.

In chapter 10, I focus on a set of fourth-century BCE cultural attitudes about *philosophia* different and on average later than those on which chapter 7 focused, a set that serves expressly as context and occasion for the versions of the protreptic story about Pythagoras told by Heraclides and by other fourth-century BCE writers. Positive and negative perceptions of *philosophia* coexisted. The positive feelings are most strikingly manifest in the Delphic maxim *philosophos ginou* ("be philosophical"), the existence for which comes from a 1966 discovery in Afghanistan. The negative feelings are best appreciated from fragments of the comic dramatist Alexis, from an anti-philosophical "apotreptic" found in a recently published Oxyrhynchus papyrus, and from apotrepitics found in familiar philosophical texts. What becomes clear is that two ideas about *philosophia* operate simultaneously, one quasi- or fully disciplinary, the other mundanely ethical. Equivocation between these two ideas is prominent in certain parts of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and in the Platonic *Rival Lovers*.

In an epilogue, this book concludes with a brief discussion of the relevance of this study to the way we might now think about *philosophia* and the history of philosophy in contemporary discussions of philosophy.

(continued...)

INDEX

- Abderites, 156. *See also* Democritus of Abdera; Hecataeus of Abdera; Protagoras of Abdera
- abstraction, 7, 101–2, 105, 135, 138, 225, 237–38, 252, 298; and emotional control, 202; “philosophizing” and, 168, 171–72, 176–77, 204–5; research and, 51, 207–8; *sophia* and, 54, 94, 101–2, 275–76
- The Academy, 28–30, 271; and defense of *philosophia*, 29–30; as expression of a vision of philosophy, 28–29, 194, 221, 273; Heraclides as member of, 9, 28; and historical consciousness, 3; and historiography of philosophy, 30, 32–33; and *philosophia* as discipline, 29–30, 194, 216, 273, 282–87; and Pythagoras as subject of discussion, 22; and use of *philosophia* as term, 260
- Adeimantus, 240, 250, 256, 302
- Adler, Ada, 152
- advice: as competitive arena, 123–24; and mantic forecasting, 129n9, 139, 142, 169–70; as meddling, 165–66; political advisory roles (*see under* politics); practical or personal, 104, 127–28, 149; sage advice about good life, 127–28; *sophoi* as advisors, 100–104, 123–24, 150, 266, 314; “wise advisor” trope, 24, 105
- Aeschines (orator), 149, 247
- Aeschines of Sphettus (Socratic), 20n53, 114n36, 154n92, 203n25, 247
- Aëtius, 3–4; *Placita Philosophorum*, untranslated text, 323
- Against the Philosophoi* (Zeno), 151–53
- Against the Sophists* (Isocrates), 207, 210–11, 213–14
- Agariste of Sicyon, 20n53
- “Ages of Man” (Solon), 97–98
- agriculture, 39, 105, 144, 183–84, 186–87, 189, 202, 272
- Ai Khanoum, inscription at, 291–97
- Aischines of Sicyon, 20n53
- Alcibiades* (Plato), 258
- Alcidamas: and history of philosophy as a discipline, 206–9, 268–69, 272; and the probably spurious *Odysseus*, 209; Pythagoras in, 115–16, 140; and “sophist” as laudatory term, 207, 209; uses of *philosophos* in, 5, 28–29, 150, 157, 194, 198n7, 209
- Alcmaeon, 109, 161, 267, 276, 279
- Alexander of Aphrodisias, 195
- Alexis, 30, 297–301
- Al-Mubassir, 152
- Alyattes, 103, 129
- Amasis, 92n81, 129–30
- ambiguity: and ambivalence toward *philosophia*, 77–78; in Heraclitus, 50, 58–61, 63–64; and Platonic vs. Isocratean notions of *philosophia*, 233n22; poetry or gnomic language and, 229; in *Rival Lovers*, 315–16
- ambition, 109n13, 118; and philosophizing, 172–73; *philosophoi* and excessive, 1, 6, 61, 72–73, 77–79, 78–79, 123–24, 146–47, 150; *phil-* prefixed terms related to excessive, 254–55
- ambivalence toward *philosophia*: ambiguity and, 77–78; and polymathy in Heraclitus, 38–41; and protreptics, 288–90
- Ambrose of Milan, 3–4, 256; *On Abraham the Patriarch*, 327
- Ammonius, *Commentary on Porphyry’s Introduction*, 328–29
- Anabasis* (Xenophon), 177
- Anacharsis of Scythia, 131
- anachronism, 1, 210–11; and *sophia*, 80n36

- Anaxagoras, 28, 67, 115, 141, 229n15; as archetypal figure, 158–65; in Diogenes Laertius, 170; and early uses of *philosophos* in Athens, 167; and Euripides, 170; impiety charges against, 159–60, 170; as initiator of natural philosophy in Athens, 159n6; Pericles as student and defender of, 159–60, 170; as *philosophos*, 67, 158–65, 170; in Plato, 162–64, 270; and rhetorical pedagogy, 168–70; and Socrates, 28, 158–64; in Xenophon, 162–64
- Anaximander of Miletus, 3, 114, 263–64, 277
- Andron of Ephesus, 95–96
- Antidosis* (Isocrates), 213–14, 260, 267, 271
- Antiochus I Soter, 291, 295n19
- Antiphon, 92, 155–56, 156n98, 180–82, 184, 189
- Antisthenes, 31–32, 114, 182–84, 194–95, 197–203, 256, 302–5
- Aphrodite, “smiling” as epithet of, 85
- Apologia* (Apuleius), 324
- Apology* (Plato), 158, 161, 164, 242; and meaning of *philosophos*, 104; and Socrates’s denial of “wise man” label, 165–66
- aporia*, 48n36, 242, 273, 279
- apotreptics, 30, 290, 301–6
- appearances, 46–47
- “appropriation” of term *philosophia*, 23, 256–59
- Apuleius, 3–4; *Apologia*, untranslated text, 324; *Florida*, untranslated text, 323–24
- archaeological record, 31–32, 103–4, 201–2; Ai Khanoum inscription, Afghanistan, 291–95; Delphi inscriptions, 291–97; and potsherd etched “Simon,” 154n91; Uruk List of Kings and Sages, Anu’s Bīt Rēs temple, 104
- Archelaus, 67, 159n6, 160, 166, 171
- Archilochoi* (Cratinus), 265–66
- Archilochus, 96–97, 115, 261
- Areopagiticus* (Isocrates), 212–13
- Aristippus, 194, 202–3, 297, 300, 302, 304–5
- Aristodemus of Sparta, 95–96, 98
- Aristophanes, 102n125, 153, 175; *Clouds*, 138–39, 148n70, 164, 188; *Ecclesiazusae*, 127, 135, 147–48; and *phil-* prefixed name-calling in *Wasps*, 22–23, 27, 39n6, 90–93, 306; political advice roles in, 102n125, 128, 147–48; and *sophoi*, 265
- Aristotle, 3–4, 167; as corroboration of Pythagoras story, 22; and diachronic conversation, 271–73; and documentation of Pythagoreanism, 117–22; and etymology of *philosophos*, 80n36; and Heraclides’s version, 27; and historical consciousness, 260–61; and history of philosophy, 117, 271–73; and history of the *philosophoi*, 276–80; “perfect protreptic argument” of, 306–12; *philosophos*, use of term by, 260–61; and philosophy as a discipline, 260–61, 273–76; and philosophy as cooperative or communal effort, 271–73; and *phil-* prefixed names as pejorative, 27, 77–81; on the Pythagoreans and *philosophia*, 279; synonyms used for “intellectual practitioners” by, 273–74
- Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (Jaeger), 21
- “art of words,” 166; and Anaxagoras in Xenophon, 166–67; as *philosophia*, 167–70; prohibition against teaching, 179; as suspect pedagogy, 166–69, 175–76, 178–80
- Asia Minor, 3, 129
- aspiration, 45; as hubristic, 105–6; philosophizing and political, 168, 189; *philosophoi andres*, 62; *phil-* prefix as striving, 26; protreptics and encouragement of, 290; “sage-wannabes,” 1, 6–7, 158; and self-identification or self-appellation, 45, 63, 105; to status as *sophos*, 64–65, 72, 105, 111–12, 131, 146–47; youth and, 179
- atheism, 162–64, 167
- Athens: Anaxagoras and introduction of natural philosophy to, 159–60, 164, 166; literary production in, 154; Pericles and defense of Athenian *philosophiein*, 132–35, 168, 215; and philosophizing, 158, 166, 168–69; and *philosophoi* subset

- of society, 172, 189–90; as setting for comedies, 147, 297
- athletes or athletic competition, 5, 305; festival analogy, 13–14, 18, 74, 117–21, 280n67; at Olympia, 74, 120–22
- Augustine, 3–4; *City of God*, untranslated text, 328; *On the Trinity*, untranslated text, 327–28
- autodidacticism, 71, 173, 184n68, 205
- Autolyclus, 182, 185
- Babylon, 8, 94; precursors for Seven Sages in, 8, 94, 98–99, 104
- Bactria, inscription at Ai Kahnoum, 291–95
- beauty, 118–19, 153, 274; as an object of knowledge, 252; “beautify” in Thucydides, 133; of Charmides, 223–24; equated with wisdom, 236, 250; *mania* and love for, 236
- belief, *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 255
- Berosus, 99
- Bias of Priene, 69, 71, 102–3, 129, 261, 263
- “blame,” 87
- “blood,” 87
- boys, *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254
- breath, lack of, 11–12, 15–16, 305
- Bryson of Heraclea, 9
- Burkert, Walter, 20–24, 221; glosses of *phil-* prefix by, 87–88; and Plato’s use of *philosophia*, 29; and Pythagoreans as named group, 107; and skepticism about reliability of Heraclides’s Pythagoras story, 20–24, 26–28, 66, 83
- Busiris* (Isocrates), 114–15, 212, 267
- Callias* (Aeschines of Sphettus), 229, 244, 262
- Callias* of Alopece, 182–85, 187, 228–30
- Callicles, 134, 301
- Cephalus of Clazomenae (in Plato’s *Parmenides*), 244
- Cephalus of Syracuse (in Plato’s *Republic*), 239
- cereal, *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254
- Chaerephon, 95, 224
- Chaldaea, 8
- Chamaeleon, 9n18
- charity, 272
- Charmides, 182, 224–27
- Charmides* (Plato), 15, 223–30, 233–34, 239, 248, 273, 295, 311
- Charondas, 109
- Chilon, 71, 95–96, 103, 115, 268
- Chion (Academic), 9n18
- Cicero, 3–4, 10, 27; and Aristotle, 121; and association of Pythagoras with Seven *Sophoi*, 67–68; and connection between *sophoi* and *philosophoi*, 67–69; and Heraclides, 16, 18–19, 119, 289; and Iamblichus, 117–22; and “philosophy” as neologism, 13–14, 317; and transmission of Heraclides’s Pythagoras story, 3–4, 14, 16, 18–19, 26–27, 67, 119; *Tusculan Disputations* (Book 5), 13–14; *Tusculan Disputations* (Book 5), untranslated text, 321
- Cineas, 291–92, 294–95
- City of God* (Augustine), 328
- Clearchus, 291–95
- Cleisthenes, 20n53
- Clement of Alexandria, 57–58, 307–8; and Heraclitus’s self-identification as *philosophos*, 61–63; on “research” as essential practice, 26, 48n35; as source, 37–38, 41–48; *Stromata*, 265; *Stromata*, untranslated text, 324–25; use of *philosophos* (*anêr*) in, 42
- Cleobulus, 101
- Clitophon* (Plato), 258
- Clouds* (Aristophanes), 138–39, 148n70, 164, 188
- coinage of *philosophos*, 26, 104, 109n13; Aristophanes’s *phil-* prefixed name-calling and, 90–93; Aristotle’s theory of *phil-* prefix, 73–83; Burkert’s theory of, 22–23; and first appearance, 94; as group name, 107; and Herodotus’s use, 128; and identification of distinctive group in Athens, 172, 190; and identification of Pythagoreans as a group, 122–24, 142; lexical preconditions for, 26; mistakenly attributed to Pythagoras, 22, 71–73; and

- coinage of *philosophos* (cont.)
need for gloss or definition, 5, 18–19, 24; *phil-* compounds and, 66; Plato and, 256–59; and social contexts for new term, 8, 25–27, 105. *See also* etymologies
- color names, of metals, 302, 304
- comedies: connotations of *philosophos* in, 3, 31, 92, 290–91, 297–303; *philosophoi* as figures in, 290, 300–301; *phil-* prefixed words in, 92; and the quotable Socrates, 153
- Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus* (Hermias), untranslated text, 328
- Commentary on Porphyry's Introduction* (Ammonius), untranslated text, 328–29
- commercial philosophy, 109n13, 113, 118, 129n9, 165–66, 180–85, 180n61, 230n16, 264
- competition, 74; among the *Sophoi*, 101; analogies to athletes, 18, 213, 312–14; debate or oratory, 145–47, 146, 210, 213–14, 226; and jealousy, 159; public oratory and, 146, 194, 206, 216; with the *sophoi*, 261–62; *sophoi* and advice-giving, 123–24; and *sophos* status, 95–96; for students among schools or pedagogues, 29–30, 232–33
- concepts of knowledge, 214, 222
- connotations of *philosophos*: as ambivalent or ambiguous, 30–31, 58–61, 78; Anaxagoras and negative, 158–65; in comedy or satire, 3, 31, 92, 290–91, 297–303; criticism or censure linked to *phil-* prefix, 27, 79, 81, 84, 87–88, 90, 253–56; as disparaging, 188–90; as laudatory, 63, 231–32; as negative, 38, 61, 78, 190; as positive, 45, 64–65, 72–73, 291–97; and shift in valence, 25, 83; and shifts in meaning, 27–28
- consolation or reassurance, 316
- contextualist approach, 3
- continuity of *philosophia*, as concept, 1, 19, 161, 222–23, 232, 257, 272–73, 306, 311. *See also* lineages, *sophos*
- conversation, 29–30; Academy and formalized, 273; Anaxagoras and rhetorical pedagogy, 169; Anaxagoras and value of freewheeling (*adoleschia*), 170; Aristotle and *philosophia* via diachronic conversation, 271–73; “art of words” and philosophical, 166–69, 175–76, 178–80; as competition, 191–92, 226–31; as cooperative and mutually beneficial, 226–29, 244–46, 271–73, 311–12; and dialogue as philosophical form, 9–10, 158; as exercise, 230; with friend or beloved, 240–41; history of philosophy as diachronic, 271–73; as mutually beneficial, 257; passive listeners as audience for philosophical, 123, 256; as pedagogical method, 29, 169, 213, 215, 230, 273; *philosophia* and conversationality, 29, 118, 128, 181, 227, 240, 248, 285; philosophy and present-tense, 269–70; in Plato's *Phaedrus*, 223; and poetic expertise, 224–26; as political deliberation, 132–35; as quest for agreement and understanding, 191–92; and reality, 244–45; and revelation of the soul, 224–25; rules and forms of, 244–45, 311; rules for symposium, 145, 191n76, 229, 230; rules or norms of, 257; and self-improvement, 223–28, 244–46; and self-knowledge, 223–28, 270; Socrates and learning through, 189; with the soul, 201, 224–25; thought as, 201
- Cooper, John, 29
- cooperation, philosophy and, 226–29, 244–46, 263, 271–73, 311–12
- Cornford, Francis, 38, 58
- cosmology, 10, 21, 40; Anaxagoras and, 168–70; Empedocles and, 142, 145–46; Gorgias and, 145–46; Heraclides and, 10; Hippocratic critique of cosmological approach, 135–38, 142; Pericles and, 168–69; *philosophia* and study of, 138, 142, 145, 148, 150, 166, 168–70, 172; Pythagoras and, 40; as Pythagorean practice, 10; Socrates and, 161–63, 166, 168–70
- Cratinus, 153, 265, 278n54
- Cratylus* (Plato), 170, 264–65, 270–71
- Critias: and *philosophos* as an insult, 166–67, 178–80, 182; in Plato's *Charmides*, 224–28

- Croesus, 127, 129–32
Croton, 5n12, 107–9, 121–22
“cultivator of one’s intellect,” as proposed
 original meaning of *philosophos*, 1–2,
 5–6, 23, 62, 73, 107, 127, 131–32, 134,
 149–50, 153, 157, 171, 178, 190, 201, 221,
 300, 306, 307
Curd, Patricia, 45–46, 49–51
curiosity, 255–56, 313
- Damon of Cyrene, 69n9
Damon of Oa, 160, 170
dating, 127, 297; chronology and authentication of texts, 37–38; relative, of Heraclitus’s and Pythagoras’s lives, 37; of shifts in valence of *phil-* prefix, 83
death, 15–16, 105, 139, 178, 192, 257;
 ambiguity about, 12; Empedocles’s, 11, 140n46, 305; fear of, 8; Heracles’s philosophizing until, 199; Pythagoras’s overcoming of, 13, 112; Socrates’s, 28, 154n87, 157, 192–93, 197
debate or public oratory: and “art of speech,” 168–69; and civic issues, 146–47; as competition, 144–46, 240; Empedocles and rhetoric, 141, 206; extemporaneous, 206–9; forensic, 7, 127, 144, 149, 203, 226–27; Gorgias and, 143–47; Isocrates and pedagogy for political speech-making, 210–16; *logographoi* and speech writing, 210; and pedagogical method, 168–69; Pericles and rhetoric as political instrument, 168–69; persuasion and, 144–45, 240–41, 245, 270, 290; *philosophia* and political speech, 150, 185–86, 210–17; *philosophia* as distinct from, 149; philosophical rhetoric, 145–46; Pythagoras and, 109n10; quick-minded, 143–48, 204–5, 231; research and preparedness for, 143; skill in, and political influence, 172, 185–86; social value of, 185–86; speech as bewitching power, 109n10; speechwriting, 210, 243
deceit, 85–86, 209, 240–41
Delphi: competition of the *sophoi* at, 95–96; Pythagoras associated with, 108;
 Sage maxims at Temple of Apollo, 30, 291–97
Demetrius of Phalerum, 94–96, 292; on Anaxagoras’s purported trial for impiety, 159
democracy, 108, 206, 283, 303, 317
Democritus of Abdera, 9, 114, 128, 155–56, 276, 304
Demosthenes, 78n32, 149–50n73, 200
derision: Pythagoreans as group derisively named *philosophoi*, 105–7
Derveni papyrus, 31, 171
desire: modification of, 20, 194, 196, 200; *philosophia* as desire for *sophia* that one lacks, 248–49; *phil-* prefixed terms and affection or, 80–81
dialogue as philosophical form, 9–10, 158
Dicaearchus, 14n38, 103, 109n10, 295n23
“dice” or gaming, 91–92
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Diels and Kranz), 41–42
Diels, Hermann, 42
dietetics, 14n38, 71, 128, 300
Diodorus Siculus, 3–4; *Library of History*, untranslated text, 321; and non-Heraclidean version of Pythagoras story, 67–73, 289; and *phil-* prefixed names, 73; as relatively unstudied account of *philosophia*, 67; and the Seven Sages, 68–69, 94, 98–99; and *sophoi* as precursors for *philosophoi*, 69
Diogenes Laertius, 4, 10; on Empedocles as representative of Pythagoreans, 140–41; and Greek origins of word *philosophia*, 17–18; *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, untranslated text, 324; versions of Pythagoras’s self-appellation, 17–20
Diogenes of Apollonia, 276
Diopithes, 159
Diotima, 250
discipline, philosophy as a, 1–3, 8–9, 20–21, 25–26, 30, 32–33, 291, 305–18, 311; and Academic use of term *philosophia*, 28–29; and Alcidas, 268; and Aristotle’s historiography, 260–61; and Aristotle’s history of the *philosophoi*, 276–80; association of *sophos* lineages

- discipline, philosophy as a (cont.)
with history of, 7, 262–67, 285; and
commitment to norms, 32; Hippias and,
262, 266; and historical consciousness,
282–87; Isocrates and, 212–13; Plato and
formulation of, 23, 29–30; protreptics
and promotion of, 258–59; and Simmias
of Thebes, 267–69; *sophoi* as precursor
for *philosophoi*, 67–69; and Xenophon,
267–68
- discipline of the self: Antisthenes and heroic
self-mastery, 197–203; and modification
of desire, 194, 196, 200; and *philosophia*,
224; *philosophia* and self control, 98,
175–76, 202, 238–39; Pythagoreanism
and, 71, 300; as the virtue of *sôphrosunê*,
102, 195n1, 199, 223–25, 239, 256–57
- Dissoi Logoi*, 28–29, 114, 194, 203–7, 213,
228, 231, 260
- dogs: “lovers or friends” of, 248; *philoso-*
phoi as, 251, 313
- Dorandi, Tiziano, 18–19
- “drinking,” 91–92
- ease, conceits of, 316
- effluences, 143
- egoism, 133; aspiration as hubristic, 105–6;
and aspirations of grandeur, 168; *philau-*
tia and, 72–73, 80–82
- Egypt, 8, 100n118; Pythagoras and, 71–72,
113–15, 212, 267
- Egypt Exploration Society, 302
- elders: Aristotle on the many bad qualities
of, 82n43; civic order as responsibility of,
59, 109, 114; as enchanted by Pythagoras,
109n10; philosophizing as valuable for, 309
- Empedocles of Acragas, 44, 122, 137,
139, 140–43, 141n52, 161, 196–97, 201,
206–7, 266, 267, 275, 281, 289, 305; in
On Ancient Medicine, 137; as orator, 141;
and links to Pythagoras, 140–42; in Plato,
270–71; Pythagoras in, 111–12; as *sophos*
in Aristotle, 276
- emulation, 67, 70–71, 94, 178, 212, 215,
224–25, 249
- Encomium of Helen* (Isocrates), 211, 267
- entertainment and *philosophos*-group
words, 182–85
- envy, 244
- Epaminondas, 115–16
- Epicharmus, 199, 271
- Epicurus, 300, 309–10, 312–13
- epistemic charity, 272
- epistemic humility, 232, 272
- epithets formed with *phil*- prefix, 84–90
- equivalence (“an equal number”) as
Pythagorean concept, 304
- Eroticus* (Demosthenean corpus), 149
- etymologies, 5, 7; Aristotle and, 80n36,
276; Diogenes Laertius on Greek origins
of *philosophia*, 17–18; Hippias and, 265;
“love of wisdom” as implausible, 102,
107; “lover of wisdom,” 1–2, 5, 29, 66–67;
of names of gods, 264; of *philosophos*
in Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, 80n36; for
philosophos in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, 241–42;
of *phil*- prefixed terms, 83–88, 254–56;
Plato and deployment of, 104, 222–23;
Plato and reconstructive etymology of
philosophos, 250, 258, 289; playful ety-
mologies as rhetorical strategy, 254; and
punning, 85; Socrates and, 245–56, 260;
sophos’s relationship to *philosophos*, 27
- The Etymologies* (Isidore of Seville), un-
translated text, 329
- Eudemean Ethics* (Aristotle), 76–77
- Eudemus, or On the Soul* (Aristotle), 12n34
- Euripides, 9, 138n36, 170, 205
- Eusebius of Caesarea, 4, 5, 42; *Praeparatio*
evangelica, untranslated text, 326; *Pref-*
ace to St. Jerome’s Chronicle, untrans-
lated text, 326–27
- Euthydemus, 172–76, 178, 181–83
- Euthydemus* (Plato), 204, 210–11
- Evagoras* (Isocrates), 212
- excess: *philosophoi* and excessive ambition,
1, 6, 61, 72–73, 77–79, 78–79, 123–24,
146–47, 150; *phil*- prefixed words and,
76–77, 90–92, 247, 254–55
- exercise, “lovers or friends” of, 248
- exile: of Anaxagoras, 159–60, 166, 264; of
Empedocles, 141n52; of Solon, voluntary,
130

- experience, direct: and *polumathia*, 39; and wisdom, 46–47, 57, 105
- expertise: Aristotle and *philosophia* as expertise with respect to reality, 279–80; and coinage of *philosophos*, 104; and *historoi*, 59–62; *poiêtikos* as poetic, 225–26; *sophia* as, 328; *sophoi* and, 263; *sophos* as, 68, 93–94, 97, 101–2
- eyes, 46, 49, 144, 195
- farming. *See* agriculture
- festival analogy, 4–5, 13–14, 18, 74, 117–21, 280n67
- first principles, 274–75, 277–78, 279n61, 309
- fish, 76
- Florida* (Apuleius), untranslated text, 323–24
- Florilegium* (Stobaeus), 292
- food, 252n48, 313; as concern of *philosophoi*, 174, 299–300; *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254
- Ford, Andrew, 283
- forensic speech: debate or public oratory, 7, 144, 149, 226–27
- frauds or impostors, philosophers as, 39, 61–62, 177, 184n68
- Freaks, 1
- friendship, 80, 240–41, 246–49, 263
- Galateia* (Alexis), 297–98
- Galen, 10, 15, 152n82
- genitals, 85
- Genres of Dialogue* (Nightingale), 23, 171
- geography: geographical distribution of Seven Sages, 102–4; geographical evidence and Sicyon-version author, 19–20; map of places mentioned, xxii–xxiii
- geometry, 71, 114, 138, 183n66
- Glaucon, 153, 250–54, 256
- glosses on *philosophos*: and coinage of term, 5, 18–19, 24; Pythagoras and explanation of self-appellation, 22, 73; Socrates and novel uses or, 248–49
- gold: as analogy in Heraclitus, 48; and process of refinement or purification, 183n66; *sophoi* and recognition of value, 97; as yellow and red in color, 304n44
- Gorgias* (Plato), 22, 29, 143, 259, 301
- Gorgias of Leontini, 27, 67–68n1, 74n24, 127, 135, 141–42, 164, 179, 184, 194, 204, 207, 215, 245, 309; Empedocles as influence on, 140–47, 143; Nestor as nickname for, 155; and philosophical debate, 145–47, 196, 203; *philosophos*-group word in, 143–44; rhetoric and, 200–201, 206
- Gottschalk, H. B., 16, 122
- greed or avarice, 86
- Guthrie, W. K. C., 38, 46, 58
- Hades, 12–13, 139, 265–66, 272–73
- happiness, 29, 180–82, 197–98, 211, 246, 308–10
- heavens, study of the, 120, 163
- Hecataeus of Abdera, 68n5, 295n23
- Hecataeus of Miletus, 40, 50, 102, 111, 261–62; as polymath, 38, 40, 111, 262
- hedonism, 198, 245, 301
- Helen* (Gorgias), 127–28, 135, 143–47, 211
- Helen* (Isocrates), 211, 213–14, 267
- Heraclites, 9n18
- Heraclius, 199; in Alexis's *Linus*, 199, 299–300
- Heraclides of Pontus* (Gottschalk), 16
- Heraclides Ponticus, 3–4; Aristotle and, 27; Burkert's discrediting and rejection of, 20–24; Empedocles in, 141; fragmentary nature of extant works of, 21; and pre-existing narrative (Sicyon-version author), 19–20; as Pythagorean, 21; reliability as source, 117, 119; as source, 17, 289; sources for, 110
- Heracliteans, 270
- Heraclitus of Ephesus, 9, 22, 271, 272; and ambiguity, 50, 58–61; and art of speech, 111–12; Clement's reliability as transmitter of, 41–45; and competition with *sophoi*, 261–63; epistemology of, 51–57; *logos* in, 47–57; *philosophos* as term in, 63–64; and philosophy as a discipline, 261–62; in Plato, 270; and plurality or diversity, 60–61; and *polumathia*, 40–41,

- Heraclitus of Ephesus (cont.)
62–63, 110–11, 261–62, 313; and Pythagoras as fraud, 111; and “research,” 48n35, 51–57; and self-distinction, 261; and use of *philosophoi*, 260
- Hermias, 3–4; *Commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus*, 328
- Herodorus of Heraclea, 198–99
- Herodotus, 27, 31, 62–63, 113–14, 148, 185, 205, 208, 265; Croesus-Solon exchange in, 127–32, 135–36; *philosophhein* in, 128–32
- Hesiod, 9, 30, 265–66, 275, 299; Heraclitus and critique of Hesiod and polymathy, 38–41, 50; *histôr* as used in, 59; as polymath, 111, 262; and punning with *phil-* prefixed terms, 85; *sophizein* as used in, 96; as *sophos*, 261; in *sophos* lineages, 261n3
- hidden things, investigation into, 138–40, 276
- Hippasus of Metapontum, 111n21, 276
- Hippasus of Phlius, 19–20n53
- Hippias, 165, 167, 175, 184–85, 260–67, 272, 278–79, 289; and history of philosophy as a discipline, 262–67; and non-use of term *philosophos*, 260; Plato as influenced by, 262; Plato on, 262–63; reputation of, 262–63; and *sophos* lineages, 262–67
- Hippias Major* (Plato), 167, 190, 230, 263
- Hippias Minor* (Plato), 229n15
- Hippolytus: as source about Empedocles, 140n45; as source for Heraclitus, 37n1
- Hippothales, 225n8, 246
- histôr/histores*: and expertise, 59–62; and social arbitration, 59–61; women as, 59–60. See also *pollôn histôr*
- historia*, study of, 39–40, 46–47, 50, 60–61, 207–8, 268n29
- historical consciousness, 25–26, 262n4, 270–71; Hippias and, 262
- historicizing approach, 3
- historiography of philosophy, 2, 30, 269; Aristotle’s chronology and, 273–76; Aristotle’s diachronic conversation and, 271–73; and evidence of meaning shift for *sophos*, 93–94; Hippias and *sophos* lineages, 262–67; by Plato and contemporaries, 267–71. See also discipline, philosophy as a
- History* (Herodotus), 128–32
- Homer, 270; *phil-* prefixed terms in, 83–89; as a *sophos*, 115, 261; use of term *sophos* in, 96–97
- Homeric Hymn to Selene* (Homeric corpus), 59
- honor: excessive striving for, 75, 78–79; *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254
- horses, 74, 204; horsemanship as a kind of *sophia*, 97n98, 101n122; “lovers or friends” of, 74, 247–48; training of, 212
- hospitality, 86
- hubris, 105; and self-appellation as *philosophos*, 70–71; of self-styled philosophers, 176
- Huffman, Carl, 60
- humility, epistemic, 70, 249, 313
- hunger, *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254
- Hutchinson, Doug, 31–32, 118, 120–21, 303–4, 306
- Iamblichus of Chalcis, 3–4, 21, 27, 31–32, 117–23, 117–24, 159, 289; *Protrepticus*, untranslated text, 325; *On the Pythagorean Way of Life*, untranslated text, 117–18, 325–26
- Ibycus, 100n114, 109
- identity: self-labeling as *philosophos*, 9, 13–20, 16, 24, 73, 110, 118–19
- ignorance, 55, 133, 166, 204; *amathia*, 248–50; *aporia*, 48n36, 242, 273, 279; in Heraclitus, 52–55
- Iliad* (Homer), 59, 97n95
- impiety, 159–60, 162, 170, 301
- impossibility, seeming, 316
- inquiry. See “research”
- Institutes of Rhetoric* (Quintilian), untranslated text, 322
- intellect, cultivation of: as proposed original meaning of *philosophia*, 1–2, 5–6, 23, 62, 73, 107, 127, 131–32, 134, 149–50, 153, 157, 171, 178, 190, 201, 221, 300, 306, 307

- Introduction to Arithmetic* (Nicomachus of Gerasa), untranslated text, 323
- Ionia, 40, 50, 113; as cradle of natural philosophy, 159; as multicultural, 317; and Persian threat, 12, 40, 94, 103, 129n6
- Ion* (Plato), 190, 225–26, 225n10
- Ion of Chios, 112–13, 154, 160, 214
- iron, 304
- irony or ironical uses: in Heraclitus, 38, 44n25, 46n29, 58, 64; in Ion of Chios, 112; in Xenophon, 185n70
- Ischomachus, 186–89
- Isidore of Seville, 3–4; *The Etymologies*, untranslated text, 329
- Isocrates, 28–29, 114–15, 149, 150, 157, 180, 194, 207, 210–16; on Gorgias, 143; and pedagogy for political speech-making, 210–16; in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, 243–44; on Pythagoras, 267; and separation from Socratic tradition, 216–17
- istês* suffix, 7n15
- Jaeger, Werner, 21
- jealousy, 71, 159, 216, 233–34
- “jeering,” 86
- John Malalas, 198–99
- Johnson, Monte, 31–32, 118, 120–21, 303–4, 306
- Julian the Apostate, 196
- justice, 39, 74, 105, 304, 314; *philêliastês* (jury obsessed) as epithet, 92; wisdom and, 98
- Kahn, Charles, 42
- Kirk, Gregory, 38, 58
- knowledge: “learning” as *phil-* prefixed term, 255
- kosmos*, 6–8, 10, 55–56, 105, 162–63, 206, 289, 318
- Kranz, Walther, 38, 41–42, 57–58
- labels: and coinage of neologisms, 6, 57; and identity constitution, 7, 258, 282; and norm-policing, 1–2, 76–81, 87–88, 90, 105; Pythagoras and self-labeling as *philosophos*, 9, 13–20, 16, 24, 73, 110, 118–19; as self-applied, 7, 260; Socrates and self-labeling as *philosophos*, 186–90; and synecdoche, 74. See also *phil-* prefixed terms
- lacking, 27–28
- “ladder of love,” 250
- Laks, André, 41–45
- learning: *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254–55
- legal decision making: being *philêliastês*, 91–92; *pollôn histôr* as judges, 59–60
- legislation, 69, 103, 172, 185, 212
- legislative practice, *philosophos* and, 69, 103, 109, 127–28, 144, 168, 182, 185, 200, 212
- Leon of Phlius, 4, 13–14, 24
- Letter to Menoeceus* (Epicurus), 309
- Leucippus, 276
- Library of History* (Diodorus Siculus), untranslated text, 321
- “lies,” 85–86
- Life of Zeno of Elea* (Al-Mubassir), 152
- lineages, *sophos*: and continuity, 19, 70n12; Hippias and, 262–67, 278–79; and historical consciousness of philosophy, 7, 262–67, 285, 287, 289; in Plato, 263–65, 270–71; Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans in, 19; *Successions* of Sosicrates, 4–5, 321
- Linear B, 27, 31, 89–90
- linguistic evidence, and assessment of Heraclides’s account, 22
- linguistics, as methodology, 22, 73–74, 78, 94, 128, 268n29, 283–84
- Linus* (Alexis), 298–300
- Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (Diogenes Laertius), 4, 17–20, 324
- logical argumentation, *philosophos* and practice of, 128
- logos*, 47–57, 261–62; in Heraclitus, 47–57
- Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Burkert), 21
- love, 6, 75, 80, 85, 89, 184–85, 232–40, 245–52, 267, 274–75, 298; Socrates on philosophizing and, 23, 185. See also *philein*; *phil-* prefixed terms

- “love of wisdom,” 48, 300, 323, 328–29; as attribute of *philosophoi*, 1, 5; and coinage of *philosophos*, 107; as etymological invention, 2; as gloss of *philosophos*, 66; Greek instances of term, 6n13; as implausible etymology, 107; as insult to Pythagoras or *pollôn histores*, 2; “ladder of love” and commitment to virtue, 250; as misrepresentation, 104, 150, 191; Plato and, 29, 222, 249–50, 260; psychological translation, 105–6; and research or inquiry, 48–49, 62
- Lysias, 27, 127, 128, 140, 196, 209, 231–33, 239–40, 243, 288, 309
- Lysis* (Plato), 22, 30, 116, 154n87; and etymologies of *philosophia*, 222, 246–50
- madness, 302, 303, 305; of Anaxagoras, 162; Aristotle on, 304; love and *mania*, 236; *phil-* prefix and manias, 76, 81, 90–91
- Magna Graeca, 107–8
- Marcovich, Miroslav, 42–48
- Margites* (Epic Cycle), 96–97
- martial language to describe philosophy, 197–98, 239–40
- “master,” 87
- mathematics, 114n39, 138, 213, 221, 237; Pythagoreans and, 116, 279n61
- maxims: Ai Khanoum, inscription at, 291–97; Clearchus and, 291–95; collection or consolidation of, 282, 295–96; Dicaearchus’s list of, 14n38, 295n23; “Hard it is to be good,” 229; about learning or polymathy, 255; *philosophos ginou*, 30, 291–97, 309, 326; Pindar and, 98, 101–3; poetry and gnomic language, 226; Sosiades’s list and principles of ordering, 6n14, 292–94; at Temple of Apollo, Delphi, 30, 291–97
- Maximus of Tyre, 3–4
- medicine: compared to rhetoric by Socrates, 169; Egyptian influence on, 114; philosophical approach to, 135–38, 140; *philosophos* and practice of, 127–28, 137n32. See also *On Ancient Medicine*
- Meletus, 161, 166, 183n66
- Melissus, 143, 211, 267, 276, 279
- Memorabilia* (Xenophon): and differentiation of Socrates from Anaxagoras, 162, 164, 178–80, 182; and *philosophhein philosophia*, 171–76; and *philosophos* as disparaging term, 178–80; self-styled philosophers in, 176–78; and “sketches,” 154n88
- Memorable Deeds and Sayings* (Valerius Maximus), 71, 322
- memory, 13, 71, 161, 204–6, 237; in *Dissoi Logoi*, 204–5
- Menexenus, 190, 246–48
- Meno, 270
- Meno* (Plato), 190
- metals: colors of, 302, 304; gold, 48–49, 97, 183n66; metallurgy, 97; mining, 48, 139; silver, 88, 97, 302, 304
- Metaphysics* (Aristotle), 274–81
- metempsychosis, 12–14, 12n35, 71
- meteorology or meteorological talk, 8, 40, 43–44, 138–40, 144–47, 166, 169–70, 172, 203–4, 216; Anaxagoras and, 161–63; in Gorgias, 143–47; Pythagoras and, 40, 118–20
- methodological, philosophy as. See systematization
- Metrodorus of Lampsacus, 171
- Minor Socratics, 28
- miracles: Empedocles and, 274n44; mantic forecasting, 112, 129n9, 139, 142, 169–70; and medicine, 15, 274n44; Pythagoras and, 141, 274n44, 279
- moderation, 77–78; virtues of restraint, 202–3
- morphosemantics, 8, 78–79, 89, 249, 250
- Most, Glenn W., 41–45
- Mouraviev, Serge, 42
- muses, 233, 240–41, 245
- Mycenaean *pi-ro-* prefix, 27, 31, 88–90
- Myth of Er (Plato), 12n34
- mythography, 40, 99, 198, 282–83; and Seven Sages as trope, 103–4
- name-calling: and Aristophanes’s use of *phil-* prefix in *Wasps*, 22–23, 27, 39n6, 89–93,

- 306; and caricature of personal qualities, 87–88; and consolidation of identity, 1; Mycenaean *pi-ro-* prefix and, 88–90; norm-policing and labels, 1–2, 76–81, 87–88, 90, 105; *Philosophia* as nickname of Democritus of Abdera, 155–56
- natural science, *philosophia* and study of, 128, 137–39
- Neanthes of Cyzicus, 140n46
- neologisms, and need for explanation or gloss, 5, 215, 222
- Nestle, Wilhelm, 38, 57–58
- nicknames: evidence for practice, 155; *Philosophia* as nickname of Democritus of Abdera, 155–56
- Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle), 22, 73–74, 76, 80, 253
- Nicomachus of Gerasa, 21, 69n9; *Introduction to Arithmetic*, untranslated text, 323
- Nightingale, Andrea, 23–24, 28, 29, 171, 184, 221
- noos/nous*, 39, 52n42, 62, 111, 155, 169, 261
- norm-policing: Aristotle on *phil-* prefixed terms as slurs, 76–79; labels and name-calling as, 1–2, 76–81, 87–88, 90, 105; *philosophoi* and transgression of social norms, 57n54; *phil-* prefixed names and, 70–71, 79–80, 105–6, 122–24; *phil-* prefixed terms and censoring tone, 76–80, 86–88
- “not-*sophos*” explanation, 19, 22, 24, 122
- “oar-loving” (seafaring), 84–85
- Ode to Scopas* (Simonides), 101
- Odysseus* (Alcidamas), 92n80, 209
- Odysseus as one of Seven *Sophoi*, 67
- Odyssey* (Homer), 59, 86
- Oeconomicus* (Xenophon), 172, 186–89
- Oenopides of Chios, 139, 310
- Olympian Odes* (Pindar), 98–100
- omniscience, 214, 241–42
- On Abraham the Patriarch* (Ambrose of Milan), untranslated text, 327
- On Ancient Medicine* (Hippocratic author), 27, 127, 128, 135–36, 141, 145–46, 169, 186, 282, 301
- On Diseases or Causes of Diseases* (Heraclides), 10–18, 119, 122, 141, 260, 288; as protreptic, 15–16, 135–38, 150, 288–89, 302, 305–6
- On Non-Being* (Gorgias), 143–47, 268n32
- On Philosophy* (Simon the Shoemaker), 153–55
- On Proverbs* (Clearchus), 295
- On Pythagoreanism* (Iamblichus), 119
- On Riddles* (Clearchus), 295
- On Sophists* (Isocrates), 207, 210–11
- On the Pythagoreans* (Heraclides), 10
- On the Pythagorean Way of Life* (Iamblichus), 121; untranslated text, 117–18, 325–26
- On the Sophists* (Alcidamas), 207–9
- On the Things in Hades* (lost works), 12n35
- On the Trinity* (Augustine), 327–28
- “On the Woman Not Breathing” (Heraclides). See *On Diseases*
- opinions, debatable views, 231, 260–61, 280–81
- oratory. See debate or public oratory
- Orpheus, 30, 265–66, 299, 324, 327; as *philosophos*, 112
- Oxyrhynchus papyri, 30–31, 201–2, 290–91, 302, 304–5
- Palamedes, 143, 209, 268
- Panegyricus* (Isocrates), 215–16
- Pantheia of Acragas, 11
- papyrological discoveries: biographical sketch of Socrates, 197; Derveni, 31, 171; Oxyrhynchus (Egyptian), 30–31, 201–2, 290–91, 302, 304–5; Strausboug and insight into Empedocles, 31
- paradoxes, 105, 139; eristic, 204; Heraclides as paradoxologist, 21n55; used against Pythagoreans, 151; Zeno’s, 51–52, 151–52
- Parmenides, 51, 62–63, 141, 143, 151–52, 244–46, 267–71
- Parmenides* (Plato), 29–30, 244–46
- Pausanias, 11, 16, 132n23, 266n25
- pedagogy, 172; Anaxagoras and rhetorical pedagogy, 169; and “art of words,” 166–72, 178–80; autodidacticism, 173, 184n68,

pedagogy (cont.)

205; competition for students among the schools, 232–33; conversation as method of, 169, 213, 215, 230, 273; education as preparation for politics, 175; as fraudulent or overpromised, 210; Isocrates and political speech-making, 210–16; *phil-*prefixed terms related to learning, 254–55; and political influence, 109, 175, 210–16; as profession of *philosophoi*, 180–81, 211; prohibition of *philosophia* as topic, 179; Socrates as commercial failure, 180–81; and *sophos* lineages, 264–68; and transmission of cultural norms, 236; wisdom as innate, 100–101

Peisianax of Acragas, 11

Pelopidas, 115–16

Periander of Corinth, 71, 102–3, 129

Pericles: and defense of Athenian *philosophain*, 132–35, 168, 215; Funeral Oration in Thucydides, 127, 132–35, 168, 215, 235, 256; as an ideal worthy of emulation, 185; as student and defender of Anaxagoras, 159–60, 170

Persia, 40, 72, 102–3, 127, 160n10, 283, 295
persuasion: belief and compulsion, 144; and debate or public oratory, 144–45, 240–41, 245, 270, 290; and research into all topics, 169; rhetoric and, 201

Phaedo (Plato), 16, 43, 161–64, 192, 259, 268, 300

Phaedo of Elis, 154n92, 194–97, 200, 202–3

Phaedrus (Plato): and “art of words,” 167–68; and etymologies of *philosophia*, 222; oratory in, 143; Palinode, 234–40; *philosophia* as unified and justified practice in, 22, 222–23, 231–44; *philosophos* in, 222

Phalinius, 177–78

Pherecydes of Athens, 265

Pherecydes of Syros, 71, 100n18, 112–13, 274–75, 278n57; Pythagoras and association with, 71, 112

philanthrôpia, 78n32, 192, 258

philautia, 72, 80–82, 247, 258

Philebus (Plato), 29–30, 116, 244–46

philein: Aristotle and, 75, 81n39, 83–84; as a desire for something one lacks, 248–49;

early Greek use of *philein sophian*, 6n13; gloss by Socrates in Plato’s *Republic*, 251; in Heraclitus, 62n66

*philês-*prefixed terms, 90–77

Philodemus, 156n98

philosophain (philosophizing): as activity of *sophoi*, 128–32; Athenians and, 158; conversation and, 269; as cooperative, 311–12; as dithering over decisions, 134, 298–99; in Herodotus, 128–32; as idiosyncratic behavior, 10, 40, 107, 116, 174, 182, 259, 310–11; and moderation, 202; as narrowly defined speech, 146; as oratory tricks, 149n73; and political ambition, 168, 189; and political deliberation, 132–35; and problem solving, 149; reading as, 173–75; as research or inquiry, 149; Socrates accused of, 158, 165–67; Socrates on love and, 185; as solitary practice, 269; as specific practice, 132–35; as “taming,” 202; in Thucydides, 132–35

philosophers. See *philosophoi* (philosophers)

philosophia (philosophy): and Academy and defense or redemption of, 29–30; as “art of words,” 167–70; as beautiful talk, 240; as a collaborative endeavor, 280–81; as commercial venture (see commercial philosophy); competing meanings and visions of, 194–97, 216–17, 221–23, 267 (see also *specific individuals*); continuity of, 1, 19, 222–23, 232, 272–73, 306, 311; as cultural production, 235–36; defined by application, 246; and the divine, 182, 200, 233–34, 238, 240–41; Empedocles and, 140–43; as exercise in self-improvement, 149, 185, 195–96; and friendship, 240, 246–49; and “hidden matters,” 138–40; as idiosyncratic way of life, 182, 259; as inexhaustible, 270; meaning of, 260; as methodical, well-ordered, or systematic, 50, 53–54, 64, 132, 266, 317; and pedagogy, 237–38; Plato’s appropriation of, 29, 258–59; Plato’s etymologies for, 29, 222; Plato’s legitimation and justification of, 258; and political or legislative preparation, 185, 214–15; and polymathy, 313–14;

- as practical or pragmatic, 171, 178, 240, 244, 286, 301; and preparation for civic or political engagement, 215; as preparation for death, 192; preservation and consolidation of term, 288; as Pythagorean activity, 215; and reality, 143, 212, 232, 236–39, 241–42, 244–45, 279–80; relationship of to other ways of life, 234–36; and rhetoric, 145–46, 150, 166, 171, 172, 200, 208, 232, 256; scientific, formalized, and self-directed elements, 128; as self-defense, 149; and self-purification, 182–83; shifting meaning of, 145–46; as social arrangement, 233–34; as socially odd, 238–39; Socrates on, 232, 256–57; and *sophia*, 248–49; as sophomore way of life, 310; as a term and philosophy as a discipline, 28–29; as term with multiple historically related expressions, 256; as too reductive and imprecise to be useful, 137–38; in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, 178–80; in Xenophon's *Symposium*, 181–83
- Philosophia* as nickname of Democritus of Abdera, 155–56
- philosophizing. See *philosophhein* (philosophizing)
- philosophoi* (philosophers): Anaxagoreans as, 170–71; Aristotle's history of the, 276–80; Aristotle's use of term, 160–61; and the “art of words,” 167–68, 170–72, 179–80, 203–4; and aspiration to being *sophos*, 64–65, 72, 105, 111–12, 131, 146–47; and civic or political engagement, 104–5, 128, 146–47, 168, 189, 210–11, 213, 215 (see also advice); as comedic figures, 290, 297–98; competition among (see competition); and conversationality (see conversation); as criminal element spreading corruption, 159, 165–66, 183n66; and deductive reasoning, 177; as disreputable, 166–67, 178–80, 206–7, 210; earliest application or attestation of term, 3, 37; and emulation of *sophoi*, 1, 71, 128, 150; as identifiable social group, 5, 166–67, 170–71, 176–77, 189, 203–4, 211, 234–35, 252, 271–72, 306, 310–11; as idiosyncratic oddballs, 116, 138–39, 155, 237–38, 300; as “investigators into much” (see polymathy; “research”); Isocrates and categories of, 210–12; lay vs. professional distinction among, 183–84; as “lovers of wisdom,” 66; as misdirected or misguided, 64–65; and myth, 274–76, 279–80; as object of derision, 297–300, 310–14; and poetry, 275–76; and relation to *theologoi*, 274–76, 279–80; “research” as practice of, 45, 128; and sage advice about good life, 127–28; self-identification as, 45, 63–64, 72–73, 260; and self-improvement, 72, 108–9, 174, 209, 213–14, 221, 256, 257, 271, 314, 316, 318; as socially valuable individuals, 25–26; Socrates and rejection of inclusion among, 157–58; Socrates and various types of, 243; as *sophoi*, 276–77; as striving or ambitious to an excessive degree, 1, 6, 61, 72–73, 78–79, 123–24, 146–47, 150; as subset of *sophistai*, 211; as teachers (see pedagogy); in Xenophon, 178–79, 182, 204; in Zeno of Elea, 151–53
- philosophoi andres*, 43–44; in Heraclitus, 38, 62–64, 107; and polymathy, 38; and Pythagorean practice, 38, 58
- philosophoi-kings*, 223, 250–56
- philosophos* (as word), 25; applied to Athenians, 190; competition for label or identification with, 28–39; conceptual continuity of, 222–23, 232; connotations of (see connotations of *philosophos*); and cultivation of one's intellect, 131–32, 134, 149–50, 153, 157, 171, 178, 190, 201, 221, 300, 306, 307; Hellenistic culture and, 291–97; ironical or sarcastic use of, 64; “lover of wisdom” as gloss of, 66; as narrowly specific term with infrequent use, 127; as nebulous term, 61; as neologism in need of explanation or definition, 73; and “not-*sophos*” definition, 19, 22, 24, 122; Pythagoras and use of, 3–5, 8–14, 16–25, 71–73, 107, 256; related words (see *philosophos*-group words; *phil-* prefixed terms); and sage advice about good life,

philosophos (as word) (cont.)

127–28; as self-appellation or self-identification, 45, 63–64, 72–73, 260; shift in meaning of, 146–47, 157–58, 190; Socrates and self-attribution as, 186–90; Socrates as, 156–57, 178, 190; Socrates on, 232

philosophos-group words: Alexis and derision, 297–300; Antisthenes and, 197–98, 200; Aristophanes and *philosophon* in *Ecclesiastusae*, 147–48; broad geographic currency of, 291–97; chronology of use of, 62–63; and entertainment or diversion, 182–85; Gorgias and single use in *Helen* of, 143–44; Herodotus and singular, specific use of, 131–32; Lysias and persuasive problem-solving, 149; in *Odysseus* attributed to Alcidas, 209; and peculiarity or abnormality, 149; persistence of, 217; in Plato, 238–39, 241, 257; Plato and shift in meaning of *philosophia*, 221–22; Plato and sparing use of, 190, 197, 230–31, 238–39, 241, 257; Pythagoreans linked to, 70–71, 105–6, 107, 122–24; and self-improvement, 238–39; and specificity, 131–32, 149; Thucydides and political orientation of, 132–35; use as narrow and infrequent, 27–28, 74n23, 127, 131–33, 186, 191; in Xenophon's *Symposium*, 182–86. *See also specific words*

philosophy. *See philosophia* (philosophy)
Philosophy of the Greeks and Its Historical Development (Zeller), 21

philotoioutos, 74–77, 82

phil- prefixed terms, 27, 31; and acquaintance or familiarity, 26–27, 87; and ambivalence, 78; Aristophanes and name-calling, 22–23, 27, 39n6, 89–93, 306; Aristotle's theory of, 73–83; Burkert on, 22–23, 26–27; and caricature, 87; and desire or affection, 80–81; and deviation from social norms, 87–88, 105, 107; and excessive or abnormal attitude, 76–77, 90–92, 254–55; and friendship, 80; and identity relationships, 242–43; and idiosyncratic behavior, 74–77, 155; and intensification, 68n3; and lack of attitudi-

nal component, 105; and lack of literally-referred-to object, 105; morphosemantics and, 249; and Mycenaean *pi-ro* words, 27, 89–90; as name-calling names, 255–56; and negative connotations, 27, 76–77, 78, 82, 105, 246–47, 253–56; as other-applied, 80, 84–88, 105, 108; and personal name formation, 88–89; and positive connotations, 89, 246–47; in pre-classical Greek, 83–88; and punning in Hesiod, 85; Socrates and examples as glosses on *philosophia*, 253–56

Phlius: as hometown of Pythagoreans, 20n53; as setting for Pythagoras story, 4, 13–14, 17–19, 119–21

Phocylides, 44

Phrynis, 280

phusiologia, 269, 273–74, 279

Physics (Alcidas), 268

Physics (Aristotle), 273n42, 276, 280–81, 309

Pindar, 289; and maxims, 98, 101–3; *phil-*prefixed terms in, 83–87, 90n77; *sophos* in, 93, 98–101, 289

Pittacus, 69, 100n118, 101–3, 129, 229, 263

Placita Philosophorum (Aëtius), untranslated text, 323

Plato: and “appropriation” of term *philosophos*, 23, 256–59; and commonplace view of *philosophia*, 246; and continuity of *philosophia*, 222–23; etymologies and reconstruction of, 222–23, 250, 258, 289; and expansion of philosophy, 259; and history of philosophy, 270; and innovation or revision of *philosophia*, 221–22; and *philosophia* as discipline, 222; and *philosophia* as universally normative activity, 259; *philosophos* as used by, 2, 29–30, 190–92, 256, 272; and redemption of *philosophia*, 25, 29–30, 221; reluctance to associate term with Socrates, 158, 190–93; and retrojection of *philosophia* as term, 246; and *sophos* lineages, 270. *See also under specific works*

“Platon oder Pythagoras” (Burkert), 21–23

“play,” 86–87

Plutarch, 155, 159, 169, 264

- poetry, 100; Aristotle on, 271, 275; in *Charmides*, 224–26; and devotion to the Muses, 236; as discipline, 283–85, 318; *phil-* prefixed epithets and poetic usage, 83, 87; poets as incapable of self-exegesis, 226n10; *poiêtikos* as expertise, 225–26, 229; Solon as poet, 132n21, 224; *sophos* as poetic skill, 100; Xenophanes as poet, 40
- Polemarchus, 239–40
- political advice, 24, 27, 129, 175, 213; in Aristophanes, 102n125, 128, 147–48; and coinage of *philosophos*, 104; Ionians and sage political advisors, 40, 103, 129n6; Pythagoras and, 24, 108–11; Seven Sages and, 102–3; Socrates as uninvolved in, 185–86; of *sophoi*, 99–100
- politics: advisory role in, 128, 175 (see also *sophoi* as political advisors *under this heading*); education as preparation for, 175; investigation and discussion of, 127–28; Isocrates and pedagogy for political speech-making, 210–16; legislation, 69, 103, 172, 185, 212; Pericles and rhetoric as political instrument, 168–69; *philosophhein* and political deliberation, 132–35; *philosophia* and political speech, 150, 210–17; *philosophia* and preparation for legislation, 185; and “philosophizing philosophy,” 171–76; *philosophoi* and, 210–211; *philosophoi-kings*, 223, 250–56; and polarized debates, 303; and *pollôn histores* as judges, 59–60; and Prodicus’s “straddling class,” 211; socio-political contexts of Pythagorean movement in Magna Graeca, 108; Solon and, 129–30; *sophoi* as political advisors, 6, 69–70, 146–50, 167
- pollôn histôr*: in Heraclitus, 45, 50–52, 58–61, 63; and legal or political decision making, 59; and polymathy, 40–41, 45, 58, 60–61; Pythagoras as, 58–61
- Polus of Acragas, 171
- polymathy: as bad pedagogy, 38–39, 49, 50; as beginning point, 50; as collection and collation of research, 40–41; in Heraclitus, 26, 38–41, 45–58, 62–63, 261–62; as inadequate, 47, 51–57; as insult directed at Pythagoras or *pollôn histores*, 40–41; and philomathia, 254–55; and *philosophoi andres*, 38; and politics, 175; Pythagoras and, 38–41, 58; and “research,” 41, 47–49; in *Rival Lovers*, 310–11; and wisdom, 48–50, 62, 110–11
- popular perceptions of *philosophoi*, 8–9, 38, 105, 166–67, 174, 182, 288, 302, 305. *See also under* comedies
- “possession,” 86
- Praeparatio evangelica* (Eusebius), untranslated text, 326
- Preface to St. Jerome’s Chronicle* (Eusebius), untranslated text, 326–27
- problem solving, 149; Lysias and personal, 149; medical diagnosis as, 136; *philosophhein* as dithering, 134, 298–99; *philosophia* as simplistic or imprecise, 137–38, 298; *philosophos* and, 104. *See also* advice
- Prodicus, 139n40, 165, 175, 183, 185, 211, 229n15
- professionalism, 18, 184; *-istês* suffix and indication of, 7n15; *philosophoi* as professional class, 23–24, 204–6, 211; Plato and formulation of philosophy as discipline, 23, 29–30; professional vs. *sophos* as title, 97, 102. *See also* expertise
- “profit,” 87
- prognostication, 12, 14, 112, 141–42, 144, 169–70, 210
- Prometheus, 67, 99n109, 116n46, 278n55
- Protagoras* (Plato), 29–30, 94–95, 99n109, 101, 206, 262–63, 273, 311
- Protagoras of Abdera, 12n34, 68n1, 146n66, 160nn9–10, 164, 175, 183–84, 191n76, 211–12, 226, 262nn4–5, 267, 269–71; and philosophical conversation, 228–31
- Protarchus, 245
- protreptics: and adaptation of Pythagoras story to goals, 19; and ambivalence toward *philosophia*, 288–90; Aristotle’s “perfect protreptic argument,” 306–12; audience for, 259, 287–89; Heraclides and protreptic goals, 15–16, 19, 288–89, 302, 304–5; as intrinsic to *philosophia*, 290, 316; in medical texts, 15–16, 288–89, 302, 304–5; and public as unsympathetic to

- protreptics (cont.)
philosophia, 288–89; and redemption of
philosophoi, 25
- Protrepticus* (Aristotle), 30–32, 80n36;
Cicero and, 121; as evidence for Pythagoras story, via Iamblichus, 117–22, 290–91, 303–5; and “perfect protreptic argument,” 306–12; and “self-contradiction” genre, 290–91
- Protrepticus* (Iamblichus), 119–20; untranslated text, 325
- prudence, 167
- punctuation and meaning, 18–19, 115n44, 152
- purification: *philosophia* and, 182–85, 196–97, 201, 245; of the self, 8, 15, 108, 114–15, 182–84
- Pythagoras: as aggrandizing, 112; in Alcidas, 115–16; as ambitious or egotistical, 22, 71–72; in Antisthenes, 114; and aspiration to status of *sophos*, 111–12; and association with Seven Sages, 68–69, 112, 117; as autopolybiographer, 12–13; as charismatic and beloved teacher, 116; and coinage of *philosophos*, 22, 71, 256; as controversial thinker, 22; and conversation, 108, 114; Croton as adopted home of, 107–9; and cult associations, 108, 112–13; Egyptian influence and, 113–15; in Empedocles, 111–12, 141; as fraud or impostor, 38–39, 61–62, 109n10, 111; in Heraclitus, 38–39, 61; in Herodotus, 113; and hubris, 70; and idiosyncratic behavior, 10, 40, 107, 116; in Ion of Chios, 112; in Isocrates, 114–15; and Leon, 14, 24; memory and, 12–13, 71; and miracle-mongering, 274, 279; “not-sophos” explanation and, 19, 22, 24, 122; and pedagogy, 121–22; as *philosophos*, 71, 107; in Plato’s *Republic*, 116–17; political influence of, 107–10, 113, 115; and polymathy as path to wisdom, 110–11; and reincarnation, 4n9, 12–13, 113; reputation of, 21, 40, 72, 110–17; as “researcher,” 110–11; self-appellation as *philosophos*, 24, 72–73, 110, 117–18, 122; as *sophos*, 115–16; as target of name-calling, 71; travels of, 72, 109, 113–15, 121; versions of Pythagoras story, untranslated texts, 321–29; as wonderworker, 141
- Pythagoreans, 270; Aristotle on, 117–22, 279; conversation or speech as important to, 123; in *Dissoi Logoi*, 114; and distinctive way of life, 14n38, 116; doctrines of, according to Dicaearchus, 14n38; and emotional control, 202; Empedocles as representative of, 140–43; and emulation of *Sophoi*, 71; as group named *philosophoi*, 105–8, 122–24; and idiosyncratic behavior, 10, 116; and mathematics, 116; as pedagogues, 114; as *philosophoi* (philosophers), 6–9, 19, 24–27, 37–38, 58, 106, 116, 152, 170, 196, 202, 215, 262, 270, 276, 279, 300; and *philosophos* as pre-existing term, 25–26; Phlius as hometown of, 20n53; Plato and group identification of, 116; polymathy and, 116, 262; and self-identification as *philosophoi*, 25; and silence, 123; and striving for *sophos* status, 71; as target of *phil-* prefixed name-calling, 70–71, 105–6, 122–24; as two groups, 116
- quacks, 184n68
- Quakers, 1
- qualitative vs. quantitative shifts in insight, 45
- qualities, bad, 82n43, 251, 254n51, 314
- queer activists, 1
- questions: asked of Pythagoras, 13, 24, 120–21; asked of Solon, 130, 135; asked of oneself, 228; and *historia*, 60n63; investigated in *philosophia*, 30, 311; prompting gnomic explanations of *philosophia*, 201, 203; Socrates’s, 23, 223–24, 226n10, 228; “What is philosophy?,” 32; “What is *x*?,” 136, 313; in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, 187–88
- quickness of judgment, 144–47, 204
- Quintilian, 3–4; *Institutes of Rhetoric*, untranslated text, 322
- reincarnation: resurrection and return from Hades, 15n41. *See also* metempsychosis
- Reinhardt, Karl, 46–47

- Republic* (Plato), 116–17; and etymologies of *philosophia*, 222; *philosophos* in, 222; re-semanticizing of *philosophos* in, 250–56
reputation, 109n13; of Anaxagoras, 162–64; modesty and *sophos*, 95–96; peril caused by envy, 159; *philosophoi* as disreputable, 166–67, 178–80, 206–7, 210; and *philosophos* as charge, 159–64; *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254–55; of Pythagoras, 21, 40, 72, 116–17; Socrates on his own, 188–89, 190–91
research, 26; and abstraction, 51, 207–8; as beginning point, 50; Clement on research as essential practice, 26, 48n35; connotations of, 64–65; and direct experience, 46; as hearsay, 60; Heraclitus on, 38–39, 48n35, 62–63, 261–62; *historia* as, 58–60; as hubris, 105; learning as pleasurable, 186–87; limitations of relying on, 51–57, 60, 172–75; and “love of wisdom,” 48–49, 62; and oratory, 143; over-dependence on books, 173–75; *philosophhein* and, 135; *philosophos* and inquiry, 128; polymathy and, 40–41, 47–49, 261–62; practical problem solving and, 136, 142, 149; as purported path to wisdom, 110–11; Pythagoras as “inquirer,” 39n29; and self-improvement, 318; Socrates and, 162, 172–73; and *sophia*, 205–6
resemanticizing of *philosophos*, 250–56
retrojection, errors of, 1, 21, 24–25, 62, 93, 108, 246, 256
rhetoric: Alcidamas as rhetorician, 115, 140–41, 150, 206–9, 268; and Anaxagorean pedagogy, 168–70; Antisthenes and, 199–201; and competition among *philosophoi*, 194; as defensive instrument, 149, 200; Empedocles and, 141, 206, 278n59; extemporaneous, 194, 206–9; Gorgias and, 143–47, 200–201, 206; and memory, 205–6; in non-Academic philosophy, 194; Pericles as perfect in, 168–69; persuasion and, 201; and *philosophia*, 145–46, 150, 166, 172, 200, 208, 232, 256; in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, 223, 231–32; as political instrument, 168–69, 186, 200; Pythagoras or Pythagoreans and, 108, 141, 206; research and preparedness for, 143, 208; rhetorical contexts of *philosophia*, 28; Socrates and, 232, 240–41, 254; technical rhetoric as *philosophia*, 215n47
Rhetoric (Aristotle), 75, 77, 255
Riedweg, Christoph, 19n51, 25n67, 68n3, 131n15, 158n4
Rival Lovers (Plato), 30, 290–91, 310–16
Robert, Louis, 292–95
Robinson, Thomas, 42, 47–48, 205–6
sages. *See* Seven Sages; *sophoi* (sages or wise people)
“sage-wannabes,” 1, 7, 105
Samos, 103; as home of Pythagoras, 19–20n53, 103, 108n6, 112, 113
Sandanis of Lydia, 129
sapientes, 13, 67; *philosophoi* as replacement for, 67
sarcasm, 58, 64, 300
Satyrus, 141
“Sayings of the Seven *Sophoi*” (Demetrius), 95–96
“self-contradiction” genre, 290–91
self-discipline: and self-knowledge, 314–415; as virtue, 102. *See also* discipline of the self
self-improvement, 72, 108–9, 174, 221, 256, 257, 271, 314, 316, 318; conversation and, 223–28, 244–46; learning as pleasurable, 186–87; and modification of desire, 20, 194, 196, 200; Phaedo of Elis and, 195–97; as Pythagorean preoccupation, 195–97, 209; value of moderate effort and, 259
selfishness, 80, 81n41
self-knowledge, 52, 56–57, 97, 261, 270; “know yourself” as maxim, 226n12, 230, 295, 296n25
self-reliance, 46–47, 108, 197, 201
self-sufficiency, 201
Seven Sages (Seven *Sophoi*): Babylonian precursors for, 8, 94, 98–99, 104; Cicero and association of Pythagoras with, 68; competition and status of, 95; dating of, 94–95; Diodorus on, 68–69; as distinct group, 67, 103–4, 129; and expertise, 104;

- Seven Sages (Seven *Sophoi*) (cont.)
geographical distribution of, 102–4; in Heraclitus, 102; in Iamblichus, 121–22; and innate wisdom, 100–101; as legendary figures, 67, 69, 94, 98–99, 103–4, 277–79; origin of concept, 98–99; in Pindar, 95, 98–101; in Plato’s *Protagoras*, 94–95; as political advisors, 102–3; as precursors of *philosophoi*, 67–71; Pythagoras and association with, 68–69, 112, 117; Pythagoras on *sophos* as descriptor for, 68–70, 72; and rejection of *sophos* as descriptor, 69–70; social role of, 6, 96–97; and *sophos* as laudable status, 94–96; and *sophos* lineage, 261; as trope, 103–4; in Zeno of Rhodes, 99–100
- Shakers, 1
- Sicyon, 19–20n53, 31. *See also* Phlius
- Sicyon-version author, 17, 19, 122; as predecessor or contemporary of Heraclides, 117; as pre-existing narrative of Pythagoras story, 19–20
- silver, 88, 97, 304; as white in color, 302, 304
- Simmius of Thebes, 267–68
- Simonides, 87, 93, 229–30, 239–40, 254n50; *Ode to Scopas*, 101–2; and *sophos* as specific expertise, 101–2
- Simon the Shoemaker, 153–55
- Simus, 299
- skepticism, 46–47
- “smiling” as epithet, 85
- Smith, Justin E. H., 318
- Socrates: and accusations of philosophizing, 158, 165–67; and agriculture as philosophical matter, 186–89; Anaxagoras linked to, 159–65; biographical sketch of, 197; and etymologies, 246–56, 260; and expertise, 97, 263, 313–14; as failed commercial philosopher, 180–81; on his own reputation, 188–91; as model of philosophical life, 28; on *philosophia*, 256–57; and *philosophia*’s value, 313–14; as *philosophos*, 67, 180–82, 186–89; and protreptics, 259; and rejection of appellation *sophos anēr* (wise man), 156–57; and self-attribution as *philosophos*, 186–89; on *sophoi*, 167; as *sophos*, 175; in Xenophon, 162–64; Zopyrus and physiognomic assessment of, 195
- Solon, 69, 71, 96–98, 100n118, 102–3, 224–25, 313, 327; in Herodotus, 127–32; in Xenophon’s *Symposium*, 185–86
- soph-* compounds: coinage patterns of, 66, 104; and etymology of *philosophos*, 26–27, 66, 104; and *sophoi*, 93–96; and synecdoche, 123
- sophia* (wisdom): abstraction and, 275–76; as clarity, 276; and research, 205–6; and *sophos* as linked terms, 17, 94, 97
- sophistai*, 7; in Cratinus, 265; in *Dissoi Logoi*, 114; in Herodotus, 113, 128–29, 132, 135–36; *philosophoi* as subset of, 211; Seven Sages in Isocrates as, 96n93
- sophoi* (sages or wise people): in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, 273–76; aspiration to status of, 72, 105, 111–12; competition with the, 261–62; contrasted with *philosophoi*, 223; Diodorus on Pythagoras’s use of, 69–70; as divine, 18, 165, 237–38, 265; and etymology of *philosophos*, 27, 93–94, 104–5; as experts, 68, 93–94, 96–97, 101–2, 328; as group term in Pindar, 95, 98–101; in Heraclitus, 104; Hippias and, 262–67; as inappropriate term for mortals, 18, 69–70; as legendary figures, 67, 98–99, 103–4; lineages of, 19, 261–68, 270, 289; as pejorative term, 165; philosophizing as activity of, 128–32; *poiētai* as, 273–75; and political involvement, 70, 263–64; Pythagoras on, 18; ranking of, 96, 265; and “research,” 131–32; the *Seven Sophoi* (*see* Seven Sages [Seven *Sophoi*]); as *sophistai*, 265–66; as synonym for *philosophoi*, 276–77; *theologoi* as, 272–75; as theorists of the number of “beings,” 271; travel as typical of, 40, 100n118, 105, 113n34, 131–32, 160
- sophos anēr* (wise man), 129n9; Socrates’s rejection of the appellation, 157–58
- sophos* (as word), 27; and advice for living, 93; as despecialized or generalized in meaning, 60, 93–94, 128n4; and *philosophos* as “not-*sophos*,” 19, 22, 24, 122;

- philosophos* as replacement for, 68–70; pre-classical uses of, 96–104; Pythagoras's use of, 328; radical change in use of, 60, 93–94, 97–98; Seven Sages as only application for description as, 18, 69–70; and *sophia* as linked terms, 17, 94, 97; as “technically skilled,” 93–94, 96, 100
- Sosiades, 292–95
- Sosicrates of Rhodes, 3–4, 9–10, 13, 16–19, 21, 289; *Successions*, untranslated text, 321
- soul: and afterlife in Tartarus or Hades, 139, 265–66; conversation and revelation of the, 224–25; cultivation of the, 212, 224, 234, 309–10; Egyptian concept of, 113–14, 212; excess as damaging to the, 313; and observation of reality, 234, 237; *philopsuchos* and, 81–82; *philosophia* and purification of the, 15–17, 182–83, 200–202; *psuchê* as alternative to *nous*, 168n37; Pythagoras and metempsychosis, 12–14, 22, 71; Socrates on, 169, 232, 234, 237–38; soul-immortality as doctrine of Pythagoreans, 4n9, 14n38, 71, 112–13, 117; as steadfast, in Herodotus, 198–99; Thales's view of, 277n45; thought as conversation within one's, 201
- Sparta, 72, 103, 115, 185, 229–30, 264
- Spectacles of Truth* (Nightingale), 23
- “spectation” (*theôria*): as philosophical activity, 4–5, 18, 21–22, 27–28, 119–20, 132, 147, 252; *phil-* prefixed terms related to, 254–55
- speech. *See* conversation; debate or public oratory
- speech act theory: Aristotle's, 78–82; of *phil-* prefixed names (see *phil-* prefixed terms); of proper names, 88–90
- Stesimbrotus of Thasos, 154
- Stobaeus, 39n6, 200–202, 292, 294; untranslated text, 323–24
- “strangers,” 86
- Strasbourg papyrus, 31
- Strepsiades, 138–39
- “striving for wisdom,” 21–22
- Stromata* (Clement), untranslated text, 324
- Suda*, 151–52, 155
- swarm, of *sophia*, 264–65
- Symposium* (Plato): and etymologies of *philosophia*, 222, 246–50; *philosophos* in, 222
- Symposium* (Xenophon): *philosophia* as instruction in clever speech, 182–86
- synecdoche, 254
- systematization, 50, 53–54, 64, 132, 266, 317
- “taming,” 202
- Tartarus, 139
- temporality: diachronic conversation in Aristotle, 271–73; *philosophia* as synchronic before Aristotle, 269–70; “quickness,” 143–48, 204–5, 231; timeliness of action, 133–34
- Thales of Miletus, 3, 8, 30, 128, 167, 261, 263–65; as autodidact, 100n118; as first to be proclaimed *Sophos*, 94–95; as “initiator” of *philosophia*, 276–78, 281
- Thargelia of Miletus, 263
- thatton de*, translation of, 17n45
- Theaetetus* (Plato), 191–92, 200–201, 270–71
- Theagenes of Rhegium, 266
- Theodorus, 192
- Theognis, 93, 97
- Theogony* (Hesiod), 39, 85
- theologoi*, 273–76, 279–80
- “things below the earth,” 135n27, 138–40, 162, 165–66, 190–91, 301
- Thrasylkes of Thasos, 139, 302–4
- Thucydides, 24, 27, 31, 175, 247; and Anaxagoras, 127–28, 167–68, 170; “beautify” in, 133; defense of Athenian *philosophein* in, 132–35, 170, 256; Funeral Oration in, 127, 132–35, 168, 215, 235, 256
- Timaeus* (Plato), 116n46
- Timaeus of Tauromenium, 11, 21n55, 68n5, 81n41, 111n23, 140–42
- Timotheus, 280–81
- To Demonicus* (Isocrates), 212
- To Nicocles* (Isocrates), 212
- translation issues, 13–14, 17n45, 21, 47n30, 52n46, 58–59, 62, 68
- travel, as typical of *sophoi*, 40, 100n118, 105, 113n34, 131–32, 160

- trial and error, 48
- trials, legal, 51, 159n8, 190; and enthusiasm for jury duty, 90–93
- Troy/Trojans, 86, 143, 266, 327
- trust, 85; misplaced, 111, 296n24
- truth: discovery of, 232, 237, 242, 252–53, 280–81, 284, 318–19; persuasiveness and, 144; *philosophoi*'s orientation toward, 4–5, 18, 22, 80n36, 120, 145–46, 202, 204, 211, 214
- tuition, 165, 172, 180–81, 183, 212, 264
- Tusculan Disputations* (Cicero), untranslated text, 321–22
- tyrants, 20n53, 69, 102n125, 103n126, 108; as lowest kind of life, 235; “sage advisor of tyrants” trope, 24, 102–3; *sophoi* and “chosen,” 103n126. *See also* Leon of Phlius
- Valerius Maximus, 3–4, 71; *Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, untranslated text, 322
- value of philosophy, 25–26, 313–16, 315–16; Aristophanes and, 148; in Cicero, 67; as commercial product (*see* commercial philosophy); as debatable, 310, 318; as immortalizing or soul purifying, 182–85, 196–97, 200–201, 245; as object of Antisthenes's concern, 197–202; as object of Socrates's concern, 191; as path to flourishing and virtue, 29, 148, 172, 180–81, 212, 222–23, 259, 318; as preparation for death, 195; as preparation for politics or legislation, 172, 175; and prosperous cities, 134; protreptics and acceptance of, 290, 312; to rulers, 70, 212, 235, 250–56 (*see also* political advice; politics)
- van der Eijk, Philip, 15
- vegetarianism, 10, 14n38, 71
- Verdenius, W. J., 46n29, 57n54, 169n38
- virtue: *-aretê* as second element of *phil-*prefixed word, 74–75; and competition among the *sophoi*, 95–96; conversation conducive of, 29, 222; and flourishing as goal of *philosophia*, 29, 148, 172, 180–81, 212, 222–23, 318; as instrument of *sophoi*, 74–75; linked with *sophia*, 205, 214; Pythagoras and Pythagoreans as notably committed to, 109, 114–15; *sôphrosunê* (discipline of the self), 102, 195n1, 199, 223–25, 239, 256–57; and striving for honor, 77; teachability of, 153, 187, 210–11, 228–29
- “war,” 86–87
- Wasps* (Aristophanes), 22, 39n6, 90–93, 306
- weakness or softness, *philosophein* and, 132–34
- wealth, 75, 86, 98, 120, 130, 133, 197, 199; and origin of *philosophia*, 317; philosophy as lucrative profession (*see* commercial philosophy)
- White, Mary, 31
- white, as color of silver, 302, 304
- wine: “lovers or friends” of, 248; *phil-*prefixed terms related to, 254
- wisdom: Cicero on, 67; direct experience and, 46–47, 70–71; as “education,” 229–30; in Heraclitus, 49–50; love of (*see* “love of wisdom”); and polymathy or “research,” 48–50, 62, 110–11; of Seven Sages, 100–101
- wise advisor trope, 24
- women: in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, 127, 147–48; Diotima's gloss on *philosophia*, 250; as *histores*, 59–60; Pantheia of Acragas (“the unbreathing woman”), 11–12
- wonder, 7, 140, 192, 279, 317
- Works and Days* (Hesiod), 39; 792–93, 59
- Xanthus of Lydia, 141n52, 262n4, 268n29
- Xenophanes of Colophon, 102, 279, 281; in Plato, 270; as polymath, 38, 40, 111, 262; on Pythagoras, 110
- Xenophon, 28, 31, 40, 50, 150, 154nn87–88, 160, 162–64, 300; and disreputable pedagogy of *philosophoi*, 175–76, 178–80; and exclusion of Socrates from the *philosophoi*, 171, 176–77, 180–82, 185–86, 189, 267–68; and *philosophoi* and abstract deductive reasoning, 177; and *philosophoi*

- and the “art of words,” 167–68, 170–72, 203–4; and *philosophoi* as group identity, 171–72, 177; and philosophy as a discipline, 267–69; and *phil-* prefixed words, 247, 254; and “purified souls,” 182–83; Socrates in, 157–58
- youth: immaturity and excess of, 76–77, 179, 211; *philosophein* as activity of, 134, 302, 309–10; and *philosophoi*, 178, 250; *phil-* prefixed terms related to boys, 254; influence of Pythagoras on, 109, 115, 121; Socrates’s trial for corruption of, 160, 165–66, 183n66, 190, 213; study of astronomy and geometry by, 114
- Zaleucus, 109
- Zalmoxis, 15n42, 108–9, 113
- Zeller, Eduard, 21, 23
- Zeno of Elea, 22, 51, 141, 143, 150–53, 160n10, 211, 244, 267–70, 278n59, 279
- Zeno of Rhodes, 99–100
- Zopyrus, 9n18
- Zopyrus* (Phaedo of Elis), 195–97

INDEX LOCORUM

- Aeschylus
fr. 326a.14: 6n14
Seven against Thebes
45: 87n64
Suppliant Maidens
485: 6n14
770: 96n94
803: 88n69
- Aëtius
1.3.7: 4n5, 323
2.13: 10n28
4.4.7: 12n34
5.25.3: 12n34
- Alexander of Aphrodisias
Commentary on Aristotle's Topics
149,15: 307
On Fate
6: 195
- Ambrose of Milan
On Abraham the Patriarch
2.7.37: 4n5, 256, 327
- Ammonius
Commentary on Porphyry's
Introduction
Proem 9.7–9, 16–18: 328–29
- Anacreon
fr. 72.2: 97n98
fr. 100D.3: 87n64
- Apuleius
Apologia
4.7: 4n5, 323–24
26.4: 15–16n42
Florida
4.5: 323–24
15: 108
15.22: 323–24
- Aristophanes
Acharnians
168: 43n18
- Assemblywomen*
(*Ecclesiazusae*)
212–38: 147n67
441–53: 147n67
560–67: 147n67
571–80: 147–48
- Birds*
689–91: 139n40
1009: 278n57
- Clouds*
94–97: 144n6
180: 278n57
187–94: 139
225: 164n32,
188n73
333: 43–44
358: 148n68
412: 25n67, 43–44
423: 43–44
478–80: 300n35
512: 148–49n70
1161: 148–49n70
1169: 148–49n70
- Frogs*
280–82: 77n31
1032–36: 265n21
- Knights*
787: 148n68
- Wasps*
71–90: 91
439: 43n18
1174–87: 39n6
1526: 148n68
- Women at the Thesmophoria*
(*Thesmophoriazusae*)
383–84: 77n31
- Aristotle
Constitution of the Athenians
11: 130n10

- On Generation and Corruption*
325a20–23: 304n47
- On the Heavens (De Caelo)*
279b7–12: 282n72
294a28–b6: 277n54
- Metaphysics*
982a8–13: 275–76
982b29–983a11: 162n20
983b2: 276
983b6: 277
983b20: 277
984a4: 277–78n54
984b15: 163n25
984b18–19: 277n52
984b23–985a10: 277n52
985a6: 280n65
985b23: 279
985b23–986a2: 279n61
986b18–28: 279n60
986b21: 279n60
986b27: 273n42
993a16: 276
993a35: 280
993b1: 280
993b3: 280
993b12–14: 280–81
994a22–23: 122n58
995a24–b4: 282n72
- Meteorology*
347a6–8: 277n53
353a34–b1: 277n53
- Nicomachean Ethics*
1099a7–13: 74
1099a10: 255n53
1106b28–31: 69n7
1108b29–1109a5: 77
1118b21–27: 76
1125b14–18: 77
1125b18–25: 77
1141a15: 97n97
1141b2–8: 167
1142b34–1143a18: 103n129
1150a31: 134n24
1155a29: 77n30
1155a34: 77n30
1156a7: 304n48
1168a28–1169b2: 80
1168a28–30: 80n38
- 1169b27–1170b4: 82
1175a14: 256n54
- On Poets*
fr. 1: 141n50
fr. 3: 278n57
- On the Soul (De Anima)*
405a19: 264n15, 277–78n54
405b2: 277–78n54
- Parts of Animals*
640a5: 152n82
677a6–12: 171n45
- Physics*
184b15: 273n42
206a12–14: 282n72
- Poetics*
1451b1–7: 275n46
- Politics*
1263b2: 82n43
1274b18: 103n126
1285a30: 103n126
1285a35–39: 103n127
1315b10–21: 19–20n53
1316a30–31: 19–20n53
- Posterior Analytics*
79a5: 275n47
- Rhetoric*
1363a37–b3: 75
1371b20–21: 82n43
1373b6–17: 142n54
1381b27: 77n30
1387b32–34: 255
1389b32: 82
1398b: 268n31
1398b11–16: 115n43, 115n44, 268n31
1398b17–20: 115n44
1398b30–32: 304n42
1406b: 198n7
- Sophist*
fr. 1: 151n49
- Sophistical Refutations*
171b26: 80n37
183b29: 278
183b37–184a1: 205n33
184b27: 282
- Topics*
100b21–23: 282n72
101a36–b4: 282n72
104a8–15: 282n72

- 105a34–b18: 282n72
 149a7: 304n46
- Aspasius
Commentary on Aristotle's
 Nicomachean Ethics
 91,10: 76n28
 116,27–117,18: 76n33
- Athenaeus
The Learned Banqueters
(Deipnosophistai)
 1.6d: 76n29
 4.54.29: 268n29
 4.163f: 4n7
 5.220c: 229n15
 6.235a: 295n20
 6.263f: 4n7
 10.422c: 4n7
 10.714: 252n48
 13.589: 154n89
 13.592: 207n35
 13.602c: 155n97
 13.603a–b: 254n50
 13.608f: 263n9
 13.610b: 39n7
 14.620: 141n46
 15.668e: 155n97
- Augustine of Hippo
City of God
 8.2: 4n5, 328
On the Trinity
 14.1.2: 4n5, 327
- Bacchylides
 3.69: 248n44
 9.44: 59
 10.37–45: 97n98
 13.164: 43n21
- Celsus
On Medicine
 2.6: 12n34
 proem 7–9: 15n40
- Cicero
Letters to Atticus
 13.19.4: 10n23
 15.4.3: 10n23
- 15.13.3: 10n23
 15.27.2: 10n23
 16.2.6: 10n23
 16.11.3: 10n23
 16.12: 10n23
- Letters to His Brother Quintus*
 3.5.1: 10n23
- On Invention*
 2.2.6–7: 282
- Republic*
 3.11.19: 142n54
- Tusculan Disputations*
 1.48.116: 207n35
 3.28.69: 281n70
 5.3.8: 67
 5.3.8–9: 4n5, 13–14, 321
 5.3.9: 10n29
 5.4.10: 118n48
- Clement of Alexandria
Stromata
 1.14.59.1: 324
 1.14.61.4: 324
 1.15.58.3: 15–16n42
 1.15.72.5: 295n22
 1.21.129.3–4: 278n57
 1.25.1: 97n97
 1.61.4: 4n5
 1.63: 159n6
 1.93.1: 39n7
 1.129.4: 95n92
 2.20.107.2–3: 198n10
 2.21.130.3: 10n27
 4.9.1: 324
 4.50.2: 58n58
 5.59.5: 58n58
 5.140.6: 37
 6.15.1–2: 265
 6.18.5: 307
 6.30.1: 12n33
 6.32.2: 155n94
- Demosthenes
[Eroticus]
 4.5: 198n7
- Orations*
 4.5: 198n7
 18.289–90: 69n7

Diodorus Siculus	1.85: 103n127
<i>Library of History</i>	1.88: 103n127
5.55–57: 99n110	1.92: 254–55n52
5.57.1: 98–99n107	1.99: 103n126
5.80: 4n7	1.116: 112n26
9 fr. 1: 71n13	1.122: 264n15
9 fr. 1–5: 68–69, 69n8	1.124: 264n15
9 fr. 4: 71n14	2.6: 155n95, 159n5, 169n40
9 fr. 6–7: 70n10	2.6–7: 167n35
9 fr. 9–15: 70n11	2.7: 158n5
9 fr. 24–25: 70n11	2.10–11: 170
9 fr. 31–32: 69n8, 70n11	2.12: 164n32
9 fr. 38–39: 70n11	2.13: 158n5
9 fr. 1.2: 132n21	2.16: 160n11
9 fr. 4.2: 132n21	2.20: 158n5
10 fr. 4: 112n26	2.23: 160n12
10 fr. 24: 4n5, 68–69	2.39: 17n45
12.20.1: 109n12	2.44: 158–59n5
12.39: 168n36	2.46: 278n57
12.53: 143n60	2.48: 154n87, 154n88, 268n29
13.83.1: 12n33	2.60: 154n87
Diogenes Laertius	2.68: 203n25
<i>Lives of Eminent Philosophers</i>	2.71: 313n60
1.1–11: 8n17	2.85: 305n49
1.2: 262n4	2.105: 154n92, 195n1
1.5: 112n29	2.120: 17n45
1.12: 4n5, 5n4, 10n29, 16–17, 21, 22, 68n5, 128n4, 261n3, 265, 324	2.121–25: 153n85
1.13: 109n8, 112n26, 264n15	2.123: 154n87
1.16: 152n80, 161n18	2.125: 268n30
1.22: 95n88, 278n57	2.139: 17n45
1.23: 278n57	3.4: 312n58
1.24: 278n57, 300n34	3.24: 304n42
1.25: 263n11	3.25: 270n37
1.27–33: 70n10	3.35: 154n87
1.29: 278n57	3.38: 154n87
1.29–30: 95n90	3.46: 9n19
1.30–31: 95–96	3.47–48: 154n87
1.31: 98	5.8: 171
1.40: 69n9, 103n129	5.20: 201n18
1.41–42: 131n18	5.39: 17n45
1.42: 112n26, 168n36	5.80–81: 292n7
1.68: 103n128	5.86: 9n19, 10n25
1.73: 103n128	5.86–88: 10n22
1.74–76: 103n127	5.87: 10n29, 261n3
1.76: 103n126	5.88: 10n25
1.79: 103n127	5.89: 9n21
	6.1: 200n14

- 6.2: 198n9, 200n14, 200n14–15, 305n49
6.3: 198n9
6.10: 198n9
6.11–13: 198n7
6.16: 195, 305n49
6.56: 17n45
6.63: 201n18
6.90: 5n4
6.103: 198n10
6.104: 198n9
6.105: 198n9
8.1: 20n53
8.2: 113
8.2–3: 108n4
8.3: 108n3, 109n12, 109n14
8.4–5: 12n35
8.5: 108n7, 140n45, 277n52
8.8: 4, 68n4, 108n7, 112n28, 321
8.11: 108n7
8.13: 108n7
8.16: 109n12, 109n14
8.21: 108n7
8.36: 110n15
8.46: 20n53
8.51: 10n29, 11n31
8.52: 262n4
8.54: 111n23, 140n46
8.55: 140–41n46
8.55–56: 141n47
8.56: 140–41n46, 268n32
8.58: 141n51
8.59: 142n53
8.60: 10n29, 11, 108n6, 142n53
8.61: 142n53
8.62: 11n33, 142n53
8.63: 262n4
8.63–72: 141n52
8.66: 81n41
8.67–68: 11, 141n48, 142n53
8.69: 11n32
8.72: 21n55
8.83: 138n36
9.1: 37n3, 39n7
9.18.11–12: 278n57
9.20: 40n11
9.22: 261n3
9.35: 163n24
9.37: 158–59n5, 312n58
9.38: 114n37, 262n4
9.46: 12n34
9.52: 146n66
9.55: 12n34
9.57: 159n5
10.12: 160n11
Dionysius Halicarnassus
Isocrates
1: 215n44
Lysias
3: 143n60
Dissoi Logoi
1.1: 204–5, 204n27, 206
5–8: 204
5.89: 9n21
6.8: 205
8: 266n24
9.1: 205, 206
9.1–2: 204n28
9.1–5: 205
Epic Cycle
Cyprria
fr. 5.1: 85n55
“Homerus”
fr. 2: 96n95
Margites
fr. 2: 96
Euripides
Andromache
1080: 69n7
Children of Heracles
20: 202n24
Electra
904: 88n79
fragments
fr. 183 (*Antiope*): 254n51
fr. 282.23 (*Autolycus*): 43n21
fr. 542.1 (*Oedipus*): 304n46
fr. 574 (*Oenomaus*): 304n46
fr. 811 (*Phoenix*): 138n36
fr. 816.6 (*Phoenix*): 82n42
fr. 910 (*Antiope*): 266n24
fr. 913 (unknown play): 144n64
fr. 935 (*Alexander*): 248n44

- Hecuba*
9: 248n44
348: 82n42
428: 248n44
- Helen*
1067: 69n7
1604: 43n18
- Hippolytus*
680: 69n7
1445: 69n7
- Iphigenia among the Taurians*
411: 88n71
- Iphigenia at Aulis*
337–42: 77n31
527: 77n31
- Phoenician Women*
198: 88n79
531–6: 77n31
597: 82n42
- [*Rhesus*]
932: 87n64
- Eusebius
Life of Constantine
4.2.8: 6n13
Preface to St. Jerome's
Chronicle
14.2–4: 4n5, 326–27
Preparation for the Gospel
(*Praeparatio evangelica*)
10.4.12–13: 326
10.14.3: 4n5
- Galen
[*History of Philosophy*]
2: 10n28
53: 159n6
On Affected Parts (De Locis affectis)
6.5: 10n29, 11n32, 15n41
On Difficulties in Breathing (De difficultate respirationis)
1.8: 10n29, 15n41
On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis)
9.6.54.5: 152n82
- On the Natural Faculties (De facultatibus naturalibus)*
2.38.13: 268n29
On Tremor, Palpitation, Spasm, and Rigor (De tremor, palpatione, convulsion et rigore)
6: 15n41
- Gorgias
Funeral Oration
fr. 1: 74n24
- Helen*
13: 143–47
- Heraclitus
B1/D1: 52, 55
B2/D2: 40, 55
B3/D89b: 51n41
B9/D79: 49n36
B12/D65a: 51n41
B17/D3: 44n29, 49, 50, 55
B18/D37: 48
B19/D5: 55
B20/D118: 41n13
B22/D39: 48–49
B24/Dd122a: 42n15
B25/D122b: 44n24
B26/D71: 41n13
B28/D19: 41n13, 58n60
B29/D13: 58n58
B30/D85: 42n15
B32/D45: 102n123
B34/D4: 55
B35/D40: 37–41, 44, 44n23, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 57–58, 58, 61, 63, 63, 64
B38: 261n1
B39/D11: 103n127, 261n1
B40/D20: 25, 38, 39, 42n15, 45, 47, 49, 50, 63, 261n1
B41/D44: 49, 50, 63
B42/D21: 261n1
B43/D112: 57n57
B44/D106: 57n57
B48/D53: 51n41
B49a/R9: 51n51
B51/D49: 42n15, 51n41

B52/D49: 51n41	1.74: 278n57
B52/D76: 51n41	1.75: 278n57
B54/D50: 49, 50	1.86.3: 131n19
B55/D31: 47	1.96–101: 129n5
B56/D22: 55, 261n1	1.120: 69n7
B57/D25a: 39–40, 47, 261n1	1.170: 103n127, 129n6, 129n8
B59/D52: 51n41	1.214.3: 43n18
B64/[27]D307: 39n6	2.20: 278n57
B65/[9]R104: 39n6	2.49: 43n21, 129n9
B71–75/D54–55: 55n50	2.53.2–3: 265n21
B80/D63: 57n54	2.81: 113
B81/D27: 39, 40, 58n60, 261n1	2.134: 155n96
B86/D38: 44n24	2.143: 40n10
B87/D8: 62n66	2.160: 95n88
B89/R56: 40, 55	2.174.1: 92n81
B93/D41: 47n31, 56	2.177.2: 130n11
B101a/D32: 46–47	3.25: 43n21
B101/D36: 56	3.54.4: 77n31
B105/D24: 261n1	3.85: 43n21
B106/D25b: 261n1	3.121.1: 109n9
B107/D33: 47n31, 49, 50	4.76.2: 131
B108/D43: 40, 49, 50	4.93–5: 113
B112/D114a + b: 49, 50	4.95: 14n38, 108n6
B114/D105: 49, 50, 57n57	5.23: 43n21
B116/D30: 56	5.36: 40n10
B122/D61: 42n15	5.95.2: 103n126
B123/D35: 48, 62n66	5.125–26: 40n10
B125/D59: 51n41	6.11: 134n24
B129/D26: 25, 39, 40, 42n15, 45, 47, 63, 63, 261n1	6.65.2: 129n8
Hermias	6.106: 43n18
<i>Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus</i>	6.126–30: 19–20n53
278b: 4n5, 328	7.130: 43n21
Herodotus	7.221: 129n9
<i>History</i>	7.235.5: 129n8
1.1: 130n10	8.87: 43n18
1.20–22: 129n5	8.124.1–2: 96n93
1.26.1: 202n24	9.34: 129n9
1.27: 129n6	Hesiod
1.29: 129n7, 130	fragments
1.29–32: 131n14	fr. 247.1: 85n55
1.30: 24n65, 71n13, 128–32, 311n57	fr. 256: 100n114
1.30–32: 14n38	<i>Shield of Heracles</i>
1.30.3–1.31: 130	355: 44n25
1.32: 131	<i>Theogony</i>
1.59.2: 129n8	119: 139n42
1.71: 129n9	200: 85
	256: 85n55

400 INDEX LOCORUM

<i>Theogony</i> (cont.)	21.86: 86n60
721–810: 139n42	23.129: 86n60
990: 85n55	23.712: 96n95
<i>Works and Days</i>	23.761: 44n25
649: 96n96	24.527–30: 98n104
657: 96n93	<i>Odyssey</i>
Hierocles	1.181: 84n54
<i>Commentary on the Golden Verses</i>	1.419: 84n54
23.2: 141n46	1.1419: 84n54
Himerius	4.96: 44n25
<i>Orations</i>	5.386: 84n53
28.2: 278n57	6.121: 86n61
[Hippocrates]	7.34–36: 84n53
<i>Airs, Waters, Places</i>	8.96: 84n53
1: 92n81	8.191: 84n53
2.14–26: 144n64	8.362: 85n55
<i>Fractures</i>	8.369: 84n53
16: 69n7	8.386: 84n53
<i>On Ancient Medicine</i>	8.535: 84n53
1.1.3: 136n30	8.566: 84n53
1.3: 138n37	8.576: 86n61
5.1–2: 282	9.176: 86n61
9: 137n34	11.349: 84n53
12: 137n34	13.36: 84n53
20.1: 135–42	13.166: 84n53
20.3: 136n31	13.174: 84n53
Homer	13.202: 86n61
<i>Iliad</i>	15.427: 84n54
1.256: 87n63	16.426: 84n54
3.424: 85n55	23.134: 86n62
4.10: 85n55	24.123: 44n25
4.235: 86n59	Homeric Hymns
5.375: 85n55	<i>Hymn to Aphrodite</i>
10.351: 86n60	17: 85n55
12.164: 85	49: 85n55
14.201: 265, 271	56: 85n55
14.211: 85n55	65: 85n55
14.302: 265, 271	155: 85n55
15.411–12: 96n95	<i>Hymn to Apollo</i>
16.65: 86n60	171: 44n25
16.90: 86n60	<i>Hymn to Demeter</i>
16.835: 86n60	102: 85n58
17.194: 86n60	<i>Hymn to Hermes</i>
17.224: 86n60	483: 100n114
19.269: 86n60	511: 100n114
20.40: 85n55	<i>Hymn to Selene</i>
	2: 59

- Iamblichus of Chalcis
On General Mathematical Science (De communi mathematica scientia)
 22.68,7–24: 272n39
 23.70,26–71,4: 80n36
 25.78,5: 46n29
 26.71,4: 80n36
 26.79,14: 171n45
 26.82,27–28: 272n39
 26.83,7: 80n36
On the Pythagorean Way of Life
 2.9: 112n26
 6.29–30: 122–23
 8.40: 122n58
 8.44,5–15: 121–22, 325–26
 12.58–59: 4n5, 118–19, 122n58, 280n67, 325–26
 17.71: 109n11
 18.81: 111n21
 18.88: 109n11
 23.104,10–11: 154n88
 24.108: 142n54
 35.250: 116n45
 35.251: 19–20n53
 35.254: 109n11
 35.267: 19–20n53
Protrepticus (Exhortation to Philosophy)
 4,9–13: 119, 325
 6.37,3–22: 80n36
 6.40,2–3: 80n11
 8.48,16: 277n52
 9: 4n5, 325
 9.51,6–8: 325
 9.51,8–10: 119–20
 9.51,8–15: 159n7
 9.53,19–54,5: 120, 325
 13.64,2: 5n11
 20.99,15: 5n11
- Ibycus
 fragments
 S151.47–48: 109n9
 S151.23: 100n114
- Inscriptiones Graecae*
 I³ 766: 101n122
 I³ 833: 101n122
 I³ 949: 101n122
 I³ 1265: 101n122
 I³ 1393: 101n122
 VII 3501: 101n122
 XII,3 1020: 294n17
- Isidore of Seville
The Etymologies
 8.6.1.2: 4n5, 329
 14.6.31: 4n5, 329–30
- Isocrates
Against the Sophists
 1: 210n40
 1–2: 210n40
 3: 210n40
 6–7: 210n40
 7–8: 210n40
 8: 210n40
 9: 210n39
 11: 210n40
 14: 211
 16–18: 210n40
 17: 186n3
 19–20: 210n39
 20: 210n40
 21: 186n3, 211
- Antidosis*
 15: 213n42
 30: 213n42
 47: 225n9
 93–94: 216n48
 183: 213
 201: 213
 226–28: 210n39
 235: 96n93, 128n4, 168n36
 250: 134n26
 258: 213
 261: 213
 262: 213
 265: 213
 265–68: 267
 266–70: 214
 268: 143n58
 270: 149
 271: 214

402 INDEX LOCORUM

- Antidosis* (cont.)
 283–285: 212n41
 285: 307n51
 313: 96n93
- Areopagiticus*
 11: 69n7
 45: 212–13
- Busiris*
 1: 212
 2–3: 212n41
 6: 215n45
 17: 212
 18: 267n26
 22: 212
 22–23: 114n38
 24: 115n41
 28: 114n39
 28–29: 115n40
 29: 109n11
 30: 212
 42: 212
 49: 212
- Evagoras*
 8–10: 212
 76–81: 212
- Helen*
 1–3: 211
 3: 143n58
 4: 211
 6: 211
 7–8: 211
 57: 74n24
 66–67: 211
- Panegyricus*
 47–50: 215n45
- To Demonicus*
 3: 212
 4–5: 212
 7–8: 212
 10: 74n24
 18: 255
 18–19: 212
 27: 74n24
 30: 212
 40: 212
- To Nicocles*
 1–9: 212
- 35: 212
 50–52: 212
- John Malalas
Chronographia
 6.6: 132n21
- John Philoponus
Commentary on Nichomachus's
 Introduction to Arithmetic
 1.8: 6n13
 1.52: 6n13
 15.2: 6n13
 21.20: 6n13
- Josephus
Against Apion
 1.22: 295n20
 1.176–82: 295n22
 2.265: 159n8
- Julian
Caesars
 309c: 16n42
Epistles
 82 445a: 196
Orations
 8.244a: 15–16n42
- Lucian
The Fly
 7: 277n52
Hermotimus
 11: 303
- Lysias
Orations
 2.34: 280
 10.11: 134n24
 18.13: 69n7
 24.10: 149
- Maximus of Tyre
Dissertations
 1.2a: 4n5
 28.4: 15–16n42
- Munich Florilegium*
 182: 200n15

- Nicomachus of Gerasa
Introduction to Arithmetic
 1.1: 69n9
 1.1.1.2: 6n13
 9.7: 69n9
Manual of Harmonics
 1: 154n88
- Olympiodorus
Commentary on Aristotle's Meteorology
 17.19: 159n8
Commentary on Plato's Alcibiades
 136.1: 168n36
 144.15–17: 307n52, 308n54
Commentary on Plato's Gorgias
 35.12: 141n46
 Proem 9: 143n60
- Origen
Against Celsus
 2.15.40: 12n34
 2.16: 15n41
- Papyri
Erlangen
 4.41–46: 198n8
Herculaneum
 1021 col. vi.41—ii10: 9n20
Hibeh
 2.182: 197n6
Oxyrhynchus
 666: 305n50
 1365: 19–20n54
 2402: 305n50
 2403: 305n50
 3659: 302–6
Rylands
 18: 20n53
- Philostratus
Epistles
 73: 155n96
Life of Apollonius of Tyana
 1.1: 141n46
 1.2: 169n42
- 4.25: 114n39
 6.5: 141n46
Lives of the Sophists
 1.15: 155n96
 1.16.2: 155n96
- Pindar
 fragments
 fr. 35b (*Hymn* 1): 98n102
 fr. 70b.24 (*Dithyramb* 2): 98n106
 fr. 164: 87
 fr. 209: 95n91
 fr. 210: 77n31, 109n13
Isthmian Odes
 1.45: 43n21
 2.6: 87n66, 109n13
 2.10–11: 98n103
 2.10–12: 98n103
 5.28: 7n15
Nemean Odes
 5.18: 101n119
 7.17–18: 101n119
 8.40–41: 100
 8.41: 43n21
 9.32: 248n44
 10.87–88: 138n39
Olympian Odes
 2.10–12: 98n103
 2.87–88: 100n117
 5.16: 101n119
 6.19: 87
 7.30–31: 99n108
 7.44: 99n109
 7.72–73: 98
 7.74: 99n109
 7.74–76: 99n109
 9.28–29: 100n117
 11.10: 43n21
 11.10–11: 100n115
 11.16–19: 100n115
 14.14–16: 90n77
Paeans
 1 fr. 52a.8: 90n77
 6 fr. 52f.50–53: 101n119
 13 fr. 52s.3: 43n21
Pythian Odes
 1.42: 100n117
 3.80–84: 98n104

404 INDEX LOCORUM

- Pythian Odes* (cont.)
 4.138–41: 98n106
 5.12–13: 100n117
 8.74–76: 100n117
 12.1: 87
- Plato and Platonic corpus
- Alcibiades*
 118c: 160n14, 168n36
 119a: 182n64
 199a–120d: 307n52
- Alcibiades II*
 147b9: 225n7
- Apology of Socrates*
 17b–d: 213n42
 18b8–10: 165
 19c4: 188n73
 20c: 182n64
 23d1–7: 191
 23d2: 166
 23d2–6: 178
 23d5–7: 166
 26c7–e2: 161
 26e: 161n18
 28a8–c6: 226n10
 29a1: 270
 29b4–5: 12n34
 38a5–6: 313
 41a6–7: 266
- Charmides*
 153a1–d2: 223
 153d2–4: 223–24
 153d5–154a6: 224
 154d1–5: 224
 154d5–7: 224
 154e1: 224
 154e8–155a3: 132n21, 224
 155c: 225n8
 156d5–6: 113
 157a6–b7: 224
 158e7–159a4: 224
 159b5: 225n4
 160d5–e1: 224
 160e4–5: 225n4
 161a2–3: 226n12
 162c1–d4: 227n14
 163b2–c10: 226n12
 164d5–165a7: 226n12
- 165a7–b3: 227n14
 166c3–6: 227n14
 166c7–d6: 227
 169c6–d1: 227n14
- Cratylus*
 401c–402c: 265
 402b7: 159n6
 409b6: 170n44
- Critias*
 113a2: 43n18
- Definitions*
 411c8: 225n6
 411d4: 225n6
 411d5: 225n6
 413b12: 225n6
 414e12: 225n6
 416a29: 225n6
- Euthydemus*
 274c3: 254–55n52
 304c6: 254–55n52
 305c7: 43n18, 211
- Gorgias*
 447d: 154n90
 448b5–7: 171n47
 465d: 171n47
 484c–485e: 134
 485a4–d1: 301
 485d7: 302
 486c4–d1: 302
 487c2–d1: 225n7, 301
 491a: 154n90
 502c12: 225n7
- Hippias Major*
 281a: 263n7
 281a1: 263n9
 281a1–283b4: 175n56
 281a3–c2: 167
 281b6: 263n8
 281c7: 167, 263n10
 281d5–282a10: 264n12
 281d7: 263n8
 282b1–d5: 264n15
 282b4–c1: 143n60
 283a1: 264n13
 283a6: 169n38
 283b7–285b7: 263n6
 286a1: 264

- 286d7: 263n8
286e6: 263n6
287b2–3: 263n6
- Hippias Minor*
363a2–6: 229n15
363c2: 265n20
363c4–d3: 263n6
364a3: 263n7
364a10: 263n7
364b8–c2: 263n6
365c10–d3: 226n11
365d: 269n35
- Laws*
656c3: 225n7
660a4: 225n7
682a3: 225n7
700d4: 225n7
731e1: 81n40
731e4: 81n40
778d6: 225n7
802b6: 225n7
810e6–811a5: 39n6
819a1–6: 39n6
845a3: 304n48
- Lysis*
204d7–206c8: 225n8
206c10: 254–55n52
207d5–210d10: 246
209c4: 248n45
209e2: 248n45
210a6: 248n45
210a8–210d9: 248n45
211d7–e8: 247
212d6–7: 248
212d8: 6n13
213d2–3: 248
213d4–5: 248
213d8: 248
214b: 266n24
214e2–3: 249
217e8–9: 249
218a5–b1: 249
218b7–10: 249
- Menexenus*
243b: 280n67
- Meno*
71d: 269n35
- 76c: 141n51, 143
99c9: 69n7
99d1: 225n7
- Parmenides*
126b8: 244
126b8–9: 151n74
127c3: 151n77
127d3: 151n77
128a3: 151n77
128b8: 151n77
128c3: 151n77
128c7: 151n77
128d1: 152n78
128d3: 151n77
128d7: 152n77
128e2: 152n77
130e2: 244
135c5: 245
135d: 245
- Phaedo*
60e3: 236
60e7: 236
61a4: 236
61a5: 192
61b1: 236
61c5: 192n80
61d6–7: 115n44
63e10: 192n80
64b4–6: 115n44
66c2: 5n20
78a: 43n18
78a3–4: 43n18
82d: 192n80
85c: 268n30
86d: 268n30
91a: 192
96a: 266n24
96a6–b8: 161
96b1: 144n61
96c1–97b7: 161
97a8: 144n61
97b8–99d2: 269
97c1–2: 161
97c5–98b3: 161
98b4: 161
98c2: 161n15
98c2–3: 163n26

406 INDEX LOCORUM

- Phaedo* (cont.)
98d6–e1: 163n26
99b6–c1: 161n16
102a1: 192n80
111c4–e4: 139n43
127c3–e4: 269–70
- Phaedrus*
230d3: 192, 255
234e5–235a8: 239
236e5: 192
239a7–b4: 233–34
242b: 268n30
245a1–8: 236
245a6: 225n7
245c5–246a2: 168n37
247c5–e2: 236
248b4: 234
248c7: 234
248d2–3: 43n18, 234,
250n47
248d4–e3: 235
248e1: 225n7
249b5–d3: 22, 237
249d7–8: 278n57
249e3–4: 236
249e5–e1: 236
250a5–e1: 236
250b7–8: 236
252a1–b1: 234
256a6—b3: 238
256b2–3: 239
256b7–c7: 238
257a5: 225n7
257b4–6: 239
257b6: 233
259b3: 233
259d3: 236
259d3–8: 240
260a1–4: 240–41
260b1–d1: 241
260d3–9: 241
261a3–262c4: 232
261a4: 233
261a4–5: 241
261c: 155n96
263a6–11: 304n45
265b4: 225n7
266e: 155n96
267b: 171n47
269a6–c5: 168
269e1–2: 168
270a1: 144n64, 168, 311n57
270a5: 168
271d1–7: 136n31
274a1–2: 200n17
277d10–278b4: 242
278a: 4n5
278b: 231
278c4–d6: 241–42
278d: 22
278e5–279b1: 243
- Philebus*
57c2–3: 245n39
62d5: 225n7
- Protagoras*
312c8: 230n17
313c5–7: 230n17
315a1: 226
315c: 266n24
315c7: 263n6
316a7: 226
316c5–17c2: 7n15
316c5–317c7: 230n17
317c9–d8: 262n5
318e1–319a2: 175n56
318e2: 262n5
319b5: 206
319d: 154n90
334a1–335a7: 228
337c8–338b2: 263n7
338e7–a6: 226n11
342b8: 229–30
342d3: 230
342d5–6: 230
342e4: 278n57
342e6: 230
343a5–b2: 95n91
343b7: 101n120
347e: 269n35
- Republic*
327a1–328a10: 239
332b9: 225n7
333a: 154n90
335e9–10: 101n121

- 376a6: 251
376b: 180n61
376b6: 251
376b8: 251
387b3: 225n7
387b4: 225n7
393d8: 225n7
397e: 154n90
400b–c: 160n13
424c: 160n13
437d8–e8: 251
443c: 154n90
473c8: 250
474a1–3: 250
474a4–5: 250
474a5: 250
474b7: 250
474b10: 250
474c5: 250
474d2: 251
475a4: 251
475a6–8: 251
475a10–b2: 251
475b8–9: 252
475b10–c5: 252
475c7–10: 252
475d1–4: 252
475d4–9: 252
475e1–2: 252
475e7: 252
476a10–b2: 252
479b10–17: 252n48
479e10: 252
480a6: 252
487c–d: 302
488a5–7.: 298n30
488d5–489d1: 104n136
530d6–9: 116
535d5: 254–55n52
548e5: 254–55n52
600a4–7: 278n57
600a10–b3: 116
600e5: 225n7, 601a4
601a4: 225n7
606d4: 225n7
607a2: 225n7
607b6: 225n7
607d7: 225n7
608b7: 225n7
Rival Lovers
132c9: 312
132d1–2: 312
132d1–6: 312
132d3: 312
133a8–b1: 312
133c3–4: 132n21
133c7: 313
133c10–133d1: 313
133d6–e2: 313
134a8–9: 313
134a8–b2: 313
134c10–d2: 313
135a9–10: 313
135b1–d8: 313–14
135e1: 43n18
135e1–137b3: 314
136a8–b2: 313–14
136b10: 43n18
137a2: 315n63
138a8: 314–15
Sophist
216c: 192n79
218d–223d: 5n11
219b11: 225n6
219d1: 225n6
242c–244b: 278n59
253b–254a: 192n79
259e–260a: 192n79
265a4–266d5: 225n6
268b: 192n79
Statesman
299b7: 144n64
Symposium
202d6: 249–50
221e: 154n90
Theaetetus
146d: 154n90
152e1–8: 271
157e2–158d6: 54n48
164c7–10: 191
165a1: 182n64
167d–168c: 191n76
172c8–175b7: 145n65, 192
174a4–b6: 278n57

- Theaetetus* (cont.)
 175d10–e2: 192n78
 179e3–180b3: 270
 183e5–184b1: 270
 189e6–7: 201n19
 189e9–190a6: 201n19
 203b9: 69n7
- Timaeus*
 19d5: 225n7
 19e5: 43n18
 41d8: 304n48
- Pliny
Natural History
 2.149: 163n24
 7.42: 277n52
 7.52: 15n41
- Plutarch
Greek Questions (Quaestiones Graecae)
 295e: 103n127
Life of Lysander
 12: 163n24
Life of Nicias
 23: 163n24, 163n26
Life of Numa
 1.6: 264n17
Life of Pericles
 4: 155n95
 4.4–6.3: 169n41
 4.4–6.4: 168n36
 16.5–7: 168n36
 32: 163n24
Life of Solon
 3: 132n21
Life of Themistocles
 2.4: 70n12
 2.6–7: 103n129
Table Talk (Quaestiones convivales)
 728e: 140–41n46
That the Philosopher Ought to Converse Especially with Men in Power (Maxime cum principis philosopho esse disserendum)
 776b: 153n83
- Porphyry
Life of Pythagoras
 1: 108n4
- 6–8: 108n4
 9: 108n3, 108n5
 14–15: 108n6
 16: 108n3
 17: 108n4
 18: 109n10
 19: 14n38
 21: 109n12, 112n26
 30: 111n22
- On Abstinence from Animal Food*
 1.26.2–4: 10n26
 2.26: 295n22
- On the Cave of the Nymphs*
 21: 141n46
- Proclus
Chrestomathy
 1.4: 265n21
Commentary on Euclid's Elements
 66.16: 304n42
Commentary on Plato's Parmenides
 694.18: 151n77
Commentary on Plato's Republic
 2.113.6–9: 12n34
Commentary on Plato's Timaeus
 102,22: 39n7
- Quintilian
Institutes of Rhetoric
 3.1.8: 141n51
 3.1.10: 32n268
 12.1.19: 4n5, 322
- Sappho
 fragments
 16.1–4: 247n40
 56.2: 100n114
- Scholias
 Σ Apollonius of Rhodes *Argonautica*
 2.1248–50: 278n55
 Σ Aristophanes *Birds*
 521: 4n7
 Σ Euripides *Hippolytus*
 47: 4n7
 Σ Pindar *Olympian*
 7: 100n113

Σ Plato <i>Theaetetus</i>	α 2733: 200n14
179e: 39n7	α 2744: 155n96
Septuagint	α 2745: 155n96
<i>Proverbs</i>	γ 388: 207n34
29.3: 6n13	δ 41: 265n21
Sextus Empiricus	δ 454: 207n34
<i>Against the Mathematicians</i>	ε 738: 40n10
7.132: 52n45	ε 1002: 141n51
9.360: 160n11	ε 1007: 10n25
<i>Outlines of Pyrrhonism</i>	ζ 12: 109n12
2.244: 304n43	ζ 77: 151–52
Simplicius	η 461: 9n20
<i>Commentary on Aristotle's Physics</i>	η 472: 37n3
23,21–33: 278n55	ι 543: 265n21
27,23: 160n11	σ 806: 18n45
36,25–37,6: 273n42	τ 1019: 12n34
Solon	φ 154: 154n92
fragments	φ 214: 112n26
fr. 13.52: 100n14	φ 214.1–9: 278n57
fr. 27.16: 98n101	φ 414: 307n53
Sophocles	
<i>Antigone</i>	
347: 43	
1055: 88n71	
<i>Electra</i>	
416: 69n7	
846: 59n61	
850: 59n61	
fragments	
fr. 528: 88n71	
fr. 859: 248n44	
<i>Oedipus at Colonus</i>	
1487: 69n7	
Stobaeus	
<i>Anthology</i>	
2.1.21: 95n91	
2.31.68: 202n22	
2.31.76: 200n12	
2.31.116: 39n6, 39n7	
3.1.172: 95, 292n7	
3.1.173: 6n14, 254–55n52, 292n8	
4.32.21: 154n90	
4.37.23: 15n42	
<i>Suda</i>	
α 1283: 207n34, 269n34	
α 1981: 159n8, 163n24	
α 1987: 114n37	
	Tertullian
	<i>De anima</i>
	43: 12n34
	Theodoret
	<i>Cure for Greek Maladies</i>
	4.20: 10n28
	11.8: 10n27
	Theognis
	<i>Theognidea</i>
	60: 112n24
	120: 43n21, 97n99
	199: 87n66, 109n13
	502: 97n100
	563–65: 97n100
	790–92: 97n100
	849: 87n65
	876: 97n100
	1074: 97n100
	Thucydides
	<i>History</i>
	1.21: 155n96
	1.22: 24, 132n23
	1.122.4: 134n24
	2.40.1: 74n24, 250n47
	2.40.1–3: 132–35

410 INDEX LOCORUM

- History* (cont.)
2.40.2: 136n29
2.61.4: 134n24
2.65.7: 77n31
2.85.2: 134n24
3.82.4: 77n30, 247n41
3.82.8: 77n31
3.86: 143n60
5.7.2: 134n24
5.7.3: 134n24
8.89.3: 77n31
8.95: 198n7
- Valerius Maximus
Memorable Deeds and Sayings
8.7 ext. 2: 4n5, 72, 322
- Vatican Gnomologium*
4: 200n14, 200n16
7: 200n12
430: 201n18
743n166: 203n25
- Xenophon
Anabasis
1.9.5: 255n54
1.9.5.4: 248n44
2.1.12–13: 177
6.5.30: 280n67
7.2.8: 280n67
- Cynegeticus* (*On Hunting with Dogs*)
12–13: 5n11
- Cyropedia* (*Education of Cyrus*)
1.2.1: 255n54
1.3.3: 74n24
1.4.3: 255n54
1.6.8: 255n54
2.1.22: 74n24
7.5.67: 184n68
8.3.5: 74n24
8.3.49: 77n30, 247n42
- Hellenika* (*History of Greece*)
5.1.2: 198n7
7.2.20: 19n53
- Memorabilia* (*Memoirs of Socrates*)
1.1.11: 162n21, 162n22
1.2.16: 181
1.2.19: 176
1.2.29–30: 178
1.2.31: 166, 178
1.2.34–37: 179
1.2.37: 181
1.4.7: 82n42
1.6.2–3: 180
1.6.11–12: 181n63
1.6.12: 180
1.6.14: 182
1.11.11: 266n24
1.11.14: 266n24
2.1.21–34: 175
3.1.3: 69n7
3.11.9: 74n24
4.2: 181
4.2.1: 154n90, 172n50
4.2.2–6: 172n50
4.2.2–8: 174n55
4.2.8: 173n51
4.2.9: 173n51
4.2.10: 173n51
4.2.11: 172n50, 173n52
4.2.11–19: 175
4.2.12: 173n52
4.2.12–19: 172n50, 303n40
4.2.20: 173n52
4.2.23: 172–73
4.2.24–30: 174n54, 175
4.2.31–35: 174n54
4.2.36.39: 174n54
4.4.5–25: 175
4.4.6: 262
4.5.9: 175
4.6: 179
4.6.2–12: 176
4.7.6: 162, 162n20
4.7.7: 162n20
4.2.10: 173n51
- Oeconomicus* (*On Estate Management*)
1.3: 188n73

5.4: 184n68	1.5: 172, 175, 196
15.13: 188	2.26: 155n96
16.9: 186	3.6: 114n37
20.25–27: 254	4.14.4: 74
<i>Poroi</i>	4.33–44: 197n5
5.3: 180	4.62: 175, 184
<i>Symposium (Banquet)</i>	8.8: 134n24
1.4: 183, 196	8.39: 132n21, 185