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PROPOSED PREFACE

MS NYPL (Berg Collection); in a copybook containing a transcript of C's letters "To Mr. Justice Fletcher". The "Proposed Preface to the first Volume" of *Op Max* is written and signed by C in ink on the pastedown inside the back cover of the copybook. See the frontispiece for an illustration.

DATE. After 1828, probably 1832. It is not known when the transcript of C's eight letters to William Fletcher (published in *The Courier* 20 Sept–10 Dec 1814) was made, but C's annotations of the transcript are dated 1832 and other entries in the copybook date from early in the same year: see *EOT (CC)* 11 373–4 and nn, and *SW & F (CC)* 1500, 1502–4. Some of the leaves in the copybook bear the wm date 1828, others 1829.

Proposed Preface to ~~my~~ <the first> Volume of my Work,¹
the "Magnum Opus
et labor ^a(mea vitae)"^b

In my judgement, there are but two schemes worthy the name of Religion: and I believe that the first is to the Second, as the Acorn to the same Acorn expanded into ~~the~~ <an> Oak. The first is that of Lieutenant Bowling—in his reply to <the> Zealous Romish Priest—"As for me, friend! d'ye see, I have no objection to what you say. It may be either true or false for what I know. I meddle with nobody's affairs but my own—the Gunner to his Linstock,² and the Steersman to the helm, as the saying is. I trust to no creed but the compass, and do unto every man as I would be done by: so that I defy the Devil, the Pope and the ^cPretender, and hope

^a The parentheses are written in pencil

^b Closing quotation mark inserted

^c Just above the above the first letter of this word is the apex of a triangle, the sides of which extend just below the "e" in "the" and the "n" in "second" of the next sentence. The diagram is in ink and appears to have been made before the preface was written. The top and bottom of the triangle are labelled thus:

¹ For the significance of Coleridge's word here see Prolegomena vii: The *Magnum Opus* as System. Note that immediately below Coleridge changes the


word "Work" to "System".

² A long stick used to hold a lighted match for firing a cannon.

to be saved as well as another.”—The second Scheme the Reader will find in the following System of Faith and Philosophy: or ~~Chain of Truth~~ (Catena Veritatum) de Deo, Homine et Naturâ.³

S. T. Coleridge.

The ~~Work~~ (System) is divided into three unequal parts, each of which forms an independent Work—the whole comprized in five Volumes. Two of these, and the larger part of the third,⁴ are prepared for the press—and (of) the remainder the materials & principal contents exist^d in Sybilline MSS—



^d There is a stray quotation mark here in the ms

³ Tr: “Chain of Truths Concerning God, Man and Nature”. *Catena* (chain) is a favorite Coleridgean conception, and indicates the progression of necessary implications that made system such an important commitment for him. “The Christian Preacher should abjure every argument, that is not a link in the chain of which Christ is the Staple & Staple Ring” (*CM—CC—II* 291). Again: “Ah! poor Hobbes, he possessed fine talents: in forming his theories, however, he fancied the first link of his chain was fastened to a rock of *adamant*; but it proved to be a rock of *ice*.” (Brinkley 63). Yet again: “But in the human mind, the succession of whose thoughts constitutes *Time* for us, and of course therefore in Grammar and in Logic we assume one

circle, like the staple of a Chain, as the only means of letting all other Links follow each other in one Line of Dependency” (*CN* iv 4644). For a single example—among several—in the work at hand, see below, Frag 4 f 76: “. . . the chain of our disquisition in the last link”. Cf another Latin rubric that constitutes an alternate formulation to the one that follows. The alternate reads “Coleridgii Fides et Doctrina de Deo, Mundo, et Homine.”—“The Faith of Coleridge and the Doctrine concerning God, World, and Man” (*CN* iv 4645).

⁴ For variations in the number of treatises projected see the discussions in Prolegomena xii: The Content of the *Magnum Opus* and xiii: The Transformations of the *Magnum Opus*.

FRAGMENT 1

VCL S MS 29, “Say Vol. III” (*L&L* B2); wm “JOHN HALL | 1819”. This, the thinnest of the three clasped vellum notebooks of S SM 29, was mistakenly identified as Vol III by C. A. Ward in pencil on the verso of the second unfoliated flyleaf at the beginning of the notebook. The text is written in ink in the hands of JHG (ff 1–28, 38–122) and a second amanuensis (ff 28–37), almost certainly John Watson, with occasional corrections and insertions in C’s hand. A number of corrections and comments have been made in pencil, probably by Ward; these are recorded in the textual notes.

DATE. 1820–3. On 16 May 1822 C reported to RS that John Watson (1799–1827), a “temporary Partner” of JG’s, had been living with him in the Gillman household for “the last 18 months”, i.e. since Dec 1820 (*CL* v 226–7). By Jan 1822 he had become one of C’s amanuenses for the *Logic* (see *Logic*—*CC*—xliv–xlv), and on 11 Oct 1823 he left for Germany with letters of introduction from C (*CL* v 287–8, 303–4, 335). Ff 1–28 could have been written no earlier than 1819, the wm date; ff106–22 derive from C’s “Essay on Faith” of c Jul 1820 (*SW* & *F*—*CC*—836–44).

[*f* I]

Chapter III¹

In every science something is assumed, the proof of which is prior to the science itself, whether supplied by some other science or consisting of some fact, the certainty or validity of ~~the maxims derived from~~ which is of common acknowledgement, or lastly of some idea or conception without which the science itself would be impossible and the denial of which implies the logical falsity of the whole, and consequently stamps the very act of commencing it in detail with the character of absurdity. We have spoken of *Science*, of *Sciences*, in the severest sense of the word, viz. those superstructures of the pure intellect in which the speculative necessity reigns throughout and exclusively, the act itself of reasoning and imagining being the only practical ingredient, or that alone in which any reference is made to the Will, and even in this to the Will in that sense only in which it remains utterly undetermined, whether it be a simple

¹ Chapters I and II, which presumably set the scope and goal of the *magnum opus* (if this is the beginning, which is

not certain, and perhaps not even probable), are not contained in this fragment, and are not known to exist.

spontaneity, [f2] which as in the growth of plants or the unconscious functions of (the lower) animal life no more excludes the predicate of necessity than a motion proceeding from an outward impact, to which alone, namely causation *ab extra*,² spontaneity as an act, *actio ab intra*,³ doth in philosophical language stand in antithesis.⁴ For example, the Practical or the postulate is merely the power of imagining the shortest possible line between two points, or a line deviating at each point from the former, and in these the figures composed of one or other or both of these two classes of lines. When, in asserting the existence of such a power as the universal predicate of intelligence, we assert at the same time the impossibility of either withholding our assent and of imagining anything contrary to the former acts, and thus attach a necessity to them which has no opposite, and the contrary of which is an absurdity, we have the whole foundation of *Geometry*, as far as the Practical is concerned.⁵

It has likewise been shown [f3] that the power of withholding and, indirectly at least, of refusing our assent to the necessary foundation of an intellectual superstructure forms the essential difference between the moral and sciential systems. The assent having been given, this difference ceases, and moral positions both may and ought to be treated as sciences subject to the same universal logic as those ~~weight~~ of number and measure.⁶ Still, however, a weighty difference would remain as the result if there be no other distinction. A fact, for instance, having been taken for granted, whatever is legitimately deduced and concluded [from it] becomes a logical truth, for in reality in all such reasoning nothing more is affirmed than the legitimacy of a given connexion according to the necessary and inherent forms of thinking. The (As) proof of this it need only be noticed that in all syllogisms, the major of which consists

² Tr: "from without".

³ Tr: "action from within".

⁴ The phrases *ab extra* and *ab intra* occur frequently in C, and are the basic distinction from which flows his characteristic emphasis on organic form. They occur as early as Feb 1805, where he speaks of the "difference" between "Fabrication and Generation": the "Form" of the latter is "ab intra, *evolved*, the other ab extra, *impressed*" (CN II 2444).

⁵ Both from his commitment to logic, and from his instinctive identification with Pythagoras and Plato, C frequently takes examples from the realm of mathematics. It is to be regretted—and he

himself regretted it bitterly (see CN IV 4542)—that he had had no formal training in mathematics. Again, see TT (CC) I 8 and n 17. See also CM (CC) III 349: "O my most unhappy unwise neglect of Mathematics at Jesus College, Cambridge! No week passes, in which I do not groan for it!"

⁶ Underlying C's insistence on the parallelism of moral and sciential logic is Spinoza's insistence, in his *Ethica*, that "I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids" (*Spinoza* II 138).

of a fact, i.e. by which, both here and elsewhere, we mean nothing more than an assertion respecting particulars or individuals ^a((in antithesis to universal truths) or positions [f4] affirmed as such, that this often is the sense of the word *Fact*, and that at the same time it is an unfortunate word in consequence of its etymology may be seen from the frequency with which we speak of a false or mistaken fact and yet the feeling of embarrassment, as if dissatisfied with the term and yet unable to find a substitute except by a periphrasis—so too, “I deny the fact”, which from the evidencetness of our meaning we use without hesitation, tho’ relatively to the etymon it involves the same contradiction as a false or mistaken fact. I apprehend that the negative use will likewise bear out the definition of “fact” given out in the text. If I am not greatly mistaken, no one in the habit of correct speaking would say, “it is a fact that two straight lines cannot enclose a space”, or that “two and two make four”, though he would not hesitate to ~~call his position~~(say), “it is a fact that this position is to be found in Euclid’s axioms”)^b.

We may always prefix, and indeed most commonly understand, an “if”.⁷ Thus all stones think; but a flint is a stone; therefore a flint thinks. No less to the minor, [f5] where the fact of inclusion is not of universal knowledge: thus all stones think; but men are stones; therefore men think. It may be worth remarking that this ridiculous syllogism has been adduced in a recent work on logic to prove that a truth may be syllogistically deduced from a falsehood and vice versâ.⁸ But the whole purpose (amount) of the assertion is merely that “if” was a predicate common to all stones; and if men were a particular sort of stones, then it would necessarily follow that men must think. The proper answer to this syllogism, and all of the same kind—if such nonsense deserved an answer—would

^{a-b} Square brackets are placed around this passage in the ms, the opening bracket being written over the parenthesis

⁷ That is to say, logical formations can always be rendered as if/then sequences.

⁸ The “recent work on logic” should seemingly be that of Richard Whately, but the editor has not found the instance. Other popular works on logic, such as that of Watts and that of Aldrich, could hardly be called “recent”. Whately wrote the section on logic for the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*, and the work in revised form was published in 1826 as *Elements of Logic*, which eventually went into nine editions. Whately incurred C’s animosity because as Dean of Oriel Col-

lege at Oxford he had presided over Hartley Coleridge’s expulsion in 1820. Not least perhaps for that reason C rejected Whately’s logic with contempt. As he said in 1830: “I never read such wretched stuff as those two books of Whately’s on Logic and Rhetoric. There are two kinds of Logic. 1. Syllogistic 2. Criterional. How any one can by any spinning make more than ten or a dozen pages about the first is inconceivable to me; all those absurd forms of syllogisms are one half pure sophisms and the other mere forms of Rhetoric” (*TT—CC—* 1 201).

be, “Men^c think, I own, but not ‘therefore’, unless except on the condition of conceding a notorious absurdity.” It follows, then, that if the ~~moral~~ truths of the moral world are to maintain an equality of rank with those of science—not to speak of a superior dignity, which indeed would supersede the equality in the very moment in which the latter is admitted—we^d must discover an opposite to hypothetical positions no less than to the unconditionally necessary, [*f*6] i.e. the positions of pure ^escience. And^f in order to this we must find [that] which agrees with the positions of pure science in as far as its affirmations are universal and not of particulars or individuals, the contingency of which ~~the~~ still remains for the mind even when it is removed by the ~~fact~~ knowledge of the fact, and yet agreeing with the latter in its distinction from the former by the possibility of affirming the contrary. It must in some sense, therefore, be necessary, or it could have no point of connexion with the sciences; and yet it must not be unconditionally so, or it would be one and the same with science. Again, in its relation to hypothetical positions or those grounded on facts, it must be contingent and yet contingent in a different manner, which can only be that as in the hypothetical affirmations the contingency remains for the mind when it is removed by the ~~fact~~ establishment of the fact, so here the necessity must remain in the mind while the contingency is retained in the fact.

Such, indeed, is the usage in all languages. When, [*f*7] speaking of some duty or its contrary, we say of ourselves or to another, “I, or you, must do this or that,” we well know that the necessity is not absolute but ^gconditional. But^h still a necessity is acknowledged, and the “if” or condition is ~~of a divers~~ diverse in kind from the contingency expressed in all affirmations of mere facts. ~~we~~ We content ourselves in resolutely asserting—and if our word be doubted, in calling others to witness—that such and such sheep *are* always white, but never think of seriously asserting that they must be so, though we have not the slightest doubt on our minds respecting the accuracy of the observation. Whereas we tell another that he must abstain from any given act of baseness or ingratitude with the same fullness of conviction when we anticipate that he will do the contrary as when we are most confident that he will act in consonance to the obligation. In the position itself we admit no more contingency than is found in the mathematics; and yet the position must be itself more or other than the positions of the mathematicians, or the difference between the two [*f*8] would vanish and the contingency be wholly divided from the position itself, just as in the case of sciences em-

^c ms: men ^d ms: We ^{e-f} ms: science and ^{g-h} ms: conditional but

pirically applied, where the position respecting the properties of a mathematical arch remains altogether unaffected by the contingency of the materials employed in the construction of a bridge or the probability of their greater or lesser approximation.

The moral position, therefore, must have a reality of its own, even independently of its application, and its necessity must not only remain even where the application is refused or subverted, but the denial of the position must be itself a reality and a realizing act in addition to and even independent of the contingency of the accordance or discordance of the fact connected therewith.⁹ You must do your best to relieve a deserving and afflicted parent; if you do not, the import contained in the term “must” remains, and still you ought to have done so—you *ought* still to make compensation for that neglect, and [even] if you reply, [*f* 9] “Thereⁱ is no ‘must’ in the matter, for who shall make me?”^j If you threw me out of the window, I must go; but while you are no stronger than I believe you to be, I know and feel that I can and shall stay where I am. And as to your ‘ought’, so you and the parson say, but I deny it and believe what nature tells me more than all the priests in the creation and all the herd of ninnies that are duped by them. Does the young lion ~~deny himself a m~~ lessen his meal to feed his old dam, or waste and fret his season of power and enjoyment to lengthen out the misery of his toothless sire’s old age?” If such were the reply, the retort, I presume, would be to this purpose: “Hateful as your conduct is, it is in and of itself less affrightful, because less certainly of inmost wickedness and a series of past guilty acts within or without than ~~the ve~~^k this very act of mind by which you reject the ^{l-m}obligation. Nay,^m that you are capable of so doing, and consequently that the principle partakes of contingency as far as you [*f* 10] are included in it, of which yet it must not partake inasmuch as it is essentially of the highest necessity, excludes you from the name and rank of manhood. You appeal to the beasts: well for you if this appeal could lawfully have been made for you as being one of the[ir] ^{n-o}number. But^o you are not a beast, for beasts are not capable of reasoning; and you are not a man, for you disown the principles of reason.¹⁰ To transgress

ⁱ ms: there ^j ms: me. ^k ms: the ~~ve~~
^{l-m} ms: obligation nay ^{n-o} ms: number but

⁹ The great stress on this point is necessitated by C’s dealing so exclusively here in purely mental functions, or “facts that have their sole being entirely in consciousness” (f 75). The possibility that the moral is the figmental must be rejected; since so much is to be built on it,

the moral must have an impregnable foundation.

¹⁰ Not only in the *Op Max*, but repeatedly throughout his theological and philosophical argument on other occasions, C is concerned with the essential distinction between man and beast, on

but still to acknowledge is that which, dividing us in our conception at least from angels or in whatever other form we represent to ourselves the idea of human nature in all its possible perfection, forms the riddle of humanity, the problem which all ages labour to solve and is the mystery of the world. But at once to transgress and disown, or rather to include, the guilt of all transgressions in the deliberate act of disowning is proper neither to man nor beast, and constitutes the idea of a fiend, the real existence of which you are employing your endeavour to make manifest.”

[f 11] In this imagined conversation we have insensibly developed the first and most general forms of morality and of religion.¹¹ While the nature of the actions, which here take the same place as facts, holds^p in hypothetical affirmations, gives^q the contents and form the conception of morality, in as much and are so far akin to that class as that there is a contingency inherent in the same and yet still more nearly to the affirmations of science, inasmuch as this contingency, so far from removing all necessity, inheres in its first specific conception in like manner to the principles or universal positions, which have the same place as the definitions, postulates, and axioms in the propositions and demonstrations of pure science, and yet preserve a point of connexion or kindred with the class of empirical positions, [which] by their reality and realizing power contain the substance and form the first general conception of religion. If, therefore, [f 12] we recapitulate the code and creed given in the first chapter (we shall see at once) both (what) the assumptions and the postulates are, without which there would be an absurdity in the commencement of any investigation of the truth or falsehood of the particular positions contained in that code, and that their necessity does not consist merely or chiefly in their indispensableness to this investigation, or as the condition of our assent to the truth of the particulars. In other words, that the conclusion does not rest on an understood “if” prefixed as in the syllogism above-stated—that the truths are not hypothetically

^p ms: hold ^q ms: give

which man’s hope of immortality depends. He speaks, for instance, of “the chasm, the *diversity in kind*, between man & beast” (CL iv 856). The establishment of that distinction was one of the most welcome services rendered by the differentiation between “reason” and “understanding”. Cf *The Friend*: “But Reason is wholly denied, equally to the highest as to the lowest of the brutes;

otherwise it must be wholly attributed to them, and with it therefore Self-consciousness, and *personality*, or Moral Being” (*Friend*—CC—I 155).

¹¹ Cf the overarching definition in *The Friend*: “Religion, in its widest sense, signifies the act and habit of reverencing THE INVISIBLE, as the highest both in ourselves and nature” (*Friend*—CC—I 440).

true, but that the necessity arises out of and is commensurate with human nature itself, the sole condition being the retention of humanity, while that this is contingent, i.e. that a human being may be dishumanized,¹² which it cannot be but by his own act, all calamities from without having at the utmost only the power of suspending it instead of subordinating it to science, or in any way constituting an inferiority, [*f 13*] is the very ground and efficient cause of its supremacy, differencing it from science by addition, not subtraction, by addition, too, not of an alien ~~prop~~ quality but of the same power in a higher dignity, namely by adding goodness to truth while it realizes truth by goodness, enlightens goodness by truth and transubstantiates, as it were, truth and goodness each into the nature of the other. In one concluding sentence: there are several positions, each of which might be legitimately assumed and each of which might stand on its own grounds as a postulate of humanity, and à fortiori, therefore, of every code of religion and morality. But the one assumption, the one postulate, in which all the rest may assume a scientific form, and which granted we may give coercively deduce even those which we might allowably have assumed, is the Existence of the Will,¹³ which a moment's reflexion will convince us is the same as *Moral Responsibility*, and that again with the reality and essential difference of (moral) *Good* and *Evil*. ~~Morally both.~~^{14 15}

¹² What is entailed in being human, and what is the distinction between person and thing, are at the very centre of C's thinking throughout his life. "Every Man is born with the faculty of Reason; and whatever is without it, be the Shape what it may, is not a Man or PERSON but a THING. Hence the sacred Principle indeed, which is the *groundwork* of all Law and Justice, that a Person can never become a thing" (*Friend*—CC—II 125). Again: "morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between Thing and Person" (*AR*—CC—327). See *AR* (CC) 78 and nn 11, 137, 269.

¹³ Will, which is the first of the great central abstractions to be encountered in the *Op Max*, is for C the very first principle both of God and man. See *Prolegomena* xvii: The Concept of Will, and below *passim*. Cf e.g. *Frag 2 f 242*: "An absolute Will, which, therefore, is essentially causative of reality and therefore in *origine* causative of its own reality, the essential causativeness, however, abiding

undiminished and indiminishable, this is our first Idea."

¹⁴ This, for C, is the foundation of everything else. Cf a notebook jotting: "The moral responsibility of man, and the truths implied in this, either as presupposed or necessarily consequent. 2. the Personhood and the *Holiness* of God?—3. The Pauline Ethics resulting from the admission of the 1. and 2.? 4. From the *fact* of moral Evil and No. 3. the reality of *Original Sin*?—5. The removal of this by the incarnation and Cross of the Son of God, as the *only possible* Redemption, thro' Faith as the only possible means of appropriating the boon in each Individual redeemed?—I affirm that each of these five, and each in the full and literal sense of the words in which it is stated, and that all five collectively, are essential to Christian Belief—" (*CN* iv 5215).

¹⁵ This initial complex will bear the burden of the entire elaboration of the *Op Max*. The extrication of the "essential

Chapter IV

There is one point on which we are particularly anxious to prevent any misunderstanding. This respects the difference between the two ⟨possible⟩ assertions, “such a truth may be known as truth by the light of reason” and “the same truth was discovered, or might have been discovered, by men by means of their reason exclusively”. We may assert the former, and in the course of this work shall find occasion to assert it without involving, nay, we altogether disbelieve and deny, the latter. The *facit*¹⁶ or sum total affixed to the examples in the common elementary school books of arithmetic are all capable of being demonstrated by the science of arithmetic, and yet it is very possible that the children might never attain to that scientific insight without that and similar as helps and assistances. To take another instance, which may bring us still nearer to the point in question. An object may be placed at so great a distance or so dense an [*f* 15] atmosphere may intervene as to render it in the highest degree improbable that it could ever be noticed by persons placed at the given point under the supposed impediment of distance and misty air, which yet may become recognisable without much difficulty by the naked eye after it had been once pointed out and accurately described by others familiar with the object, or seen by means of a telescope. Instances in which a knowledge given to the mind quickens and invigorates the faculties by which such knowledge is attainable independently cannot have escaped the most ordinary observer, and this is equally true whether it be faculties of the mind or of the senses. Who has not experienced the help which a good county map affords to a traveller in a country where, as in Wales for instance, the names of places, villages, etc. are relics of a language unknown to him? It is indeed wonderful both how small a likeness will suffice a full apprehension of sound or sight when the correspondent sound or object is foreknown and foreimagined, and how small a deviation or imperfection will render the whole confused and indistinguishable or mistaken where no such previous intimation has been received.¹⁷ Hence [*f* 16] all unknown languages appear to a foreigner to

difference of moral good and evil” is not only of critical importance to C’s own needs but is something that cannot occur if pantheism is adopted as the system of reason. In C’s view, it goes hand in hand with the doctrine of the Trinity, which the progress of the *Op Max* is also moving to extricate, e.g. “the Doctrines of the Tri-une God and Eternal Life; of Sin

& originaive Evil; Theanthropy; Incarnation, and Redemption by the Cross” are all linked together in a single passage (*CN* iv 4924).

¹⁶ Tr: “it makes”.

¹⁷ In this observation C resumes a thread that runs through both his conception of symbol and his conception of method. The “great law of imagination”,

be spoken by the natives with extreme rapidity, and to those who are but beginning to understand it, with a distressing indistinction. But nearest of all, and on a scale and in extent and importance commensurate which it is brought to illustrate as an instance and to prove by its strict analogy, is the education of the human race¹⁸ at large and of each individual in all its different periods. A language may now be formed by agreement: every system of cyphers and of short hand is such a language, but how could language in reference to which these conventional languages are constructed have arisen?¹⁹ Convention itself, nay, even the very condition and materials of all convention, a society of communicants, presupposes a language. It is not impossible, indeed perhaps, what we may without much hazard assume, that all the grounds and causes of language may exist in the human mind, just as all the faculties of the adult body exist potentially in the new born infant. But yet this does not in the least degree lessen the necessity of ~~an adult~~ the pre-existence of an adult or of some cause equivalent in order to explain the infant's [f 17] own existence, nor the coexistence of an adult in order that the infant should become a full-grown man. In short, it is as inconceivable that language should have been given to a mind that did not contain in itself the grounds and principles of language, as that these grounds and principles should ever emerge from latency, had not a language in its rudiments at least have been previously given. What the impregnating power is to the egg or germen, what soil, heat, and moisture are to the seed or egg so fecundated—that is [the] example, the presentation, of a something to be

as he said, is “that a likeness in part tends to become a likeness of the whole” (*Friend*—CC—1 146). That law empowers the functioning of symbol, which “always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible, and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative” (*LS*—CC—30). The same movement from part to whole characterizes Coleridge's theory of method. He asserts that the principles of method he presents should be regarded “as the basis of my future philosophical and theological writings, and as the necessary introduction to the same” (*Friend*—CC—1 446). A chief characteristic of method is that it must employ a “mental antecedent” (513): “We have seen that a previous act and conception of the mind is indispensable even to the mere semblances

of Method: that neither fashion, mode, nor orderly arrangement can be produced with a prior purpose, and ‘a pre-cogitation *ad intentionem ejus quod quaeritur*’” (475).

¹⁸ The education of the human race was a famous rubric of Lessing (*Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*), of whom C in his early years planned to write, and read widely to gather materials for, a biography (see e.g. *CL* 1 518–19).

¹⁹ C often addresses problems of language and grammar, both in the *Op Max* and elsewhere, on the ground that grammar is connected with the fundamental processes of reason: e.g. “the science of grammar is logic in its first exemplification” (Frag 2 f 273). See below, in addition to the notes to that citation, Frag 4 f 38.

imitated and repeated for the human faculties. As the reason is compelled to the alternative of assuming either an infinite series or a creation, even so when it has assumed the latter it still finds the problem imperfectly solved, unless in some way or other it combines both by some equivalent for that which it has excluded. The creation, as the simple production of seed the individual, would still leave us in the same^r inconclusive state of mind as the new-born infant without the idea of the parent,²⁰ and even at the risk of the contradiction involved [*f* 18] in the hypothesis, we should feel ourselves compelled to presume an Adam before Adam, were it not that in creation we imply a creator and thus prepare ourselves for the equivalent to the advantage which the infinite series forever gives and snatches away, according as we contemplate each part severally or attempt to account for the All: the Creator, I say, is again pre-~~re~~quired by and presented by the reason and by the imagination in the service of the reason as the fosterer, the teacher, the Providence.²¹ In what particular mode this may be effected, whether by a sudden infusion of habits, or by an accommodation of the divine guide through the medium of forms correspondent in kind to the creature who is to be educated, or by a providential arrangement of all external forms under peculiar directive stimulants acting on an extraordinary and prepared susceptibility, no sane man will expect, no wise man be solicitous, to determine. Rather, perhaps, he will ~~deem it~~ rest in the probability that all these means may have acted in providential^{s-t} concert, and^t deem [*f* 19] himself amply remunerated for this enquiry that he has acquired an insight into one most important truth alike for the purposes of practice and speculation, namely that this is one distinctive mark of the human being, arising out of its double nature, namely the *animal* and the “*rational*”²²—that,^v if we may use so humble an illustration, as certain pumps will flow

^r ms: same state ^{s-t} ms: concert. And ^{u-v} ms: *rational*. That,

²⁰ Here C first broaches that concern with the relation of mother and child that assumes such enormous importance as the *Op Max* progresses. Also, the unconditioned Idea of the parent, as it antedates the conditioned reality of the child, is a happy example of a fundamental of C’s position throughout all his argumentation: that is, to cite merely one form of his expression of the contention, that “From the indemonstrable flows the sap which circulates through every branch and spray of the demonstration” (Frag 2 f 36). Again: “The grand problem . . . is this: *for all that exists conditionally* . . .

to find a ground that is unconditional and absolute . . .” (Friend—CC—1 461).

²¹ Cf C’s story about the childhood of Epicurus: “he received his first impulse from Hesiod when he was twelve years old in a line beginning ‘First of all things arose Chaos’, ‘And out of what’, said the boy, ‘did Chaos arise?’” (*P Lects*—1949—213). The source of the story is Apollodorus the Epicurean as reported by Diogenes Laertius (*DL* II 529–31).

²² It must be reiterated that the absolute distinction of the claims of the animal and of the rational, along with the conceding that both are necessary to the

only when a portion of water has been previously thrown in, so in order to all the products of the mind a similar product must be presented as the inceptive or fermenting principle of the process by which the product may be after knowingly and regularly obtained. When Euclid, or Pythagoras, ~~asserted~~ promised his pupils or followers^w ~~const~~ to teach them to construct the circle and to deduce its astonishing properties independently of all outward experience, he neither denied nor meant to deny that the very words in which he expressed his promise might have conveyed neither meaning nor inducement but for the empirical necessities, discoveries, and technical inventions occasioned by the overflowing of the Nile.²³ In like manner, [f 20] when we affirm of any moral or religious truth [that] it is susceptible of rational or philosophical demonstration, we are so far from implying that the knowledge of its truth had its primary origin in the (unaided) efforts of human reason that we regard the ~~actual~~ (present) existence (and actual exercise) of such a power as the result of a revelation which had, by enlightening the mind, roused, disciplined,^x and invigorated all its faculties and appealed to experience and history for the confirmation of the fact. Whether we direct our historical researches to Egypt, to India, or to the earliest scientific schools of Greece, there, where the sciences are, we find either claims to a revealed religion or traditions of the same. And in the religions themselves for which the claims are made, the farther back we are enabled to trace the (its) existence, the more simple do its creed and forms become, the more clearly do they discover themselves to be the reliques of a religion, having every claim to the character of revelation that internal evidence and congruity with the philosophic idea of God and the nature and needs

^w ms: followers to ^x ms: discipline [*correction supplied in pencil on f 19^v*]

composition of the human being, are essential to C's edifice of thought. "Either we have an immortal soul or we have not; if we have not, we are beasts; the first and wisest beasts, but still beasts; we only differ in degree, and not in kind; but we are not beasts by the concession of materialists, and by our own consciousness; therefore it must be the possession of a soul within us that makes the difference" (TT—CC—1 31).

²³ Cf *Philosophical Lectures*: "What the state of information must have been when Pythagoras, after having travelled through Egypt, Persia, and India, came back and was transported and offered

a hecatomb on having discovered the thirty-seventh [forty-seventh] proposition of Euclid, is a pretty good answer to those men who would suppose a high state of knowledge in scientific men who were nobody knows who. But such an idea has been carried to a most extravagant height by some of our modern contenders for Indian wisdom. Was it to be supposed that Pythagoras, who had passed his life in seeking knowledge wherever he went, should when he came back express a delight amounting to rapture at the very elements of geometry if geometry had been already carried to a system?" (*P Lects*—1949—110).

of man can supply. [*f*21] The main purpose of this digressive chapter has been to preclude offence in one class of readers, and the opportunity of flattering their unbelief in another, and misunderstanding in all. But the reflecting mind will, we trust, hereafter recur to ~~the facts and truths~~ the contents of this chapter with another and higher end—will trace in it a cycle of action and re-action in which the facts that constitute the history of revelation awake^y the reason to the knowledge and possession of its powers. The fruits and attainments of the reason are at hand to compensate and make indemnification for whatever diminution, either of the proofs or their influence on the mind, may be inherent in the nature of all historical testimony by the ravages or even the mere lapse of time.²⁴ Thus will the one main object of the present work be justified and the true spirit of the following chapters be recognised, that, namely, of invalidating the most plausible objections of infidels, those which are built on the uncertainties and chasms occasioned by the loss or corruption of documents and outward testimony, by a proportional diminution [*f*22] of their necessity, which can alone be effected by ~~the~~ establishing and increasing the anterior probability.²⁵ For the probability of an event is part of its historic evidence and constitutes its proof presumptive or evidence à priori, and the degree of the evidence à posteriori requisite to the satisfactory conviction of the actual occurrence of an event stands in an inverse ratio to the strength or weakness of the evidence à priori. Nay, there are conceivable cases in which the proof presumptive or the anterior probability may be so strong as that the mere circumstance of its having been asserted by any respectable man or believed by any number of men shall suffice for the proof of its actual occurrence.

[*f*23]

Chapter V

At the close of the last chapter but one, we had agreed to reduce the postulates and assumptions, the denial of which would stamp the very act of

^y ms: awaking

²⁴ This was an essential of C's theological position, and allowed him to withstand the ravages of the Higher Criticism. See Prolegomena vi: The Higher Criticism. See also the whole of the posthumous tract, *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*.

²⁵ For the necessity of this statement, for C's assumption of the task of defending against "plausible objections" arising from "the uncertainties and chasms occasioned by the loss or corruption of

documents and outward testimony", and for the added urgency thereby imparted to the conception of the *magnum opus* by the rise of the Higher Criticism of the Bible, see above, Prolegomena vi: The Higher Criticism. C spoke of himself as "I, who hold that the Bible contains the religion of Christians, but who dare not say that whatever is contained in the Bible is the Christian Religion" (*CIS* 61).

commencing the investigation with the character of absurdity, to the one great and inclusive postulate and moral axiom—the actual being of a *responsible Will*. A fortiori, therefore, the actual being of WILL in genere. We suppose, too, that in conceding this, it is at the same time admitted that a something is meant by the Will distinct from all other conceptions, and which, therefore, no other term²⁶ expresses with the exception of perfect and therefore superfluous synonyms, if any such should exist in one and the same language. We do not apply the term to the current of a stream, whether necessitated by the inclination of its channel or as the varying effect of wind or tide or gusts from the openings of mountains on either bank. Nor do we apply it to any necessitated motion combined with life, as the circ[u]lation of the blood. Nor when identified with action, as when we attribute instinct, not Will, to bees and other insects. The very term²⁷ implies a necessitation, “Instinctus”, a goading or pricking, the essential power of which is not affected by the accessory circumstance of its being inward and invisible. Again, even though this moving or goading should be accompanied with sensation and consciousness, still we do not designate it as a will as long as it is contemplated as an effect, the (sufficient) cause of which pre-existed in an antecedent. No man attributes calls hunger to a will, but an appetite—or the migration and peculiar habits characteristic of whole kinds or classes in the animal world, or (to give particular instances)^z the flight of the wild duck while the fellow-nestling remains content in the farm yard, where both eggs had been hatched under the same bird. These and whatever resembles them we call natural or acquired Tendencies, Propensities, etc., but we need not the term “Will” to express them; and if [f 25] in such cases we ever employ that term, it is done either ignorantly or wantonly or metaphorically for the purposes of elevation and poetic passion. But even though no antecedent be known, and though the thing (predicate) be one with the subject and implied in the idea of the subject, we cannot always designate it as the *Will*. The various acts, products, and educts which accompany or follow the growth of plants—the irregular oscillatory motions, for instance, of the hedyrum gyrans²⁸—and with these the organisation and the correspondent circumstances, as the joint result of which we explain these several peculiar acts, we infer *Spontaneity*, indeed, but do not recur to the Will unless it be as to the principal or causa causarum²⁹ of the compages³⁰ or organismus itself, and

^z Parentheses inserted

²⁶ That is, Will.

²⁹ Tr: “cause of the causes”.

²⁷ That is, instinct.

³⁰ A whole formed by the compaction or juncture of parts; a system of conjoined parts.

²⁸ A genus of tropical Asiatic herbs, having showy labiate flowers.

therefore pre-existent to the plant or animal of which the spontaneity is predicated. If we carefully collate these negatives, the only positive which will present itself as the result we shall find to be the *power of originating a state*.³¹ This, however, though an accurate is still [f 26] but a verbal definition of the *a*Will. It^b informs us sufficiently what we cannot attribute to a Will, but not what that is—which is a power to begin or originate a state—much less whether such a power exists. This is true, but yet we gather so much from the definition that we see clearly, or at least cannot reflect on the force of, the defining words without seeing that the question must be confined to its reality, namely whether a *W* Will is, and cannot be extended to its conceivability, namely whether a Will be conceivable or—which in the present case is fully equivalent—can be explained or accounted for. For if it be that which can absolutely begin a state or mode of being, it is evidently not the result or aggregate of a composition. It must be *ens simplicissimum*,³² and therefore incapable of explication or explanation. As little can it be accounted for, for we account for a thing when we ~~place something~~ name its antecedent or that which contained potentially what appeared really in the thing ~~expli~~ to be accounted for as the consequent: thus we account for the motion of the billiard ball from the [f 27] impact given by the cue as the antecedent.³³ But again, for this very reason and inasmuch as it is an origin and not originated, and simple, not composite, it is likewise unique—that which it is, it alone is; consequently, there can be nothing like it or analogous to it. Now if we consider what we mean by the term “conceive” (*conciPIO*, i.e. *capiO* hoc comparativè cum alio),³⁴ or I take two or more things under some common predicate), we shall see at once that the Will cannot be an object of conception. This indeed applies to all unique ideas; and in the strict and purest sense of the term, all ideas are unique, and by their very unicity are contradistinguished from all images, conceptions, theorems, and notional forms. Thus life is in its idea inconceivable, and falls under that class of which the Schoolmen say, “*dantur non intelliguntur*”,³⁵ they may be known but cannot be understood.

a-b ms: Will it

³¹ Cf a note of Sept 1825: “Will is that which originates . . . Will is the Subject, the sole predicate of which is to be essentially causative of Reality. COROLLARY: Therefore and in origine causative of its own reality, the essential might abiding unexhausted, indiminishable” (CN iv 5256).

³² Tr: “most simple thing”.

³³ The philosophical use of billiard

balls and cues in discussions of events and their antecedents was inaugurated by Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* iv i 24–5.

³⁴ *conciPIO* means “to take hold of”, as does *capiO*; the emphasis is on the *con*: “to take hold of this in comparison with another”.

³⁵ Tr: “they are given, not understood”.

In a more advanced stage of this investigation, when it will be required of us to speak of the Will in its absolute sense and not as now, under the predicate of respon[*f*28]sibility, or the Will in the finite and creaturely—this consideration of absolute antecedency in the necessity of thought and without any relation to time³⁶—we shall be compelled to fix our attentions longer and more steadfastly on the necessities involved in this definition, the most abstruse of all metaphysical speculations and the one great mystery of the mind.³⁷ As how, indeed, should that, which is to contain in itself the explication and conceivability of all things, be otherwise than the abysmal mystery into which all causes must at last resolve themselves?³⁸ ^cHad we purposed in this Place to have treated of the absolute Will, we ~~have~~^d must have propounded it under the above verbal definition ~~thas~~ an idea, the acknowledgment or acceptance of which would have been recommended by a scientific interest only, namely by a demonstration that without such an idea as the ground or inceptive position, a system of Philosophy and therefore a \langle consistent \rangle Philosophy of any kind, [*f*29] as distinct from mere history and empirical classification, would be impossible, ~~A~~and the very attempt absurd.³⁹ This we mean on the supposition that the enquirer has not mastered the idea so as to know its truth by its own evidence.⁴⁰ While this evidence is not present to the mind, the position is not indeed an idea at all but a notion, or like the letters expressing unknown quantities in algebra, a something conceded in expectation of a distinct significance which is to

^c At this point the transcription continues in the second transcriber's hand

^d Cancelled in pencil

³⁶ For the absolute Will's "absolute antecedency in the necessity of thought" cf a formula contained in a notebook entry of 1825: "As the Absolute Will, essentially causative of all Reality + 0. The Will, causative of its own Reality I = The Father, Contemplative of all Reality in itself and in the contemplative generative II = the adequate Idea, the eternal Alterity, the Son" (CN iv 5249).

³⁷ "What is A Mystery! that which we apprehend but can neither comprehend or communicate—a truth of Reason which the Understanding can represent only by Negatives, or contradictory Positives" (CN iv 5170).

³⁸ The "absolute Will" is "the universal Ground of all Being" (AR—1825—328).

³⁹ Cf C's statement in the *Biographia Literaria*: "After I had successively stud-

ied in the schools of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, and Hartley, and could find in neither of them an abiding place for my reason, I began to ask myself; is a system of philosophy, as different from mere history and historic classification, possible? If possible, what are its necessary conditions? I was for a while disposed to answer the first question in the negative, and to admit that the sole practicable employment for the human mind was to observe, to collect, and to classify. But I soon felt, that human nature itself fought up against this wilful resignation of intellect" (BL—CC—i 140–1). And see above, Prolegomena vii: The *Magnum Opus* as System.

⁴⁰ C at one point speaks of the "Pleroma in the Idea—and the Birth of the Distinctities, the Forms, the Infinite in the Finite" (CN iv 5233).

be hereafter procured.⁴¹ With him, however, who possesses the idea we have only to proceed with the involved and consequent truths in order to determine by the fact itself whether a Philosophy can be constructed thereon.⁴² That it has not been hitherto, or that the renewed attempt should have again fail'd, is no proof that it is impossible. But ~~that~~ the success, i.e. the existence of such a Philosophy, is the sufficient [*f* 30] and only proof of its possibility. Here, however, we begin not with an idea in this high and pure sense of the term⁴³ but with the postulate of a fact and the assumption of a truth as a necessary consequence of the *e*fact—the^f logical principle on which the reason proceeds being this: whatever is real must be possible and therefore whatever is necessary to^g the possibility of a reality must be itself both possible and real. The reader will not, we trust, so far misunderstand us as to confound the *p*term “(im)possibility” with “incomprehensibility”,^h or that in affirming that A is necessary to the possibility of B we mean no more than without A, we should not be able to account for B;ⁱ or if A be supposed, B may be theoretically solved. Far other is our meaning. That without which the conception of B [*f* 31] would involve a contradiction equal to that, perhaps, of declaring the same thing in the same sense to be second and first a dependent on another without any other to depend from—that alone is here said to contain or to be necessary to the possibility of B when we affirm that B having been granted as real and (the position of)

^{e-f} ms: fact—The

^h No punctuation in ms

^g ms: in order to

ⁱ No punctuation in ms

⁴¹ Here C approximates Hegel's distinction between “Idea” (*Idee*) and “Notion” (*Begriff*). But the “notion” that C specifies above, when referred to the conscious subject, may in another perspective be the unconscious Idea: “You may see an *Idea* working in a man by watching his tastes & enjoyments: tho' the man's understanding may have been enslaved to the modern Metaphysics, or rather tho' he may hitherto have no consciousness of any other reasoning but that by conceptions & facts—On such a man you may hope to produce an effect by referring him to his own experience & by inducing him to institute an analysis of his own acts of mind and states of being, that will prove the *negative* at last But to talk of Ideas to men who neither have them or or *had* by them, is profanation & folly to boot” (*CN* iv 5409).

⁴² “*The first man, on whom the Light of an IDEA dawned, did in that same moment receive the spirit and the credentials of a Law-giver: and as long as man shall exist, so long will the possession of that antecedent knowledge (the maker and master of all profitable Experience) which exists only in the power of an Idea, be the one lawful qualification of all Dominion in the world of the senses*” (*LS—CC—42—3*).

⁴³ In the high and pure sense of the term, “no Idea can be rendered by a conception. An Idea is essentially inconceivable” (*CM—CC—II* 1145). Again: “one Diagnostic, or contra-distinguishing Mark, appertaining to all *Ideas*, is—that they are inexpressible by adequate words—an Idea can only be expressed (more correctly *suggested*) by two contradictory Positions” (Brinkley 291).

that reality involving a contradiction except under the condition of A, A itself the reality of A likewise is co-assumed. On this rests another canon of logic, viz namely an argument which, if valid, would disprove a certain truth is *ex absurdo*⁴⁴ invalid. The fact, then, with the demand of which we commence our investigation, is the existence of conscious responsibility;⁴⁵ and of its existence every conscious and rational *Being* must himself be the judge, the consciousness being the only organ by which it can be directly known. But the [*f* 32] consciousness of a conscience is itself conscience. All that words and outward reasoning can effect is ~~tha~~ first to state an instance which is supposed to exemplify and thus expected to convey the direct, proper, and exclusive meaning, which as in the case of all terms representing simple truths⁴⁶ or acts of knowledge^j is insusceptible of any definition or periphrasis. We can only explain the sense of the word “red” by referring to the phenomenon itself. If the *respondant* (Individual to whom we address the discourse) hardly denies that the example has any correspondent in himself; or if he professes to have a correspondent indeed, but (a something) which instead of being unique in its nature and therefore incapable of being expressed by any other appropriate (word),^k not a mere superfluous synonyme of the former; or lastly if he make *†* (the term) “conscience” itself properly synonymous with any other term [*f* 33] having an appropriate sense, ~~and~~ [. . .] *correspondent* or [*?* *in*] (uses it) to expressing a *result* from ~~two or more~~ [*?* acts] or ~~things taken~~ the^l combination of two or more distinct predicates or predicabilia⁴⁷ of the human Being—in this case the respondent can do no more than restore the terms to their proper meaning, thus showing what that conscience, ~~which~~ the existence of which he asserts, is *not*.⁴⁸ Andⁿ if in addition to this he proves by induction that all known languages of the civilized World ~~are~~ manifestly suppose an appropriate sense in the term “eConscience” distinct to each and all of those

^j This is C’s habitual spelling, though the hand is not his

^k No punctuation in ms ^l Mistakenly cancelled in ms ^{m-n} ms: not and

⁴⁴ Tr: “by reason of its absurdity”.

⁴⁵ Cf *Aids to Reflection*: “if I asked, How do you define the *human mind*? the answer must at least *contain*, if not consist of, the words, ‘a mind capable of *Conscience*.’ For Conscience is no synonyme of Consciousness, nor any mere expression of the same as modified by the particular Object” (AR—1825—19).

⁴⁶ That is, as distinguished from complex truths, which by that fact can be analysed into their components.

⁴⁷ Tr: “things that may be predicated”.

⁴⁸ “Above all things it is incumbent on me who lay such a stress on Conscience, & attach such a sacredness to it, to shew that it is no Socratic Daimon which I mean, but the dictate of universal Reason, accompanied with a feeling of free Agency—that it is *Light*—that an Erring Conscience is no Conscience, and as absurd as an erring Reason—i.e. not Reason/—” (CN III 3591).

into which the opponent would reduce it, and that the presumption therefore is strong against a position thus contradicting the general accordant sense of mankind as best revealed in the common form and structure of all known languages, he has done all that it is either [*f* 34] possible or desirable to effect. To a Reason higher than that of Man and a tribunal incomparably more awful must both ~~the~~ denial ~~he that makes it~~ [*? regu*] and the recreant who dares hazard it be remitted. It has been said [that] all would have been attempted that is either practicable or desirable, but in effecting this much will have been done that is indeed most desirable and not only of high importance in its own worth but, we apprehend, of strong moral necessity in the present aAge. The following chapter will therefore be devoted to the attempt in which we propose these several objects—⁴⁹

^oFirst, to convey as far as the nature of the subject in connection with the nature of language will permit the proper and only proper sense of “Conscience”, or if this be too bold a phrase for a professed enquirer to adopt, the one sense in which we [*f* 35] ourselves understand the term.⁵⁰

^{2ndly}, to enumerate the several meanings in which the term is *not* to be understood ~~and~~.

^pThirdly,^q to confute the reasons or grounds which have been assigned in justification of such misappropriation as far as this can be done by outward facts and arguments of Philology, ~~the~~ our opponent persevering in denying or otherwise explaining of the facts of which we affirm ourselves assured by inward evidence.

^o Paragraph break inserted

^p Paragraph break inserted

^q Written over another word, possibly “lastly”

⁴⁹ This prospectus for the chapter, coming as it does as late as *f* 34, shows with what a deliberate pace C has been occupied in laying the foundation stones for his system. From early in his career C had stressed the need for such careful procedure: “With the Metaphysical Reasoner every fact must be brought forward and the ground must be well & carefully examined where the system is to be erected” (*Lects* 1795—CC—95). As John Taylor Coleridge recorded of his uncle’s conversation: “It is impossible to carry off or commit to paper his long trains of argument, indeed it is not always possible to understand them, he lays the foundation so deep and views every question in so original a manner” (*TT*—CC—I 16). Again, in 1809: “I should first lay the *foundation* well, but

the merit of a foundation is its depth and solidity—the ornaments and conveniences, the pictures, and gilding, and stucco-work, the Sunshine and sunshiny Prospects will come with the superstructure” (*CL* III 237).

⁵⁰ Cf *The Statesman’s Manual*: “The conscience is neither reason, religion, or will, but an *experience* (*sui generis*) of the coincidence of the human will with reason and religion. It might, perhaps, be called a *spiritual sensation*; but that there lurks a contradiction in the terms, and that it is often deceptive to give a common or generic name to that, which being unique, can have no fair analogy. Strictly speaking, therefore, the conscience is neither a sensation or a sense, but a testifying state . . .” (*LS*—CC—66–7).

Fourthly, to compare the experience of mankind individual or collective as effects with our opponent's statements on the one hand and with our own on the other as the adequate 'causes. and

Lastly,^s leaving to the reason of mankind to determine on the comparative sufficiency of the two hypotheses as causes, and to the hearts and (the) conscienceness^t of the reader, which is the more correspondent to his own in^u inward experience as^v asserted facts [f 36] and which of the two may^w safest be preferred, which of the two he knows and feels he ought to prefer as maxims of life and principles of morality. ^x(We) will be add one other remark^y which, as containing a preliminary of our next chapter, will aptly the form the conclusion of the present. It is this, that as the affirmant or postulant of the fact in question we adhere strictly to the forms of science and refer to no other positions or propositions as Truths, aware that we have undertaken to deduce these from the postulates and the assumption built on the conception of the postulate; and if the arguments of the opponent refer to positions susceptible of an evidence not in themselves or dependent on other positions without arriving at any [f 37] one self-evident (like the world of the Brahmins⁵¹ resting on the Elephant which is supported by the Tortoise,⁵² or in a giddy circle in which the motion of the horse is explained by that of the cart, the motion of the cart solved by that of the horse),^z it will be but a further proof of the Philosophical-qualifi fitness of our postulate considered as the possible commencing principle of a Philosophy and consequently as long therefore for as many men as have a striving^a after connected insight,⁵³ a presumption of its Truth.

It is enough, if the replies rendered necessary by the desultory argu-

^{r-s} ms: causes; and lastly [A vertical stroke has been made here in pencil in the ms]

^t A slip for "conscience" or "consciousness"?

^u Cancelled in pencil

^v The suggested interpolation "to the" is written in pencil on f 34^v and marked for insertion here

^w ms: may be

^{x-y} Written "One other remark (we) will be add" and marked for transposition

^z Parentheses inserted

^a Written over another word, now illegible

⁵¹ C customarily refers to Hindu philosophy as that of the Brahmins, who were the highest Hindu caste, therefore the priestly caste in charge of all religious and philosophical conceiving.

⁵² Cf *Biographia Literaria*: "We might as rationally chant the Brahmin creed of the tortoise that supported the bear, that supported the elephant, that supported the world, to the tune of 'This

is the house tht Jack built'" (*BL—CC—* 1 137–8).

⁵³ "Connected insight" is the very essence of C's mentation throughout his life, hence the title of the *magnum opus* as a "chain of truths" (*Catena Veritatum*). As L. C. Knights cogently observed: "In the Coleridgean world everything is connected with everything else" (Knights 26).

ments of our antagonist be not charged on us as our own anticipations or as regular parts of the System we are labouring to construct—

[f 38]

^bChapter VI

When an adherent of the scheme⁵⁴ which considers virtue as a species of prudence,⁵⁵ giving the name of the latter to those prudential actions, which originate in motives supplied by the present state of existence, while it appropriates the name of Virtue to a prudence determined likewise, and in case of competition, predominantly by motives (self-interest) of a supposed futurity⁵⁶—when such an adherent is pressed with facts of immediate impulses “to do as we should be done by”, which, as far as we can know or discover, have reference to neither class of motives, those of this life or those of the life to come, ~~the answer~~ (it) depends on the moral character of the respondent⁵⁷ which of the two following assertions will constitute his reply to the objection. The inveterate

^b At this point the transcription resumes in JHG’s hand

⁵⁴ I.e. the scheme espoused, among C’s nominated opponents of Christianity, most prominently by Paley. C elsewhere says that “the late Dr. Paley, by a use of terms altogether arbitrary” urged a “distinction between Prudence and Virtue, the former being Self-love in its application to the sum of pain and pleasure” (LS—CC—186). “The spirit of prudential motive . . . is not, even in respect of *morality* itself, that abiding and continuous principle of action, which is . . . one with the faith spoken of by St. Paul” (LS—CC—186–7). See further *Friend* (CC) I 108, 313–25 for strictures on Paley and “selfish prudence eked out by superstition”.

⁵⁵ As C says in *The Friend*, “there is a Wisdom higher than Prudence, to which Prudence stands in the same relation as the Mason and Carpenter to the genial and scientific Architect” (*Friend*—CC—I 118). Again: “The widest maxims of *prudence* are like arms without hearts, disjoined from those feelings which flow forth from *principle* as from a fountain” (*Friend*—CC—I 123).

⁵⁶ The fact that C does not name Paley (who did not die until 1805) in this

attack is consistent with his practice on other occasions. For instance, in the *Statesman’s Manual* he says “I am most fully persuaded, that the principles both of taste, morals, and religion taught in our most popular compendia of moral and political philosophy, natural theology, evidences of Christianity, &c. are false, injurious, and debasing” (LS—CC—110). But in that statement, “the principles . . . taught in our most popular compendia of moral and political philosophy” refers to Paley’s *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* of 1785, which was immediately adopted at Cambridge as a standard textbook; the phrase “natural theology” refers to Paley’s last book, *Natural Theology* (1802); and the phrase “evidences of Christianity” refers to Paley’s famous *View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1794).

⁵⁷ Cf C in 1805: “almost all men nowadays act and feel more nobly than they think / yet still the vile cowardly selfish calculating Ethics of Paley, Priestley, Lock, & other *Erastians*, do woefully influence & determine our course of action!” (CN II 2627).

worldling^c will boldly deny the fact and, if his understanding be better than his heart, will attempt to explain the appearance by distinguishing between Selfishness, or the unconsidered obedience to [f 39] an immediate appetite or restlessness, and a Self-interest, i.e. the extension and modification of the same selfishness by Fore-thought, i.e. by an imagination of the future and the present. Then what he cannot derive from motives of Self-interest he will attribute to impulses of selfishness. Now this argument supposes the plenary causative or determining power in these motives or impulses, so that both the one and the other do not at all differ from physical impact as far as the relation of cause and effect is concerned. For if it were otherwise, we should still have to ask what determined the mind to permit this determining power to these motives and impulses.^d Or why did the mind or Will sink from its proper superiority to the physical laws of cause and effect, and place itself in the same class with the bullet or the billiard-ball? It would be most easy to trace this whole mechanical doctrine of causative impulses and determining motives to a mere impersonation of general terms. For what is a Motive?⁵⁸ Not^e a thing, but the thought of a thing. But as all thoughts are not motives, [f 40] in order to specify the class of thoughts we must add the predicate a “determining” ~~thought~~, and a motive must be defined [as] a determining thought.⁵⁹ But again, what is a Thought? Is this a thing or an individual? What are its circumscriptions, what the interspaces between it and another? Where does it begin? Where does it end? Far more readily could we apply these questions to a notion below, or the drops of water which we may imagine as the component integers of the ocean; or [as] by “a billion” we mean no more than a particular movement of the sea, so neither by “a thought” can we mean more than the mind thinking in some one direction. Consequently, a motive is neither more nor less than the act of an intelligent being determining itself, and the very watchword of the necessitarian is found to be, in fact, at once an assertion and

^c ms: wordling ^d ms: impulses? ^e ms: not

⁵⁸ Cf *Aids to Reflection*: “the Man makes the motive, and not the motive the Man. What is a strong motive to one man, is no motive at all to another. If, then, the man determines the motive, what determines the Man—to a good and worthy act, we will say, or a virtuous Course of Conduct? The intelligent Will, or the self-determining Power?” (AR—1825—67)

⁵⁹ This continuing discussion of “motive” is a necessary corollary to the ex-

trication of “responsible Will”. For a pertinent parallel discussion, not only of “motive”, but of “cause” and “ground” as well, see *SW & F (CC)* 1 399–401. The necessitarianism in which C had steeped himself in youth was tantamount to the views of Spinoza against which C directed his whole force of opposition. See “Excursus Note XIV: The Religious Heterodoxy of Hartley, Priestley, and Godwin” *CPT* 311–14.

a definition of frequency, i.e. the power of an intelligent being to determine its own agency. But even this is for us superfluous; it is enough that ~~the upholder of this~~ he who upholds this scheme of universal selfishness [*f*41] or self-interest, not from any corruption but from the original necessity of our nature, implies the denial of a responsible Will. He refuses our postulate: he considers our foundation as emptiness, and it would be equally absurd on both sides to enter into any examination of the intended superstructure. The other answer differs from the preceding not perhaps in substantial value, for by fair consequence it would lead to the same result—yet still it differs as symptomatic of a different character in the respondent himself. If we object to such a man, “Will^f you be faithful to a confiding friend, or grateful to a benefactor in the hour of his distress, only as far as you calculate on a renewal of his power and will to benefit you?”, ^sor, “Would^h you ~~do other~~ have done otherwise, though at the moment you had not been reflecting on the consequences after death?”, “Nay!”, would be the reply, “I should, I must have done my duty without the immediate anticipation of any consequences from without, present or future, and yet my actions originate in Self-love, though I did my duty solely [*f*42] for the pleasures of a good Conscience.” Various are the ways in which the hollowness of this position, every word of which it is composed, ~~p~~ the very terms, “Pleasure”, “Self”, “Love”, “Conscience”, nay, the very preposition “For”ⁱ would, if strictly defined and appropriated, lead to its ~~confrontation~~ exposure by a detection of the equivocation contained in each. We will confine ourselves for the present to the term “Pleasure”.⁶⁰ Not without some attention to a kindred sentiment expressed in the thousand times quoted line, “O Happiness, our being’s end and aim”,⁶¹ not ignorant how innocently thousands have used both the one and the other as expressing their own thoughts, but at the same time fully aware of the exceeding importance of Hobbes’^j remark, “animadvertē quia sit ab improprietate verborum pronam hominibus prolabi in errores circa res”,⁶² in accurate language is ~~both~~ the

^f ms: will ^{g-h} ms: Or would

ⁱ An unnecessary “it” is written on *f* 41^v and marked for insertion here, evidently because “For” was interpreted as the first word of a new sentence rather than as the preposition to which *C* refers

^j ms: Hobbes’s

⁶⁰ That is, to the word that indicates the central core of Epicureanism, which *C* saw as infecting the whole spiritual climate of the Europe of his time. See Prolegomena III: The Epicurean and Stoic Background.

⁶¹ Alexander Pope *An Essay on Man* Epistle iv line 1.

⁶² Hobbes *Examinatio et emendatio mathematicae hodiernae*, in *Opera Philosophica* ed Molesworth iv 83. Cf *CN* i 911 and tr in 911n.

effect ~~and cause~~ of confused, and the cause of erroneous, conception.⁶³ Under the vague term “Happiness” there are three kinds of states of being confounded, and as the term can by no means be taken as a [*f43*] summum genus having the other as its subgenera, it would be most desirable to confine it to the sense included in its etymon.⁶⁴ “*Hap*” originally designated not mere chance but a fortunate chance, as is the case with the word “Fortune” itself and our own anglo-saxon “*Luck*”. “Fortunate”, “lucky” imply good luck, good fortune; to express the contrary, we must add the epithet by which the contrary is ^kexpressed. And^l in like manner “hap”, “happy”; the simple negation “hapless” expresses mishap, and “unhappy” [. . .] has the like force. Happiness, therefore, is the aggregate of fortunate chances; but our birth, wealth, person, natural talents, opportunities of cultivating them, health, country—and with the other *circumstances* (of man,) quicquid homines circumstat,⁶⁵ are all prizes in the lottery of life. These, therefore, are all so far “haps”; and the aggregate, and the state that results therefrom, are in [. . .] “*Happiness*” in the only proper sense of that word. The more reflecting who reject alike the notions of chance and of fate are accustomed [*f44*] to express the same meaning by the words “favorable providence”. And even so in the greek, the epicurean would express our “happiness” by “εὐτυχία”, the Stoic or Platonist⁶⁶ by “εὐδαιμονία”. Those, therefore, who have not so far entangled their better mind as to have rejected the belief that man is a responsible agent, and who consequently must adopt the division of Epictetus⁶⁷ of the τα ἐφ’ ἡμῶν, or that which appertains to our Will as our

^{k-l} ms: expressed: &

⁶³ “‘Notice how easily men slip from improper use of words into errors about things themselves’ This was a favourite maxim of Coleridge’s: he copied it into a notebook early in 1801, used it as a ‘text’ for ‘a sort of sermon’ in the third of the four philosophical letters he wrote to Josiah Wedgwood (Feb 1801), and had more recently resurrected it as one of the mottoes for Essay III in *PGC* (1814). *CN* I 911 and n; *CL* II 961; *BL* (1907) II 228” (W. Jackson Bate).

⁶⁴ In the *Philosophical Lectures* C, in speaking of Greek philosophy, says “Happiness is everywhere stated as the aim of man” (*P Lects*—1949—140) and complains about the confusion induced by lack of distinction in usages: “I know not a more impressive instance than this

of the word ‘happiness’. There are four perfectly distinct states” (*P Lects*—1949—141).

⁶⁵ Tr: “whatever surrounds men”.

⁶⁶ “It is one of my Objects to prove the difference of the Christian Faith from Platonism even in its purest form—but so is the Xtn Moral System different from the Stoic—but as no one on this account denies the resemblances & coincidences in the latter, so neither ought we to do so in the former” (*CN* III 4316).

⁶⁷ Greek Stoic philosopher (c 55–135 A.D.). Originally a slave, was freed and taught philosophy in Rome, from which he was expelled by Domitian in 90 A.D. Epictetus left no writings, but his philosophy is contained in the *Discourses* and *Enchiridion* of his pupil Flavius Arrian.

proper self, and the τα εφ ουκ ἡμεν, ought to accept the former, τα εφ ἡμεν, and find some more appropriate term for them, which belongs exclusively to the latter, τα ουκ εφ ἡμεν. The things to be thus excepted, and for which “happiness” is an inappropriate term, are all those which we have produced in the first instance from within by the exertion of the Will in obedience to our sense of duty. I should not hesitate to say, “I am happy in a father or mother”; but had I successfully devoted my best efforts to the virtuous education of a child, or had I sought out a man from having received proof of his virtues, and if [*f* 45] by the likeness of my own character, a likeness produced in me by many struggles, many defeats earnestly bewailed, and some ~~consequences~~ conquests achieved by my own efforts, and lastly by giving and receiving moral support and comfort, I had become this man’s friend, I ~~sh~~ in these cases I should prefer saying, “I am blessed in a virtuous son, I am blessed in a noble friend”. And yet tempering stoic dignity, I should gratefully acknowledge my “happiness” too in these blessings, i.e. I should acknowledge how much even of these things I owed to the favour of providence, εὐδαιμονία. To contemplate the state in which the offspring of ignorant and vicious men are commonly found, to walk through the purlieus of S! Giles’s, and to deduce from the facts there seen grounds of thankfulness for mine own happier lot, and at the same time of pity and allowance for the unhappy, without losing our faith in the amenability of all men to moral judgement—this^m is indeed a giant difficulty, a difficulty the single fact of thousands [*f* 46] of these ignorant, vicious, and most unhappy men suddenly awakened as they have been to compunction and repentance by a single discourse, a single well-timed appeal to their conscience—this,ⁿ I say, this strong testimony, which the heart gives concerning its own state when the unhappy man loses the sense of regret, which alone is the appropriate feeling for unhappy or calamitous circumstances, in remorse and self-reproach—nay, the struggles of the guilty criminal to find a refuge from the anguish of guilt in the ~~assumption~~ doctrines of necessity or fatal influence, and the vanity of these efforts, will more avail to overcome than all the mere reasonings which the logician can draw from all the premises which outward experience can supply—and the intellectual solution of this awful enigma does not be-

^m ms: This ⁿ ms: This

For C’s longstanding knowledge of and interest in Epictetus see e.g. *CN* II 2236.

See in general Prolegomena III: The Epicurean and Stoic Background.

long to the present place and subject. Enough has been done if we have shown and elucidated the proper force and extent of the term “happiness”.⁶⁸

To express ourselves accurately and thereby to prevent that confusion [f47] of thought which the use of equivocal terms cannot fail to engender, we must reduce the aggregate of desideranda⁶⁹—whatever, I mean, a man is bound or permitted to pursue—to four heads, ~~the several relations of which will appear without any further analysis than that which has been given above;~~ Of the of which we take “happiness” as the third. Of the remaining three, the second only presents any difficulty as to the name fittest to express it. The first, or “Pleasure,” comprises all the modes of being which arise from the correspondence of the external stimuli in kind and degree to our sensible life, as variously stimutable and vice versa under the universal law of reciprocity or action and reaction. It is peculiar to this ~~term~~ that considered irrelatively for itself alone, it offers no other criterion of preference but that of quantity in degree or in duration. ~~Where~~ Where pleasure alone is the object, the choice between different pleasures depends on the question, how much! and how long will it continue? and with what effects on other [f48] pleasures? But even in this we admit too much, for in extending judgement concerning (the notion) of pleasure from quantity or present amount to comparative duration and causative influence, we already suppose the intervention and union both of power and motives which do not result from the relations between the animal life and the stimulants, organic or external, that call it into sensibility. The doctors of Self-love⁷⁰ are misled by the wrong ap-

⁶⁸ Of the four distinctions of happiness described by C in *Philosophical Lectures*, “The third is a speculative point which arises from the consideration of our extreme dependence on external things. That a man has reason to congratulate himself on having been born in such an hour and climate under such and such circumstances, this the ancients called Εὐτυχία, Εὐδαιμονία”. That is when the Gods were favorable to them, and we call it ‘happiness’ when things happen well” (*P Lects*—1949—141).

⁶⁹ Tr: “things to be desired”.

⁷⁰ Paley’s “prudence” was “Self-love in its application to the sum of pain and pleasure” (*LS—CC*—89). Kant frequently uses the term “self-love” (*Selbst-*

liebe) in his discussions of moral desirability. See e.g. *Kant* iv 406. Elsewhere C attributes the first explicit philosophy of “self-love” to Aristippus, “who took the principle of self-love to himself, and (as a man who felt in himself, in the enjoyment of good health, good fortune, and high connexions, that he was doing no great harm in the world, and thought, as many men of the kind have, that to live well and comfortably was the great end of life) he founded a system” (*P Lects*—1949—154). For C the doctors of self-love were pre-eminently the representatives of modern Epicureanism. See below f 126^v. See the equation of Paley and Epicurean doctrine at f 62^v. See further Prolegomena III—IV.

plication or equivocal use of words. “We love ourselves”, they say. Now^p this is impossible for a finite being in the absolute meaning of the term “Self”. For if [. . .] by the “Self” we mean the principle of individuation—the band or copula which gives a real unity to all the complex products, functions, and faculties of an animal—a real unity, I say, in contradistinction from the mere semblance or total impression produced by an aggregate on the mind of the beholder, and even from that combination of parts which originates and has its whole end and object [f 49] in an external agency—a unity different, in short, from a steam engine or other machine, it is manifest that the self in this sense must be anterior to all our sensations, etc., and to all the objects toward which they may be directed. ~~Before~~ Nothing can become an (the) object of consciousness but by reflection, not even the things of perception. Now the Self is ever pre-supposed, and like all other supersensual subjects can be presented (made known) to the mind only by a ‘representative. And’ again, what that representative shall be is by no means unalterably fixed in human nature by nature itself, but on the contrary varies with the growth, bodily, moral, and intellectual, of each individual. Even the combination of the sense of Touch, and more strictly of Double-touch,⁷¹ with the visual image of such parts of our body as we are able or accustomed to behold is so far from being the only possible representative of self that it is not even the first in the earlier periods of infancy: the mother or the nurse is the self of the child. And who has not experienced in dreams the attachment [f 50] of our personal identity to forms the most remote from our own?⁷² All actions, therefore, which proceed directly from the individual without reflection, as those of a hungry beast rushing to its food, all those in which the volition acts singly and immediately towards the object to be appropriated, may be classed as selfish,

^{o-p} ms: say: now

^{q-r} ms: representative: and

⁷¹ Keats, in his recoual of the varied contents of Coleridge’s conversation, lists one of the topics as “single and double touch” (Keats *Letters* II 89). Double touch—a phrase used by Euler before C (Beer *Intelligence* 84)—was a complex and recurring Coleridgean emphasis. It was “the generation of the Sense of Reality and Life out of us, from the Impersonation of double Touch” (CN I 1827); and C had a “theory of Volition as a mode of double Touch” (*P Lects*—1949—423–4). At the centre of the elusive complex seems to be a conception of double touch as an orientating phenome-

non: “Babies touch by taste at first—then about 5 months old they go from the Palate to the hand—& are fond of feeling what they have taste—/Association of the Hand with the Taste” (CN I 924).

⁷² The focus on the importance of dreams is a characteristic both of C and of Romanticism as such. See Albert Béguin *L’Ame romantique et le rêve* (Paris 1939). As Henry Nelson Coleridge noted in 1823: “My uncle in great force at John’s. He treated the subject of ghosts and dreams at great length.” And see Woodring’s long note (TT—CC—I 52, 52–3 n 2).

perhaps, but have no pretence to the name of ^sSelf-love. Or^t as far as any reflection is supposed, or as far as the simple perception of the object is taken as a substitute for reflection, we ought to say that the food in the trough is the temporary *self* of the hog,⁷³ i.e. it is that form with which the volition, the thoughts, and the sensations of the animal are ~~een~~ united without any intermediate. In the absolute meaning of “Self” as the perpetual antecedent within us, Self-love, we repeat, is inconceivable; and in its secondary, representative or symbolical meaning “Self” signifies only a less degree of distance, a determination of value by distance, and the comparative narrowness of our moral view. Hence the body becomes our *self* when the reflections [*f* 51] on our sensations, ~~obj~~ desires, and objects have been habitually appropriated to it in too great a proportion. But this is not a necessity of our nature. Even in this life of imperfection there is a state possible in which a man might truly say “my Self loves A or B”,^u freely constituting the object, i.e. the representative or objective ~~love~~ <Self> (as distinguished from the primary originative and subjective self) in whatever it wills to love, commands what it wills, and wills what it commands. ~~w~~Without this power, indeed, the commandment “that we should love our neighbour as our self and God more than either” would be a mockery.⁷⁴ The difference between Self-love and a Self that loves consists in this: that the objects of the former are *given* to it according to the law of the senses and organization, while the latter (a Self that loves freely) determines the objects according to a higher law. The first loves, if we may dare use that term to express so unworthy a relation, because in its abandonment to its animal life it must; the second, because [*f* 52] it ^vshould. And^w we trust that we shall hereafter make it appear that the guilt of the first, in any particular ~~objective~~ thought or deed single deed or series of deeds but pre-existent, by which the Self of the individual, which in this sense is equivalent to the Will, abandoned its power of true agency in that action in and by which the Self willed its own form, or in and by which the Will engendered a false and phantom self. This is indeed a ^xmystery! How^y can it be otherwise?

^{s-t} ms: Self-love or
^{v-w} ms: should and

^u Quotation marks inserted
^{x-y} ms: mystery!—how

⁷³ The subtext here is the identification, stemming from antiquity, of the Epicurean as a hog. For the famous phrase, “a hog from Epicurus’s herd” (*Epicuri de grege porcum*) see Horace *Epistles* i iv 16.

⁷⁴ Cf Mark 12.30–1: “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,

and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. This is the first commandment. And the second is like, *namely* this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these.” See also Matt 22.39, Luke 10.29, Rom 13.9, Gal 5.14, James 2.8.

For if the Will be unconditional, if it either be not at all (except as a superfluous word)^z or properly originative, it must of necessity be inexplicable and incomprehensible.⁷⁵ For to understand and comprehend a thing is to see what the conditions and causes of it are.⁷⁶ ~~mm~~More “we cannot say^b in the present state of our investigation; nor indeed, according to the announced plan of our procedure, is there any need that more be said, for we have begun by proving that ~~the~~ a responsible Will is not only the postulate of all [f 53] religion but the necessary datum incapable from its very nature of any direct proof—the datum,⁷⁷ we say, and ground of all the reasonings and conclusions, which in the particular religion are assumed as already granted. We will merely suggest, as a sort of corollary to the above definition of the objective Self and its dependence on proximity, that the grossness of Self-love is no less diminished by distance in time than by distance in space, and that an individual who is capable of deliberately sacrificing an immediate and certain gratification of the Self to a greater good, of that which his reason enables him to look forward to as a Self fifty years^c hence, perhaps even under the supposition of such relations as imply the cessation of all animal sensations and the gratifications resulting therefrom, exhibits as unselfish a love, as complete a transfer of the idea “Self” from his visual form and the feelings and impulses connected ~~the~~ with it as if the distance had been in space, [f 54] and the transfer had been made towards a contemporary. In both instances the term “Self” is generalized, in both instances the self and the neighbour are rendered visual synonymes, inasmuch as both are taken up into and become One in a higher Love which comprehends both not as the result but as the cause and principle of their union. Not the single soul, as One of a class, is it that contributes to the idea of that which

^z Parentheses inserted ^{a–b} This phrase is written twice in the ms
^c ms: hears [*correction supplied in pencil on f 52*]

⁷⁵ This insistence is a crucial source of will’s value for C. Cf a marginal note: “. . . the Will, the ineffable Causa Sui, et Fons Unitatis in tota infinita entis sui plenitudine, is evermore and eternally impassible” (CN iv 5413). See Prolegomena xvii: The Concept of Will.

⁷⁶ C attached importance to the distinguishing of “comprehend” and “apprehend”. Thus, “how can any Spiritual Truth be comprehended? Who can comprehend his own Will or his own Personēty? (i.e. his ‘I’ or his own Mind, i.e. his Person, or his own *Life*? But we can

distinctly *apprehend* them” (Brinkley 385). Again: “Well may I *believe* what I do not *comprehend*, when there are so many things which I *know* yet do not *comprehend*—my Life, for instance, my Will, my rationality, &c. But let us be on our guard not to confound *comprehending* with *apprehending*. I do not, even because I can not, believe what I do not *apprehend*—i.e. I cannot assent to the meaning of words, to which I attach no meaning, tho’ I may believe in the wisdom of the Utterer” (Ibid. 17–18).

⁷⁷ Tr: “given”.

(continued...)

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Abp = Archbishop

Bp = Bishop

ed = edited

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