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Introduction

On July 3, 2018, the New York Times reported that in Denmark, “starting at the age of 1, ‘ghetto children’ [children of immigrant parents who live in neighborhoods with high concentrations of immigrant populations] must be separated from their families for at least 25 hours a week, not including nap time, for mandatory instruction in ‘Danish values,’ including the traditions of Christmas and Easter, and Danish language.” While this public policy might have been motivated by a commitment to providing access to publicly funded education in Denmark, the undertone of the reportage suggests that any such initiative could also be perceived as a strategy of forced assimilation of immigrant populations. Indeed, policies of coercive assimilation are becoming increasingly common in Europe. In France, wearing a face covering (which is common among some Muslim women) is now illegal in public spaces; and in England, David Cameron’s first speech as prime minister in 2011 declared “state multiculturalism” as having failed, calling instead for “muscular liberalism,”¹ which promotes national unity by providing a “shared vision of the society to which [immigrants] feel they want to belong.”² This viewpoint, which was endorsed by French president Nicolas Sarcozy, was also reflected in later statements by London mayor Boris Johnson in the run-up to the elections from which he emerged as the country’s new prime minister.

Integration policies that amount to forced assimilation are increasingly seen as a tool in the state’s arsenal of strategies to “de-radicalize” Muslim minorities in Europe. Even though available evidence suggests that these communities are actually not radicalized, fears that a “Muslim invasion” will

threaten Europeans’ national identities are prevalent and multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to liberalism. Many perceive assimilationist policies as the only way to reduce intergroup conflict between natives and immigrants by minimizing the social and cultural distance that divides them.

Underlying the growing backlash against immigration from predominantly Muslim countries is a perception that deep ideological and normative differences divide Christians and Muslims—that there is a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). At the same time, in the context of Europe’s liberal democratic regimes, cultural differences must be respected and accommodated as immigrant populations have the same freedoms as others to retain their group values and cultural norms. Yet, this accommodation of difference can generate anxiety among the native population, which fears that immigration from Muslim majority cultures will slowly change European culture (Caldwell, 2009). Large segments of European societies feel aggrieved; they believe that immigrants resist assimilation and establish a “parallel society” (Caldwell, 2009) that threatens to change European identity. This identity threat is fueled by liberal policies of accommodating cultural differences among migrant communities whose norms and ideas are perceived to clash with those of the native population. The challenge seems greater in countries where citizenship is imbued with the ideology of ethnic nationalism, where the population has been taught that there is continuity between its present makeup and an ethnic past that excluded the groups that are now trying to move in. Negative stereotypes and antipathy toward immigrants derive partly from “tribal impulses” and have perpetuated primordial identities that are challenged by the processes of globalization (Ahmed, 2018). These challenges create anxiety, further fueled by far-right voices, which result in many Europeans viewing the scale of Muslim immigration as a real threat to the very survival of “European” identity. Some go as far as to fear that Europe will soon become “part of the Arabic west, of the Maghreb.”

This sentiment takes various guises and is broadly shared in European countries, leading to antipathy and discrimination toward immigrants from any country that is perceived to be culturally “distant” (Hagendoorn and Sniderman, 2001). The result is growing opposition to multiculturalist policies and support for assimilationist policies designed to erase cultural differences.

between immigrants and natives. Paradoxically, multiculturalist policies that are now seen as evidence of yielding to and accepting of cultural difference, were initially conceived as a way to ensure that migrant workers would not integrate and would eventually have to return to their countries of origin. “Guest” workers were considered as a temporary solution to support economic growth in postwar Europe, and it was assumed that cultural differences dividing them from natives could not be overcome; allowing migrants to retain their norms and practices meant that their connections to their homelands would be kept alive, making it more likely that they would go back (Vollebergh, Veenman, and Hagendoorn, 2017; Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder, 2006). However, attitudes toward multiculturalism have changed along with the realization that migrants are here to stay and there is now a backlash against policies that encourage cultural pluralism, which is seen as a threat to European countries’ national identities. Whereas multiculturalist policies were expected to build consensus, they may have inadvertently sown divisions (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007, p. 5).

The term multiculturalism often has different meanings in public debates in different countries and in the scholarly literature on immigration. In this book, we do not use the term to refer to support for specific policies of immigrant integration such as affirmative action for immigrants, constitutional affirmations of respect of cultural diversity, accommodation of foreign religious practices, and so on. Rather, we use the term multiculturalism to refer to coexistence between native and immigrant populations and we study attitudinal and behavioral effects of exposure to cultural diversity in everyday settings. Specifically, we share normative theorists’ orientation toward the term multiculturalism as suggesting respect for diversity; such respect should translate to recognition of the rights of immigrants to retain their culture (Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994; Miller, 2006) and it should manifest as equal treatment of immigrants in the public sphere. As such, our analysis is consistent with the colloquial use of the term multiculturalism as expressed in a well-known speech by German chancellor Angela Merkel who once described “Multikulti” as an effort “to live happily side by side” with immigrants—an effort which she claimed has “failed utterly” in Europe (cited in Koopmans (2013, p. 148)).

This negative sentiment toward immigration is reflected in cross-country research which shows that the adoption of state policies that are supportive of multiculturalism has stalled in the past two decades (Koopmans, 2013). The primary reason for this reversal of state support for multiculturalism
is likely the fact that religious claims—and claims from Muslim groups in particular—now constitute the lion’s share of all immigrant groups’ claims for cultural accommodation in Europe (Koopmans et al., 2005). According to Koopmans (2013, pp. 150–151), religious claims are harder to accommodate than cultural claims by ethno-linguistic groups because religious claims often challenge core values of the host society. Others have explored the correlates of countries’ immigration and integration policies, and such analysis is beyond the scope of this book. Yet public support for individual or group rights for immigrants, as reflected in cross-country indices of multiculturalism, should correlate with underlying public attitudes toward immigrants, albeit imperfectly. Our book is concerned with exploring such attitudes rather than citizens’ support for the extension of specific rights or privileges to immigrant groups. Our empirical measures of individual-level dispositions and behavior toward Muslim immigrants are reflective of a “common sense” understanding of the term “multiculturalism,” which essentially captures how one feels about “living side by side” with immigrants.

This book explores the limits of multiculturalism by considering whether conflict over ideas, norms, and values underlies discrimination against immigrants, and by analyzing whether native bias against immigrants can be overcome when natives come to believe that immigrants share valued norms that define the idea of good citizenship in native society. While most integration policies—especially increasingly common assimilationist policies—focus exclusively on immigrants and their behavior, this book focuses on natives’ beliefs and stereotypes. If perceived ideational differences are what shapes bias and discrimination against immigrants, then that behavior should change when the perceived cultural threat is removed by establishing that natives and immigrants adhere to shared civic norms. The book explores this idea by focusing on recent immigration to Europe from predominantly Muslim countries and asks whether anti-immigrant attitudes and behavior are motivated by ethnic, racial, linguistic, or religious differences between natives and immigrants; and whether the social distance that is created by such differences in ascriptive traits can be overcome by forging a shared civic identity.

If multiculturalism creates divisions by encouraging immigrant and native communities to maintain different norms and potentially conflicting identities, how can intergroup conflict be mitigated? Complying with a society’s laws is not enough to reduce conflict if bias is fueled by perceived cultural and ideological differences. Could natives and immigrants identify a set of fundamental social norms regarding civic life that they share as the foundation to
overcome the perception of social distance that divides them? Could immigrants retain key markers of their distinct cultural identity and still be accepted as equal members of their adopted European societies by demonstrating their respect for the host country? How do you demonstrate such respect? Despite a surge of research on immigration and ethnic politics, these questions remain largely unaddressed.

The idea that negative attitudes and biased behavior toward immigrants are grounded in perceptions of intergroup differences has gained support in empirical investigations across disciplinary boundaries, from social psychology (Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman, 1999) to sociology (Schneider, 2008) and political science (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008). Often grounded in seminal theories of social identity and categorization (Tajfel, 1981; Turner et al., 1987), prejudice (Allport, 1979; Paluck and Green, 2009), and ethnocentrism (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Kinder and Kam, 2010), many of these studies trace the sources of anti-immigrant sentiment to the perceptions of threat experienced by host populations, as they come into contact with immigrants who deviate from prototypical conceptions of what members of their ingroup should be (Mummendey and Wenzel, 1999; Kauff et al., 2015).

Ethnicity and religion are at the core of what defines perceptions of the national ingroup identity in most countries. Ethnic and religious differences between native and immigrant populations can generate both “realistic” and “symbolic” identity threats (Stephan and Stephan, 2000) that cause anxiety among natives, encouraging the formation of negative stereotypes that lead to a backlash against immigration. This book uses an experimental approach to identify which types of cultural differences between immigrants and natives generate perceptions of threat and anti-immigrant bias. Based on the analysis of the causes of bias, the book then considers possible solutions to mitigate native-immigrant conflict, focusing on whether shared social norms can be effective in reducing the perception of social distance that explains the feeling of identity threat by native populations.

Prior literature has already established that stereotypes and prejudice driven by differences in ascriptive characteristics that define race, ethnicity, and religion can cause discrimination (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort, 2010;
Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013). It is a short step from identifying such differences as the cause of discrimination to proposing strategies of bias-reduction that are premised on eliminating intergroup differences via assimilation (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort, 2010). It might be true that if immigrants change their names and their religion, this will eliminate sources of friction with the native population. That might be a step too far, however. Furthermore, many strategies of assimilation are likely to be perceived as coercive by immigrants and they might backfire. Coercive assimilation policies can take many forms: requiring cultural assimilation as a precondition for access to rights; refusing to accommodate foreign religious practices and organizations; enforcing native tongue-only rules in schools and other public institutions; or making classes on national culture and history and loyalty oaths a precondition for citizenship. While in theory coercive assimilation could work by eliminating cultural differences, in practice it could make these differences seem bigger and more important than they really are.\textsuperscript{5} While coercive assimilation policies do not constitute the standard approach to integration across European countries, they are widely used and they have become more prevalent as support for state multiculturalism has weakened in the past two decades (Koopmans, 2013).

We do not yet know the extent to which assimilation is really necessary to reduce native-immigrant conflict. Is it really necessary to ban the use of the veil in public? Do African or Muslim immigrants really need to adopt European/Christian-sounding names so as to avoid job-market discrimination? Should it be mandatory to use the host country’s language in public spaces to induce immigrants to learn it? Do Muslim immigrants have to take classes that teach them about Christmas or about the value of a firm handshake in business dealings? Or is it possible to achieve ideational convergence that reduces native hostility in other ways which immigrants might perceive as less repressive? What if immigrants signaled that they share the respect of norms that are deeply valued in the host society, while retaining their own distinctive cultural markers? Could this help reduce discrimination against them by natives? We posit this hypothesis in this book, and suggest a way to test it empirically. The key implication to be tested is that assimilation does not need to take the form of shedding the veil or hiding one’s ethnic identity as long as

\textsuperscript{5} For an empirical example of such backfiring due to the banning of the veil in France, see Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2020. For a conceptual critique of coercive assimilationist solutions to anti-immigrant discrimination, see Norton, 2018.
ideational conflict over valued social norms is resolved. Perhaps the need to demonstrate that immigrants share natives’ norms and ideas will also be perceived as repressive by some advocates of multiculturalism; but it is surely less interventionist than other ways to reduce social distance and it concerns behavior in the realm of civic—not private or family—life.

Previous work on immigrant integration focuses on much more visible signals of assimilation, defined as a one-way process of immigrants adapting to native society. Such signals include de-prioritizing religion (e.g., banning veils in France), adopting the country’s language (e.g., foreign language prohibition laws in the United States after World War I), or changing dietary habits (e.g., eating pork in Denmark). Our argument is that there are subtler ways of overcoming difference by signaling appreciation and belonging. Natives’ anxieties about immigrants are revealed in public discussions of their ascriptive traits, but they are not necessarily caused by those traits, but rather by what those traits signify according to prevailing beliefs in native society. The main fear is that immigrants reject the norms and values of that society and that they do not “fit in.” Immigrants can overcome bias not necessarily by shedding the distinctive cultural features that they value, but by showing that they do not reject valued local norms and habits. Demonstrating that immigrants share natives’ values and norms is a much lower bar to clear compared to outright assimilation. Although this point is subtle, the contrast with previous approaches to the study of native-immigrant conflict is sharp.

To address these important questions, we need new research that uncovers the sources of bias and discrimination in social interactions between natives and immigrants. Most of what we know about anti-immigrant attitudes comes from public opinion polls, survey experiments, audit studies, or lab experiments that are focused on the labor market or other economic domains (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013, p. 2). What is wanting is an investigation of how typical social encounters with immigrants in everyday settings structure the real-world behavior of natives. In this book we provide such a perspective from the ground up; we design, implement, and analyze a series of large-scale field experiments that present a unique view of the forces that shape natives’ behavior toward Muslims and test the power of shared norms and ideas to reduce discrimination.

6. An example of such a study is Enos (2014), which examines the effect of sustained exposure to foreign language–speaking nonnatives during a morning commute on exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants.
Another difference from previous studies of integration is that we focus on everyday social interactions that capture part of the “lived experiences” of immigrants. The importance of exploring the everyday content of our social lives cannot be overstated. Much of political science analyzes “big events”—elections, regime changes, wars, independence campaigns. Such events are important because they “move the needle” and can change reality seemingly overnight. But most of life is occupied by an accumulation of much smaller events, routine actions, habits, and seemingly mundane interactions. Our book focuses on those types of everyday interactions which make up the bulk of our lives because they can add up to something important. The social encounters that natives and immigrants have on the street, at the train station, in the shopping mall, or at the soccer field can play an immensely important role in shaping their perceptions of each other, their biases, and behavior. If native-immigrant interactions are characterized by several, repeated small acts of mutual disappointment, hostility, and discrimination, these daily experiences will resemble “death by a thousand cuts” and result in pervasive, lasting barriers to intergroup cooperation.

The Argument in a Nutshell

This book argues that intergroup conflict between natives and immigrants can be decreased through shared social norms that define a common ingroup identity—the identity of citizen. Anti-immigrant bias is reduced or eliminated if natives view that immigrants share norms and ideas that define salient social identities among the native population or among large segments of native society. It is not necessary for immigrants to change their appearance or their religion in an attempt to “pass” as members of the majority. It might not even be necessary to become fluent in the local language for them to be treated with the same respect that any other citizen is afforded. However, natives will make assumptions about immigrants’ values and ideas based on their appearance; they have priors that may be based on incomplete information or prejudices that will lead them to discriminate against immigrants on the assumption that differences in appearance (in ascriptive traits) translate into differences in interests and value systems. Thus, social distance between natives and immigrants can cause discrimination, but it is not necessarily the ascriptive characteristics per se that explain that distance; rather, social distance is created by the assumptions that natives make about normative and ideational baggage that are implied by these ascriptive differences. Once this
distinction between “appearance” and “behavior” is made clear, social distance between people who look different can be overcome as long as they are not perceived to be different. If natives believe that immigrants share key social norms that define native identity, they should feel less anxious about integrating immigrants and accommodating ascriptive differences. In that regard, norms and ideas can help define a common ingroup identity—a shared civic identity—that can overcome the native-immigrant divide.

The key here is that norms must be shared—the burden is not necessarily on immigrants to adopt to local norms that they find repressive; but they must behave in a way that indicates respect for their adopted country and its rules. Certainly, many immigrant populations have found that the path of least resistance is to adapt to local norms and habits, so the gradual assimilation of minority populations into the majority is one pathway through which social norms come to be shared over time. But the argument in this book is not dependent on such a pattern since it is possible for immigrants to already share many of the norms and ideas that define the native population. Moreover, even if norms come to be shared via a gradual process of acculturation into native society, this is a far less coercive way to reduce social distance between natives and immigrants compared to assimilation that is based on the principle of erasing (or hiding) subgroup differences, such as changing immigrants’ names or forbidding the wearing of some religious symbols.

In some cases, native-immigrant conflict is based on the misperception of intergroup differences. Such differences might exist when one compares people across countries, but they might be less pronounced when we compare natives and immigrants, since immigrants are a self-selected group and might not fully share cultural beliefs and norms that are prevalent in their countries of origin. Thus, the expectation of cultural conflict might be exaggerated. Opening one’s eyes to the full range of shared experiences in civic life will make evident that there is more common ground among natives and immigrants than is often believed. Over time, a gradual and mutual process of acculturation is likely to lead to a convergence in the norms and ideas shared by groups that live together in close proximity. In the short term, however, bias and discrimination will persist and could be driven by assumptions about the depth of ideational differences that divide the two groups. Taking this constraint of native opposition to multiculturalism seriously, this book considers whether bias and intergroup conflict can be reduced without repressing or erasing subgroup identities.

Observing behavior that suggests that natives and immigrants share common norms and ideas helps de-emphasize the native-immigrant divide by
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bringing to the foreground ideas about citizenship. Such observations make ethno-racial or religious differences less cognitively salient and help forge a common ingroup identity without erasing the differences that delineate group boundaries. This effect (forging a shared ingroup identity) can be achieved either by de-emphasizing the group-level attributes that accentuate social distance between natives and immigrants or by recategorizing immigrants as part of another ingroup—fellow citizens—rather than think of them primarily as outsiders. Natives might be conditioned to think that immigrants do not share their values and interests, so when they observe immigrants adhere to valued social norms or when they see them enforce those norms in public spaces, this will lead them to change the way they think about immigrants and it could reduce the social distance between them. When immigrants signal that they share ideas that define the social identities that are salient among the native population, the native-immigrant divide becomes secondary and immigrants can be treated as individuals or as members of a common ingroup rather than as members of an outgroup.

We substantiate this argument with evidence from a series of experiments and surveys related to the treatment of Muslims in Germany. Our analysis suggests that some—though by no means all—differences in ascriptive traits can indeed cause bias and discrimination in everyday interactions between native Germans and Muslim immigrants. However, that behavior is often driven by the normative-symbolic content of those ascriptive differences and much of the bias can be overcome. When natives acquire better information about immigrants’ degree of commitment to social norms that are valued in the host society (or at least by some groups in that society), their behavior toward immigrants changes and differences in ascriptive characteristics become less important. Thus, a conclusion supported by the analysis in this book is that multiculturalism is possible, but that it also has its limits. While discrimination against immigrants based on ascriptive differences can be decreased, this requires shared norms and ideas and natives must be willing to reassess deeply held stereotypes about immigrants. Intergroup conflict between immigrants and natives can be reduced through a process of education, mutual adaptation, and understanding that highlights their shared identities.

Theoretical Advances

Our approach to studying the sources of anti-immigrant behavior is grounded on the foundational insights of social identity theory (SIT) and
self-categorization theory (SCT) in psychology. These theories argue that group membership shapes the process through which individuals perceive their own identity. Human beings derive their self-worth and self-esteem in large part from their membership in social groups (Tajfel, 1981; Turner et al., 1987). As members in these social groupings, individuals venture through the process of social categorization, through which they “parse the world into manageable sets of social categories,” and ultimately develop a sense of who they are and who others are (Kinder and Kam, 2010, p. 20). Once these boundaries are clearly delineated and the perception of belonging transforms into group identities, individuals tend to accentuate or reify the differences, real or imagined, between their own groups and outgroups (Tajfel, 1981, p. 276). And these distinctions become the basis upon which individuals come to treat “us” and “them” differently.

These insights are echoed in theories of conflict and cooperation in world politics and specifically in the constructivist tradition that explains inter-state conflict not as the inevitable consequence of structural conditions (anarchy) in the world system, but rather as the result of context-specific histories of conflictual or cooperative relations between states (Wendt, 1999; Hopf, 2002). Over time, and through repeated interactions with others, states (like people, if one is willing to reason by analogy) learn who their neighbors are and come to define their own interests and identities in relation to their neighbors. Thus, the fears and anxieties that are ever-present in an anarchic international system need not be so prevalent as to produce conflict as long as states can forge common expectations of cooperation over time. In world politics as in other realms, norms of cooperation are built based on shared experiences and common interests that come to define the limits of appropriate behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Darden, 2009).

Building and expanding on theories about the power of identities to shape behavior, the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) has argued that an effective way to reduce inter-group conflict is to induce a cognitive shift away from attributes that divide groups and toward a common identity that unites them (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). That paradigm is central to the argument put forward in this book, but we develop the CIIM further by showing the role of ideational similarity or difference in forging a common ingroup identity. Most prior empirical work on the CIIM in social psychology is focused on experimentally demonstrating that a cognitive shift that achieves the recategorization of an individual from a subordinate (e.g., ethnic) toward a superordinate (e.g., national) identity is effective in managing and reducing
intergroup conflict. We share this general orientation while focusing on natives’ and immigrants’ ability to forge a new, common ingroup identity as citizens who are defined by shared ideas, norms, and interests.

**Overcoming Identity Threat**

From the perspective of the CIIM, discrimination and hostility toward an outgroup by an ingroup is symptomatic of ascriptive, cultural, or other differences that divide social groups. Bias against minorities held by majority groups would result from negative stereotypes and a sense of identity threat perceived by the majority, which considers itself superior (higher status) than minority groups and therefore lays claim to more resources and power. Conflict between immigrants and natives is an example of such majority-minority competition where the lack of a common ingroup identity induces conflict, as natives, who consider themselves as the prototypical and superior members of the nation perceive immigrants as threatening their influence over the nation’s trajectory. The larger the ethnic and cultural differences between natives and immigrants, the more intense the conflict, as the perceived identity threat grows.

Could a simple cognitive shift that emphasizes an alternative, shared identity be sufficient to reduce bias and conflict as the CIIM would suggest? And how could the CIIM apply to native-immigrant conflict given that these groups do not possess a common national, superordinate identity that they can shift to? Setting aside how lasting the effect of such a cognitive shift is likely to be, for the CIIM to be applicable as a framework for conflict-resolution, a shared identity must already exist. The focus of any conflict-reducing intervention would consist of increasing the salience of the shared identity relative to other parochial attachments. The hard part is to create such a common identity if it does not already exist.

In political science, a vast literature on nationalism echoes this insight as it emphasizes the role of national identification in reducing the salience of subordinate ethnic, religious, regional, or other parochial attachments and inducing loyalty to the idea of the nation (Ricke et al., 2010; Charnysh, Lucas, and Singh, 2015; Levendusky, 2018; Wimmer, 2018; Mylonas, 2013). However, a common national identity does not unite natives and immigrants since their national origins are different. Indeed, perceived threat to national identity is precisely what causes conflict along the native-immigrant divide. Our book explores whether such conflict can be reduced by cultivating other shared
identities based on the realization that natives and immigrants can share norms and ideas about public behavior and civic life that are either shared by most people in a society (civic norms) or by large segments of society (group-derived norms). Could shared respect for a common set of norms and ideas about group rights and responsibilities serve as the basis for the reduction of bias? Or do ascriptive differences between native and immigrant groups dominate any conflict-mitigating effect arising from shared norms?

*Expanding the Common Ingroup Identity Model*

We make two advances to the literature on identity politics, including previous applications of the CIIM to study majority-minority group conflicts. First, we understand common identities as implying common interests and shared ideas; it is the *shared content* of social identities that gives them power to shape behavior. Simply sharing attributes such as skin color, language, or religion is not enough to forge shared identities. We design experimental interventions during which publicly observable behavior reveals individuals’ social *identification*: the extent to which individuals adhere to a set of norms that define specific social identities. Behavior that reveals that individuals have internalized those norms and ideas suggests that they identify with the group. In turn, this behavior helps form the basis for natives and immigrants to realize that they share a common ingroup identity. This approach speaks to a large literature on integration, acculturation, and assimilation as we argue that strategies to reduce intergroup conflict between natives and immigrants should not be premised on erasing differences in group attributes in hopes of creating a more ethnically homogeneous population. Rather, alternative forms of similarity can be relied upon to forge a shared idea of *citizenship*.

Second, we explore the consequences of the intersectionality of social identities for the CIIM and argue that common superordinate identities can be identified on the basis of shared ideas and interests between immigrants and specific subgroups of the native population. Since social identities often crosscut, any number of group identities could be considered superordinate for a subset of the population and could be relied upon to reduce the salience of the native-immigrant divide. Gender, for example, could be considered as a

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7. Identification with a group implies that individuals will take actions that are consistent with advancing the interests of the group, such as enforce group norms. Other types of behavior are also consistent with a revealed preferences approach to social identification, such as fighting for the group or pursuing strategies to increase group status and power.
superordinate identity for native and immigrant women. We focus on gender identity in chapter 6 and argue that the potential for a shared gender identity to reduce conflict between native and immigrant women will not depend on sharing superficial attributes (gender traits) that qualify one for membership in a gender group; rather it will depend on sharing the same ideas and norms that define that gender identity. Thus, if gender identity implies different types of behavior for natives and immigrants, this could actually increase conflict between them rather than decrease it; the overall effect of shared ideas about gender identity will be large or small depending on how salient gender identity is relative to other social identities. If native women and immigrant women have different concepts of what female identity means and if they espouse different ideas about gender roles, then the more salient gender identity becomes relative to other identities, and the more conflict we should expect to see. Conversely, if natives and immigrants share the same ideas about gender norms, then making gender identity salient could have a conflict-reducing effect by reducing the salience of the native-immigrant divide. This theoretical argument is developed further in chapter 2, where we elaborate on the conceptual foundations for the empirical analysis in the book. At the core of our theory is the notion that both widely held civic norms (general norms) and group-derived norms are central in defining shared interests based on common group identities that reduce the perceived distance between natives and immigrants and these commonalities can help reduce native-immigrant conflict.

The kinds of norms that we consider in this book include both group-derived norms that are defined with reference to specific groups, and general norms that apply to society as a whole and might well apply to different societies and countries. Both are types of social norms—internalized habits or customs that suggest a set of expectations regarding civic behavior. These norms pertain to behavior that demonstrates whether one cares about society’s rules, whether one respects others and wants to contribute to the common good. Many types of behaviors could satisfy those conditions; and although we analyze only one example of each type of norm, our discussion

8. This typology does not imply a hierarchy of norms; rather, our intent is to describe how widely the norm is likely to be internalized/adhered to by the population and whether the norm is more directly relevant to the core identity of a particular social group. Whereas “general” norms are norms that are expected to be widely adhered to in the whole society, “group-derived” norms might be felt more strongly among members of a particular social group—people whose group identities are more directly impacted by this norm.
should apply more broadly to different norms and civic behaviors. We analyze one example of a general norm (anti-littering) and one example of a group-derived norm (gender equality). Both of these are important in our specific country context (Germany), but they resonate in other European country contexts as they speak directly to debates regarding the integration of immigrant populations from Muslim countries.

The Evidence

In this book we present new evidence on the multiple influences on anti-immigrant bias and explore ways to reduce anti-immigrant discrimination. We rely on a series of randomized experiments that are conducted in the field in the context of day-to-day interactions that reveal immigrants’ attitudes toward valued social norms in Germany. We complement these studies in the field with data from numerous survey experiments as well as observational survey data. The experiments manipulate different sources of perceived social distance between natives and immigrants and are complemented by survey experiments designed to uncover the mechanisms underlying natives’ anti-immigrant bias. These studies allow us to assess the degree to which the native population’s attitudes are driven by the perception that immigrants’ internalized values and ideas are different from their own. This, in turn, allows us to observe whether eliminating the perception of normative or ideological differences reduces discrimination by natives toward immigrants.

We chose this particular approach for a number of reasons. First, the rhetoric of anti-immigration advocates in Western Europe often centers around concerns that immigrant populations are unwilling to integrate or assimilate, resisting the adoption of important socio-cultural norms that are widely accepted in host societies. Lack of respect for the native culture and divergent ideas about which public behaviors are appropriate are at the core of native populations’ justifications for their animosity toward immigrants and their explanations for why immigrants pose an identity threat. This makes the study of native attitudes toward immigrants in settings where the acceptance or violation of valued social norms is at stake especially relevant. Second, an individual’s adherence to or violation of social norms can elicit behavioral responses—often in the form of direct or indirect sanctions and rewards—from onlookers who often tend to be strangers. Our experiments allow us

9. See, for example, Balafoutas, Nikiforakis, and Rockenbach, 2014 or Keuschnigg and Wolbring, 2015.
to observe these responses in settings designed to abstract from other behavioral influences. In the micro-environments that we create, individuals cannot expect a direct reward or other material benefit from enforcing civic norms. This provides a rare opportunity wherein to induce the latent immigration attitudes of native individuals to manifest into real behavior spontaneously without alerting individuals that they are being observed.

The first goal of these experiments is to identify the causes of discrimination against immigrants; the second goal is to explore whether adhering to general or group-derived norms has a bias-reducing effect. We draw evidence from experiments fielded in thirty cities with more than ten thousand subjects to show that Germans discriminate against Muslims in every-day interactions. However, we also show that when Muslims signal that they share social norms with the native majority society or with specific groups within it, discrimination against them decreases. Via targeted experimental interventions we are able to elucidate the reasons that a large segment of German society adopts a negative position vis-à-vis Muslim immigrants.

We find that natives’ perceptions that Muslim immigrants do not conform to valued social norms is a key driver behind anti-Muslim discrimination. Other fears and concerns, as well as unconscious biases, are also likely to exert some influence. We identify many of those additional factors in a series of survey experiments that provide rich context to explain the behavior we observe in the field experiments. While we show evidence that discrimination declines when Muslims behave identically to natives in the context of experiments designed to reveal their preferences over social issues, or when they signal that they share common norms with natives, we also find that immigrants are held to a higher standard by the native population. Our analysis suggests that immigrants have to work harder than natives to be treated the same as everyone else.

Religion is the main axis along which discrimination is observed in the field in our experiments in Germany. We find no evidence that foreign language use or ethno-racial differences alone cause discrimination in the context of everyday interactions. This result stands in sharp contrast to prior literature in other countries, where the lack of linguistic assimilation has been identified as a primary cause of fears that immigration can threaten the national culture (Hopkins, 2014b; Citrin et al., 2007; Dowling, Ellison, and Leal, 2012; Schildkraut, 2010; Schildkraut, 2005; Newman, Hartman, and Taber, 2012). In the United States, even brief exposure to uses of Spanish by strangers in public settings has been shown to generate hostility among natives
Moreover, multiple studies have presented evidence of significant bias against ethno-racial minorities across countries. Thus, the evidence we present from Germany offers a useful point of comparison from a country with a recent history of multiculturalist policies that suggests that it is possible to overcome barriers to cultural integration and that ethno-linguistic or racial differences need not result in discrimination in ordinary, everyday forms of human interaction. Although individuals may be prejudiced, their public behavior need not reflect that prejudice and discrimination is likely to manifest in settings that respond to the politicization of social cleavages.

The Christian-Muslim cleavage in Germany, as in other European countries, remains politically salient due to the ongoing wars in the Middle East and large-scale immigration from predominately Muslim countries. Those immigration flows have been politicized by far-right political groups; in the absence of these political pressures, the salience of religious markers can decline and so could bias and discrimination. The future of multiculturalism in Western democracies might not be as bleak as is often thought.

Having identified religious differences as the key factor motivating anti-immigrant bias in Germany, we explore the mechanisms underlying that result. Our focus is on how native Germans perceive Muslim religious symbols and on whether bias is driven at least in part by inferences natives make about Muslims’ social norms and values. Our approach allows us to consider why ascriptive differences generate social distance and sets the stage for an analysis of the power of general and group-derived norms to erase the salience of religious markers and reduce discrimination.

Our results suggest that adherence to general civic norms reduces bias, but it is not enough to completely offset other sources of discrimination toward Muslims. Consistent with previous studies that point to group-specific causes of anti-immigrant bias (such as sectoral economic interests), we find that adherence to group-derived norms that are very important to specific subgroups of the native population is more effective in reducing bias. While this is encouraging from the perspective of multiculturalist democracy, this also means that the scope of any intervention to align immigrants’ and natives’ norms is likely defined by the size of the group whose norms are being invoked, and its impact will therefore be limited to that group.

As we show later in this book, part of the reason that discrimination persists even when immigrants adhere to widely held civic norms is that natives view immigrants from the perspective of their own narrow self-interest or
from the prism of the social group with which they identify. Natives have priors about immigrants’ beliefs and value systems and they consider how their own interests—defined by their social identities—are likely to be affected by immigration. Thus, even when Muslims signal that they adhere to generally valued civic norms in Germany, pockets of suspicion and resistance to immigration will remain as long as natives believe that immigrants pose a threat to specific social identities shared by a subgroup of the native population. In situations where those subgroup identities are salient, adherence to general norms may not be about to eliminate anti-immigrant bias; but adherence to group-derived norms might have such a stronger effect. In that regard, our analysis differs from much of the previous literature, which has considered group threat at the aggregate level (i.e., natives vs. immigrants). In the experimental micro-environments that we create, the native/immigrant cleavage is not always the most salient identity dimension. By activating different social identities that subgroups of natives might share, we can explore the effect of group-derived norms that are central to the identity of specific groups of natives. Focusing on such parochial attachments allows us to uncover and experimentally manipulate specific forms of symbolic threat posed by Muslim immigration to subgroups of German society.

One could explore any number of group-specific identities and analyze how they shape attitudes toward immigrants. Prior literature in political economy has focused on class identity or profession as influences on immigration attitudes, with the emphasis being on the effect of economic competition for blue-collar jobs (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Partisanship has also been considered as another social identity that could shape perceptions of the risks associated with immigration (Levendusky, 2018; Hopkins, 2014b). Much less attention has been paid to other social identities, such as gender. A review of empirical studies on immigration does not reveal a major focus on the impact of gender and most studies implicitly assume that men are more likely to discriminate against foreigners than women, which is an expectation that may be inspired by socio-biological theories of ingroup bias. Yet systematic analyses of gender-based differences in discrimination are in short supply and our book opens the way for an analysis of how the politics of gender intersect with the politics of immigration.

An insight that emerges from the realization that social identities are multiple and partially overlapping is that there is no reason to expect any single intervention that highlights commonalities in norms and ideas between any two groups to be fully effective in reducing intergroup bias and conflict. At
best, such interventions can hope to resonate among a few subgroups of the
native population. The intersectionality of social identities implies that any
such intervention to establish common norms can gain allies among some
groups while polarizing others and leaving the rest indifferent. This insight
applies broadly to any consideration of how the crosscuttingness of social
identities can be used to reduce intergroup conflict. We address this ques-
tion explicitly when we consider how gender identity might intersect with the
native-immigrant divide in an experiment that primes both gender and immi-
grant identities and manipulates the information provided to native German
experimental subjects about immigrants’ views concerning gender equality
norms.

Our results highlight that a key mechanism underlying the anti-Muslim
discrimination identified in our experiments is the perception—held more
strongly among women—that Muslims are regressive with respect to ideas
about gender equality. That perception is of course not the only cause of
discrimination, but it is a powerful one, particularly among women. More
importantly, when we experimentally manipulate natives’ exposure to Mus-
lims who appear to hold either regressive or progressive ideas about gender
equality, we find that progressive ideas reduce discrimination overall and
completely eliminate it among women.

These results are consistent with the expectation that the integration of
large groups of immigrants in liberal, multicultural democracies threatens the
interests and identities of different groups of citizens differently. Secular, pro-
gressive women are particularly impacted by the political accommodation of
regressive attitudes toward gender equality and might therefore be expected
to be opposed to Muslim immigration as long as immigrants are perceived to
be regressive. By the same token, they should be very receptive to signals that
many Muslims are actually as progressive as they are and, when confronted
with such information, their behavior toward Muslims should be decidedly
less discriminatory. This is precisely what we find: shared group-derived
(particularist) norms can eliminate anti-immigrant discrimination.

Why Study Germany?

An ideal context for our study is a country with a high level of anti-immigrant
bias due to the perception of cultural differences separating natives from im-
migrants; and also one where rules and norms regarding civic behavior are
clearly defined and broadly shared among the native population. This would
allow us to test whether sharing those norms with immigrants can reduce native-immigrant conflict. Germany is an ideal case for such an analysis. Since 2015, Germany has experienced one of the largest waves of immigration in modern European history; with more than 1.8 million individuals having applied for asylum, Germany is the largest recipient of refugees in the European Union (Bundesamt, 2018). Immigration has emerged as a salient issue in public debates and party politics, and Germans of immigrant background are affected by a backlash to the refugee crisis, which has sparked debates about the future of multiculturalism in Germany and other European countries.

As in any other country built on the foundation of ethnic nationalism, immigrants are seen as outsiders in Germany, and many natives assume that immigrants are unable or unwilling to adhere to prevalent social norms that define their national identity. We show evidence of these beliefs in our own surveys and in reviews of previous public opinion polls. Inevitably, such perceptions create significant challenges for social or political inclusion of minorities and nonnative populations. In ethnic nationalist countries such as Germany the problem is magnified since immigrant inclusion often requires challenging the notion that the concept of the nation is based on racial or ethnic homogeneity. Looking back at the history of Germany, affinities among German peoples is what enabled the unification of German states under Prussian leadership after the Franco-Prussian War, which is how the modern German nation-state emerged. Even though Germany began receiving a large number of immigrants in the aftermath of the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany in the name of ethnic purity and World War II, it was not until decades later that it would start developing coherent immigrant and integration policies. A long history of immigration from Mediterranean and near-Eastern countries was seen as necessary to fuel the growth of the (Western) German economy in the 1950s and 1960s, but it was followed by a period of both violent and nonviolent conflict with immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, Germany satisfies the first condition for case selection: a clear divide and a politically salient conflict between natives and immigrants.

At the same time, Germany also satisfies the second condition: there is broad-based respect for rules and for norm adherence and individuals have a well-developed sense of civic duty. In that sense, Germany is a case in which we are likely to observe positive effects of norm adherence by immigrants, while controlling for other determinants of social distance between natives and immigrants.
Putting Germany in a Broader Context

Compared to immigrant nations such as the United States or Canada, as well as other European countries such as France, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom that have had a long history of large-scale immigration from their colonies, Germany began to grapple with questions of immigrant integration relatively recently. Even though Germany was on the receiving end of large migrant inflows in the postwar period, it was not until decades later that it started developing coherent immigration and integration policies.

Severe labor shortages during the so-called Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle)—the economic boom in West Germany during the 1950s and 1960s—prompted the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR) to implement policies to meet soaring demand by aggressively courting foreign workers. In this context, the FDR signed a series of bilateral recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), South Korea (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) for the purpose of creating a Gastarbeiter (guest worker) program. However, as the term Gastarbeiter already implies, this initiative was never intended to be permanent, with the expectation that workers hired through the program would ultimately return to their originating countries. Yet many of the guest workers never left Germany even after the program had exhausted its purpose. It is the long-lasting demographic changes that the program brought about that set the scene for the questions we address in this book.

Although Germany has received the lion’s share of asylum applications in Europe, this has not turned the population “off” immigration. Looking at polling data since 1980, we see clear evidence of increasingly positive views about immigrants as well as more contact with immigrants over time. Over the last four decades, opposition to immigrant participation in the workforce and in political life has decreased continuously (see panels (a) and (b) in

10. Data from the nationally representative ALLBUS surveys show that in 2016, when asked if they would support stopping the inflows of workers from non-EU countries, about 90% of Germans state that they would support at least limited inflows; and a similar level of support is extended toward limited inflows of refugees; compared to about just 60–70% during the 1990s (GESIS, 2018).

11. According to Gallup data, about 68% of Germans report knowing an immigrant; this is lower than the rate in Sweden (89%), Spain (89%), or Greece (81%) and in light of the large size of the immigrant population this could suggest that the degree of intergroup contact is still not very high relative to other countries in Europe.
Foreigners living in Germany should be sent home when there is not enough employment.

Foreigners living in Germany should be prohibited from taking part in any political activity.

Foreigners living in Germany should marry among each other.

Do you have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany?

**Figure 1.1.** Trends in attitudes toward immigration in Germany

*Notes:* Survey responses of German citizens in the ALLBUS surveys (GESIS, 2018).

Similarly, opposition to intermarriage with immigrants has decreased to very low levels and personal contact with immigrants has increased across different areas of social interaction (see panels (c) and (d), respectively, in figure 1.1).

Although German attitudes toward immigrants have been improving over time, survey data also reveal a fairly stable degree of antipathy toward Muslims. Fewer than half of survey respondents would support a statement that Turks living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans and more than half admit that they would be uncomfortable if a member of their family married a Turk (see figure 1.2). By contrast, Italians and native Germans from Eastern Europe appear to be viewed as “less objectionable.”

The vast majority (75%) of native Germans believe that migration creates conflict between natives and immigrants and these conflicts appear to be cultural since more than 65% of respondents also believe that migration
Would you be uncomfortable with a member of a foreign community marrying into your family?

Would it be uncomfortable for you to have members of foreign communities as neighbours?

Turks living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans in all areas.

**Figure 1.2.** Trends in attitudes toward immigration in Germany

Notes: Survey responses of German citizens in the ALLBUS surveys (GESIS, 2018).

has an overall positive effect on the economy, according to a 2019 survey (Kober and Kösemen, 2019). Only a small percentage (around 9%) are willing to state that it would be better if no Muslims lived in Germany (Heitmeyer et al., 2013b) and only 20% see Islam as culturally “backwards” with 11% arguing that “equality is not compatible with Islam” (Heitmeyer et al., 2013a). These views, though extreme, are held by a relatively small part of the population and more than half of respondents in the above-mentioned 2019

12. These survey data were part of a study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung about the Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture) in Germany after the so-called “refugee crisis.” Our analysis of the survey data focuses on German-speaking respondents without migration background.
survey indicated that they would support legislation to prevent discrimination in the housing market, the job market, and education (Kober and Kösemen, 2019).

One hypothesis is that negative attitudes toward Muslims are in fact due to a culture clash with Turkish immigrants dating back to the 1960s and 1970s. Turks represented the main group of immigrants from the Middle East at the time and there was a clear education gap vis-à-vis the German population as the average Turkish immigrant during the 1970s, for example, had no more than six years of education (Marplan, 1982). As we show later, this gap is now closing as new arrivals from Syria and other predominantly Muslim countries are more educated and their views are much closer to those of the typical German. But those early encounters may have created prejudices and stereotypes that have lasted through generations.

At the same time, survey data suggest that government policies supporting multiculturalism have not backfired to the degree that is often reported in the media. As shown earlier (see figure 1.1), anti-immigration attitudes are declining overall and immigrants themselves are less likely to perceive xenophobia as a real concern. Indeed, while Germany is not the most welcoming country, it does better than many other European countries with respect to the “migrant acceptance index” constructed using Gallup data (Fleming et al., 2018, p. 12) and Germany is not an outlier with respect to attitudes toward immigrants using other metrics of inclusivity. The share of German natives who view

13. Whereas about 70% of Turkish immigrants pointed to xenophobia as their main concern in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this figure dropped to below 15% by 2004, according to the Migrants in Germany survey that was conducted by GESIS regularly until 2004 (Marplan, 1988; Marplan, 1989; Marplan, 1992; Marplan, 1994; Marplan, 1996a; Marplan, 1996b; Marplan, 1996c; Marplan, 2012a; Marplan, 2012b; Marplan, 2012c; Marplan, 2012d; Marplan, 2012e; Marplan, 2012f; Marplan, 2012g; Marplan, 2012h; Marplan, 2012i; Marplan, 2012j; Marplan, 2006a; Marplan, 2006b).

14. According to the “multiculturalism policy index” compiled by researchers at Queen’s University, the degree of openness of Germany’s policies has been improving since the 1960s and in recent years it has been similar to that in France, Spain, Austria, and the United States, though it lags behind some Scandinavian countries, Australia, and New Zealand. See https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/home (accessed 10/2/20). According to a different index of multiculturalism—the ICRI (Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants)—which places heavier emphasis in religious rights (Koopmans, 2013, p. 154.), Germany seems to lag a bit further behind than several other migrant-receiving countries in the West, but it is by no means an outlier. It is possible, however, to identify aspects of immigration policy according to which Germany (as well as Switzerland and some other European countries) appears to be relatively restrictive. Koopmans et al., 2005 draw such a distinction in discussing mechanisms.
immigration as improving life in their country has also been increasing and is now roughly similar to that in other Western European countries (ESS, 2002; ESS, 2004; ESS, 2006; ESS, 2008; ESS, 2010; ESS, 2012; ESS, 2014; ESS, 2016; ESS, 2018). Similarly, Germany is not an outlier with respect to the prevalence of perceptions among the native population that immigration creates a cultural threat; the share of German natives who perceive such a threat has been fairly constant, hovering around 25% over the past twenty years (ESS, 2002; ESS, 2004; ESS, 2006; ESS, 2008; ESS, 2010; ESS, 2012; ESS, 2014; ESS, 2016; ESS, 2018), and preferences for cultural homogeneity are fairly consistent with other Western European countries (ESS, 2002; ESS, 2004; ESS, 2006; ESS, 2008; ESS, 2010; ESS, 2012; ESS, 2014; ESS, 2016; ESS, 2018).

Overall, evidence from public opinion polls going back decades shows a clear picture of bias against Muslims that has persisted over time, albeit within an environment of improving attitudes toward diversity and somewhat more positive views regarding immigration. In that regard, Germany is not different from other Western European countries and therefore there is every reason to expect that our analysis can help us think about the challenges of immigration in the broader Western European context.

Broader Impacts

This book addresses core questions for ongoing debates on immigration in Europe, and it does so by placing the analysis of anti-immigrant bias within the scope of a broader study of identity politics. The book’s conclusions and methods can inform a number of social science literatures and analytical approaches.

First, the theoretical framework developed in this book expands the common ingroup identity model (CIIM) (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) by exploring how commonalities in norms and ideas form the foundation of common identities and by testing the implications of the intersectionality of social identities for CIIM-based approaches to conflict reduction. The CIIM was of mobilizing immigrants politically and consider differences in that dimension of immigration policy as relevant for the depth of immigrants’ political integration. Although Germany appears more restrictive than other countries with respect to this index, it has better socioeconomic outcomes—such as labor market participation and lower housing segregation—for immigrants, than most European countries (Koopmans, 2013, pp. 162–163).

15. Absent better indicators with good coverage to identify “natives,” our analysis of the ESS survey data focuses on respondents born in the country.
developed in psychology to explore how social experiences can lead individuals to recategorize outgroup members as ingroup members by highlighting a shared identity; or treat them as individuals by de-emphasizing attributes that define the outgroup. This model is increasingly used in political science as a framework to think about minority/majority group interactions across different contexts. However, empirical applications of the CIIM usually presuppose an established superordinate identity (e.g., national identity) that could be made salient so as to reduce the strength of subordinate, parochial attachments and unify individuals from majority and minority groups. In doing so, these studies overlook the fact that individuals have multiple social identities (e.g., gender, religion, professional occupation) and these identities often intersect. Thus it is not always obvious which identities can be selected to serve as the vehicle to unify ingroup and outgroup members without creating new ingroup/outgroup divisions. This book provides the first analysis we are aware of that considers whether the native/immigrant divide can be made less salient by activating crosscutting social identities via emphasizing shared norms and ideas that define those identities. Norms are the “constitutive grammar” that defines social identities (Bicchieri, 2006) and makes it possible for different individuals to have a shared concept of what these identities mean. This book shows that it is possible to appeal to shared norms and ideas to reduce conflict along the native-immigrant divide.

Second, we contribute to a large and growing literature on the “contact hypothesis” (Allport, 1979) by suggesting that only meaningful interactions that highlight shared norms and ideas can lead to changes in perceptions and behavior toward others and can overcome bias. It is a common misinterpretation of Allport’s original research to suggest that more contact between culturally different groups will inevitably reduce bias and increase cooperation. There are now hundreds of studies testing the contact hypothesis and a key lesson from a meta-analysis of those studies is that the type of contact determines whether it reduces conflict (Paluck, Green, and Green, 2019). Although our study does not directly test the contact hypothesis, our findings are consistent with this important lesson since we show that simply making salient a shared attribute (such as gender) that establishes that natives and immigrants share membership in the same social group will be insufficient to reduce discrimination. Bias reduction is reduced only if natives and immigrants

16. One might argue that we do not study “contact” as that has been defined in the social psychology literature and that our experiments set up encounters that amount to brief “exposures”
who share a common attribute also share the same understanding of the norms and ideas that define their shared group identity.

Third, our empirical approach provides a new model for the design and implementation of coordinated experimental interventions across different contexts. Recently, scholars have taken steps to coordinate on the design and implementation of experimental projects on common research topics across different contexts with the aim of producing generalizable findings that contribute to the accumulation of knowledge (Dunning et al., 2019). The goal of accumulating knowledge via closely coordinated, systematic analyses of data drawn from different contexts is of course not a new preoccupation; earlier initiatives have used multi-method research designs to the same effect. Our book expands that approach by drawing on multiple, closely coordinated experiments conducted over a multi-year period that aim to partially replicate and expand on each other. Thereby, it shares in the spirit of such initiatives to uncover new insights regarding discrimination against immigrants. Our approach has distinct advantages over some of the existing initiatives for cumulative learning using experimental research. By virtue of being implemented by a single research team, our experimental design has the coherence that is difficult to achieve in cross-team coordinated impact evaluations of different programs that might have been designed differently across different contexts. Furthermore, each executed phase of the project has informed how we build on and modify the research design in subsequent phases. Having completed multiple experiments over three years of research both in the field and in surveys, we are able to explore key mechanisms underlying causal effects more richly than individual experimental studies might be able to.

Fourth, the ideas and approaches that we explore in this book with reference to Germany are readily applicable to other countries in Europe. While different societies have different sets of valued norms that can form the basis of shared identities, the effect of shared norms should be observable beyond Germany. Our study opens a path forward for a novel exploration of
identity politics across countries as the experimental framework that we have developed is readily adaptable to different country contexts.

Finally, our findings have broad implications for policy design in the management of discrimination against immigrants. Policy interventions need to reflect an understanding of what causes anti-immigrant attitudes: is discriminatory behavior driven primarily by ascriptive differences or by beliefs that immigrants do not share the same values? Initiatives designed to educate host populations to reduce negative stereotypes should be effective in the latter case. Our research provides examples of messages that are likely to resonate with different subsets of host populations. It also suggests that policy interventions to reduce native-immigrant conflict should not simply target immigrants; they should also be developed with an eye toward messages that can shift natives’ perceptions and prejudices.

Plan of the Book

Chapter 2 presents our theoretical approach to understanding the origins of anti-immigrant animus, and discusses ways in which such hostility and discrimination can be overcome.

Chapter 3 builds on the argument made in the introduction about persistent anti-Muslim bias in Germany and begins to explore the nature of that bias. We draw on data from existing surveys of anti-immigrant attitudes as well as data from original surveys, experiments, and psychological tests that we implemented in the immediate aftermath of the European refugee crisis. These data show that German native populations hold strong negative attitudes and bias toward immigrant minority groups. This chapter suggests that cultural differences—religious differences in particular—play a pivotal role in structuring these attitudes. We build on these insights to further show that these attitudes translate into discriminatory behavior in the field. In so doing, we introduce a novel experimental intervention that we explicitly designed to unobtrusively observe discriminatory behavior against immigrants in everyday social interactions between natives and immigrants. Our findings from these interventions, conducted in twenty-eight cities across four states in Germany, show that native Germans are significantly less inclined to offer assistance to immigrant minorities (and religious Muslim immigrants in particular) in need of help vis-à-vis their fellow natives in need of help. These insights set the stage for our empirical investigation of the ways through which such bias and discrimination against immigrants can be overcome.
Chapter 4 tackles the question of whether the bias and discrimination documented in chapter 4 are driven by perceptions of linguistic differences between the host population and immigrant minorities. While popular discourse suggests that natives consider linguistic assimilation (i.e., the adoption of the host society’s language) to be a critical condition for the acceptance of immigrants into German society, our findings in this chapter show otherwise; we find no evidence that immigrants who adopt the host society’s language (in our case German) in everyday conversations are discriminated against less than immigrants who continue using the language of their originating country (i.e., a foreign language). Our precisely estimated null effects suggest that perceptions of difference generated by ascriptive identity markers such as religion are unlikely to be offset by the linguistic assimilation of immigrant minorities. At the same time, although our experiments in chapter 3 show that native attitudes are more negative toward immigrants who do not speak the native language, we find no evidence that immigrants who speak in a foreign language in everyday social interactions are discriminated against more than those who speak in German.

In chapter 5, we put the first of our main empirical predictions of our theoretical framework to the test. We show that shared civic norms between native and immigrant populations reduce native discrimination against immigrant minorities. We do so by leveraging data from the first of our field interventions (conducted in the summer of 2018), in which we experimentally manipulated whether our confederates enforced a generally held social norm against littering in public spaces. The act of norm enforcement was intended to correct German stereotypes regarding the extent to which immigrant communities adhere to standards of “cleanliness” that shows “respect for the host country.” We find that immigrant confederates who enforced the anti-littering norm were significantly less likely to face discrimination from native Germans than those who did not enforce the norm. However, we also find that this reduction is limited in its magnitude; even after norm enforcement, immigrant confederates are treated significantly worse than native German confederates who demonstrate the same civic-mindedness.

Chapter 6 turns our empirical investigation to whether group-derived norms can provide the necessary foundation to reduce discrimination against immigrants among subgroups of the native population who should care deeply about those norms by virtue of their social identities. To do so, we exploit the fact that there is a gap—or at least the perception of a gap—between native Germans, and the predominantly Muslim immigration populations.
with respect to ideas about the “right” role for women in the job market or the household. We implemented an experimental intervention that exposed native Germans to information that countered stereotypes of regressivity with respect to gender equality-related attitudes among immigrant minorities. Our analysis finds that immigrant confederates who signal that they share progressive gender equality norms with natives are discriminated against significantly less than those that do not. Yet we also find that the reduction in discrimination is driven by members of the native population who share gender equality norms most deeply—women and non-religious individuals. No such reduction is observed among men or religious Germans.

With the centrality of shared norms as a determinant of behavior having been established in previous empirical chapters, chapter 7 brings evidence to bear on the psychological processes that lead to the reduction in anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination. Using a series of lab experiments embedded in a nationally representative survey of German citizens, we identify the mechanism through which discrimination is reduced in the “civic norm” experiment. Specifically, we consider whether observing pro-social, norm-adhering behavior by immigrants changes natives’ attitudes toward immigrants as a group or whether it pushes them to consider the immigrant confederate as an individual, differentiating her from the rest of her group and considering her as another German citizen. This speaks directly to the mechanisms of recategorization, decategorization, and mutual differentiation that are so central in theories of bias reduction.

Chapter 8 takes stock of the empirical results presented throughout this book and closes our discussion by summarizing the book’s contributions and returning to the question that framed this study at the outset—the promise and limits of multiculturalism.
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