CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii
Introduction ix
Note on the Translation xliii

HOW TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND

Chapter 1. Skepticism: The Big Picture 1

Chapter 2. Arguments to Have Up Your Sleeve: The Modes 39

Chapter 3. Talking and Thinking Like a Skeptic (and Not Like Anyone Else) 87

Chapter 4. Going After the Other Philosophers: Logic 117
CONTENTS

Chapter 5. Going After the Other Philosophers: Physics 151

Chapter 6. Going After the Other Philosophers: Ethics 181

Glossary 199
Persons Referred To 203
Notes 207
Further Reading 221
περὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω διαφορᾶς τῶν φιλοσοφιῶν

[1] Τοῖς ζητοῦσί τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὕρεσιν ἐπακολούθειν εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὑρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολογίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως.
[2] διόπερ ἱσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὑρηκέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ’ ἀπεφήναντο μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο
CHAPTER 1

Skepticism: The Big Picture

Sextus gives an overview of skepticism in the opening of book I of Outlines of Pyrrhonism: except for one minor omission (in section [7]), I include the whole of this.

On the Most Basic Difference among Philosophies

[1] Suppose you’re investigating some topic: chances are, the result is that either (a) you make a discovery, or (b) you deny making a discovery and admit the matter is not to be grasped, or (c) you keep on investigating. [2] So equally, when it comes to the things investigated in philosophy, some people have claimed to have discovered the truth, some have declared that it is not possible for this to be grasped, and some are
καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν. [3] καὶ εὑρή-
κέναι μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰδίως καλούμενοι δογμα-
tικοί, οἶον οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ἐπίκουρον
καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς καὶ ἀλλοι τινές, ώς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων ἀπεφήναντοι περὶ Κλειτόμα-
χον καὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ ἀλλοι Ἀκαδημαϊκοί, ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί. [4] ὥθεν εὐλόγως
δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς εἶναι,
δογματικὴ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ σκεπτικὴ. περὶ μὲν οὖν
τῶν ἀλλων έτέρως ἀρμόσει λέγειν, περὶ δὲ τῆς
σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ πα-
ρόντος ἥμεις ἑροῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες, ὅτι
περὶ οὐδὲν τῶν λεχθησομένων διαβεβαιοὐ-
μεθα ώς οὕτως ἔχοντος πάντως καθάπερ λέ-
γομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον ἡμῖν
ἰστορικῶς ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ έκάστου.
SKEPTICISM: THE BIG PICTURE

still investigating. [3] It is those strictly called dogmatists* who think they have discovered it—people like Aristotle* and Epicurus* and the Stoics* and some others; it’s Clitomachus* and Carneades* and other Academics* who have declared they are dealing with things not to be grasped; and it’s the skeptics who are still investigating. [4] Hence it makes sense that the most basic philosophies are thought to be three: dogmatic*, Academic, and skeptical. About the other ones, it will be appropriate for others to speak; right now it’s about the skeptical approach that we are going to speak in outline, with the following preface—that on none of the things to be discussed do we insist* that the matter is definitely as we say, but on each one we are reporting like a case study, according to how it now appears to us.
περὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς σκέψεως


Περὶ τῶν ὀνομασιῶν τῆς σκεπτικῆς

[7] Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοῖνυν ἀγωγὴ καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ ἐφεκτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τήν
There is one account of the skeptical philosophy called “general,” and another called “specific.” The general one is where we expound the features of skepticism, telling how it is conceived, what are its starting points and its arguments, its criterion and its aim, what are the modes of suspension of judgment, how we employ the skeptical statements, and the distinction between skepticism and the philosophies closest to it; the specific one is where we argue against each part of so-called philosophy. Well, let’s deal first with the general account, beginning our survey with the names of the skeptical approach.

On the Ways Skepticism Is Named

The skeptical approach, then, is called investigative, from its activity involving investigation and inquiry, and suspensive from the reaction
ζήτησιν περὶ τὸν σκεπτόμενον γινομένου πάθους, ... καὶ Πυρρώνειος ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὸν Πύρρωνα σωματικότερον καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προσεληλυθέναι τῇ σκέψει.

Τί ἐστι σκέψις

[8] Ἐστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοεμένων καθ’ οἰονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ’ ὧς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχήν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν.

[9] 'δύναμιν' μὲν οὖν αὐτήν καλοῦμεν οὐ κατὰ τὸ περίεργον ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι 'φαινόμενα' δὲ λαμβάνομεν νῦν τὰ αἰσθητά, διὸ ἀντιδιαστέλλουμεν αὐτοῖς τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ 'καθ’ οἰονδήποτε τρόπον' δύναται προσαρμόζεσθαι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἓνα ἀπλῶς τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως...
that comes about in the inquirer after the investigation . . . and Pyrrhonian, from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have gone in for skepticism in a more full-bodied and obvious way than those before him.

What Skepticism Is

[8] The skeptical ability is one that produces oppositions among things that appear and things that are thought in any way whatsoever, from which, because of the equal strength in the opposing objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment, and after that to tranquility.

[9] We call it an “ability” not in any elaborate sense, but simply in terms of being able; “things that appear” we are taking here as the things perceived with the senses, which is why we contrast with them the things that are thought. “In any way whatsoever” can be connected with the ability (meaning that we’re
CHAPTER 1

όνομα, ώς εἰρήκαμεν, παραλαμβάνωμεν, καὶ τῶν ἑντιθετικῆ φαίνομένων τε καὶ νουμένων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποικῖλως ἀντιτίθεμεν ταῦτα, ἡ φαινόμενα φαινόμενοις ἢ νουμένα νουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ ἀντιτιθέντες, ἵνα πᾶσαι αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἐμπεριέχωσι, λέγομεν ‘καθ’ οἰονδήποτε τρόπον· ἡ ‘καθ’ οἰονδήποτε τρόπον φαινόμενων τε καὶ νουμένων, ἵνα μὴ ξητῶμεν πῶς φαίνεται τὰ φαινόμενα ἢ πῶς νοεῖται τὰ νουμένα, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς ταῦτα λαμβάνωμεν. [10] ἀντικειμένους δὲ λόγους παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχὶ πάντως ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μαχομένους. ἑσοσθένους δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν ἑσοτητα, ώς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκείσθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ώς πιστότερον. ἔποχή δὲ ἐστὶ στάσις διανοίας δι
taking the word “ability” in a simple way, as we said), or with “producing oppositions among things that appear and things that are thought”; since we oppose these in a variety of ways—opposing things that appear to things that appear, or things thought to things thought, or interchanging them, so that all the oppositions are included—we say “in any way whatsoever.” Or “in any way whatsoever” goes with “things that appear and things thought,” meaning that we are not investigating how the things that appear do appear, or the things that are thought are thought—we’re taking these in a simple way. [10] We speak of “opposing” accounts not necessarily in the sense of an assertion and a negation, but simply in place of “conflicting.” “Equal strength” refers to an equality in terms of trustworthiness or its absence, so that none of the conflicting accounts is ahead of any other as more trustworthy. Suspension of judgment is when thought comes to a stop; because of
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΥ

tαι· ἦστι γὰρ ὁ μετέχων ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως.

ΠΕΡΙ ΆΡΧΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΣΚΕΨΕΩΣ

[12] Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἑλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτήσειν· οἱ γὰρ με­
γαλοφυεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τήν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦ­
ντες τίσιν αὐτῶν χρή μᾶλλον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἤλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν, τί τε ἄληθὲς ἦστιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεῦδος, ὡς ἐκ τῆς ἐπικρίσεως τούτων ἀταρακτήσοντες. συστάσεως δὲ τῆς
SKEPTICISM: THE BIG PICTURE
	his we neither deny nor put forward anything. Tranquility is a trouble-free condition, or calmness, of the soul. How tranquility comes in alongside suspension of judgment we will suggest in our remarks on the aim.¹

About the Skeptic

[11] The Pyrrhonian philosopher was in effect already explained in the conception of the sceptical approach; it’s the person who has a piece of this “ability.”

About the Starting Points of Skepticism

[12] The starting point that causes skepticism, we say, is the hope of getting tranquility. Highly gifted people, being bothered by the inconsistency in things, and at a loss as to which of them they should give more of their assent to, went for investigating what is true in things and what is false, on the assumption that by determining these things they would achieve tranquility. But
σκεπτικῆς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἵσον ἀντικεῖσθαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου καταλήγειν δοκούμεν εἰς τὸ μὴ δογματίζειν.

Εἰ δογματίζει ὁ σκεπτικὸς


12
the starting point of the skeptical setup is, above all, every argument’s having an equal argument lying in opposition to it; for from this we seem to end up not having doctrines.

Whether the Skeptic Has Doctrines

[13] We say that the skeptic does not have doctrines not in that more everyday sense of “doctrine” in which some say that a doctrine is when you agree to something—for the skeptic assents to the reactions that are forced on him by appearance (for example, when being warmed or cooled, he would not say “I think I’m not being warmed or cooled”); we say that he does not have doctrines in the sense in which some say that a doctrine is the assent to some unclear matter investigated by the sciences—for the Pyrrhonist does not assent to anything unclear.

[14] He doesn’t have doctrines even in uttering the skeptical phrases about unclear things—for example, “No more” or “I determine nothing,”
CHAPTER 1

ὁρίζω' ἢ τίνα τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὅν ὑστερον λέξομεν δογματίζει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δογματίζων ως ὑπάρχον τίθεται τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖνο ὁ λέγεται δογματίζειν, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς τίθησι ταύτας ὡς πάντως ὑπαρχούσας· ὑπολαμβάνει γὰρ ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἢ 'πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδή' φωνὴ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν ψευδὴ εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἢ 'οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές' ὁμοίως, οὕτως καὶ ἢ 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν φησὶ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτὴν συμπεριγράψει. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν λέγομεν. [15] πλὴν ἄλλ’ εἰ ὁ δογματίζων τίθησιν ως ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὁ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς αὐτοῦ προφέρεται ως δυνάμει ύφ’ ἑαυτῶν περιγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν λεχθεῖη. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λέγει καὶ τὸ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυ-
or any of the others about which we’ll speak later. For someone with a doctrine puts forward as a reality the matter on which they are said to have a doctrine, but the skeptic does not put forward these phrases as definite realities; he supposes that, just as the phrase “everything is false” says that it is itself false along with the others, and likewise “nothing is true,” so too “no more [this way than that]” says that, along with the others, it is itself “no more” the case [than its opposite], and for this reason brackets* itself together with the others. We say the same about the other skeptical phrases too. [15] But if the dogmatist puts forward as a reality the thing on which he has a doctrine, while the skeptic utters his own phrases in such a way that they are potentially bracketed by themselves, he cannot be said to have doctrines in uttering them. But the most important thing is that in uttering these phrases he says what appears to himself, and announces without
CHAPTER 1

toῦ ἀδοξάστως, μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑπο-κειμένων διαβεβαιούμενος.

ei αἱρεσιν ἔχει ὁ σκεπτικὸς

[16] Ὁμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑρωτᾶσθαι ei αἱρεσιν ἔχει ὁ σκεπτικὸς. ei μὲν <γάρ> τις αἱρεσιν εἶναι λέγει πρόσκλισιν δόγμασι πολλοῖς ἀκολουθίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλληλά τε καὶ <τὰ> φαινόμενα, καὶ λέγει δόγμα πράγματι ἀδήλῳ συγκατάθεσιν, φῆσομεν μὴ ἔχειν αἱρεσιν. [17] ei δὲ τις αἱρεσιν εἶναι φάσκει τὴν λόγῳ τινὶ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκολουθοῦσαν ἀγωγήν, ἐκεῖνον τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἐστὶν ὅρθῶς δοκεῖν ζῆν ὑποδεικνύοντος (τοῦ ὅρθῶς μὴ μόνον κατ’ ἀρετὴν λαμβανομένου ἀλλ’ ἀφελέστερον) καὶ ἔπι τὸ ἔπ-έχειν δύνασθαι διατείνοντος, αἱρεσίν φαμεν ἔχειν· ἀκολουθοῦμεν γάρ τινι λόγῳ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ὑποδεικνύντι ἡμῖν τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὰ
opinions* the way he himself is affected, making no firm statements* about the objects actually out there.

Whether the Skeptic Has a School of Thought

[16] We go a similar way on the question whether the skeptic has a school of thought. If one says that a school is an attachment to many doctrines that are consistent with one another and with apparent* things, and by “doctrine” one means assent to an unclear matter, we will say that he does not have a school. [17] But if one says that a school is an approach that follows a certain rationale in line with what appears, where that rationale indicates how it is possible to seem to live properly (“properly” being understood not only in terms of virtue but in a more straightforward way) and extends to the ability to suspend judgment, we say that he does have a school; for we do follow a certain rationale that, in line with what appears, marks out
πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη.

εἰ φυσιολογεῖ ὁ σκεπτικὸς

[18] Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγομεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν εἰ φυσιολογητέον τῷ σκεπτικῷ· ἐνεκα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μετὰ βεβαίου πείσματος ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τινος τῶν κατὰ τὴν φυσιολογίαν δογματιζομένων οὐ φυσιολογοῦμεν, ἐνεκα δὲ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἵσον ἔχειν ἀντιτιθέναι καὶ τῆς ἀταραξίας ἀπτόμεθα τῆς φυσιολογίας. οὐτω δὲ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἡθικὸν τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας ἐπερχόμεθα.
SKEPTICISM: THE BIG PICTURE

a life for us that fits with ancestral customs and the laws and the culture and our own reactions.

Whether the Skeptic Does Natural Science

[18] We say similar things on the question whether the skeptic should do natural science. If the point is to make declarations with strong confidence about any of the things on which doctrines are held in natural science, we do not do natural science. But if the point is to be able to oppose to every argument an equal argument, and to achieve tranquility, we do engage in natural science. This is also how we cover the logical and the ethical parts of so-called philosophy.
CHAPTER 1

εἰ ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα
οἱ σκεπτικοὶ

[19] Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὁτι ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα
οἱ σκεπτικοὶ ἀνήκοοί μοι δοκοῦσιν εἴναι τῶν
παρ’ ἡμῖν λεγομένων· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν
παθητικὴν ἀβουλίτως ἡμᾶς ἄγοντα εἰς συγκα-
tάθεσιν οὐκ ἀνατρέπομεν, ώς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν
ἐλέγομεν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα. ὅταν
δὲ ξητῶμεν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον
ὀποῖον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν ὅτι φαίνεται δίδομεν,
ἐπιτόμεν δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀλλὰ περὶ
ἐκείνου ὃ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου· τοῦτο
dὲ διαφέρει τοῦ ξητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φαινο-
μένου. [20] οἷον +φαίνεται+ ἡμῖν γλυκάζειν τὸ μέλι
(τοῦτο συγχωροῦμεν· γλυκαζόμεθα γὰρ ἀισθητι-
κῶς), εἰ δὲ καὶ γλυκὺ ἐστὶν ὃςον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ,
ζητοῦμεν· ὃ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλὰ +περὶ
tοῦ φαινομένου λεγόμενον+. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἄντι-
Whether the Skeptics Do Away with Apparent Things

[19] Those who say that the skeptics do away with apparent things seem to me not to be listening to what we say. We don’t overturn the things that lead us, owing to a passive appearance and whether we like it or not, to assent—as we said before;⁴ and these are the apparent things. When we investigate whether the actual object is such as it appears, we allow that it appears, and our investigation is not about the apparent thing but about what’s said about the apparent thing; and that’s different from investigating the apparent thing itself. [20] For example, honey appears to us to sweeten; we agree to this, for as a matter of sense-perception, we are sweetened. But whether it is indeed sweet as far as argument is concerned,⁵ we investigate—which is not the apparent thing but something said about the apparent thing. And even if we
κρυς κατά τῶν φαινομένων ἐρωτῶμεν λόγους, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν βουλόμενοι τὰ φαινόμενα τούτους ἐκτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἐπιδεικνύντες τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν· εἰ γὰρ τοιούτος ἀπατεών ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὡστε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν ὁφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν ὑφαρπάζειν, πῶς οὗ χρὴ ὑφορᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις, ὡστε μὴ κατακολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ προπετεύεσθαι;

περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς σκεπτικῆς
[21] Ἄτι δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις προσέχομεν, δῆλον ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς. κριτήριον δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, τὸ τε εἰς πίστιν ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας λαμβανόμενον, περὶ οὗ ἐν τῷ ἀντιρρητικῷ λέξομεν λόγῳ, τὸ τε τοῦ πράσσειν, ὃ προσέχοντες κατὰ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν πράσσομεν τὰ δ’ οὐ, περὶ οὗ νῦν λέγομεν. [22] κριτήριον τοῖνυν φαμὲν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμε-
do go ahead and raise arguments against apparent things, we put these forward not with the aim of doing away with the apparent things, but for a show of the dogmatists’ rashness; for if argument is so tricky that it just about snatches apparent things from under our eyes, how can we not be suspicious of it on unclear matters, and hence avoid following it and acting rashly?

On the Criterion of Skepticism

[21] That we pay attention to apparent things is clear from what we say about the criterion of the skeptical approach. A criterion is spoken of in two ways: there’s the kind that is used for the purpose of trust on a matter of reality or unreality—and we’ll talk about this in the account that involves counter-arguments;⁶ and there’s the one for acting—by attending to this in life we do some things and don’t do others, and this is the one we’re now talking about.

[22] So, we say that the criterion of the skeptical
νον, δυνάμει τὴν φαντασίαν οὔτω καλοῦντες· ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτω πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν. διὸ περὶ μὲν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τὸ ύποκείμενον οὐδεὶς ἵσως ἀμφισβητήσει, περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐστιν ὁποῖον φαίνεται ζητεῖται.

[23] τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἄδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. ἔσοικε δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ βιωτικὴ τήρησις τετραμερῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἐν ύφηγήσει φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ θὸν, τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν, [24] ύφηγήσει μὲν φυσική καθ’ ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοὶ ἔσμεν, παθῶν δὲ ἀνάγκη καθ’ ἣν λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφὴν ἡμᾶς ὁδηγεῖ, δίψος δ’ ἐπὶ πόμα, θὸν δὲ καὶ νόμων παραδόσει καθ’ ἣν τὸ μὲν εὐσεβεῖν παραλαμβάνομεν βιωτικῶς ως ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ώς
approach is what is apparent, in effect here meaning the appearance; for it has to do with a reaction, with how we’re affected whether we like it or not, and so is not up for investigation. I mean, whether the actual object appears this way or that, surely no one will dispute; it’s whether it is as it appears that gets investigated.

[23] Paying attention, then, to the things that appear, we live without opinions according to the routine of life, since we can’t be completely inactive. This “routine of life” seems to have four aspects: one is involved with the guidance of nature, one with the necessity of how we’re affected, one with the handing down of laws and customs, and one with the teaching of skills. [24] Natural guidance is how we are naturally perceivers and thinkers; the necessity of ways we’re affected is how hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; the handing down of laws and customs is how, as far as our lives are concerned, we accept being pious as good and
CHAPTER 1

φαῦλον, τεχνῶν δὲ διδασκαλία καθ’ ἥν οὐκ ἀνενέργητοι ἐσμεν ἐν αἷς παραλαμβάνομεν τέχναις. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα φαμὲν ἀδοξάστως.

τί τὸ τέλος τῆς σκεπτικῆς

[25] Τούτων ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἰη καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διεξέλθειν. ἐστι μὲν οὖν τέλος τὸ οὗ χάριν πάντα πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸ ἐσχάτον τῶν ὑπεκτῶν. φαμὲν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν. [26] ἀρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τὸ τὰς φαντασίας ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, τίνες μὲν εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενὴ διαφωνίαν, ἢν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχεν· ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολού-
being impious as bad; and the teaching of skills is how we are not inactive in the skills we take up. And we say all this without opinions.

What Is the Aim of Skepticism?

[25] After this, the next thing for us to go over would be the aim of the sceptical approach. Now an aim is what everything is done or considered for the sake of, while it is not itself for anything; in other words, it’s the endpoint of the things desired. We say up to now that the skeptic’s aim is tranquility in things to do with opinion and moderate reactions in things that are forced on us. [26] For though he began to do philosophy with a view to deciding among the appearances and grasping which were true and which false, so as to achieve tranquility, he fell into a dispute with sides of equal strength. Since he couldn’t resolve it, he suspended judgment. But when he suspended judgment, it just
CHAPTER 1

θησεν ἡ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία.

[27] ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῇ φύσει ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταράσσεται διὰ παντός· καὶ ὅτε μὴ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὑπὸ τὸν φύσει κακῶν νομίζει ποινηλατείσθαι καὶ διώκει τὰ ἀγαθά, ὃς οἶται· ἀπερ κτησάμενος πλεῖοσι ταραχαῖς περιπίπτει, διὰ τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ ἀμέτρως ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ φοβούμενον τὴν μεταβολῆν πάντα πράσσειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀποβάλη τὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι. [28] ὁ δὲ ἀοριστῶν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καλῶν ἢ κακῶν οὔτε φεύγει τὶ οὔτε διώκει συντόνως· διόπερ ἀταρακτεῖ.

ὅπερ οὖν περὶ Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ ζωγράφου λέγεται, τούτῳ ὑπήρξε τῷ σκεπτικῷ. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐκείνος ἵππον γράφων καὶ τὸν ἀφρὸν τοῦ ἵππου μιμήσασθαι τῇ γραφῇ βουλήθεις οὔτως

28
so happened that tranquility in matters of opinion accompanied this.

[27] For the person who has the opinion that anything is by nature good or bad is disturbed all the time. When the things thought to be good are not available to him, he believes he is being persecuted by things that are by nature bad, and he pursues those that (as he thinks) are good; but upon getting these, he falls into even more disturbance, both because of being excited beyond reason and measure, and because, fearing a change, he does everything in order not to lose the things he thinks are good. [28] But the person who is indefinite about things good or bad in their nature neither flees nor pursues anything intensely, and for this reason has tranquility.

What happened to the skeptic is the same as what’s told about the painter Apelles. They say that he was painting a horse and wanted to depict the horse’s froth in the painting; but it was