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1

Introduction

I TRUDGED THROUGH dirt lanes muddied by rain on my way back to Xiancun—an urban village sitting right in the middle of Guangzhou's central business district. It was late December of 2016, and I wanted to snap photos of the place at night. Urban villages, called *chengzhongcun* in Chinese, are hybrid informal settlements blending urban locations with rural collective land ownership. Originally these were agricultural villages, some even dating back centuries to China's imperial era. In the 1980s, many villages began to lose farmland to rampant urban construction led by developers in conjunction with the city government. To make a living, villagers started "growing apartments" on their remaining land and renting out rooms to migrant workers. More than three hundred such urban villages have appeared in Guangzhou, the largest city in the Pearl River Delta in south China. Almost half of the city's inhabitants (six million out of thirteen million) live on these pockets of rural land engulfed by urban development.[1]

Sandwiched between sleek skyscrapers, Xiancun is a world apart from the formal city that surrounds it. The city outside is complete with state-of-the-art subways, new BRT (bus rapid transit) lines, and high-rise residential towers catering to the growing middle class. Xiancun, by contrast, is a maze of dark, narrow alleyways, with entangled electric wires blocking the sky, mounds of garbage strewn everywhere, and apartment buildings packed together so tightly that residents of adjacent buildings can shake hands with one another through their windows—hence their nickname "hand-shake buildings." Urban villages still fall under the category of rural land ownership, which renders them extraterritorial entities in the city, and thus not subject to city planning and zoning regulations. Correspondingly, these places do not benefit much from the city's infrastructure funds, which explains the prevalence of haphazard construction and lack of basic services (figure 1.1).

Although urban villages are highly transient communities, each village has its own daily rhythms. In Xiancun, the busiest hours are evenings, when migrant tenants stream back from their work. At that time the local market is



FIGURE 1.1. Xiancun, Guangzhou

bustling. Vegetable and meat vendors hawk their products with chants and hollers of bargain prices. Narrow alleys slither ahead, lit up with businesses of all kinds—groceries, hole-in-the-wall restaurants, hairdressers, and electronics shops plugging pirated DVDs and cellphone cards. Some workers perch on the sidewalks of the alleys to enjoy their dinner. One shop owner brings outside a small TV, tuning in to a soap opera about the anti-Japanese war—an always popular genre in China—and soon a crowd of male residents huddles around to watch; the TV also attracts onlookers atop a mound across the alley, a dozen or so of them sitting single file, like birds on a wire. In contrast to the sanitized, generic apartment buildings towering above, the urban villages—their sounds, smells, colors, and residents themselves—give a human touch to the endlessly expanding metropolis. Nobody lives here for long, but everybody is welcome. The grocery around which people gather to watch TV is meaningfully named "settling point" (*luojiaodian*). And the convenience store next door is called "having a home" (*youjia*), signaling that this is a temporary settling place for migrants from all corners of the country.

Xiancun stands out among Guangzhou's urban villages for its decades-long struggle with the municipal government over redevelopment. Because of the village's prime location, the municipal government and developers eye the valuable land for property development. Negotiations with villagers, which began in the early 2000s, have been interrupted by corruption scandals involving village chiefs and municipal officials, numerous villagers' protests, and crisscrossing lawsuits filed by both villagers and various branches of the municipal government. Soon after I started researching Xiancun in 2013, a succession of scandals ensued: several senior city officials were prosecuted on corruption charges arising out of their involvement with the redevelopment; the village head embezzled a large sum of funds and emigrated to Australia; and other senior village leaders were sentenced to several years in prison. Negotiations between developers and villagers have progressed slowly and in piecemeal fashion.

Most families had already signed contracts with the developer and moved out by 2018. As soon as a family agreed to accept compensation and leave, the developer would send in demolition crews and knock down their building. Xiancun is only a few hundred yards away from the city's new luxury hotel, the W, but it resembled a war zone under siege, with half-gutted buildings missing a ceiling or a wall, and demolition debris dumped everywhere. The holdout families, called "nail households"—in reference to their stubbornness and to how their buildings protruded from the razed landscape around them—were negotiating with the developer for higher compensation; while doing so, they continued to rent out rooms to migrant workers for extra income.

On the night when I returned to Xiancun, I captured some good shots of the village against the spectacular backdrop of the city's futuristic skyline. I did not have to hide my camera, as it was after dark and raining, and village security was nowhere to be seen. On prior visits I had been stopped by security guards hired by the developer. According to a notice issued by the village council a few years earlier, only people living in the village could enter the place, and all visitors had to register with village security. But that night, everybody was busy with their own business, and nobody paid attention to me. I felt relaxed and pleased about my evening return.

As I was about to leave, I spotted an army of police assembling at the village's main entrance. By now, it was already after eight o'clock, and I wondered what this fuss could be about. I headed toward the group, but before I could approach anyone, the crowd started marching lockstep into the village. Instinctively, I followed them. On closer look, I saw that the group was a hodgepodge of people—some donning city police uniforms, others wearing the uniforms of village security officers, but most in ordinary street clothes. They came from several different units of the local *jiedao* (translated as "street offices"), China's neighborhood-level government bureaucracy that deals directly with urban villages. About half of the group were female officers, who, I sensed, did not know one another well. Some people were chatting quietly, and others just marched in silence with a dreadful look on their faces, as if eager to go home. The group split into a few smaller teams, and I decided to trail one of them. Nobody seemed to notice me. We walked on, and the rain started hitting harder.

It was not long before I realized that this was some sort of inspection of migrant workers who were renting rooms in the village. The group's leader was holding pages of renters' registration rolls, listing exact locations of buildings, street addresses, and the names of tenants living inside. The group was going door to door to verify that the people on their records still lived in these buildings. They chose to do the inspection in the evening because that was when most tenants were likely to be home. But the inspection team had no way to enter a building if residents didn't let them in. If they were buzzed in, male police officers would proceed first, followed by mostly female officers. For many, it was their first time stepping into these dark, crumbling buildings occupied by the city's underclass. Urban villages are routinely portrayed in the media as dens of crime, drug trafficking, and prostitution, and the faces of the officers tensed as they ventured through the dark stairwells.

The group I followed had some luck with one building, as tenants opened the first-floor gate and let them in. We walked up to the fifth floor and knocked on the door of one apartment. The door opened from inside, and I saw a tiny room packed with six bunk beds and ten men—ranging in age from their early twenties to their sixties. The officers asked for their IDs, took a picture of each ID, and wrote down their names, hometown, and other basic information. Some tenants looked concerned, but others did not even bother to get up from bed, continuing to stare at the screens of their cellphones and other gadgets. The officers uttered warnings about fire hazards and eventually left for the next building. The police had no search warrant to enter these apartments, and the migrant tenants were under no obligation to show their IDs, but under China's deeply entrenched urban-rural order, migrants—to avoid harassment by the police—almost always show their IDs when asked.

After two hours, the inspection began to wind down, and by then I had followed the police into several buildings. The group took a break, and I watched a female officer use a walkie-talkie to communicate with other groups still doing inspections. After she finished talking, her eyes landed on me. "Who are you?" she demanded. Others turned and began to stare at me. Soon I was surrounded by a group of about twenty people from various units of the local jiedao. I responded that I was an academic teaching in the United States and was in Guangzhou to research urban villages. She asked for my ID and then said to me, "This is our secret operation—we didn't even tell the district and city government. How did you find out?" I replied that I had noticed a big crowd of police and out of curiosity tagged along. She looked angry. She ordered me not to leave and then dialed the local police.

A few minutes later, a police car with piercing sirens pulled up sharply at the curb next to us. Two police officers popped out. In response to their questions, I again explained that I was doing research on urban villages and had stumbled on their operation. They scrutinized my Michigan driver's license but then were not sure what to do with me. Everybody watched and waited. My hands started to sweat, my body tensed, and I could hear my own heartbeat. Then the more senior police officer turned to me and said, "This is a secret operation, and we don't want anybody to know about it. You need to delete all pictures you took. Then we can let you go." I slid my hand into my left pocket and reached for my local phone—an old Samsung of my father's that I used whenever I returned to China—and handed it to him. In my other pocket was my iPhone with a superior camera, with which I had taken many pictures that night. Examining the Samsung phone, the police officer saw only old family photos. Once he assured himself that there were no pictures from the village, he allowed me to go.

Relieved, I scurried toward the closest street, hailed a cab, and bolted. In the taxi's rearview mirror, I could see the small crowd still congregated at the village entrance, finishing another inspection of this urban village that the municipal government has been trying for nearly two decades to remove. That night was the closest encounter I had ever had with the local Chinese police. But for villagers and migrant tenants, that night probably was no different from others. They are routinely harassed by the local police, simply because the value of the land on which their community stands has become too high for an informal settlement of this sort to continue to exist.

A door-to-door inspection such as the one I encountered in Guangzhou would be unthinkable in Indian cities. At my fieldwork site in Mumbai—a large slum area outside the city's international airport (figure 1.2)—state authorities for years have struggled to conduct a survey to find out how many people live there and for how long. Such information can be used to determine who is eligible for compensation in the case of demolition and redevelopment. At times the state government tried to work with housing rights NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) to conduct the survey, and at other times it tried to do it alone or with a private developer. Each time, however, the state government met resistance: residents would lock out surveyors from their houses and even organize open protests. Despite repeated attempts, the state government never could finish the survey.

The ease of raiding an urban village and getting information from residents (in the Chinese case) and the difficulty of doing so (in the Indian case) suggest



FIGURE 1.2. The airport slum, Mumbai

a crucial difference in how cities in China and India are governed. China has a set of local territorial institutions and authorities that directly intervene in local affairs, such as the officials and employees of jiedao, who conducted the inspection in Xiancun. India does not have such territorial institutions, and the bureaucracies within the state government are too fragmented at the local level to directly intervene in urban affairs. In other words, China and India have two different sets of subnational institutions, which have given rise to different forms of urban governance. As I demonstrate in the rest of the book, urban governance in China exhibits a territorial logic, centered on territorial institutions and authorities such as local governments and officials, and urban governance in India features an associational logic, contingent on alliance building among the state, the private sector, and civil society groups. Drawing on historical-comparative analyses and ethnographic fieldwork, this book explains how the territorial and associational approaches to governing cities are contested in each case, and how both approaches have produced new forms of inequality and exclusion.

Defamiliarizing the Chinese City

China has experienced explosive urban growth since the last quarter of the twentieth century, and Chinese cities have attracted significant research attention. Over time, an unspoken consensus has emerged in the scholarship on urban China: Chinese cities are unique, exceptional, and therefore do not allow for meaningful comparisons with cities in other countries. Urban villages, for example, have been the subject of a large body of scholarship. But most scholars see these villages as uniquely Chinese, the product of China's relentless urban growth, large-scale migration, housing shortages, and dual-track land market that differentiates state-owned urban land from collectively owned rural land.[2]

But my research about cities elsewhere has led me to believe that urban development in China is not as unique and incomparable as experts maintain. The proliferation of urban villages stems from an endemic housing crisis for the urban poor, a problem faced by many cities throughout the world. In cities from India to Brazil, large populations dwell in various kinds of informal settlements marked by ambiguous land ownership, precarious tenure security, and inadequate infrastructure. In Mumbai, for example, 41 percent of the city's population lives in slums (Government of India 2011), and in Rio de Janeiro, 22 percent of the city's residents live in favelas (Hurrell 2011). Like Xiancun, some slums and favelas face great pressure for their removal, simply because the land value has become too high for them to stay. Regarding the Mumbai airport slum that I study, the state government and developers propose to acquire the land and relocate close to half a million slum dwellers so that they can expand the airport as well as build luxury hotels, shopping malls, and office parks (Ren 2017a). In Rio de Janeiro, hosting the 2016 Olympics put great pressure on the city's favelas: some were razed, while many others, especially those occupying central locations, face displacement by gentrification (Gaffney 2016). Even in Chicago, where I live, similar stories of urban poverty, housing inequality, and real estate speculation unfold. A telling example is Cabrini-Green, Chicago's best-known public housing project, which has dwindled to just a few lines of row houses surrounded by a sea of new luxury condos (Hunt 2009; Vale 2013; Austin 2018).

All these instances speak to a similar phenomenon. First, the state and the private sector use various means to try to evict people. Second, residents mobilize and resist, either to gain better compensation or to fight to stay put. This pattern manifests in many countries, across different political regimes, economic conditions, and subnational institutions. In this sense, the Chinese urban experience is far from exceptional. After three decades of studying the

Chinese city in relative isolation, the field of urban China studies needs to move beyond the area-studies approach and adopt a comparative perspective. This book is such an undertaking.

This book draws on theoretical debates and comparative scholarship in the interdisciplinary field of global urban studies. In global urban studies, cities in the Global South have received increasing research attention, but the predominant theoretical frameworks for interpreting their transformations still derive mostly from cities in North America and western Europe (Robinson 2006, 2011, 2016; Roy 2009, 2015, 2016; Parnell and Robinson 2012; Schindler 2017). One example is the neoliberalism thesis, which views urban restructuring in the Global North and South as part of a larger process of market-oriented regulatory reforms geared toward capital accumulation (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2005). A substantial scholarship, including some works on Chinese cities, takes a revisionist approach, using empirical evidence gathered from cities in the Global South to prove and revise Western-based urban theories (Banerjee-Guha 2002; He and Wu 2009). Yet this revisionist approach cannot fully capture urban social change in the Global South because most cities in the developing world did not experience the distinct phases of Fordism and post-Fordist transition; their transformations, therefore, have to be explained by processes other than deindustrialization. To decenter urban theory from the West, a comparative urban scholarship has emerged in recent years that is more attuned to historical and geographic differences of urban transformations in different parts of the world (Ren 2018a). Urban scholars have launched large-scale comparative projects to examine different modalities of urban governance and their impact on social inequality (Bunnell 2015; Hamel and Keil 2015; Sellers et al. 2017; Shatkin 2014, 2017). This book builds on this new comparative urban research by positioning cities in the Global South as key sites for advancing urban theory.

The book defamiliarizes the Chinese city by juxtaposing urban development in China with India. India is the only other continent-sized country experiencing a similar scale of urbanization to China. The number of urban residents in the two countries is now more than one billion and counting. In both countries, large-scale urbanization has unleashed enormous pressures in sectors vital to daily living, such as housing, urban planning, land use, and the environment. Also, both national governments have positioned urban regions as engines for economic growth. The magnitude of urban challenges and the strategic role of urban regions for the national economy make China and India ideal laboratories to study urban governance and social change in comparative perspective. The book seeks to mine comparative insights while also drawing on history, examining how particular forms of urban governance in China and

India have evolved over time and continue to shape both urban development and citizens' struggles over housing, land, and the environment.

Urban Governance in China and India

Two views on urban governance in China and India predominate today. The first is the state-capacity perspective, which contrasts the powerful local state in China with the fragmented local state in India and posits that the difference between a strong and a weak local state largely distinguishes urban governance in the two countries.[3] The second view is the regime-type perspective, which traces the key difference in urban governance between China and India to their political systems. This view assumes that the different capacities of the local state result from China's authoritarian and India's democratic regimes. Urban policymaking in China is fast but not accountable to citizens, as power is concentrated in local governments whose leaders are appointed from above rather than elected by constituencies. Urban policymaking in India is slow and contested, because of the checks and balances that come with democracy.

Undoubtedly, both state capacity and political regimes can powerfully shape urban governance, but they offer only a partial view of how differently urban policies are made, implemented, and contested in China and India. The state-capacity and regime-type perspectives also leave a range of other social phenomena and processes unexplained. For example, both China and India, notwithstanding their different political regimes and state capacity, experience endemic corruption, high levels of inequality, widespread land grabbing, and social protests (Sun and Johnston 2009; Shue and Thornton 2017; Duara and Perry 2018). How China and India govern their cities requires a more sophisticated diagnosis than simplified dichotomies of strong versus weak state or democracy versus authoritarianism.

This book presents a new thesis to complement the state-capacity and regime-type perspectives. My central argument is that urban governance in China is *territorial* in nature, while that in India is *associational*. Territorial forms of governance in China are anchored in territorial institutions, such as the *hukou* system, rural collective land ownership, and the cadre evaluation system for promoting local officials. All these institutions enable territorial forms of governing because they distribute rights, benefits, resources, and responsibilities according to territorial jurisdictions. By contrast, associational forms of governance depend on not territorial institutions but a dense web of networks and alliances—in constant formation and mutation—among the state, the private sector, and civil society groups.

Postreform China inherited from previous eras a set of territorially based subnational institutions. One inherited territorial institution is hukou—the residency system that defines citizens' access to social welfare by where they are officially registered as a resident. The hukou system, a paradigmatic example of Chinese territorial institutions, divides the national population into urban and rural segments, with different sets of social and economic rights. Another inherited territorial institution is rural collective land ownership. Under the current setup, Chinese peasants have legal rights of land ownership that enable them to engage in resistance against land taking based on territorial claims. In addition, postreform China has invented a set of new territorial institutions, such as the cadre evaluation system, under which local Chinese officials are incentivized through territorial promotion criteria to boost economic growth in the areas they govern. The most dramatic example of a territorial innovation to spearhead urban development is the central government's special economic zone (SEZ) policy. This policy has created a new megacity in China—Shenzhen, a territory carved out from existing regional administrations and endowed with enormous decision-making authority to experiment with deregulatory reforms (O'Donnell, Wong, and Bach 2017). Together, these territorial institutions turn Chinese cities into relatively autonomous political economic units, where the local state coordinates economic development and provides social welfare for residents. I refer to this mode of governance anchored in subnational territorial authorities and institutions as "territorial politics," and I argue that it has led to an uneven distribution of rights and benefits across localities.[4]

Postliberalization India, by contrast, lacks powerful territorial institutions and authorities at the local level, and its urban governance exhibits an associational logic contingent on alliance building. India has no territorial institutions that resemble China's hukou, collective land ownership, or cadre evaluation system. Access to social welfare does not depend on where a citizen is officially registered; the lack of legal land ownership makes Indian peasants vulnerable in cases of land acquisition; and the careers of local officials are influenced by many other factors besides economic performance within their jurisdictions. Moreover, India's SEZs (of which there are hundreds) operate very differently from those in China (Jenkins, Kennedy, and Mukhopadhyay 2014), as many are schemes for property development rather than autonomous political economic units endowed with wide-ranging decision-making authority. Instead of being driven by territorial institutions, the execution of policies and projects in Indian cities depends on alliance building among actors from the state, the private sector, and civil society. Urban programs—ranging from slum clearance and infrastructure provision to environmental protection—can succeed, fail, or be radically modified by key stakeholders through alliance building. To capture this coalition-based mode of governance characteristic of Indian cities, I use the term "associational politics."

Territorial and associational forms of governing can be found in both countries. In China, one can find examples of associational types of mobilization and governing, as when protesters reach out to the media to aid their cause, or when the state seeks support from NGOs to quell environmental protests before they get out of control. Conversely, in India, one can find manifestations of territorial forms of governing—for instance, state authorities exert territorial control by announcing urban development plans and by allowing SEZs. My broader argument, however, is that the territorial approach is more consequential in China, and the associational approach is more prevalent in India.

The different central-local relations in the two countries are critical for understanding the territorial logic in urban governance in China and its lack in India. China and India are almost opposites when it comes to central-local government relations. If China is one of the world's most decentralized countries in terms of fiscal policies and distribution of administrative power, then India is one of the least (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Take, for instance, the quintessential urban matters of housing, land use, and infrastructure provision. Municipal governments in China can make most decisions without seeking approval from the provincial and central governments. In India, by contrast, urban affairs fall under the domain of state governments, with municipal governments wielding limited power and shouldering fewer responsibilities. The different scales at which power, authority, and resources are delegated are perhaps the biggest factor shaping how cities are governed in the two countries.

In China, one of the major institutional changes during the market reform era has been the devolution of both power and responsibilities from the central ministries and provincial governments to municipal authorities. China's single-party system has facilitated this process through its control of local officials (Landry 2008; Chung 2016).[5] Municipal governments have unchecked power to launch new policies involving land, housing, and infrastructure sectors, and decision-making power is often concentrated in the hands of mayors and party secretaries, who can make quick policy decisions without having to consult the public. But with great power comes heavy responsibility. From healthcare and education to infrastructure and affordable housing, the provision of social welfare and services—which in other countries typically is shared among central, state, and local governments—falls almost entirely in China on local governments. Chinese cities thus have become relatively autonomous political economic units, with city officials acting as entrepreneurs to drum up investment, enhance revenue, and provide social welfare and services to residents.

In India municipal governments lack real power, and this can be traced to both historical and contemporary sources. The British introduced municipal councils in the late colonial era to better manage social tensions and to help generate revenue, but they did not devolve substantial power to municipal councils, which were dominated by Indians. Instead, the British retained decision-making power within the provincial state governments that they controlled. After independence, elite politicians in the national government continued to resist devolving power to the local level, as many distrusted local politicians and bureaucrats; in the eyes of the elite, a less decentralized India was a more democratic one (Khilnani 1999). After 1990, the seventy-third and seventy-fourth constitutional amendments mandated the empowerment of local governments; however, the transfer of power from state governments to municipalities did not go smoothly, and the hand of regional state governments is still ubiquitously visible in urban affairs (Weinstein, Sami, and Shatkin, 2014). The ruling parties in state governments typically do not want to relinquish power to municipal governments, especially if the latter are controlled by a different political party. Moreover, as politicians in state governments have their constituencies in the rural sector, many of them are more interested in rolling out agricultural subsidies to court the rural vote rather than devising urban policies and tackling urban social problems (Varshney 1998). Taking this situation together with the weak revenue base of Indian cities, local territorial authorities lack both power and resources, which has given rise to associational forms of governance. As no single institution or authority is in charge, to get things done, one has to build alliances and coalitions to garner support and minimize resistance. Some argue that the absence of strong municipal institutions has turned Indian cities into "driver-less engines" for economic growth (Mukhopadhyay 2018).

The Study

This book focuses on three of the most controversial and contested urban policy fields—land acquisition, slum clearance, and air pollution control—to examine how differently China and India govern their cities. Land acquisition has become widespread as China and India urbanize. It is no exaggeration to say that the urban question in China and India today centers on the land question—namely, who has the rights to land, and under what conditions can the state and the private sector take it away? In the housing sector, both countries face a severe housing shortage for the urban poor, and as a result, informal settlements have proliferated in large cities. The redevelopment of informal settlements offers a prime example to comparatively study urban governance and citizens' struggle for their rights to housing. Urban growth in China and India is also resource intensive and has caused unprecedented levels of environmental damage. One of the most urgent environmental issues facing the two countries today is air pollution. Local and central governments in both countries have recently stepped up their efforts to curb air pollution by introducing a wide range of policy experiments and legislation.

To study land acquisition, I chose a high-profile land protest from each country. The Chinese case is the Wukan protest in Guangdong province that erupted in 2012, one of the few protests in the country that succeeded in blocking the land deal because of the quite extraordinary mobilization efforts of local villagers. Although the partial success of the protests makes it an outlier among Chinese land protests, the Wukan case nevertheless offers critical insights into contested land acquisitions in China. Wukan highlights, for instance, the country's aggressive urban expansion, rapid loss of farmland, corruption of village officials, and repression by municipal authorities. The comparative case in India is the Singur protest, which broke out in 2006 in the state of West Bengal. As in Wukan, farmers took to the streets when they learned that their land was being acquired by the state government to enable a private company to build a car factory. Villagers quickly mobilized, and the Singur protest triggered the eventual end of the Communist Party's three-decade rule in West Bengal. The Singur protest spotlights the highly politicized nature of land acquisitions in India, characterized by strong intervention from political parties.

For the redevelopment of informal settlements, I chose Guangzhou and Mumbai as fieldwork sites. Both cities have substantial populations that live in informal settlements, and more importantly, both have pioneered their country's policy experiments with privately sponsored redevelopment of urban villages and slums. After visiting several ongoing redevelopment projects in both cities, I selected Xiancun (an urban village) in Guangzhou and the airport slum (a large cluster of slums adjacent to the international airport) in Mumbai. Their coveted locations—Xiancun sits at the center of Guangzhou's central business district, and the airport slum abuts Mumbai's international airport—sealed their fate for redevelopment. In both cases, the struggle against eviction and demolition has lasted for nearly two decades, and they represent the most contested redevelopment projects in each city, offering rich ethnographic material with which to examine the politics of slum clearance.

On air pollution control, Beijing and Delhi stand out as excellent cases for comparison. Each city is the key site for major policy actions on air pollution control in its country. In Beijing, since 2009, when the U.S. embassy started publicizing real-time air quality data, the city government has committed substantial financial resources and enacted extensive legislation toward reducing air pollution. In Delhi, activists have been filing public interest lawsuits urging the government to take action to improve air quality and protect public health. The tales of Beijing and Delhi spotlight the dilemma faced by these two developing countries, caught between the imperatives of economic growth and environmental protection. Together, these two cities provide dynamic sites to study the contested politics of environmental governance.

The book is primarily based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2013 and 2016, with follow-up visits to China and India in 2018 and 2019. During the fieldwork, I interviewed key stakeholders for each case. For land acquisition, I interviewed key participants in the Wukan and Singur protests. To research slum clearance, I interviewed local residents, developers, government officials, and representatives of housing rights NGOs in Guangzhou and Mumbai. And for the clean air campaigns, I interviewed researchers at major environmental think tanks, heads of environmental NGOs, scientists leading large nationally funded research projects on air quality and public health, and prolific bloggers, journalists, and activists who write about air pollution. The fieldwork interviews are complemented by other sources, including historical censuses, policy documents, court files, urban master plans, environmental legislation, NGO reports, and documentary films.

Overview

The main section of the book is organized thematically into five chapters. Following this introduction, in chapter 2, I scrutinize the meanings and consequences of urban versus rural classifications for residents and localities in the two countries. Currently, China adopts a rather broad definition of urban localities—based entirely on administrative status. By contrast, India has been using a rather strict urban definition—based on administrative status, population size, density, and nonagricultural employment. In China, the benefits of gaining urban status are substantial—for both residents and localities. By comparison, in India, the benefits of urban classification are uncertain, and residents either demand or resist being classified as urban depending on what they will gain or lose. These differences manifest the presence of strong territorial institutions in Chinese cities and their lack in Indian cities, which give rise to different forms of governance.

In chapter 3, I examine territorial and associational forms of governance through the case of land acquisition and citizens' protests. In China, rural protesters at Wukan targeted the bottom-level village authorities and made strong claims of land ownership. In the Indian case, by contrast, rural protesters at Singur targeted the regional state government, and the success of their resistance depended not on land ownership claims but on the intervention of political parties. Rural collective land ownership lent a strong territorial logic to residents' mobilization in Wukan, and the involvement of political parties marked the associational character of the mobilizations in Singur.

Chapter 4 compares urban village and slum redevelopment in Guangzhou and Mumbai. In Guangzhou, the redevelopment of urban villages has displaced migrant tenants who lack local hukou and has enriched villager-landlords who have hukou and are also members of the incorporated village companies. In Mumbai, the eligibility of slum residents for compensation is decided according to when the residents settled in the slum, with an arbitrary cutoff date, which can be negotiated through mobilization efforts by residents and housing NGOs. How the two cities deploy different forms of exclusion—the use of hukou and membership in village companies in Guangzhou, and a negotiable cutoff date in Mumbai—exemplifies territorial and associational forms of governance at work.

The differences between territorial and associational forms of governance are even more apparent in the case of air pollution control, which I examine in chapter 5. Beijing's clean air campaign is led by the municipal government, which applies a territorial strategy of holding local officials responsible for reducing pollution within their jurisdictions. By comparison, Delhi's clean air campaign has been spearheaded by environmental NGOs, which strategically mobilize the Indian Supreme Court to prod the Delhi government into action. In the long run, however, neither approach will be effective in tackling the problem of air pollution. Whether blue skies can return to Beijing and Delhi depends on a combination of factors, including, for example, strong government intervention, private-sector compliance, market incentives, and citizen participation beyond the urban middle class and NGOs.

Chapter 6 excavates the historical conditions that led to such divergent forms of governance in the two countries. It traces early territorial forms of local governance—such as the role of the Confucian gentry in managing local affairs—back to imperial China in the thirteenth century and tracks them up to 1911. The chapter then identifies continuities and ruptures in territorial institutions throughout the republican, socialist, and postreform eras. Turning next to the Indian experience, the chapter follows the trajectory of associational forms of governance in India throughout the precolonial, British, and postindependence eras, spotlighting how communities have resorted to alliance building to navigate conflicts arising from caste, religious, and ethnic divides. The postindependence era is the crucial period for the consolidation of the territorial form of local governance in China and the associational form of local governance in India.

The concluding chapter discusses the consequences of the territorial and associational forms of governing cities. Neither approach has been able to deliver just and equitable urban growth. In China, territorial forms of governance have created not only a deep cleavage between urban and rural areas, but also unprecedented levels of disparity across cities and towns throughout the country. In India, associational politics has also produced inequalities, but the disparities stem from the exclusion of citizens from particular alliances and partnerships. To lessen the strains of large-scale urbanization and uneven development, the two countries should move forward by adopting a model that can empower municipal-level urban authorities yet preserve space for democratic deliberation. China needs to scale back the power of municipal authorities, lessen the responsibilities of local governments, and subject local officials to greater public accountability. India needs to empower municipal institutions and put them in charge of urban policy making.

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