

CONTENTS

Preface vii

| | | |
|---|------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Not Yet Basic Equals | 1 |
| 2 | Histories of Exclusion | 18 |
| 3 | Justification Is Still Condition | 40 |
| 4 | Status <i>and</i> Resources | 63 |
| 5 | Equality, Prescription, and Choice | 86 |

Notes 113

Bibliography 125

Index 135

1

Not Yet Basic Equals

WE LIVE IN A PERIOD of reducing inequalities between countries, but increasing inequalities within them, reversing in the latter case what had previously been a more encouraging trend. The twentieth century witnessed what in studies of the United States is termed ‘the Great Levelling’, a dramatic decline in the income share of the richest 1% and associated rise in the share of the bottom half. Wars destroyed much private wealth, the financial crash of 1929–33 led to policies of tight financial regulation, and slower population growth combined with a general shift towards the political left such that lower skilled Americans were able to capture a significantly higher share of total income. In their study of American inequality, Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson describe the period from the 1910s to the mid-1970s as ‘a revolutionary fall . . . unlike anything experienced in any other documented period in history.’¹ Much the same pattern was replicated across all the richer countries of the world, with the share of total income held by both the top 1% and top 0.1% falling significantly up to the 1950s. The trend (if it can be called that, given how short-lived it was) then either levelled out or weakened, and in the English-speaking countries of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, later went into reverse. Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez argue that the reversal is almost entirely accounted for by an ‘unprecedented surge in top incomes’,² but the trend towards reducing gaps between middle and lower incomes also stymied. Since the 1970s, none of the Anglo countries ‘has experienced a narrowing of the income gaps—not among the bottom 90%, not among the top 10%, and not between the two. And most have experienced a widening.’³ The distribution of income is yet again heavily skewed, and the distribution of wealth even more so. An almost inconceivable share of the world’s resources now goes to a miniscule percentage of the world’s population: in one

2019 estimate by Credit Suisse, 1% of the world's population owns 44% of total global wealth.⁴

Many find the resulting distribution of income and wealth unacceptable. Yet, if we are to judge by the political parties citizens vote for, many more remain untroubled. Despite periodic flurries in the press, when journalists review the latest statistics or muse over the crisis of capitalism, and despite many inspirational moments of activism around the world, there is little sustained evidence of revulsion against current inequalities. This may be less a matter of complacency and more of popular despair about the possibilities for change. My worry is that it reflects something worse than either of these. I fear we are living through a period in which even basic ideas of equality are revealed as lacking power. We know that people disagree on matters of economic equality, that some favour a radical redistribution of resources whilst others consider the current arrangements entirely fair. But as regards the more basic idea of human equality—the idea that, as human beings, we are all *in some sense* of equal worth—we are supposed to be in general agreement. It is sometimes offered as the defining characteristic of modernity that people today recognise all humans as fundamentally equal; this is said to separate us from the pre-moderns, who continued to think in terms of hierarchies determined by birth. Not who you are, but what you can do: this is supposed to be a defining feature of our age.

It's a nice thought, but hardly seems a plausible depiction. Nearly eighty years on from the horrors of the Holocaust, when six million people were murdered just for being Jewish, and millions more just for being Polish, Roma, disabled, or gay, people are still being killed, persecuted, criminalised, or stripped of their citizenship because they are the 'wrong' kind of person. Genocidal wars target people for their ethnicity; jihadists target them for their religion; and governments also get in on the act, variously employing ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or gender as bases for either denying people citizenship altogether or denying them full citizen rights. In India, celebrated as the world's largest democracy and founded on a commitment to secularism that was meant to enable people of multiple faiths to live side by side, the recent cultivation of a Hindu nationalism now threatens to make religion a criterion for citizenship. An unprecedented *Citizenship Amendment Act*, passed in 2019, offered fast-track citizenship to refugees fleeing persecution in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, specifying as potential beneficiaries members of virtually every South Asian faith, except Islam. Coming on the heels of a register of citizens in the state of Assam, where nearly two million people were

left off the register, and Muslims appealing against their plight were disproportionately declared illegal immigrants, this looks suspiciously like an attempt to redefine Indian citizenship along religio-ethnic lines. In the United States, a series of *Presidential Proclamations*, dating from 2017, banned entry to the country from certain (mostly Muslim-majority) countries. There was no direct specification of religion in this—that would be illegal under US law—but the proclamations were widely understood as a ‘Muslim ban.’ In the UK, *Immigration Acts* from 2014 and 2016 introduced a requirement for people to prove their citizenship to employers, landlords, hospitals, and banks. When combined with a deliberately ‘hostile’ immigration environment, this had the effect of rendering illegal people who had migrated perfectly legally in the 1940s, ’50s or ’60s, but never troubled to get UK passports. Many of those affected were from the ‘Windrush generation’, Commonwealth citizens who had arrived from the Caribbean to help meet postwar labour shortages, but were now denied employment, evicted from their homes, refused medical treatment, and in some cases deported ‘back’ to a country they barely knew.⁵ Again, there was no direct targeting by race, but the message was pretty clear.

Despite what is expressed in instruments like the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1976), or *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (1981), many around the world today face officially sanctioned discrimination relating to their race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or gender. Most countries sign up to CEDAW, thereby seeming to signal their commitment to gender equality, but they are permitted to sign with ‘reservations’, and generally cite religious or cultural reasons for doing so. Even the Taliban in Afghanistan felt able to sign up to CEDAW. Countries can then avoid implementing elements that ought to be beyond question, like equality rights in marriage or rights to sexual and reproductive health. At the time of writing, to give a different example, more than seventy jurisdictions around the world treat homosexuality as a criminal offence, and some of these make it punishable by death. Neither example generates much confidence in a supposedly shared belief in human equality.

Other countries pride themselves (often justifiably) on their record of anti-discrimination legislation, but wherever in the world people live, they continue to face forms of racism, sexism, and homophobia that veer between the insidiously persistent and the life-threateningly violent. A recent UNDP study of gender norms, drawing on data from seventy-five countries that between them account for more than 80% of the world’s population, found 91% of men

and 86% of women harbouring at least one bias against gender equality, agreeing, for example, that ‘it is not essential for women to have the same rights as men’, or that ‘men have more right to a job than women’, or that ‘men make better political leaders.’⁶ There are important variations between countries, but even in Sweden, the country that reports the least bias, a full 30% of the population admits to at least one gender bias, and the proportion of men with *no* gender bias has been decreasing in recent years. In the UK, 55% admit to at least one gender bias; in the United States, it is 57%. Ascriptive hierarchies, based on assumptions about who we are and the qualities we were born with, continue to exercise their force. It is not only the maldistribution of resources that should worry us. It is also a failure to commit to basic equality.

One might think of this as mere time lag, but this is one of the alibis I reject in this book. It is not, I will argue, just that the world is taking its time in making good on the promise of human equality, but that the conditionalities built into that promise were always going to limit it. Nor can we assume that once societies finally get it together to move from ascription- to achievement-based measures of worth, our fundamental human equality will at last be recognised. What we face today is a combination of startling inequalities of income and wealth, continuing inequalities of gender, caste, and race, and the further ‘achievement-based’ hierarchies of education and intelligence. One of the successes of past decades has been the expansion—in all regions of the world, but particularly Europe, North America, and South East Asia—of access to higher education, and the virtual elimination of the previous gender gap in this. This has been accompanied, however, by a trend towards increasing hierarchies in production, as the differential between the high-skilled well-paid and low-skilled poorly paid widens, and those in the latter group—now often described as the ‘precariat’—have to patch together a living from a mixture of insecure short-term jobs, none of which offers much in the way of self-fulfilment. This is a significant reversal of that earlier ‘great levelling’, and not just a reversal. In a new twist to older stories, differences in intelligence are projected onto differences in social class, generating categories of the ‘smart’ and the ‘stupid’ that attribute social inequalities to individuals’ own lack of ability. Ironically and depressingly, progressive critics of the right-wing populisms that have promoted ethnicised conceptions of national identity or encouraged racist discrimination sometimes buy into this hierarchy, generating strains of a new elitism that despairs of the citizens and wishes them less of a political voice.⁷

In 1958, Michael Young coined the term ‘meritocracy’ to describe a dystopian future in which human worth was measured exclusively in terms of

performance in intelligence tests.⁸ The history was purportedly written by a great admirer of meritocracy, just before a female-led ‘populist’ movement against the system, in the course of which he was killed. The author describes how a previous *inequality* of opportunity had ‘fostered the myth of human equality.’⁹ When opportunities and rewards were distributed according to inherited privilege and nepotism, those at the bottom of the social ladder could always think themselves as good as or better than their social superiors, while those at the top would come across many in lower stations whose abilities dwarfed their own. Once merit, however, supplanted nepotism, and the class system had been scientifically restructured on the basis of intelligence tests alone, there was, in the author’s account, no further room for all that silliness about equality. The successful knew that they deserved their position; the unsuccessful had to face the unpalatable truth of their stupidity. Young’s concerns about this as the possible trajectory of educational and social policy were twofold. First, that it reduced all qualities to a single measure, making ability to succeed in intelligence tests the only skill that mattered; second, that it deprived those who failed the test of alternative bases for self-esteem.

His critique of meritocracy resonates with what Michael Walzer once termed the ‘democratic wager’: the belief that qualities and talents are roughly evenly distributed across the population, such that those who do badly in one sphere of life will be compensated by success in some other sphere.¹⁰ So you might not make it to university professor, or become a world-famous athlete, but perhaps you’re the one who manages to steer her children successfully through the dangers of adolescence, or tells the best jokes, or plays a good game of darts. Meritocracy disrupts this, for it encourages us to think in terms of a single scale of value—you are either clever or stupid, able or unable, with or without merit—and prevents us from appreciating the full range of qualities that characterise human beings. It also encourages us to think that one person genuinely is superior to another, slipping, as Amartya Sen puts it, into personification.¹¹ Instead of treating a particular selection process or incentive system as a convenient way of getting things done to the best advantage of the society (finding the people with the most steady hands to become brain surgeons, for example), it encourages us to think that it is the people selected who have the merit, not their actions, that they are indeed better than the others, and do indeed deserve their additional rewards. A meritocratic principle that perhaps began as an egalitarian challenge to the inequities of a class-ridden, gender-biased, racist system, can then end up destroying the very belief in human equality that supposedly underpins democracy.

We do not live in meritocracies, either of the narrowly IQ-based kind that Michael Young feared, or of the type fantasised over by those who believe in social mobility. As the evidence on global inequality confirms, we live in societies where privilege is still passed down through the generations and rewards to the most favoured far exceed what anyone could claim to merit. We do however live in the ideological shadow of meritocracy, where there is just enough semblance of people advancing by virtue of their own abilities for them to buy into the myths of merit and desert. In this context, differences in educational level and presumed differences in intelligence have added an extra layer to long-standing hierarchies of class, gender, and race. The combination is proving particularly inhospitable to ideas of human equality. There is a flourishing market for pseudo-scientific ideas about innate gender differences or the racial distribution of intelligence, and once discredited- eugenicist ideas are more widely promoted. People write excitedly about the prospects for genetic enhancement that will produce people of superior intelligence and ability—not, in general, with a view to enhancing all people, but those with the money to pay. The notion that our ‘modern era’ is characterised by a belief in human equality looks increasingly absurd.

This is the concern that inspires this book and, in it, I partially retrace what have been shifts in my own thinking. Though I have thought of myself as an egalitarian from as long as I knew what the word meant, I ordered my thinking for many years around what I now see as a misleading distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ equality, misleading because it implies that we have already achieved the former. In the context of the postwar welfare states, it was tempting to make this assumption: tempting to assume an upward trajectory towards increasing equality and think in terms of a developmental paradigm in which the first stages had been more or less completed, but a great deal more needed to be done. I was born in 1950, into a Britain that still held onto much of its colonial empire but was edging at home into what we came to call social democracy. Deference to one’s superiors was still widely taught and practised; women were still encouraged to view themselves primarily as wives and mothers; boarding houses still carried their signs of ‘no coloureds or Irish’. With all this, new ideas of equality were abroad. The election of the 1945 Labour Government ushered in a battle against William Beveridge’s five ‘giant evils’: squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease. The creation of the National Health Service made health care available to all regardless of income. The expansion of National Insurance to cover pensions, sick pay, unemployment pay, and compensation for industrial injury meant that most adults

(more precisely, most men) were guaranteed an income from either employment or insurance benefits. The building of more than a million new homes, mostly to replace those destroyed in the war, provided significantly improved levels of housing and sanitation. The 1944 Education Act had already introduced free compulsory secondary education up to the age of fifteen, though with a pernicious divide that shunted the majority of pupils into poorly resourced secondary moderns, offering more academic education only to those who passed the eleven-plus. This last policy signalled meritocracy rather than equality, but even so, carried some semblance of the idea that all were potentially equals.

My own family was to benefit enormously from these changes. Neither of my parents had been able to progress far with their education: my mother left school at the then standard age of fourteen; my father won a scholarship to continue, but this only financed one additional year. Nobody in the older generations of my family had been to university; I, all three siblings, and a number of my cousins subsequently did. Which is not to say that I was especially impressed by the state of the new society. My parents were Labour supporters, and I recall my father planting a willow tree (an odd choice, perhaps) in honour of the 1964 election that brought Harold Wilson to power, but I was drawn to a more radical socialism, to feminism, and to ideals of participatory democracy. I had read Isaiah Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty', with its distinction between the negative freedom to pursue one's interests without undue interference from the state, and the positive—as I saw it, the 'real'—freedom that came from resisting the distorted desires of the market or (not his example) patriarchy, to press for more genuine self-fulfilment.¹² I read this (wrongly, as I later realised) as a distinction between liberalism and socialism, and ranged myself firmly on the side of the latter. In doing so, I saw myself as arguing for 'real' as opposed to 'formal' freedom, and 'real' rather than 'formal' equality.

In his essay 'On the Jewish Question' (1843), Karl Marx makes much of the distinction between political and human emancipation, arguing not only that these are distinct, but that achieving the former can in some ways make it harder to achieve the latter. The state, he argues, 'abolishes distinctions based on *birth, rank, education* and *occupation* when it declares birth, rank, education and occupation to be *non-political* distinctions, when it proclaims that every member of the people is an equal participant in popular sovereignty regardless of these distinctions.' In doing so, however, it does not abolish the distinctions themselves; it frees them up, rather, to do as they will outside the political sphere. To this extent, he suggests, the state 'presupposes them in order to

exist'.¹³ So taken was I by what seemed to me the elegance of this argument that I overlooked (as did Marx, at least in that formulation) the fact that 'every member of the people' was nowhere near being proclaimed an 'equal participant in popular sovereignty'; and that at the time of his writing, the merely 'political' equality he exposed as compatible with the continuing domination of private property had so far been granted only to a few. But even as I corrected that error, I continued to take my cue from a related distinction between formal and real. Equality in voting rights self-evidently failed to deliver equal political influence; equality before the law remained an empty achievement when people lacked the funds for legal advice and representation; freedoms of press and association patently left power in the hands of wealthy interest groups. It was not that I despised the 'merely formal' equalities (and neither, in fact, did Marx), for by now I was well-aware that not everyone enjoyed even these, that women, for example, still lacked the equal right to sign contracts in their own name. But even as I became more deeply involved in feminist politics, and more thoroughly alert to the many ways in which women were denied equal status, I continued to think in terms of the socioeconomic transformations necessary to deliver on the egalitarian promise. I tended, that is, to see the more formal equality rights as placeholders for the really important changes. When I later turned my attention to women's underrepresentation in politics (something I had previously seen as a more superficial issue), I still framed this as a *deepening* of an earlier promise: as pushing beyond the voting equality of the suffrage to a more substantial equalisation of power.¹⁴

The Developmental Paradigm

In an essay on 'Citizenship and Social Class', published in 1949, T. H. Marshall theorised the evolution of citizenship as moving progressively from civil to political to social rights, with the major challenges of the twentieth century revolving around the delivery of the last.¹⁵ This happy progression was based more on the experience of white working-class men than that of women, who were still disenfranchised in many countries of the world in 1949.¹⁶ It failed abysmally to capture the experience of racialised minorities: African Americans, for example, who were denied both political *and* civil rights at the time of Marshall's writing, and only partially gained these with the passage of the *Civil Rights Act* in 1964 and *Voting Rights Act* in 1965; or black people in Britain, who could be denied access to public places like pubs or hotels until this was

made illegal in the 1965 *Race Relations Act*. Yet that broadly Marshallian image of evolution from a more legal to a more social citizenship, or (as I saw it) from a more surface to a deeper equality, continued to frame much thinking over subsequent decades.

In *One Another's Equals*, Jeremy Waldron employs the language of 'deep' and 'surface' to the opposite effect, referring to issues about the distribution of wealth and income as the 'surface-level' questions, and contrasting these to the 'deeper', foundational, principle that regards all human beings as of equal worth.¹⁷ But I do not think I was unusual in my different deployment of that contrast. I envisaged the story of equality as progressing from early beginnings that were severely limited in both scope (the 'who' of equality) and nature (the 'what' of equality) yet developed over the centuries into a deeper understanding of the social and economic conditions necessary to make good on the egalitarian promise. In my version, the modern story of equality started roughly in the seventeenth century, around the time when philosophers like Thomas Hobbes were building theories of political authority out of ideas of a 'natural equality' that dispensed with God-given hierarchy. In those early beginnings, the equality was self-evidently limited. For Hobbes, it reflected not much more than the fact that the weakest person can still kill the strongest and carried no implications about societies being obliged to offer their citizens either civil, political, or social equality. There were people who took the ideas much further—these were the years of the English Civil War, which threw up numerous challenges to the established order, including to the rights and privileges of property owners—but most of those more ambitious imaginings died out or were suppressed. The story, however, continued. Another century on and we had the American *Declaration of Independence*, with its compelling 'we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal', followed by the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, which tore down aristocratic privilege and proclaimed that 'men are born free and remain equal in rights'. Again, the equality was self-evidently limited. When the French revolutionaries said all men were born free and equal, they did indeed mean men, not women; they meant white men, not black; men of property, not the impoverished or homeless; and though, under pressure, they extended the equal rights of man to include freed slaves from the French West Indies, and even—briefly—to abolish slavery, the equality they proclaimed was never intended to apply to all. Here, too, there were those who envisaged a more far-reaching egalitarianism, but they usually ended up persecuted or executed for their pains. This was the fate, for example, of the Marquis de Condorcet

and Olympe de Gouges, both of whom argued for the equal rights of women: Condorcet died in prison, de Gouges on the guillotine.¹⁸ It was also the fate of Gracchus Babeuf, for whom equality meant a strict levelling of rewards, with all men receiving the same wage, regardless of ‘the plea of superior ability or industry’.¹⁹ His *Conspiracy of Equals* dismissed as irrelevant the objection that in the face of such a strict egalitarianism, many desirable activities would disappear: ‘Let the arts perish, if need be! But let there be real equality.’²⁰

These were early and mostly unheeded voices, but you can see how a reading of them encouraged a notion of equality as on an upward trajectory, as starting out in minimalist versions that restricted both the scope and impact but building momentum over the centuries to generate ideals of equality that were more inclusive and far-reaching. Marshall sought to capture some of this upward trajectory with his idea of a movement from civil through political to social citizenship. Lynn Hunt captures it, in her story of the invention of human rights, in the notion of a ‘promise’, laid out in those eighteenth-century declarations, that ‘can be denied, suppressed, or just remain unfulfilled, but . . . does not die.’²¹ More generally in the human rights world, it is captured in notions of first-, second-, third-, and fourth-generation human rights, with the first as the civil-political rights against torture and inhumane treatment and for freedoms of thought and association, and later generations expanding and deepening this to include economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights. All these accounts contain elements of the trajectory that framed my own thinking, a trajectory from formal to real. For some, the trajectory assumes the force of a logic, as if the more radical future is already contained within the early formulations, just waiting for the necessary impetus that will cause it to unfold. Hunt suggests something like this when she writes of ‘the bulldozer force of the revolutionary logic of rights’;²² and though there is nothing inevitable about her analysis (she stresses powerful counter-logics that are also at work), the formulation makes the restrictions and exclusions appear secondary to the internal logic of the egalitarian idea. In my own past work, I have written of democracy as ‘erod(ing) assumptions of natural superiority’, holding out ‘a twin promise of political equality and popular power’; and have over-confidently claimed a ‘ratchet’ effect that makes serious backsliding unlikely.²³

I will say more in later chapters about what I now think of this progressivist history, and the way it plays down the significance of the many exclusions, but for the moment I just want to pull out one troubling implication. In this story of the growth of egalitarian ideas, there is a tendency to take the first stage as

relatively secure. We assume, that is, that we can now agree on at least one aspect of equality, the aspect that represents us all as civil and political equals; that we can agree, moreover, on the assumption that underpins this, that all of us are, in some important sense, of equal significance and worth. If we did not think this, why, after all, would we think it appropriate for everyone to be regarded as an equal before the law? Why would democracies insist on one person one vote, rather than votes only for men, or only for those with university degrees? Why, indeed, would the value of democracy have become (as a number of commentators noted in the latter part of the twentieth century²⁴) so much the shared consensus that even the most authoritarian of regimes tried to claim its name? It looks, then, as if we can take the first stage of egalitarianism as done and dusted, such that any future extension, for those inclined that way, need focus only on what comes next. We (mostly) have the civil equality, we (mostly) have the political equality, so what else should we be committing ourselves to as regards social and economic equality?

Political philosophers have been particularly prone to frame their work in this way, and to assume that all the compelling issues start after that first ‘basic’ stage. They commonly begin from the assertion that all of us, as human beings, are to be deemed of equal moral worth, taking this as a reasonably uncontroversial axiom, and then turn to the more interesting and challenging questions about what this means in terms of entitlements or obligations, and what kind of equality it implies. Ronald Dworkin has argued that all ‘plausible’ political theories now agree that each person matters equally; Will Kymlicka endorses this with the claim that all start from an ‘egalitarian plateau’ and continue from that point only to argue alternative interpretations of what equality means; Tim Scanlon claims that ‘basic moral equality is now widely accepted, even among people who reject substantive egalitarian claims.’²⁵ On this view, equality has become the default position, such that even the most seemingly anti-egalitarian of thinkers will agree on equality in some respect. They may recoil in horror from the idea of people having equal rights to roughly similar amounts of property, but do so only to insist instead on our equal right to hold on to what is already our own. Much of the egalitarian literature has then revolved, not around the pros and cons of equality, but around its so-called currency, as if the crucial divisions are only over what Amartya Sen summed up as ‘equality of what’?²⁶ Do we favour equality of resources? of welfare? of capabilities? Do we think that everyone should be guaranteed employment, housing, education, health care? Do we see equality in terms of equalising opportunities or equalising outcomes? Do we think, à la Babeuf, that there

should be no income differentials, or do we see that as a crazy interpretation of the egalitarian idea?

I do not at all discount the importance or the challenges of spelling out the kind of socioeconomic arrangements that best give meaning to an idea of equality. Socioeconomic inequality is a pressing concern, and from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, any confidence about an upwards trajectory towards greater economic equality seems misplaced. It is misplaced because that one-way progressivism was always illusory; but also because the expectation of ever more substantial equality has been confounded, in most of the advanced capitalist countries, by a reversal of policies of economic redistribution that threatens to shunt us back from social to (at best) liberal democracy. What looked at one point like steady progress, at least within the advanced countries, now appears more as an aberration: a temporary alleviation, achieved in part through the strength of now weakened trade unions, that has subsequently reverted to the norm. One might point, more optimistically, to a reduction of inequalities *between* countries and rising living standards in many parts of the previously less developed world, but these countries too are characterised by much internal inequality, often bringing with them acute status differentiation. Economic inequality cannot be easily detached from ‘basic’ equality, nor treated as a separate stage; and while a strong commitment to basic equality sometimes propels people to support policies of economic equality, too much exposure to economic inequality can also corrode that basic commitment. In the current moment, the global movements of people escaping wars, famine, the effects of climate change, or just seeking a better life, can hardly be said to be reinforcing perceptions of our human equality. To the contrary, they expose often deep-seated resistance to regarding others as our equals. It is not, that is, just that a progressive extension or deepening of the egalitarian promise is halted. The scale of current inequalities arguably promotes a movement backwards.

One aspect of this is that people live increasingly cordoned lives. This has always been the case for the super-rich—that 1% of the world’s population that now captures 44% of the world’s wealth. But leave these aside for the moment to consider only those earning five to ten to twenty times the average wage, enjoying the security of their professional or business lives, and able to buy themselves out of the public provision that was a feature of the postwar settlement in many countries. When people no longer share the routines of their daily existence—the schools they send their children to, the hospitals where they get treatment, the buses they travel on, the libraries from which they

borrow books, the media from which they get their information—they may start to lose the capacity to view each other as equals. Even before that moment, they may lose the capacity to view them as people like themselves. For those at the richer end of the spectrum, the poor can become an almost alien species, known primarily through the lens of stereotype, objects of either fear or contempt. In his analysis of the demonisation of the working class in contemporary Britain, Owen Jones recounts a dinner table conversation in a comfortable middle-class home where all laughed unselfconsciously at a joke about the ‘chavs’ shopping for their Christmas presents in Woolworths. “How,” he asks, “has hatred of working-class people becomes so socially acceptable?”²⁷ Meanwhile, for those at the poorer end of the spectrum, the insecurities and vulnerabilities can also produce hatreds, though this time directed at others all too much like themselves whom they see as competitors for employment or housing: at immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers. Living in a world of stark economic inequalities erodes our ability to see others as people like ourselves, as human beings equally worthy of respect. Equality increasingly becomes something we pay lip service to rather than something we live or feel.

So my point, to repeat, is not that the social and economic inequalities are any less urgent than before: indeed, it is partly the recent widening of those inequalities that seems to me to have such corrosive effect. What I now query is the relative complacency about what we have been encouraged to think of as an early first stage in the evolution of egalitarian thinking and practice, and the assumption that we can now move on to the later ones. We are misled by the global spread of democratic systems employing the principle of one person one vote to think that the battles over who counts as an equal have been won: after all, it is only the odd outlier like Saudi Arabia that still differentiates between the sexes in voting rights, and anyway, Saudi Arabia isn’t a democracy. But governments conceded equal voting rights for a whole host of different reasons, and the mere existence of a democratic voting system does not yet demonstrate that either governments or the population actively endorse a belief in equality. There is no straightforward timeline here, nor can we assume a comforting ratchet effect in which advances towards yet greater equality may halt, but will not fall back. The trajectory has not been uni-directional, the future is far from guaranteed, and when we look more closely at the earlier moments, it becomes clear that the declarations of equality were never intended to embrace us all.

In writing this book, I do not anticipate winning over those who actively oppose equality: I would like to have the skills to do this, but don’t think my

persuasive abilities stretch that far. Nor do I hope to add to the literatures tracking trends in economic and social inequality, or documenting the corrosive effects of that inequality on mental and physical health, patterns of drug abuse and incarceration, social mobility, or the welfare of children. There are excellent studies out there by people far more qualified than I.²⁸ Finally, I do not offer this as contributing in any detailed way to debates about the ‘currency’ of equality; or as helping sort out whether policy makers should prioritise poverty over equality, focus their attention on establishing a floor below which no person should fall, on setting a ceiling above which no person should rise, or more simply (not that simple!) on equality. There are many important and compelling debates between what people call sufficientarianism, prioritarianism, limitarianism, and equality, and I partially address these in a later chapter, but they are not my main focus. I certainly have something to say about how we should conceptualise equality, but do not aim to resolve what are currently only hypothetical questions about what a government committed to greater equality should do.

Structure of the Book

My aim, more simply, is to put equality at the centre of our political endeavours, in ways that no longer presume a developmental paradigm, or imagine us as on an upward trajectory, with the first, supposedly ‘basic’, stages already secured. I begin, in chapter 2, with an alternative account of the beginnings of so-called modern ideas of equality that treats the multiple exclusions as far more significant than they are often allowed to be. One central argument here is that the emerging understandings of equality that came to inform the self-definitions of the Western powers, and eventually underpinned their claims to be the ‘more civilised’ nations, were inextricably bound up with the violence and *inequality* of enslavement, colonialism, and the annihilation of indigenous peoples. As writers from Frantz Fanon to Sylvia Wynter to Anibal Quijano have argued, a high-minded discourse about equality, humanity, and the Rights of Man coincided with the dehumanisation of most of the world’s inhabitants, and this coincidence cannot be dismissed as accident. It is not only that those articulating new ideas of equality lacked the imagination to think of them as applying to all humans, or were too bounded by their context to be able to apply them more widely, though both of these were undoubtedly the case. It is also that they deployed often genetically based ideas of what it is to be human that involved stark new distinctions between different categories of

being and actively excluded the bulk of humankind. From its inception, the modern idea of equality came with conditions as regards character, temperament, rationality, and intelligence; and these conditions made a mockery of much of the language. This history casts a long shadow over the idea of equality, challenging assumptions about its birthplace as well as optimistic stories of its progress.

In chapter 3, I draw on these observations about the historical exclusions to offer a nonfoundational account of equality that presents it as something we commit ourselves to, or claim.²⁹ This is important for two reasons. First, it challenges the idea that we recognise others as our equals because of some human property (dignity, rationality, the capacity for empathy, etc.) we supposedly share. I take this as a deeply flawed way of thinking about equality, for when the claim to be regarded as an equal is justified by reference to the possession of some ‘human’ property, the claim becomes conditional. It becomes a basis for excluding those regarded as lacking the key property. This is not just a historical matter, for the process continues well into our own time, with some philosophers still arguing that those who fall short of a certain level of cognitive ability cannot be counted as ‘persons’. It also continues in more nebulous form, in the multifarious ways through which we differentiate between those humans we consider important and those we more readily discount. In a speech he gave in 2017 at the inauguration of a new start-up endeavour, Emmanuel Macron confirmed suspicions of his elitism when he described a train station ‘as a place where we encounter those who are succeeding and those who are nothing.’³⁰ In a meeting with Californian leaders and public officials in 2018 to discuss measures to deal with undocumented immigrants, Donald Trump reputedly said (of those suspected of being gang members), ‘These aren’t people, They’re animals.’ When Matteo Salvini announced plans, in the same year, to register and deport undocumented Roma from Italy, he noted with regret that ‘unfortunately we have to keep Italian Roma people in Italy because you can’t expel them.’ One could give many such illustrations, all suggesting how far we still are from any unconditional acceptance of people as equals. I include, moreover, some of those who have been most alert to the failings of right-wing nationalisms and populisms yet themselves fall into a kind of anti-democracy that points to differences in knowledge or experience or intelligence as relevant considerations in assessing who is entitled to a political voice. In my argument, any such differences are and should be entirely irrelevant. Equality is not grounded in facts about our shared rationality or intelligence or dignity or shared willingness to obey the law; it is not even

grounded in Walzer's more generous 'democratic wager', which still makes claims about what is factually the case regarding our qualities and capacities. Equality is not conditional on any of these and is not something to be withdrawn if people fail to meet the conditions.

The second reason a nonfoundational—unconditional—account is to be preferred is because it makes much more explicit the sense in which equality is a political commitment and claim. When democracies insist on the principle of one person one vote—or affirm, to use what was reputed to be Jeremy Bentham's formulation, that 'everybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one'—they are not noticing something about actually existing equality. They are making a commitment, rather, to regard us as of equal significance and worth. It is important to recognise that this is indeed a commitment. It is a commitment that societies make at the point of adopting democratic systems; a commitment people as individuals make when they talk of human, not just citizen, rights; and a claim people make *against* their societies whenever they mobilise to challenge subordination or exclusion. These are commitments and claims we have to continue making, which is an important part of the reason equality cannot be taken for granted as an accomplished first stage.

Chapter 4 moves on to the relationship between the commitment to equality and the socioeconomic conditions that enable us to sustain it. Though one aim of the book is to challenge developmental trajectories that assume a progressive move from basic through to substantive equality, and thereby encourage a misleading complacency about the first stage, my object is not to suggest that we stop thinking about the relationship between status and economic equality, or that we focus exclusively on the former. I argue, rather, that these cannot be viewed as separate stages, and in this, I return to themes addressed in an earlier book, *Which Equalities Matter?*³¹ That book was written in the 1990s, at a time when questions of economic equality seemed to be dropping off the political agenda, to be replaced by seemingly distinct concerns about gender, racial, or multicultural equality. In that period, people discussed tensions between what Nancy Fraser identified as a politics of recognition and a politics of redistribution, and worried about whether one set of concerns might be drowning out the other. My own contribution at that point was to argue for their interdependence. Similar issues are debated today under the rubric of identity politics, with mobilisations against racist violence or sexual harassment still disparaged as distractions from the 'real' issues of socioeconomic change. I argue that these debates expose a continuing—and unhelpful—normative hierarchy about which inequalities most matter, and I

draw considerable support in this from so-called relational accounts of equality. I also argue, however, that relational accounts veer too much towards a version of sufficiency, and thereby risk re-installing a normative hierarchy.

Chapter 5 focuses on concerns that have arisen with particular urgency in recent feminism but are also oddly echoed in some of the jeremiads against political correctness that represent appeals to equality as licencing an unhealthy politics of victimhood and complaint. In the feminist version, equality has come under suspicion for overly prescriptive ideas of what counts as such, and a possibly dictatorial tendency that frames some women as saviours, others as victims, and looks to the former to rescue the latter from their predicament. The dangers of ethnocentrism figure large here, and in feminist engagement with these there has been an otherwise surprising withdrawal from what many now perceive as the overly normative language of equality.³² Here, I address and try to lay to rest concerns about equality as prescription that have helped drive it down the feminist agenda. Equality is not, I argue, about conformity to a previously conceived norm; should not require us to pretend away key features of ourselves; and is compatible with forms of affirmative action that depend on the specification of difference. It is not, then, to be equated with sameness or regarded as the opposite of difference and is open to a very plural way of understanding how we live our lives. The worries about regulation or prescription nonetheless arise because there is a problem with *systemic* difference, like the gender division of labour, and the stereotypes of difference that tie us to unchanging essences or hierarchically ordered binaries. It can be hard to challenge these without offering what some will regard as overly prescriptive notions of what constitutes living as equals. In addressing this worry, I turn to recent arguments in the literature to the effect that what matters is not so much being able to delineate equality or justice as being able to identify *inequality* and *injustice*. This reinforces arguments already made in chapter 4 against thinking of equality as a condition or state, and re-emphasises the importance of unconditional equality.

INDEX

- Aboriginal people, 34–35, 46; civilising mission, 35
- Abu-Lughod, Lila, 86, 103
- affirmative action, 17, 96, 103, 108
- Afghanistan: military intervention in, 104; refugees fleeing, 2; Taliban signing up CEDAW, 3
- Africa: culture, 101; French colonies in West and Equatorial, 38; perception of Africans, 37; polygamy and child marriage, 122n41; status of Africans, 38
- African Americans: desegregation of Little Rock school, 55; Historically Black Colleges, 68; housing and, 88; political and civil rights, 8; race term, 98; racial segregation in United States, 89–90; Simone on equality and, 86; voter literacy test, 38
- Against Democracy* (Brennan), 38
- Allen, Amy, on emancipation, 109
- Allen, Danielle, on Little Rock school, 118n46
- American culture, 101
- American Declaration of Independence, 9, 31, 58
- Amish in North America, 98
- Anderson, Elizabeth, 119n9, 123n52; democratic equality, 74; egalitarian movements, 73–74; on neighbourhood segregation, 89–91; on political equality, 78; *Private Government*, 81, 120n40; relational equality, 71, 75–76; on sufficiency, 77, 78–79, 81; supermarket survey, 121n8
- Anderson, Kay, on race, 34–35
- animals: human and nonhuman, 49–50, 58–60; ill treatment of, 46
- anti-discrimination legislation, 3, 88
- Arendt, Hannah: on equality, 53–55; on political equality, 51, 55–56, 118–119n49; on school desegregation, 55, 86–87, 118n46
- Aristotle, 22
- Arneson, Richard: basic equality, 48–49, 118n28; modern view of equality, 40, 43; range property, 48
- Asian culture, 101
- Auschwitz, 46, 61
- autonomy, 114n32; feminist debates about, 48; literature on, 91; moral, 52; personal, 49
- Axelsen, David, viii
- Axial Age, 20
- Babeuf, Gracchus, 10
- Bartels, Larry, *Unequal Democracy*, 120n38
- Bejan, Teresa, viii, 115n30; equality-as-indifference, 20; progress of equality, 19
- Bell, Duncan, 26, 27
- Bentham, Jeremy, on equality, 16, 79–80
- Berlin, Isaiah, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 7
- Beveridge, William, giant evils, 6
- Bickford, Susan, on identity, 66
- Blackburn, Robin, on abolition of slavery, 116n51
- Black liberation, 73
- Black Lives Matter, 67
- Bourke, Joanna, *What It Means to Be Human*, 46
- Brennan, Jason, *Against Democracy*, 38

- British Labour Party, 42, 76
British life, Napoleonic wars, 35
Brown, Wendy, on identity, 66, 102
Buchanan, Allen, term human, 118n27
Buddhism, 20
Burke, Edmund, on colonialism, 33
Butler, Josephine, Contagious Diseases Act, 115n41
- Capital* (Marx), 79–80, 120n40
capitalism: challenges of modern, 19; crisis of, 2; nature of, 83–84; opening opportunities for women, 30; violence and exploitation of, 116n53; wealth and, 79, 81
Carlyle, Thomas, *Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question*, 36, 116n62
Carter, Ian, viii, 8; on basis of equality, 44, 46–49; on respect, 47–49, 104
CEDAW. *See* Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981) (CEDAW)
Centre for Gender Studies, 114n32
Césaire, Aimé: on colonialism, 18; *Discourse on Colonialism*, 36; on equality, 37
'chavs', Jones on term, 13, 120n45
choice, 53, 79; debate on, 91–92; equality and, 72–73, 88; free, 89; identity politics and, 64; people's agency and, 104, 105; in politics, 55
Christianity, 20, 35
Christiano, Thomas, on money in politics, 78
citizenship, Marshall on evolution of, 8–10
Citizenship Amendment Act (2019), 2
Civil Rights Act (1964), 8
Clinton, Hilary, on contempt for others, 43
Cohen, G. A.: on basic equality, 41, 117n2, 118n31, 120n27; treating people as equals, 118n31
colonialism, 33; Césaire's *Discourse on Colonialism*, 36; Fanon's diagnosis of, 67; inequality of, 14; slavery and, 19, 31, 68; violence of, 14, 18, 33, 116n53; women and, 104
Condorcet, Marquis de, 9–10
Confucianism, 20
Conspiracy of Equals, Babeuf, 10
Contagious Diseases Act, 115n41
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981) (CEDAW), 3
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1976), 3
Cooper, Frederick, on equality, 38
Covenant of the League of Nations, 32
Covid-19 pandemic, vii
Credit Suisse, 2, 113n4
Cromwell, Oliver, New Model Army, 25
- Darwall, Stephen, on respect, 44
de Beauvoir, Simone, 97
decisionism, 51, 60
Declaration of Independence, American, 9, 31, 58
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, French, 9, 32
Decolonizing Universalism (Khader), 106, 123n45
de Gouges, Olympe, 10
de Las Casas, Bartolomé, defending indigenous peoples, 21–24
democratic wager, Walzer's, 5, 16
Descartes, René, 27
de Tocqueville, Alexis: on colonialism, 33; Pitts on, 36
Discourse on Colonialism (Césaire), 36
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (Rousseau), 27
discrimination: anti-, legislation, 3, 88, 89; blindness to differences, 95–96; harassment and, 90; just society and, 107–108; racial, 121n16; racist, 4; shared identity and, 70; social, 55; wage, 100; white working class Americans and, 119n16
DNA: human, 50, 57–58, 62; Neanderthal, 62
Donaldson, Sue, *Zoopolis*, 60
Douglass, Frederick, on slavery, 31, 58
Dworkin, Ronald, 71; on equality, 11, 74

- economic equality: class categories, 74;
Frankfurt on, 77; policies of, 12; relationship between status and, 16; resource redistribution, 2; social and, 11, 55; theories of, 63
- economic inequality, 12, 49, 65, 68, 83, 85
- economic limitarianism, 79, 81
- Education Act (1944), 7
- egalitarianism, *vii*, 9–11, 27, 111; champions of luck, 72, 73; French colonies, 32; Hobbes, 47; literature, 11; radical, 25; talent or effort, 78; triumph of moral, 19
- elitism, 4, 15
- encomienda system, 21–22
- English Civil War (1642–1651), 9, 24, 28
- equality: civil, 9, 11; as commitment and claim, 53–57; criticism of human, 57–62; difference and, 97–103; from distributive to relational, 71–74; gender, *viii*, 3–4, 87–88, 92, 94–95, 97, 103–104, 106, 111, 114n32, 122n39; human, 2, 4–6, 36–39; human property, 15; justifying and conditional, 40–44; moral, 11, 43–44, 117n9; not sameness, 94–97; political, 8–11, 43, 51, 55, 78–79, 82, 84; as prescription, 103–106; reframing, 106–111; seeking basis of, 44–53; in sight of God, 20, 20–21; social, 9, 75, 90, 108; sufficiency or, 75–78; treating people as equals, 41–42, 87, 95, 105, 118n31; understanding man's natural, 18. *See also* human equality; political equality
- Equal Opportunities Commission, 42
- Evers, Medgar, activist, 86
- Faces of Injustice (Shklar), 106
- Family Allowances Act, 121n17
- Family Fortunes* (Davidoff and Hall), 116n47
- Fanon, Frantz: on equality, 14, 37, 53; on harms of colonialism, 67; *The Wretched of the Earth*, 36
- Farris, Sara, femonationalism, 104
- feminism, 7, 17, 93; Khader on, 106, 123n45; liberalism and, *viii*, 28; 'me-too', 95; Rathbone's new, 99, 121n17; Scott on, 69; social movement, 73; Wollstonecraft's, 27
- femonationalism, term, 104
- Fernández-Armesto, Felipe, *So You Think You're Human?*, 61
- Fifteenth Amendment, 32
- Filmer, Robert, *Patriarcha*, 29
- forced marriage, 104, 105, 122n41, 122n43
- Frankfurt, Harry, 77; on sufficiency, 77
- Fraser, Nancy: on cultural injustices, 68–69; politics of recognition, 16, 69–70
- French Revolution, 116n51
- Fukuyama, Francis: dignity and self-esteem, 66, 67, 70; *Identity*, 65; multiculturalism, 94
- Gay Pride marches, 67
- gender: differences, 99–100, 122n29; equality, *viii*, 3–4, 87–88, 92, 94–95, 97, 103–104, 106, 111, 114n32, 122n39; norms, 3–4; quotas, 42
- genital cutting, 104, 105
- genocide, 2, 74
- Gilroy, Paul: planetary humanism, 53; on slavery, 33
- Goff, Sarah, *viii*
- Goodhart, Michael, on injustice, 108
- Great Levelling: financial crash of 1929–33, 1; income inequality, 82; reversal of, 4
- Greek philosophy, 20
- headship complementarianism, 109
- Hindus, 2, 38
- Hirsch, Afua, 96
- Historically Black Colleges, 68
- Hitler, Adolf, 52
- Hobbes, Thomas, 9, 49, 115n27; egalitarian ideas, 28, 47; *Leviathan*, 25; on natural equality, 9, 27
- Holocaust, 2; Auschwitz, 46, 61
- homophobia, 3, 65, 71
- honour killing, 104, 105
- human DNA, 50, 57–58, 62

- human equality: basic idea of, 2; belief in, 3, 4–6, 36–39, 112; fundamental, 44–45; modern view of, 40; perceptions of, 12; promise of, 4; radical ideas about, 25; resistance to thinking about, 57–58; unconditional, 49.
See also equality
- Humanity Without Dignity* (Sangiovanni), 117n9
- human rights, Hunt on, 10
- human supremacism, 60
- Hunt, Lynn, on human rights, 10
- Hypatia* (Russell), 121n18
- Iceland, 98
- ideal theory, 107, 123n52
- Identity* (Fukuyama), 65
- identity politics, 65–70; categories disparaged as, 74; criticisms of, 71; debates about, 64; Ignatieff on, 65–66; modern label, 67, 70; rubric of, 16
- identity recognition, Young on, 68–70
- Ignatieff, Michael, on identity politics, 65–66
- Immigration Acts (UK), 3
- income gaps, narrowing of, 1
- Indian Constitution (1950), 41
- Indian society, caste system, 41
- individualism: liberal, 28; possessive, 18
- Islam, 2, 20
- Jansen, Jonathan, on negotiating differences, 101–102
- Japanese culture, 101
- Jaspers, Karl, on axial age, 20
- Jim Crow laws, 32
- Jones, Owen, on ‘chavs’, 13, 120n45
- Judaism, 20
- Kant, Immanuel, 19, 27, 45
- Khader, Serene: on feminism, 106, 123n45; headship complementarianism, 109–110; on injustice, 108; on oppression, 111
- Kymlicka, Will: on equality, 11; *Zoopolis*, 60
- Labour Government, election of 1945, 6
- Lacey, Nicola, ix, 30
- Leopold, Bruno, viii
- Levi, Primo, on dehumanisation, 61
- Leviathan* (Hobbes), 25
- LGBTQ, 55
- liberalism: feminism and, 28; socialism and, 7
- limitarianism, 14, 79, 81
- Lindert, Peter, 1, 82, 113n1
- Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, 75
- Little Rock High School, desegregation of, 55, 86
- Locke, John: as founding father of liberalism, 26–28; on slave trade, 115n31
- luck egalitarians, 72–73, 78
- MacDonald, Margaret, choosing a side, 51, 53
- Macpherson, C. B., natural equality, 18
- Macron, Emmanuel, 15
- Mandelson, Peter, on inequality, 76, 84
- Mantel, Hilary, *Wolf Hall* trilogy, 77–78
- Marshall, T. H., evolution of citizenship, 8–10
- Marx, Karl, viii, 8, 120n40; *Capital*, 79, 79–80, 120n40; ‘On the Jewish Question’, 7; protections for workers, 80; on violence and exploitation, 116n53
- material equality, 64
- Mehta, Uday Singh, on liberalism, 33, 37
- Mengele, Josef, experiments of, 46
- meritocracy, Young on, 4–6
- #MeToo movement, 95
- Mexican culture, 101
- Mill, John Stuart, 27; equality of the sexes, 29, 31, 33, 87; *The Negro Question*, 36, 116n62; on patriarchy, 30; on racism, 36; *The Subjection of Women*, 29
- Mills, Charles: egalitarianism, 19; on racial injustice, 107; social contract theory, 18
- Mississippi Goddam* (Simone), 86
- moral equality: human dignity, 117n9; language of, 43, 44; Scanlon on, 11

- multiculturalism: assimilation and, 93; cultural differences, 101; Fukuyama on, 94
- Muslims, 3, 94, 101; anti-, 104; majority countries, 3; women, 104, 110
- NAACP. *See* National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
- Nath, Rekha, on Waldron, 50
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 55, 86
- National Health Service, creation of, 6
- National Insurance, expansion of, 6
- National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship, 121n17
- natural lottery, 72–73
- nepotism, 5
- New Model Army, Cromwell's, 25
- New South Wales, 34–35
- Nussbaum, Martha, on feminism, 28
- Okin, Susan Moller: on gender, 28, 31, 106, 122n31; promoting equality, 115n37
- One Another's Equals* (Waldron), 9, 49, 53, 58
- oppression, social phenomenon, 111
- Otsuka, Michael, on Cohen, 117n2
- Oxfam study, 113n4
- Pagden, Anthony, on de las Casas, 23
- Parekh, Bhikhu, on operative public values, 94
- Pateman, Carole, viii; on equality, 18; on illusions of contract, 80
- Patriarcha* (Filmer), 29
- Pettit, Philip, on power relationship, 80–81
- Piercy, Marge, *Woman on the Edge of Time*, 100–101, 122n31
- Pitts, Jennifer: on human equality, 36–37; on liberalism, 33; on racism, 36
- planetary humanism, 53
- political equality: campaigns and voting, 78–79, 82; civil equality and, 11; commitment to, 84; discrimination and, 55; moral equality and, 43; non-natural basis for, 51; popular power and, 10. *See also* equality
- political realism, 107
- possessive individualism, 18
- Poulain de la Barre, François, 27
- precariat, 4
- Presidential Proclamations (United States), 3
- prioritarianism, 14
- Private Government* (Anderson), 81, 120n40
- private schooling, 120n46
- progressivism, 12
- Putney Debates of 1647, 25
- Quijano, Anibal, 14, 24
- race: black Americans, 67, 88, 90, 93, 119n16; racial segregation in America, 88–90; white Americans, 88, 90, 119n16
- Race Relations Act (1965), 9
- racism, 3, 33, 52, 65; colonialism and, 67–68; egalitarian movement, 71; institutional, 70; misogyny and, 64; Pitts on, 36; social contract theory, 18
- Rainsborough, Thomas, 25
- Rakowski, Eric, 119n20
- Rathbone, Eleanor: on 'me-too' feminism, 94–95; new feminism, 99, 121n17
- rationality: African Americans, 38; modern equality, 39; women and, 38
- Rawls, John, 27; on justice, 47, 107; liberalism, 28; *A Theory of Justice*, 107
- Representation of the People Act (1918), British, 38
- requerimiento, 22, 23
- Rights of Man, 14, 18, 36
- Robeyns, Ingrid: economic limitarianism, 79, 81; personal income, 83
- Roemer, John, on choice and circumstance, 72–73
- Rorty, Richard, on human rights, 56
- Rossello, Diego, on species aristocritism, 60
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, nature, 27–28
- Russell, Dora, *Hypatia*, 121n18

- Salvini, Matteo, Roma people and, 15
Sardinia, 98
Scandinavian countries, gender equality, 88, 121n4
Scanlon, Tim, on equality, 11
Schaap, Andrew, 54
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 41
Scheffler, Samuel, relational equality, 71, 75
Schmitt, Carl, sovereignty theory, 51
school desegregation, 55, 86–87, 90
Scott, Joan: on feminism, 6; on hijab wearing, 122n42
Scramble for Africa, 32
segregation: America, 32; desegregation, 55, 86–87, 90; enforced, 87; gender, 121n4; neighbourhood, 111; play places, 52; racial, 88–90; residential, 91; schools, 55; self-, 90
Sen, Amartya: equality, 11, 108, 114n26; personification, 5
Sepúlveda, Juan Ginés de: enslavement of indigenous peoples, 21, 39; Valladolid debate, 21–24
sexism, 3, 52, 65, 67, 68
Shelby, Tommie: on assimilation, 93; on justice, 107; on neighbourhood support, 90
Shklar, Judith, *Faces of Injustice*, 106
Sikh school boys, 94, 121n16
Simone, Nina: Arendt and, 86–87; civil rights song, 86; on equality, 90
Singer, Peter, on animal rights, 59, 60
slavery, 31–36; colonialism and, 19, 31, 68; empire and, 31–36; in French colonies, 32; Thirteenth Amendment and, 32; three-fifths clause of 1787 constitution, 31
Smith, Adam, 33, 34, 120n40
social class, 64
socialism, 7
socioeconomic inequality, 12
South Africa, 91, 101–102
So You Think You're Human? (Fernández-Armesto), 61
species aristocratism, 60
Steinhoff, Uwe, against equality, 43, 52
Stoicism, 20
Stuurman, Siep, 23; on modern equality, 114n14; on status of women, 115n38; turning points, 20, 21, 22
The Subjection of Women (Mill), 29
sufficientarianism, 14
tax credits, 120n35
Taylor, Charles, demand for recognition, 67–68
A Theory of Justice (Rawls), 107
Thirteenth Amendment, slavery and, 32
Towns, Ann, on women in politics, 116n48
Trollope, Anthony, electioneering, 78
Trump, Donald: supporters of, 43; undocumented immigrants and, 15
Two Treatises on Government (Locke), 26
Ubuntu, 102
Uglow, Jenny, 35
Unequal Democracy (Bartels), 120n38
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 3, 31
University of Pretoria, 101
Vallodolid debate, 21–24
veganism, 59
vegetarianism, 59
vivisection, defence of, 46
Volpp, Leti, 102
Voting Rights Act (1965), 8, 38
Waldron, Jeremy, 53; on 'being in Ohio', 47; on dignity of humans, 60; on disabled humans, 50–51, 52; on economic equality, 49, 63; *One Another's Equals*, 9, 49, 53, 58; range property idea, 49; scintillation process, 49; on treating one another as equals, 49–51
Walzer, Michael: democratic wager, 5, 16; on income inequality, 76, 79
What It Means to Be Human (Bourke), 46
Which Equalities Matter? (Phillips), viii, 16, 84
Williams, Bernard, on equality, 45–47, 57
Williams, Patricia, on race, 96, 98

- Williamson, Jeffrey, 1, 82, 113n1
- Wilson, Harold, 7
- Windrush generation, 3
- Wolff, Jonathan, *ix*; on means-tested benefits, 63; on social equality, 75, 108
- Wolf Hall* trilogy (Mantel), 77–78
- Wollstonecraft, Mary, 27
- women: gender quotas, 42; genital cutting, 104, 105; status, 38; voting, 8, 13, 87, 91, 95; work classifications, 122n27
- Woman on the Edge of Time* (Piercy), 100
- Women's Liberation Movement, 110
- The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon), 36
- Wynter, Sylvia, 14; on equality, 14, 53; on de las Casas, 25; on white explorers, 37
- Young, Iris Marion: distributive paradigm, 73; identity recognition, 68–70
- Young, Michael, meritocracy, 4–6
- Zerilli, Linda, on assimilation of women, 95
- Zoopolis* (Donaldson and Kymlicka), 60