CONTENTS

Acknowledgements · ix

Introduction 1

CHAPTER 1 The Rise of the Bacris 22
CHAPTER 2 War Comes to the Regency 51
CHAPTER 3 “Assassination of the King of the Jews”
(Long Live the King) 88
CHAPTER 4 Difficult Relationships 124
CHAPTER 5 Diplomacy, New and Old 161
CHAPTER 6 Invasion 195

Conclusion 222

References · 229
Index · 249
Introduction

Standing at the port of Algiers on a bright day in winter, you look north, out over the vast expanse of calm blue that is the Mediterranean Sea. The ferry to Marseilles is docked, awaiting its cargo of cars and passengers. Tall nineteenth-century buildings line the promenade along the water’s edge, forming a clean, straight, man-made line. Once proud and dignified, a marker of French civilization in Africa, they now stand empty, neglected, and decaying, casting sad shadows. The port is calm—surprisingly so in this bustling, Mediterranean city. But the port of Algiers is not the city’s central focus, as it once was. In its twenty-first-century guise, it betrays nothing of the productive chaos that once reigned here. At the end of the eighteenth century, as the Napoleonic Wars raged, Algiers was a major trading and corsairing port in the Mediterranean. There was a constant flow of merchant ships bringing luxury goods, highly prized by the ruling Turkish elite, and loading raw produce from the Algerian hinterland, from Europe and the New World. These same ships would load raw produce from the Algerian hinterland, for transport to Europe and America. Algerian corsairs roamed the sea between lands, capturing the ships of enemy powers, and snatching hapless victims from along its shores. They would tow in their booty, for sale and enslavement.

The marina was a hive of activity. Slaves, captured from the merchant ships that ran the gauntlet of the Mediterranean at war, loaded and unloaded cargoes. The foreign consuls resident in the city would rush down to the port to welcome any ship flying their
flag, with the hope that it brought news and letters. If one of their ships was captured, they would come to the marina to argue for the release of their countrymen. In the thick of business, at the water’s edge, consuls would rub shoulders with traders, who bought and sold everything that came through the port. These traders were the regency’s brokers, the vital link between the outside world and the ruling elite. They sourced the raw materials so desired by European regimes, they ordered the luxury goods that came from those same regimes, and if a corsair towed in a captured ship, they would be there, to negotiate purchase of cargo, crew, and passengers, as well as the ship itself, for sale to the highest bidder. Often, the traders were Jews. Elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, Jews competed with local Christians—Greeks and Armenians, as well as Muslims—for access to trade, and to all the roles brokers could occupy. In Algiers, there was no significant Christian minority to provide competition, and Jews alone could take advantage of this lucrative space. In the late eighteenth century, as the wars of the French Revolution broke out, the most prominent among them was one sprawling family, the Bacris.

The Bacris, and the debt owed to them by France, have long been linked in the historiography to the diplomatic contretemps that set off France’s invasion of the regency in 1830.1 In 1827, on April 29, the French consul, Pierre Deval, had paid a formal visit to the Dey—or ruler of Algiers—Hussein, to mark the festival of Eid al-Fitr, the end of Ramadan. Hussein was not in a festive mood. He was angry with France. He believed that King Charles X and his regime were withholding several million francs that they owed the regency, for deliveries of wheat dating back to 1794. This wheat had been supplied by the Bacris. Hussein was their business partner, and some of this money was owed to him. As France’s representative, Deval had been instructed to hold his ground, and not to dignify the Dey Hussein’s repeated demands with a formal response from France. But on that day, as Deval stood before him, Hussein saw the consul’s refusal to budge as unbearable insolence. Furious, Hussein grabbed a huge fan that one of his slaves was using to keep flies away. He struck Deval across the face with the fan, three times. This was a

1. See the discussion in McDougall, A History of Algeria, 50–51.
diplomatic insult, and France responded with a list of demands. They wanted an apology, punishment of the Algerian pirates who had been plaguing France’s ships, the right to bear arms in Algiers, a statement that France would enjoy a most-favored-nation treat-ment in Algerian commerce, and a declaration from the dey that the French government had, in fact, completely liquidated the debt owed to the extended Bacri family for the wheat they had sup-plied to France. Hussein responded, in turn, with a list of his own grievances, including the money that he believed was still owed. With his response, tantamount to a refusal of France’s conditions, French warships commenced a blockade of the Algerian coast on June 12, 1827, and, so the story has gone, the spat simply escalated from there.

The Bacris, and France’s debt, have provided an easy, linear nar-rative of the invasion. But behind the tale of misplaced diplomacy and the French invasion is the fascinating and important story of how the Bacris came to occupy such a central place in international relations. For some four decades, from the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars to the invasion of Algiers, the five Bacri brothers, their children, and their nephew, Naftali Busnach, were perhaps the best-known Jewish families trading in the Mediterra-nean Sea. Their trading house sent prized Algerian wheat around the Mediterranean and beyond, to Northern Europe and America. They brought in colonial goods from the Atlantic, and luxury goods from Europe. They insured boats, and they armed corsairing ships. When captured enemy boats were towed into Algiers Harbor, the Bacris would sell off the cargo. When unfortunate members of the ship’s crew, or even its passengers, were enslaved, as was the standard practice, the Bacris would lend money at interest to foreign consuls, so that they might buy back their citizens from the regency. They made loans to consuls to buy luxury gifts for the dey, too, as well as for his extended family and his ministers. So present were members of the extended Bacri family in the lives of consuls that they featured in virtually every letter sent home to the metropole,


3. Because members of the Bacri family were the main figures in this history, and for the purpose of simplicity, I will refer to the two interrelated families together as “the Bacris.”
and they were no less well known in the centers of power. Jacob Bacri—one of the brothers—was invited to dinner with Napoleon, who personally designated the task of supplying his armies to the family. Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson puzzled over how to deal with the Bacris. American Secretaries of Foreign Affairs Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe considered strategies that would allow them to circumvent the Bacris’ influence.

The Bacris were everywhere. Yet history writing, siloed into sub-disciplines, has not been able to accommodate them. Like the now-silent port of Algiers, their story has been lost in a space between historiographical fields and absolute dates. Histories of the wars in the Mediterranean and its shores are always told from within the bounds of one national narrative, whether British, French, or American. Notwithstanding their involvement in all aspects of trade, including corsairing and slavery, Jews do not figure in the histories of these activities. Nor has space been allowed for trading Jews in the broader histories of the Mediterranean for this period. Jews are always absent from these histories, as though somehow separate from events in which they were involved, and from people with whom they dealt. The history of Jewish trade in the Mediterranean has been told as a stand-alone story, distinct from the histories that surround it. This failure of historians of the Mediterranean to consider Jewish traders and brokers, present throughout the Ottoman Empire, is an opportunity missed. How would these histories change if we let them interact, just as their protagonists interacted? What do we find, and what new questions are we able to ask, if we shift our angle of vision from metropole to periphery, and place these brokers at the center of analysis? These questions lie at the heart of this book.

Periodization, too, has left an empty space where the Bacris exist. In terms of their activity as traders, the family descends from the Sephardic Jews who dominated Mediterranean trade in the sixteenth century. These refugees from the Inquisition established some of the most extraordinary trade networks the world has seen, unprecedented in their scope and spread. Setting up

4. Colley, Captives; Jasanoff, Edge of Empire; Panzac, Les Corsaires barbaresques; Weiss, Captives and Corsairs.
new communities all around the Mediterranean and beyond, they took advantage of new shipping technologies and built a global web that crossed oceans, rather than land. It stretched from the Ottoman Empire to the Caribbean, and from Spanish America to Europe. They brought new-world products to eager old-world markets, including sugar, spices, silver and gold bullion, diamonds, pearls, hides, tobacco, cacao, silks and American wood dyes, ostrich feathers, indigo, cochineal, ginger, and coffee. These Jews were in a unique position. They could take advantage of a moment in history that offered full access to the Atlantic for the first time. They could take advantage of their Jewishness, which made them trusted middlemen for the Ottoman powers, and they could make use of their knowledge of European languages, the networks of contacts they had left behind, and those they had created in their new homes.

The historiography of these Jews comes to a halt with the eighteenth century. Indeed, as Francesca Trivellato has noted, the Mediterranean, and Sephardi Jewry, “disappear” from most accounts of early modern European trade after the mid-seventeenth century. According to the historians of these Jews and their trading networks, their unique position allowed for their rise to dominance, and a similar pattern announced their decline. 1750 has been set in the literature as the marker of this latter phenomenon. Portuguese conversos—Jews who had converted to Catholicism—gradually stopped emigrating to fertile ports in the new world, and their distinctiveness and significance as a trading community in Portugal and Spain also waned. This meant that their fellow Jews, Jewish or nominally Christian, in Northern Europe and Italy no longer had a network of agents on whom they could rely. These factors led to the steady and certain downturn of Sephardi Transatlantic trade. The Sephardi trading network lost “its momentum and creative drive, and its capacity to adapt.” Once-flourishing communities were weakened and impoverished. Sephardi communities dispersed and assimilated, and “not infrequently” crypto-Jews renounced their secret practices of ritual.

5. Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 4.
Judaism.\textsuperscript{7} The history of Jewish trade is only picked up more than two centuries later. Between one strain of historiography and the next, lies a gap, as Sarah Stein wrote of the late nineteenth century, “a confluence of significance and silence”.\textsuperscript{8}

Jewish trading networks never managed to retrieve the extraordinary spread and influence of the networks established by refugees from the Iberian Peninsula, but Jews around the Mediterranean did not stop trading. Sephardic Jews had shown themselves to be wonderfully capable of accommodating change when they left their lives behind them. If we look for the Jews who remained in Mediterranean ports, then we find them adapting to changed circumstances but still active, still trading, and still taking full advantage of their unique position. The networks established by Spanish and Portuguese Jews might have been breaking down, and the once-thriving trading port of Livorno on Italy’s northwest coast might have been at the beginning of its stagnation, but France and Britain had entered the Mediterranean, and this presented a new context for trade. We might approach this story anew as a tale of adaptation, rather than decline. The nature and patterns of trade changed, but trading did not stop, and there was no reason for enterprising Jewish traders to stop either. Following their trail leads us to the continuation of this history, through to the Revolutionary Wars, where this story begins.

By the time the Revolutionary Wars broke out in 1793, the extended Bacri-Busnach family was well-established in business. Initially, the Bacris were a family of five brothers: Mordecai, Solomon, Abraham, Joseph, and Jacob. Their father, David Bacri, had set up a trading house in the regency of Algiers in 1774.\textsuperscript{9} Within less than a decade, it was prospering. David Bacri brought four of his sons into the business. Abraham, the fifth son, was also involved in family affairs, but seems to have taken the role of fixer, traveling around the Mediterranean as needed. In 1798, the brothers extended the business to include their nephew Naphtali Busnach, the son of an unnamed Bacri sister. The Bacris were independent

\textsuperscript{7} Israel, Diasporas within a Diaspora, 38–39.
\textsuperscript{8} Stein, Plumes, 6.
\textsuperscript{9} Eisenbeth, “Les Juifs en Algérie,” 373.”
traders and financiers, or brokers. They belonged to the well-established Jewish communities in the regency of Algiers, where Jews made up around ten percent of the population. This was a loose community, made up of different groups, separated by origin. The original Jewish inhabitants had been present in the region since Roman times. In late antiquity, they had been joined by Berbers who had adopted Judaism. Later came Jews fleeing the Inquisition, and those who had come, or returned, from the port of Livorno.\(^\text{10}\) With centuries of cohabitation, distinctions between long-established Arab Jews and the more recently arrived Andalusi refugees became less distinct, although they could still be separated by class. The majority lived modestly as artisans, often beside and in close contact with their Muslim neighbors, “indistinguishable from the other poorer classes of society.”\(^\text{11}\) A small elite were merchants; among them the Bacris. They were able to gain proximity to state power in Algiers through the position of *muqaddam*, or head of the Jewish community. The *muqaddam* represented the Jewish community to the dey and was given entry into the circle of the regency’s elite. As different members of the family became *muqaddam*, they were able to gain the trust of the ruling dey and elite, and become their broker, both in trade and diplomacy. In this sense, in the way it gave them such prized access to power, their Jewishness was central to their success. Deys came to rely on members of the family as intermediaries in both trade and diplomatic negotiations. Mordecai was the first of the five brothers to act as diplomat for the dey. As the trusted advisor to Hassan, he helped negotiate the peace treaty concluded with Holland in March 1794.\(^\text{12}\) In early 1795, Mordecai assisted the Swedish consul in a negotiation with the dey for the ransom of approximately one hundred American slaves.

Brokers such as the Bacris were vital for Europeans in the Ottoman Empire.\(^\text{13}\) Armenian, Greek, and Jewish minorities, as well


12. Mordecai is referred to in French sources as either Mardochée, Michel, or Micaïo, a name that might best translate to Mordecai, or else Michael, in English. Names written in Hebrew characters could enjoy a variety of equivalencies, and spellings, in translation. The most consistent name given this particular brother was Mardochée, which translates to Mordecai. For the purpose of consistency, this is the name I will use.

as Muslims, were traders, interpreters, and guides. Trade in the Mediterranean did not experience the “revolution of scale” that occurred in the Atlantic in the late seventeenth century, where a smaller number of actors were able to control ever larger segments of the market. Rather, it was made up of numerous small and medium-sized companies, forming networks between major ports. Nor were European powers able to exert control over production, prices, and transport, as they had done in Southeast Asia and the new world. In the Mediterranean, Europeans were dependent on the negotiation of concessions, and on an array of traders and financiers, including the Bacris: “Local brokers, suppliers, and lenders.”

In Algiers, Europeans were barely represented. In the eighteenth-century regency, the only French trading house was the Compagnie royale d’Afrique (Royal African Company), and there were hardly any English or Dutch traders. This lack of competition from both local and European Christians meant that Jews like the Bacris could occupy multiple spaces in the regency’s economic and political hierarchy. They were brokers and dragomen, or interpreters, capable of speaking Italian and Spanish, as well as Turkish. They acted as financial agents for the consulates.

Jewish historians have brought Jewish brokers in North Africa to life. They have shown how Jews, who so often occupied middle spaces, bring to light the nature of relations between states on the ground, in the Barbary States. Daniel Schroeter chronicled the life of Meir Macnin, who traded from Essaouira, Morocco’s principal trading port. He was one of a group of elite Jews who monopolized virtually the entirety of Morocco’s trade with Europe in the early nineteenth century. These elite Jews were crucial to the ruling elite and foreign merchants who came to seek opportunity in this new town. The absolutist regime within which Macnin operated offered opportunities that were unprecedented, given the regime’s hunger for wealth and Macnin’s place, as a merchant possessing

Kalman, Orientalizing the Jew. On the role of Jews as go-betweens in the Ottoman Empire, see, also, Schroeter, The Sultan’s Jew, 121; Philipp, “The Farhi Family,” 37–52.

15. Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, 104.
“a network of financial and commercial connections.” Schreier has told the story of another successful Jewish merchant, Jacob Lasry, who traded from the port of Oran, on the coast of the regency of Algiers. Schreier’s story spanned the years of invasion and occupation by French forces, and he sought to counter the classic narrative whereby French dynamism reversed decline and brought civilization to the downtrodden and primitive. Instead, Schreier showed how Lasry’s activities and his role as middleman during those years served to destabilize binaries such as colonizer and colonized, and to bring to light the messiness of the French project of colonization in Oran. Like Macnin and Lasry, the Bacris’ context facilitated their rise. But the Bacris were able to go further than their contemporaries in their pursuit of wealth, notoriety, and power. They operated as a family, allowing them to spread around the Mediterranean, building their own family networks. They were able, too, to profit from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which created a situation of chaos and urgent need.

It mattered that the Bacris were Jews, because their Jewishness enabled their entry into the circle of state power. As “insider-outsiders” in the Empire, Jews could claim a fruitful middle space, between Muslim authorities and foreign, Christian powers, seeking ingress and access. As muqaddam, they were able to gain access to the circle of state power. Ottoman authorities, of course, understood the place of religious minorities differently from Western Europe. Rather than impose Islam by force, Ottoman rulers accommodated religious diversity, through the Pact of Umar. This pact established the principle of dhimmitude, whose purpose was to define the status of non-Muslim minorities in the Muslim state. Jews, and the many branches of Christianity in the Middle East, were seen as People of the Book: monotheistic people who had received divine revelation, but before the coming of Islam. They occupied a middle ground between savagery and full enlightenment. Thus they were subject to certain measures geared toward ensuring separation and subordination, but at the same time, they enjoyed communal autonomy.

Muslim rulers in the regencies that made up the empire had to find the balance between holding Western powers at arm’s length, and allowing them in. It was a Muslim ruler’s duty to protect his community from any ingress of a power beyond the realm of Islam. At the same time, however, it was important to maintain trade with non-Muslim nations, as this could aid and strengthen Islam. This created a space in the Ottoman Empire that both Jews and Christians could fill. Jews did not need to be protected from corruption by non-Muslims in the same way as Muslims did, and they posed no threat in terms of challenges to rule. Across the empire, Ottoman sultans, deys, and beys relied not only on Jewish traders, but also physicians, tax collectors, and administrators.

It was the Bacri family’s good fortune to be in the regency. In the Revolutionary Wars being fought in the Mediterranean, Algiers was an important strategic port for all those powers whose ships sailed that sea, but particularly for France and Britain. The regency of Algiers was a semi-independent province in the westernmost reaches of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish elite that ruled the regency was recruited and imposed from the Empire’s center. Both France and Britain had been implanting themselves in the Barbary Coast for some time, and had managed to establish strong trade relationships, particularly in the grain that they both needed. The eighteenth century saw a revival of European trade in the Mediterranean. Britain and France had long-standing diplomatic relationships with the Ottoman Empire. France had been granted concessions—fiscal and jurisdictional privileges that local rulers granted to foreign entities—in the early sixteenth century, allowing them to build and run enclaves along the North African coast. Half a century later, Britain followed, establishing the Levant Company in 1581. This was created by Elizabeth I, who granted a royal charter to a corporation of English merchants, so that they could establish a trading monopoly with the Ottoman Empire (although in fact, their presence in North Africa was weak). In part, the commercial expansion of both powers was a diplomatic move. Both France and Britain hoped that trade relations with the Ottoman Empire would constitute a strong enough alliance to block Spain. But neither France nor Britain wished for the other power to enjoy that protection: France protested the establishment of the Company.
outset of the establishment of trade relations with the Ottomans, France and Britain were in competition with one another.\textsuperscript{21} The Bacris derived enormous benefit from this contest.

In eighteenth-century North Africa, France was the dominant power. France was Algeria’s main client, and Algeria was France’s main supplier. For fifty years, from 1740, nine-tenths of the wheat brought into Marseilles for distribution throughout France was of Algerian origin.\textsuperscript{22} There was constant traffic between Marseilles and various towns along the Algerian coastline. Barbary grain was vital for France. It ensured supply to the Midi, regularly threatened by famine, and it fed France’s revolutionary armies in Egypt, and later in Italy. Supplies of grain, meat, and other products from the Barbary States were equally vital for British garrisons on Gibraltar, as well as for Malta, when the latter came under British control in 1801.\textsuperscript{23} Minorca, where another garrison was stationed, had never been able to feed itself, and most years it had to import grain from Algiers. This trade was of fundamental importance to the life of the island, and thus to the maintenance of British power in the Mediterranean.

France and Britain were competing for the raw products that the Algerian market had to offer, and over which the Bacris, in effect, had monopolies. Both powers dedicated significant resources to their capture, protection, and exploitation. The Mediterranean and the shores that bordered it were important strategic points during this period, even if that body of water did not become a theater of outright war. French and British actions regarding the regency fit into what Dzavid Dzanic has called “informal imperial tactics,” “the extraction of economic, political, and legal concessions from peripheral polities through the erosion of their sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{24} But this was also mercantile imperialism. In Cornel Zwierlein’s formulation, applied to an earlier period, mercantilist imperialism involved the “nationalization of economics,” its organizing logic “the distinction between the trade of ‘our’ nation and that of others.”\textsuperscript{25} Imperialism, in this time of war, was profoundly competitive, as France and Britain, and their allies

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Gale, “Beyond Corsairs,” 39; Vlami, \textit{Trading with the Ottomans}, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Touati, “L’Algérie au ‘siècle du blé.’”
\item \textsuperscript{23} Gale, “Beyond Corsairs,” 51. See also Horn, \textit{British Diplomatic Service}, 35.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Dzanic, “France’s Informal Empire in the Mediterranean,” 2.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Zwierlein, \textit{Imperial Unknowns}, 20.
\end{itemize}
and enemies, all competed for preference and preferential access to exports, while also seeking to block the other, in an extension of the war being fought across Europe and in its surrounding seas.  

Algeriers was useful, but it was just as important to maintain good relations with the regency, so as to shut the other out. In much the same spirit, in 1802, shortly before he departed for the Mediterranean, Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson wrote of Malta, “It must never belong to France—Britain does not want it.” Algeriers was central in both French and British reckoning in the early nineteenth-century Mediterranean.

Consuls had the often-difficult job of representing these competing empires. Consuls were the agents of informal imperialism on the ground, and they all developed relationships of varying closeness and reliance with members of the extended Bacri family. As Joshua Meeks has demonstrated, competition in the Mediterranean during the Revolutionary Wars was a contest of military might, but it also played out diplomatically, through “conversation and negotiation.” In late eighteenth-century Algeriers, the Revolutionary War and imperial contest played out on the ground, through diplomacy that was, at times, barely diplomatic. Consuls representing France and Britain, but also the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Spain, battled to impose a regime of informal imperialism on the regency. This would allow them exclusive and advantageous access to all the precious grain and other primary produce that the regency had to offer, as well as rights to lucrative coral fishing. It would serve to avoid, or circumvent, all the irritations the regency presented, particularly the capture of their boats by its Algerian corsairs, and the enslavement of their citizens. It would deflect this activity onto competitors or enemies. The Bacris were central to these processes in more than one way. As the contest continued and loyalties shifted through the wars, consuls remained convinced that the Bacris always worked to favor their

27. Nicolas, ed., Nelson, vol. 5, 36. Later, of course, in 1803, Nelson stated what Chris Bayly called “the new doctrine”: that Malta was “the most important outwork to India, and that it will give us great influence in the Levant and indeed in all the southern parts of Italy.” Cited in Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 103.
competitor, to their own disadvantage. How did this shape their own ambitions?

All consuls in the Barbary regencies were generally required to play a more extensive role than their confreres elsewhere. Consuls were ambassadors in all but name (they could not assume the title, as Western states officially had diplomatic relations with the sultan, in Istanbul). In North Africa, their responsibilities extended beyond the economic (seeking new products and markets), and into the domain of the political. British consuls on the Barbary Coast were treated differently from most other consuls in the British service. They were managed by the Home Office, separated from the main branch of the British consular service, which was under the direction of the Foreign Office. In the sense that they essentially worked as diplomats, undertaking political as well as the normal economic duties of the “merchant-consul,” they did, indeed, have different responsibilities from the standard posting for the average British consul. French consuls in North Africa, too, played a more extensive role than their confreres elsewhere. It was only in the Ottoman Empire, in fact, that French consuls had “a truly political role to play.” In the Barbary regencies in particular, part of the consul’s responsibilities was to negotiate treaties, and this required the establishment and maintenance of good relations with the dey and his entire ministry, or divan. This was not easy. As the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars progressed, and islands in the Mediterranean were gained and lost, treaties had to be constantly renegotiated. Each new treaty required the regular presentation of sumptuous gifts, and deys could choose to reject anything that they considered to be insufficiently luxurious. There was always a Bacri in the middle of these transactions, managing both finances and

29. Much of the scholarship of consular studies has focused on postings in the North African states of Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and Morocco, because of the unique demands of these positions for both French and British consuls. See Pennell, “The Social History of British Diplomats in North Africa,” 348; Platt, The Cinderella Service; Marzagalli, “American Shipping into the Mediterranean,” 43–62.
diplomacy, and thus placing themselves at the center of relations of power in the regency.

For the consuls of both nations, the broadening of their responsibilities was due to their isolation, both from the ambassador in Constantinople, and their minister in Paris or London. Consuls along the Barbary Coast were distanced from the metropole. Corsairing and piracy, but also—in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—war, interrupted the passage of mail. With no instructions arriving from the metropole, these consuls, who often had a very detailed and long-standing knowledge of the world of their posting, were forced to adapt, on their own initiative, to changing circumstances and diplomatic expectations; to create diplomatic policy “on the hoof.” Consular policies were forced to adapt, and the consuls in Algiers had a wide remit.

Among consuls’ tasks was dealing with the consequences of corsairing, the practice whereby enemy ships would be captured, with ship and cargo sold, and passengers taken into slavery. Corsairing was sanctioned and often directly funded by the state. The goal of corsairing was to make money through spoils and prisoners, so unlike pirates, corsairs did not kill. Rather, they sought to bring their booty into a safe port in the best possible state, so as to maximize their profit. At sea, corsairs would capture enemy boats carrying goods and people. The captured boat would be taken to port, and there, both the boat and its cargo would be sold, and passengers and crew enslaved, either to be sold or ransomed. These were the established and accepted parameters of the practice. All the states of the Barbary Coast had corsairing ships: not just Algiers, but also Tunis and Tripoli, and the short-lived seventeenth-century city-state of Salé, established by Moriscos from Spain, and located on today’s Moroccan coast. Corsairing ships from the Maghreb stole thousands of men from ships, but also from shores. From lone shepherds to entire villages, none were safe from them. Many thus stolen never returned home.

Algiers was a corsairing port. Corsairs, sponsored by the dey, would regularly capture the ships of French and British allies,

34. Pennell, “The social history of British diplomats in North Africa,” 348. See also Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans, 344.
35. Weiss, Captives and Corsairs, 1, 7.
towing them into port, distributing their riches, and enslaving their crew and passengers. Corsairing had declined over the course of the eighteenth century, but in the shipping chaos caused by the Revolution, it enjoyed new impetus. Algerian, but also French and British corsairs, roamed the Mediterranean, often capturing ships carrying Bacri goods. The Bacris would charter the ships of neutral powers and load them with goods for non-neutral ports, such as Marseilles. Woe betide any corsair that captured a Bacri ship. The Bacris always involved the dey in their trading ventures, and he would angrily demand restitution and compensation for any ship caught for which the Bacris sustained a loss. Over the years of the war and beyond, the Bacris drew various powers into long drawn-out battles for restitution of goods or the payment of their value. Due to the involvement of deys in the Bacris’ business, these spats were often elevated to the level of state relations, and consuls were inevitably the messengers.

Consuls were also required to maintain almost constant trade negotiations, a process in which members of the Bacri family played a central role.\textsuperscript{36} Every consul had a dragoman, or interpreter, but they would often find that a Bacri would interpose himself in the middle of negotiations, whether they be economic or political. Bacris did not make a distinction. All the consuls interacted with the brothers and their nephew regularly, whether for trade, financial, or diplomatic negotiations. If they didn’t quite socialize, they nonetheless spent considerable time in one another’s company and homes, discussing strategies and making deals. The diplomatic correspondence is rife with tales of the exploits of Mordecai, Jacob, Joseph, his son David, and Naphtali Busnach. Consuls reported conversations verbatim; they gave close descriptions of physique and character. The Bacris bring these separate sets of diplomatic correspondence together. They become a focal point of the contest between France and Britain in particular, and they shine light on it from an external, nonnational perspective. Thus they, and the dynamic of contest that they reveal, are the focus of this book.

\textsuperscript{36} See Kämpe, “Competition and Cooperation,” 37; Calafat, “Les Juridictions du consul.”
Consuls were the agents of imperialism in Algiers. Imperialism in the regency was informal, in more than one sense. It was informal, because those powers that sought imperial influence did not seek to formalize their relations of power, but instead, for the most part, allowed consuls to act as representative agents. But it was informal, also, because it was mediated by personal relations. It was here that the Bacris were expert. The world in which they operated was governed by personal relationships: between the Bacris and the dey, as well as his ministers, and between the Bacris and various consuls. This was why the Bacris always sought to establish a personal relationship with any new consul in the regency. Those representing the lesser powers in the regency, such as American and Swedish consuls, tended to acquiesce in these relationships. French and British consuls would react to overtures with astonishment and outrage. It was an insult that one often levelled at the other, that they were in league with the family. It would not do for the representatives of these great, competing nations to be drawn into the Bacris’ web.

The newly created United States of America, a particularly significant latecomer to the Mediterranean, understood the contest in different terms. The signing of the Declaration of Independence did not mark the beginning of US shipping to the Mediterranean. Ships from New Britain, protected by the crown, had been sailing to the Western Mediterranean since the seventeenth century. They had immunity from attack by corsairs bought by the British government, which paid tribute to the Barbary States for protection. In the ports of Southern Europe, British-American colonists found willing buyers for their cod and grain.37 With the independence of the United States in the late eighteenth century, this shipping met new challenges as the new republic sought to assert itself as an independent trading power. After 1783, US ships could no longer rely on the security provided by the cover of the British flag. Indeed, in a practice it was to use widely throughout the years of war, Britain used Barbary corsairs as proxies in the trade contest, both stifling US trade and leaving the sea clear for British merchantmen. It was

37. This discussion draws on Silvia Marzagalli’s important and groundbreaking work on American shipping in the Mediterranean, as part of the larger Navigocorpus project. Marzagalli, “American Shipping into the Mediterranean,” 43.
effective. US vessels became easy prey to the depredations of Barbary corsairs. They were frequently raided, and trade suffered terribly. In 1785, Algerian corsairs took two US ships: the Maria and the Dauphin. By December 1795, there were approximately 150 US slaves in Algiers.

The United States, too, had to deal with the Bacris. In the final years of the eighteenth century, pressure from US shipowners to continue and extend trade in the Mediterranean did not abate. US grain, naval stores (resin-based components such as tar, pitch, turpentine, pine oil, and rosin, used in building and maintaining wooden sailing ships), as well as dried cod, and rum were in demand in Europe’s Mediterranean ports, and the number of US ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar was increasing. In March 1794, Congress narrowly approved the creation of a navy, authorizing the building of four forty-four-gun and two thirty-six-gun ships of war. In a test of the new republic’s abilities on the world stage, Congress also sought peace with Algiers, the busiest corsairing state.38 Bacris were at the center of negotiations. Joseph Donaldson Jr. was employed to bargain with Dey Hassan. After some discussion, they reached terms: the United States would pay Hassan $642,500 in cash, as well as an annual tribute in naval stores to the value of $21,600. This was equal to an extraordinary seventeen percent of the annual US budget. It was Mordecai Bacri who supplied the necessary gifts for the dey and his family, at a value of approximately $21,000.39 This was a peace bought dearly, but as Jefferson saw it, “when the Barbary States threatened American trade in the Mediterranean, they threatened the well-being of the American Republic.”40

The US Senate ratified the treaty in early 1796. This did not mark the end of US efforts to ensure the safety of its shipping in the Mediterranean. Peace could be fragile, if the annual tribute was late, or if a ruler chose to dislike the diplomatic presents. But the Revolutionary War presented too good an opportunity to pass up. US ships, neutral in the war, could offer their services for

39. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, 103.
40. Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty, 7.
intra-Mediterranean trade, and the Bacris were always ready with a cargo. With French ports blockaded, and British ships stopping and seizing any ship flying the French flag, or carrying French cargo, the need for neutral ships to keep maritime trade alive was great. The wars began a period of unprecedented growth and great prosperity for US shipping. Between 1790 and 1807, US shipping into the Mediterranean grew by five to six times.\textsuperscript{41}

In order to help ships’ captains and merchants deal with local authorities, the United States established consular posts in Tangier, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. In Algiers, Richard O’Brien, master of the ship Dauphin when it had been captured in 1785 and captive in Algiers since that time, became US consul for the port city, and consul general for all of the Barbary States. It was O’Brien who named the Bacris and Naphtali “The Kings of Algiers.”\textsuperscript{42} Consuls were to help secure US shipping by providing assistance to US ships and acting as intermediary in any interaction with local authorities. They were also required to provide information on the local economy and trade possibilities. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering was a keen reader of this information. He believed “the enterprise of American merchants and navigators would prompt them to visit the ports of the Barbary powers” if they were well-informed, and able to do so safely.\textsuperscript{43} He estimated that Mediterranean trade before independence had counted for one-sixth of the wheat and flour, and one-quarter of the fish traded from the American colonies. This trade loaded “outwards from eighty to one hundred ships, annually, of 20,000 tons, navigated by about 1,200 seamen.”\textsuperscript{44} The goods came from all parts of the United States. The Mediterranean did not take the bulk of US trade and shipping. It was nonetheless considered important enough to warrant a costly, drawn-out war against Tripoli. In the Mediterranean, Marzagalli argues, the US

\textsuperscript{41} Marzagalli, “American Shipping and Trade in Warfare,” 23–24.

\textsuperscript{42} National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Atlanta, State Department Consular Despatches, Algiers Series, M23, roll 3, vol. 2, n.p., August 24, 1797, O’Brien to Secretary of State Pickering.

\textsuperscript{43} Cited (but not referenced) in Wright and Macleod, The First Americans in North Africa, 29.

\textsuperscript{44} Jefferson, “Report of the Secretary of State Relative to the Mediterranean Trade.” Also cited in De Goey, Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism.
government “cut its diplomatic teeth.” But this was the different diplomacy of a new nation seeking to establish its credentials on an international stage. The United States did not seek to compete with France and Britain to gain influence in the regency. Nor did it try to block powers it saw as hostile. Like their fellows, US consuls dealt daily with members of the Bacri family. But the United States’ different investment in the regency means that US consuls could generally stand outside the imperial contest between France and Britain and see it for what it was. Their letters and reports provide us with an important external view of the relationship between the Bacris, the French and British consuls, and the Dey of Algiers.

The Bacris sit at the center of this history. It is a history of what it was to be a Jewish trader in this volatile world: the opportunities and constraints they faced, the challenges of devising business strategies in the face of these, and the ways in which the different contexts in which they operated—strategic port city, secular republic, semi-independent regency of an Islamic empire—contributed to and complicated their fortunes. It is a history of Jewishness, too, and the ways in which this was perceived and understood by those who dealt with the Bacris. Jewishness is a presence throughout this book: it is central to the Bacris’ story. At times, this is a positive attribute, one that allowed the family to reach levels of great influence in the regency by virtue of being neither Christian nor Muslim. But in the regency, all of the advantages of being a Jewish broker in Algiers could also be vulnerabilities. Deys, chosen by the elite Ottoman infantry that was the janissary corps, came and went. Many did not die in their beds. When a dey was deposed, his trusted advisor would be left exposed. Two of the Bacris were murdered either because of or by their dey. Naphtali’s extraordinary rise to power engendered disquiet and jealousy among the broader population, alarmed at the power vested in one Jew. He was assassinated by a janissary. David, Joseph’s son, was to be the victim of the vicious jealousy of the Duran family: trading Jews who also sought the advantage of the post of muqaddam, and bitter rivals to the Bacris. David was killed on the dey’s orders, after the

46. Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, 266.
Durans spread rumors about him. Jews in the regency who sought advancement could be seen to be too powerful, and this could have serious consequences.

At other times, the Bacris’ Jewishness was the reason behind great hostility from the Europeans with whom the Bacris dealt, who brought ideas of Jews and Judaism from their own societies. In the eyes of Europeans and Americans, Jews were the deicide people, and their lowly position in most Western societies was fully deserved. Jews in France had been emancipated, but as Napoleon’s partial reversal of this emancipation suggests, they were held to a very high standard of behavior. For foreigners in the regency, it was an affront to Christianity—and for the French in particular, an affront to the nation—that Jews could act assertively, as the Bacris did. It is perhaps because of their confidence and ambition that they were perceived to be inordinately powerful. It is impossible to know whether the Bacris were as powerful as consuls made out, but it is important that consuls perceived them to be so. It is rare that the Bacris’ voices can be heard unmediated. For the most part, they come to us by way of consular letters, as well as a precious handful of letters that they themselves wrote, to various ministers in Paris, when the French government placed the family and their assets under sequestration. The Bacris’ Jewishness—with all of its baggage and connotations—was the lens through which they were perceived and understood, and this book traces the implications of these perceptions, both for consuls and the powers they represented and for the Bacris themselves.

This is also a family story, and the book is structured chronologically, following the extended Bacri family’s heady successes, and their equally dramatic failures. Family ties were no guarantee of cohesiveness, trust, or protection; family loyalty lasted only as long as each family member did their job well. Much of the drama that drives this book turns around the youngest brother, Jacob. His business correspondence reveals the breakdown in relations and growing acrimony between the brothers and their Busnach cousins. A massive fraud committed by a Busnach against a Bacri would echo down the generations, as family members pursued one another through the courts of Europe for money, and family disputes played out on a wide stage.
The Bacris were Jewish traders. As we have seen, their identity and status as Jews was essential to access the politics and economy of the regency. It also allowed them to force their way into events taking place around them. When their story is allowed to interact with the surrounding histories—just as they themselves interacted with their patchwork, varied world—it brings to life a history of war, competitive imperialism, corsairing, slavery, and global trade in the nineteenth-century Mediterranean. It expands and enriches British imperial history, bringing Britain back into the Mediterranean, in a time when their presence there has been lost to the historiography. It gives shape to an early, self-conscious United States, seeking to be recognized as a national player on the big stage of international diplomacy and trade. It tells the story of France and Algiers from a perspective where the invasion marks an ending, rather than a beginning, giving depth and nuance to the story that follows. By starting at the periphery, rather than in the metropole, by taking a perspective that looks north, across the Mediterranean, we see the formal history of French imperialism in a new way. The Bacris bring these histories together.

The Bacris sat between the representatives of an old, weakening empire and the nascent nations that wished to expand into it. They give us new access to and perspective on relations between the two. They allow us to revisit old stories and pose new and important questions. We know that in war, imperialism, and diplomacy, policies were formed in the metropole. But how did they play out on the ground? What happened when a nation's representatives came up against others, whether competitors or independent brokers, who had conflicting ambitions? The relations between consuls and members of the extended Bacri family allow us to explore how the imperatives of the Napoleonic war, imperialism, and international relations played out, and were adapted and reshaped, “through incessant concession and sparring,” far from the metropole.47 They show how people's interactions in distant ports could determine paths chosen and directions taken in the great history of the imperial world.

47. Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans, 344.
INDEX

Aberdeen, Lord, 200, 202, 203, 216, 218
Aboulker (Abulker), Isaac, 116, 128
Abraham Bacri: Jacob’s conflict with, 71, 104, 223; in Paris, 61, 125; role in family business, 6, 24–25
Abraham Busnach, 24
Abucaya, Simon, 33, 58, 59, 61, 68
Abu Qir Bay, 52, 57–58
l’Africain (ship), 220
Ahmed Pasha (Dey): assassination of, 104, 111; Bacris as muqaddam under, 99, 107; Bacris imprisoned by, 96–98; established as leader, 96; Franco-British contest involving, 99–101; Thainville’s relationship with, 108–9, 141–42
Alexandria, 58
Algerian Jewish community: attacks on, 92–94, 104, 115–16, 134–35; dhimmi status, 9–10, 73; expulsion of, 95, 209–10; head of (see muqaddam; nation hébraïque); origins of, 7, 24; petition against Jacob, 208–9, 219; as traders and brokers, 2–9, 19–20, 37–38, 222–25. See also Bacri family
Algeriens: Bacri headquarters in, 24, 160, 221; Bacri house in, 222; British bombardment of, 174–77, 201, 204, 212–13; consuls in (see consuls; specific consul); corsairing in (see corsairing); Europeans in, 8, 10–12 (see also specific country); expatriate community in, 104–5; French armistice with, 79–83; French citizens imprisoned in, 53–58, 61–65, 69, 76; French colonization of, 195, 215, 218–19; French invasion of (see French invasion); French war with, 51–89, 86–87; instability in, 163–64; Jews in (see Algerian Jewish community; Bacri family); as major port, 1–2, 10–12, 172, 204 (see also Mediterranean trade); ruler of (see Dey of Algiers; specific ruler); treaty negotiations with, 13–14; US conflicts with, 119–21, 172–75, 194; war’s centrality in, 51–52; wheat exports (see wheat trade)
Alicante, 29; agents in (see Dié Brothers)
Ali Khodja (Dey), 111
Ali Pasha (Dey), 177, 189
Amar, Judah, 96–97
Amar, Moses, 96–98, 153
Amar family: petition against Jacob, 208
Amiens, peace of, 87
Angiolino Bacri, 145
Arab Jews, 7, 23, 180
Arbib, Isaac (Isaiah), 133, 144
Arnaud (lawyer), 141
Astoin-Sielve, Joseph Charles, 53
Austria, 110, 154, 203
Ayoun Skakna (Hot Springs), 88, 221
Aziza (ship), 103
Aziza Bacri (Jacob’s daughter), 220–21
Aziza Bacri (Salomon’s daughter), 144, 185, 219
Azulai, Salomon, 30
Bacri-Clark Sickle-leaf carpet, 225–26
Bacri family: after French invasion, 195, 199, 207–9, 214–15, 219–21, 226; agents for, 28–30, 129 (see also specific agent); assassinations of (see assassinations); as brokers, 7–8, 37–39; conflicts within, 20, 25, 104, 124–36, 152–54, 160, 164–65, 223; cultural misunderstandings by, 70–72, 122–23,
Bacri family (continued)
126, 160, 196, 221–25; debt owed by France (see French debt); diplomatic role of (see diplomacy); gifts facilitated by (see gift exchanges); as interpreters, 8, 15; as Jewish leaders (see maged-dam; nation hébraïque); as Jews (see Jewishness); as “Kings of Algiers,” 18, 122, 228; languages spoken by, 23, 71, 134; modern-day, 225–26; origins of, 23–24; overview of, 3–7, 19–21, 227–28; perceptions of (see foreign perceptions of Bacris); personal relationships used by (see clientelism); religious festivals celebrated by, 66–67, 143; role in French invasion, 2–3, 227–28; sequestration of (see sequestration); success during wars, 22, 27–28, 45, 51, 75, 79, 162, 224; US dealings with, 17–18, 41–43, 75–77, 97–98. See also specific family member

Bacri house (dar Bakri), 222

Bacri ships: captured by corsairs, 15, 78, 84–85, 106; names of, 37, 103–4, 220; sailing under neutral flags, 28–29, 48–49; seized by regency, 96; sequestration of (see sequestration). See also specific ship

Barbary piracy. See corsairing

Barlow, Joel, 41n61, 42, 43

Barnard, Sophia, 113

Bassano, Duc de, 117–18, 121, 150, 151–52

Batavian Republic, 53

Bathurst, Earl (Henry), 176, 190, 193

Bavastro, Captain, 103

Bedjaia, Elijah, 93

Belgium, 217–18

Benhacok, Joseph, 129

Benjamin Busnach, 91

Bensamon, Isaac, 38, 95

Ben Tibi, 99, 116

Berlioz, Hector, 31

Berruyer, Pierre-Antoine, 139

bills of exchange, 39n50, 181–82

Blanckley, Elizabeth, 102–3

Blanckley, Henry Stanyford, 102, 103n44, 104–7, 112, 118, 121–23

Blanckley, Mrs., 112, 115–16

Blanc-Mavit and Mathieu (watchmakers), 132

Bloch, Isaac, 90n4, 97, 99, 114

Boislecomte, Baron de, 200–201

Boissy d’Anglas, François-Antoine de, 59

Bona (Annaba): British concessions in, 107–8; British consulate ransacked in, 211; coral fishermen massacred at, 175; Franco-British rivalry involving, 35, 66, 210, 213; French consulate ransacked in, 183; French imprisoned in, 69

Bonaparte, Joseph, 87

Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon

Bondurand, Baron (Alexis-Adolphe Bligny), 208

The Book of Friendship of Nations, 97, 99

Bougie, 107

Bourmont, Louis de, 205–8, 210, 213–14

Bresson, Mr., 132

Brilli, Catia, 28–29

Britain: Abu Qir Bay victory, 52, 57–58; bombardment of Algiers, 174–77, 201, 204, 212–13; campaign against corsairing, 163, 166, 174–79; consuls in Algiers, 13 (see also specific consul); corsairing sanctioned by, 51–52, 163, 200–201; debt owed to Bacris, 165–66, 180–81, 189–93; French invasion mistrusted by, 196, 199–204, 209–15, 218–21; gift giving, 110, 166, 196–97; Good Hope incident, 48–49; instability in, 170–72, 216–18; misunderstanding of regency (see cultural misunderstandings); new diplomacy, 163, 166, 170–72, 193–94; rivalry with France (see Franco-British rivalry); role in Naphtali’s death, 94–95; rulers of (see specific ruler); status of Jews in, 73; trade with Ottoman Empire, 10–12; wars (see Napoleonic Wars; Revolutionary Wars); wheat imports (see wheat trade)

Broughton, Elizabeth, 116–17

Bruce, Thomas, 77

Bunbury, Henry, 122

Burrard-Neale, Harry, 204
Busnach family. See Bacri family; specific family member
Byron, Lord, 31
Cadore, Duc de, 115
Capoudan, Hadgi Ali, 183
Cardoza, Aaron, 30, 173
Carlos IV (King), 38
Carminati, Gaetano, 129
Cartwright, Richard, 94–95, 99–102
Casbah, 222
Cavendish-Bentinck, William, 44
Champagny, Jean-Baptiste de Nompère de, 141–42, 145–46, 149
Charles IV (Spain), 142
Charles X (King), 2, 200, 202, 204–5, 215–16
Charles Louis (King), 143
Chatan Torah, 143
Clark, William, 225–26
Clausel, Bertrand, 210–11
Cohen, Joseph Raphael, 135, 136
Cohen, Phyllis Albert, 137
Collingwood, Admiral Lord, 106, 112
Collo, 107
concessions: Franco-British rivalry for, 107–8, 124, 156–57, 167–72; role of, 10, 182
Congress of Aachen, 178–79
Congress of Vienna, 161–63, 178
consuls: after French invasion, 213–14, 218; alliance between, 104–5; Bacris' personal relationships with (see clientelism); gift exchanges (see gift exchanges); interpreters for, 8, 15; isolation of, 14, 118; misunderstanding of regency (see cultural misunderstandings); perceptions of Bacris (see foreign perceptions of Bacris); role of, 12–16. See also specific consul
coral fishing, 44, 101, 107, 172, 175, 190
corn laws, 171
Cornwallis, Marquis, 87
corsairing: Bacri ships captured by, 15, 78, 84–85, 106; David's use of, 103–4; definition of, 14; European campaign against, 163, 166, 170, 174–79; European ships captured by, 58, 103–4, 163; Good Hope incident, 32–36, 45, 48–50; during Napoleonic Wars, 162; role of, 30–32, 51–52; sanctioned by Europeans, 51–52, 163, 200–201; slavery (see slaves); US ships captured by, 17, 32, 76, 120, 163, 172–74
Corsica, 44–45
Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias), 132n20
Courton, Ravel and Company, 135
Cowley, Baron, 203
credit system, 39n50, 181–82
Crescent (ship), 42
Cresp, Jean-Baptiste, 140
Damas, Baron de, 192
Dauphin (ship), 17, 18
David Bacri: Ahmed Pasha's dislike of, 96; appearance of, 102–3; assassination of, 19–20, 88–89, 112–16, 154, 224; British relations with, 106–8; complaint against Duran, 99; epitaph, 114–15; imprisonment of, 96–98, 135, 223–24; as mugaddam, 99, 102; Napoleon's business with, 103, 113; remaining in Algiers after attacks, 95, 134; role in family business, 24–25, 27, 95, 102–6; as Swedish agent, 97; Thainville supported by, 108–9, 111; as US agent, 97–98
David Bacri (son of Abraham), 184–85
David Bacri (son of Salomon), 144, 185, 219
Dahui, 51–52, 182
Eid al-Fitr, 2, 192, 196
Elba, 154, 159, 161, 168
Elia Bacri, 145
Elizabeth I (Queen), 10
Elliott, Gilbert, 39
Epitaphs, 90–91, 114–15
Eugénie (Empress), 220
Europeans: in Algiers, 8, 10–12; Bacris as brokers for, 7–8, 37–39; campaign against corsairing, 163, 166, 170, 174–79; corsairing sanctioned by, 51–52, 163, 200–201; hostility toward Jews, 20, 62–63, 73–74, 102, 209–10, 213, 219; new diplomacy, 163, 166, 172, 183–84, 193–94. See also specific country
Excommunication (herem), 138–39
Exmouth, Lord (Edward Pellew), 175–77, 201, 212–13
Eyraud, François, 147
Falcon, John, 48, 50, 63, 74–79, 83–86, 128–29
Famin, Étienne, 141
Ferdinand I (King), 23
Ferdinand VII (King), 187
Ferret (ship), 207
Ferrier (consul), 112, 159
Ferroul, Mr., 131
First Barbary War, 173
Foa, Alexandre Benjamin, 220
Foreign consuls. See consuls; specific consul
Foreign perceptions of Bacris: as barrier, 118–22; based on Jewishness, 20, 62–63, 73, 78–80, 102; as disrespectful of national interests, 100–102, 105; as powerful, 45–50, 72–74, 88–90, 228
Forest, Count de la, 155
Fortunata (Fortunée ) Bacri, 144, 185, 219
Fox, L. General, 84
Fraissinet, Antoine Pierre, 53, 55, 105, 110
France: Abu Qir Bay defeat, 52, 57–58; Algerian armistice with, 79–83; Algerian citizens imprisoned by, 58–73;
Algerian war with, 51–83, 86–87, 127; Bacri legal battles in, 137–41, 147, 160, 184–85, 219–20; campaign against corsairing, 178–79; consuls in Algiers, 13 (see also specific consul); corsairing sanctioned by, 51–52, 163; debt owed to Bacris (see French debt); gift giving, 110, 126, 147–48, 166–67, 197; Good Hope incident, 32–36, 45, 50; instability in, 168–70, 216; invasion of Algiers (see French invasion); misunderstanding of regency (see cultural misunderstandings); new diplomacy, 163, 166–70, 193–94; religious diversity in, 59–60; rivalry with Britain (see Franco-British rivalry); rulers of (see specific ruler); sequestration in (see sequestration); trade with Ottoman Empire, 10–12; wars (see Napoleonic Wars; Revolutionary Wars); wheat imports (see wheat trade).

See also specific city


Fraser, Mr., 211

Fremantle, Thomas Francis, 179


George IV (King), 190, 202, 203, 217

Germany, 154, 225

Gibraltar, 46, 173, 211
gift exchanges: in regency system, 109–10, 126, 182; Western perspective on, 109, 125, 147–48, 166, 196–98

Giordani (agent in Cadiz), 28

Good Hope (ship), 32–36, 45, 48–50

Gozlan, Jacob, 67, 131–34, 146

grain. See wheat trade

gravestone inscriptions, 90–91, 114–15

Greece, 199–200

Guys, Augustin, 55

Hadj Ali (Dey): assassination of, 163–64; David’s assassination, 113–14; French relations with, 111, 145, 147–48; Jacob as advisor to, 117–18; US conflicts with, 119–21, 172–73

Hammida, Reis, 174

Hasnagi (prime minister), 36, 95–96, 209

Hassan (Dey): death of, 26, 75; Jacob supported by, 37, 182; Joseph as advisor to, 48; Mordecai as advisor to, 7, 25–26, 35, 39, 42, 45, 75; Swedish war with, 30; US treaty with, 17, 175

Hastings, Marquis of, 190

Heras, Manuel de las, 54–55, 132, 134

herem (excommunication), 138–39

Higuero, Mr., 113

Hildesheimer, Françoise, 59, 61

Hilton, Boyd, 52, 216

Holland: Algerian treaty with, 7; alliance against Algiers, 187; gift giving, 105, 110; wars (see Revolutionary Wars)

Humphreys, David, 41
Hussein (Dey): British relations with, 196–97, 204, 206–7; capitulation of, 206–7; debt negotiations, 3, 166, 180–84, 186–93; Deval’s incident with, 2–3, 192–93, 200, 204; equal dealings with West, 110, 179–80; exile of, 214–15; Franco-British rivalry involving, 172; imprisonment of Jacob, 191–92; Jacob’s dealings with, 181, 185–86; as last Dey of Algiers, 177–78

imperialism, 11–12, 16, 21, 83–85, 123, 196, 227–28

Inconstant (ship), 168

Inglis, Robert, 219

Inquisition: refugees from, 4–7, 23–24, 40, 144, 180, 209n44
terpreters (dragomen), 8, 15

Intrepid (ship), 103

Jackson, Andrew, 197


janissary corps: assassinations by, 88–91, 94–96, 104, 111, 177; expulsion of, 209–10; during French invasion, 205; Jewish community attacked by, 92–94, 104, 115–16, 134–35; Jews expelled by, 95; resentment of Bacris, 27; role of, 19

Jardin, André, 199n4

Jarrett, Mark, 161

Jean-Luc (nephew of Molendo), 53

Jefferson, Thomas, 4, 17, 173

Jesus Mary Joseph (ship), 24

Jewish community: in Algiers (see Algerian Jewish community); festivals celebrated by, 66–67, 143; head of (see muqaddam; nation hébraïque); in Livorno (see Livorno)

Jewishness: advantage of, 5, 7, 9, 19–21, 223–25; cohesion not guaranteed by, 224; cultural misunderstandings of, 224–25; as identity, 66–67

Jewish oath (more judaico), 137–39

Jews: Arab, 7, 23, 180; European hostility toward, 20, 62–63, 73–74, 102, 209–10, 213, 219; as interpreters, 8, 15; in Ottoman Empire, 9–10; Sephardic, 4–7, 23–24, 144, 180; as traders and brokers, 2–9, 19–20, 37–38, 222–27

joint liability rule, 39n50

Joseph Bacri: as advisor to Hassan, 48; as agent for Mustapha, 37, 45, 52–53, 75; Ahmed Pasha’s dislike of, 96; Bacris imprisoned in France supported by, 70; complaint against Duran, 99; cultural misunderstandings by, 70–72; death of, 186; exile from Algiers, 164, 186; Falcon’s meeting with, 84; foreign perceptions of, 48–50, 72–74, 78–80; French prisoners in Algiers supported
by, 55–56, 63–64, 76; imprisonment of, 96–97, 135, 233–24; Jacob’s conflict with, 25, 104, 128–30, 153–54, 165; in Livorno, 145; as muqaddam, 95, 116; remaining in Algiers after attacks, 95, 134; role in family business, 6, 24–27, 95, 102, 114, 117–18, 122, 160; as Spanish agent, 40, 97, 106, 164, 180–81, 186–87; spared from pillage, 93; Thainville’s relations with, 108–9, 119, 150; US negotiations involving, 172–73

Joseph Bacri (Jacob’s son), 145

Journal de l’Empire (Journal des débats), 89–90

Journal du commerce, 140

Judeo-Arabic language, 23, 71, 134

July Revolution, 213, 217

Jurien (Pierre Roch Jurien de la Gravière), 179–80

Kaplan, Yosef, 138

Keene, Raynal, 30, 173

Keith, Lord Admiral, 78–79, 84–86

khaznadji (prime minister), 36, 95–96, 209

khodja-cavallo (secretary of cavalry), 178

Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 175

“Kings of Algiers”: Bacris as, 18, 122, 228

Klein, Henri, 220

Kol Bo herem, 138–39

La Calle (El Kala), 69, 107, 124

Lamorcière, Louis Juchault de, 206

Larreu, Michel de, 55–56

Lasry, Jacob, 9, 226

Laval, Duc de, 200

Lear, Tobias: alliance with other consuls, 104–5; appointment as consul, 97; on David’s assassination, 114, 116; David’s dealings with, 97–98, 103; debt negotiations, 119–21; on Franco-British rivalry, 100–101, 107–8, 157

Lecointe, Michel, 53–54

Lee, Henry IV: appointment as consul, 195–98; competition for Hussein’s attention, 197; French invasion described by, 205; refugees sheltered by, 206; role after French invasion, 214, 218

Lesseps, Mathieu de, 142, 145

Levant Company, 10, 123, 172

Lisbon, 129

Livorno: Algerian Jews fleeing to, 95, 134, 144–45; Bacri office in, 24, 124; David Busnach in, 128, 223; French annexation of, 142; Jacob in, 71, 130, 135–36, 223; Jewish community in, 7, 23–24, 143–45; Joseph in, 145, 165; Michel Busnach in, 139; Mordecai in, 26; Moses Bacri in, 144–45; Moses Busnach in, 125; religious diversity in, 142–43; Salomon in, 25, 118, 124–25, 128–29, 142–44, 196; Salomon’s children in, 185; sequestration in, 125–27, 142–43, 149, 196

Logie, Charles, 43, 110

Louis, Baron, 170

Louis-Philippe (King), 216–17

Louis XVI (King), 46, 168

Louis XVIII (King), 154–56, 166–67, 169–70, 183

Lyons, 41

MacDonell, Hugh, 121, 156–57, 172, 176, 187, 189, 191, 204

Mace, Charles, 39, 44–45, 47, 50

Macnin, Meir, 8–9

Madison, James, 4, 98, 101, 104, 108, 173

Madrid, 40, 113, 188

Mahon, 23, 24, 78, 84, 165, 179

Maitland, Thomas, 172

Malta: blockade of, 57–58, 69, 79; British seizure of, 85; Franco-British rivalry over, 12, 203; Hussein’s desired exile to, 207, 214; Jacob’s provisioning of, 146

Marali, Jacob, 128

Maria (ship), 17

Marseilles: Bacri office in, 24–25, 61, 64–65, 67, 118, 124; British spy in, 202; Jacob’s debts in, 130–35; Jacob’s intention to settle in, 146–47; Jacob’s legal battles in, 137–41, 147, 160, 184–85, 219–20; Jacob’s role in, 25, 37, 39–41, 93, 117, 124–25, 128; Jacob’s sequestration in, 58–59, 69; Michel Busnach in, 61, 124, 130–31, 137, 139, 146; Thainville in, 111

Marshall, John, 76
Martignac, Viscount de, 215
Marzagalli, Silvia, 16n37, 18
Mashuda (ship), 173–74
Masters, Richard, 74, 77

Mediterranean trade: after French invasion, 221; aftermath of war, 170–71, 194; Algiers as major port, 1–2, 10–12; role of Jews in, 2–9, 19–20, 37; US entry into, 16–19, 21, 196

Meeks, Joshua, 12
Melvill van Carnbee, Pieter, 38
Metternich, Prince, 203
Michel Busnach: in Algiers, 95; avoidance of imprisonment, 146; family conflict with, 126–30, 223; imprisonment of, 61, 64–67; Jacob's dispute with, 20, 130–41, 147, 152–53, 160, 185; in Livorno, 139; in Marseilles, 61, 124, 130–31, 137, 139, 146; role in family business, 60, 130

Minorca, 23, 24, 58, 78, 84, 165, 179
Mollah Mohammed, 34, 36

Moltedo, Dominique-Marie: Bacris' sequestration, 73; Good Hope incident, 36; imprisonment of, 53–57, 61, 63–65, 76, 127; opinion of Bacris, 72

Moniteur universel (newspaper), 58, 61, 64, 66, 216

Monroe, James, 4, 41, 120
Montmorency, Mathieu de, 187
Moors, 209–10, 212

Mordecai Bacri: as advisor to Hassan, 7, 25–26, 35, 39, 42, 45, 75; death of, 26; foreign perceptions of, 46–47, 49; imprisonment of, 26; role in family business, 6, 24–25; US dealings with, 17, 41–43, 75; wheat trade negotiations, 25–26, 35, 38–39

Moses (ship), 103, 118
Moses Bacri, 144, 145, 219
Moses Busnach, 125, 142, 145
Muhammad Khaznaji (Dey), 164

Napoleon (Bonaparte): Algerian armistice, 79–83; David's business with, 103, 113; Egypt invaded by, 51–52, 182; exile to Elba, 154, 161, 168; exile to St. Helena, 169; false death announcement, 108; gifts sent to, 109; Jacob's dealings with, 4, 71, 82, 140; refusal to exchange gifts, 125–26, 147–48, 167; return from Elba, 159, 168–69; Treaty of Fontainebleau, 142

Napoleon III (Emperor), 220

Napoleonic Wars, 154; Bacris' success during, 162; Congress of Aachen, 178–79; Congress of Vienna, 161–63, 178; Franco-British contest during,
INDEX [ 257 ]

89–90, 99–101; new diplomacy after, 162, 166–72, 183–84, 193–94; social effects of, 168–70
Nathan Bacri, 67, 116, 133, 145, 184, 186–87
National Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions (Algiers), 222
nation hébraïque (head of Jewish nation), 199, 207–8
Negrotto (vice-consul), 112
Nelson, Horatio, 4, 12, 52, 58
Netherlands. See Holland
neutral ships, 28–29, 48–49
Noah, Mordecai, 114
Norderling, Johan, 40–41, 111, 174
North, Frederick, 39
Novela, Joseph, 106
O’Brien, Richard, 18, 41, 72, 75–76, 79, 145
Odessa, 169–70
Omar (Dey), 159, 164, 166, 173–75, 177, 186
Oran, 9, 46, 112, 148, 180, 190, 212, 213, 226
Ottoman Empire: Algiers as subject to, 51–52, 86; European trade with, 10–12; Greek uprising, 199–200; religious diversity in, 9–10; scope of Jewish activity across, 227; war with France, 52; weakening of, 205
Pact of Umar, 9
Panza, Daniel, 30
Paret, Dominique Joseph, 53, 55
Paris: Abraham in, 61, 125; Bacri office in, 24; Jacob in, 59–61, 69, 117, 127–29; modern-day Bacris in, 225–26; Nathan in, 184
Paris Peace Treaty, 161–63
parnas (head administrative officer), 143
Pasquier, Etienne-Denis, 186
Passover, 66–67
Pelham, Lord, 49
Pellew, Edward, 175
People of the Book, 9
personal relationships. See clientelism
la Piccini (singer), 60
Pickering, Timothy, 18, 42–43
Pierre Baille and Co., 40
piracy. See corsairing
Poir (French consul), 55, 64
Polignac, Jules de, 200–202, 205, 215
Portalis, Count, 180
Porter, David, 214, 216, 218
Portugal, 5, 187
Poujol, 41
prime minister (Hasnagi or khaznadji), 36, 95–96, 209
Queen Charlotte (ship), 176
Rachel Bacri, 185, 219
Rachele Bacri, 145
Racheline Bacri, 144
Raguena de la Chesnaye, Alexandre, 112
Rault, Charles, 130, 131, 136
Rayneval, Count, 203
religious diversity, 9–10, 59–60, 142–43
Le Requin (ship), 32
Revolutionary Wars: Bacri’s success during, 22, 27–28, 51, 75, 79, 87; corsairing during, 32, 52 (see also corsairing); diplomacy during, 12–16, 32–43, 51–52, 72–74, 86–87 (see also consuls; specific consul); overview of, 22–23; peace of Amiens, 87; role of Algiers in, 10–12; social effects of, 168
Ricca Bacri, 144
Richelieu, Duc de, 166–67, 178, 179
Roberts, Lewes, 123
Rosa Bacri, 144
Rothesay, Stuart de, 201–2, 216, 217
Rovigo, Duc de, 152
Royal African Company (Compagnie royale d’Afrique), 8, 34, 95, 170
Rozet, Claude-Antoine, 207
Russia, 205
Saint-André, Jeanbon, 46–47, 50, 53, 68, 72
Samadet, Jean-Baptiste Dupuy, 139
Saportès, Isaac, 38
Sardinia, 175, 190
Sasportis, Israel, 93
Schreier, Joshua, 9, 226
Schroeter, Daniel, 8
Second Barbary War, 173–74
secretary of cavalry (khodja-cavallo), 178
Seguin, 41
Selim (Ottoman sultan), 52
Sephardic Jews, 4–7, 23–24, 144, 180
sequestration: Algerian decree (1810), 148–49; French decree (1799), 58–73, 82n84, 87; French decree (1807), 141–42, 145–46; French decree (1810), 149–50; role of, 125–28, 148, 160, 196
Shaler, William, 31, 151, 177, 180–81, 190, 191, 193, 198
shipping: Bacri (see Bacri ships); difficulties with, 28–29; piracy (see corsairing). See also specific ship
Sielve, Marie Victoire, 53, 61–62
Simchat Torah, 143
Six Years Residence in Algiers (Brough-ton), 116–17
Skjöldebrand, Matthias, 40, 46–47
Skjöldebrand, Pierre Eric, 43
slaves: European campaign against, 166, 174–79; French negotiations for, 108–9, 111, 142, 148; during Napoleonic Wars, 162; origins of, 31; US negotiations for, 17, 42, 83, 173–74
Smith, Robert, 157
Smyrna, 203
Solal, Simon Coen, 146
Spain: Algerian treaty with, 189; Bacris’ dealing with, 40, 97, 106, 164, 186–89; consul withdrawn by, 187–88; corsairing sanctioned by, 51–52, 163; Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias), 132n20; debt owed to Bacris, 165–66, 180–84, 186–89; gift exchanges, 110, 166; rulers of (see specific ruler); wars (see Revolutionary Wars). See also Alicante; Madrid; Minorca
Spanish Inquisition: refugees from, 4–7, 23–24, 40, 144, 180, 209n44
Stein, Sarah, 6, 223
Stella Bacri, 144
St. Helena, 169
St. John, Elizabeth, 195
St. John, Robert William: appointment as consul, 195–96; on Belgian revolution, 217–18; on British superiority, 212–15, 218; Hussein’s relations with, 204, 206–7; Jews disliked by, 199, 207, 209–10, 213–15; negotiations about Gibraltar, 211; role after French invasion, 213–14; on usefulness of Algiers, 204
St. Vincent, Lord, 52
Stuart, Charles, 122
Sweden, 30, 40–41
Talleyrand (Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord): armistice with Algiers, 79–83; debt negotiations, 183; French prisoners in Algiers, 54–57, 61–66, 77; Good Hope incident, 33, 35, 45; Jacob’s letters to, 67–68; Jacob’s opinion of, 71; opinion of Bacris, 72–73; rivalry with Britain, 83–85, 107–8
Téllez-Girón, Pedro, 40
Thainville, Charles-François Dubois:
Ahmed Pasha described by, 96; alliance with other consuls, 105; appointment as consul, 39–40, 53, 64, 78–79; armistice negotiations, 79–80, 84; attack on Jews described by, 92–94; attempts to return to Algiers, 159; Bacri family conflict involving, 128, 130; Bacris as adversaries of, 125–26, 148, 150, 152–53, 156–58; Bacris described by, 91, 95, 112, 117, 119, 139, 151–54; Bacris’ support for, 108–9, 111; British described by, 77, 83–85; conflict with regency, 108–9, 141–42, 145, 147–48, 156; cultural misunderstandings by, 126; David’s death reported by, 115; death of, 159; debt negotiations, 82–83, 95, 128, 156–57, 160, 183; expulsion from Algiers, 86, 157–59; Franco-British rivalry involving, 99–102, 106–8, 123, 151, 156–57; on French defeats, 154–55; imprisonment
of, 148–49; isolation of, 118; royal celebrations, 155–56; sequestration supported by, 145–52; US-Algerian war described by, 119–21; wheat negotiations, 81–82, 126, 157–58
Thibaudeau, Antoine Claire, 141–42
Thomas, Vice-Consul, 190–91, 193
The Three Brothers (ship), 103–4, 106
Times (newspaper), 89, 218
Toledano, Jacob, 136
treaties: negotiation of, 13–14, 182
Treaty of Fontainebleau, 142
Tripoli, 30, 175, 178
Trivellato, Francesca, 5, 185n79, 223
Tudesq, André-Jean, 199n4
Tunis, 30, 95, 172, 175, 178
Turkish elite: expulsion of, 209–10, 212
Tuscany. See Livorno
Ucciani, François, 53
United States: Algerian conflicts with, 119–21, 172–74, 194; Bacris’ dealings with, 17–18, 41–43, 75–77, 97–98; consuls in Algiers, 19 (see also specific consul); diplomatic role of, 83, 98; entry into Mediterranean trade, 16–19, 21, 196; gift exchanges, 197–98; ships captured by corsairs, 17, 32, 42, 76, 120, 163, 172–74; treaty with Algiers, 17, 175
Vallière, Césaire-Philippe, 34, 44, 46, 62, 64
Van Buren, Martin, 197, 198, 206, 214, 216, 218
vekilardji (navy/prime minister), 57, 167
Vékilargy (ship), 37
Volant, Baron, 208
Von Rehbinder, 48
Vulgar Algerian (Judeo-Arabic) language, 23, 71, 134
Warde, Captain, 175–76
Waterloo, Battle of, 169, 172
Weiss, Gillian, 175
Welsford, Mr., 213
wheat trade, 11, 34, 43–45, 91–92; aftermath of war, 169–72; corn laws, 171; debt related to (see French debt); during Franco-Algerian war, 57–58, 81–82, 86–87; monopolies over, 11, 211; role of Bacris in, 25–26, 34–35, 38–39, 43–45, 91–92, 118, 122, 124–26, 158; Thainville’s negotiations, 81–82, 126, 157–58
Wickham, William, 63, 76–77
Yahia, 88, 94
Zugasti, Ortiz de, 188
Zwierlein, Cornel, 11