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Introduction

The Camp Fire that swept through the foothills of Northern California in November 2018 inverted an idyll, turning Paradiso into an Inferno. Burning for seventeen straight days, this fast-moving fire destroyed almost the entire town of Paradise, killing eighty-five people and consuming more than eighteen thousand structures. In his account in the New York Times Magazine, Jon Mooallem suggests that as Paradise was engulfed by fire it became “a zone at the limits of the American imagination—and a preview of the American future.”1 Katy Grannan’s accompanying photographs depict what this unimaginable but unignorable future might look like: burnt skeletons of homes and automobiles cover a mountain landscape suffused in evening light. This Turneresque aura cannot soften the devastation that time has hardly touched, nor the ruined future it prefigures. The article ends with a refusal of easy optimism: “How did it end? It hasn’t. It won’t.”2

Mooallem sketches out one possible response to such a catastrophic future in his vivid portrait of Joe Kennedy, a Cal Fire heavy-equipment operator with the “affect of a granite wall.” Set down amid an unfathomable fire, Kennedy maneuvers through Paradise in a bulldozer, hacking away at any feature of the landscape that might facilitate the spread of the flames. As Mooallem puts it, “He worked quickly, brutally, unhindered by any remorse over the collateral damage he was causing.” Pushing flaming cars out of the way, Kennedy clears an exit path for stranded evacuees. Tearing down hillsides, pushing through fire, confronting death up close, he keeps ever on the move. He was “a stoic figure somewhere inside the smoke, single-mindedly grinding through neighborhoods in his bulldozer, music blaring, chasing after flames as they stampeded uphill.”3
In our ordinary language and collective discourse, Stoicism is troubled by a subtle equivocation. In one register, it implies acquiescence, unfeeling capitulation to a set of circumstances beyond one’s control. Stoicism in this sense is simply quiet submission to a predetermined course. It involves no questioning, no swerves. This convergence of placidity and passivity lurks behind the recent vogue for the publicity poster designed by Britain’s Ministry of Information at the start of the Second World War: “Keep Calm and Carry On.” In the pages that follow, however, I will suggest that the possibility of Stoicism in modernity is also fostered by an alternative history, one in which its detachment was filtered through an age of Romanticism and revolution, aligning its power with a radical rejection of things as they are. In this sense, being a Stoic entails something other than passive surrender to an inevitable course of events. Stepping outside of the immediate sway of emotion leads not to apathy but to a strenuous concern for others, even strangers. It is less a retreat than a form of commitment. The Stoic doesn’t stand by as the fire burns; he chases after it, cool and collected, ready to put it out.

What unlikely links make it possible to suggest that a firefighter in twenty-first century California might have been living out a distinctly Romantic inheritance? At the broadest level, Stoic Romanticism and the Ethics of Emotion represents my attempt to unearth a central moment in the shift of understanding that reconciled Stoicism—so often dismissed as solipsistic, unfeeling, or indifferent—with the affective crosscurrents of modern “expressive individualism.” What resonance could Stoic philosophy and its infamous apatheia hold for individuals in modernity whose very identities and ethical aspirations were increasingly tied to emotional intelligence and expression? Or, more simply, what made Stoicism a posture of commitment rather than an unfeeling form of renunciation? These might seem perilously open-ended questions, investigations best left to philosophers or historians of philosophy, but my argument in this book is a literary historical one by design. In Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau, Christopher Brooke tracks the sinuous evolution of Stoicism through seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political philosophy, ending fittingly but rather abruptly with Mary Wollstonecraft and “the Revolutionary decade in France.” While Stoicism continued to resonate in political philosophy and many other fields of knowledge, I argue that its uptake in modernity was focalized by a range of imaginative writers from Wollstonecraft to Emerson who integrated its moral psychology into their own innovative poiesis, even as they approached its ethical aspiration in decisively revolutionary terms.
Borne along by literature’s emergent interest in the “daily lives of ordinary people,” Stoicism was often stripped of its severity, its tenets made newly apprehensible in a range of everyday postures and practices. More than just an object of literature’s attention, many of these self-reflexive practices worked to reshape its operative logic. As I will argue in what follows, Stoic ideas informed new accounts of lyric subjectivity, perceptions of literary character, and the mediating perspectives made possible by topographical verse. They disrupted an easy, autonomic notion of sympathy by calling for a more elaborate and expansive discipline of attention. Stoicism was often implicit in the fault lines that separated gender and genre, and it facilitated powerful new conceptions of irony and paradox. Putting all of this in broader terms, I argue that Stoicism nurtured literary transformation at precisely the same moment in which its irrelevance might have seemed assured. But this was hardly a one-sided exchange, for the subtle interleaving of literature and Stoicism in the late eighteenth century gave an antiquated philosophy a striking new zone of inhabitation: implicated in a new poetics that took “its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility,” Stoicism had never seemed so imaginative, so visionary.

An argument like this is bound to elicit misgivings, for conventional wisdom tends to depict Romanticism as an aesthetic and philosophical movement more preoccupied with “emotion” than “tranquility.” Notorious for its ability to wriggle past attempts at definition and delineation, Romanticism contains multitudes, and yet it is almost always thought to involve a special or renewed valuation of feeling. Given this widely shared presumption, making a sustained case for the formative impact of Stoicism on Romanticism might seem like a fool’s errand from the outset. As the Scottish philosopher R. M. Wenley once put it, “if Romanticism be the retreat of reason before feeling and imagination, we should not expect Stoic moods.” In each of the following chapters, I show just how big an if adheres in Wenley’s observation. But setting this conditional and its attempt at definition aside, Stoic Romanticism might just as easily seem a hybrid position rendered irrelevant by the slow decline of Stoicism earlier in the eighteenth century.

As a number of studies have argued, the most notable quality of Stoicism in eighteenth-century literary culture is its evanescence. In Tropico-politans, Srinivas Aravamudan suggests that Joseph Addison’s Cato (1712) “represents the last gasp of the earlier, more comprehensive Renaissance interest in Stoicism”—an important “coda,” but just that: an endpoint. Similarly attuned to its limited shelf life, Howard Weinbrot has argued that Stoicism’s intermittent reappearance throughout the century tended
to be almost immediately qualified by its repudiation: in his dramatic terms, Stoicism constantly “raises its hydra head only to be decapitated.”

Robert Adams, a founding editor of the Norton Anthology, described Samuel Johnson’s “The Vanity of Human Wishes” (1749) as nothing less than Stoicism’s “swan song”: “When we look through the nineteenth century for another work informed with stoicism, defined by stoicism, we look in vain. What happened to stoicism? Without undergoing refutation or criticism, without being so much as remarked in its stealthy departure, stoicism faded away and became obsolete.”

In a limited sense, all of these critics are right: after the spectacle of Addison’s Cato, Stoicism too often seems to slip beneath the century’s critical radar. In an age defined by sensibility and sentimentality, its greatest moments of visibility in literary culture are those ironic ones in which it is unmasked as stupid, hypocritical, egotistical, and unnatural. But if the rumors surrounding the demise of Stoicism are understandable, they remain—like so much of the dogma crystallized by literary periodization—greatly exaggerated. As impoverished as they are misleading, accounts of Stoic evanescence work in tandem with a teleology that looks forward to autenic emotional expression as both the breakthrough and bedrock of modern, expressivist aesthetics. But as I hope to make clear, this sense of Stoicism’s superannuation obscures as much as it clarifies, especially when it comes to the philosophical commitments of Romanticism itself. In the chapters that follow, the course I chart through the Romantic century starts to look something like a map of collective misreading—a wide-ranging survey of familiar territory, but one designed to highlight what has been overlooked or misunderstood as the slow onset of powerful feeling is thought to signal Stoicism’s obsolescence.

**Stoic Resistance and the Resistance to Stoicism**

At first glance, Romanticism can seem like a hotbed of resistance to the kind of Stoicism that pervaded Renaissance and Enlightenment culture. Take, for example, one of the devil’s assertions in Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790): “Those who restrain desire, do so because theirs is weak enough to be restrained.” Tackling prudential rationality head-on, Blake evokes an early vision of Romanticism in which “strong poets” pursue expression as the natural terminus of emotion. But this succinct critique also focalizes a commonly held perspective on Stoicism, one in which its austerity is thought to reflect mere submission. By this logic, the ability to suppress an emotion or desire only illuminates its paucity in the
first place. Restraint becomes a kind of disempowerment that one enacts upon oneself—a lazy contentment, or a kind of disenchantment that sidesteps action. The idea that Stoic reserve represents a counterproductive way of being in the world has attracted powerful adherents. In a post-Freudian age equipped with a vocabulary for identifying repression and other defense mechanisms, Stoicism is often consigned to the margins of modernity as an unhealthy or antiquated philosophy. Though Philip Rieff and others have posited “an indirect but genuine affinity between psychoanalysis and the psychological theories of Stoicism,” Freud’s own account of traumatic repression renders emotional detachment suspect, the sign of a dangerously illusory freedom. While writers in the eighteenth century often took pains to foreground the “disingenuousness” of Stoicism, critics who took aim at the Stoics after (or even amid) Romanticism tended to describe it as a kind of “emotional impoverishment.” No less a figure than Hegel endorsed this sense of its delimited possibility in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). For Hegel, Stoicism was the product of a “time of universal fear and bondage,” a “slave ideology” (to use Alexandre Kojève’s term) that mistakes detachment as a form of freedom. Retreating into the realm of thought and “solid singleness,” Hegel’s Stoic justifies inaction and cultivates a “stolid lifeless unconcern which persistently withdraws from the movement of existence.”

Often employed to depict political apostasy as part of a more pervasive unconcern, the easy alignment of Stoicism and acquiescence has vastly misconstrued its force in the period. For many of the writers I take up in this book, Stoicism was a decisively radical term in a revolutionary age. Its impress on the literature of the period was heightened by its dramatic deployment over the course of the French Revolution. Long associated with Roman republicanism and its virtuous defenders, Stoicism also served as a “deep source” for an emergent discourse of natural and human rights that resulted in the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789). This radical vein of Stoicism emerged in multiple forms on both sides of the Channel. It was a recurrent feature of the republican pageantry and ethos deployed by Maximilien Robespierre and other Jacobins, just as it was a theatrical resource for British radicals forced to endure William Pitt’s “Reign of Alarm.” In France, Louis de Saint-Just described Stoic self-control as the healthy alternative to a reign of terror: “Stoicism, which is the virtue of the spirit and the soul, alone can prevent the corruption of a commercial republic which lacks manners. A republican government must have virtue for its principle: if not, there is only Terror.” In Britain, Stoic philosophy was a prominent catalyst for William Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), a text similarly committed to the idea
that Stoic self-government would take the place of revolution and its worst excesses. Later, Wordsworth landed on Stoicism as a chief point of contention in his retrospective disenchantment with Godwin in *The Prelude* (1805).

I will dwell at more length on the revolutionary contours of Stoicism in chapter 2, but even this quick sketch speaks to its contested character in the Revolutionary controversy that rocked Britain in the 1790s. The character of Stoicism could shift with ideological perspective; it might appear to be the promising source of a new cosmopolitan reign of reason, but it struck other commentators as a hypocritical and notably unfeeling form of savagery. Either way, its alignment with the French Revolution was unsurprisingly equivocal, for the spectacular collapse of that revolution qualified an easy optimism in abstract morality across the board. The stock that figures like Godwin put into Stoic perfectionism plummeted along with their faith in the revolution’s own perfectionist working possibilities.

It seems useful to foreground at the outset two implications of the whiplash wrought by this Stoic revolution and its quick implosion. Looking back at the French Revolution and its reversals, William Hazlitt described it as the ultimate face-off between experience and philosophy: “The French revolution was the only match that ever took place between philosophy and experience: and waking from the trance of theory to the sense of reality, we hear the words, *truth, reason, virtue, liberty,* with the same indifference or contempt, that the cynic who has married a jilt or a termagant, listens to the rhapsodies of lovers.”21 For Hazlitt, the blunt reality of the revolution laid waste to philosophical idealizations and abstractions; the siren song of philosophy would never sound quite so seductive again. At the same time, Stoicism was especially vulnerable to the bright light of reality. It had, almost from its origins, been maligned as a paradoxical philosophy that flew in the face of human nature. In this sense, the French Revolution became epic confirmation not just that fears about Stoic dissimulation were amply warranted, but that its vision of perfect dispassion was, as Pierre Hadot has put it, “more an inaccessible ideal than a concrete reality.”22 The reputation of Stoicism would not quickly recover from the horrifying aftermath of the revolution that often invoked its power. All the same, I want to suggest that the abrupt shuttering of Stoicism’s revolutionary career gave it new life as an imperfect, diminished thing. One legacy of the revolution was a sustained mistrust of Stoicism in all its rigorous austerity. But stripped of its rigid perfectionism, Stoicism was reclaimed—sometimes hesitantly, often quietly—as an imperfect aspiration rather than an inflexible ideal, one whose emergence alongside a life of feeling made it particularly compatible with literature itself.
Once a catalyst for revolution, the Stoicism made imperfectly available in genres like the lyric survived to facilitate new ways of imagining or living out a lapsed revolutionary ideal. In spite of this productive repossession, however, the reputation of Stoicism within Romanticism was irrevocably hobbled by the lingering aura of its radicalism. What Robespierre called “the sublime sect of the Stoics” was so fully identified with the revolution in France—in both its aspirations and its fatal overextensions—that many writers resisted public acknowledgment of their own fascination with Stoicism. This strategic silence meant that it often dropped out of the main current of literary history in the period, emerging if at all in what Simon Swift has described as “submerged and coded” form.

The Low Road: An Exercise in Critical Semantics

Stretching from politics to poetics, Stoicism pervaded writing from the Romantic period. But what did Stoicism entail in the late eighteenth century, and what exactly do I mean by the term in this book? In Cicero’s De finibus, Cato praises “the marvellously systematic way in which Stoic philosophy sets out its doctrines,” asking hyperbolically, “Can you imagine any other system where the removal of a single letter, like an interlocking piece, would cause the whole edifice to come tumbling down?” While an apt portrayal of an aspiration, this sense of Stoicism’s necessary systematicity was unceremoniously refuted by its reception in modernity. In its earliest articulations, Stoicism was a threefold philosophy, a systematic view of the universe in which ethics, physics, and logic intertwined to make the individual a relatively insignificant part of a large cosmological whole. Though writers like Coleridge and Emerson never tired of pondering this comprehensive world view, Stoicism had—over many centuries—become more of a piecemeal affair, a philosophy that could exist alongside an increasingly individualistic ethos. Most Romantic readers approached Stoicism by way of its ethics. Attributable in part to reading habits, this shift reflected a transformation that had been afoot since Roman times. Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect who first articulated its philosophy beneath the Stoa Poikile in Athens, wrote at least two dozen books. His successor Chrysippus was rumored to have authored no fewer than seven hundred texts, but save for a few fragments, all of these early works were lost. Much as today, readers in the long eighteenth century absorbed Stoicism from Roman practitioners like Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, not to mention the recapitulation of Stoic teachings prominently available in Cicero’s influential commentary.
Several centuries stood between these Roman Stoics and the school’s Athenian origin at the turn of the third century BCE. The chronological distance separating Epictetus and his Discourses from the school’s founding was comparable to the wide interval that stood between Lyrical Ballads and The Canterbury Tales. Over such a broad stretch of time, rigid tenets advanced by the early Stoics had been moderated and reinterpreted in new contexts. For these later Stoics, the ideal of a sage defined by iron-clad emotional imperturbability was often approached as an impossibility. Seneca, for example, recognized what many eighteenth-century critics of Stoicism did not. The virtue of the sage was dependent upon his humanity and sensibility, not his insensibility:

There are other things that strike the wise person even if they do not overthrow him, such as physical pain, loss of a limb, loss of friends and children, and during wartime the calamity of his fatherland in flames. I do not deny that the wise person feels these, for we do not endow him with the hardness of stone or of iron. To endure without feeling what you endure is not virtue at all.26

As Seneca’s account of a sensitive but forbearing sage makes clear, the elimination of emotion was ultimately less important than its evaluation. In fact, Stoic invulnerability struck many commentators as impossible but also undesirable. Robert Burton quipped in The Anatomy of Melancholy that no mortal man could be free of “perturbations or if he be so, sure he is either a god or a block.”27 Traces of this more moderate vision of Stoic ethical practice were scattered throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the third installment of his Imaginary Conversations (1828), Walter Savage Landor imagined an apocryphal conversation between Epictetus and Seneca, one in which the unvarnished moral austerity of the former illuminates the perilously stylized philosophy of the latter:

**Epictetus:** I should have remarked that, if thou foundest ingenuity in my writings, thou must have discovered in them some deviation from the plain, homely truths of Zeno and Cleanthes.

**Seneca:** We all swerve a little from them.

**Epictetus:** In practice too?

**Seneca:** Yes, even in practice, I am afraid.28

For Landor, the philosophers have distinctly divergent personalities, and yet both acknowledge that the evolving relevance of Stoicism was dependent upon a certain amount of “deviation,” a “swerve.”
Suffice it to say, Stoicism as it streams through these pages is often a messy term. On the one hand, it was a formal philosophy with its own textual corpus. Served up to schoolboys year after year, it was also widely available in translation. One could, like Shelley, write to one's London publisher from the far corner of Wales and ask to have (among other texts) the “cheapest possible editions” of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius dispatched “very soon.” But more often than not, Stoicism spilled past these narrow channels to lend the aura of its moral psychology to a vast array of moods, moments, and discourses. There was, as Ralph Waldo Emerson put it, “a stoicism not of the schools, but of the blood” (EW 2:147). Emerson was hardly the only one to notice the easy slippage between disposition and doctrine. The *Oxford English Dictionary* makes it clear that the adjectival forms of Stoicism had been marking a similar transit from the early sixteenth century forward. To describe a temperament as “stoical” could imply philosophical alignment, or at least a strict attention to “the precepts of the Stoic philosophy.” But the same word could just as easily activate a mere sense of temperamental resemblance: “Resembling a Stoic in austerity, indifference to pleasure and pain, repression of all feeling, and the like.”

To borrow one of Alexander Nehamas’s formulations, Stoicism was one of those abstract philosophical ideas “capable of living independently of their original manifestations.”

In this book, I have opted to approach Stoicism in the broadest possible terms, preferring the murkier challenge of tracing a philosophy that is never just precisely that. All of the authors I consider were familiar with Stoic texts, many of them intimately. But I have been struck by the suggestive complications that emerge out of the often-clumsy way in which they wield the term. Adventures in Stoic reception often involve such a wide-angled approach. In *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations*, Steven Strange and Jack Zupko note that tracking Stoic influence often involves a choice between taking “the high road or the low road.” The high road entails a dogged search for the exact provenance of Stoic ideas, an attempt to establish clear “proximity to the genuine article.” By contrast, following the low road entails giving up clear “criteria for what counts as Stoic” in favor of “a looser, somewhat more impressionistic reading of Stoicism and what it means to be a Stoic.” In the pages that follow, I often keep to the low road out of a sense that the only way to accurately convey the real heft of Stoicism within Romantic discourse is to think carefully about its diffuse and often hazy manifestations. While I take pains to identify specific vectors of Stoic reception in what follows, I recognize that it was not just a system of ethics but an ethos, an aspect of character that was just as liable
to end in caricature. In this sense, Stoicism fits a broader pattern of classical reception in the period, one in which ancient thought and culture were—in Jennifer Wallace’s terms—“actively recreated or imagined, rather than passively inherited.” The Stoicism that emerges in the following pages takes many shapes, all of them foregrounding in their own way the prodigious and variable impress of ancient philosophy on an unfolding modernity. Stoicism can reflect a need for insulation from uncertainty or calamity, but it can also speak to a desire for the tranquility that might facilitate the creation of art. Depending upon the author, Stoicism can appear to be a kind of Christian consolation or a form of secular critique. Either way, its austerity often informs seemingly unphilosophical manifestations of fortitude and perseverance. For some writers it becomes a prompt for broad justice and cosmopolitan thinking; for others, it signals only the ascent of apathy or indifference. Sometimes it looks more like a style, a temperament, or even an affectation rather than bona fide philosophy itself. These shadowy instantiations might seem to suggest a gradual narrowing of Stoicism and its significance, but in fact they reflect the broad coordinates of an ancient philosophy that, in Charles Taylor’s words, has been “transposed into a thoroughly modern position.”

Situating Stoic Romanticism

In its multifarious forms, the Stoicism I explore in the following pages looks more like a discipline of attention than a disavowal of affective capacity. In belaboring what Epictetus called making the correct “Use of the Appearances of Things,” Stoics attend to the emotions and impressions that make up their own mental life, but they also lavish attentive judgment on the world that gives rise to those impressions. This gap between reductive caricature and nuanced reality aligns Stoicism with resignation, humility, and other unpopular or pathologized “modes of self-limitation,” which Steven Connor has thoughtfully explored in Giving Way: Thoughts on Unappreciated Dispositions. For Connor, a sense of the complex ethical positioning inherent in such “minorizing modes” has simply been lost as the long quest for more obvious forms of agency and empowerment drove them out of fashion. Connor’s reparative account works toward a new understanding of the many ways in which “the mitigation of assertion and the attenuation of agency are indeed often powerfully affirmative and require skilled and attentive application.” I have conceived Stoic Romanticism and the Ethics of Emotion with a similarly reparative agenda, one that tries to think generatively about an impulse toward detachment...
that has, for several decades now, been viewed skeptically by critiques of Enlightenment rationality.

Thinking carefully about the competing and often radical overtones of Stoicism in the late eighteenth century seems especially consequential, however, for the tendency to equate Stoicism with repression has had a prominent afterlife in literary discourse. In a vein of especially influential historicist scholarship, Stoic detachment tends to be flagged as a form of false consciousness, part of a quest for self-coherence that works by occlusion, as if in denial. In this sense, the volitional power of Stoicism is easily confused for a mechanism of displacement or blockage. In _Romantic Moods_, for example, Thomas Pfau argues that “the seemingly stoic ‘composure’ and ‘tranquility’ of lyric or pastoral writing reveals itself as a phantasmagoria painstakingly elaborated so as to shelter its speakers from the impinging knowledge of their complicity in a historical world so entropic and volatile as to preclude its timely comprehension.”37 A similar kind of denial adheres in Ian Baucom’s account of an “actuarializing discourse of stoic disinterestedness” that represses or denies the melancholy facts of history.38 For Pfau and Baucom, Stoic composure points toward the historical harm that cannot or will not be comprehended. By contrast, many of the writers I consider draw on the Stoics in an effort—albeit often an imperfect one—to see the world and its harms more clearly, even justly. At many points in the book, I foreground the convergence of Stoicism and cosmopolitanism, an affiliation that was especially central to the Romantic reception of Stoicism, early and late.

As a correlative of this larger reappraisal, I try to think more generatively about various states of dispassion within Romanticism by resisting a tendency to equate a noticeable lack of emotion with trauma itself. Though trauma often results in what Pfau describes as “the nearly total absence of any affective or emotive disturbance,” the same lack of feeling could also signal a number of other volitional possibilities.39 The unfolding of Romanticism against a backdrop of what Mary Favret has called “everyday war” offers a convenient way of drawing out this distinction.40 Jeffrey Cox’s rehearsal of the seemingly endless parade of military entanglements of the period suggests how much trauma must have accompanied war and its “ongoing background state of terror.”41 For many of those in uniform, the atrocities encountered on the fields of Europe must have eluded timely comprehension, narration, and assimilation.42 But other soldiers worked to cultivate the “Character of the Happy Warrior,” a temperament on Wordsworth’s mind after the proximate deaths of Lord Nelson and his own seafaring brother. Drawing on Stoicism to manage the pain, fear, and
bloodshed that accompanied life in war could help a soldier turn all of the
trials of an “exposed” existence to “glorious gain”:

In the face of these [he] doth exercise a power
Which is our human-nature’s highest dower;
Controls them and subdues, transmutes, bereaves
Of their bad influence, and their good receives;
By objects, which might force the soul to abate
Her feeling, render’d more compassionate;
Is placable because occasions rise
So often that demand such sacrifice;
More skilful in self-knowledge, even more pure,
As tempted more; more able to endure,
As more expos’d to suffering and distress;
Then, also, more alive to tenderness.43

For Wordsworth, Stoic management of feeling works against the always
looming possibility of trauma and its affective abatement. Far from a
denial of experience, it elicits “self-knowledge” and tends toward eudai-
monia, not to mention “tenderness” itself. Nor, as Neil Ramsey demon-
strates, did Stoic self-culture serve merely individualistic ends: the “stoical
endurance” of wartime suffering fed into national narratives of identity
and defense.44 The happy warrior’s Stoic balancing act might not stack
up against various contemporary yardsticks for measuring emotional
knowledge and well-being, but this anachronistic dissatisfaction need not
obscure its influential and often radical force in the period.

In exploring some of the avenues opened up by volitional, nontrau-
matic, and always imperfect abstentions from the realm of affect, I have
been galvanized by work in Romantic studies attuned to the ethical pos-
sibilities that emerge only when transcendence, self-expression, end-
less Bildung, and other forms of conventional Romantic egoism are set
aside. In Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience, Anne-
Lise François suggests that her account of “minimal contentment” and
“recessive action” is different in kind from “the tranquility of stoic self-
sufficiency.”45 All the same, her patient evocation of “a readiness to go
without” as something other than sublimation informs my sense of the
subtle, fleeting power of apatheia in Romantic writing. But unlike many
of the figures in Open Secrets, the writers I analyze here are rarely con-
tent to rest empty-handed. In my book, Stoic self-culture is less a form of
abandonment than a radical commitment, an impulse toward world mak-
ing—at once ethical, poetical, and political—in which justice is predicated
on affective restraint. Many of the writers in these pages would happily take on the work of adjustment and the “habits of self-denial” that Ana-hid Nersessian has described as integral to Romanticism and its “peda-gogy of utopian limitation.”

This dual sense of Stoicism as at once an aspirational ideal and an ordinary, nontraumatic habit speaks to its particular legibility in a literary and cultural field broadly attentive to the centrality of affect, a diffuse realm of felt intensities pithily glossed by Kate Singer as the “physiological, material, and figural movements through and beyond a variety of human and nonhuman bodies.” Though it might seem counterintuitive, I want to suggest that Romantic Stoicism is a corollary to the period’s “gravitational pull toward feeling” rather than a blinkered rejection of that force. To put it simply, a newly awakened sense of the transiency of affect drew renewed attention to an ancient but familiar philosophy for managing it. Stoicism as a form of self-culture or a discipline of attention was particularly relevant in a world still assimilating Hume’s destabilizing assertion that passions were “contagious” and passed “with the greatest facility from one person to another.” As a text like Coleridge’s incomplete treatise “On the Passions” (1828) starts to make clear, the possibilities opened up by an “infinitely connectable, impersonal, and contagious” realm of affect were liberating but also destabilizing. Methods for navigating feeling were eagerly sought. Many of the writers I study in this book looked to Stoicism as an unwieldy array of practices and ideas that might, in Joel Faflak and Richard Sha’s terms, preside over the emotional “matrix through which the world is brought to our sensoria.” In this role, Stoicism could be as unremarkably quotidian as affect itself, just another way of negotiating the in-between spaces of everyday life. Indeed, the literary case studies I have assembled here speak to how Stoicism underwrites the diverse “styles of composure” and “norms of self-management” that Lauren Berlant has described as emerging out of the affective impasse of history itself.

All the same, it would be foolish to minimize a central distinction between Stoic moral psychology and much of the work associated with the study of affect in literary and cultural studies. For many theorists of affect, its power as an analytic category grows out of embodied intensities that remain “unassimilable” to cognition, while also opening up what Eve Sedgwick has described as a conceptual realm not shaped by “the commonsensical dualities of subject versus object.” For Brian Massumi, affect is “autonomous” by nature of its “singular openness.” The Stoics, by contrast, ascribed to a cognitive-evaluative model of emotion,
one in which impressions emanating from the body and the world were not autonomous but ancillary to the perspective-shaping judgments of the mind itself. In A. A. Long’s words, Stoicism’s “rationalistic analysis of emotions and evaluations implies that they themselves, and the judgements on which they depend, are completely in our power, up to us, within the control of our will.”57 If affect theory prioritizes the power of the body, Stoicism makes a case for the power of the mind itself. And for all of the ways in which affect circulates in and among bodies and beings, the Stoics suggest that processing such circulation ultimately falls to individual subjects and their autonomous minds. To be sure, the story I tell about Stoicism in the Romantic period hardly validates these tidy distinctions. As we will see, more than a few writers approached Stoicism as a worthy ideal undercut by embodied existence and material reality more generally. Others saw it as inherently rhetorical and performative, a philosophy more suited to surface-level social interactions than intensely subjective self-culture. That said, Stoic moral psychology resonates with Romantic moral psychology for the same reason that Gerard Cohen-Vrignaud suggests contemporary affect theory has had a “negligible impact” on how scholars analyze various forms of feeling in the period. As he puts it, the intricacies of Romantic interiority are often out of step with the “interpersonal extensions” of affect itself.58

In exploring the vexed possibilities of Stoicism in the period, I try to foreground the complexities of a moment in which two different ways of “touching feeling” collide.59 Amid this generative complexity, I want to emphasize two brief points at the outset. My first point turns on the possibility of a broad frame of reference toward which both modes of feeling aspired. One of the generative possibilities of a noncognitive account of affect lies in its power to overleap the isolating subjectivity of the buffered self, opening up a new atmosphere of intersubjectivity in the process. Set against this expansive potentiality, Stoicism might seem an inherently rearguard affair, a nervous shoring up of the citadel of the rational self. In stark contrast, however, one of the consistent transits I trace in this book runs from the Stoic evaluation of emotion toward the cosmopolitan ethics to which it was often thought to aspire. For a generation of writers shaped by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the Stoic regulation of affect was commonly affixed to a Stoic cosmopolitan ideal. This consanguinity seems essential: the regulation of affect as well as its profusion held out the promise that the links connecting an individual to the world could be reimagined or redrawn.

My second point is a simple historical one, a move to affirm a background consensus easily occluded by powerful methodological innovation.
at any moment. Coming to terms with the status and significance of feeling in the long eighteenth century entailed as fraught and unending a conversation as it seems likely to elicit in ours. Eve Sedgwick’s appealingly ambivalent assertion that affect is “thoroughly embodied, as well as more or less intensively interwoven with cognitive processes” could just as well reflect a Romantic position. Within this realm of clarifying indistinction, my hope in this book is to think searchingly about the role of Stoicism within the history and science of Romantic feeling, for as Bruce Graver notes, “Romantic theories of emotion begin with the Stoics, and thus are fundamentally, and paradoxically, classical.”

In thinking about how Stoicism defines a literary period often thought to mark its abeyance, I have drawn on scholars attentive to the history of emotions as well as the history of those practices and forms through which they cohere. In method and scope, my account of Romantic Stoicism resembles (though in different ways) Chris Jones’s work on “radical sensibility,” Adela Pinch’s account of “epistemologies of emotion,” Andrew Stauffer’s history of Romantic anger, and James Chandler’s “archaeology” of sympathy. But amid the profusion of work on the historicity of emotion, my book speaks most directly to scholars who have paid particular attention to a countervailing interest in the regulation of that emotion. On this front I would single out Julie Ellison’s *Cato’s Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion* as an especial catalyst. Weighing the competing claims of Stoicism and sensibility in a transatlantic context, Ellison’s sense of Stoicism as a lived philosophy played out in a world of racial and gender inequality informs my own account of its radical and cosmopolitan capacities. But while Ellison’s focus on eighteenth-century literary culture allows her to do little more than scratch the surface of Romanticism, I demonstrate that the destabilizing power of Stoicism was just as vital a feature of the next century’s self-culture and global imaginings. In making this case, I have benefited from foundational work on Stoicism in the period, a great deal of which coheres around the well-documented Stoic proclivities of William Wordsworth, a philosophical persuasion explored most recently and compellingly by Graver and Adam Potkay. Another prominent vein of Stoic inquiry focuses on Anna Barbauld, Mary Wollstonecraft, and other women writers who move—in Claudia Johnson’s terms—to take up “the once-masculine virtues of stoic rationalism and self-control.” But even these important accounts of the persistence of Stoicism within Romanticism do not do full justice to its radical and poetic significance. Before I lay out the course of my argument through the chapters that follow, I want to bring that significance into range by showing how Stoicism
and its “philosophic mental tranquillity” stand, forcefully and almost surreptitiously, at the center of familiar Romantic terrain.\(^{65}\)

**“The Torturing and Conflicting Throngs Within”**

When Percy Shelley first caught sight of Mont Blanc, it seemed less a “soulless image” than a living presence, an entity as notable for its Stoicism as its sublimity (Prelude 6:454). In a letter to Thomas Love Peacock, Shelley called up personification in an attempt to evoke its power: “One would think that Mont Blanc, like the god of the Stoics, was a vast animal, and that the frozen blood for ever circulated through his stony veins.”\(^{66}\) This was the kind of image that would fuel William Butler Yeats in his mystical Shelleyan devotion, a premonition of that “rough beast” bound for Bethlehem to wreak havoc after twenty centuries of “stony sleep.”\(^{67}\) In “Mont Blanc” (1816), Shelley falls into apostrophe to make it clear that the mountain itself was teeming with such revolutionary possibility: “Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal / Large codes of fraud and woe.”\(^{68}\) Shelley’s figural alignment of mountain and Stoic deity might simply reflect an attempt to embody a power made almost inscrutable by its vacancy, and yet I am struck by the possibility that the voice of the mountain might be a Stoic one. The channeling of “frozen blood” through “stony veins” mimics the slow crawl of its glaciers as they “creep / Like snakes” to overwhelm the living earth.\(^{69}\) But this strange evocation of Stoicism amid one of European Romanticism’s primal scenes results in an especially chilly view of fraud’s evanescence. Early British advocates of the French Revolution had imagined it as an enkindling blaze that might lay despotism in ashes while illuminating Europe. Shelley’s Stoic mountain god almost seems to mock that living power with an absence of heat, its “frozen blood” forever circulating yet unthawed all the same.

Three years later, the Stoics were again on Shelley’s mind in “A Ravine of Icy Rocks in the Indian Caucasus.”\(^{70}\) It is easy enough to look past the short epigraph to Prometheus Unbound (1820), a stray line salvaged from Aeschylus’s own lost version of the play that Shelley found in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations: “Audisne haec, Amphiarae sub terram abdite?”\(^{71}\) Making sense of its significance requires a bit of patience. In reading the Tusculan Disputations, Shelley was working through one of the most significant accounts of Stoic moral psychology, a series of disquisitions that Cicero wrote shortly after the devastating loss of his daughter Tullia. Shelley borrows his epigraph from a point in the text in which Cicero treats self-mastery as the one thing necessary to “bear
pain quietly and calmly.” Cicero pauses over the negative example of a figure sometimes described as Dionysius the Turncoat, an early student of the Stoic founder Zeno who recanted all of his Stoic training after an excruciating bout of kidney pain. Cicero assigns the line in question to the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes, who stomps his foot on the ground and calls out to the shade of Zeno in incredulity: “Audisne haec, Amphiarae sub terram abdite? [Do you hear this, Amphiaraus, in your home beneath the earth?]” Stuck in an irresolute present, Cleanthes looks back with longing to the almost mythological self-mastery of an evanescent past.

As Earl Wasserman and others have noted, the epigraph works in at least two ways. On the one hand, Shelley announces in no uncertain terms an interpretive rift in the Prometheus story. He scribbled the lines into his notebook under the heading “To the Ghost of Aeschylus,” suggesting his own contempt for the Greek playwright’s willingness to reconcile “the Champion with the Oppressor of mankind.” In Shelley’s version of the play, Prometheus will not submit to Jupiter’s tyranny. On the other hand, Cicero supplies more than a fragment ripe for ironic reversal. His exploration of self-mastery and the nature of grief reflects Prometheus’s own austere resistance. In his preface to the “lyrical drama,” Shelley makes it clear that Prometheus is as sage-like as they come; he is, “as it were, the type of the highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature.” Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the “ministers of pain and fear” dispatched by Jove to torture Prometheus elicit a response that would have made Zeno and Cleanthes proud. Threatening to overwhelm Prometheus with new forms of dread and desire, the Furies deploy the language of the crowd, comparing their affective (and noticeably embodied) tortures to “a vain loud multitude / Vexing the self-content of wisest men.” Alert like any Stoic to the misapprehensions that emotion can allow, Prometheus shrugs off their attempt to shake his self-possession:

Why, ye are thus now;
Yet I am king over myself, and rule
The torturing and conflicting throngs within,
As Jove rules you when Hell grows mutinous.

Crowd control is reimagined as a personal regimen, and given the chronological proximity of the Peterloo Massacre, the very fact of that reimagina-
tion might seem to entail a stark internalization of violence. Yet what looks like tyranny on one level turns out to be the secret of its elimination on the other. Prometheus’s rule over himself becomes the model for overturning
a world in which slavery in the broadest sense is made multitudinous by “fear and self-contempt and barren hope.”78

While Prometheus Unbound validates the importance of enduring pain and remaining ever firm, Shelley’s Stoic agenda extends beyond mere forbearance. Viewing new blasts of dread and desire against the reality of his own “calm power,” Prometheus also denounces the false belief lurking in the grief that once gave rise to his awful curse: “Grief for awhile is blind, and so was mine.”79 As Cicero puts it, grief is “far remote from the wise man” because “it does not originate in nature but in an act of judgment, of belief.”80

While chained to the mountain, Prometheus discovers a Stoicism capable of ushering in regime change, but its revolutionary power remains rooted in retrospection. In this sense, at least, Prometheus Unbound follows Laon and Cythna (1817) in imagining the proper conditions for a new revolution, one that will not be hobbled by the “dupes and slaves” who were “incapable of conducting themselves with the wisdom and tranquility of freemen so soon as some of their fetters were partially loosened.”81

Taken as a whole, Shelley seems to suggest that the French Revolution—ultimately undone by its own “torturing and conflicting throngs”—was not quite Stoic enough. Emotional self-mastery might be arduous in its cultivation, but such private autonomy was the source of collective freedom. Another way of putting this would be to say that in Prometheus Unbound, Shelley portrays “Self-empire” as the necessary supplement to “the all-sustaining air,” which is nothing less than “the majesty of love.”82 There is a distinct Stoic dimension to his ultimate envisioning of utopia:

The loathsome mask has fallen, the Man remains,—
Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed,—but man:
Equal, unclassed, tribeless and nationless,
Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the King
Over himself; just, gentle, wise,—but man:
Passionless? no: yet free from guilt or pain,
Which were, for his will made, or suffered them,
Nor yet exempt, tho’ ruling them like slaves,
The clogs of that which else might oversoar
The loftiest star of unascended heaven,
Pinnacled dim in the intense inane.83

Like “the much admired Republic of Zeno,” Shelley’s utopian world is not divided up by tribe, class, or nation: there is rather “one way of life and
order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law.”84 Integral to the cosmopolitanism that often went hand-in-hand with Stoicism, the self-mastery exhibited by Prometheus is effectively democratized. It becomes a common inheritance, a foundation for just and gentle dealings. Tyranny is replaced by self-rule, but all of this justice and wisdom does not result in the cold transcendence of human nature. There is no ultimate exit from the realm of passion, nor is earthly existence set aside for some dim region in the “intense inane.”

Such a utopian prospect might seem like the utmost Stoicism could possibly offer, even for a poet always ready to rend the next veil. But in the same summer in which Shelley finished *Prometheus Unbound*, Thomas Love Peacock intimated—albeit in a backhanded kind of way—that Stoic detachment was a vital fixture of not just political power but poetical power as well. Designed to elicit Shelley’s response, “The Four Ages of Poetry” (1826) traces the gradual rise and decline of modern British poetry. The essay is unstinting in its condemnation of poets like Coleridge, Scott, and Byron who do little more than produce “gewgaws and rattles for the grown babies of the age.” Peacock’s account of poetic decline is highly satirical; what looks like a condemnation of poetry in modernity actually encodes a vision of its most exalted possibility. This is especially the case when it comes to his account of the respective roles that feeling and “philosophic mental tranquillity” might play in poetry itself:

The philosophic mental tranquillity which looks round with an equal eye on all external things, collects a store of ideas, discriminates their relative value, assigns to all their proper place, and from the materials of useful knowledge thus collected, appreciated, and arranged, forms new combinations that impress the stamp of their power and utility on the real business of life, is diametrically the reverse of that frame of mind which poetry inspires, or from which poetry can emanate. The highest inspirations of poetry are resolvable into three ingredients: the rant of unregulated passion, the whining of exaggerated feeling, and the cant of factitious sentiment: and can therefore serve only to ripen a splendid lunatic like Alexander, a piling driveller like Werter, or a morbid dreamer like Wordsworth. It can never make a philosopher, nor a statesman, nor in any class of life an useful or rational man.85

It is easy enough to catch Peacock playing the devil’s advocate. After all, poetry must be doing something right if its ingredients are ultimately “resolvable” into Shakespeare’s own triumvirate, the lunatic, lover, and poet in imagination “all compact.” Peacock’s exaggerated portrayal of
poetry and philosophical rationality as polar opposites points to their inevitable inversion: poetry and “cool reason” were hardly antithetical. In his own terms, the “philosophic mental tranquillity which looks around with an equal eye on all external things” is precisely the state of mind from which Peacock thinks poetry emanates, especially if you aspire to be an unacknowledged legislator of the world. Barring that productive tranquility, poetry risks its own partiality, receding from “the real business of life” to rest in its own empty and exaggerated feeling. In “The Defense of Poetry,” Shelley would uphold the inversion that Peacock only implied. Retaining all of its power of sympathy, Shelley collapsed the boundary between poetry and philosophy in heralding its ability to enlarge “the circumference of the imagination” by purifying the affections. In his suggestive Stoic terms, the most celebrated modern poets wield an “influence which is moved not, but moves.”

The Road Ahead

Ernst Cassirer once noted that Stoic philosophy was pivotal to the “formation of the modern mind and the modern world.” In chapter 1, I explore one facet of this emergence by examining how powerfully the Stoic substratum of eighteenth-century moral sentimentalism shaped Romantic notions of mind and world. After surveying the often-militant repudiation of Stoicism in eighteenth-century literary culture, I pause over an overlooked but consequential fracture in the moral philosophy of Shaftesbury and Adam Smith, one that Mary Wollstonecraft took up in her own feminist critique of sensibility. Though working in different ways, all three thinkers approached Stoicism as a necessary supplement to sympathetic connection, one that was crucial to life in an increasingly cosmopolitan and interconnected world. Following the crosscurrents of sympathy and Stoicism in their private and public works, I argue that Shaftesbury and Smith landed on an ethical impasse, one that would pit Burke against Wollstonecraft in the 1790s, igniting in the process a broad Romantic attempt to square ethics and aesthetics in a new way.

Chapter 2 takes up the legacy of the radical 1790s more directly by positing a subterranean connection between the Stoic radicalism that rocked Britain and France in the 1790s and Wordsworth’s “mature” and much-maligned indifference. Thinking in these defamiliarizing terms seems useful, for Wordsworth’s evolving response to Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice perfectly encapsulates the paradigmatic story about the Romantic generation’s pivot from revolutionary fervor to
political apostasy. It goes something like this: At the height of the French Revolution, Wordsworth was an ardent proponent of Godwin's *Political Justice*, a radical philosophy that promised “to abstract the hopes of man / Out of his feelings” (*Prelude* 10:807–8). But in the wake of that revolution's breakdown, Wordsworth took a bleaker view of systems of morality that fail “to melt into our affections.” My contention in this chapter is that the vast power of Stoic radicalism was not so easily put to rest. I tell a different story about Wordsworth's philosophical commitments and the trajectory of Romantic radicalism by exploring an overlooked affinity between Godwin's “Stoical Morality” and Wordsworth's moderated Stoicism in *The Excursion* (1814), a poem often censured—then and now—for its flat-footed conservatism. While Godwin qualified his early Stoic convictions and embraced the empire of feeling, Wordsworth channeled his recalcitrant interest in Stoic radicalism through the figure of the stone, separating a philosophical attitude from its customary rhetoric and political extremity.

Taking these radical and cosmopolitan connotations of Stoicism for granted, the next two chapters consider its complex relation to two central literary categories: lyric and character. Chapter 3 is perhaps best glossed with a line from Thomas De Quincey, who once confessed that while he could occasionally “agree with the gentlemen in the cotton-trade at Manchester in affecting the Stoic philosophy,” he remained on the “look out for some courteous and considerate sect that will condescend more to the infirm condition of an opium-eater.” In this chapter, I turn not to De Quincey but Coleridge in exploring a consequential disconnect between Stoic philosophy and corporeal reality. Coleridge occupies a strange position in a study of Romantic Stoicism: what he described as his own “utter impotence of the *Volition*” thwarted his attempts at emotional regulation, but he spent more time contemplating the history and efficacy of Stoicism than almost any other writer of the period. While drawn to Kant's and Spinoza's modern renditions of Stoic ethics, Coleridge was deeply skeptical about what he described as the most “peccant part of Stoicism,” the discrepancy between its moral psychology and the fact of embodied selfhood. I argue that this interest was borne out most substantively, if a bit surprisingly, in the realm of lyric. In reading “Ode to Tranquillity” in relation to his better known conversation poems, I argue that Coleridge approached the lyric as not just a genre or an artistic artifact but an askesis or practice, a technology of the self by which emotion, opinion, and mental impressions might be evaluated, attenuated, or affirmed.

In chapter 4, I argue that while the pageant of his bleeding heart might have made him infamous, Byron was deeply attuned to the intricate
permutations of emotional detachment. Galvanized by the Horatian *nil admirari* and other Stoic commonplaces, Byron investigated Stoicism at the level of character, a nebulous concept that straddled the ethical, the social, and the literary. In *Don Juan* and other narratives, Stoicism transcends culture and class even as it is approached as a surface-level, exteriorized phenomenon. The unlikely consonance of Byron’s own performative detachment and the Stoic postures of marginalized figures was significant and destabilizing. Byron intuited—and, indeed, interrogated—the way in which a Stoic ethos blurred social distinctions by forging lines of affinity between elite citizens of the world and the wretched of the earth. In their attempts “to steel / The heart against itself,” Byron’s Stoic characters capture the spirit of a critical age, one in which cosmopolitan detachment could also lead to irony and other modern forms of alienation (*CW* 2:117).

In very different ways, the final two chapters of this book explore Stoic Romanticism as a vanguard movement, the shape of a future in the works but still to come. In chapter 5, I turn from poetry to the novel to consider two texts at opposite ends of the Romantic timeline, both of which attempt to unlock the reorienting, feminist possibilities inherent in Stoicism by bringing it in line with a precarious propriety. In *Millenium Hall* (1762), Sarah Scott imagines a world in which virtuous retirement and the regulation of feeling could result in paradoxically extensive benevolence. I trace the reappearance of this radical potentiality in Mary Shelley’s *Lodore* (1835), a late, transatlantic novel whose tidy conclusion is undone by Fanny Derham, a “quixotic” character with a penchant for reading Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*. A haunting rendition of Mary Wollstonecraft, Fanny Derham is also an outsized figure of the future, a woman whose transformative Stoic vision demands not “a few tame lines” but “the gift of prophecy” itself (*L* 448).

Finally, I look across the Atlantic in chapter 6 to suggest that Emerson’s gnomic essays reflect, theorize, and call for a bold American extension of the Stoic Romanticism I have been tracking throughout the book. In a late journal, Emerson claimed that the doctrines of “Zeno & the Stoic sect” could be reduced to one thought: “self-reliance” (*JMN* 13:463). While his Stoicism is often described as a late and disenchanted formation, I argue that his idealism was Stoic from the outset. In a range of essays, Emerson mercilessly investigated an intuition that troubled Smith and his Romantic inheritors: however pleasurable, sympathy was incommensurate with ethical action. Like the Stoics, Emerson deployed paradoxical rhetoric to make a case for the broad justice of Stoic cosmopolitanism in a sentimental age. In owning up to his own Stoic tendencies, Emerson, like the other
writers in this book, articulated a complex and challenging vision of how ethical self-culture might lead to widespread social reform.

As even this quick delineation of my argument suggests, the vision of Stoicism that emerges over the course of the book entails a demanding sense of how individuals—even in the midst of their ordinary lives—might reimagine their perception of and relation to a vast world. But Stoicism did not always emerge in such grandiose terms. A letter from November 1822 finds John Keats trying to articulate an unfamiliar and seemingly barren sense of self: “I sometimes feel not the influence of a Passion or Affection during a whole week—and so long [as] this sometimes continues I begin to suspect myself and the genuineness of my feelings at other times.”93 There is a hesitancy to this acknowledgment, as if Keats worried that a deeply engrained, almost inexplicable Stoicism might render him cold and unpoetical. But the contrary reality seems equally compelling: arriving at a place beyond the influence of passion foregrounds its power in the first place. Calling affect into question is the sign of its ultimate affirmation. T. S. Eliot was thinking along similar lines in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” when he suggested that Wordsworth’s account of powerful feeling recollected in tranquility was “not quite the whole story.” In notably Stoic terms, Eliot suggests that poetry “is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality.” His next sentence—offered without explanation or elaboration—strikes me as particularly resonant: “But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things.”94 Eliot’s understated “of course” is a wonderfully overworked prepositional phrase, for in unweaving literary historical distinctions, it makes a counterintuitive perspective on the Romantic project seem almost too obvious to be stated. Hardly oppositional, emotion and Stoic tranquility were inherently correlative.
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