CONTENTS

List of Illustrations xi
List of Tables xiii
Acknowledgments xv

1 Introduction 1

PART I

Introduction to Part I 31

2 Securing the Social Order: The Politics of Child Labor Regulation in Prussia 40

3 A Tale of Two Reformers: Success in France, Failure in Belgium 78

4 Defending Democracy: Cultural Consensus and Child Labor Reform in Massachusetts 117

Conclusion to Part I 140

PART II

Introduction to Part II 145

5 Restoring Solidarity and Domesticity: Conciliatory Factory Inspection in Imperial Germany 151

6 Appeasing Labor, Protecting Capital: Conciliatory Factory Inspection in Massachusetts 193

7 Social Justice Feminism and Labor Law Enforcement in Illinois 230

Conclusion to Part II 275
Introduction

The early modern economy was replete with regulation. Guilds imposed rules specifying the rights and mutual obligations of masters, journeymen, and apprentices, and even in the “free” labor market, governments sometimes intervened by fixing wages or prohibiting arbitrary dismissals. But toward the end of the eighteenth century, as laissez-faire ideologies took hold and the new industrial bourgeoisie began its ascendance, most of these rules were swept away. Workers and employers now encountered one another as formally equal parties, at liberty to make contracts unfettered by the restraining hand of the state or moderating influence of the guilds. Unprotected by law or custom, the new industrial proletariat was exposed to intense exploitation. Almost as soon as economic liberalization reached its apex, however, a countermovement emerged (Polanyi 2001). Tentatively and gradually, states reversed their retreat from the market to stem its most extreme abuses.

Laws regulating child labor in factories were at the forefront of this countermovement. Before the standardized working day, the minimum wage, special protections for working women, or workplace safety and sanitation rules, European and US governments intervened in the relationship between the manufacturing bourgeoisie and the child labor it employed. Governments protected (and controlled) working children in part because they seemed clearly incapable of defending their interests in the harsh early industrial labor market. Vulnerable young people—grinding away at mindless repetitive tasks, their health imperiled by bad air and physical strain, deprived of opportunity to learn and play—aroused pity in humanitarian lawmakers. But child labor regulation was not simply a matter of compassion. Most fundamentally, it was part of a broader state-building project carried over from previous centuries that aimed to create a new and improved working-class citizenry—one that
was healthy, intelligent, and most important, morally self-disciplined (Gorski 2003). It reflected elites’ fears about the dangers posed by the nascent industrial working class as well as elites’ hopes for a harmonious and prosperous nation.

Earlier generations of scholars recognized that states’ first attempts to protect workers against the abuses of industrial capitalism came in the area of employment regulation. Karl Marx (2011, 310–11) considered the 1847 Ten Hours Act to be the British labor movement’s first major legislative victory. Karl Polanyi (2001, 152, 174–75) pointed to this and other regulatory measures as important initial steps in the countermovement against economic liberalism. Today, though, the welfare state and regulatory state are often treated as distinct (see, for example, Majone 1994, 1997; for a similar point, see Levi-Faur 2014). Welfare state scholars pay little attention to worker protection, focusing instead on social provisions such as pensions and insurance. Similarly, historical accounts tend to date the modern welfare state to the 1880s, the decade when the Bismarckian health, accident, and old age insurance programs were passed (see, e.g., Pierson 2007, 110–11). Likewise, with few exceptions, analyses of contemporary welfare policy tend to leave worker protection out. In his influential classification of the three worlds of welfare capitalism, for instance, sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) does not take regulatory labor laws into consideration. The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Castles et al. 2010) includes chapters on pensions, health insurance and services, accident and sickness benefits, social assistance, and the like, but no chapter on employment protections.4

This book refocuses attention on the modern regulatory welfare state. Doing so necessarily pushes the welfare state’s origin back about fifty years, from the 1880s to the 1830s. I define regulatory welfare as the web of policies that protect or empower workers by limiting employers’ arbitrary power over them. These policies include child labor laws as well as the standard working day, overtime pay requirements, protections against arbitrary dismissal, workplace safety and hygiene standards, family leave laws, the minimum wage, and workers’ legal right to organize and engage in collective bargaining. The regulatory welfare state also includes the administrative apparatuses used to carry out and enforce these protections.5 I use the term “regulatory welfare state,” rather than simply “worker protection,” to underscore that these policies, similar to welfare provisions, are integral to decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990) because they reduce the extent to which workers’ quality of life is determined by market forces alone. Like welfare provisions, regulatory policies reduce risk—not income loss, perhaps, but the many other risks associated with dependence on wage labor, including physical and developmental harm, insufficient pay, loss of leisure time, and the inability to provide care at critical times.
Worker protection limits capitalists’ capacity to exploit their labor forces. Particularly for low-skilled workers with little bargaining power, it makes wage labor bearable where it otherwise would not be. Regulatory welfare saves lives and helps ensure that life is worth living. It is therefore an important but understudied feature of the modern welfare state.

**Agents of Reform**

What is puzzling about the regulatory welfare state is that it emerged in continental Europe and the United States when there was little demand for it from either above or below. Marx’s (2011, 330) contention that labor protections come about when workers “put their heads together, and, as a class, compel the passing of a law,” does not apply to most child labor laws enacted in the 1830s and 1840s. Indeed, the laws’ intended beneficiaries, working children and their parents, viewed them as harmful restrictions on family earning capacity, colluded with employers to evade the rules, and sometimes protested openly against them. Even if workers had wanted limits on child labor, they did not exercise the political power needed to effectively demand them until much later. Child labor laws came at a time when the working class was still politically marginalized; in most places, it did not even have the right to vote, and efforts at collective action were ad hoc and fleeting. Neither were these laws the result of top-down administrative priorities. Early mid-nineteenth-century states did not yet have agencies devoted to labor issues, and nowhere had the idea that government should actively intervene in the relationship between worker and employer been institutionalized. In short, modern institutional channels through which a countermovement against market fundamentalism could be mounted did not yet exist.

Instead, the push to protect (and control) child workers came primarily from middle-class and elite reformers—men and women who pursued child labor legislation largely on their own initiative, not at the behest of popular constituencies or state mandates. Child labor reformers laid the groundwork for a new conception of the proper relationship between state, market, and worker. In doing so, they connected the problem of child labor with indirectly related state priorities—economic prosperity, social order, and military readiness—seeking to convince policy makers that these aims could not be achieved as long as poor children’s minds, morals, and bodies were being ruined by excessive and premature industrial employment.

The regulatory welfare state owes its emergence primarily to these individual “agents of reform.” Accordingly, this book explains how these reformers exercised decisive causal influence over social policy outcomes through a *pragmatist field theoretical approach* to institutional change in which reformers are conceptualized as strategic, creative actors whose influence is conditioned...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeted employers</th>
<th>Minimum age</th>
<th>Hours/age, exclusive of breaks</th>
<th>Nightwork</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Religious instruction</th>
<th>Health/safety</th>
<th>Enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Textile mills, exc.
| 9, except in silk
mills | 9 hours/day for children 9 to 12, except in silk; 12 hours/day for children 13 to 17 | None | None | None | None | None | By local school committees alongside existing
| and some employers | (6½ hours/day for children 8 to 12; 10 hours/day for children 13 to 17 and adult women, except lace and silk) | | | | | | appointed inspectors and mining engineers |

by the structure of the policy field and their positioning within it. Methodologically, it adopts a genetic approach (Ermakoff 2019) to uncovering the causal processes through which child labor and factory inspection reforms came about. I trace over time the microlevel relational processes whereby regulatory welfare policy was forged and enacted. In doing so, I show that dominant theories of welfare policy development cannot adequately explain the origins of nineteenth-century regulatory social policy because they do not appreciate the causal influence of individual middle-class and elite reformers. It was these actors who did the crucial work of putting the child labor problem on the policy agenda and pushing legislative responses through to enactment.

This book develops this claim through seven case studies set in nineteenth-century continental Europe and the United States. The case studies in part I are 1820s–30s Prussia, 1830s–40s Massachusetts, 1830s–40s France, and 1840s Belgium. Whereas Prussia, Massachusetts, and France were all pioneers in industrial child labor regulation, roughly contemporaneous reform efforts in Belgium failed. Part I focuses on explaining these divergent outcomes as well as why states enacted a particular law and not another (for the major provisions of these laws and bills, see table 1.1). Chapter 2 traces how Prussia became continental Europe’s first state to intervene in children’s factory employment and compares two rival reformers to demonstrate why one prevailed over the other. Chapter 3 shows that Belgium’s failure stemmed from strategic mistakes made by its leading social reformer—mistakes whose significance becomes clear in a close comparison with the lead reformer in France. Chapter 4 presents a case in which opposition to child labor regulation was nonexistent, rendering Massachusetts child labor crusaders’ influence nearly superfluous. Thus chapter 4 begins to establish scope conditions under which individual reformers are most important.

Whereas part I is devoted to explaining the success or failure of early child labor reform efforts, part II seeks to elucidate why states later adopted different approaches to child labor law enforcement. Over the mid-nineteenth century, it became evident that labor rules do not enforce themselves and that new state administrative structures were needed to implement worker protections. Fledgling administrative entities, foremost among them factory inspection departments and departments of labor statistics, granted middle-class reformers new institutional opportunities to alter the relations of economic power by harnessing the interventionist authority of the state. The analysis presented in part II—drawn from 1870s Imperial Germany, 1860s–70s Massachusetts, and 1880s–90s Illinois—shifts the focus from legislation to implementation and shows why states adopted different models of factory inspection. Individual reformers’ ideas and strategies continue to be featured, but changing institutional and political conditions—including the opening up of the polity to new kinds of political actors—require the analysis to adopt a wider lens.
In particular, organized labor plays an increasingly important role in the narratives presented in part II. In Germany, the advent of universal male suffrage and rise of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party motivated a senior state official there to advocate mandatory factory inspection throughout the Reich. Chapter 5 relates how this reformer partially overcame the most powerful of opponents, Otto von Bismarck, and analyzes why Germany adopted a conciliatory model of inspection aimed at securing employers’ voluntary compliance with labor laws. In Massachusetts and Illinois, grassroots labor movements organized to demand factory inspection and had more direct influence over policy outcomes. As chapter 6 describes, Massachusetts workers managed to push factory inspection through the state legislature but could not control how it was implemented. The middle-class party loyalist appointed to lead the inspection department pursued a conciliatory approach that secured the department’s long-term bureaucratic survival at the expense of rigorous child labor law enforcement. Finally, chapter 7 demonstrates how organized labor and progressive middle-class women—working as policy advocates and, later, as factory inspectors—partnered to bring about a strict enforcement model of inspection in Illinois.

These episodes illustrate the historically evolving nature of child labor reform: the changing reasons for regulation, entry of new types of advocates into the policy field, and adoption of new strategies to navigate increasingly complex political and institutional landscapes. They highlight the birth and dramatically expanding capacities of the regulatory welfare state—not only the political origins of the first modern worker protection laws, but the forging of administrative infrastructures designed to carry them out. Most important, they show that individual reformers—those pursuing policy change largely on their own initiative—were essential for regulatory welfare’s emergence and evolution in nineteenth-century Europe and the United States.

It is no coincidence that most reformers profiled in this book were middle class. The middle class was, no less than the haute bourgeoisie or proletariat, a creation of the modern capitalist order. By the mid-nineteenth century, middle-class actors were well positioned in terms of their economic security and social-institutional locations to exercise political influence. As public intellectuals, professionals, civil servants, and legislators, they enjoyed a measure of access to policy making that the working class still lacked. Not surprisingly, the policy interventions they pursued were designed to address what they thought would benefit labor and the general public—not necessarily what labor actually wanted. The regulatory welfare policies they promoted sought to preserve the existing social order, and their place within it, through moderate reforms that aimed at both protecting and disciplining the poor, but left the capitalist profit imperative intact. Still, variation among them was considerable in regard to why they thought child labor was a problem and precisely what they believed
should be done about it. Their influence was a product of their class position as well as their individual ideas and actions.

The claim that individual reformers were central to the birth of regulatory welfare needs to be qualified two ways. First, this account of the causal significance of individual agency for institutional change does not offer a “great man” theory of history in the sense of attributing actors’ influence to their exceptional aptitudes, moral righteousness, or other personal attributes. Middle-class reformers’ agency did not manifest itself in an exercise of extraordinary freedom at the margins of a set of social structural constraints (Martin 2003, 25, 37; Bourdieu 1988, 149–50; Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 1004) but instead was constituted by and through social structural and field-specific factors. Large-scale economic and social transformations gave rise to the conditions reformers interpreted as requiring state responses. Culturally embedded discourses informed their definitions of these problems. Political institutions defined their legitimate pathways to influence. Field dynamics shaped their coalition-building opportunities and requirements. These factors did not determine reformers’ understandings and actions; interpretation and strategic decision-making were always involved. But contextual factors such as these are causally significant to the extent that they influenced the motivations, opportunities, and strategies of the social actors who did determine the policy outcomes under analysis (Ermakoff 2008, xxiii; see also Mudge 2018, 25).

The second qualification is that the causal significance of individual middle-class reformers for policy outcomes varied. By making use of two negative cases—1830s–40s and 1870s Massachusetts—I show that whether middle-class and elite reformers were necessary for regulatory welfare development hinged on two conditions: the degree of cultural consensus around the need for regulation and working-class strength. The Massachusetts cases are negative in the sense that although labor reforms were enacted in both, the influence of individual reformers on these outcomes was less significant than the other two factors. Thus individual reformers were most essential for labor policy development when labor was weak and opposition to regulation was strong. Where working-class voters were still by and large excluded from politics, and where labor parties and politically engaged unions were absent or marginalized, middle-class and elite actors were the ones to take the lead in the cause for protective legislation. Where opposition to labor regulation was fierce, individual reformers’ efforts were central to explaining policy outcomes. Their strategic and creative actions, including efforts to forge coalitions and circumvent veto players, determined whether labor reform succeeded and what type of law was passed in their state.

This does not mean that middle-class reformers played no role when labor exercised the power resources needed to make protective legislation happen. In 1870s Massachusetts, middle-class reformers contributed to the campaign
for factory inspection, although they were not directly responsible for its legislative victory. In 1890s Illinois, when labor was at the height of its political power, middle-class reformers nevertheless had a decisive impact on policy outcomes. They harnessed a grassroots antisweatshop movement to mount a campaign for a factory inspection bill drafted by a middle-class activist. In both states, middle-class actors took the helm of newly created factory inspection departments and shaped the implementation models these agencies adopted. The point is that when labor is institutionally and politically empowered, it may not need middle-class leadership to successfully promote policy change; middle-class reformers, however, may still contribute to labor-driven policy change in substantive and significant ways.

Theories of the Welfare State and Institutional Change

Why do social policies emerge and change? Over the past sixty years, most answers emphasize structures, institutions, and collectivities rather than individual actors. The welfare state scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s posited that modern social policies, including worker protections, were a natural by-product of industrialization (see, for example, Wilensky 1975; Kerr et al. 1960; Pryor 1968; Rimlinger 1971; for a succinct overview of this literature, see Myles and Quadagno 2002). This view assumed a deterministic relationship between economic development and policy change, with social actors playing no significant mediating role. Although it points to a necessary condition for child labor law development—these laws always began as restrictions on employing children in factories—the theory is far from adequate. That Belgium, Europe's most industrialized country by the mid-nineteenth century, did not enact child labor regulations until 1889—decades after its biggest rival, Great Britain did so—is a case in point. Likewise, the Kingdom of Saxony, despite industrial conditions similar to neighboring Prussia, did not regulate child labor until 1861 (Feldenkirchen 1981), and the state of New York, despite industrial development comparable to Massachusetts, did not regulate children's working conditions until 1886 (Ensign 1921). In short, the "logic of industrialism" can do little to explain important variations in the timing of child labor policy enactments.

By the late 1970s, the economic structural-determinist view had come under fire and a new generation of social scientists turned their attention to politics. These scholars focused their explanations on class-based interest groups fighting for or resisting policies designed to protect workers and the poor. Welfare state theorists in the power resources vein argued that major social policy changes are typically a result of working-class mobilizations, the growing strength of labor unions, and the political ascendance of labor parties (Castles 1982; Korpi 1978, 1983; Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Hicks 1999). Others asserted that capitalists are the most
decisive class group when it comes to the welfare state. Employers often successfully block welfare expansion (Quadagno 1996; Hacker and Pierson 2002), but may sometimes support social policies they see as furthering their interests in some way (Stryker 1990; Esping-Andersen 1996; Swenson 2002). Scholars working in the “varieties of capitalism” perspective have shown that employers may advocate (or at least not oppose) labor regulations they see as reining in competition, or as enhancing workers’ skill, productivity, or complacency (Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2003).

Although attention to class-based interest groups is essential, such groups varied widely in their approach to child labor. For example, whereas workers advocated forcefully for child labor laws and factory inspection systems in two of the later cases (1870s Massachusetts and 1890s Illinois), they were otherwise marginal. Likewise, employer influence was not consistent across cases. Whereas manufacturers put child labor on the policy agenda in France, they effectively blocked it in Belgium. Explaining this variation requires paying attention to the fractured and undetermined ways in which class actors come to understand and act on their interests. In the absence of labor mobilization, moreover, we must turn our attention to other kinds of promoters of social policy change.

Another variation of the class-based approach contends that states enact social policies to assuage poor and working-class people’s grievances when elites feel threatened by collective social disorders (Piven and Cloward 1971; Tilly 1975). In this way, workers and the poor exercise influence even when they are not organized into parties or unions. This perspective is relevant to early cases of child labor reform in which spontaneous lower-class social disorder raised alarm and contributed to elites’ sense that labor protections were needed. Nonetheless, it does not explain child labor policy outcomes. Not all countries with significant unrest enacted a child labor law during the early phase of their industrial development; Belgium and Saxony are, again, cases in point (C. Tilly, L. Tilly, and R. Tilly 1975, 210; Bazillion 1985). Moreover, that child labor laws were intended to assuage rioting workers’ grievances makes little sense because workers protested for other reasons. In fact, most did not want restrictions on child labor because it was a vital source of family income (Schmidt 2010; Kastner 2004, 208–9, 212–13; Weissbach 1989, 57–58; Heywood 1988, 231). To understand why policy makers responded to social disorder by enacting child labor laws, we need to pay closer attention to the motivations and understandings of the key reformers involved.

The theory that comes closest to explaining nineteenth-century labor reform is the state-centered scholarship of the 1980s. In this view, semiautonomous states pursue social protections to mediate between the interests of competing social groups, or perhaps even to further their own state-building, economic development, or social welfare agendas (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and
Skocpol 1985; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Weir and Skocpol 1985; McCarthy 2017). For example, states may adopt various social policies to enhance their military capacity or promote domestic tranquility. But with some noted exceptions, the classic state-centered literature treats “states as actors” (Skocpol 1985, 9) that are conceived rather monolithically. To be sure, the new sociology of the state describes its “many hands,” disaggregating it into multiple organizations and agencies (Morgan and Orloff 2017, 18). Yet even this work tends not to focus on individual state actors. In the cases that follow, legislators and bureaucratic officials were often the key movers behind the emergence of child labor laws and factory inspection departments, but they were never mere conduits of state interests or lower-level administrative prerogatives. Instead, they were acting on their own initiative according to their own interpretations and objectives, encountering both opposition and cooperation from other state actors in the policy field. Further disaggregation of the “the state”—all the way down to the level of individual actors—is therefore necessary for understanding the politics of nineteenth-century labor reform.

More recently, historical institutionalism, which arose from explorations into how government structures shape social politics, has come to dominate welfare states scholarship. Institutionalist scholars point to the effects, both constraining and enabling, of states’ institutional arrangements on policy making (see, for example, Immergut 1992; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Institutionalist explanations of the weakness of the US welfare state, for instance, focus on how US government institutions (federalism, the separation of powers, the congressional committee system) generate veto points that opponents can exploit to block social legislation (see, for example, Steinmo 1994; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Hacker and Pierson 2002). Institutionalist scholars also often stress how policies generate positive feedbacks that reproduce policy trajectories over time (Weir 1992; Pierson 1993; Skocpol 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001; Orloff 1993). Relatedly, the influential concept of path dependence argues that social policy, once it is set on a certain course, can become locked in and “virtually impossible to reverse” (Pierson 2000, 251; see also Krasner 1988; Mahoney 2000). As many critics have pointed out (Blyth 2002; Lieberman 2002; Thelen 2003; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Steinmo 2008), the emphasis on veto points, positive feedbacks, and path dependence makes it difficult to explain institutional change.

In response, the latest generation of institutionalist scholars has theorized how change occurs—including the emergence of new policies and administrative infrastructures. Moving beyond the “punctuated equilibrium” model, which treats change as a result of exogenous shocks (Krasner 1988), this literature stresses incremental endogenous processes (Hacker 2002, 2005; Thelen 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Individual agency has still not been incorporated into historical institutionalism’s theoretical tool kit, however. As a result, the
theory is still ill-equipped to explain abrupt breaks from the past that result from endogenous processes rather than exogenous shocks (Anderson 2008).

All these approaches offer insights relevant to the cases of child labor reform presented in this book. Class-based mobilizations, whether spontaneous or organized, informed reformers’ motivations for pursuing labor legislation; in some cases, organized labor even took a leading role. Although states with vastly different governmental institutions adopted legislation at similar times, institutional arrangements were still important. For instance, whereas women could leverage the increasingly institutionalized power of voluntary associations and labor unions to exercise significant policy influence in the late nineteenth-century United States, their access to politics was far more restricted in Germany, where in some states they were legally barred from participating in political associations and meetings (Anderson 2000, 297–98). There, by institutional necessity, bureaucratic civil servants took the lead in pushing for labor reforms. In these and many other ways, institutional conditions constrained who could exercise influence over social policy making while also shaping reformers’ coalition-building opportunities and requirements.

Moreover, child labor laws clearly built on the positive feedback that policy precedents generated, particularly in the area of public education. At the core of reformers’ appeals was the argument that the state could not rear productive, peaceable, and hardy citizens if poor children did not go to school. Such claims rested on and reinforced states’ preexisting efforts to promote popular schooling, including compulsory education laws and laws requiring localities to build primary schools. Decommodification involved not only removing children from factories but also putting them into classrooms; the institutional development of regulatory welfare and public education are therefore tightly bound up with one another. The case studies in this volume illustrate this interconnectedness, and thereby contribute to a growing literature on how the welfare state and education intersect (Marshall 1964; Allmendinger and Leibfried 2003; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Busemeyer and Nikolai 2010; Busemeyer 2014).

Despite their relevance, though, class-based, institutionalist, and state-centered theories are inadequate for this analysis because they overlook four important aspects of social policy origin and change. First, although many institutionalist scholars contend that both institutional continuity and change depend on the actions of historical agents (see Thelen 2004, 286; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), their empirical analyses still tend to portray actors as organized collectivities or their representatives. This tendency to portray actors as carriers or conduits of social structure, rather than as agents of social transformation in their own right, makes it easy to overlook the differential impact that distinct individuals may have on policy outcomes. Second, in both class-based and institutionalist approaches, actors tend to be construed as pursuing
material or power interests deterministically derived from their social and
class locations. This leaves out actors pursuing goals other than narrow self-
interest. Where do social reformers acting on behalf of marginalized others or
the general social good fit in? Third, questions of how actors arrive at partic-
ular understandings of their interests and goals, and how they translate them
into particular policy plans, are often sidelined. Why, for instance, might state
actors situated in similar positions in the same ministry or department have
radically different conceptions of what sorts of policies might best serve the
interests of “the state” or general public? Fourth, these perspectives do not
tell us much about the microlevel interactive processes through which actors
develop their policy programs and strategically build alliances around them.
In short, the interpretative and microinteractive dimensions of policy making
are black boxed.

A Pragmatist Field Theory of Institutional Change

This book addresses these issues by analyzing and theorizing the impact of
individual agents on social policy enactment and implementation. Focusing on
individuals requires the researcher to recognize not only the diversity among
similarly situated political actors' ideas and goals; it also leads to a recognition
that political actors' motives are frequently complex, involving a mix of both
altruism and self-interest (Wolfe 1998). The middle-class reformers featured in
the case studies that follow were acting on behalf of marginalized and disadvan-
taged children. They were genuinely appalled by working children's suffering
and sincerely wanted to ameliorate it. Yet they also believed that protecting
such children was in the broader interest of the state, society, and by extension,
themselves. Their precise articulation of this mix of interests varied not only by
sociopolitical context but among similarly situated reformers acting within the
same context too. Thus focusing on individuals allows the researcher to empiri-
cally discover actors' culturally informed understandings of social problems,
interests, and goals—rather than imputing to actors whatever understandings,
interests, and goals it seems logical they should have based on their position
in society.

Most important, the analyses presented in this book show that there are
cases in which policy outcomes, in terms of both legislative content and its
practical implementation, cannot be explained without taking into account
the causal impact of individual middle-class reformers. To reiterate, my con-
tention is that where opposition was strong and labor was weak, it was the
strategic and creative action of these reformers that pushed states to adopt
certain kinds of child labor and factory inspection laws at certain times. In
some cases, the fact that a state enacted one law and not another is trace-
able to the differential impact of rival reformers. In others, states might have
enacted policies if not for the mistakes these actors made. Even in cases where labor was politically powerful, middle-class reformers contributed to policy outcomes and exercised decisive influence over how labor policy was practically implemented.

This emphasis on individuals as agents is new, not because scholars of the welfare state have not taken individuals into account, but because they have no general theory of individual reformer influence. As a result, important figures in the history of the welfare state—Bismarck, William Beveridge, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and so on—are often handled in one of two ways: either as residuals whose effects lie beyond theoretical explanation or as avatars of more fundamental forces (class-based power resources, economic imperatives, state-building prerogatives, and so on). The pragmatist field-theoretical approach aims to reconcile these extremes by developing a theory of how and under which conditions individual reformers matter, situating them in the context of a policy field that constrains and enables their influence.

**POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENTREPRENEURS**

Calls to pay greater attention to the influence of individual agency on institutional change (such as Katznelson 2003) have not yet enjoyed broad resonance, but one way social scientists have smuggled the individual into social change theory is through the concept of social entrepreneurship. Types of social entrepreneurs are of course numerous. They share several characteristics that justify the common term, however. First, like business entrepreneurs, they take the initiative to promote products. These products could be commodities, ideas, policies, or organizations, but regardless of the type of product, social entrepreneurs try to secure support for or investment in it. Second, social entrepreneurs invest their own resources—money, perhaps, but also effort, time, and reputation—into promoting these products. Third, they take on risk: if the products fail to catch on, the invested resources will be lost.

I highlight two types of social welfare reformers: policy entrepreneurs and administrative entrepreneurs. Both attempt to influence policy outcomes by developing and promoting certain products: either policies, or administrative agencies and implementation models to carry out policies. The main goal of policy entrepreneurs is to influence legislative outcomes. To that end, they interpret social structural conditions as problems, craft policy solutions, seize political and institutional opportunities, build support around their programs, and push legislation toward enactment. Depending on the institutions governing policy making in their state, policy entrepreneurs may be government officials, elected representatives, nongovernmental policy experts, interest group lobbyists, social movement leaders, or civil society advocates. To the extent that a policy is the initiative of a particular individual who invests
resources in promoting and building a coalition around it, we have a case of policy entrepreneurship.

Administrative entrepreneurs come onto the scene after policies have been enacted; they determine how those policies are practically implemented. Particularly when policies are new, administrative entrepreneurs can exert long-term influence by forging durable institutions and practices. Relative to policy entrepreneurs, they tend to occupy a narrower set of positions; typically they are mid- to high-ranking officials in the state bureaucracy. They often strive for some measure of bureaucratic autonomy—that is, the ability to set their agencies along courses of action in accordance with their priorities (Carpenter 2001, 14). Sometimes, the same actor can take on the role of both policy and administrative entrepreneur; more often, the two are not the same person.

THE POLICY FIELD

Child labor policy and administrative entrepreneurs were constrained agents. They exercised influence in strategic and creative ways, but their goals, strategies, and effectiveness were shaped by their social context and position within it. A theory that can usefully conceptualize their social significance and explain their varying degrees of influence must balance these two facts. To that end, I combine insights from Bourdieusian field theory and US pragmatism to build a novel approach to policy reform that highlights individual actors.

Although I do not adopt a Bourdieusian perspective wholesale, I borrow his concepts of field and capital to make sense of political contestation and institutional change. Often thought of as a theorist of reproduction rather than change (Gorski 2013, 1), Bourdieu in fact contended that field theory was a useful analytic tool for explaining change because the competitive dynamics within fields are themselves sources of social transformation (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 101–2; Bourdieu 1983, 312, 335–39; see also Gorski 2013, 1–13). In a given field, such as the field of politics, actors struggle over common stakes in a rule-based dynamic akin to a game (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 95–101, 107; Martin 2003). These struggles enable actors to change their field positions, but can also lead to endogenous institutional or structural change. Thus, by throwing into relief individual actors and their relational struggles, field theory offers more analytic leverage for explaining pathbreaking policy change than mainstream institutionalist theory, with its emphasis on stability and incrementalism.

Policy and administrative entrepreneurs maneuver within a policy field in which the stakes of the game are policy outcomes: both legislation and its practical implementation. The rules of the game are the political institutions that structure policy making and implementation. Fields are like ordinary games except that one of the stakes of the game is the rules themselves (Bourdieu
and Wacquant 1992, 99, Martin 2003, 31); hence political actors may act in accordance with political institutions, or attempt to change or subvert them. Actors in the policy field struggle to influence outcomes by trying to build coalitions—the political equivalent of social capital. Allies can be anyone, from kings to voters, who has the ability to influence policy outcomes; who they are—and relatedly, the boundaries of the policy field—thus varies from case to case, depending on political institutions as well as the policy at stake.

In relation to others in the policy field, actors occupy positions that shape their goals and ability to achieve them. Field positions matter in at least three ways. First, the political institutions relevant to the policy field (rules of the game) empower actors in different positions differently and unequally. Second, field positions tend to shape (but not fully determine) policy-relevant goals and strategies (Swartz 2013, 30–31, 2014; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 105). Third, field positions are unequally endowed with resources, including political capital and the chance to increase it. Particularly important is the idea that actors positioned at the overlap of the policy field with another field may enjoy strategic advantages when it comes to leveraging resources and building alliances. I return to this point in a moment.

Reformers’ ability to effect institutional change is of course conditioned by their position within the field, and their related powers and resources. Position and resources, however, are not all that matter; how reformers take advantage of their positions and leverage their resources matters too. Reformers’ strategic action can be classified into two broad categories: strategic alliance building and creative problem-solving.

STRAATEGIC ALLIANCE BUILDING

In the policy field, as elsewhere (Latour 1987, 1988), influence requires allies.14 To get past political veto players (Immergut 1992; Tsebelis 2002)—that is, actors institutionally empowered to block policy change—reformers must either build alliances with them directly, or circumvent or defeat them through alliances with others. At the same time, opponents of reform will try to prevent it by building alliances too. Fields are therefore characterized not only by competition but also by cooperation; indeed, to compete for influence, policy reformers must first build networks of support.

I identify six observable relational strategies that policy and administrative entrepreneurs use to build alliances. These strategies can succeed or fail depending on how audiences receive them. They are the causal mechanisms specifying how entrepreneurs transform audiences into allies and thereby build the political capital needed to realize their goals. By identifying these strategies, demonstrating how they are used, and pointing to conditions under which they may succeed or fail, the case studies in this book lend precision to
the claim that under certain conditions, individual reformers’ strategic action matters greatly for policy outcomes.

First, rhetorical *framing* refers to presenting proposed policy changes in ways intended to resonate with the existing ideas, interests, and identities of audiences to win their cooperation (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 50–51; see also Snow et al. 1986). The likelihood of frames achieving positive resonance with audiences in the field depends on the degree to which they fit the field’s discursive opportunity structure (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 1999b; Snow 2008). In other words, frames that tap into either dominant or institutionalized discourses, or elite interests, are more likely to be regarded as legitimate than those that tap into marginal or counterhegemonic discourses (Ferree 2003; McCammon et al. 2007). Nevertheless, a frame may fit with the discursive opportunity structure—that is, invoke hegemonic, institutionalized, or elite discourses/interests—and yet still be rejected if audiences do not deem it empirically credible or if it does not accord with their experiences (Snow and Benford 1988).

When entrepreneurs construct their policy and administrative programs, they often borrow and recombine the ideas of others. These ideas may simply be “out there” in the policy field or already be institutionalized in law. Borrowing itself does not win allies unless combined with the second strategy, *citation*: giving public credit to those whose ideas are borrowed in order to give the impression that goals are shared or valued (Latour 1987; Anderson 2013). To this end, reformers may also simply cite either people who agree with them, or domestic and foreign policy precedents. Citations are more likely to be deemed legitimate, and thus facilitate alliance building, when they reference actors who are respected or powerful in the policy field, or policy precedents deemed relevant by others in the field. Citing foreign actors and policy precedents is therefore generally riskier than citing domestic sources.

Third, *compromise* involves changing the content of policy programs in response to the opinions and demands of potential allies, and is perhaps the most important of all the alliance-building strategies. Compromise is effective when it involves giving potential allies something they want without seriously undermining the reformer’s goals. If the latter occurs, the reformer runs the risk of co-optation or capture.

Fourth, *piggybacking* occurs when reformers try to maximize alliances by attaching their preferred policy programs to other, more popular or more viable policy demands or programs. For example, they may attach their program to an existing piece of draft legislation that has a high chance of passage or insert it into the agenda of a policy-oriented social movement.

To win allies, reformers must convince their audiences that they are credible by *signaling expertise or competence*. How they do this varies with social
context; for instance, referencing research-based facts and statistics rather than anecdotal evidence became more common toward the end of the nineteenth century. Referencing facts and statistics can backfire, though, if audiences deem the information to be irrelevant or questionable. Other ways in which reformers signal expertise and competence include invoking relevant personal experience or accomplishments, and demonstrating a firm grasp of a subject when under questioning.

Finally, expanding jurisdiction is a strategy specific to administrative entrepreneurs that they may use to help secure bureaucratic autonomy and long-term agency survival. Expanding jurisdiction to new areas of administrative responsibility enlarges an agency's base of constituents. Constituents are potential allies; when agencies have broad and diverse constituencies—particularly, in democracies, if those constituencies include large swaths of the voting public—then politicians will have a harder time defunding or otherwise weakening the agency. Expanding jurisdiction can backfire, however, because it is difficult to satisfy every constituency equitably, and disgruntled constituencies may become opponents.

In the case studies that follow, it will become clear that the success or failure of policy entrepreneurs is in large part attributable to not just whether but also how they used the first five strategies—namely whether they used them in accordance with the ideas, expectations, and priorities of potential allies. Similarly, the effectiveness of administrative entrepreneurs was related to their ability to signal expertise, compromise with key stakeholders, and expand jurisdiction in ways that did not alienate core constituencies. Entrepreneurs who used these strategies effectively can be described as having what sociologists Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2012, 46) call “social skill,” or the ability to win cooperation by creating shared goals and understandings.

**CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING**

What happens when initial attempts at alliance building fail? How might reformers respond when blocked by veto players in the policy field? As the case studies presented in this book demonstrate, successful policy entrepreneurs frequently show considerable creativity of action (Joas 1996) in the face of obstacles. When one set of alliances fizzles out or fails, they forge new ones; when one route to change is blocked, they find alternatives. Fligstein and McAdam (2012, 47) gesture toward this in their discussion of social skill: socially skilled actors “will do whatever it takes to induce cooperation, and if one path is closed off, they will choose another.” Similarly, political scientist Adam Sheingate (2007) argues that entrepreneurs get things done by creatively exploiting the ambiguity of rules.
The theoretical tradition most strongly associated with theorizing creativity in social action is US pragmatism. Pragmatism sees humans as problem solvers whose strategies are alternately routine and creative (Gross 2009). As actors move through their daily lives, they largely follow tried-and-tested routines. Most of the strategies outlined are examples of such routines—framing, citation, compromise, and signaling expertise are all ordinary, everyday strategies deployed in the course of normal policy making. This does not mean that they are unreflective or automatic, only that they tend to fit customary patterns of political action and communication. When routine strategies fail, though, actors experience doubt or perplexity (Peirce 1877, 4–5; Addams 1902, 13–70) to which they respond with greater deliberation and creativity (Dewey 2002, 207–8; Whitford 2002, 340–41; Emirbayer and Maynard 2010, 227–29; Schneiderhan 2011, 596; Jansen 2017, 20). They examine the situation inquiringly, revise their assumptions, devise new strategies for achieving their goals, and modify their goals to make them more achievable. They may bend the rules to get what they want.

The ability and willingness to do this distinguished effective from ineffective child labor policy entrepreneurs. In certain cases of reform, such as 1830s–40s Massachusetts, reformers never confronted any perplexing or problematic opposition, and the path to reform was apparently so smooth that they never needed to exhibit any real creativity of action. They could follow routines and still win. In other cases, however, reform efforts were met with potentially crippling opposition from veto players, and reformers had to exercise creativity if they were to get past this opposition. As several of the case studies demonstrate, effective child labor policy entrepreneurs recognized and opened unconventional windows of opportunity in the midst of such challenging situations. Those who did not, failed.

As pragmatist theory would predict, effective entrepreneurs are good situation readers, able to devise solutions that make sense given the immediate circumstances; they “keep their goals somewhat open-ended and are prepared to take what the system will give” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 47). At the same time, however, and often over years or even a lifetime, many stick to a core vision for policy change—sustained projects through which they persistently work toward an imagined future outcome (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 991). Their goals may fall into abeyance for a time, but when the political situation shifts in their favor, they may bring the goal back onto the agenda again (Kingdon 1984, 181–82). Effective political actors are thus both creative and goal oriented; indeed, the ability to steadfastly pursue long-term political goals requires just the sort of creative flexibility evoked by the pragmatist understanding of social action.

The most important mechanism through which child labor reformers exercised goal-directed creativity was circumventing or subverting normal
institutional channels of policy making in unconventional ways. For example, in Prussia and Imperial Germany, state bureaucrats actually bent rules to get around veto players and push their programs forward. Subverting rules in this way can be risky; it can backfire if other actors in the policy field are aware of it and perceive it as unacceptable. In the two German cases, rule bending was conducted behind the scenes and succeeded in part because it was invisible to opponents. By contrast, ineffective policy entrepreneurs stuck close to institutionalized scripts and did not look for unconventional pathways to change when they encountered opposition. Instead, they repeated failed strategies or simply gave up.

FIELD ARCHITECTURE AND FIELD POSITION

The concepts of field architecture and field position are helpful for specifying conditions that shape actors’ capacity for alliance building and creative problem-solving. Field architecture refers to the structure and extent of overlap between fields (Evans and Kay 2008) or subfields. Overlap can take the form of actors’ multiple membership in more than one field or subfield; for instance, a legislator may be a wealthy businessman with significant ties to the business field. It can also entail institutional penetration of one field or subfield by another; for example, business groups may enjoy formal power to advise lawmakers on economic policy. In the analyses that follow, overlaps between the policy field and the intellectual field, business field, religious field, and social reform field are relevant, depending on the particular case.

The field position of child labor reformers relative to these overlaps is significant to explaining their understandings of policy problems, the strategies available to them, and their chances of success. Reformers who are members of more than one field may combine discourses across fields to develop new and potentially compelling problem definitions. Moreover, as many scholars note, actors who are positioned where fields or other semibounded groups (for example, networks or organizations) overlap may enjoy strategic advantages (Padgett and Ansell 1993, 1303; Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 1007; Sheingate 2003, 194; Vedres and Stark 2010; Campbell 2004, 74–75; Evans and Kay 2008; Eyal 2013; Mudge and Vauchez 2012). Such a positioning makes it possible for them to import allies, frames, or resources from the other field into the policy field to help them win new allies or overcome obstacles there. On the other hand, as I demonstrate in chapter 3, actors occupying “dual membership” positions may experience this as a liability if the overlap is weak. Moreover, given that they have other realms in which to achieve distinction, political actors who also belong to another field may have less incentive to exercise goal-directed creativity to accomplish aims within the policy field.
CULTURE, PROBLEM DEFINITIONS, AND PROGRAMS

Culture shapes social policy making in profound ways. For example, scholars have argued that the cultural values embedded in dominant political ideologies help explain variations in welfare state generosity, particularly the tightfistedness of the US welfare state (Steensland 2006, 2008; Somers and Block 2005). Religious beliefs and values shape national social policy trajectories; for instance, Christian Democratic parties have been major drivers of social policy progress in some European countries (Kersbergen 1995; Kersbergen and Manow 2010), and national religious differences have led countries to approach social provision differently (Gorski 2003; Kahl 2005; Morgan 2006).

The cases in this book contribute to our understanding of how culture and religion shape social policy, but do so using a microinteractive rather than macro “national cultures” lens. Culture—like all structures—is not an autonomous force that exerts influence on historical outcomes all by itself, like wind or earthquakes. Instead, culture affects policy making via individuals’ social interactions. Like anyone else, policy reformers are culturally embedded actors. Through participation in the cultural discourses they encounter in the places of worship they attend, books they read, media they consume, teachers they study under, and associations they join, reformers develop culturally informed interpretations of social problems and how to address them. The same is true for the other actors with whom they cooperate and clash. Several child labor reformers profiled in this book, for example, were deeply motivated by religious beliefs they absorbed by engaging with religious movements and associations. At the same time, some encountered opposition from those who feared that child labor reform and especially mandatory schooling for working children would undermine their religious agendas. Church-state conflict thus influenced regulatory welfare development in certain cases, but did so because of the learned religious commitments of specific historical actors. In short, culture affects policy making through social interactions that inform political agents’ policy-relevant ideas, which in turn shape their actions and interactions with others in the policy field.

Policy-relevant ideas can be sorted into two broad types. Problem definitions are theories about social conditions that explain why such conditions demand policy attention (Mehta 2011, 32–40). Typically, actors develop new problem definitions by drawing on and recombining elements of existing discourse in a process similar to bricolage (Campbell 2004, 69–74) or schematic transposition (Sewell 1992, 17). Problem definitions serve three core functions in policy and administrative entrepreneurship. First, they motivate entrepreneurs to take political action by connecting the problematic condition with
entrepreneurs’ interests or value commitments. Second, they can be deployed strategically as frames in which they become strategic resources for political action. It can be tricky to distinguish between problem definitions that motivate policy entrepreneurs and those used strategically as frames; the two may or may not have the same content. When reformers consistently express the same problem definition and use it with a variety of audiences, however, it becomes more likely that the problem definition is one they are sincere about and is actually motivating them. If, on the other hand, their articulated definition changes depending on their audience, it is more likely that it is only being used as a strategic frame (Anderson 2013, 91). Third, problem definitions provide the general road map that points the way forward in terms of what sort of policy should be pursued (Blyth 2002; Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Thus they undergird the content of policy entrepreneurs’ concrete policy plans or programs (Campbell 2004, 98; Hall 1993).

Programs are the other broad type of policy-relevant idea. Grounded in problem definitions, they differ from them in that they comprise a concrete and specific set of policy prescriptions. Like problem definitions, programs are typically creative recombinations of existing ideas (Kingdon 1984, 124; Sheingate 2003). As others have pointed out (Hall 1993), however, programs are more malleable than problem definitions. This is yet another way that ideas serve as resources for political action; revising programs in the course of political compromise is a key way policy entrepreneurs recruit allies.

To review the theoretical framework developed so far, the macrostructural and institutional factors emphasized by existing theories of social policy development cannot fully explain the emergence of two major institutional innovations at the forefront of the modern regulatory welfare state, namely, child labor laws and factory inspection systems. While factors highlighted in existing welfare states theory—economic conditions, institutional frameworks, political dynamics, and cultural discourses—certainly did matter, they do not adequately capture the causal impact of individual reformers. Particularly when opposition to reform was strong and labor was institutionally disempowered, policy and administrative entrepreneurs exerted decisive influence on labor policy outcomes. To explain how this influence works, I invoked the policy field: a social dynamic akin to a game in which actors struggle over stakes—that is, policy outcomes and the alliances (or political capital) needed to affect them. Reformers’ influence on policy outcomes is exercised through two types of empirically observable strategies: alliance building (manifested in six causal mechanisms through which audiences in the field are transformed into allies) and goal-directed creativity (a causal mechanism through which problematic veto players can be overcome). Finally, actors’ likelihood of being
able to effectively deploy these strategies is conditioned by the policy field’s architecture and their position within it. This framework contributes to existing understandings of social policy development by systematically theorizing how individual actors contribute to institutional change, elaborating on the specific processes through which their agency is exercised, and taking into account how this influence is enabled and constrained by field dynamics as well as the broader social-cultural context.

Given that the framework explains institutional change in cases as diverse as 1830s Prussia and 1890s Illinois, it is conceived at a high level of abstraction. Yet the empirical application of the theory requires deep engagement with historical specificities, including macrolevel socioeconomic conditions, culturally specific discourses, diverse political institutions, and the dynamics of policy fields at particular times. Thus, though the framework may be broad and historically aspecific, how it is applied in the case studies is anything but.

**Case Selection, Data, and Methods**

For part I, the universe of cases is not especially large. Besides Prussia and France, four other European countries were early adopters of laws to regulate child labor in factories: Great Britain (1802, 1819, and 1833), Bavaria (1840), Baden (1840), and Italy (1843). With the notable exception of New York, eight northeastern US states—Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and New Jersey—as well as Ohio established rudimentary child labor laws at some point before the Civil War (Otey 1910). The universe of late adopters was thus much larger.

Various considerations were taken into account when selecting Prussia, France, Belgium, and Massachusetts for the analysis in part I. The first was to select cases that exhibited both similarities and differences on dimensions theorized to be important in the welfare states literature. Accordingly, selection loosely followed a combined method of difference and method of agreement logic. This classic approach has been roundly criticized (see, for example, Goldthorpe 1997; Ragin 2014, 36–42), and rightly so, but I contend that it remains useful as a guiding rationale for case selection and way to rule out deterministic variable-based hypotheses, if not as an analytic method for generating positive causal claims. The Millian case selection logic was loose for two reasons. First, cases were not independent of one another given that states were aware of and to some extent emulated foreign labor policy precedents, particularly British ones. Second, because the similarities and differences were typically a matter of degree, not presence or absence.

Massachusetts and Prussia, despite their theoretically relevant economic, political, and institutional differences, both passed similar child labor laws at nearly the same time. The two states had different levels of industrialization
(Massachusetts being significantly more industrialized) and distinct political institutions, which in turn had implications for working-class strength. Whereas poor and working-class people exercised no political power in Prussia, working-class men had the right to vote in Massachusetts. In contrast, France and Belgium had many similarities. Both countries were liberal, semidemocratic constitutional monarchies in which all but the wealthiest property owners were excluded from the franchise, and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie enjoyed increasing political power. Both had national legislatures empowered to introduce and enact legislation. Neither had a well-developed public education system, compared to Massachusetts and Prussia, which were already quite advanced in this regard by the 1830s and 1840s (see figure 2.1). In spite of this, France enacted a child labor law in the early phase of its industrialization. Belgium did not.

This case selection was intended to uncover theory-based patterns—that is, causal factors that Prussia, Massachusetts, and France had in common, but Belgium lacked. Preliminary analysis yielded no definitive findings. None of the factors that existing welfare state theory would predict to be causally relevant (a high level of industrialization, certain set of institutional arrangements or policy precedents, politically powerful industrial bourgeoisie, mobilized working class, or recent history of popular unrest) were consistently present in early adopting states and consistently absent in the late-adopting one (see table 1.2). A different analytic approach, one capable of closer analysis of causal processes as they unfold, proved necessary.

A somewhat different logic guided selection of the second set of case studies on the origins of factory inspection. Whereas two of the three cases (1870s Massachusetts and 1890s Illinois) were similar on various theoretically relevant institutional and political dimensions, one (1870s Imperial Germany) was quite different (see table 1.3). In the traditional sense, part II includes no negative cases; factory inspection systems were successfully adopted in all three places. Yet the type of inspection system in each state varied in important ways. Germany and Massachusetts, despite their differences, adopted conciliatory models in which factory inspectors aimed at securing voluntary compliance by serving as friendly mediators between labor and capital. Illinois, in contrast, created a strict enforcement model in which inspectors could and did rigorously prosecute and punish violators. The case comparisons in part II were intended to identify causal factors that contributed to the adoption of factory inspection systems, but could also explain this variation in the type of system that each state implemented. Again, no consistent patterns in terms of macrolevel causal variables were evident.

In light of the absence of variable-based patterns and the well-known shortcomings of a simple variable-based approach to small-N comparative-historical analysis (Ragin 2014, 36–42; Ermakoff 2019, 7–11), the analytic method I
eventually settled on was along the lines of the genetic approach outlined by sociologist Ivan Ermakoff (2019). This involves an in-depth and historically contextualized tracing of the temporal sequence of events that led to the outcome in question (Ermakoff 2019, 14–16). The genetic approach focuses on microlevel processes—the actions and interactions of key actors—to explain macrolevel outcomes. It emphasizes the need to uncover actors’ motives and understandings to explain their action and its social effects (Ermakoff 2019, 15, see also Weber 1978, 4–5). It explains why an outcome occurred, not by detecting correlations among variables, but by carefully documenting how it came about. Its goals include the identification of generalizable causal mechanisms or processes as well as the conditions under which those are likely to occur. To avoid retrospective bias or teleological thinking, the genetic approach pays particular attention to situations of indeterminacy where counterfactual outcomes were possible and to explaining why actors took one path rather than another (Ermakoff 2019, 12–15).

### TABLE 1.2. Similarities and Differences across Cases in Part I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prussia</th>
<th>Massachusetts</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrializing</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerful legislature</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to public schooling</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically empowered working class</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class unrest</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically empowered capital</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early adoption of child labor law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1.3. Similarities and Differences across Cases in Part II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imperial Germany</th>
<th>Massachusetts</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrializing</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerful legislature</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically empowered working class</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically empowered capital</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory inspection model</td>
<td>Conciliatory</td>
<td>Conciliatory</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
My analysis began with a close reading of secondary historical literature, approached inductively and involving only a general theory-driven expectation that microlevel processes among political actors were important. Deeply researched studies of the origins of child labor and factory inspection reform in Prussia, France, Imperial Germany, and Illinois exist. Less has been written on the Belgian case, but it has been addressed to some extent. The two Massachusetts cases have not been researched comprehensively by historians to my knowledge. In each of the cases for which secondary sources existed, a consensus emerged that one or two individuals—not part of the working class, but elite or middle-class state or civil society actors—had taken the lead in developing and advocating for a child labor law, or implementing a new factory inspection system. This was the basis for a broad working hypothesis that elite and middle-class policy or administrative entrepreneurship was the missing link between the structural and institutional factors emphasized by existing welfare state theories and labor policy outcomes.

Although secondary historical accounts were in general agreement on who the leading reformers were in each case, they could not systematically explain why some were successful, but others were not; why some states enacted child labor laws early in their industrial development, and others did not; or why states adopted different models of factory inspection. To answer these questions and refine the working hypothesis, I analyzed archival and published primary materials to develop a genetic account of the causal processes that led to divergent outcomes. The types of primary materials available varied from case to case. For example, backstage communications between government officials were most copious for the two German cases, whereas for the two later US cases, newspaper articles were abundant. The relative absence of backstage materials for some cases (the two Massachusetts cases and the Belgian one) means that relevant interactive dynamics among key players possibly went undetected. The policy entrepreneurs in these cases may, for instance, have displayed more behind-the-scenes creativity of action than I give them credit for. Still, public documents (news articles, records of legislative proceedings, published legislative drafts and investigative reports, and published books and essays by lead reformers) provided substantial insight into their how they went about developing and promoting their policy programs in interaction with other political actors.

The genetic analysis proceeded abductively (Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014). I had a broad working hypothesis that the unexpected variations in policy outcomes had something to do with policy and administrative entrepreneurship, and some theories of action to draw on, such as John Kingdon’s theory of policy entrepreneurship (1984, 179–83), Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of social skill in strategic action fields (2012, 45–53), and pragmatist action theory. Close, repeated reading and summarizing of
the primary sources alongside the secondary historical literature allowed me to re-create in detail the temporal sequence of social interactions and events that generated particular policy outcomes in each case.

The genetic analysis leverages three types of comparison. All three rely on negative cases, though the nature of these negative cases and the purpose they serve vary. First, I compare cases with different outcomes. The negative case of failed child labor reform in part I is conceived in the traditional way, as the absence of a particular historical outcome. It obeys the “possibility principle” (Mahoney and Goertz 2004) in the sense that although Belgium failed to adopt a child labor law, it could very well have done so, as I show in chapter 3. The inclusion of this crucial negative case allows me to rule out deterministic variable-based explanations, such as those that would treat industrialization, working-class power resources, or institutional prece-dents as sufficient causes of child labor reform. In place of such accounts, the comparative genetic analysis leads me to explain variations in outcomes by focusing on the strategic and creative action of key reformers, and by pinpointing the particular relational strategies through which they tried to build alliances and solve problems.

Second, I compare actors using three paired comparisons, each between a successful and unsuccessful policy entrepreneur who strove for labor reform under the same or similar social and institutional conditions. Here, negative cases of failed policy entrepreneurship help identify the distinguishing attributes of successful policy entrepreneurship, and the conditions under which alliance-building and problem-solving strategies are more likely to succeed. They also point to the significance of field position in determining the likelihood that actors can and will adopt effective strategies. Furthermore, these paired comparisons allow me to imagine plausible counterfactuals: how unsuccessful reformers could have acted in a given situation had they been more skillful, and what outcomes would have transpired had they behaved differently. Counterfactual thinking highlights missed opportunities, such as moments where policy entrepreneurs could have compromised with potential allies but chose not to, contributing to their eventual failure. Such counterfactuals are valuable because they strengthen my assertion that policy outcomes were not purely the result of structural determinants; had policy entrepreneurs acted differently, labor policy outcomes likely would have turned out differently as well.

Finally, I compare cases in which policy entrepreneurs mattered greatly for policy outcomes with those in which their influence was less decisive than other factors. Here, the negative cases, the two in Massachusetts, are those in which the outcome is present, but the hypothesized causal process leading to it—middle-class policy entrepreneurship—is absent or weaker than other factors. These comparisons allow me to theorize scope conditions under which
the contributions of individual middle-class and elite reformers may be especially important for social policy development.

One last note on case selection is warranted here. The United Kingdom is not among the cases in this book, even though it was the first country—with the passage of its 1802 Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, and the 1819 and 1833 Factory Acts—to regulate child labor in factories and establish a national factory inspectorate. The 1833 act in particular set an important international precedent, serving as a model for subsequent reform efforts on the continent and in the United States. I omitted the United Kingdom for two reasons. First, because it industrialized so early and tackled child labor in factories more than three decades before any other state, Britain is an outlier and thus direct comparisons with it are problematic. Second, the British factory acts have received nearly all the English-language scholarly attention to nineteenth-century labor regulation; the cases I cover are less well known to English-speaking audiences but equally deserving of attention. The extensive literature on the British case, however, suggests that though it differs from the cases covered in the first half of this book, it is not entirely incompatible with the theory developed here. It is different in the sense that the 1833 Factory Act arose directly from a massive labor movement in which tens of thousands of Lancashire and Yorkshire mill operatives marched to demand restrictions on children’s working hours. But, lacking the franchise, labor’s power resources would have been futile without an alliance with sympathetic elites in Parliament, foremost among them Michael Sadler and Lord Ashley of Shaftesbury. The nucleus holding this cross-class alliance together was the “Tory radical” Richard Oastler, a middle-class estate steward who became the movement’s leading strategist and orator (Driver 1946; see also Smelser 1959; Thomas 1948; Kirby 2003). Thus, although labor supplied the grassroots pressure that pushed Parliament to act, middle-class and elite reformers took on essential roles as social movement organizers and policy entrepreneurs in the British case as well.

Looking Ahead

The chapters that follow describe the political events leading to the passage of child labor laws or factory inspection systems in Germany, France, Massachusetts, and Illinois as well as the failure of child labor reform in Belgium. Each chapter concentrates on answering four sets of questions.

1. What contextual factors created an impetus for middle-class labor reformers to pursue child labor laws and factory inspection systems? To answer this question, I provide a brief overview of the social conditions that reformers responded to and connected with child
labor, such as industrialization, collective social disorders and labor unrest, and primary school truancy.

2. What problem definitions motivated middle-class labor reformers, and how did these definitions shape the programs they pursued? Furthermore, where did these ideas come from—how were they related to the broader cultural context? To answer these questions, I explicate discourses that influenced policy and administrative entrepreneurs’ thinking about the child labor problem and how to address it.

3. Both across and within sociohistorical contexts, why did some child labor policy entrepreneurs succeed while others failed? To answer this question, I trace in detail policy entrepreneurs’ alliance-building efforts and problem-solving approaches. Wherever possible, I use paired comparisons between a successful and unsuccessful reformer to tease out what distinguished the two.

4. Relatedly, how was reformers’ influence shaped by political context, the policy field’s institutions and architecture, and their own field position? To answer this question, I pay attention to the major political players with whom reformers cooperated and clashed. I outline the relevant political conditions and basic institutional arrangements that structured policy making in each case. Further, I identify significant overlaps between the policy field and other fields, reformers’ positioning relative to those overlaps, and the ways these overlaps facilitated or impeded their entrepreneurship.

The seven case studies in which I answer these questions cover a great deal of ground. Each contains many specificities that make it irreducibly complex and in some ways unique. But the task of comparative historical social science is to unearth the common patterns—causes, processes, and conditions—lying beneath such profusions of historical detail. This book reveals that elite and middle-class reformers contributed to the birth of the modern regulatory welfare state to an extent so far underappreciated by scholars. By leveraging three types of negative cases, it moreover demonstrates the alliance-building and problem-solving strategies through which their influence was carried out as well as the conditions under which they mattered most.
Aachen, 55, 175
abolitionism, 245, 250
absenteeism, 120, 136, 200, 207, 236
Achenbach, Heinrich, 172–74, 191
Act Relating to the Inspection of Factories and Public Buildings, 211
“Act to Provide for the Better Instruction of Youth Employed in Manufacturing Establishments” (Carter), 135
Addams, Jane, 259, 265. See also Hull House
administrative entrepreneurs, 13–14, 17, 21–22, 194, 213–15, 221–22, 229, 232, 267. See also agents of reform; Kelley, Florence; middle-class and elite reformers; policy entrepreneurs; Wade, Rufus
advisory conciliation model, 23–24, 148–49, 152, 173, 189–91, 276–77, 286. See also conciliatory policing model; factory inspections; Germany; Lohmann, Theodor; soft regulatory capture
agents of reform, 3. See also administrative entrepreneurs; policy entrepreneurs
agriculture, 31
alienation, theory of, 91, 170
Allen, Stephen M., 208
Allgemeines Landrecht (Prussian Civil Code) of 1794, 46–47, 48, 53
Altenstein, Karl vom Stein zum: definition of child labor problem and, 40–41, 54–56, 58–59, 67, 74–75; discursive opportunity structure and, 60; failed policy entrepreneurship of, 41–42, 58, 60, 70, 72; failure of, to cite sources of ideas, 60, 75; failure of, to compromise, 60–61; failure of, to use fundamental frame, 60, 75; field position of, 56; neglect of Bodelschwingh’s plan and 67–68, 77; use of frames of, 58, 70. See also Bodelschwingh, Ernst von; policy entrepreneurs; Prussia
Altgeld, John Peter, 230, 234, 266, 270–71. See also Illinois
Alton, 269, 271, 280. See also Illinois
American Federation of Labor, 270
American Institute of Instruction, 119
apprenticeship, 46–47, 293n1, 294n2
Arrington, Louis, 271, 280
attractive labor, 108
Bagley, Sarah, 129
Banks, Louis Albert, 245
Barry, Leonora, 258
Bartels, Adolphe, 92
Battelle, Hezekiah, 137
Bavaria, 168
Bebel, August, 158, 181
Beckedorff, Ludolf, 51, 57
Belgian Labor Party, 114
Belgium: chamber of commerce in, 80–81; child labor in, 85–88, 301n8–9; children in the mines in, 34–35, 88; conflict between secularist and Catholic factions over control of schools in, 81–82, 114, 287; economy of, 84–85; failure to enact a child labor law until 1889 in, 78–79, 105–6, 112–14; liberal revolution of 1830 in, 79–80; policy field in, 106; primary education in, 81–84; repression of labor in, 80; similarities between France and, 23, 93, 114–15; social question in, 90–93; working-class in, 90. See also child labor laws; Ducpétiaux, Édouard; France
Beeth, Peter, 57
Bismarck, Otto von, 149, 151, 155–56, 169, 179–80, 183–86, 188–89, 191–92, 276. See also Germany; Lohmann, Theodor; veto

For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu
Bisno, Abraham, 266–67
Blanc, Louis, 91
Blewett, Mary, 226
boardinghouse system, 127–29
Bodelschwingh, Ernst von: alliance building and, 42, 65, 68, 71, 76; background of, 63; creative problem solving of, 69–70, 72, 76–77; definition of the child labor problem, 66; differences between Altenstein and, 40–42, 67–68, 70, 75; discursive opportunity structure surrounding, 67, 76; field position of, 63–65, 71–72; use of citations by, 58, 65, 76; use of frames by, 58, 63–67, 76; compromise and, 70, 76. See also Altenstein, Karl vom Stein zum; child labor laws; policy entrepreneurs; Prussia
Bonaparte, Napoléon. See Napoléon
Bonn, 62
Borinage, 90
Boston Daily Globe, 218
Boston Daily Times, 136
Boston Eight Hour League, 195
Boston Globe, 207, 211
Boston Herald, 219, 222
Boston Labor Reform Association, 195
Boston Manufacturing Company, 126
Boston Working Men’s Party, 125
Bourcart, Jean-Jacques, 94
Bourdieuian field theory, 14, 295n12
Bowles, Samuel, 121
Brentano, Lujo, 163–64
Britain, 2. See also United Kingdom
British Factory Acts, 27, 35–36, 207
Bundesrat, 155–58, 168, 188
bureaucratic autonomy, 14, 17, 148–50, 195, 214–15, 217, 232, 280–81. See also factory inspection
Bush, George W., 288
Butler, Benjamin, 196
Cabet, Etienne, 91
capitalism, 2, 8–9, 62, 103, 219, 256, 260
Carter, James: definition of the child labor problem and, 136; field position of, 132; framing by, 133, 135; thoughts on public education of, 121–24. See also child labor laws; Massachusetts; policy entrepreneurs
case selection, 22–23, 27
Catholic Center Party, 158, 162, 181, 187. See also Germany; Hertling, Georg von
Catholicism, 81, 91, 161–62, 287. See also religion
Central Association of German Industrialists, 159
Chamberlin, Edwin, 193
chambers of commerce, 65–66, 80–81, 94–96, 103–4, 105, 111–12, 114, 142, 159
Channing, William Ellery, 131
Chicago. See Illinois
Chicago Anti-Sweat Shop League, 263
Chicago Daily Times, 246
Chicago Ethical club, 233
Chicago Trade and Labor Assembly, 247
Chicago Tribune, 234, 269
child labor: apprenticeship and, 46–47, 293n1, 294n2; in Belgium, 85–88, 301n8–9; as beneficial to children, 53; decline in Massachusetts of, 199; de-skilling caused by, 53–54, 62, 98; in France, 88; glassmaking and, 33–34, 176, 269; health problems caused by, 56; at home, 168; human development definition of the child labor problem, 59, 75; in Illinois, 236–37; impact of child labor laws on, 73–74, 153, 168; light work and, 32–33; machine making and, 33; mining and, 34–35, 88; statistics on, 73–74, 85–88, 153–54, 199, 236–37, 267, 301n8–9; in sweatshops, 32–33; in textile industry, 31–32, 84–85, 88, 127–28; transitions to workshops and factories, 31. See also child labor laws
child labor laws: contemporary weakening of child labor laws in U.S., 289; convictions for violations of, 267–68, 271; to create an improved working class, 1–2; deferring to capitalist interests, 43–44, 65–66, 101; early adopters of, 22; employer attitudes toward, 39, 65–66, 94–95, 105, 111; exceptions for certain industries to, 34, 176–77; factory inspection in response to disregard of, 145, 164, 172, 193, 202, 207, 275–76; impact of child labor laws on child labor, 73–74, 153, 155, 168; influenced by middle-class and elite reformers, 3, 12–13, 45, 74, 103–4, 139, 140, 282–83; lack of enforcement of and compliance with Illinois’s, 237–38, 267–68, 270; modern welfare state began with, 2, 282; motivated by desire to get poor children to attend school, 11, 36, 38, 62; negative cases of, 23, 26, 37, 60, 74–77, 79; opposition from working class families to, 3, 44, 136; provisions of, 4; restricting children’s working hours to ten per day, 69, 138; sacralization of children’s lives and, 234–35; in the
INDEX 353

United Kingdom, 27, 35–36, 298n27; violations of, 136–38, 167–68, 200, 202–3, 205–7, 210, 212, 223–27, 238, 267–68, 275–76. See also Belgium; Bodelschwingh, Ernst von; Carter, James; child labor; Ducpétiaux, Édouard; Dupin, Charles; education; factory inspection; framing; France; Massachusetts; Prussia

citizen's petition, 137

“City Slave Girls” (Nelson), 246

class: belief that economic conditions are cause of class conflict, 163, 170; class-based approach to theorizing the welfare state, 8–9, 43–44; comparing the exploitation of the working class to slavery, 245, 251, 257; education as a tool of social control over the poor, 49, 66–67, 83, 109, 122–26, 132, 136; education to cultivate the neglected human capital of the poor, 53–55, 83–84, 97, 122; elites’ concern over moral decline among lower classes, 49, 66, 92–93, 98, 130–31, 235–36; elites’ desire for social order, 6, 66–67, 71, 83, 99–100, 109, 119, 122, 130, 133, 142, 237; mitigating class conflict through education, 49–50, 123; mitigating class tension through factory inspection, 173, 220–21, 276–77; working-class discontent, 44, 67, 75, 88–90, 98, 124–25, 232; working-class desire for better education and improving economic standing of their class, 125, 131–32, 237. See also labor; middle-class and elite reformers

Cloakmakers Union, 264

citizenship building. See alliance building

Cologne, 55

commodification, 287

Commons, John R., 239

communism, 208

compromise, 16, 60–61, 70–72, 76, 102, 103–4, 220–22, 265, 290–91. See also alliance building; policy entrepreneurs

concession, 280

conciliatory policing model, 23–24, 148–50, 195, 198, 220–22, 229, 276–77, 280, 291. See also advisory conciliation model; factory inspection; Massachusetts; soft regulatory capture; Wade, Rufus

Congress of Vienna, 61

conservatives, 51–52, 71, 83, 158, 161, 170, 188

Considerant, Victor, 92

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 290 cooperatives, 162

corporatist welfare regimes, 286

counterfactuals, 24, 26, 76. See also missed opportunities

counterframes, 111

Cousin, Victor, 83

COVID-19, 288

creative problem-solving, 17–19, 39, 68–72, 76–77, 102, 141, 186–87, 190–92, 283; unsuccessful reformers and, 25, 39, 113. See also policy entrepreneurs

crime, 90, 122–23

crimes of poverty, 90

cross-case paired comparison, 37

cultural fragmentation, 232
culture, 20. See also discursive opportunity structure, problem definitions

Cunin-Gridaine, Laurent, 98

Daughters of Freemen, 127–29

Davies, Edgar T., 271
decommodification, 2, 11, 287

De la condition physique et morale des jeunes ouvriers et des moyens de l'améliorer (Ducpétiaux), 108

Delmas, Corinne, 97

Democratic Party, 196–97, 230, 234, 271, 290
democratic socialism, 243. See also Social Democratic Party
democratization, 123, 131

Deneckere, Gita, 114

Denny, J. Waldo, 202–3

Deutsche Reichspost, 186

Diesterweg, Adolph, 50
discursive opportunity structure, 67, 76, 100, 136, 174, 242, 257, 272, 277–78, 291. See also framing

Driscoill, Dennis, 224
dual field membership, 19, 39, 97, 102, 118, 141, 149, 166, 262. See also field position

Ducpétiaux, Édouard: child labor laws and, 107, 109–11; citations and framing by, 99, 109–10; definition of the child labor problem, 109; differences between Charles Dupin and, 115–16; and discursive opportunity structure, 110; failure as a child labor policy entrepreneur, 111–16; field position of, 106; influences on, 92, 108–9,
Ducpétiaux, Édouard (continued)
302n3; in the transnational penology field, 106. See also Belgium; child labor laws; policy entrepreneurs

Dupin, Charles: citations and, 98–100, 101; compromise and, 101, 103–4; creative problem solving by, 101; definition of the child labor problem, 98; differences between Édouard Ducpétiaux and, 115–16; and discursive opportunity structure, 100, 104; dual field membership of, 97, 102; framing and, 98–101, 102. See also child labor laws; France; policy entrepreneurs

Düsseldorf, 56, 62, 175

Économie politique chrétienne (Villaneuve-Bargemont), 92

education: absenteeism and, 120, 136, 200, 207, 236; in Belgium, 81–84; compulsory schooling and, 48, 102, 287; conflict between Catholics and secularists for control of schools in France and Belgium, 81–82, 114, 287; to cultivate the neglected human capital of the poor, 83–84, 122; and decommodification, 11, 287; as a defense against female emancipation, 165; as a defense against socialism, 165; education frame, 38, 58–59, 63–66, 99, 100–101, 133–34, 137–38, 207, 257; to enable workers to peacefully bring about a more just society, 243; as the foundation of US democratic republic, 121, 257; issue motivating child labor laws, 11, 36, 107, 118, 132–35, 207, 235; in Illinois, 236; illiteracy and, 200; industrial schools and, 53; intersection of welfare state and, 11, 142, 286–87; in Massachusetts, 118–26, 132, 207; primary education in France and Belgium, 81–84; as problem definition, 66, 74–75, 109, 118, 136; in Prussia, 47–52; religion and, 47–48, 55–56, 119, 287; as a tool for social control, 49, 83, 109, 122–26, 132–35; working class’s desire for better education, 125, 131–32. See also child labor laws

Emerson, George Barell, 119–20, 122


degenous processes, 10–11, 14, 284. See also institutional change

Engels, Friedrich, 255–56. See also Kelley, Florence

English Friendly Societies, 162

Ermakoff, Ivan, 24

Esping-Anderson, Gøsta, 2

Essai sur l’organisation du travail (Bartels), 92

Essays upon Popular Education (Carter), 122
eugenics, 175

expertise signaling, 16–17, 217, 231, 260–61, 272

Factory Acts (1833 and 1819), 27, 36

factory inspection: advisory conciliation model of, 148–49, 191, 276, 286; as an enforcement mechanism for labor regulations, 145, 164, 193, 209, 275–76; as a benefit to employers, 174; conciliatory policing model of, 148–50, 195, 198, 220–21, 229, 276–77; contemporary factory inspection departments in the U.S., 288; failed factory inspection policy entrepreneurs, 202, 206, 209, 227; failure to appoint an independent agency of factory inspectors in Massachusetts, 194, 198, 201, 209–12, 227–28, 277; feminist enforcement model of, 148, 230, 273, 278–80; framing factory inspection systems, 174, 187; Germany and, 172–74, 178, 187–88, 192, 276; ideal candidate for a factory inspector, 172–73; influence of middle-class and elite reformers on systems of, 147, 188, 192, 273, 283; lack of autonomous coercive authority for factory inspectors in Germany, 189–90, 276; mitigating class tension through, 173, 220–21, 229, 276–77; a new development of regulatory welfare, 145; Otto von Bismarck’s opposition to, 151–52, 179–80, 183–86, 191–92, 276; prolabor enforcement of factory inspection invites employer backlash, 231–32; United Kingdom and, 27; variation in type of system states implemented, 23; women as factory inspectors, 258, 273, 278–80. See also advisory conciliation model; bureaucratic autonomy; child labor laws; conciliatory policing model; feminist enforcement model; Germany; Illinois; Kelley, Florence; Lohmann, Theodor; Massachusetts; Morgan, Elizabeth; Oliver, Henry; Wade, Rufus
Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), 288–89, 294n3
Fall River, 127–28, 200, 205–7, 226. See also Massachusetts
Feldenkirchen, Wilfried, 73
feminism, 244–45, 256, 278. See also women
feminist enforcement model, 148, 230, 267–80. See also Illinois; Kelley, Florence; women
feudalism, 49
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 50, 55
Field, Marshall, 266
field architecture, 19, 41, 65, 94, 97–98, 106, 115, 117–18, 141–42. See also dual membership, institutional penetration
field overlap. See field architecture
field position: Altenstein’s, 42, 56; Bodelschwingh’s, 42, 63–65, 71–72, 77; of James Carter, 118, 132; of Charles Dupin, 97, 102, 104, 115; dual membership and, 19, 39, 97, 102, 118, 141, 149, 166, 262; of Édouard Ducpétiaux, 106, 115; as enabling or constraining alliance building and creativity, 19, 42, 65, 77, 104, 115, 141, 147; field architecture and, 19; of Florence Kelley, 150, 259, 262, 273; importance of, 15; as influencing who is empowered to be a policy entrepreneur, 141, 147, 191, 227, 231; of Theodor Lohmann, 149, 166, 191; of Rufus Wade, 213. See also dual membership; policy entrepreneurs
Fligstein, Neil, 17
Fourier, Charles, 91, 108
France: 1841 child labor law in, 78, 93–104; chambers of commerce in, 80–81; child labor in, 88; conflict between secularist and Catholic factions over control of schools in, 81–82; economy of, 84; enacts a child labor law in 1841, 78; Revolution of 1830 in, 79–80; field policy in, 94, 97, 101; primary education in, 81–84; repression of labor in, 80; similarities between Belgium and, 23, 93, 114–15; socialism and, 91; social question in, 90–93; textiles in, 84, 88, 93; working class in, 88–89, 97. See also Belgium; child labor laws; Dupin, Charles franchise. See voting free markets, 46
Freitas, Mary, 223
Frère-Orban, Walthère, 81
Friedrichs, Rudolf, 186
Fritzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 181, 183
fundamental frames, 38, 58, 66, 99, 100, 110, 133–34, 175, 250–51, 257, 296n4. See also framing; simple frames
Galen, Ferdinand, 181–82
Gaston, William, 207–9
General-Landschul-Reglement of 1763, 48
generic approach, 5, 24–26, 39, 93, 296n20
George, Samuel W., 218
German Association of Glass Industrialists, 176
German Conservative Party, 157, 186, 188. See also Germany
German Progress Party, 157. See also Germany
Germany: the academy in, 163; advisory conciliation model in, 148–49, 191, 276, 286; basic rules governing child labor in, 153; conservatives in, 161; countertrends to declining number of child laborers in factories, 153–55, 169; democratic socialist
INDEX

Germany (continued)
movement in, 146; depression in, 151–53; differences between Imperial German policy field and Prussian policy field, 155–60; factory inspection system in, 172–74, 178, 187–88, 192, 276; female labor in, 167–68, 174–76; labor unions in, 159–61; lack of autonomous coercive authority for factory inspectors in, 189–90, 276; policy field in, 155–60; political parties in, 157–58; Reichstag debates worker protections, 181–83; religion in, 161–63; role of Prussia in Imperial Germany, 155; socialists in, 160, 165; social question in, 160–64; universal manhood suffrage in, 146; violations of child labor regulations in, 163–64, 167–68; women in, II, 278–80; working-class education in, 165. See also advisory conciliation model; Bismarck, Otto von; Catholic Center Party; factory inspection; German Conservative Party; German Progress Party; Lohmann, Theodor; National Liberal Party; Prussia; Reichspartei; Social Democratic Party

Gerry, Elbridge, 235
Ghent, 85
Gingrich, Newt, 289
Ginnodo, Samuel, 211
Gintis, Herbert, 121
Gladbach, 61
glassmaking, 33–34, 176, 269, 271
goal-directed creativity, 18–19, 70, 104, 149, 186–87. See also creative problem-solving
Gompers, Samuel, 233
Gouin, Alexandre, 101
Granite Mill, 205–6, 257
Great Broad Street Riot, 125
great man theory, 7
Greenback-Labor movement, 255
guilds, 46–47, 293n1, 294n2
Guizot, Francois, 82–83
Guizot law of 1833, 82
Gunn, H. N., 137
Handelskammern, 65, 159, 298n33. See also chambers of commerce
Hardenberg, Karl August von, 43, 45, 49, 53–54
Haymarket bombing, 232–33
Health and Morals of Apprentices Act (1802), 27
Hecker, Johann Julius, 48
Hertel, Robert, 184
Hertling, Georg von, 187, 192
Heyman, J., 93
historical materialism, 170, 250
Hoar, Sherman, 252
Hofmann, Karl von, 156, 180, 182–86, 188–89
home shops, 239, 241, 265. See also industrial home work
Horn, Heinrich Wilhelm von, 57–58
Huber, Victor Aimé, 162
Hull House, 234, 252–53, 259, 263, 265, 273. See also Addams, Jane
Hull House Maps and Papers, 260
Humphrey, Heman, 119
Illinois: Bureau of Labor Statistics of, 260; ethnic and cultural fragmentation in, 232; Democratic Party in, 230, 234, 271; democratic socialism in, 243; education in, 236; efforts to regulate child labor in, 237; feminist enforcement model of factory inspection in, 148, 230, 273, 278–80; glassmaking in, 269; Illinois Woman's Alliance, 246–47; Kelley's enforcement model endures in, 271; labor movement in, 230–33, 272; labor's alliance with middle-class reformers in, 234, 272; nongovernmental social reform field in, 233–34, 273; rates of child labor in, 236–37, 267–68; regulatory capture in, 271, 280; Supreme Court strikes down eight-hour rule for women in, 270; sweatshops in, 232, 239–42, 246–47, 249–51, 260–63, 266, 318n69; violations of child labor laws in, 237–38, 267–68, 270; women's involvement in labor movement in, 230–31, 233, 272; Workshop and Factories Act in, 230, 245, 265–66. See also Altgeld, John Peter; Alton; factory inspection; feminist enforcement model; Kelley, Florence; Morgan, Elizabeth
Illinois Glass Works, 269, 271
Illinois Manufacturers' Association, 270
Illinois Supreme Court, 270
Illinois Woman's Alliance, 234, 246–47
illiteracy, 51, 200
incrementalism, 10, 243, 290. See also institutional change
industrial capitalism. See capitalism
industrial home work, 126, 239
industrialization, 8, 43, 84, 133
Industrial Revolution, 31, 85
industrial schools, 53
infant depravity, 119
Inner Mission, 166, 169, 191, 287. See also Pietism; religion
insiders: citation of, 38, 58, 99, 100, 115, 134, 174–75, 257; alliances with, 289–90, 291
institutional change, 3–4, 10–11, 12–22, 140, 283, 285. See also endogenous processes, incrementalism
institutionalism, 10–11, 294n9
institutional penetration, 19, 63, 81, 104, 141–42
International Workingmen’s Association, 164–65, 305n19
Irish immigrants, 119, 127–29, 198
Italy, 235–36
Itzenplitz, Heinrich Graf von, 171–72
Jones, Jesse H., 208–9
July Revolution, 79, 88. See also France jurisdictional expansion, 17, 215–17. See also alliance building, bureaucratic autonomy
Kats, Jacob, 90
Keller, Ernst, 61–62
Kelley, Florence: ability to signal expertise, 150, 231, 257, 261–62, 272; abolitionism and, 245; as administrative entrepreneur, 232, 267; belief in the ameliorative power of the state, 256; belief that employer-labor relationship is inherently exploitative, 231, 255–56, 258–59, 277; belief that women require social protection under the law, 244; as chief factory inspector, 267–68; comparing Elizabeth Morgan to, 231, 253–55, 261, 263–64, 272–73; compromise and, 265; as a democratic socialist, 243; discursive opportunity structure surrounding, 242–46; enforcement model endures, 271; factory inspection bill by, 264–66; feminism and, 244–45, 256, 278; field position of, 150, 231, 259, 262, 273; at Hull House, 253, 259, 273; influences on, 255; loses her position as chief inspector, 271; as policy entrepreneur, 231, 263–65, 272–73; political conditions facilitating influence of, 230–31, 234, 277–78; definition of the labor problem, 245–46, 277; provokes the ire of Illinois manufacturers, 269–70, 280; report on sweatshops by, 260–63; socialism and, 256–57; on sweatshops, 241; use of citations, 257; use of framing, 257; use of piggybacking, 264; view that the factory inspector enforced labor laws for the benefit of workers, 258–59; view that women should be factory inspectors, 258, 278–80. See also administrative entrepreneurs; Engels, Friedrich; factory inspections; feminist enforcement model; Illinois; Morgan, Elizabeth; policy entrepreneurs; social justice feminism
Kelley, William, 255
Kenney, Mary, 253
Ketteler, Wilhelm, 161–62
kindergarten, 236
Kingdon, John, 94
Knights of Labor, 233
Knights of St. Crispin, 196–97
Kuczynski, Jürgen, 42
Kulturkampf, 158
labor: British labor movement and, 2; current weakened state of, 289; disillusion with Rufus Wade from, 222–23; employer-labor relationship as inherently exploitative, 231, 255–56, 258–59, 277; factory inspectors serving as mediators between labor and capital, 173, 220–21, 229, 276–77; importance of organized labor to administrative state building, 275; labor activity in Massachusetts, 131–32, 194–96, 208, 228; labor movement in Illinois, 230–33, 272; labor regulation in the 15th–18th centuries, 293n1; labor’s alliances with middle-class reformers in Illinois, 234, 272, 274; middle-class reformers most important when labor is weak, 7–8, 12, 113–15, 149–50, 194 228; new labor protections in response to an increasingly powerful working class, 146; prolabor politicians in Massachusetts, 208, 210, 227; repression of labor in France and Belgium, 80; threat of organized capital to US labor movement, 270; unions and, 159–61, 196, 233; women’s involvement in Illinois’s labor movement, 230–31, 233, 272.
See also class
Labor Reform Party, 196–97
Ladies’ Federal Union, 233
Lancaster, Joseph, 121, 301n4, 303n3
Landtag, 68–69, 76, 299n51
Lasalle, Ferdinand, 158
Lasker, Eduard, 152
Lawrence, 129
LeGrand, Daniel, 71, 93, 96
Leopold I, 105
INDEX

liberalization, 1–2, 57, 103, 152, 275
Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 158
Liège, 85, 111
light work, 32–33
literacy, 51. See also illiteracy
Lloyd, Henry Demarest, 233–34, 243
Lohmann, Theodor: alliance building and, 174, 180–81, 191–92; citation and, 174, 179–80; desire to mitigate class tension through state institutions, 169–71, 173, 177, 189–91, 276–77; efforts to retain inspectors’ enforcement powers by, 189–90; expertise of, 166; on female employment, 174–76, 178; field position of, 149, 166, 191; framing by, 174–77, 179–80; Germany’s factory inspection system and, 172–74, 178, 187–88, 192; investigates child and female labor, 167–69; Otto von Bismarck’s opposition to policy proposed by, 179–80, 183–86, 191–92; piggybacking and, 187; policy proposal by, 178–79, 187–89; religious influences on, 166, 169; support for exceptions to child labor laws from, 176–78. See also advisory conciliation model; Bismarck, Otto von; factory inspections; Germany; policy entrepreneurs
Lowell, 126–29. See also Massachusetts
Lowell, Francis Cabot, 126
Ludwig, Karl-Heinz, 73
Luther, Seth, 131
Lynch, Katherine, 92, 98
Mann, Horace, 120–25, 130
Mareska, Daniel, 93
Marxism, 3, 42, 91, 170, 250, 256–57, 260
Marx, Karl, 2, 160, 163, 305n13
Massachusetts: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 202–5, 212–13, 228; child labor laws in, 117–18, 132–38; citizen’s petition in, 137; conciliatory policing model of factory inspections in, 148–50, 195, 198, 276–77, 280; decline of child labor in, 199; Democratic Party in, 197; deputy state constables in, 201–3, 206; differences between Prussia and, 22–23, 136; disregard for child labor and schooling laws in, 136–37, 200, 202–3, 205–7, 210, 212, 223–27; District Police in, 213–26; early criticisms of child labor in, 129–32; economic transformation in, 126–29, 198; education system in, 118–26, 132, 200, 207; emergency of the administrative entrepreneur in, 194–95; expansion of the factory inspection system in, 213–17; failure to appoint an independent agency of factory inspectors in, 194, 198, 201, 209–12, 227–28, 277; labor activity in, 131–32, 194–96, 208, 228; lack of opposition to child labor laws in, 118, 136, 138–39; policy field in, 117–18, 136; population growth in, 198–99; prolabor politicians in, 208, 210, 227; proletarian underclass in, 129; regulations on daily working hours of women in, 193; Republican Party in, 194, 196; Republican party’s strategy of throwing bones to working-class voters in, 194, 198, 203–4, 228; state police in, 201, 206, 212; sweatshop laws in, 252; ten hour law in, 195, 198, 209, 212, 219; workplace safety measures in, 211, 224. See also Carter, James; child labor laws; conciliatory policing model; factory inspections; Fall River; Lowell; Oliver, Henry
Massachusetts Board of Education, 120
maternalism, 244, 279
Maybach, Albert, 189
McAdam, Doug, 17
McNeill, George, 195, 206–7, 211, 227, 311n43
Mellen, James, 194, 210–11, 228
method of agreement, 22
method of difference, 22
Meyer, Rudolf, 162
microinteractive, 19, 20
middle-class and elite reformers: alliance with labor in Illinois, 234, 272, 274; child labor laws influenced by, 3, 45, 74, 103–4, 140; complex motivations of, 12, 284–85; influence on factory inspection systems, 147, 189, 192, 273, 283; influence on regulatory welfare, 3, 7, 10–12, 21–22, 25, 116, 283; involvement in nongovernmental social reform field in Illinois, 233–34; most important when opposition is strong and labor is weak, 7–8, 12, 113–15, 139–40, 149–50, 194, 228; policy making institutions influence on, 279–80; under-appreciation in dominant theories of welfare development of, 5, 10–12; unique social position of middle-class reformers, 5, 284–85. See also administrative entrepreneurs; Bodelschwingh, Ernst von; Carter, James; Dupin, Charles; Ducpétiaux, Edouard; Lohmann, Theodor; Kelley, Florence; policy entrepreneurs; social entrepreneurship; Wade, Rufus
military, 57, 100
Millian case selection logic, 22  
mill towns, 199  
mining, 34–35, 88  
missed opportunities, 26, 60–61, 68, 76, 79, 113, 273. See also counterfactuals  
moderates, 114–15, 204, 232, 243, 290  
Mohl, Robert von, 67  
Montalembert, Charles Forbes René de, 100–101  
moral economy discourse, 92, 98  
Morgan, Elizabeth: abolitionism and, 245; comparing Florence Kelley to, 231, 253–55, 276, 287, 290; definition of the labor problem, 245–46; as a democratic socialist, 243; discursive opportunity structure surrounding, 242–46; erosion of influence of, 252–53, 273; failure of, 150; feminism and, 244, 249; investigates sweatshops in Chicago, 247, 249–51, 318n69; involvement in Chicago's social reform field, 249; preemption as model housekeeper, 249; tension with Hull House, 252–53, 263; use of framing, 250–51. See also factories; Illinois; Kelley, Florence; policy entrepreneurs  
Morgan, Thomas J., 237, 247, 253  
Mulhouse, 78  
Mulhouse Industrial Society, 94, 96  
multiple field membership. See dual field membership  
Napoléon, 61  
Napoleonic Wars, 42  
Nardinelli, Clark, 73  
National Cotton Spinners’ Association, 223  
National Liberal Party, 157. See also Germany  
Nelson, Nell, 246  
New England Association of Mechanics, Farmers, and Other Workingmen, 125, 131  
“New Slavery, The” (Morgan), 250  
New York, 252, 258  
Nieberding, Arnold, 180, 191, 308n71  
Nord, Martin du, 94, 96  
Nothomb, Jean-Baptiste, 105  
Obama, Barack, 288–89  
objectivity, 205, 217  
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 288  
Oliver, Henry, 199, 201–4, 227. See also factories; Massachusetts  
“Our Toiling Children” (Kelley), 257  
outsiders, 38, 110, 111  
Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, 2  
Paris, 89  
paternalism, 57, 159  
path dependence, 10  
pauperization, 49, 66  
Pennsylvania, 35  
Pestalozzi, J. H., 50, 82, 121, 303n3  
Philadelphia Working Women's Society, 258  
Philippe, Louis, 79  
Phillips, Wendell, 197  
Pietism, 47–48, 55, 166. See also Inner Mission; religion  
piggybacking, 16, 102, 187, 264  
Piore, Michael, 291  
Polanyi, Karl, 2  
police, 201, 206, 212–15  
policy entrepreneurs: contemporary, 289; as culturally embedded actors, 19; definition of, 13; dual membership and, 19; failed, 26, 79, 112–16, 202, 206, 209, 227; influence of field position on, 104, 141, 147, 191, 227, 231; influence on factory inspection systems, 147; qualities of effective, 17–19, 21–22, 114–15, 190–92, 265, 283, 290. See also administrative entrepreneurs; agents of reform; alliance building; Altenstein, Karl von Stein zum; Bodelschwingh, Ernst von; Carter, James; creative problem-solving; Ducpétiaux, Édouard; Dupin, Charles; field position; Kelley, Florence; Lohmann, Theodor; middle-class and elite reformers; Morgan, Elizabeth  
political differentiation, 218–19, 229  
Pomeroy, W. C., 253  
populist Jacksonian democracy, 122  
positive feedbacks, 10  
possibility principle, 26  
power resources theory, 8  
pragmatism, 14–15, 18, 76–77  
pragmatist field theoretical approach, 3–5, 13, 139, 228, 283–84  
Pricing the Priceless Child (Zelizer), 234  
prison reform, 106, 112–13  
progressives, 290  
progressivism, 242, 272  
prosopographical analysis, 39, 97. See also dual membership  
protectionism, 61, 126, 152–53, 159, 297n7  
Protestantism, 162–63, 169. See also Inner Mission, Pietism, Puritanism
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 91

Prussia: 1839 Regulative regarding the Employment of Children in Factories, 40, 73; 1854 Prussian child labor law, 153; capitalists’ attitude towards child labor regulation in, 43–44, 65–66; child labor and the military in, 57; conservative opposition to liberal reform in, 51, 54, 57; differences between Imperial German policy field and Prussian policy field, 155; differences between Massachusetts and, 22–23, 136; economy in, 46, 61; education in, 47–52; existing explanations of child labor law in, 42–44, 74; impact of child labor laws on working children in, 73–74, 168; investigations into child labor situation in, 53–56; lack of reformist will in Prussian bureaucracy, 171–72; opposition to child labor laws in, 43, 57; policy field in, 41–42, 45, 56, 65; Prussian Civil Code of 1794, 46–47; reforms in Prussia after defeat in Napoleonic war, 45–46; role of Prussia in Imperial Germany, 155. See also Altenstein, Karl vom Stein zum; Bodelschwingh, Ernst von; child labor laws; Germany

Prussian Civil Code (1794), 46–47

punctuated equilibrium model, 10

Puritanism, 118–19

Ranke, Leopold von, 163

Regulative regarding the Employment of Children in Factories, 73

regulatory capture, 16, 271, 280–81. See also soft regulatory capture

regulatory welfare, 2–3, 285–86

Reichspartei, 157. See also Germany

Reichstag, 155, 157, 181–83, 185–86, 188, 192

religion: church-state conflict influence on welfare development, 20; conflict between secularist and Catholic factions in France and Belgium over control of schools, 81–82, 114; education and, 47–48, 55–56, 119, 287; efforts to ban work on Sunday, 162–63, 181–82, 187; in Germany, 161–62; intersection of welfare and, 287–88; Pietism and, 47–48, 55, 166; religious influences on Theodor Lohmann, 166, 169; shapes social policy, 20; social question and, 91, 182; Unitarians and, 131; Universalists and, 131. See also Catholicism; Inner Mission; Pietism; Protestantism; Puritanism; Social Catholicism

Renouard, Charles, 102–3

Republican Party, 194, 196, 228, 290

retailers, 266. See also employers

Rhinelan, 33, 56, 61–62, 67

Rhode Island, 127

Rice, Alexander, 211

Riis, Jacob, 235

Ritchie v. People of Illinois, 270

Ritter, Ellen, 253

Robinson, Frederick, 132

Robinson, Harriet Jane Hanson, 128

Rochow, Gustav von, 43, 71–73, 300n59

Rodbertus, Karl Johann, 163

Rogier, Charles, 81, 110–11

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 50

Russell, Charles Theodore, 211

Russian Jews, 251

Saint-Simon, Henri de, 90

Saxony, 73, 164

Schilling, George, 234

Schmoller, Gustav von, 163

Schrank, Andrew, 291

Schuchard, Johannes, 68–69

Schuckmann, Friedrich von, 43, 59–61, 76

serfdom, 49

Sewell, William, 91

Shay’s Rebellion, 124

Sheingate, Adam, 17

Short Time Committees, 195

signaling expertise/competence, 16–17, 217–18, 231, 260–61, 263–64, 272

simple frames, 38, 58, 60, 63–65, 99–101, 133–34, 137, 174, 175, 250–51, 257, 296n4. See also framing

Singer, A. L., 266

Sklar, Kathryn Kish, 255

Skowronek, Stephen, 117

Slater, Samuel, 127

slavery, 245, 251

slums, 259

Smith, Adam, 46

Social Catholicism, 91–92, 108–9, 287. See also religion

social data, 145–46, 163, 169

Social Democratic Party, 158, 172, 181, 183. See also Germany

social entrepreneurship, 13. See also administrative entrepreneurs, middle-class and elite reformers, policy entrepreneurs

social housekeeping, 244, 249, 279

socialism, 146, 158–60, 165, 172, 181, 243, 257

Socialism and Communism in Contemporary France (Stein), 169–70

© Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
Socialist Workers’ Party. See Social Democratic Party

social justice feminism, 244, 256, 278. See also Kelley, Florence

social kingship, 170. See also Stein, Lorenz von

social question, the, 90–93, 160–64, 169–71, 182. See also utopian socialism

Society of Christian Socialists, 234

Society of the Seasons, 89

soft regulatory capture, 281, 291, 319n3. See also advisory conciliation model; conciliatory policing model

Sparta, 125

Stein, Karl von, 45, 49, 169–70

Stein, Lorenz von, 161, 163, 169–71

Stephenson, Luther, 209–10, 212

Steward, Ira, 195

strikes, 232, 305n19

structural-determinism, 8

suffrage. See voting

sweatshops, 32–33, 219, 232, 238–42, 246–51, 260, 262–63, 266, 318n69

Tea Party, 289

technology, 73

Ten Hour Law, 195, 198, 209

Ten Hours Act (1847), 2

Tennstedt, Florian, 186

textiles, 31–32, 84, 93, 126–27

Tilly, Charles, 42

transnational penology field, 106

truancy. See absenteeism

Truell, Byron, 210

Trump, Donald, Jr., 288

Tuckerman, Joseph, 131

typhoid, 129

unions, 159–61, 196, 233

Unitarian, 131, 287

United Kingdom, 2, 27, 35–36, 293n1

United Labor Party of Chicago, 247

Universalists, 131. See also Unitarian

U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, 288

utopian socialism, 90, 108. See also social question, the

Vanhulle, Bert, 112–13

varieties of capitalism, 9, 104

Verein für Sozialpolitik, 163

veto, 10, 56, 76–77, 149, 157, 180, 184, 191, 276. See also Bismarck, Otto von

Villaneuve-Bargemon, Alban de, 91–92

Villermé, Louis, 93

voting, 80, 123, 146, 161

Wade, Rufus: administrative entrepreneur-ship of, 213–22; compromise and, 220; conciliatory approach to factory inspection by, 195, 220, 222, 229, 276–77, 280; definition of the labor problem, 220–21; expertise signaling by, 217; field position of, 213; labor’s disillusion with, 222–23, 229; lack of enforcement of labor laws from, 224–27, 229, 268, 280–81; legislative influence of, 219; jurisdictional expansion under, 215–27; success as Massachusetts's chief factory inspector of, 213–19, 229, 281; view that interest of capital and labor could be harmonized, 150, 220–21, 229, 276–77. See also conciliatory policing model; factory inspections

Wagener, Hermann, 161, 165

Warren, Elizabeth, 289–90

Weber, Max, 166

welfare: campaigns for restrictions on the length of the work day and, 195, 209; church-state conflict influence on, 20; definition of regulatory welfare, 2, 286; factory inspection systems a new stage in development of regulatory, 145; inadequacy of dominant theories of welfare development, 5, 9–12, 21, 42–44, 74, 285–86; influence of middle-class and elite reformers on welfare, 3, 7, 10–12, 21–22, 25, 116, 282–83; intersection of religion and, 287–88; intersection of welfare state and education, 11, 142, 286–87; modern welfare state began with child labor laws, 282; neglect of the US regulatory welfare state, 288–89; theories of the welfare state, 8–12, 42–44; welfare state and regulatory state treated as distinct and, 2, 285–86; work-family policies, 294n4; workplace safety regulations, 205–6, 210

What Is Property? (Proudhon), 91

Whigs, 122, 132

“White Child Slavery,” 245

white slavery, 245

wholesalers, 266. See also employers

Wichern, Johann Hinrich, 166

Wilbur, Thomas, 137

William, Frederick, III, 43, 48

within-case paired comparison, 36

women: in the 1893 Workshop and Factories Act, 245, 270; boardinghouse system
women (continued)  
and, 127–29; as factory inspectors, 258, 273, 278–80; female labor in Germany, 167–68, 174–76; feminism and, 244, 256; framing regulations of women’s labor, 246; in Germany, II, 278–80; in Illinois’s labor movement, 230–31, 233, 272; Illinois Supreme Court strikes down eight-hour rule for, 270; policy proposals concerning female labor, 178, 187; regulations on daily working hours for women in Massachusetts, 193. See also feminism; feminist enforcement model work booklets, 90 worker question. See social question, the work-family policies, 294n4 Working Women’s Union, 233 Workshop and Factories Act (1893), 230, 245, 265–66 Wright, Carroll D., 205–6, 259 Zelizer, Viviana, 234