

## CONTENTS

*Acknowledgments* xiii

*Preface: Toward Dialogue* xv

1	Fundamentalism Writ Large	1
	<i>The End of Days?</i>	1
	<i>Fundamentalism Abounds</i>	4
2	Fundamentalism and Its Alternatives: From Fanaticism to Dialogue	12
	<i>Part 1: The Fundamentalist Style of Thought</i>	12
	Conception and Evolution	12
	Fundamentalist Criterion #1: Certainty	22
	Negative Fundamentalism	35
	Fundamentalist Criterion #2: The Perspicuity of Truth	39
	Fundamentalist Criterion #3: Foundational Text or Revelation	47
	<i>Part 2: Alternatives</i>	51
	Assertion and Dialogue	51
	Alternatives: Just in Case	57

X CONTENTS

	Avoiding Extremisms	64
	Alternatives: The Wisdom of the Novel	65
	Acquiring Wisdom	67
	Alternatives: Dialogue and Truth	70
3	Divided We Stand: The Politics of Hate	75
	<i>Joined Together by Hatred of the "Other"</i>	75
	<i>Tables Turned</i>	78
	<i>Fundamentalism and Democracy in Tension</i>	84
	<i>Pseudoscience</i>	90
	<i>Criticism and the Experience of Others</i>	100
	<i>Criticism and Certainty</i>	103
	<i>Novels and Utopias</i>	110
	<i>Satire and Systems</i>	116
	<i>The Silo</i>	121
	<i>United by Hatred or Hope?</i>	124
4	Price and Prejudice: Economics and the Quest for Truth	129
	<i>Another Kind of Fundamentalism</i>	129
	<i>The Economics of Hate?</i>	140
	<i>Learning from Objective Analyses</i>	142
	<i>Let Justice Be Done, Though the World Perish:</i>	
	<i>Dealing with Climate Change</i>	145
	<i>Not Just Climate Change</i>	156
	<i>Prejudice and Price</i>	165

	<i>A Way Forward Based on Facts?</i>	176
	<i>Back to Adam Smith</i>	177
5	Searching for Eternal Truths: Religion and Its Discontents	181
	<i>A Rabbi's Parable</i>	181
	<i>The Clock and the Dictionary</i>	182
	<i>When Standards Become Mere Prejudice</i>	186
	<i>Challenging Stories</i>	189
	<i>The Relevance of the Timeless</i>	194
	<i>Compassion and Holiness</i>	200
	<i>Equivalentents</i>	206
	<i>How Scripture Reads</i>	212
	<i>The Difference That Science Makes</i>	215
	<i>How Old Is the World?</i>	219
	<i>Propositions and Prayer</i>	226
	<i>The Great Dialogue</i>	232
	<i>Adjusting the Clock</i>	236
6	Literature: How to Ruin It and Why You Shouldn't	239
	<i>Alibis for Reading</i>	239
	<i>Literature Lost</i>	247
	<i>The Need for Stories</i>	257
	<i>World Literature</i>	263
	<i>Equivalent Centers of Self</i>	265

xii CONTENTS

7	A Path Forward	273
	<i>How the New Fundamentalisms Are Connected</i>	275
	<i>Return to Dialogue</i>	279
	<i>Chekhov with the Final Word</i>	283

	<i>Index</i>	291
--	--------------	-----

# 1

## Fundamentalism Writ Large

### The End of Days?

Perhaps the world balances on a precipice. Could it be that if we make the slightest mistake, life as we know it would end? Or does that way of thinking reflect what sociologist Barry Glassner has aptly called “the culture of fear”?<sup>1</sup>

Our predispositions can mislead either way: complacency can be comforting, but looming disaster makes us feel important. Movements that warn of an imminent apocalypse usually foresee special treatment for a favored few, a “saving remnant.” Or they at least flatter those who can discern the signs others miss.

Climate change is upon us, political differences have become toxic, authoritarian governments are on the rise, and younger generations are losing confidence that market economies and democratic processes can lead to equitable outcomes. It seems that the latest industrial revolution is destroying jobs every day. The notion of free speech for all—an axiom until recently—has

1. See Barry Glassner, *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things*, 10th anniversary ed. (New York: Hachette, 2018).

grown almost quaint. And when people are not allowed to criticize orthodoxies, societies get locked into destructive thought patterns and policies.

Doom, it seems, is everywhere. If anything, the global pandemic has made things even worse.

But when haven't predictions of impending disaster been the norm? It seems that what all generations share is the conviction that they live at the most important, and often most perilous, period in human history.<sup>2</sup> And they think so sincerely, because the criteria of importance belong to the present, while what earlier epochs regarded as important seems much less so as time goes on. How, we wonder today, could people have fought wars about the nature of divine grace, or what exactly goes on during the Eucharist?

The trademark irony that marks Edward Gibbon's masterpiece *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* depends on the difference between what his age and what antiquity regarded as of supreme significance. What the early Christians were willing to die for now seems almost impossible to explain, let alone take seriously. In his ironic catalog of theological squabbles that, in the opinion of the early Christians, would determine the salvation of humanity, he mentions one about the exact wording of the Trisagon, the chant of "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of Hosts" that the angels sing to God: "In the fever of the times, the sense, or rather the sound, of a syllable was sufficient to disturb the peace of an empire. . . . The Trisagon . . . was chanted in the cathedral by two adverse choirs, and when

2. Perhaps they feel that way because, as Marcel Proust put it, we "imagine ourselves always to be going through an experience which is without precedents in the past." Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*, vol. 1, trans. C. Scott Moncrieff and Stephen Hudson, loc. 23336 of 51336, Kindle.

their lungs were exhausted, they had recourse to the more solid arguments of sticks and stones.”<sup>3</sup> We laugh today at the absurd fears and controversies of our predecessors, but we, too, succumb to a “fever of the times.”

All the same, to understand an earlier period is to grasp what people then feared or expected. What Bertrand de Jouvenel called “futuribles”—the sense of possible futures—are an inescapable part of each present moment, which those living through it almost inevitably regard as singled out by destiny. There is an egoism of time, and part of this sense of unparalleled importance is that unprecedented dangers await just around the corner.

We take some comfort in the fact that this type of thinking almost always proves incorrect. Are today’s challenges really as threatening as, for example, the destruction wrought by Genghis Khan, or the twentieth century’s two world wars? Is there anyone now who poses as great a danger as Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin? We both remember the daily terror of nuclear annihilation that, in our school years, had children crouching next to their lockers or under their desks, coats covering our heads, as we waited to see how the Cuban Missile Crisis turned out.<sup>4</sup> By that standard, even in the wake of COVID-19, these days don’t seem quite so scary.

And yet, as amateur golfers know when they hit a six iron and end up a foot from the hole, unlikely things do happen. Some predictions of disaster are, alas, realized; catastrophes do occur, and they make skeptics look foolish. The outbreak of the

3. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury (New York: Heritage, 1846), 1557.

4. While we did what we were told, we never quite understood how our coats would protect us from a nuclear attack.

coronavirus may remind us that the Black Death, which wiped out a substantial part of the world's population, could be repeated, if not by this pandemic, then by another. Those who successfully predict catastrophes—the way Dostoevsky predicted what we now call “totalitarianism”—are in their time regarded as, at best, highly eccentric. They become prophets only in retrospect.

Perhaps this time the world really *is* on a precipice, with democracy, freedom, and other cherished principles at risk should it teeter in the wrong direction. While we do not see the present as the most dangerous of times, we do discern some serious threats with common features that need to be addressed. And the sooner, the better.

## Fundamentalism Abounds

So urgent . . . is the necessity of believing, that the fall of any system of mythology, will most probably be succeeded by the introduction of some other mode of superstition.

—EDWARD GIBBON, *DECLINE AND  
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE*<sup>5</sup>

We sense a danger in what we call a new “fundamentalism,” a term we use in a special sense elaborated at length in chapter 2. That fundamentalism has infected not only politics, but also many other areas of thought. Not so long ago, it seemed as if belief in “grand narratives,” or “metanarratives,” as Jean-François Lyotard observed, was over.<sup>6</sup> No longer would people rush to

5. In *English Poetry and Prose, 1660–1880: A Selection*, ed. Frank Brady and Martin Price (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), 397.

6. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv.

adopt theories that purport to explain everything (or, at least, everything pertaining to a whole domain of human experience). Also not so long ago, it was an unchallenged commonplace that cultures are undergoing a far-reaching secularization that, in spite of occasional resistance, is unstoppable. The rise of militant Islam, and what some have termed “fundamentalist Hinduism,” have called the “secularization thesis” into question. Where are the inevitabilities of yesteryear?

We often flatter ourselves that, when ideas or policies lead to terrible consequences, people eventually admit their error and change course. But, in matters touching their very sense of self, or a movement’s very reason for being, the opposite often happens; disconfirmation turns into confirmation. Failure, it is argued, was due to lack of sufficient rigor in executing the policy. That is the logic that led Stalin to proclaim the “intensification of the class struggle” after the Revolution, when no opposition was visible. Greater vigilance is demanded, and a bigger dose of the dubious medicine is administered. The more extreme the theory, the less is disconfirmation possible.

When people adopt extreme theories, they discover dangers that justify extreme actions. That is because such theories teach a way of viewing the world that (as we shall see) reveals only confirming evidence. When extreme and still more extreme action is taken, the result may indeed be horrific. What was meant to solve a serious problem creates a still more serious one. Call it “the self-fulfilling catastrophe.”

In the United States and Europe, discussions of political polarization are everywhere. The rise both of the far left and the far right poses a threat different in both degree and kind from that entailed by a bad policy decision, which might be corrected. Some of these movements may fall prey to forms of fundamentalist thinking that make correction impossible. Matters grow still worse when one fundamentalism confronts another.

Clinging to opposite poles, they accuse each other of all sins, including polarization.

Beyond the political arena, we see analogous conflicts among fundamentalisms. What might be called “market fundamentalism” (as opposed to a general inclination to market solutions) insists categorically, and on a priori grounds, on deploying market solutions everywhere economically possible. And not only there: it also applies market models to disciplines and areas of life remote from economics. These models are offered not as a contribution to another discipline, but as its replacement. Just as some sociobiologists have never met a human behavior they could not explain, so some economists have never encountered problems that could not best be solved by the tools of economics.

This market fundamentalism encounters an opposite one, a revival of the sort of thinking that the failure of the “socialist bloc” had seemingly consigned to what Leon Trotsky called “the dustbin of history.”<sup>7</sup> In this view, capitalism cannot be compassionate any more than the plague can be healthy. Some have described these opposites in terms of a generation gap—which, if true, seems as wide as the Grand Canyon.

We are speaking here not of arguments between those who favor either a market or a government solution to this or that problem, but to those who think categorically, so that the answer to any question is known as soon as the question is posed. The answer is always privatization or nationalization, drastically

7. When the Mensheviks walked out of the 1917 Congress of Soviets, Trotsky (as tradition has it) told them: “Go to the place where you belong from now on—the dustbin of history!” See William Safire, “On Language; Dust Heaps of History,” *New York Times*, October 16, 1983, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/16/magazine/on-language-dust-heaps-of-history.html>.

cutting or increasing regulations, radically lowering or raising taxes.

Categorical thinking admits no compromise and allows no correction in light of results. On the contrary, as we have noted, it makes the failure of a policy the reason for more of it. It is this kind of thinking, not just the bad solutions to which it might lead, that we find especially dangerous. While dangerous in itself, it is still more so because it prevents learning from experience. Alchemy failed to transmute base metals into gold, but this intellectual alchemy successfully converts reasons against a course of action into reasons for still more of it.

Some fundamentalisms cause more havoc than others. The political is usually the most dangerous, with the economic close behind. But when a given way of thinking becomes routine, it affects areas less vital but still significant. It is worth examining these areas to see how the fundamentalist way of thinking manifests itself. The more examples, the clearer it becomes. And, by the same token, if one can show what the alternative looks like in area after area, one might more successfully arrest the harmful tendency.

In our classes, we have seen students who adopt fundamentalist ways of thinking almost by default: not as a choice, but because they imagine that is just what thinking *is*. These students seem genuinely surprised that there are situations where one cannot find a uniquely correct answer, where one needs to make choices under uncertainty, and where those who recommend a different course of action might turn out to be right. By showing what other ways of thinking there might be, we have at least encouraged some of them, even if they remain fundamentalists, to be so more reflectively, precisely because what had been automatic has become a choice. As Mikhail Bakhtin liked to say, the old way of regarding things has become

“contested, contestable, and contesting.”<sup>8</sup> As we discuss in chapter 2, when that happens, people have moved from a “Ptolemaic universe,” which they regard as the unchallenged center of things, to a “Galilean” one, where theirs is but one of many planets—or as sociologists like to say, their world has lost its “taken-for-grantedness.”<sup>9</sup>

Some students take the next step and recognize that the more circumspect alternatives we offer may be better. Each time students recognize them, they become more thoughtful. In a course we teach together, we treat a variety of disciplines, including economics, city planning, history, and philosophy. In the present volume, we turn our attention to two others: religion and literary study. The fate of the world does not depend, as English professors sometimes seem ready to maintain, on the nature of the canon or of interpretation, but the issues are still significant. They happen to display one or another version of fundamentalism, different from but recognizably resembling those we have seen in politics and economics.

We wonder about the persistence of an old conflict in religion, which has been with us for a century or more, but may now be reviving and intensifying. Like the early twentieth-century Christian fundamentalists, who invented this sobriquet, there are those who see no alternative to an unchangeable idea of the sacred and what it demands, other than a radical relativism that makes Scripture and faith mean whatever seems most in accord with present beliefs. By the same token, those

8. Mikhail Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 332.

9. See Peter Berger and Anton Zijderveld, *In Praise of Doubt: How to Have Convictions Without Becoming a Fanatic* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 13–17, 71.

who think that Scripture means whatever current thought needs it to mean see no alternative to their view but rigid adherence to ideas that at best make no sense and, at worst, are morally repellent. The idea of a principled middle ground seems like cowardice or intellectual inconsistency. In a pattern we shall see repeated, a positive fundamentalism encounters a negative fundamentalism, and ne'er the twain shall meet.

In the study of the humanities, a similar dynamic repeats itself in various issues. This is hardly surprising for disciplines that abandoned structuralism, with its aspiration to be a theory of everything, for deconstruction and other theories of nothing. Almost overnight, a purported hard science of culture was replaced by a radical skepticism denying the possibility of knowledge. One would have made even Plato smile, the other even Hume blush. One might suppose that a radical skeptic would, like Hume, be anything but militant, but, when we are dealing with fundamentalisms, the very reverse is the case. There is such a thing as missionary nihilism, and in the humanities we have seen it.

The questions surrounding “the canon” pertain not just to what works should be included in it, or what qualities make literary works great, but to the very notion of great literature. In literary studies there seem to be no positive fundamentalists left, or, at least, none that admit to being so. Negative fundamentalism reigns supreme. Few would defend, at least publicly, the proposition that the determinate meaning of a text is to be found either in the author’s intention or in the text itself. The very notion of determinate meaning, like that of objective value, is suspect. It is not that nonsubjective meaning and value are difficult to ascertain, and that evidence can point in different directions; rather, they are, like God for Nietzsche—dead. Issues remote from these, which are not really literary at all,

have consequently taken their place. Literary scholars, who for decades have been denouncing, deconstructing, and decolonizing the canon, and who have established the orthodoxy that literary value is a myth, wonder why enrollments in literature courses have declined. Somewhere there must be atheist pastors baffled by their empty pews.

In our view, great literature, which surely exists, teaches a lesson the very opposite of fundamentalisms, positive or negative. That is especially true of the great realist novels, which often take fundamentalist styles of thinking as their topic (“the novel of ideas”). As we shall see, all literary genres have presuppositions—you don’t write a saint’s life if you don’t believe in holiness, or an epic if you scorn heroism—and the realist novel presumes the irreducible complexity of individual psychology, culture, society, and ethical questions. The finest novelists (Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Joseph Conrad, Henry James, George Eliot, and Jane Austen) offer readers marvelous experiences in nonfundamentalist thinking. Their works contain a deep wisdom, a real alternative to fundamentalisms, and we shall therefore be returning to them frequently. If we allow them to teach us to think more complexly, we can address many other questions more wisely.

We suspect that these new fundamentalisms, in politics, economics, religion and literature, demand a common response. It is time to be sure at least that fundamentalism is not adopted by default.

Talking with colleagues and students, we sometimes have the impression that they have no clear idea as to what an alternative way of thinking might be. They seem to suppose either that the only alternative to a positive fundamentalism is a negative one, or that anything else is at best makeshift accommodation. But it is not true that anything short of a totalizing theory is somehow

flawed, at best a stopgap until such a theory is found. Aristotle was right to maintain that “it is the mark of an educated person to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits.”<sup>10</sup> It is therefore important to clarify what alternatives are available, and why they are superior to totalisms in explaining human affairs, understanding specific people and cultures, formulating policies, and judging moral actions. To be effective, policies must respond to reality and therefore may go badly wrong when they are based on premises that look neat, appear symmetrical, and sound magnificent, but are untrue.

The Bolsheviks thought that human nature was infinitely malleable and perfectible to those with the right theory, who could be, in Stalin’s famous phrase, “engineers of human souls” (inzhinery chelovecheskikh dush).<sup>11</sup> Immanuel Kant maintained the opposite view: “From the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.”<sup>12</sup> When we build with such material, we must not assume all logs are straight and must look for the intransigent knots. We hope that this book will be a lesson in the carpentry appropriate for crooked timber.

10. Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 936.

11. From Stalin’s speech in Maxim Gorky’s apartment, October 26, 1932, as cited in David Joravsky, “The Construction of the Stalinist Psyche,” in *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 127. For the Russian text, see <https://citaty.su/inzhinery-chelovecheskikh-dush>.

12. Immanuel Kant, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, proposition 6, in *On History*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977), 17–18, where the line is given as: “From such crooked wood as man is made of, nothing perfectly straight can be built.” To render the German (Aus so krummem Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann nichts ganz Gerades gezimmert werden), we prefer Isaiah Berlin’s version. See Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas* (New York: Knopf, 1991), xi.

## INDEX

- Abraham, 189–90, 189n, 194, 208–9
- adherents of fundamentalisms:  
contempt/disdain shown by, to  
nonadherents, xix, 30–31, 33;  
monitoring of, 108; psychology of,  
33–34, 82–83, 125–26; reversal of  
fortunes of (becoming the enemy),  
78–83. *See also* nonadherents of  
fundamentalisms
- Affordable Care Act, 162
- Afghanistan, 16
- afterlife, 211
- Agamemnon, 192
- agnosticism, xvii, 35, 36
- Aitken, George A., 66n135
- Alexandria, library of, 199
- Algerian Armed Islamic Group, 16
- Ali, Tariq, 20
- allegory, 206–7, 216
- all-or-nothing mentality: about  
climate change, 146–56; about free  
speech, 254–55; about politics,  
256; about science, 90–100; Soviet  
thought characterized by, 77, 94,  
105, 106–7. *See also* compromise;  
extremism; us vs. them mentality
- Almond, Gabriel A. *See Strong Religion*
- Al Qaeda, 16
- Alter, Robert, 190, 195–96
- alternatives to fundamentalism:  
casuistry as instance of, 57–65;  
dialogue as chief among, 70–74,  
279–83; encounters with, 7–8;  
Erasmus-Luther exchange as  
instance of, 51–56; features of, xvii,  
10–11; fundamentalist attacks on,  
xvii; ignorance of, 10; novels as  
instance of, 65–73, 244
- animals, religious classification of,  
216–18
- anthropology, 86–87
- Antigone, 209–10
- anti-Semitism, 277
- apocalyptic thinking: attraction of,  
1–2; evidence when subjected to, 5;  
in politics, 280; presentism implicit  
in, 2–3; religion as basis for, 2–3, 35;  
successful predictions and, 3–4;  
theories underlying, 5. *See also*  
revolutionism
- Appleby, R. Scott. *See Strong Religion*
- argument. *See* criticism; dialogue;  
disagreement
- argumentum ad lapidem*, 38
- Aristophanes, *The Clouds*, 118
- Aristotle: on ethics, 58–62; on  
necessity and contingency, 257, 259;  
on purpose, 225; on reasoning, 11,  
43, 58–62

- Armenia, 170
- Armstrong, Karen, 16–17, 21, 26
- atheists, 10, 29, 36, 114, 201, 203, 226, 229–30, 242, 242n, 248
- Auden, W. H., 144
- Austen, Jane, 10, 113, 207, 240, 244, 267; *Emma*, 268; *Pride and Prejudice*, 71–72, 245, 268
- autonomy, 204–5
- Avenarius, Richard, 106
- Bacon, Francis, 26, 27, 40, 92
- Bakhtin, Mikhail, 7–8, 70–73, 193, 232–35, 244, 260–61, 263, 268, 272
- Bakunin, Michael, 248–49, 278
- Barthes, Roland, “The Death of the Author,” 251–53
- Bazelon, Emily, 48n
- Becker, Gary, 24, 31, 45, 131
- Bellamy, Edward, *Looking Backward, 2000–1887*, 27, 110, 240
- Bentham, Jeremy, 23, 24, 57
- Berger, Peter, 36
- Berkeley, Bishop, 40–41
- Berlin, Isaiah, 22, 280
- Bhagavad-Gita*, 264
- Bible: authorship of, 13–14, 51, 193, 212–15, 236; canonization of, 213–15; core values of, 204; dialogic approach to, 236; inerrancy of, 13–14, 43, 212, 275–76; interpretation of, 13–15, 43–44, 52–53, 82n, 192–94, 202, 206–15, 232; language use in, 226–28; meaning of/belief in, 14, 212–15, 228, 232, 236; moral questionability of stories in, 189–94, 197, 202–12; moral wisdom sought in, 214–15; relevance of, 197, 200–201; sacredness/holiness as value in, 204–5, 217–19; science in relation to, 26; translations of, 52, 195–97, 201, 237
- Biden, Joe, 274
- Bierce, Ambrose, 20, 264
- Bill of Rights, 194–95, 236n
- Black Death, 4
- Blake, William, 42–43
- Blanchard, Charles, 46
- Bolsheviks, 11, 34–35, 77, 79, 198, 232
- Boot, Max, 141
- Boswell, James, 40–41
- Brexit, 141
- Breyer, Stephen, 48n
- Bryan, William Jennings, 15
- Bukharin, Nikolai, 79
- Bulgakov, Mikhail, 120; *The Master and Margarita*, 248
- Bush, George H. W., 123
- Butler, R. A., 274
- Buttigieg, Pete, 81
- calendar, 238
- Calvin, John, 128, 192
- capitalism, 6, 136
- carbon emissions, 145–56
- Carlyle, Thomas, 165
- Carroll, Lewis, *Through the Looking-Glass*, 182, 242
- Case, Shirley Jackson, 14
- casuistry (case-based reasoning), 58–70, 74, 255, 281–82, 281n13. *See also* practical reasoning
- categorical thinking, 6–7
- Catholicism, 19, 43
- central planning. *See* command economies
- certainty: criticism in relation to, 103–9; dangers resulting from strong commitment to, xix, 35–36, 38–39, 85–86, 89; disconfirming

- evidence vs., 32–33; as fundamentalist characteristic, xvi, 7, 22–35, 85–86, 90; hatred linked to, 126–27; morality and, xix, 34–35; novels as antidote to worldview based on, 73, 114; opinion in relation to, 85; popular misunderstanding of, 7, 90; psychological appeal of, 125–26; science in relation to, 90–92; simplification linked to, 24–25. *See also* complexity and uncertainty; truth
- Charisma* (magazine), 81
- Chaucer, Geoffrey, 185
- Chechnya, 16
- Chekhov, Anton, 138–39, 283, 283n15;  
*The Cherry Orchard*, 139, 241–42;  
“Enemies,” 283–88; *Uncle Vanya*,  
138–39, 241–42
- Chicherin, Georgy, 106
- Christian fundamentalism: certainty  
as feature of, 8, 14, 31; inerrancy  
of scripture in, 13–14, 43, 275–76;  
nonreligious fundamentalisms  
compared to, 28; in politics, 81–82;  
scientific claims made by, 26–27,  
31–32; truth as perspicuous in, 39,  
43–44, 46
- Clausewitz, Carl von, 273
- climate change, 95–96, 145–56
- Clinton, Hillary, 124n, 128
- clock parable, 181–82, 200, 236
- Club of Rome, 94
- Coase theorem, 130n1
- “Come, let us reason together,” 77
- command economies: failures of, 132,  
135–36, 158, 167–75, 279; Soviet  
Union as, 135, 167–74
- Common Sense philosophy, 26, 40–41
- Communist Party, 33–34. *See also*  
Marxism-Leninism; Soviet Union
- compassion, 138, 202–4. *See also*  
empathy; sympathy
- complexity and uncertainty: decision  
making in situations of, 7; dialogue  
as tool suited for, 56; domains  
characterized by, 59; economic life  
characterized by, 174–75; fear of,  
54, 115, 125, 280; negative capability  
and, 221; the novel’s worldview  
based on, 10, 66, 68–69, 110–14, 116,  
207–8, 240–41, 243–44, 261–72, 282;  
opinion—not dogmatism—suited  
for, 85, 100–101; practical—not  
theoretical—reasoning suited for,  
59, 175; religious faith as response  
to, 231; satire’s worldview based  
on, 116; science—in contrast to  
pseudoscience—characterized  
by, 95
- complicity, 81–83
- compromise: democracy character-  
ized by, xvi, 64, 274, 280; hostility  
toward, xvi, xvii, 7, 77, 105. *See also*  
all-or-nothing mentality
- Comte, Auguste, 23–24, 86, 89
- Condorcet, Marquis de, 25, 57
- confirmation/disconfirmation, 5, 32,  
53, 120
- Confucianism, 131, 198
- Conquest, Robert, 172
- Conrad, Joseph, 10
- conservatism: criticism of, during  
World War I, 14–15
- constitutions, 194–95, 213, 238. *See also*  
U.S. Constitution
- Corbyn, Jeremy, 158
- COVID-19 pandemic, xvii–xviii, 2,  
3–4, 30, 96–100, 175, 246
- criticism: certainty in relation to,  
103–9; as feature of dialogue, 55–56;

- criticism (*continued*)  
function of, in fundamentalist worldview, 104–5; necessity of, 100–103; others' experiences as source of, 74, 100–103, 278; refinement of thought by means of, 74, 84–85, 100–103. *See also* dialogue; disagreement; higher criticism, of the Bible; perspective-taking
- “crooked timber of humanity” (Kant), 11, 280
- Crusades, 19
- Cuban Missile Crisis, 3
- Cultural Revolution, 115
- cultural studies, 253
- culture: dialogic perspective on, 74; literature as lens on, 263–65; moral differences in, 202–5
- culture wars, 239
- Dagestan, 16
- danger, attributed when fundamentalist claims are not embraced, 3, 5, 98–100
- Daniel, 188
- Darwinism/evolution, 15, 27, 45, 49, 88, 92–93, 216n62, 224
- David, 192
- Davies, William, 141
- death, 242–43
- death of the author, 251–53
- deconstruction, 9
- Defoe, Daniel, 65–66, 282; *Moll Flanders*, 66, 240
- democracy: characteristic features of, xvi, xvii, xviii, 77, 273–74; compromise as feature of, xvi, 64, 274, 280; dialogic thinking as feature of, 74, 76–77, 84–85, 282–83; disagreement as feature of, 76, 84; fundamentalism in tension with, 84–89; multivocal nature of, 122; opinion as basis of, 84; threats to, xvi, xviii, 4, 74, 83, 124, 277, 280, 282–83
- democratic centralism, 79
- Democrats: attitudes of, 75–76, 80–81; and climate change, 153; Republicans' views of, 75–76, 140
- Descartes, René, 42, 44, 57, 60
- dialectical materialism, 28–29, 32–34, 42, 106, 258. *See also* Marxism-Leninism
- dialogue: as basis of alternative to fundamentalism, 70–74, 279–83; benefits of, 55; conflicting conceptions of, 54–56; culture and society seen in perspective of, 74; decline of, xvii; democracy based on, 74, 76–77, 84–85, 282–83; facts' role in, xviii; features of, 55–56; meaning attained through, 232–36; the novel form and, 70–73, 111, 272; opinion as basis of, 55–56; religious/spiritual, 236; requirements for, xix; significance of, xvii, xix; threats to, xix. *See also* criticism
- Diamond, Jared, 24
- Dickens, Charles: *Bleak House*, 156–57, 242; *Great Expectations*, 245
- dictionaries, 182–86
- Diderot, Denis, 111
- disagreement: as feature of democracy, 76, 84; nonexistent in utopias, 110; not countenanced by fundamentalist outlooks, 79, 89, 98–100. *See also* criticism
- disciplinary fallacy, 183–84
- disconfirmation. *See* confirmation/disconfirmation

- divisiveness and polarization: con-  
temporary manifestations of, 5;  
extremism as cause of, 5–6, 64–65;  
group-based, 128n93; human attrac-  
tion to, xv; social and political  
effects of, xv–xvi
- Dixon, A. C., 13, 26–27
- “dog whistle,” 109
- Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 4, 10, 195, 240–41;  
*The Brothers Karamazov*, 114, 125–27,  
148, 241–42; *Crime and Punishment*,  
187–88, 242, 245; *The Idiot*, 229, 243;  
*Notes from Underground*, 119–20,  
241, 260; *The Possessed*, 37, 114–16,  
240–41, 280
- “dotted lines,” 272
- double vision (thought), 220–21
- double voicing, 267–72
- doubt, 33, 36, 125–26. *See also*  
skepticism
- Douglas, Mary, 215–17
- Dryden, John, 185
- Dukakis, Michael, 123
- “dustbin of history” (Trotsky), 6, 278,  
289
- earth, age of, 221, 225–26
- Ecclesiastes, book of, 192, 213, 238
- economics: choice as fundamental  
in, 136–39; consensus and middle  
grounds in, 159–62, 176; of con-  
temporary social issues, 145–65;  
disciplinary fallacy in, 183–84;  
and efficiency, 138–39, 147, 154–55,  
161, 167, 172; fairness in, 132, 132n,  
165–67; government’s role in,  
129–30, 134–36, 165–66; human  
behavior explained by principles  
of, 24, 131, 134–37, 149, 178–79,  
243–44; humanism and, 134–39,  
165–67, 180; literary value from  
perspective of, 249–50; practical  
reasoning in, 131, 175, 179–80;  
predictions concerning, 94; and  
scarcity, 137–39, 145, 151, 156;  
scientific claims made by, 258;  
Soviet experiment in, 167–74;  
trade-offs in, 136–37, 137n, 139–40,  
145–49, 160, 281. *See also* command  
economies; market fundamentalism
- Ehrlich, Paul, 94–95
- Einstein, Albert, 91
- elections, xvi, 89
- Eliot, George, 10, 240–41; *Middlemarch*,  
67–69, 112–13, 240–41, 262, 265–66,  
272
- empathy, 73, 265–67, 272, 278, 288.  
*See also* compassion; sympathy
- “endless variety of men’s minds,” 38
- “end of history” (Fukuyama), 136
- Engels, Friedrich, 24, 28–29, 32, 47,  
48–49, 88, 93, 166, 166n48, 202,  
258–59; *Socialism: Utopian and  
Scientific*, 259
- “engineers of human souls” (Stalin), 11
- epistemology. *See* knowledge/  
epistemology
- Erasmus, Desiderius, 22, 51–57, 74, 281
- ethics. *See* morality
- eugenics, 27, 92
- Euripides, 45; *Iphigenia in Aulis*, 192
- evidence, fundamentalism’s treatment  
of, 5, 9, 20, 32–33, 49, 109
- evil, ascribed to nonadherents of  
fundamentalism, 23, 34, 64, 77, 83,  
86, 104, 105, 109, 121, 127
- evolution. *See* Darwinism/evolution
- Existentialism, 241
- experience. *See* perception/experience,  
theories of

- expertise: ineffectual use of, 143, 166–68; positive use of, 99, 144, 176
- externalities, 129, 129–30n
- “extraneous historical forces” (Engels), 166
- extremism: in economics, 140–42; epistemological, 36; polarization resulting from, 5–6, 64–65; in public opinion, 76; silos as contributing factor to, 122; status quo as target of, 140; vicious cycle of, 5, 82–83; violence resulting from, 114–15. *See also* all-or-nothing mentality
- “eye for an eye,” 211
- Facebook, xv
- facts: in analyses of contemporary social issues, 145–65; in contemporary information environment, 141–42; cultural or relativistic perspective on, 37; numbers regarded as, 143–45; reinterpretation of myths as, by fundamentalisms, 26, 29–30; revelation of truth behind, by fundamentalisms, 33–34; role of, in dialogue and argument, xviii, 180; values in relation to, 29, 215, 224
- faculty, university, 136–37
- fairness, 132, 132n, 165–67
- faith, religious, 19, 25, 212, 225, 228–31, 243
- “false choices,” 137, 139, 145
- false consciousness, 47
- falsifiability, of science, 32, 90–91, 278
- family, 202–3
- family resemblances, theoretical concept of, 17–18, 20
- famine, 94–95
- fanaticism, vii, 22, 124–25, 199, 240. *See also* ideological thinking
- Farias, Bert, 81–82, 82n
- Ferguson, Neil, 96–99, 97n33
- Fielding, Henry, 263
- Finnish Green Party, 150
- First Amendment, 194–95, 254
- Fish, Stanley, 254–56
- Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 220
- Flaubert, Gustave, *Madame Bovary*, 245
- Floyd, George, xvii
- Foucault, Michel, “What Is an Author?,” 252–53n24
- fox vs. hedgehog analogy, 22–23, 44, 52, 58
- fracking, 150, 155
- free indirect discourse. *See* double voicing
- Freemasonry, 38
- free speech, 1–2, 56, 254–55
- free trade, 160–61
- French Revolution, 82
- Freud, Sigmund, 23, 24, 47, 48, 51, 87–88, 241
- Freudianism, 28, 29, 32, 48
- Fukuyama, Francis, 136
- fundamentalism: binary worldview of, xvi–xvii, 9, 35, 36–38, 77, 105; categorical thinking and certainty as characteristics of, xvi, 6–7, 22–35, 85–86, 90, 277; coining of the word, 15; conception and evolution of, 12–15; contempt/disdain for nonadherents as feature of, xix, 30–31, 33, 104–7; dangers of, 4; democracy in tension with, 84–89; domains of thought affected by, xvi–xvii, 4, 8, 275–79; economic (*see* market-based in *this entry*); epistemological, 23; everyday manifestations of, 7–8; evidence as handled by, 5, 9,

- 20, 32–33, 49, 109; features of, xvi–xvii, 12–13, 15, 22–35, 39–51, 275–79; “hedgehogs” as example of, 22–23; of the left, 276, 278–79; in literature, 9–10, 232, 239–40, 246–47, 264, 277, 279; market-based, 6, 19, 129–38, 274; negative perceptions of, 15–16, 18–20; novels as alternative worldview to, 10, 65–73, 111–16; pacific, 21, 47; political, 5–6, 16, 19–20, 77, 120–22, 274, 277; relativism compared to, 8–9, 36–38; religion as basis for, 279; religious, 8, 13–14, 16, 206, 274; science as type of, 25–26; scientific claims made by, 23, 26–28, 30–32; in social science, 89; sympathy for difference not a feature of, 39; synthetic, 50; text/revelation as foundation of, 47–51, 194–200; utopian character of, 274; varieties of, 16–19. *See also* alternatives to fundamentalism; Christian fundamentalism; negative fundamentalism; positive fundamentalism
- Fundamental Project (American Academy of Arts and Sciences), 17
- “The Fundamentals” (pamphlet series), 13, 26–27
- futuribles, 3
- Galilean world view, 8
- Genesis, book of, 189
- Genghis Khan, 3
- genres, 260–63
- Germany, energy policies and use of, 149–50
- Gettysburg Address, 196
- Gibbon, Edward, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 2–4, 199
- Glassner, Barry, 1
- global pandemic. *See* COVID-19 pandemic
- God: in Abraham story, 208; contemporary lack of belief in, 201; death of, 9; humans’ knowledge of, 52–53; Islamic conception of, 19; science in relation to, 215; secular versions of, 28, 90; as source of truth, 23, 26, 43–44, 50
- God substitute, 28, 90
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 263
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 173
- government, economic role of, 129–30, 134–36, 165–66. *See also* command economies
- grand narratives, 4–5
- Greek romance, 260–62
- Greek tragedy, 44–45, 191–92, 209–10
- Green New Deal, 151
- Green Party (Finland), 150
- green revolution, 94–95
- Gresham’s law, 142
- “group polarization” (Sunstein), 128n93
- Gupta, Sunetra, 99
- Gusev, S. I., 108
- Halévy, Élie, 23
- Hamas, 16
- harm, principle of, 204
- Harvard faculty, politics of, 137n
- hatred: certainty linked to, 126–27; as motivating factor, 75, 126–28, 288; in politics, 76–77, 80–81, 83, 109, 273–74, 287–88; socialization into, 122, 124
- Head Start program, 159
- health policy, 162
- hedgehog vs. fox analogy, 22–23, 44, 52, 58
- Hegel, G.W.F., 22, 28–29

- “heretic in the truth” (Milton), 90, 152
- Heschel, Abraham Joshua, 201
- higher criticism, of the Bible, 13–15, 51, 213–14
- Hill, Howard, 167–68
- Hinduism, fundamentalist, 5
- history: in cosmic perspective, 221; end of, 136; human control of, 166n48; narrative foundation of, 258; particularities and contingencies as subject matter of, 60, 120, 258; scientific approaches to, 24, 32, 77, 93, 258–59. *See also* dialectical materialism
- “history is like foreign travel” (Descartes), 60
- Hitler, Adolf, 3, 126, 128
- Hobbes, Thomas, 178–79
- Hoffer, Eric, *The True Believer*, 124–28, 124n
- Holbach, Baron d’, 57
- holiness, 204–5
- Holton, Gerald, 25
- Homer, 206, 213; *The Iliad*, 212–13, 263–64
- homosexuality, 81–82, 82n, 194, 219
- Hordern, William, 15
- human affairs: complexity and uncertainty of, 111, 243–44, 259–60, 280–81; dialogue as essential to progress in, 56, 100–101; fundamentalist claims of certainty about, 86–87, 92, 117, 168, 278; non-fundamentalist explanations of, 11; the novel’s exploration of, 111, 280–81; practical—not theoretical—reasoning suited for, 60, 117, 175, 278, 280. *See also* human behavior
- human behavior: economic explanations of, 24, 131, 134–37, 149, 178–79, 243–44; evolution of, 45; fallibility and irrationality of, 119–20, 130, 177–80, 243–44; fundamentalist claims of certainty about, 11, 23–25, 32, 86–87, 130; non-fundamentalist explanations of, 10–11; the novel’s exploration of, 10, 207, 243–44, 263–64; other-directed, 179, 266–67, 266n52; sociobiological explanations of, 6, 24–25; utilitarian explanations of, 119. *See also* human affairs
- humanism and the humanities: and climate change, 149–50; decline of, 246–56, 246n, 275; and economics, 134–39, 165–67, 180; Erasmus as exemplar of, 51–57; and modernity, 57–58
- human nature, 11
- Hume, David, 9, 40; “Of Miracles,” 226–28
- Huxley, Aldous, *Brave New World*, 32
- Huxley, Julian, 168
- idealism, 41–42
- ideological thinking: dangers of, 121; Marxist criticism of, 32, 47; novels as antidote to, 73, 113–16. *See also* fanaticism
- ignorance, ascribed to nonadherents of fundamentalist worldview, 23, 33–34, 86, 89, 93, 116, 274
- Imperial College, London, 96–99
- implied reader, 264
- income inequality, 156–60
- India, 16
- individuality, 267
- individualism, 131–32, 204–5

- inerrancy: of Bible, 13–14, 43, 212, 275–76; of fundamental texts, 47–51; of Koran, 17; of Lenin’s thought, 48–49; of Torah, 17
- insanity, ascribed to nonadherents of fundamentalist worldview, 46, 89, 106, 274
- intellectuals/intelligentsia, 90, 92, 117–20, 138, 179–80, 188, 241
- “intensification of the class struggle” (Stalin), 5, 86
- intentional fallacy, 251
- “interim ethics” (Schweitzer), 203
- International Monetary Fund, 133
- “invisible hand” (Smith), 132–34
- “Ionian enchantment,” 25
- Iphigenia, 191–92
- Iran, 16
- irony, 114
- Isaiah, xv
- Islam, 5, 17, 19
- Jacobin* (magazine), 274
- James, Henry, 10
- James, William, 245, 259
- Janik, Alan, 223–24
- Jephthah, 189–91
- Jews and Judaism: anti-Semitism and, 277; biblical interpretation and moral dilemmas in, 48, 189–94, 189n, 201, 205, 210–12; Reform tradition of, 237; source text of, 50, 50n94, 212–15. *See also* Bible
- Job, book of, 44, 71–72, 192, 213
- John of Patmos, 279
- Johnson, Lyndon, 77
- Johnson, Samuel, 40–41, 158, 185–86
- Jouvenel, Bertrand de, 3
- Judges, book of, 189
- judgment, 62, 281
- Kael, Pauline, 122
- Kamenev, Lev, 106
- Kant, Immanuel, 11, 40, 42, 280
- Karaites, 48, 193
- Katsenelinboigen, Aron, 49, 168–69, 174
- Keats, John, 221
- Kelvin, Lord, 143
- Kennedy, John F., 76–77
- Keynes, John Maynard, 120
- Khmer Rouge, 198
- Kim Il Sung, 48
- King, Martin Luther, Jr., xix; “I Have a Dream,” 196
- King James Bible, 196, 201
- knowledge/epistemology: criticism as means to refining, 74, 84–85, 100–103; ethics and, 58–70; evolutionary perspective on, 45; fundamentalist approach to, 23, 120; limits of, 44–45, 53; numbers regarded as criterion of, 143; questioning of possibility of, 9, 39, 44–45; realism in, 42; relation of mind to world, 40–42, 44; silos as hindrance to, 121–22, 128n93; theoretical vs. practical reasoning, 58–70. *See also* certainty; ideological thinking; truth; wisdom
- Koestler, Arthur, 33–34, 47, 82; *Darkness at Noon*, 78–80, 240
- Koran, 17, 50
- Kugel, James, 206, 212–15, 213, 237
- laissez-faire, 132–33, 134n9, 168
- language: as source of texts, rather than authors, 251–52; standards in, 182–86, 237; use and function of, in religion, 226–28, 231, 237–38
- La Rochefoucauld, François de, 117

- law, applications of, 60–61
- Laws, Curtis Lee, 15
- Lee, Harper, *To Kill a Mockingbird*, 245
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 57
- Lenin, V. I.: absolute conformity required by, 77; compassion shunned by, 202; death of, 79; domination of opponents by, 104–6, 256, 273; and free speech, 256; inerrancy of, 48–49; philosophical positions of, 29, 41–42, 93–94, 95, 106–7; violence attributable to, 121. *See also* Marxism-Leninism
- Leonard, Wolfgang, 49
- “let justice be done, though the world perish,” 148
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 87
- Leviticus, book of, 194, 215–18
- Leviticus Rabbah*, 211
- liberalism, xvii
- libertarianism, 131–32
- Lightfoot, Lori, xviii
- The Limits of Growth* (Club of Rome), 94
- Lincoln, Abraham, Gettysburg Address, 196
- literature: academic study of, 246–56, 246n, 275; assumptions underlying, 66, 116, 260–63; canon of, 8–10, 195, 195n, 199, 232, 247, 264–65, 275, 277; concept of, 20; cultural differences revealed by, 263–65; destruction of, 198; dialogic approach to, 232–36; experience of reading as essential to meaning of, 73, 246, 265, 267–68; fundamentalism in, 9–10, 232, 239–40, 246–47, 264, 277, 279; genres of, 260–63; meaning of, 9–10, 232–33, 244–47, 251–53; moral “equivalents” in, 207–12; perspective-taking enabled and encouraged by, 207–12, 243–44, 264–72; politically-based theory and criticism of, 253–56; potentiality in, 232–35, 245; Russian, 195, 197–98, 232; timeless works of, 195, 197–99, 233–35. *See also* novels
- Locke, John, 40
- logos, 26, 29
- Lucretius, 22
- Luther, Martin, 48, 51–56, 74, 126–27, 128, 277
- Lyotard, Jean-François, 4
- Mach, Ernst, 106
- Machen, J. Gresham, 27
- Macron, Emmanuel, 158
- Magna Carta, 213
- Malinowski, Bronislaw, 23, 30, 86–87
- Mao Zedong, 48, 84, 115
- market fundamentalism, 129–38, 274; assumptions about human behavior underlying, 131; basic principles of, 6, 129–30, 132–34; certainty as characteristic of, 276; critique of, 133; extension of, into other domains, 131; government’s role according to, 129–30, 134–36; Marxism-Leninism vs., 132; misconceptions of, 19, 134n9, 135–36; moral aspects of, 131–32; origin of concept, 130–31
- Marsden, George, 13, 15, 26
- Marx, Karl, 24, 32, 41, 48–49, 51, 88, 93, 104, 165, 169, 202, 258–59
- Marxism-Leninism: conformity demanded by, 89; market fundamentalism vs., 132; mindset and thought patterns characteristic of, 32–34, 47–49, 89, 93–94, 105–9, 280;

- objectivity in, 33–34, 78; pedagogical filter of, 198; as pseudoscience, 28; religion-like character of, 21; Socialist Workers' Party endorsement of, 140. *See also* dialectical materialism; Lenin, V. I.; Soviet Union
- mass movements, 124–27
- materialism, 42. *See also* dialectical materialism
- Mayakovsky, Vladimir, “It’s Too Early to Rejoice,” 198
- McCain, John, 274
- McGurn, William, 134n9
- meaning: of the Bible, 14, 212–15, 228; dialogue as means to, 232–36; of literature, 9–10, 232–33, 244–47, 251–53; religious/spiritual, 228–31, 236; science and, 216, 221–26, 228; tradition as source of, 46, 48, 124, 187, 192–93, 200–201, 210–13, 232, 237
- measurement and numbers, as criteria of truth/importance, 143–45, 176
- Medicare, 162
- Mencken, H. L., 276
- Menshevism, 104, 106
- metanarratives, 4–5
- Michelson-Morley experiment, 91
- middle ground: in contemporary sociopolitical world, 64; in economics, 159–62; as target of fundamentalists, xvii, 9, 35, 36–38, 77; as target of Soviets, xvii, 36
- Midrash, 39n70, 189n, 190, 193, 210–11
- Mill, John Stuart, 84–85, 89, 100–101, 204, 278
- millenarianism, 13
- Milton, John, 84, 90, 152, 254
- mind. *See* knowledge/epistemology
- minimum wage, 160
- “minutiae of mental make,” 113
- miracles, 226–28
- missionary nihilism, 9
- modernity, 57–58
- monotheism, 19
- Montaigne, Michel de, 22, 57–58, 281
- morality: Adam Smith on, 178–79; Bible seen as source of, 214–15; biblical stories in tension with, 189–94, 197, 202–12; certainty and, xix, 34–35; cultural variation in, 202–5; “equivalents” in, 207–12, 219–20, 266–67; individualist perspective in, 131–32, 205; market fundamentalism and, 131–32; nature in relation to, 29–30; the novel’s treatment of, 65–70, 66n136, 112, 282; political fundamentalist perspective on, 78–80; science in relation to, 29, 215, 221–25; standards in, 187–88; type of reasoning suitable for, 58–70, 74. *See also* casuistry; human affairs; practical reasoning
- Morris, William, *News from Nowhere*, 110, 111, 240
- Morson, Gary Saul, and Morton Schapiro, *Cents and Sensibility*, 134, 243, 257, 268
- Muller, Jerry Z., 143
- Mussolini, Benito, 84
- mysteries, 231, 238
- mystery, 126, 221
- mythos, 26, 29
- narrativeness, 258, 260, 263. *See also* stories
- Nash, Diane, xix
- nationalist fundamentalism, 277
- nativism, 277

- natural gas, 147–50, 155  
nature, 28–30  
“nature takes no leaps” (Darwin), 92  
Nazis, 202  
Nebuchadnezzar, 188  
negative capability, 221  
negative fundamentalism: all-or-nothing character of, 35–39, 64, 272; characteristics of, xvi, 35–36; in literary studies, 9–10, 246–47, 264, 275, 277, 279; positive vs., 9, 10; in religion, 279; skepticism contrasted with, 36  
neoliberalism, 136, 138, 165  
New Criticism, 251  
Newman, John Henry, 204n38  
*New Republic* (magazine), 94, 146  
news, 124  
*Newsweek* (magazine), 81  
Newton, Isaac, 23, 25, 26, 86, 91, 215  
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 9, 15, 202  
nihilism, 9  
Nixon, Richard, 122  
nonadherents of fundamentalisms:  
contempt/disdain for, xix, 30–31, 33, 104–7; as evil, 23, 34, 64, 77, 83, 104, 105, 109; as ignorant, 23, 33–34, 86, 89, 93, 116, 274; as insane, 46, 89, 106, 274. *See also* adherents of fundamentalisms  
*Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, 253  
novels: alternatives to fundamentalism displayed in, 10, 65–73, 111–16; assumptions underlying, 66; complexity of world and individuals reflected in, 10, 66, 68–69, 111–14, 116, 207–8, 240–41, 243–44, 261–72, 282; dialogic character of, 70–73, 111, 272; historicity of, 262–63; moral concerns of, 65–70, 66n135, 112, 282; realist, 10, 66–73, 111–16, 240, 261–62, 266; utopian, 24, 27, 110–11, 113, 240–41. *See also* literature  
nuclear power, 146, 150, 154  
numbers. *See* measurement and numbers, as criteria of truth/importance  
Obama, Barack, 146, 155  
Obamacare, 162  
objectivity, in Marxism-Leninism, 33–34, 78  
Occupy Wall Street, 158  
Oedipus, 29, 44  
“on the whole and for the most part” (Aristotle), 59, 131, 175, 276  
opinion: criticism as necessary element of, 100–101, 278; democracy based on, 84; dialogue based on, 55–56; negative views of, 54, 85; in novels, 111; positive views of, 55, 84; practical reasoning based on, 65; provisional nature of, 55, 84; in utopias, 110–11  
originalism, in constitutional interpretation, 48n  
Orwell, George, 119, 120; 1984, 78  
Packer, J. I., 15–16, 26, 37, 43–44  
pandemic. *See* COVID-19 pandemic  
paraphrase, richness of great texts not susceptible to, 72, 232, 233, 244–46, 263  
particularity: in Bible stories, 206; history’s concern with, 60, 120, 258; the novel’s concern with, 71, 244, 265, 267; practical reasoning’s concern with, 61–63, 67, 131, 208, 219, 244, 267, 281–82  
partisanship, 76, 123, 274  
Pascal, Blaise, 222, 281n13

- perception/experience, theories of, 40–41
- perspective-taking, 207–12, 219–20, 243–44, 264–72. *See also* criticism
- Peters, Tom, 143
- Pierson, Arthur T., 31
- Pigliucci, Massimo, 37
- Plato, 9, 22, 202; *Euthyphro*, 34–35
- Plekhanov, Georgi, 106–7
- polarization. *See* divisiveness and polarization
- politics: apocalypticism in, 280; Christian fundamentalism in, 81–82; complicity in, 81–83; contemporary context of, 64–65, 273–74, 288; domination of opponents as goal in, 273; fundamentalism in, 5–6, 16, 19–20, 77, 120–22, 274, 277; hatred in, 76–77, 80–81, 83, 109, 273–74, 287–88; literature seen through lens of, 253–56; reasoning appropriate for the domain of, 74; scientific claims made in, 86, 88, 90; trade-offs in, 281; vicious cycles of failure in, 5, 7, 82, 85–86. *See also* human affairs; partisanship
- Pope, Alexander, *Essay on Criticism*, 200, 201
- Popov, Vladimir, 173
- Popper, Karl, 32, 278
- positive fundamentalism, xvi, 9–10, 64
- postcolonialism, 265
- Postman, Neil, 143–45, 176
- posttruth, 141–42
- potentiality, in literature, 232–35
- poverty. *See* income inequality
- practical reasoning: characteristics of, 59–60, 63, 65, 281–82; economics as domain for, 131, 175, 179–80; ethics as domain for, 58–70, 74, 281–82; novels as manifestation of, 65–71; politics as domain for, 63, 74; theoretical vs., 58–70. *See also* casuistry; morality; wisdom
- prayer, 188, 230–31, 237
- “preemptive epistemology,” 120
- prejudice, 44, 46, 100, 112, 135, 186–88, 240
- present: classic texts used for interpreting events in, 196, 198–99; hatred for, 125; interpretation of literature from the standpoint of, 235–36; narrativeness linked to salience of, 260–61; as only significant viewpoint, 2–3, 199–200, 206, 235–36
- prices, 167–77
- pride, 112, 116–17, 240
- Prigogine, Ilya, 262
- progressivism, 27, 92
- propositions: falsifiability of scientific, 32, 90–92; geometric, 59; inappropriate uses of, 56, 226, 228, 244–45
- protectionism, 160–61
- Protestantism, 14, 43, 48, 193
- Proust, Marcel, 2n
- Proverbs, book of, 50, 213
- psalms, 214
- pseudoscience: and criminalization of “denialism,” 95–96; examples of, 27–30, 88; and extending claims beyond proper domain, 92; market fundamentalism as, 130; and politics, 92–93; science vs., 30, 37, 90–100, 258; Social Darwinism and Marxism as, 28, 92–94; and Soviet Marxism, 93; and spectrum of certainty, 91–92; and temptation to claim certainty, 90; and understanding science as block of equally well established claims, 90–95
- Ptolemaic world view, 8

- public goods, 129, 129n  
Puritanism, 89  
Pushkin, Aleksandr, 195, 198  
Pythagorean theorem, 60, 63, 86  
Qin Shi Huang, 198  
quantum theory, 93  
radical skepticism: possibility of  
    knowledge questioned by, 9, 39,  
    44–45; practice as refutation of,  
    40–41  
rationalism, 57–60, 281–82  
reader reception theory, 235  
reading, wisdom gained through  
    experience of, 73, 246, 265,  
    267–68  
realism: epistemological, 42; literary,  
    10, 65–73, 111–16, 240, 261, 266  
reality, experience of, 39–44  
reason. *See* knowledge/epistemology;  
    practical reasoning; rationalism;  
    theoretical reasoning  
Reid, Thomas, 40–41  
relativism: facts from perspective of,  
    37; fundamentalism compared to,  
    8–9, 36–38; standards challenged  
    by, 179, 181–82, 187–88, 236–37  
religion: apocalyptic scenarios based  
    on, 2–3; dialogic approach to,  
    236; fundamentalism in, 8–9,  
    13–14, 16, 206, 274, 279; Hume’s  
    critique of miracles and, 226–28;  
    left-leaning fundamentalism in, 279;  
    and meaning, 228–31, 236; moral  
    tensions in, 189–94, 197, 202–12;  
    science in relation to, 25–27, 215–26;  
    standards in, 186–89; use and func-  
    tion of language in, 226–28, 231,  
    237–38  
Republicans: attitudes of, 75–76, 140;  
    and climate change, 153; Democrats’  
    views of, 75–76  
resonance, chemical theory of, 93  
“retarding friction” (Eliot), 68  
revelation, 50–51  
Revelation, book of, 37, 279  
revolutionism, 35, 79–80, 104  
“rhetoric of etcetera,” 250–51  
Richardson, Samuel, 263  
rights, 64, 236n  
Riley, William B., 27  
Roberts, Paul Craig, and Karen  
    LaFollette, *Meltdown*, 168–74,  
    168n50  
Robespierre, 80  
Russian Formalism, 247  
Russian literature, 195, 197–98, 232  
Russian Orthodox Church, 232  
Russian Revolution, 82  
Rykov, Aleksei, 106  
Ryzhkov, Nikolay, 171  
“sanctity of human life,” 202  
Sandburg, Carl, 235  
Sanders, Bernie, 128, 140, 154–55  
satire, 116–21, 128  
Scalia, Antonin, 48n  
scarce resources, 137–39, 145, 151, 156  
Schapiro, Morton. *See* Morson, Gary  
    Saul, and Morton Schapiro, *Cents  
    and Sensibility*  
Schiller, Robert, 257  
Schneiderman, Eric, 95  
Schweitzer, Albert, 203  
science: and age of the earth, 221,  
    225–26; certainty in relation to,  
    90–92; COVID-19 pandemic and,  
    96–100; development/progress in,  
    90–92; economics modeled on,

- 258; extension of, into other domains, 92–96, 224–25; falsification as criterion in, 32, 90–91, 278; foundational aspects of, 91; fundamentalist claims to, 23, 26–28, 30–32; and meaning, 216, 221–26, 228; misconceptions of, 90–92, 95–96; morality in relation to, 29, 215, 221–25; political claims to status of, 86, 88, 90; progress of, versus fundamental texts of, 51; reasoning process in, 91, 99; religion in relation to, 25–27, 215–26; secular fundamentalist texts claimed as, 50–51; social science modeled on, 23–25, 86–88, 92–93, 257–58; Soviet rejections of, 49, 93–94; teaching of, 91; as type of fundamentalism, 25–26; unity of, 25; viewed superstitiously, 91–92. *See also* pseudoscience
- science education, 91
- “science is real,” 92
- Scopes Trial, 15
- scripture. *See* Bible
- secularization, 5
- the self, 250–52, 265–72. *See also* literature
- self-criticism, 109
- self-deception, 113, 240
- self-examination, xix, 204, 264
- “self-fulfilling catastrophe”. *See* politics: vicious cycles of failure in
- “semantic treasures” (Bakhtin), 233
- “semantic values” (Bakhtin), 193
- Shahnameh*, 264
- Shakespeare, William, 22, 57, 195, 221, 233–34, 281
- Shmelev, Nikolai, 173
- silos, epistemological/experiential, 121–22, 128n93
- Sim, Stuart, *Fundamentalist World*, 18–20
- Sivan, Emmanuel. *See* *Strong Religion*
- “60-30-10” rule, 49
- skepticism: Christian rejection of, 54; Erasmus’s praise of, 53–54; experience as basis for, 88; “foxes” as example of, 22, 44; negative fundamentalism contrasted with, 36; relativism contrasted with, 37n62. *See also* doubt; radical skepticism
- “skepticism of the instrument” (Wells), 45
- Skinner, B. F., 24
- “the slide,” 82, 85–86, 96
- Smith, Adam, 132–34, 177–80, 243–44, 265, 276; *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 178–79, 266; *The Wealth of Nations*, 132, 177–79
- Smith, Barbara Herrnstein, *Contingencies of Value*, 249–51, 253
- social Darwinism, 27–28, 88, 92–93
- “social-Darwinization,” 93
- Social Democrats, 33, 104–5
- Social Fascists, 33
- socialism, 135–36, 259, 279
- Socialist Workers’ Party, 140
- “social physics” (Comte), 24, 86
- social science: fundamentalist strains in, 89; science as model for, 23–25, 86–88, 92–93, 257–58
- Socrates, 118
- sola scriptura* (scripture alone), 14
- Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 120–21, 121n
- Song of Songs, 214
- Sophocles, *Antigone*, 209–10, 242
- Soros, George, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*, 130–32, 140
- soul, 211

- Soviet Union: absolute conformity required by, 49, 77, 79, 89, 104, 108, 195; consequences of central planning in, 135, 167–74; and dialectical materialism, 29, 32, 42; fundamental texts of, 48–49; middle ground as target of attack in, xvii, 36; moral revaluation in, 202–3; rejections of science in, 49, 93–94; reversal of fortunes in, 78–79. *See also* Lenin, V. I.; Marxism-Leninism
- spectrum of certainty, 91–92
- Spinoza, Baruch, 43, 46, 57
- Squad, the (four female U.S. Representatives), 127
- Stalin, Joseph, 3, 5, 11, 48–49, 77, 79–80, 84, 86, 121, 128, 203, 207
- Stalin Constitution, 195
- standards: changes in, 184–86, 236–38; clock parable about, 181–82, 200, 236; linguistic, 182–86; Marxist-Leninist (authoritarian), 32, 34; prejudicial use of, 186–88; religion as source of, 186–89; subjectivity/relativity as enemy of, 179, 181–82, 187–88, 236–37; truth as, 43
- statistics, 143–45
- Steinbeck, John, 235
- Sterne, Laurence, *Tristram Shandy*, 118–20, 241
- Stewart, Lyman and Milton, 13
- Stiglitz, Joseph, 133, 144
- stories: analytical and rhetorical role of, 145, 176–77, 244, 257–63; challenging nature of biblical, 189–94; role of, in economic thought, 145, 176–78, 257; role of the present in, 260–61
- The Story of the Stone*, 264
- “strangeness of our condition” (Montaigne), 58
- stream of consciousness, 267
- Strong Religion* (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan), 16, 21, 50
- structuralism, 9
- student loan debt, 162–64
- Sudan, 16
- superstition, 46
- supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP), 159
- Swift, Jonathan, 128
- sympathy, 39, 266n52. *See also* compassion; empathy
- The Tale of Genji*, 264
- Talmud, 17, 48
- Tamar, 189
- taxes, 159–60, 165
- Thales of Miletus, 25
- theoretical reasoning: characteristics of, 59, 62–63; critique of, 117–20; ethics not a fitting domain for, 58–60, 62–64, 69, 281–82; practical vs., 58–70; rationalism’s valorization of, 60
- tolerance/intolerance, 56, 85, 99, 123
- Tolstoy, Leo, 10, 102, 117, 198, 283n15; *Anna Karenina*, 62, 66–67, 69–70, 102–3, 157, 159, 222–25, 230–31, 240, 242–43, 268–72; *War and Peace*, 38–39, 69, 240, 245, 256
- Torah, 17, 48, 50, 50n94, 211
- totalitarianism, 4, 114–15, 122, 241
- Toulmin, Stephen, 57–64, 224, 281
- trade-offs, 136–37, 137n, 139–40, 145–49, 160, 281

- trade policy, 160–61
- tradition, as source of meaning, 46, 48, 124, 187, 192–93, 200–201, 210–13, 232, 237
- translation, 52, 195–97, 201, 220–21, 237
- Trisagon, 2–3
- Trollope, Anthony: *He Knew He Was Right*, xvi; *Phineas Finn*, 261; *The Way We Live Now*, xvi
- Trotsky, Leon, 6, 106, 202, 278
- Trump, Donald, 76, 80–81, 127, 128, 137n, 141, 153
- truth: Christian fundamentalist view of, 39, 43–44, 46; criticism as means of seeking, 100–103; dialogue as means to, 56; failures and hindrances in recognizing, 33–34, 45–47; in novels, 72; perspicuity of, 39–47. *See also* certainty; knowledge/epistemology
- Tugwell, Rexford, 167–68
- Turgenev, Ivan, 35, 113, 262; *Fathers and Children*, 114, 241, 262
- Turkey, 16
- twins, 219
- “tyranny of principles” (Toulmin), 59
- uncertainty. *See* complexity and uncertainty
- University of Chicago Divinity School, 14
- U.S. Constitution, 47–48n90, 194–95, 197, 236n
- us vs. them mentality, xvi, 77, 127–28. *See also* all-or-nothing mentality; evil
- utilitarianism, 119, 187, 241
- utopias, 24, 27, 110–11, 113, 120, 240–41, 274, 279
- Valentinov, Nikolay, 104, 106–7
- Verginaud, Pierre, 80
- violence: in fundamentalists’ response to others, 19, 104–5; not a necessary aspect of fundamentalism, 21–22; as outcome of fundamentalist extremism, 114–15
- Virgil, *The Aeneid*, 263–64
- Wall Street Journal*, xv
- Washington consensus, 133
- WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) values, 204
- Wells, H. G., 45
- Wetter, Gustav, 42
- Whitehouse, Sheldon, 95–96
- “Who Whom?” (Lenin), 256
- Wilson, Edward O., 24–26, 31
- wisdom, 50, 69, 73, 113, 213, 236
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 17–18, 20, 223–25, 228–30, 245; *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 224
- Wolfe, Thomas, 235
- world literature, 263–65
- World War I, 14–15
- Yew, Lee Kuan, 131, 205
- Yezhov, Nikolai, 207
- Zakaria, Fareed, 155
- Zero Population Growth, 94
- zero-sum games, xvi, 105, 108
- Ziljderland, Anton, 36
- Zuckerberg, Mark, xv