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1

Introduction

Less than a decade ago, as protests swept through the Middle East, the world appeared to be on the verge of a wave of democratization. Today, however, many of those democratic breakthroughs have failed, and it has become clear that the path to democracy is strewn with obstacles. Why do some new democracies survive, while others fail? During the Arab Spring, for example, Tunisia completed its transition to democracy, and the ensuing democratic regime in the country lasted for about a decade. Egypt’s democratic experiment, however, was short and ended with a coup in 2013. Does the success or failure of Tunisia and Egypt reflect broader patterns of democratic survival or failure? In this book, I grapple with this puzzle and propose a novel theory regarding the durability of new democracies. I argue that democracies that emerge from long periods of protest mobilization have a better chance of survival and improvement in democratic quality than democracies that emerge out of quiescence or short episodes of protest mobilization. This is because, when movements mobilize over a long period, they are required to build an organizational infrastructure that provides a firmer foundation for democratic institutions. These movements are also characterized by a more solid leadership during the transition period, for the new democracy itself, and a strengthened civil society in the postdictatorship period.

I begin this chapter with brief definitions of democracy and other related concepts and a review of the major explanations for democracies’ survival or collapse. I adopt a minimalist definition of democracy and then focus my argument and its underlying questions on the minimal institutions necessary for a political regime to qualify as a democracy. I then explore theories that address the relation of democracies’ origins to their subsequent trajectories. These theories highlight the importance of mass mobilization to the process of
democratization. Describing next the effects of protest mobilization in democratic transitions, I conclude the chapter by elaborating my theory of the relation of protest mobilization to the success or failure of democratic transitions, with subsequent chapters presenting quantitative and qualitative evidence for the theory’s descriptive and explanatory power.

**Democracy**

Scholars have debated the definition of democracy for centuries. As with other major debates in political theory, reflections on this definition can be traced back to the writings and teachings of Aristotle and Plato, and subsequently to the works of modern classic thinkers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. While pre–twentieth-century discussions treated democracy as an abstract phenomenon, today’s debates are more concrete, taking into account the realities of mass politics in the contemporary era.

Contemporary definitions of democracy are bounded by minimalist and maximalist approaches. The minimalist approach defines democracy as being based on a minimum number of procedures for selecting political leaders—often including fair and free elections and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Maximalist or substantive approaches define democracy in terms of idealistic principles such as political equality, according to which, regardless of socioeconomic inequalities, citizens should be equal in exercising political power. Maximalist approaches contend that procedures like executive and legislative elections are not sufficient conditions for democracy. Instead, substantive democracy requires the participation of all citizens in shaping the political and policy agendas in the public sphere. Limiting democracy to procedures of representative institutions, such as competitive elections, is not sufficient to achieve the ideals of equal participation for all citizens, but by no means does such criticism suggest the insignificance of electoral democracy. Forging the procedures of such features of electoral democracy as competitive elections and the political freedoms of speech and association creates venues and opportunities to achieve the ideals of democratic participation and political equality. In other words, electoral democracy is not a sufficient condition for reaching the ideals of political equality, but it is nonetheless a necessary part of the process by which such ideals are reached. Procedures of electoral democracy create the possibility for excluded groups to organize and compete for political office. Through organizing, mobilizing, and forging alliances, activists can use institutions of electoral democracy to broaden inclusion and participation in the democratic polity. While recognizing the importance of substantive freedoms, the ideas presented herein converge on the formal dimensions of democracy.

Accordingly, we can define concepts of democratic transition, consolidation, quality, and deepening in relation to the formal and substantive
dimensions of democracy. A democratic transition occurs when a nondemocratic regime meets the minimum requirements of a formal democratic regime, such as the transfer of executive power through fair and free elections. Democratic consolidation and democratic survival occur when these minimum requirements endure. While all democratic regimes meet the minimum criteria for holding fair and free elections and ensuring various political freedoms, there is considerable variation in the competitiveness of elections and respect for political freedoms across democracies. Put simply, some democracies are more democratic than others. In this book, I refer to this as democratic quality (see chapter 2 for more details on the definition and operationalization of the concept). There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to presume that democracies with higher quality democratic institutions are also more likely to survive.4

Democratic Durability

What factors determine whether newly born democracies survive or die? Political theorists and social scientists have long pondered this question. Plato and Aristotle considered the possibility that democracies give way to the rule of tyrants and demagogues.5 In Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli asked how democracies could be prevented from devolving into elite-dominated tyrannies.6 He recommended institutional constraints and emphasized that citizens should distrust the elite and take direct action against injustice and abuses of power.7 With the advent of modern social science and the expansion of mass politics in the nineteenth century, the breakdown and decay of democracies were major topics of inquiry. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx posited the specific conditions of class struggle that led to the failure of the French Republic of 1830 and the absolutist rule of Louis Bonaparte.8 In both of Alexis de Tocqueville’s major works, the author expressed concern that growing homogeneity and individualism in new democracies could set the stage for the return of tyranny and despotism.9 To address such threats, Tocqueville emphasized the importance of civic associations mediating between individuals and the state. More recently, in the mid–twentieth century, sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset10 identified economic development as an important factor for democratic longevity. In his longue durée study of democracy and contention in Europe, Charles Tilly noted, “Although democracy has, indeed, become more prevalent in recent centuries, de-democratization still occurs frequently and widely.”11

Why do some democracies break down, but others survive challenges of de-democratization? Contemporary research on democratic breakdown focuses on the strategic choices and preferences of elites, as well as economic development, natural resources, institutional design, the international context,
and the institutional form of the antecedent regime. The existing scholarship indicates that democracies with higher levels of national income are more likely to survive, even though the mechanisms underlying such occasions are not clear. Notwithstanding, research suggests that revenues from natural resources such as oil could be damaging for democracy, as incumbent leaders occasionally turn such resources into personal resources, strengthening their grip on power and thereby undermining democratic institutions. In terms of institutional design, some political scientists point to a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown for presidential systems due to a higher concentration of executive power in such systems when compared to parliamentary systems. Other scholars contend that democracies that emerge in the wake of military regimes are more vulnerable to failure, as militaries that may have previously been politicized often succumb to the tendency to reseize power from newly established civilian authority and, in so doing, violate democratic norms. Finally, a body of scholarship elaborates on the effect of the international context and suggests that democracies in regions with more democratic regimes have a better chance of survival than those in regions with more authoritarian regimes. While expanding our understanding of democratic durability, these studies leave untouched the possibility of still different pathways to democracy, whose circumstances might have significantly different effects on their success and hence the probability of democratic consolidation.

As Tilly once commented, democracy is like a lake: water may fill it from different origins and along distinct routes. Democratic transitions may occur as a result of international intervention and brokerage among elites. Popular uprisings are thus another pathway toward democratization. For instance, South Africa democratized in 1994 following a massive uprising and the collapse of the apartheid regime. However, a democratic transition occurred in Pakistan in 1988, when the country’s dictator died in an airplane crash and the military held competitive multiparty elections. One may ask, accordingly, whether democracies emerging from popular mobilizations possess characteristics dissimilar to other democratic regimes. More specifically, are such democracies more or less durable? Some years ago, an important body of work proposed that the mode of transition also affects the fate of democratic regimes—namely, that democratic transitions led through elite pacts resulted in more sustainable democracies. I refer to this literature as the elitist approach to democratization. Samuel Huntington, a major figure in this approach, affirms this elitist bias against mass mobilization, writing, “Democratic regimes that last have seldom if ever been instituted by mass popular actors.” In this view, stable democracies are built when soft-liners in the regime and moderates in the opposition agree on certain parameters of transition and the form of the new democracy. At this stage, the negotiation skills of the political elite are significant in the success or failure of the new democracy.
Popular Mobilization and Democratic Transitions

A recurring theme in studies of democracy is the role of protest mobilization. Some scholars consider mass mobilization to be conducive to democratization, but others see unrest and upheavals as harmful to the prospect of a complete democratic transition and consolidation. The elitist approach suggests that mass mobilization is harmful to democracy, since it may destabilize the political order and threaten the interests of authoritarian elites, such as the armed forces, and encourage them to reverse the newly initiated democratic process. Additionally, a contentious civil society might overload the political regime with various demands. In Huntington’s view, when political institutions are weak, civic organizations might undermine political stability and democracy by “deepening cleavages, furthering dissatisfaction, and providing rich soil for oppositional movements. A flourishing civil society under these circumstances signals governmental and institutional failure and bodes ill for political stability and democracy.” Since political institutions are often underdeveloped in new democracies, one might expect to see such antidemocratic tendencies from protest movements in these regimes. Similarly, Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter wrote in their seminal comparative study of democratic transitions in southern Europe and Latin America that the threat of popular mobilization with radical demands could backfire and lead to the abortion of democratic transitions. The failure of the Arab Spring uprisings to create stable democracies could serve as an example for the elitist approach. The uprising that initially brought down the long-standing Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak in 2011 set the stage for the popular coup in 2013 and the government crackdown on the different political factions that had organized the 2011 revolt. The resulting disappointments led some scholars to state that mass uprisings often show antidemocratic tendencies and to question whether social movements can derail democracy. Based on the elitist approach, one can hypothesize that democracies born out of episodes of mass mobilization do not last long.

Similar trends in contemporary political science also underplay the role of protest and social movements in the survival or failure of democratic regimes. In a recent analysis of democratic backsliding, *How Democracies Die*, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt document how, in recent times, elected officials have undermined democracy through subverting democratic norms and institutions. The authors point to democratic norms and mutual toleration among competing political groups as the two main safeguards of democracy. Democratic norms and toleration are, of course, crucial ingredients for a healthy and functioning democracy, but could norms be upheld and toleration enforced without collective actors to push and mobilize for them? *How Democracies Die* draws on comparative perspectives, but pays particular
attention to the state of democracy in the United States. Indeed, the history of democracy in the United States also indicates the importance of protest mobilization for expanding and upholding democratic rights and institutions. The contentious mobilization of women and Black people has been integral to democratization in the United States throughout the twentieth century. It is because of such protests for the inclusion of the excluded parts of the population from the political process that the American political system still qualifies as a formal democracy in the twenty-first century. Perhaps it was not an accident that the presidency of Donald Trump, a serious threat to American democracy, ended in the winter of 2021, following the largest protest movement in American history during the summer of 2020. This is consistent with existing research, which indicates that the chance of incumbent defeat in authoritarian elections is greater in elections following high levels of pre-election mobilization.

Beyond the academic discussions, one can also find strong preferences for a top-down approach to democracy building in discourses of American foreign policy that aim to create democracy through military interventions. According to this approach, a democratic superpower such as the United States can topple autocratic regimes by force and build democratic institutions from the top. The most obvious example of this discourse in American foreign policy is the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when President George W. Bush and other proponents of the invasion argued that an invasion would promote democracy in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. As we know today, however, the military invasion of Iraq has led only to instability, civil wars, killing, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, and unrest that has spilled over to other countries in the region.

In contrast to top-down approaches to democracy building, comparative historical sociology has pointed to the positive role of popular upheavals from the bottom in building democratic regimes. Comparative historical scholars have debated whether the bourgeoisie, working class, intellectuals, or communal elites had prominent roles in such democratic upheavals, but all agree that it was through the processes of protest mobilization that democracy spread across the globe. Accordingly, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly conceptualized democratization as a notable phenomenon in the broader family of contentious politics. They contended, “Democracy results from, mobilizes, and reshapes popular contention.” Comparative case studies and cross-national analyses of more recent democratizations have also documented the positive effects of popular mobilization on democratic transitions.

Why and how do protest mobilizations lead to democratic transitions, despite the assertions of the elitist approach? Protest mobilization can raise the odds of a democratic transition through several mechanisms. First, large upheavals might lead to regime breakdown and the fall of authoritarian leaders.
Popular protest shows in relief the illegitimacy of authoritarian regimes and certifies viable alternatives. By raising the cost of ruling, protest movements can exacerbate splits within authoritarian coalitions and encourage defection among authoritarian allies to the opposition. Of course, the authoritarian leadership might resort to repression and raise an iron fist to the protesters, but, as the research about mobilization and repression reveals, repression can also backfire on the government.28 The moral outrage generated by the brutalities of repression could further erode support for the regime, encouraging more recruits and support for the opposition and deepening the disagreements within the regime over whether repression is the right response to mobilization. Under pressure generated from popular mobilization, authoritarian leaders might make democratic concessions to avoid a complete overthrow. Incumbents might decide they are better off initiating reforms than facing the potential danger of a full-fledged revolution, as the mass uprisings might grow bigger and unrulier.29 Authoritarian leaders might also invite opposition leaders to negotiate possible ways out of the impasse.30 Relying on popular support, opposition leaders might then be able to attain democratic concessions from the incumbents and force them to agree on holding competitive elections. This was, for example, the case in South Africa, when, after a long period of contentious mobilizations against the apartheid regime, the government invited the leaders of the antiapartheid movement to negotiate a political transition. Finally, in some cases, after mass uprisings, a faction of the authoritarian leadership launches a coup against other factions and initiates certain democratic reforms to prepare the stage for competitive elections.31 This was indeed the mechanism by which Egypt’s Mubarak fell after thirty years in power.

Other studies highlight the longer-term effects of mass upheavals, arguing, for example, that social revolutions significantly increase the mobilization capacities of emerging states;32 postrevolutionary authoritarian regimes boast higher survival capacity than other autocracies;33 different types of armed rebellion in the origin of authoritarian regimes shape relations between authoritarian parties and militaries in such regimes;34 or that women’s mobilization during democratic transitions affects gender policies in posttransition politics.35 All the mentioned studies then describe how mass mobilization during times of transition creates certain institutional arrangements whose effects last longer than the transition period.36

Despite the elitist approach’s pessimism about the repercussions of mass mobilization, I argue that prodemocratic popular mobilization may increase the durability of emerging democratic regimes. Unarmed popular campaigns that mobilize over a long period generate an organizational structure that provides a leadership cadre for the new regime, creates stronger democratic institutions, forges links between the government and society, and strengthens
checks on the power of the posttransition government. This focus on the organizational legacy of movements has important implications for studies of social movement outcomes. While some political sociologists argue that movements are rarely influential compared to state-structural and other factors,37 others believe that movement mobilization matters for policy change. Studies on the effectiveness of movements point to political mediation, strategy, and organization as factors that influence a movement’s impact.38 This chapter demonstrates the importance of social movements to democratic durability and argues that the organization-building side of mobilizations shapes the outcome. Some recent studies of democratization in Latin America and Europe also emphasize the organizational side of antiauthoritarian movements.39 This scholarship on Latin America and Europe argues for the primacy of political actors—particularly political parties, labor unions, and organized social movements—in explaining democratic survival and breakdown.40

Mobilization and Organization Building under Dictatorship

While some democratic transitions occur after relatively brief mobilizations, others emerge from a more protracted process. I argue that longer mobilizations lead to more enduring democratic outcomes because popular campaigns typically require a solid organizational infrastructure to survive under repressive conditions. Short episodes of unrest may occur without much coordination and organization. Instead, they rely on personal networks,41 which are less vulnerable to repression. However, for movements to expand into a sustained political challenge and to mobilize over an extended period, they need to generate or expand a structure of formal movement organizations.42 Activists either create organizations from scratch or appropriate and reorient existing organizations to operate in antiauthoritarian struggles.

We can break down the components of an organization into catness and netness. Catness refers to the shared sense of groupness and of belonging to a collective identity. Netness refers to direct and indirect relations between members of a group. The stronger the sense of collective identity between members of a group and the more extensive the networks among the members of the group, the more organized is the group. To build organizations and to organize a population, then, means to give a sense of collective identity to the members of a group and to build formal and informal relations among those members. For social movement organizations, an important part of organizing is to forge collective identities conducive to collective action. A common organizing strategy for activists in this regard is to redefine existing identities in a way that empowers the members and gives them a sense of efficacy
to take over collective action. Similarly, when social groups and institutions already exist within society, activists can appropriate those institutions and reorient them in their struggles for opposing authoritarianism and favoring democratization.\textsuperscript{43}

Formal organizations are crucial in bringing resources into movements and are significant in maintaining and expanding movements.\textsuperscript{44} Even though social movement organizations may take both formal and informal forms, the existence of formal organizations might be necessary for the survival of antiauthoritarian movements and the sustenance of democratic institutions after the transition.\textsuperscript{45} Formal organizations have established procedures and structures to perform certain tasks routinely, despite changes in leadership. Formal organizations also have procedures for decision making and division of labor among units, with various tasks for different branches, some criteria for membership, and rules for lower level units.\textsuperscript{46} A high-capacity organization enables movements to recover in the face of government repression, to change their tactics, and to keep their supporters connected and motivated under harsh conditions.\textsuperscript{47} In Poland, for example, the organization of the Solidarity movement enabled it to survive repressive measures in the mid-1980s and emerge again at the end of the decade as the major political actor in the country’s opposition. The duration of mobilization, in other words, may indicate the degree to which mobilization has been translated into organization.

Formal organizations are also important for the coordination between large numbers of people engaged in nonviolent campaigns. Studies of nonviolent resistance demonstrate that sustained and successful nonviolent campaigns usually engage a larger number of participants than do violent ones. This differential is partially explained by the nature of unarmed tactics, such as strikes and boycotts. While armed operations may be carried out by a smaller group of activists, a successful boycott, strike, or demonstration requires the mobilization of a considerable portion of the population\textsuperscript{48} and, accordingly, the building of a vast organizational structure to train and coordinate such tactics among members. In South Africa, the United Democratic Front was a major organization that coordinated a large number of nonviolent protest events throughout the country during the 1980s in the effort to end the apartheid regime.

There is a two-way relationship between protest mobilization and organization. While formal organizations are necessary for sustaining mobilization, protest itself revitalizes, reinforces, and reorients organizations in different ways. First, protest mobilization could signal the necessity of organizing to protesters and could show bystanders the widespread nature of the grievances. Participants in a spontaneous protest event could be motivated to form or join formal movement organizations. In South Africa, for example, the defeat of the Soweto uprising in 1977 taught the activists the necessity of organizing
and alliance building with other collective actors, such as labor. Massive protests could also create solidarity, popularize leaders and organizations, and attract more recruits to a movement. Again, in South Africa, the protests of the 1980s were crucial in popularizing the leadership of opposition figures such as Nelson Mandela, who had been incarcerated or in exile for many years. Collective action may also affect organizations’ strategic and tactical choices. For instance, militant mobilization may push organizations to take a more confrontational stance in strategy and tactics and to resist incentives for co-optation. Furthermore, protest mobilization can provide political opportunities for organization building. It is true that protest can result in repression, but protest movements can also create their own opportunities when, following a wave of protests, authorities provide limited political reforms to prevent further unrest. In Poland, we see that in 1980–81, the Communist regime opened the political scene for the self-organizing activities of Solidarity following important strikes in 1980.

Workers’ unions have played an integral role in democratization movements throughout different time periods and different geographic regions, as documented through comparative historical case studies and statistical analyses. Labor unions are unique actors in shaping the configuration between society and the state. First, unions are the biggest mass organizing movements to counter state coercion, giving them an unparalleled position when compared with other social and political groups. Second, unions have the capacity to affect the process of production. This gives unions exceptional leverage in social and political bargains. Labor unions have the potential to expand beyond one factory and shape workers’ federations at the regional and national levels. When unions develop such capacity, they are able to use tactics like general strikes. A general strike is a potent nonviolent tactic that requires a high degree of previous coordination and organizing to occur. Labor unions are among the few collective actors with the capacity to coordinate collective action at such a large scale. Particularly, when heightened repression makes street demonstrations less accessible for opposition groups, unions have the potential for tactical adaptation because they can coordinate and organize strikes. Third, unions are often specialized to use both outsider tactics, such as strikes, as well as insider tactics, such as negotiations. Unions operate by generating leverage through their capacity to act collectively through strikes, and then use the resulting leverage in negotiations with employers or government representatives to achieve their demands. The abilities to wage contentious collective action and to negotiate and reach a compromise are two political skills integral to the process of democratic transitions. Finally, unions seek to represent the subordinate class. Since subordinate classes are often excluded from the political process, they are motivated to push for the expansion of the political process and democratization. Organizing the popular sector is also a crucial
element for deepening democracy and ensuring all citizens, regardless of their socioeconomic status, have an equal say in policy making. Since unions are connected with the day-to-day grievances of workers, they can articulate those grievances in connection with the broader demands for democratization at the national level. Similar to workers’ unions, other professional groups have the capacity and resources to contribute to antiauthoritarian movements. While professional associations may not have the reach or large mobilizing structure of labor unions, they might be able to contribute other types of resources, as well as prestige, to the side of the opposition.

In addition to trade unions, ethnonationalist organizations have shown high mobilization capacity throughout the twentieth century. Such organizations bring together discourses of nationalism and democracy to organize and mobilize the populace for democratic causes. Other types of political parties have also been active players during democratization episodes. Religious organizations may provide an organizational infrastructure that democratic activists can capitalize on. The potential positive role that communities of faith may play in democratic opposition is, however, contingent upon prior development of a democratic theology, and financial and organizational independence from the state. Human rights groups have also been active in pro-democracy movements. Though these are not often large organizations, their activities are important in countering repression and promoting discourses of human rights and democracy among the opposition. Human rights organizations also ensure that issues of human rights are prioritized when new democracies emerge. Finally, shantytown dwellers and neighborhood associations have participated in democratization processes. Since these territorial organizations are the foundation of local communities, they are not as easily targeted by the state’s repressive measures. Yet this feature also makes it more difficult for these organizations to coalesce their social power at the regional or national level and exert direct influence on the political arena. These groups are, nonetheless, fundamental for practicing participatory democracy, as they bring together local communities on issues related to their day-to-day livelihoods.

The ability of activists to organize, and to build organizations, is dependent on the strategies of authoritarian regimes for controlling and taming society. Autocratic states use tactics of repression and co-optation to suppress and prevent dissent. Consistent with studies of political opportunities, authoritarian incumbents sometimes decrease the level of repression and open up the political environment for organizing. Organization building in these periods then helps to sustain the movement during more repressive eras. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes sometimes opt to build hierarchical corporatist organizations to integrate groups, such as the working class, into the authoritarian regime, while not granting them real representation and keeping them under surveillance. Activists have debated whether co-opted organizations,
such as state-sponsored trade unions, present a real opportunity for activism within authoritarian regimes, or if activities in these organizations lead to co-optation and ultimately distract from democratic movements’ aims. Such debates occurred among labor activists in Spain, when the Francoist regime created a corporatist structure in workplaces to integrate the Spanish working class into the regime. A segment of the labor movement ended up participating in the elections for these government-sponsored groups and secured a number of seats. An unintended consequence of the regime’s policy to institutionalize government syndicates was to contribute to the emergence and strengthening of the opposition and working-class leadership within the workplace. It is not easy for the opposition to infiltrate such authoritarian organizations and turn them against authoritarian regimes, but other historical examples, such as democratic transitions in Mali in 1992 and Niger in 1994, show this route is possible. In these instances, labor unions that were linked to ruling authoritarian regimes joined the opposition and led antiregime protests. During the Tunisian revolution, rank and file activists mobilized within a large co-opted union to support the ongoing protests against dictatorship. As activists drive unions out of co-optation, democratic or authoritarian states might also try to co-opt unions. The struggle between the summit and the rank and file of such big organizations, then, is itself a relevant part of contentious mobilization crucial for shaping the orientation of unions and other large organizations.

Other factors, of course, also contribute to the longevity of a movement and formation of organizations. Foreign supporters can provide resources to a movement, although some studies point out that such support could also undermine movements. The strength of a political regime is also relevant to the durability of democracy movements. A weak regime might quickly concede or collapse in the face of a popular uprising, while a powerful and oppressive regime might suppress public resistance. Thus, a movement of longer duration might be more likely to exist under a regime that stays afloat when confronted with mobilization yet is not able to kill the movement completely.

As it is important for the opposition to build new organizations and to appropriate and reorient existing organizations against autocratic regimes, it is also crucial for the opposition to forge connections between these organizations. To defeat authoritarian regimes through a bottom-up strategy, the opposition needs to build multisectoral alliances that unite groups from different social and political backgrounds. Factors that contribute to the formation of alliances in social movements include the emergence of new political opportunities and threats, convergence in ideological positions and strategic choices, and shared membership among organizations. Protest mobilization itself can also generate solidarity and bring together otherwise disconnected groups. Accordingly, short waves of mobilization can generate alliances, but
movements that mobilize over a longer period have more time to build alliances based on shared discursive positions and shared organizational ties. The latter type of alliance might have a better chance of cohesion after the upsurge in mobilization subsides and the emergent sense of solidarity weakens.

Earlier in this section, I argued that formal organizations are necessary for sustaining contentious mobilization over a long period of time. Formal organizations also have an affinity with democracy. Democracy is a formal organization of politics based on a set of universal rules that aspires to ensure political equality, freedoms of speech and assembly, clean elections, political competition, and participation of ordinary citizens in the political process. Of course, not all formal organizations are democratic. Formal organizations could have authoritarian rules that centralize power in the hands of the few and exclude members from decision making. However, while not all formal organizations are democratic, all democracies are formal organizations. Particularly, rule of law and the equality of all citizens before the law are major components of democracy as a formal organization. Accordingly, activists might try to build democratic organizations and generate democratic practices during their campaigns against authoritarian regimes. Such democratic organizations have rules and practices that ensure democratic election of leadership, collective deliberation for decision making, and mechanisms to hold the leadership accountable to members. These organizational features could serve as a blueprint for developing institutions of participatory democracy and self-governing when new democracies emerge.\textsuperscript{66}

Mechanisms of accountability and democratic organizational features also increase the strategic capacity of social movement organizations. Organizations with open, regular, and authoritative deliberations benefit from the synergy of their members’ knowledge and motivations. These practices are particularly beneficial for organizations that rely on their members to acquire resources such as members’ time and donations. Members’ participation in the decision-making process and in holding leaders accountable can motivate them to contribute more resources to the organization. Democratic practices of deliberation and accountability then increase the strategic capacity of social movement organizations by boosting the levels of information, motivation, and resources.\textsuperscript{67} The process of achieving internal democracy through formal rules and practices can be contrasted with some new social movements that advocate an internal radical democracy that rejects formal structure and limits over the decision-making process. These movements’ ideal is a form of horizontalism wherein all members equally contribute and come to a consensus on decisions. In reality, however, this model does not achieve internal democracy, as people with louder voices gain more input in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, this model can easily lead to organizational paralysis and a failure to make effective decisions in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{69}
In this framework, I emphasize the duration of the contentious movement leading to democratization. This emphasis distinguishes between the argument of this book and a few other studies that emphasize the solidifying effect of mass mobilization for democratization. These studies contend that democracies that emerge from mass mobilization or nonviolent campaigns are of higher quality or have a better chance of survival. These studies on mobilization during transitions measure contention as a binary variable. Did mobilization occur, or did it not? This binary choice simplifies the diversity of paths that countries have taken toward democracy. Again, unlike existing scholarship on instances of popular mobilization, which has been leveraged to address similar questions, I argue that the duration of mobilization, and not just the mobilization’s occurrence, matters for democratic durability. I am thus able to distinguish, for instance, the 1994 transition to democracy in South Africa, led by a massive, prolonged, and well-organized set of popular organizations, from the 2009 transition in Pakistan, where a middle-class lawyers’ movement led a year-long campaign to unseat the incumbent dictator. Both were contentious transitions, but the duration of the contention was substantially different. In this book, I argue that their consequences are likely to differ as well.

**Mobilization, Organization, and New Democracies**

I propose that sustained popular campaigns contribute to the durability of emerging democratic regimes by protecting against two of the major mechanisms of democratic breakdown, as identified by political scientists Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman: praetorianism and weak institutionalization. Praetorianism refers to countries with weak civilian control over the military. These countries often reveal histories of prior military rule and coups. Previously politicized military forces remain a potential threat to democracy because the military often has the coercive and organizational capacity to overthrow democratic governments. Such militaries try to reserve veto powers for themselves and to limit the jurisdiction of electoral institutions, which could also contribute to weak institutionalization. Institutionalization concerns the major rules and constraints in democratic regimes that ensure the proper functioning of the regime. Weak institutionalization occurs when major political actors question or disagree over the function of the main democratic institutions, or when they are uncertain about other actors’ commitments to the foremost rules of the democratic game. For example, during its transition period in 2011–13, Egypt witnessed fierce disputes between Islamists, non-Islamists, and old regime politicians over the authority and powers of the president, the parliament, the judiciary, and the military generals. Over the course of a few months, the judiciary annulled the results of the parliamentary elections, the president canceled the judiciary’s ruling and put himself above
judiciary oversight, and then the judiciary called the president's decree illegal. Islamists accused non-Islamists of not respecting the democratic legitimacy of electoral institutions, and non-Islamists, in turn, accused Islamists of not respecting the divisions of government branches.

Unarmed campaigns are more resistant to such dangers, as they generate and strengthen a popular prodemocracy leadership embedded in mass organizations and foster a vibrant and strong civil society in the postdictatorship era. Popular prodemocracy leadership and enhanced civil society create a solid foundation for new democratic institutions and fight against praetorianism.

First, a long prodemocracy campaign has a better chance of replacing authoritarian incumbents with democratic activists than democracies that emerged out of quiescence or short mobilization, because these activists have developed into viable leaders during the years of struggle. Mass mobilization against an autocratic regime creates a momentum that may marginalize authoritarian leaders in posttransition politics. Prolonged movements are crucial in generating a leadership cadre in at least two ways. First, the day-to-day work and experience involved in building and maintaining complex movement organizations train cadres that later can translate these skills from protest to institutional politics in the transition and posttransition eras. Second, long-term mobilization popularizes and endorses the leaders at the summit of the movement and gives them a hegemonic position in the posttransition era. Studies of post-Communist politics indicate that stable democracies resulted from cases where the opposition was powerful enough to replace the communists; emerging democracies without a prior powerful opposition faced incumbent turnover, authoritarian setbacks, and even resurgent authoritarianism. A committed democratic leader like Nelson Mandela in South Africa could maintain public support during the difficult process of democratic consolidation. While short episodes of unrest may fail to launch new leaders into the new polity, years of popular struggle provide a set of political leaders with credible democratic convictions and proven leadership experience to serve in the new regime.

Sustained mobilization may also give democratic forces the power to negotiate the parameters of transition, build new democratic institutions, and rein in the privileges of authoritarian institutions such as the military. In the long run, prolonged unarmed movements could also decrease the likelihood of coups—an essential mechanism of democratic breakdown—by signaling to the military that a return to politics would be very costly. In such cases, the military knows that its interference in politics could face broad popular opposition that would damage the military's prestige and legitimacy. When such a hegemonic force is absent, and the transition is the result of only elite pacts, it is less likely that the elite will ensure "horizontal accountability." When the opposition is weak in the negotiations of the transition era, it is more likely that the quality
of the new democracies becomes compromised. Under such circumstances, it is also more likely for the new democracy to be born with the syndrome of weak institutionalization. This was the case in Pakistan’s 1988 transition to democracy. Since the transition happened without much popular pressure, the military kept its authoritarian privileges and subsequently limited the powers of democratically elected prime ministers in the new regime. Popular leadership embedded in mass organizations is in a stronger position to negotiate the parameters of the transition and to demand democratic institutions free from the limitations that the remaining elite of the antecedent authoritarian regime may demand. In the course of negotiations, the popular leadership of the opposition could mobilize its supporters. The presence of a formal organization signals to the government that the opposition has the capacity to mobilize its supporters again, if needed. This helps the opposition keep its ranks in order during the negotiations. Not all parties of the opposition would necessarily support negotiations or resulting outcomes and compromises. In such situations, the opposition leadership would have difficulty representing the opposition as a cohesive camp in the negotiations if it suffers from organizational weakness. In South Africa, for example, the opposition leaders turned down several of the apartheid regime’s propositions, which would have curtailed the capacity of the new democratic government, as these leaders were well organized, broadly popular in society, and could mobilize against the government. The opposition leaders withdrew from several previous demands, such as the nationalization of banks and major industries, but kept their supporters together as they headed toward the transition process.

This kind of slow, strenuous mobilization stands in stark contrast to recent rapid and massive waves of protest facilitated by social media. Digital media has enabled activists to skip organizing efforts and launch massive waves of contention without prior coordination or building any organizational infrastructure. This new mode of mobilization, however, has had consequences for these movements. For instance, although they initially mobilized without defined leadership, in later phases, the lack of leadership has made them unable to negotiate with the authorities. Even movements themselves have been unable to define goals and to set an agenda. The lack of a formal organization could also signal a weakness in the opposition. A movement without organization might mobilize masses quickly, on occasion, but the authoritarian incumbents might perceive the movement as incapable of mobilizing for a longer period.

While lengthy mobilization requires building alliances and agreeing upon leadership for the movement, short bursts of mobilization can succeed without building strong alliances between various groups opposing dictatorship. In such cases, the only issue that binds the antiauthoritarian coalition is hatred of the incumbents. When the incumbents are toppled, prodemocracy forces lose their only incentive to stay together and may not agree on the transition
agenda. Again, in such situations, if the active political forces fail to reach an agreement over the leadership and necessary steps for the postdictatorship period, their disagreements could result in violent confrontations, alliances with regime holdovers, an unstable democracy, or even a breakdown of the new democracy. Disputes about the parameters of the transition again highlight weak institutionalization, a key mechanism for democratic breakdown.

In addition to providing emerging democracies with capable leaders, the organizational structure and activists of the prodemocracy movements may form political parties, which are crucial actors in the process of democratic consolidation. Parties contribute to both the legitimization of the new regime and to the articulation and representation of social demands. The organizational structure of a lengthy prodemocracy campaign may also form part of civil society in the new democratic regime. Activists popularized by and experienced in years of struggle often take leadership positions in civil society groups after the transition. Civil society institutions enhance democracy in various ways: they may foster democratic values among citizens, teach political skills, promote the quality of representation, facilitate public deliberation, and provide opportunities for citizens’ direct participation in governance. With a well-functioning and connected civil society, different grievances and demands are channeled within the democratic system rather than against it. As the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci has argued, civil society organizations function as an extension of the state and enhance the political regime by promoting the state’s hegemony and incorporating citizens into the existing political order. Electoral democracies, as regimes of power, function more effectively when they are inclusive and linked to society.

Democratization campaigns also contribute to posttransition civil society’s capacity to impose checks and balances on political power. The campaign may provide an organizational structure to mobilize new protest activities that hold politicians accountable or make new demands on the government. Also, years of political struggle against an authoritarian regime may enhance protest tactics as a part of the claims-making repertoire and provide inspiration for new social movements and campaigns in the posttransition polity. An empowered civil society can resist certain threats to democracy. For instance, when democratically elected incumbents try to change some of the institutional checks, such as constitutional term limits, to ensure their grip on executive power undemocratically, citizens might mobilize and stop such attempts. In other words, a vibrant democracy can act as a watchdog against the erosion of democratic institutions, either by elected officials or the military.

However, civil society is not always beneficial to democracy. Civic associations have, on occasion, mobilized against democracy and contributed to a democratic breakdown. Thus far, I have argued that sustained unarmed mobilization strengthens the postdictatorship civil society. Accordingly,
I argue that weak civil societies are more likely to turn against democracy, as they might find themselves unable to pursue their goals through democratic institutions. A weak civil society disappointed in its efforts to affect the political process might resort to nondemocratic means, such as committing to or supporting violence in the form of a coup or allying with antidemocratic forces. Stronger civil societies resulting from lengthy mobilizations have both the linkages and the mobilizing capacity to pursue their demands in the context of democratic institutions and, thus, are less likely than weak civil societies to undermine democracy.87

Prolonged mobilization and its features stand in contrast to other paths to democratic transition, such as elite brokerage, international intervention, or post–civil war settlements. Each path has its own particularities and challenges in the process of democratization. For instance, as discussed previously, transitions resulting from elite brokerage, such as Pakistan in 1988, are less likely than transitions stemming from protest mobilization to feature popular leaders with democratic convictions, to marginalize authoritarian holdovers like the military, or to impose strong institutional checks. Transitions resulting from international interventions may not enjoy the grassroots support necessary to keep democratic power-holders in check.88 Lastly, post–civil war democracies such as Libya and Iraq have sustained serious challenges in the transformation of militants into civilian parties. These democracies also usually feature the active presence of international actors, who may shift the agendas of civil society organizations away from their grassroots bases.89

Looking Ahead

In chapter 2, I demonstrate the book’s theoretical argument with quantitative evidence. I present a quantitative analysis of an original dataset on mass mobilization leading to democratic transitions in eighty countries, from 1960 to 2010. For this analysis, I first investigate the effects of unarmed mobilization duration on the probability that the new democracies will survive. I then consider the effect of unarmed mobilization on the quality of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and the state of civil society for the same set of democratic regimes. This analysis shows that democracies emerging from sustained, unarmed mobilization have a better chance of survival. Furthermore, these democracies have a better chance of improving in their electoral and liberal dimensions. Civil society in such democracies is also more likely to thrive in the posttransition period.

Chapters 3 through 5 examine five cases of either successful or failed democratization in South Africa, Poland, Pakistan, Egypt, and Tunisia. Figure 1 shows changes in the democratic score of these countries before and after their transitions. The democracy score is based on V-Dem,90 the largest and
most comprehensive dataset of democracy and other political variables. (For further details and definitions, see chapter 2.) Chapter 3 uses qualitative case studies to explore the mechanisms underlying the association established in chapter 2. First, I look at the lengthy movements that led to democratization in South Africa in 1994 and Poland in 1989. As figure 1 shows, both countries achieved high levels of electoral democracy, particularly in the first several years after the transition. These two paradigmatic cases of society-led mobilization are ideal for generating and testing theories about sustained mobilization and democratic survival. South Africa and Poland show how mobilization against authoritarianism happens in tandem with organization building and how initially isolated segments of the opposition came together during the years of struggle. In both countries, the social movements contributed to the formation of a stable democratic regime and an active civil society. As the chart shows, during previous years, both democracies experienced a decline in democratic quality. My argument here concerns the first formative years after the democratic transition. While both countries have experienced a level of decline in their democratic quality, as the chart shows, their level of democracy is still above Pakistan’s. In the third part of this chapter, I present a case study of Pakistan’s failed democratization from 1988–99. During this period, Pakistan neither endured nor achieved the high level of democracy seen in South Africa and Poland, despite it having a longer history of electoral democracy than those countries, as is evident in the chart. Pakistan’s democracy emerged without strong pressure from mobilizing masses. Political parties, trade unions, and other civil society groups were quite weak and could be easily suppressed or fragmented by the state. The transition proceeded from a pact made between the Pakistani military and opposition leader Benazir Bhutto. The case study shows how Pakistan’s democracy suffered from the pact and the military’s ongoing meddling in civilian affairs, which eventually led to the failure of Pakistan’s democracy in 1999. Pakistan’s weak civil society did not resist the coup in 1999, and some civic groups even supported it. The chapter concludes with references to particular cases that show the presence of mechanisms discussed in other instances of democratization.

Chapter 4 presents another case of democratic failure, albeit one that follows a democratic breakthrough after a short wave of mobilization. As the chart shows, we may not label the events of 2011–13 in Egypt a democratic transition, but we still see an increase in its democracy score in 2012, Egypt’s highest electoral democracy score in modern history. The revolution in Egypt on January 25, 2011, led to the fall of Mubarak and then to competitive presidential and legislative elections. This democratic interval, however, ended with a popular coup in 2013. It’s significant here that civil society participated in the breakdown of the country’s fragile democracy by setting the stage for the military’s intervention in 2013. This chapter argues that Egypt’s short period of
mobilization contributed to its failure of democracy. First, different opposition actors did not develop ties with one another during this short period and did not reach an agreement on the parameters of the transition period. Specifically, they did not come to a consensus to push back against remaining elites and holdovers from the previous regime, particularly the military. The opposition was divided between the non-Islamist and organizationally weak segment, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which hoped to secure office through its robust organizational capacity. If the mobilization period had been lengthier, perhaps non-Islamist groups would have reached an agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood or developed stronger organizations to compete with it. However, the organizational imbalance between the two groups undermined the prospect of an agreement. Disappointed with their inability to gain influence through their organizational capacity, secular groups placed their hopes in the Egyptian military to depose the Muslim Brotherhood. This miscalculation laid the groundwork for the 2013 coup that ended the elected presidency of Mohamed Morsi and brought the military back to the center of Egyptian politics.

In chapter 5, I examine the Tunisian revolution and the subsequent democratization as the Arab Spring’s only complete democratic transition. Tunisia, as the chart shows, reached a high level of electoral democracy on par with the democracies in South Africa and Poland, which were achieved through long mobilizations. Tunisia’s democracy has persisted; though, in the summer of 2021, it faced its most serious challenge since 2011. The events of

![Figure 1. Changes in the level of electoral democracy for South Africa, Poland, Pakistan, Egypt and Tunisia](image-url)
2021 could mark the end of Tunisian democracy, or at least a serious decline, yet Tunisia is still a relative success story for democratization: a near decade of democracy in the least democratic region of the world. The Tunisian revolution, from 2010 to 2011, was short in duration and thus corresponds with this book’s argument that long mobilization is crucial for durable democracy. Nonetheless, it still begs an explanation: how did the Tunisian revolution lead to a transition to a formal democracy and reach such high level of democracy? Here I analyze Tunisia as a case of relative success—and as a rather anomalous case to my argument—since the democratization came about after a short mobilization. This chapter highlights the critical role played by a prominent trade union in Tunisia: Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). Tunisian political parties were fragile after the revolution, and the political scene was soon polarized between non-Islamists and Islamists, similar to Egypt. The main difference between Egypt and Tunisia was that, because of the presence of the UGTT in the secular camp, the competition between Islamists, with their organizationally strong Ennahda party, and non-Islamists was more balanced. It was in the context of this balanced organizational field that non-Islamists and Islamists reached an agreement in the summer of 2013 that saved Tunisian democracy from an escalation of conflict and a possible breakdown. Even though the UGTT did not emerge during the protests of 2010–11, it played a role similar to that of organizations that emerged from a more extended wave of protest. A closer look at the conditions under which the UGTT emerged shows even more similarities with mechanisms of protest and organization formation discussed within the theoretical framework of this book. The UGTT emerged during the waves of protest in Tunisia against French colonial rule in the mid-twentieth century. Later, militancy within the lower ranks of the UGTT saved the organization from complete co-optation by the authoritarian regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The UGTT, then, has a history of both militancy and co-optation. Between 2010–13, the politics of protest within the organization pushed it to uphold the democratic transition process. Whether the UGTT returns to the politics of co-optation or stays an independent defender of democracy within Tunisian civil society remains to be seen.

In the conclusion, I summarize the overall argument and major findings. I then discuss the implications of the argument, both for prodemocracy activists in authoritarian countries and for policy makers at the international level.

CASE SELECTION

The statistical analysis in chapter 2 confirms a robust association between the length of unarmed mobilization and the durability of the resulting democracies, but the quantitative analyses do not tell us why we observe such a
correlation. I use five case studies to investigate the mechanisms underlying these associations. These case studies propel the investigation into why unarmed mobilization affects the durability of new democracies. I selected the cases based on variations in both the length of unarmed mobilization and the failure or success of democratic survival: South Africa (1994–present), with a lengthy mobilization and successful democratic consolidation; Poland (1989–present), with a long period of mobilization and democratic consolidation; Pakistan (1988–99), with weak and limited mobilization and democratic failure; Egypt (2011–13), with a short period of mobilization and subsequent failure of democracy; and Tunisia (2011–present), also a short period of mobilization and, thus far, a successful transition to electoral democracy.

Table 1 presents all the case studies in this book, the length of mobilization, and the outcome of democratization. I selected the first two cases of South Africa and Poland to illustrate how lengthy movements involve processes that supposedly solidify emerging democratic regimes. The Pakistan case shows how a transition from the top and an absence of a popular movement for democracy leads to weak democracy. Egypt represents a short mobilization that resulted in a failed democratization outcome, and Tunisia represents an anomalous case of short mobilization and successful democratization.

Table 1. Case Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Campaign Duration (years)</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Relative Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia happened after the timeframe of cases analyzed in chapter 2, but in both cases, short mobilizations led to competitive elections and the transfer of executive power to electoral victors. I coded two years of mobilization for each, which I defined as the time between the beginning of the revolution in each country and the election that brought in new governments. In Egypt, this was the presidential election in 2012; in Tunisia, the election of the Constituent Assembly in 2011. I code Tunisia as a relative success because it successfully finished a democratic transition, and the ensuing democratic regime has lasted close to a decade. Nonetheless, it is still too early to assess the longevity of Tunisian democracy.
For each case, I examine: whether and how protest mobilization against authoritarian regimes interacted with and accompanied organization building by the opposition; whether linkages were created among different opposition actors; how the organizational strength and mobilizational capacity of the opposition affected the transition process; whether the opposition was able to exert influence in the leadership of the new political regime; how the protest movement affected the strength of civil society in the transition and new democratic regimes; how the strength and positions of this civil society affected the trajectory of the new democracies.

SOURCES

The research for this book draws on a variety of sources. First, I use an original quantitative dataset collected for this project on the length of popular mobilizations leading to democratization for the period 1950–2010. I describe this data in chapter 2 and discuss its strengths and limitations. In chapter 3, I employ secondary sources to present shorter case studies to illustrate the mechanisms underlying the associations uncovered by the statistical analyses developed in chapter 2. In chapters 4 and 5, I use primary material from Arabic-language newspapers and websites to present two case studies of the transition periods in Egypt and Tunisia.

To illustrate this argument for Egypt, I collected data from newspapers, blogs, and organization websites. Mainly, I examined all issues of the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm from January 2011 to July 2013. I reviewed the titles of all political news articles and op-eds, roughly 25,000 items, and selected pieces related to issues of leadership after the transition, the organizational strengths of different groups, and these groups’ relative stances toward each other and elements of the previous regime, specifically the military. Al-Masry Al-Youm is ideologically liberal and, for the period of study, covers almost all of the essential groups involved in the transition process. I have supplemented this collection with other newspapers, blogs, and organization websites. These sources provide roughly 250 relevant news articles and op-eds. Finally, I use various secondary sources, such as published and unpublished analyses of the uprising and its outcome.

For the case of Tunisia, I rely on the website Turess, which collects articles from Tunisian newspapers and websites for every day throughout the transition period, 2011–13. This selection includes articles from various sides of the political spectrum, with contributions from both non-Islamists and Islamists. To collect the relevant pieces, I conducted daily reviews of articles from two papers—Al-Sabah and Al-Chourouk—and skimmed through other sources included on the website. I wrote my analysis of Tunisia’s transition period based upon an initial collection of 383 news articles. I have supplemented these sources with secondary sources on the background of the revolution, involved actors, and the main events during the transition period.
Summary

The strength and proper functioning of democratic institutions rest on the balance of forces in political and civil society. I argue that sustained unarmed mobilization forges stronger and longer-lasting democracies because movements must have formal organizational structures to mobilize for long periods in an authoritarian context. This organization, resulting from years of struggle, provides leadership and a clearer agenda for a democratic transition. After such a mobilization, the democratic opposition is more cohesive and in a stronger position to negotiate the foundation for the emergence of new democratic institutions. A lengthy prodemocracy movement also strengthens postdictatorship civil society, providing an additional mechanism for enhancing democratic institutions and contributing to the longevity of the new democracy. In the next chapter, I present statistical tests of the relationship between the length of mobilization leading up to democratic transitions and the quality and durability of the new democracies.
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