

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations ix

Preface: A Vulnerable World xi

Acknowledgments xxi

Introduction: The New Normalcy 1

PART I. CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND WORLD WAR II

1 Vital Systems 39

2 Emergency Government 84

PART II. DEMOBILIZATION AND REMOBILIZATION

3 Vulnerability 139

4 Preparedness 182

PART III. COLD WAR PLANNING FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL

5 Enacting Catastrophe 247

6 Survival Resources 291

Epilogue: From Nuclear War to Climate Change 329

Notes 341

Bibliography 399

Index 417

INTRODUCTION

The New Normalcy

During the past twenty years we have substituted for the normalcy of the halcyon 1920s an almost unbroken series of emergencies: depression, defense, war, inflation, cold war. Indeed, emergency appears to have become the new kind of normalcy. National emergencies tend to favor improvisation by government. Yet with all our improvising, our “putting out of fires,” our apparent activation *by* events instead of deliberate activation *of* events, we have emerged with a discernible pattern of domestic and foreign policy and, most important, with an acceptance of the idea that government should consciously plan a strategy for anticipating and meeting domestic and foreign emergencies at the operational level.

—JAMES FESLER, SPEECH TO THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES, SEPTEMBER 4, 1952

In 1954, the United States’ Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) published a massive multivolume tome, *Emergency Management of the National Economy*.¹ The ICAF volumes collected a series of lectures that had been delivered to military officers at the college, as well as a range of government documents that addressed ICAF’s main concern: managing industrial mobilization for war. The fourth volume, dedicated to *Principles of Administration*, reproduced a lecture by political scientist James Fesler, a veteran of government reform during the New Deal and of mobilization planning during World War II.² Looking back on the previous two tumultuous decades, Fesler observed that the United States had emerged from an “unbroken

2 INTRODUCTION

series of emergencies”—“depression, defense, war, inflation, cold war”—with a “discernible pattern” of emergency government. Its hallmark was a new norm: “government should consciously plan a strategy for anticipating and meeting domestic and foreign emergencies at the operational level.” In the “new kind of normalcy” Fesler described, emergency government was no longer confined to exceptional situations. Rather, ongoing emergency preparedness had become a part of governmental routine.

More than six decades later, it is taken for granted that government bears responsibility for continuously anticipating and preparing for emergencies. This assumption has been evident in efforts to assign blame and bolster readiness following disasters such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and, most recently, the Covid-19 pandemic. It is noteworthy, then, that in 1952, when Fesler gave his lecture, this governmental norm was neither established nor taken for granted. Rather, it was new and required explicit statement and elaboration.

It is also noteworthy that Fesler’s discussion addressed a set of problems and institutional contexts that seem distant from our contemporary understandings of emergency management. Today, government offices tasked with managing emergencies are concerned with preparedness for events such as natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and terrorist attacks, as well as with response and recovery in the aftermath of such events. But in 1952, the object of emergency management was the national economy, and its central aim was military-industrial mobilization—marshaling raw materials, industrial facilities, and manpower to build the tanks, planes, munitions, and other supplies necessary for total war. In this sense, Fesler’s speech points us to the specificity of the historical conjuncture during which new norms for managing emergencies were first articulated in the United States and were connected to forms of expert knowledge, administrative practices, and legal mechanisms. The topics addressed in *Emergency Management of the National Economy* suggest some of the issues that, in this now unfamiliar landscape, were initially clustered around emergency government: resource planning, economic controls, internal security, economic intelligence, air targeting, government reorganization, domestic vulnerability, and non-military defense. And the government offices, commissions, and agencies whose work was either collected or discussed in the ICAF volumes—most long-since dissolved, and many virtually forgotten—provide a map of the institutional settings in which emergency government was addressed at this time. Among these were committees working on government reform and resource management during the New Deal; wartime and postwar

mobilization planning offices; air-targeting and strategic intelligence units in the military; and offices of civil defense and domestic preparedness of the early Cold War.³

If *Emergency Management of the National Economy* situates the history of American emergency government in relation to economic management and military-industrial mobilization during the Great Depression and World War II, it also marks a point of inflection. In the early 1950s, emergency government was already in the process of becoming something different and, from our contemporary perspective, more familiar. In the foreword to the ICAF tome, another veteran of wartime mobilization planning, Arthur Flemming, described this new horizon of emergency government. At the time, Flemming was serving as director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Created in 1950 to lead civilian mobilization planning for the Korean War, ODM had by 1953 become the most important domestic preparedness agency in the federal government. Surveying the landscape of the early Cold War, Flemming offered a grim assessment of the current world situation. The United States, he wrote, was in an “age of peril.” The advent of long-range bombers and atomic weapons confronted national security strategists with the specter of a sudden “devastating attack on the continental United States.” In the event of such a sudden attack, the United States would not have time to mobilize its “material and human resources” over the course of months or years, as it had in the prior two world wars. Rather, Flemming argued, the country would have to shift immediately to war footing and would be faced with managing the consequences of a crippling initial blow. Adequately preparing the nation for this eventuality could “save an untold number of human lives” and ensure that the United States could “continue a substantial portion of our war production and production essential for the holding together of our civilian economy.”⁴

In light of these concerns about a devastating enemy attack, during the 1950s the civilian mobilization planning agencies turned their attention to a novel task. If earlier these agencies were concerned primarily with military-industrial production during a long war fought overseas, then increasingly their focus shifted to preparedness planning to ensure the survival of the national population and recovery of the economy in the aftermath of a domestic catastrophe. It is indicative of this shift that, by the early 1960s, the Office of Defense Mobilization had evolved into the Office of Emergency Planning, which was in turn renamed the Office of Emergency Preparedness. In 1962, the director of this office, Edward McDermott, outlined the aims and means of emergency government as they had come to be understood

4 INTRODUCTION

by this time. Citing a draft executive order issued by President John F. Kennedy, McDermott reported that he had been charged with coordinating the “national preparedness program,” whose goal was to maintain a “state of readiness with respect to all conditions of national emergency.” This meant, first and foremost, maintaining an “emergency management organization” that would be prepared to “handle the myriad of resource and economic problems necessary to save lives and sustain survival and expedite recovery.” Reviewing these “resource and economic problems”—related to electric power, transportation, communications, food, and medical care—McDermott pointed to the vast scope of his office’s concern. “We are really talking about the fundamentals of life on this earth,” he intoned, “the elemental problems of safeguarding the food we eat, the fuel we consume, the transportation to maintain a steady flow of commerce, an intricate telecommunications system which will continue to function under all conditions, and perhaps most important, the foundation of constitutional government which underpins our way of life.”⁵ In sum, the Office of Emergency Planning was charged with sustaining the very biological and associational life of the American population during a future emergency.

In the decades since McDermott’s speech, practices for anticipating and managing emergencies have continued to evolve, and the organization of emergency government has been frequently reshuffled. But McDermott’s 1962 description of the task of governmental preparedness for emergency is strikingly similar to contemporary understandings. Emergency preparedness continues to focus on reducing the vulnerability of vital systems in anticipation of a range of potentially catastrophic future events, and on preparing for life-saving response and recovery in their aftermath. Thus, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 2015 *National Preparedness Goal*—which currently guides governmental preparedness for events ranging from terrorist attacks to hurricanes and pandemics—refers to a “secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”⁶ The emphasis now, as in 1962, is on what the Department of Homeland Security’s 2017 guidance on critical infrastructure protection refers to as “the essential services that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of our nation’s economy, security, and health”; “the power we use in our homes, the water we drink, the transportation that moves us . . . and the communication systems we rely on.”⁷ Today, as in the early 1960s, emergency preparedness aims to ensure governmental functions relating to “health and safety,”

“infrastructure systems,” “hydration, feeding, and sheltering,” that, in the wake of a future disaster, will be essential to “rapidly meeting basic human needs,” “restoring basic services,” “establishing a safe and secure environment,” and “supporting the transition to recovery.”⁸ And as has been true since the beginning of the postwar period, emergency government today is not an *exception* to the normal operation of the state. Rather, it encompasses the management of unfolding emergencies and ongoing preparedness for future emergency situations as permanent functions of *normal* government.

A Genealogy of Emergency Government

This book examines the formation of American emergency government in the middle decades of the twentieth century. It follows the process through which a governmental apparatus initially assembled to manage economic depression and industrial mobilization for war mutated into an apparatus of emergency preparedness for domestic catastrophe. The account presented in this book is a genealogy of emergency government that traces how now-familiar forms of knowledge, practices, and norms first came into being.⁹ It is only relatively recently, we suggest, that we have come to understand and organize emergency government as a matter of reducing the vulnerability of vital systems, and it is only recently that preparedness for events that might disrupt these systems has become a basic obligation of government.

This genealogical approach to the study of emergency government can be usefully distinguished from histories of the field of disaster preparedness and emergency management, which follow the changing forms of knowledge and governance that have been applied to a certain class of phenomena—disasters. For example, in *Acts of God*, historian Ted Steinberg traces how the US government has understood and managed (or failed to manage) natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and storms, from the early days of the American republic to the present.¹⁰ Scott Knowles, in *The Disaster Experts*, constructs what he calls a “disaster chronology” over roughly the same period, tracking how experts have made “the knowledge and control of disasters their special concern.”¹¹ In contrast to such historical studies of disaster and disaster management, a genealogical approach asks how a range of seemingly disparate phenomena, from nuclear attacks and economic shocks to hurricanes and disease outbreaks, have been *constituted* as common types of events that present similar kinds of problems. Thus, the title of this book—*The Government of Emergency*—does not refer to the way that a pre-given class of events or situations has been governed. Rather, it refers to

6 INTRODUCTION

a form of political rationality, which we understand, following sociologist Nikolas Rose, as an “intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political programming.”¹²

As Rose suggests, political rationalities have both normative and epistemological dimensions. On the one hand, a given political rationality entails specific assumptions about the “proper distribution of tasks between different authorities” and the “ideals or principles to which government should be addressed.” Thus, it implies certain presumptions (however contested and unstable) about what government is, what it should do, and what its limits should be. On the other hand, a political rationality involves a distinct “style of reasoning,” that is, a body of “intellectual techniques for rendering reality thinkable and practicable, and constituting domains that are amenable—or not amenable—to reformatory intervention.” Importantly, a style of reasoning entails specific “conceptions of the objects to be governed,” whether the national economy, the population, or the vulnerable, vital systems on which the economy and the population depend.¹³

One strategy of genealogical research is to paint a “before and after” picture that aims, as Ian Hacking has put it, “to permanently fix in the mind of the reader the fact that some upheaval has occurred”—a momentous shift in ways of thinking and governing.¹⁴ Our account is framed by such a conceptual and political “upheaval,” in which new objects, aims, and practices of government came into being over a relatively brief period. But we also present a detailed account of *how* this momentous shift unfolded. We focus on specific organizations and on historically situated actors as they took up existing ways of knowing and intervening, or invented new ones, to address novel problems.¹⁵ Through these often-mundane practices, a new political rationality—and indeed, we suggest, a new dimension of political modernity—took shape over the period spanning roughly from the Great Depression through the early Cold War.

The first part of the book examines the period from the 1930s to the early 1940s, in which the federal government faced two conditions of “national emergency”: the Great Depression and World War II. During this period, emergency government largely involved *economic* interventions to ameliorate the Depression and to manage industrial production for total war. Chapter 1 follows the work of experts in a succession of domains—from city and regional planning to economic management, wartime mobilization, and air targeting—as they constituted vital systems as objects of systematic knowledge and as targets of intervention. Chapter 2 describes a parallel process through which government reformers invented administrative devices and

organizational forms to address the economic emergencies of depression and war. It focuses in particular on how these reformers addressed the tensions between liberal constitutionalism and crisis government by assembling what they called an “administrative machinery” to organize and prepare for emergency situations.

The book’s second part is situated in the years immediately after World War II, a period of heightening concern about the prospect of an enemy attack on the continental United States that would cripple military-industrial production systems. Chapter 3 shows how civilian experts and military officers developed systematic knowledge about American economic and infrastructural vulnerability and devised practices and understandings that would constitute a new kind of expertise—and a new kind of expert, the “vulnerability specialist.”¹⁶ Chapter 4 turns to the first efforts to develop techniques for reducing this vulnerability and preparing to manage the consequences of a massive attack. It examines postwar mobilization planning agencies, where experts and officials reoriented the existing institutions and practices of emergency government. If previously these institutions had focused on economic management of the unfolding emergencies of depression and war, their objective now shifted to preparing for a future war. Emergency government was thus becoming a matter of ongoing *peacetime* preparedness.

Part III traces a further shift in American emergency government that took place during the 1950s. As nuclear weapons and delivery systems grew increasingly powerful, mobilization planners deemphasized readiness to ramp up industrial production for a long war. Instead, they turned to the task of ensuring the continuous functioning of vital systems that would be required to sustain human life, economic activity, and governmental operations in the unprecedented conditions that would result from a thermonuclear attack. Chapter 5 examines the practices of “administrative readiness” developed by mobilization planners to prepare for government operations in a future emergency, culminating with a description of Mobilization Plan D-Minus (1957)—the first plan for national emergency preparedness in the United States. Chapter 6 focuses on one dimension of such national preparedness planning: the management of resources such as food, medical supplies, and services that would be essential to the population’s postattack survival. The chapter traces how mobilization planners used the new tool of computer simulation to envision and prepare for an unprecedented future event—a catastrophic nuclear attack.

By the late 1950s, emergency government, which had previously focused on alleviating economic depression and mobilizing for war, had mutated

8 INTRODUCTION

into emergency preparedness for a future domestic catastrophe. A coherent set of understandings, practices, and organizational forms had consolidated into an apparatus that continues to structure emergency government—in the United States and beyond—to the present day. In the next two sections, we outline the broader conceptual and theoretical significance of this mutation in governmental rationality. First, we introduce the concept of vital systems security as a form of “reflexive biopolitics,” oriented to the management of uncertain and potentially catastrophic future events. We argue that, beginning with the midcentury episodes we examine, securing the nation’s vital systems has become a central norm of modern government. Second, we describe how American emergency government took shape as a response to the challenge that increasingly common use of emergency powers during war and economic crisis posed to democratic government. In these contexts, reformers assembled a political technology for governing emergencies that, they thought, would make it possible to avoid recourse to exceptional measures that would undermine constitutional democracy.

Vital Systems Security

In 1984, applied mathematician and security expert Robert Kupperman published *Technological Advances and Consequent Dangers*, a working paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in Washington, DC.¹⁷ Kupperman’s essay was a far-reaching reflection on the vulnerability of vital systems as a central problem of national security. For our purposes, Kupperman’s paper indicates how system vulnerability was linked to a broader problematization of risk and security in modern societies.

For millennia, Kupperman argued, human beings had faced relatively localized and “self-extinguishing” threats that were “dissipated by the distribution of cultural assets, by the existence of physical and psychological ‘hinterlands,’ and by the cushioning function of institutional diversity and independence.” Even the cataclysm of World War I was a contained event. “Diversities, distances, and differences, systematic inefficiencies of civilization in themselves,” he argued, “provided the recuperative forces necessary to maintain continuity.” But in the intervening years, the “extension of technology in the service of civilization” had enabled human beings to move “into every suitable niche, and even into some not so suitable.” The increasingly “efficient, economical infrastructure” required to sustain this process carried with it an unacknowledged price. “Modern technological efficiency in the provision of food, water, energy, medicine, transport and

communication,” he wrote, has been “oriented toward economic affordability without much attention to complex network fragility.” Pointing to the “interlocking technologies” that underpin the “fragile dynamic cycle of production, transportation, and consumption” in contemporary societies, Kupperman argued that the “greater a society’s dependence for survival on its technological infrastructure, the greater its vulnerability to a collapse triggered naturally or artificially at a key point.” Like biological organisms, contemporary human societies could not manage “fundamental system failures multiplying at a biological rate.” “A critical point is reached,” Kupperman warned. “A cascade of organ-system failures ensues, and death comes quickly.” Modern civilization, in developing technologies oriented to furthering the “ends of human life,” had created a system whose “success and importance to social survival make it, ironically, one of society’s greatest weaknesses.”¹⁸

In the 1970s and 1980s, the kinds of hazards that Kupperman identified—what sociologist Ulrich Beck describes as “modernization risks”¹⁹—were taking on a new kind of public and political life. Economic and energy shocks, environmental crisis, and terrorism garnered increasing attention alongside the paradigmatic specter of catastrophic risk, thermonuclear war, which raised the prospect, for the first time, of self-inflicted human extinction.²⁰ Kupperman’s reflections are especially significant for our story given his career trajectory, which passed through some of the mostly forgotten technical domains in which, we show in this book, the vulnerability of vital systems was identified and addressed as a matter of governmental concern. In 1980, Kupperman served the incoming Ronald Reagan administration as the head of the transition for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which President Jimmy Carter had created by executive order in 1979. Prior to that, during the 1960s and early 1970s, Kupperman had worked in one of FEMA’s predecessors, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). As director of the Systems Evaluation Division within OEP, Kupperman oversaw studies on “the impact on the Nation’s security and economy created by emergency contingencies of both military and non-military nature,” examining issues such as natural disaster assistance, the continuity of government, damage assessment, resource management, and the “survivability of networks related to national preparedness.”²¹

The arc of Kupperman’s career points us to a broader question: How did it become possible to understand collective existence in the United States as dependent on a complex of vital and vulnerable systems, and how did the protection of such systems come to be a taken-for-granted obligation

10 INTRODUCTION

of contemporary government? In the chapters that follow we show that, for nearly a century, a persistent discourse has examined collective life from a particular point of view: the vulnerability of modern society and economy to disruption of the vital systems on which they depend. And since at least the early Cold War, the federal government has been concerned with ensuring the continuous functioning of such systems in the face of catastrophic threats. Today, this problem of “vital systems security” is a central object and aim of government, defined in legislation, executive orders, and broad statements of security strategy.

REFLEXIVE BIOPOLITICS

We analyze the emergence of vital systems security as the product of a mutation in the government of modern life. Specifically, it marks a *reflexive* moment in the history of “biopolitics”—that is, the government of human beings in relation to their biological and social existence. Michel Foucault famously coined the term “biopolitics” to mark a shift, dating roughly to the late eighteenth century, in the aims and objects of government in European countries: from the “classical sovereignty” of the European territorial monarchies to a new governmental concern with ensuring the health and well-being of national populations.²² Classical sovereignty, Foucault argued, ruled “from the standpoint of the juridical-political notion” of the legal subject. Diplomatic, military, and police apparatuses—elements of what might be called “sovereign state security”—aimed to ensure the security of the state itself in the face of foreign and domestic threats. By contrast, biopolitical government is exercised over the population—a collection of living beings understood as a “technical-political object of management.” Foucault traced the “birth of biopolitics” to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Europe, when government authorities sought to manage the health and welfare of populations in growing urban centers. The rapid growth of towns, the expansion of industry, the intensification of trade, and increasingly crowded living conditions posed “new and specific economic and political problems of governmental technique.” In response, officials, planners, and experts in the nascent human sciences invented new forms of knowledge about—and devices for governing—the “fine materiality of human existence and coexistence, of exchange and circulation.”²³ As Foucault emphasized, the point is not that the birth of biopolitics displaced prior mechanisms of sovereignty; indeed, particularly with the advent of total war, threats to sovereignty were a key catalyst for the development of biopolitics. Rather, the

theme of biopolitics designates the interplay between the exercise of juridical power over legal subjects and the technical management of living beings.

Building on Foucault's analysis, scholars have traced the development of biopolitical government in a range of domains from the early nineteenth century. In efforts to reduce the toll of epidemics, organize conscription for war, or manage economic fluctuations, government bureaucracies generated vast amounts of data about phenomena such as birth, illness, and death; suicide and crime; and levels of production and employment.²⁴ This "avalanche of numbers," as Hacking puts it, made possible a new, statistical understanding of collective life.²⁵ The technical and political category of risk played a central role in this development, enabling experts and government officials to quantitatively analyze how phenomena such as crime, illness, accident, and poverty were distributed over a given population, and to assess the costs and benefits of measures to minimize these risks.²⁶ New governmental apparatuses in areas such as economic regulation, urban planning, and public health specified and managed these problems. As Foucault describes this complex process, a "constant interplay between techniques of power and their object" served to "carve out" the population and its specific phenomena (birth and death rates, disease processes, etc.) as a "field of reality."²⁷

We take up this story of biopolitical modernity at a later conjuncture and in a different locale. Beginning in the early twentieth century, American planners and policymakers in various domains argued that with the development of mass industrial and metropolitan societies, the interdependencies that made modern collective life possible also rendered it vulnerable to catastrophic disruption from events such as economic shocks, industrial accidents, or wars. Over the following decades, experts and officials addressed this vulnerability by devising new ways to anticipate and mitigate the effects of such events, to reduce the vulnerability of vital systems, and to make society resilient to shocks.²⁸

The first governmental apparatus for securing vital systems was assembled in the 1950s. In the early Cold War, planners and officials working on nuclear preparedness brought together a set of elements—knowledge forms, techniques of intervention, and organizational arrangements—that constituted system vulnerability as a target of governmental intervention. Like the demographers, public health experts, and urbanists of the nineteenth century, mobilization planners produced an "avalanche of numbers" about collective existence, not through statistical analysis of populations but by using scenarios, catastrophe models, and vulnerability assessments. Through this process, society became vulnerable in a novel way. Like the figure of

12 INTRODUCTION

population a century earlier, a new figure of collective life—the vulnerable, vital system—was “carved out” as an object of expert knowledge, technical intervention, and political concern.

By the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this apparatus of vital systems security had been extended into new domains, including natural disaster response, pandemic preparedness, the management of economic crises, and homeland security.²⁹ This is not to say that vital systems security displaced prior forms of security or became the dominant form of collective security. As we will show, vital systems security emerged and consolidated in complex relation to sovereign state security and population security. Thus, the officials and planners in the 1950s-era Office of Defense Mobilization viewed the task of ensuring the functioning of vital systems in the wake of a nuclear attack as a matter of sovereign state security—prevailing in a future war.³⁰ Meanwhile, vital systems security has become central to many domains of biopolitical government, including the provision of population security in areas such as public health, urban planning, and economic governance. Indeed, we suggest that vital systems security should be understood as a form of “reflexive biopolitics.” It shares the aim of population security: ensuring the health and welfare of populations. But these two forms of biopolitical security differ in their objects of concern, knowledge practices, and norms (see table 1). Whereas population security addresses regularly occurring events that can be managed through the distribution of risk, vital systems security deals with events whose probability cannot be precisely calculated, but whose consequences are potentially catastrophic. Vital systems security does not rely on statistical analysis of past events, but rather employs techniques of enactment such as catastrophe models and scenario-based exercises to simulate potential future events and thereby generate knowledge about present vulnerabilities.³¹ Its interventions seek to increase the resilience of critical systems and to bolster preparedness for future emergencies.

A NEW POLITICAL RATIONALITY

Our claim is not that governmental concern with vital systems is itself novel. Governments have long been concerned with vital systems like roads, communication networks, and large systems of water management. The construction and control of transportation, energy, and communication systems—what has only recently come to be called “infrastructure”—is

TABLE 1. Three forms of security

	Sovereign state security	Biopolitical security	
		Population security	Vital systems security
Moment of emergence	Seventeenth century—absolutist states	Nineteenth century—social insurance, public health	Mid-twentieth century—nuclear preparedness
Aim	Secure sovereign power against internal and external threats	Manage regularly occurring threats such as endemic disease, poverty, and infirmity	Reduce vulnerability, prepare for future emergencies
Object of concern	Sovereign power: military strength, internal order, wealth	Social processes: economic production, circulation of goods and people	Vital systems: webs of industrial production, critical infrastructures, essential services
Forms of knowledge	<i>Raison d'état</i> : external balance of power, internal bases of sovereign power	Statistics, demography, epidemiology, social sciences	System-vulnerability thinking, catastrophe models, scenario-based exercises
Characteristic apparatuses	Diplomatic corps, militaries, mercantilism	Social insurance, infrastructure development	Governmental preparedness, emergency management

found in all large-scale complex societies.³² Territorial empires have for centuries recognized what were referred to as “communications” as essential to prosperity and security. And military strategists have long been concerned with the importance of transportation and communication for military lines of supply; the military tactic of blockade goes back millennia.³³ But from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, we observe a significant intensification and modulation of these concerns. In particular, three features distinguish vital systems security as a political rationality and delimit the conceptual and empirical scope of this book: first, its relationship to biopolitics; second, the emergence of specialized expertise about vital systems; and third, the consolidation of a new political norm—that governments must ensure the ongoing functioning of vital systems in the face of catastrophic threats.

Vital systems and modern biopolitics. First, we can refer to vital systems security in the sense we use the term here only with the emergence of

14 INTRODUCTION

modern biopolitics. Electricity networks, railroads, and complex chains of production became “vital systems” when they were linked to newly constituted problem domains such as the national economy or social welfare.³⁴ Although this development can be traced to the late nineteenth century, particularly in European contexts,³⁵ our narrative begins in the United States in the first decades of the twentieth century. We focus on two apparently disparate fields: regional planning and strategic bombing theory.³⁶ Experts in these fields initially used biological metaphors to illustrate the dependence of collective existence on what Muir Fairchild, an instructor at the US Army’s Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s, called “life-sustaining vital systems.”³⁷ Fairchild’s term suggested that, like the failure of vital organs or the breakdown of circulatory systems in a biological organism, the disruption of such systems would be catastrophic to the social body. As another Air Corps instructor put it in 1938, as the United States had “grown and prospered in proportion to the excellence of its industrial system,” it had become “more vulnerable . . . to wartime collapse caused by the cutting of one or more of its essential arteries.”³⁸ The use of such biological metaphors would fade over time (though never disappear, as Kupperman’s 1984 report demonstrates). But from the case studies of the Air Corps Tactical School and the quantitative analyses of “criticality” and “essentiality” in wartime and postwar facilities ratings to contemporary assessments of critical infrastructure vulnerability or resilience, experts have defined the “vitality” of vital systems, and the threat posed by their disruption, in terms of these systems’ role in the health and well-being of populations—the central concerns of biopolitical government.

System vulnerability expertise. Second, vital systems security is distinguished by the development of specialized knowledge that constitutes vital systems and their vulnerability as objects of expert analysis and rational-technical intervention. By the mid-twentieth century, technical specialists and officials working in mobilization and air-targeting agencies had devised new practices for assessing vulnerability and preparing for future events that might disrupt the nation’s vital systems. This new form of expertise rested on the accumulation of a vast amount of information about American natural resources, productive facilities, and public works—what President Franklin Delano Roosevelt referred to in 1935 as an “inventory of our national assets.”³⁹ Such expertise also drew on techniques for analyzing the interrelationships among the elements that this “inventory” comprised. Although specialists from many fields were involved in constituting vital systems—and

the vulnerability of these systems—as objects of systematic knowledge, economists played a particularly prominent role. Economists first appear in our account during the New Deal, inventing a “science of flows” to analyze how shocks would propagate through the economic system, whether these shocks resulted from a plunge in demand during economic downturns or from a surge in demand caused by government stimulus policies or war-time mobilization. A number of these New Deal economists then migrated to air intelligence offices during World War II, where they developed an “economics of strategic target selection” to assess the vulnerability of enemy production systems and to recommend bombing targets.⁴⁰ A decade prior to the development of “systems analysis” at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s, these mobilization planners and air intelligence specialists established methods for the quantitative analysis of military-industrial complexes as ensembles of interlocking vital systems.⁴¹

In the closing years of World War II and the early Cold War, technical experts coupled the analysis of vital systems with new methods for modeling how a catastrophic event—such as an incendiary bombing attack on a city (during World War II) or an atomic detonation (after the war)—would unfold in space. As we show in chapter 3, these experts produced a new kind of knowledge about vital and vulnerable systems. Initially, military analysts in air intelligence units used graphical techniques such as maps and transparent overlays to generate assessments of urban and industrial vulnerability. By the mid-1950s, vulnerability experts had replaced maps and physical overlays with digital computers and geographically tagged data sets—a precursor of geographic information systems (GIS). The advent of computer simulation added another dimension to vulnerability analysis. By incorporating randomization procedures and multiple simulated runs in their models, vulnerability specialists could account for uncertainties about how a future attack would unfold. These simulation techniques—initially used as speculative “experiments” or “war games”⁴² as part of nuclear preparedness planning (see chapter 6)—have come to be accepted in various domains as authoritative tools for generating knowledge about uncertain future events.⁴³

Vital systems security as political obligation and norm. Third, and finally, vital systems security refers to an increasingly taken-for-granted norm of politics. After World War II, the task of ensuring the continuous operation of vital systems and managing the risk of catastrophic disruption came to be accepted as a basic obligation of sovereign government. This was not the first

time that the US government was expected to deal with the consequences of domestic catastrophes. As Michele Landis Dauber has documented, there is a long American tradition of federal relief following disasters.⁴⁴ But prior to the middle of the twentieth century, these governmental responses were ad hoc, organized in the wake of what were understood to be unforeseeable “acts of god.”⁴⁵ Only in the last several decades has government been held responsible for preparing *in advance* of future catastrophes that can be anticipated if not precisely predicted. And only in the last several decades has this obligation been addressed, at least in part, by technical measures that aim to ensure the functioning of vital systems.

The first statutory mention of this new governmental obligation (discussed in chapter 4) was in the 1947 National Security Act. The Act created a new peacetime mobilization agency—the National Security Resources Board (NSRB)—and charged it with undertaking measures to protect “industries, services, Government and economic activities” whose “continuous operation” Congress deemed “essential to the Nation’s security.”⁴⁶ The NSRB was a defense mobilization agency, in which the norm of “preparedness” still referred to military-industrial readiness for war. But planners working in government agencies charged with preparedness gradually adapted these techniques to address other kinds of potentially catastrophic events, such as hurricanes, floods, and infectious disease outbreaks. By the 1960s, the norm of preparedness could refer to any event that might catastrophically disrupt the nation’s vital systems. The organization of responsibility for emergency preparedness has shifted almost constantly over the subsequent decades, and attention to this problem has ebbed and flowed. But the task of ensuring the continuous operation of vital systems is now a virtually unquestioned—if not always successfully met—obligation of contemporary government.

An “Administrative Machinery” for Governing Emergencies

The prior section described how experts and officials constituted system vulnerability as an object of specialized knowledge and a target of governmental intervention during the Depression, World War II, and the early Cold War. But on its own, this description of expert knowledge and technical interventions is too serene. It is too serene, in part, because these “interventions” into vital systems were closely linked to projects—whether war mobilization, strategic air targeting, or nuclear preparedness—that involved the mass slaughter of civilians, the annihilation of cities, and,

after World War II, the prospect of nuclear holocaust.⁴⁷ It is also too serene because the developments we have described corresponded to an upheaval in American government. Technical experts and government officials often instituted the mechanisms of vital systems security through “emergency” measures that challenged American political traditions, such as deference to legislative prerogative and judicial precedent, as well as a diffuse and decentralized pattern of sovereignty. An account of the emergence and consolidation of vital systems security must, therefore, address the fraught relationship between emergency powers and constitutional democracy.

As a point of entry into these questions, we turn to the writings of a prominent midcentury American commentator on crisis government, political scientist Clinton Rossiter. Rossiter began his seminal study *Constitutional Dictatorship*, published in 1948, with a question that President Abraham Lincoln had posed at the outset of the American Civil War. “Is there in all republics,” Lincoln asked, “this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government be too *strong* for the liberties of its people, or too *weak* to maintain its own existence?” Had Lincoln been alive on the eve of World War II, Rossiter observed, he could have “framed his question in more modern terms.” Was it possible for a democracy to “fight a successful total war and still be a democracy when the war is over?” For Rossiter, writing just after the end of World War II, the “incontestable facts of history” had provided an answer. “We have fought a successful total war,” Rossiter declared, “and we are still a democracy.” In this “severe national emergency,” the US government had employed “devices and techniques” that made it “strong enough to maintain its own existence without at the same time being so strong as to subvert the liberties of the people it has been instituted to defend.”⁴⁸

In what follows, we show that the “devices and techniques” Rossiter referred to were the product of efforts by governmental reformers who, during the New Deal and World War II, sought to meet the challenge that, they thought, emergency situations posed to constitutional democracy. These reformers assembled what Rossiter called an “administrative machinery” that would enable the US federal government, especially its executive branch, to manage emergency situations through expert rule without recourse to an extra-constitutional state of exception. They believed, like Rossiter, that in an era of pervasive doubt about the prospects for democracy, they had successfully responded to the “taunt of the dictators” that “democracies cannot meet the demands of the modern world and still remain democratic,” as the reformer Luther Gulick put it in 1941.⁴⁹ Our aim in describing these reformers’ efforts is not to assess the validity of such claims. Rather, it is to

reconstruct how they formulated and sought to address the problem that emergencies posed to democratic constitutionalism. Their responses shaped a distinctive political technology for governing emergency situations.

DEMOCRACY, EMERGENCY, AND THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE

Our account begins in the early twentieth century. At this time, Progressive reformers argued that, as Charles Merriam put it in 1933, governments had “to undertake new activities” to address intensifying processes of urbanization and industrialization. Among these new activities were the management of “public welfare, including education, recreation, health, social relief, and welfare planning”; the construction of public works, such as “highways and aid to communications”; and the “central control over social and economic forces.”⁵⁰ The challenge, Merriam and other reformers held, was that American governmental institutions, which were set up when the United States was a largely rural and sparsely populated country, were ill suited to the functions required of what they referred to as a “positive state” that was involved in managing the health, well-being, and conditions of existence of a rapidly growing and an increasingly urban population. Merriam described this mismatch as “social lag” and argued for governmental “adjustment.”⁵¹ On the one hand, technical experts would have to play an expanded role in political administration. On the other hand, such an “adjustment” would require a significant shift in the locus of political authority: centralization to address issues that crossed local jurisdictional boundaries and decisive executive leadership to manage urgent social and economic problems.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, administrative reformers succeeded in instituting significant changes along the lines Merriam and other Progressives prescribed. Initially, their efforts focused on state and local governments, as they sought to deal with the growing pressures of urban growth and industrial expansion. By the 1930s, in the context of the New Deal, these reformers turned their attention to the national level and the federal government, where they confronted the “emergency” situations of the Great Depression and World War II. Between 1933 and 1945, federal agencies took on a vast range of new functions relating to the provision of social welfare, economic management, and industrial mobilization.⁵² To better equip the federal government—particularly the executive branch—to meet these new demands, Progressive reformers working in and around the Roosevelt administration pushed through a series of laws and administrative changes. Partly as a result of their efforts, the American presidency, which

began the 1930s as a solitary office with a small staff, emerged from the war as a powerful office that oversaw an array of agencies, wielding formidable discretionary powers.⁵³ New expert bodies were scattered throughout the executive branch, and new mechanisms of rational-technical administration were woven into laws and regulations.

Political commentators of the 1940s and 1950s were acutely aware that the economic and military emergencies of the period had wrought dramatic changes in the structure of US government. In 1950, Rossiter wrote that the “startling succession of major emergencies” had produced an “extraordinary expansion in the authority of the national executive, in both relative and absolute terms.” The presidencies of 1933 and of 1945, he observed, were two “perceptibly different offices, in fact as well as constitutional theory.”⁵⁴ In 1952, James Fesler also linked the “unbroken series of emergencies” of this period to a dramatic transformation of the American state.⁵⁵ “One of the most striking changes occurring in the form and functions of the American Government in the present century,” Fesler argued, “has been the rapid growth . . . of governmental administrative activities.” The federal government had “entered into a new world of administrative empires, alphabetic agencies, organizational charts, high and low levels or echelons, coordinators and expeditors—all explained in strange terms of technical official rhetoric.”⁵⁶

In the last seventy years, scholars have continually returned to these episodes in which, to modify Charles Tilly’s phrase, the emergencies of economic depression and total war (and later, Cold War) made the modern American state.⁵⁷ Our book addresses a more specific question that has received less attention: How did these events shape the American *emergency* state with which we are familiar today, whose major concern is reducing the vulnerability of vital systems and preparing for events that threaten to disrupt the operation of these systems? To answer this question, we turn from the broad problem of governmental “adjustment” to the specific challenge that, reformers thought, emergencies posed in the first half of the twentieth century.

CRISIS GOVERNMENT: “RATIONALISM, TECHNICALITY, AND THE EXECUTIVE”

Historians have documented a significant shift in the range of situations in which governments invoked emergency powers in the early twentieth century, both in Europe and in the United States. Previously, governments most frequently drew on emergency powers to address wars, rebellions,

and other threats to state sovereignty. By contrast, in the first decades of the twentieth century, governments increasingly invoked emergency powers in response to events such as labor strikes, financial crises, and economic downturns, in which a direct threat to sovereignty was absent.⁵⁸ Notably for our purposes, governments often drew on emergency powers to address threats to the functioning of vital systems in urban and industrial societies. The British Emergency Powers Act of 1920, for example, authorized actions to limit strike activity that interfered “with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion.”⁵⁹ Emergency measures in the United States addressed similar problems. As historian Harold L. Platt has documented, the surge in demand produced by industrial mobilization during the World War I resulted in “terrifying famines of food and fuel” in cities, which were “exacerbated by a virtual gridlock of the nation’s transportation.”⁶⁰ Wartime emergency measures such as price and production controls addressed such breakdowns in vital systems.

If threats to the functioning of vital systems presented governments with novel technical problems, they also presented a political challenge. Was constitutional liberalism compatible with the decisive executive action and rational-technical administration required to manage crisis situations? This question was most famously posed by German jurist Carl Schmitt in his writings of the 1920s and 1930s. American reformers were aware of and on occasion referred to Schmitt’s arguments in their own reflections on emergency powers and democratic government. For our purposes, Schmitt’s analysis of political authority in crisis situations allows us to pinpoint the fundamental problem that these reformers identified with the exercise of emergency powers in a democracy.

In his 1921 study *Dictatorship*, Schmitt outlined the challenge that emergency situations posed to liberal constitutional government.⁶¹ With their emphasis on deliberation, legislative prerogative, democratic rule by the governed, and deference to precedent and legal norms, Schmitt argued, liberal constitutional governments were rigidly oriented to the past. This orientation was adequate to normal politics, when governments were dealing with familiar situations whose contours could be anticipated based on prior experience. But it was inadequate when governments faced economic shocks, political insurrections, and wars, which demanded a future-oriented form of executive power that could decisively respond to the ever-changing and unforeseeable demands of an emergency situation.⁶² “If the concrete means of achieving a goal can, under normal circumstances, be predicted with regularity,” Schmitt wrote, then in “cases of emergency” government

had to “do everything that is appropriate in the actual circumstances.”⁶³ Emergency government, for Schmitt, could be conducted only through discretionary executive authority based on the rational-technical—rather than charismatic and political—“needs” of a situation. It required rule by “dictate” and, crucially, *according to* the “dictates” of a given crisis as it unfolded. It is this model of emergency government that Schmitt referred to as “dictatorship,” based on the model of the Roman “commissarial” dictatorship, which was appointed for the duration of an emergency. For Schmitt, “dictatorship” did not imply an absence of constitutional or legal constraints. Rather, it referred specifically to the rational-technical character of discretionary executive authority: the actions of a dictator could be judged only by asking “whether the means, in a very technical sense, are appropriate or not—that is, whether they have achieved their goal.” In this sense, dictatorship was for Schmitt a “political technology” of crisis government, a particular way of arranging “rationalism, technicality, and the executive.”⁶⁴

The question that American reformers raised about the “adjustment” of governmental institutions to an urban and industrial society resonated deeply with Schmitt’s analysis: How, in liberal democracies, could technical rule and executive power be mobilized to address the distinctive challenges that confronted modern states? And some of these reformers, in seeking out models for emergency government under these circumstances, followed Schmitt in looking to the Roman model of the commissarial dictatorship. This was true not only of academic observers like Rossiter—who wrote extensively on the Roman institution in the 1940s—but also of the administrative reformers who were directly involved in assembling the institutions of American emergency government in the 1930s. Thus, Charles Merriam analyzed the Roman conception of dictatorship as early as 1900 in his study *The History of the Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau*. He returned to the concept again in *The New Democracy and the New Despotism*, written in 1939, when, significantly, legislation to adjust the American executive to meet the demands of emergency situations was under debate. Defending the concept “in its historic sense” (and citing Schmitt’s 1921 study), Merriam wrote that dictatorship was a “temporary device to meet an emergency,” one that was fully compatible with democratic government. “Pestilence, war, famine, flood, panic, depression,” he explained, “are crisis moments when decisionism is concentrated in the hands of one or a few who may act before it is too late.”⁶⁵

If Schmitt’s analysis in *Dictatorship* helps us to pinpoint how American reformers framed the problem of crisis government—as a matter of finding

22 INTRODUCTION

an accommodation between executive power, rational-technical rule, and constitutional democracy—it also casts these reformers’ distinctive response to this challenge in relief. Schmitt had drawn a distinction between a “commissarial” dictatorship—based on the Roman model—and what he called a “sovereign” dictatorship. A commissarial dictator was created by legislative decision, hemmed in by the constitution, and limited to the duration of a given crisis. Meanwhile, sovereign dictatorship—which Schmitt soon came to favor—stood entirely outside of law and the constitution. For American governmental reformers, in contrast, the problem was not one of choosing *between* these two models of dictatorship, since they considered “sovereign” dictatorship to be unacceptable in the American governmental system. Rather, they sought to design a form of commissarial dictatorship that was compatible with US political institutions. Rossiter, who wrote extensively on this problem after World War II, argued that in drawing a broad distinction between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship, Schmitt had lumped together a vast range of “heterogeneous offices under the former category.”⁶⁶ Referring to debates about emergency powers in Weimar Germany (a key point of reference for Schmitt⁶⁷), Rossiter found it strange that so much “energy should have been expended on this question of how much of the Constitution could be disregarded by a President in the use of emergency powers and so little in working out a law that would have settled many of the uncertainties and ambiguities” about the nature of emergency powers and how they would be marshaled.⁶⁸

This precise problem was the focus of American reformers’ attention beginning in the late 1930s. In contrast to Schmitt’s “latitudinarian” view of the emergency powers implied by a commissarial dictatorship,⁶⁹ American reformers labored to define the particular techniques and organizational forms of emergency government, and to specify how these would be constrained by statutory provisions, governmental checks, and constitutional restraints. In this sense, as Kim Lane Scheppele has noted, these mechanisms of emergency government were “crucially non-Schmittian” because they were never “outside the law.” Instead, they were based on “alternative forms of legality” that were lodged within the “processes of normal governance.”⁷⁰

The American approach to emergency government was not planned all at once as an abstract blueprint. Rather, it gradually evolved through a series of political and administrative struggles that we examine in the chapters that follow: over executive branch reform in the late 1930s, over the control of

TABLE 2. The American political technology of emergency government

	Characteristic features	Key development(s)
Administrative machinery of emergency government	<i>Executive control</i> exercised by small planning and management offices working under the president that provide a center for preparedness, coordination, and command	Reorganization Act; Office for Emergency Management (1939–1941)
	<i>Delegatory statutes</i> that temporarily transfer legislative authorities to the executive for the duration of an emergency	Lend-Lease, Stockpiling Act; War Powers Act (1939–1942)
	<i>Distributed structure of emergency government</i> among various executive branch agencies and among state and local governments	Delegations to emergency offices and executive departments (1942–1943; 1950s)
Techniques of administrative readiness	<i>Emergency government planning</i> for emergency organization, essential functions, and action steps	NSRB and ODM work on preparedness (1949–1955)
	<i>Planning for uncertain future catastrophes</i> using scenario-based exercises and catastrophe models to formulate and test preparedness plans	ODM work on D-Minus Process (1955–1957)

mobilization planning during World War II, over planning for urban and industrial dispersal in the late 1940s, and over nuclear preparedness planning in the 1950s. By the mid-1950s, a political technology of emergency government had consolidated that is more or less recognizable today. On the one hand, this political technology involved an “administrative machinery” of emergency government, through which the executive was organized, and the power to rule was distributed among its parts. On the other hand, it involved techniques of administrative readiness to prepare the government to assume the form and the functions that would be required to manage an emergency (see table 2).

The structure of emergency government. One distinctive feature of the American political technology of emergency government is an “administrative machinery” designed to establish strong executive authority to manage emergency situations without undermining civilian rule. The recommendations of Progressive reformers working on a 1937 Committee on Administrative Management (described in chapter 2) laid the groundwork for this structure of emergency government. In combination with a number of “delegatory statutes” that transferred certain legislative powers to the

24 INTRODUCTION

president, a 1939 Reorganization Act allowed Roosevelt to wield discretionary authority during emergency situations.⁷¹ Roosevelt drew on this authority to address the ongoing Depression and to manage the large-scale mobilization needed to prepare for an anticipated war.⁷² Following the German invasion of France, Roosevelt created an Office for Emergency Management within the Executive Office of the President. The first director of the Office for Emergency Management, William McReynolds, described it as a “device through which [the president] can exercise immediate supervision and control over emergency situations.”⁷³ During World War II, the Office for Emergency Management served, following Rossiter, as an “administrative sky-hook” on which Roosevelt could suspend a succession of emergency agencies—such as the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board and the War Production Board—in which technical experts managed the war production effort. The Office for Emergency Management was the prototype for subsequent executive branch emergency planning and management offices, from the 1950s-era Office of Defense Mobilization to today’s Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Another feature of American emergency government, as initially assembled under the Office of Emergency Management during World War II, was its “distributed” character. It established a central locus for coordination and control while preserving the diffused sovereignty of the US constitutional system. Within the federal government, American emergency planning and management since the 1950s has been distributed across federal agencies. Since these agencies are empowered by legislation, they are subject to congressional oversight, thus preserving, at least in principle, the balance of power among the branches of government. Emergency planning and management has also been distributed between the federal government and states, based on a coordinative structure that maintains state sovereignty while enabling states to request assistance from federal authorities when overwhelmed.

Techniques of administrative readiness. A second distinguishing feature of the American political technology for governing emergencies is a practice that Cold War preparedness planners called “administrative readiness.” In their work on administrative readiness, planners sought to address what Schmitt identified as a particular limitation of liberal constitutional regimes in dealing with emergency situations: their reliance on legislation that “codifies a series of expectations drawn from the experiences of legislators” based on the past, rather than a future-oriented anticipatory planning for

unexpected contingencies.⁷⁴ By using techniques of anticipatory knowledge, the practice of administrative readiness created new kinds of “expectations” and “experiences” about uncertain future events so that officials could prepare for emergencies within the framework of constitutional government.

These techniques of administrative readiness were developed in the period immediately after World War II, when mobilization planning offices shifted from operational tasks of wartime resource management to preparedness for a future emergency. One set of techniques involved advanced planning for the temporary government organization that would come into being in a future emergency. Among these were “blueprint” planning for emergency offices and standby legislation; lists of essential functions that emergency government offices would assume; and plans that detailed action steps to be taken in a future emergency. When mobilization planners began to work on these techniques of administrative readiness in the late 1940s, they assumed that a future war would look more or less like World War II, in which the government would manage a long period of military-industrial production. But by the mid-1950s, planners became convinced that, with the advent of ever-more powerful weapons and delivery systems, a future emergency would demand “entirely new and grotesquely different functions” that had “no human experience behind them,” as mobilization planner Edwin George put it in 1956.⁷⁵ In response, they devised new techniques, such as scenario-based exercises and computer-based procedures for simulating nuclear attacks, to anticipate the governmental functions that would be required in a future emergency and to identify gaps in preparedness in the present.

The Politics of Contemporary Security

Today we are regularly confronted with evidence of our vulnerability to catastrophic events, and, certainly, with the toll exacted by natural disasters, technological accidents, disease outbreaks, and other events that disrupt vital systems or that challenge our collective capacity to organize emergency response. Expert bodies, government commissions, and media reports tirelessly document what sociologist Craig Calhoun has described as a “world of emergencies.”⁷⁶ Meanwhile, emergency declarations are routine features of governmental practice, both in the United States and globally.⁷⁷ Beyond the specific political debates such events engender—What went wrong? Who is to blame? Are we prepared for the next emergency?—a number of social theorists and political commentators have argued that the apparent ubiquity

of catastrophes and of governmental states of emergency is diagnostic of the political condition of the present, raising fundamental questions about security, rationality, and democracy. Our analysis in this book does not directly engage in such theoretical debates. But by investigating the forgotten contexts in which taken-for-granted ways of thinking and governing initially took shape, it may cast these debates in a new light.

Catastrophe and the limits of calculative rationality. One strain of critical analysis has examined how the specter of impending catastrophe challenges expert understandings of risk and the forms of social and economic security that became authoritative in industrial modernity. For instance, in his work on reflexive modernization, Ulrich Beck distinguishes between two phases of modernity. He argues that “first modernity,” which arose in the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, was characterized by the establishment of institutions for managing risks such as unemployment, endemic disease, and accidental death. These risks were relatively predictable and bounded, Beck argues, and so security mechanisms such as social insurance or infrastructure provision could be used to distribute their effects over larger collectives.⁷⁸ “Second modernity,” by contrast, is characterized by the proliferation of unpredictable and uncontrollable hazards that threaten to destroy “the very foundations of life.”⁷⁹ Beck analyzes a range of such threats, from ecological catastrophe, global financial crisis, and the spread of chemical toxins to mass-casualty terrorism, nuclear war, and climate change. A key feature of these new hazards—and a defining element of the “reflexive” quality of second modernity—is that they have been generated by the very processes that modernization projects sought to foster: industrialization, urbanization, and technological innovation.⁸⁰ Because these reflexive risks are unpredictable and have potentially unbounded effects, according to Beck, they “escape the institutions for monitoring and protection” that have been embedded in governmental institutions over the past century.⁸¹ There “is no expert” in managing such risks, Beck writes; even when technical specialists can estimate the probability or consequences of a given hazard, these assessments often cannot provide authoritative guides for political action to mitigate risk.⁸²

For Beck, the ubiquity of catastrophic risk is a key to understanding the political condition of the present. Reflexive modernization, he argues, presents “totally new types of challenges to democracy,” as established accommodations between security, expertise, and governmental action are thrown into disarray.⁸³ Here, Beck’s argument converges with a broader literature that has examined what François Ewald refers to as the “deeply disturbed

relationship” that exists today between democratic publics and “a science that is consulted less for the knowledge it offers than for the doubt it insinuates.”⁸⁴ For some observers, this circumstance demands a new politics oriented to the precautionary avoidance of catastrophic risk, or the replacement of discredited technocratic institutions by reinvigorated democracy.⁸⁵ As Sheila Jasanoff has put it, “The problem we urgently face, is how to live democratically and at peace with the knowledge that our societies are inevitably ‘at risk’. Critically important questions of risk management cannot be addressed by technical experts with conventional tools of prediction.”⁸⁶ A more ominous prospect is what Beck refers to as a “totalitarianism of hazard prevention,” in which democratic processes are suspended in the name of the “right to prevent the worst,” and the “exceptional condition” produced by uncontrolled catastrophes “threatens to become the norm.”⁸⁷

State of emergency—the exception as norm. This prospect—that in contemporary democracies the “exceptional condition threatens to become the norm”—is approached from a very different perspective by a number of critical thinkers who have analyzed the relationship between emergency powers and liberal constitutional government.⁸⁸ Much of this work was written in response to the expanding emergency powers marshaled by the US government following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and focuses on surveillance policies, the treatment of terrorism suspects, and other aspects of the “war on terror.” This work links the proliferation of emergency measures in the aftermath of 9/11 to a broader tendency in modern democracies to govern through emergency powers. For example, philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues that persistent and widespread recourse to emergency measures suggests that mechanisms of dictatorial rule, unbounded by juridical or legislative restraints, are transforming constitutional order “to varying degrees in all the Western democracies.”⁸⁹ According to Agamben, “states of exception” to normal constitutional order exemplify the general condition of modern democracies.

In *Critique of Security*, political theorist Mark Neocleous passes through similar historical territory, examining how, in Europe and the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, liberal constitutional governments refashioned the institutions of the state of siege and martial law—originally invoked when states faced direct threats to sovereign power—as more general political instruments. Initially, these governments deployed such tools to wage class war against organized labor through disciplinary measures to break strikes and ensure economic flows. Today, Neocleous

argues, liberal governments invoke emergency powers to address other phenomena, from the catastrophic to the apparently trivial: famines, drug abuse epidemics, football hooliganism, and natural disasters or “even just a bit of unusual weather.”⁹⁰ For Neocleous, the elision of the distinction among different kinds of emergency undermines the very idea of normalcy. The result, he claims, is an insidious securitization and militarization of civil government, as the “state of emergency” has become the most “common prescription in the pharmacopoeia of statecraft” in liberal democracies.⁹¹ A broader literature on “securitization” has analyzed similar dynamics, investigating how government authorities invoke the specter of existential threats to justify exceptional measures that undermine democratic norms. As Rita Taureck has described this dynamic, “by stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence,” a strategic actor asserts a right to take “extraordinary measures” to ensure its survival. Securitization thus moves an issue “out of the sphere of normal politics” and into the realm of “emergency politics,” where it can be dealt with “swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making.”⁹²



We share with such critical analyses an interest in (and concern with) the challenges that catastrophic threats pose to modern government: on the one hand, to experts’ ability to assess and manage such threats; on the other hand, to mechanisms of democratic rule and distributed sovereignty. But our genealogical approach provides a different perspective on these questions. We begin from the observation that these critiques can be situated within broader problematizations of risk, security, and democracy.⁹³ Over the last century, the issues that are now raised as problems for political or social theory have been addressed by an array of reformers, experts, and government officials as urgent practical matters. Thus, since the 1930s, technical experts and government officials have been increasingly concerned with problems of “reflexive modernization”: the appearance of threats to the very “foundations of life” that are systematically generated by modernization processes, and the difficulty of assessing these novel threats using established forms of assessment and mitigation.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, a range of administrative reformers, government officials, and legal experts worried about how the increasing “normalcy” of emergency government in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century might undermine democratic norms. In this light, our strategy is not to offer another theoretical analysis

of catastrophic risk or the “state of emergency.” Rather, we examine how historically situated actors initially formulated these questions, and how their responses have shaped contemporary emergency government.

This analytical strategy points to a more differentiated understanding of our current “world of emergencies” than the sweeping diagnoses presented in much recent social and political theory. Increasingly prevalent catastrophic risks may indeed challenge existing forms of expertise and existing security mechanisms. But this does not mean that they exceed all means of technical assessment and mitigation. In the episodes we examine, technical specialists and government officials assembled new forms of expert knowledge about vulnerability, and they invented mechanisms to ensure the continuous operation of life-sustaining vital systems in the event of future disasters. Regardless of whether these mechanisms have achieved the aims for which they were designed and deployed, they have become increasingly authoritative and pervasive across many domains of contemporary life. Moreover, the provision of vital systems security by means of such mechanisms has come to be widely accepted as a central obligation of government.⁹⁵ Our analysis also complicates the claim that increasingly pervasive states of emergency break down the distinction between emergency government and normal government, or that emergency decrees necessarily contain the seeds of authoritarianism. Indeed, American reformers during the Great Depression, World War II, and the early Cold War sought to invent devices and techniques of emergency government that would obviate the need for exceptional measures.

We do not mean to argue that there is no need for concern about “exceptionalism” or “securitization” in American politics. Constitutional norms are threatened by security measures in many domains; the “war on terror” and recent immigration policies provide obvious examples. Rather, the point is that it is not possible to deduce a general logic of emergency government from such examples.⁹⁶ There are forms of emergency government that are compatible with liberal constitutional government, and these forms predominate in many core domains of contemporary emergency management. There are ways of anticipating and mitigating uncertain and unprecedented catastrophes that are grounded in authoritative knowledge, even if that knowledge is itself uncertain and is the subject of controversy and contestation. And there are, finally, different ways that a threat can be “securitized.” It makes a significant difference whether a particular threat is addressed by reducing the vulnerability of vital systems to disruption or by imposing disciplinary controls and extrajudicial measures that undermine

civil liberties.⁹⁷ The point of analyzing these alternatives is to sharpen our discernment, to bolster our ability to assess whether particular emergency measures truly threaten our norms of government, and, perhaps, to better equip ourselves to craft a politics of emergency that better accords with our collective aspirations for the future.

The Objects of Genealogical Analysis

The last section of this introduction describes the methods of inquiry we used to construct this genealogy. In piecing together this account, we have mainly drawn on primary documents, including bureaucratic reports, memoranda, technical studies, and plans.⁹⁸ Some of the texts we examine, such as the forty-seven-volume *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, are relatively well known among scholars of US political and military history. Most, however, are obscure documents—in some cases, recently declassified—that were intended for narrow audiences of officials, experts, and, in some cases, policymakers. They are significant for us not because they were necessarily influential. Rather, they provide us with insight into the formation of a schema or diagram of emergency government, through which a particular range of situations was constituted as a problem that called out for certain kinds of analysis and remedial intervention. In working with these primary documents, we have examined first, the *styles of reasoning* through which specific domains of expert practice are defined; second, the *knowledge infrastructures* that make it possible to constitute targets of governmental intervention; and third, *sites of technical practice*, in which experts and officials confront and formulate solutions to immediate practical problems.

In describing the emergence of novel styles of reasoning, we do not mean to suggest that a domain of practice that had previously been irrational became more rational.⁹⁹ Nor do we mean to treat the history of expert thought as the progression of ever-more accurate approximations of an objective reality. Rather, our goal is to examine the conceptual and pragmatic structure of particular forms of knowledge, and the coming-into-being of things—such as “vital systems” or “national resources”—that, as Ian Hacking puts it, “do not exist in any recognizable form” until they have become objects of expert analysis.¹⁰⁰ More concretely, an analysis of styles of reasoning focuses on experts and officials whose authority is grounded in technical knowledge and formalized (and often, but not always, quantified) demonstration.¹⁰¹ Although this approach shares something with traditional intellectual

(continued...)

INDEX

- active defense measures, 193, 244, 251, 374n39, 389n87. *See also* passive defense measures
- Acts of God* (Steinberg), 5
- acts of god, policy and, 344n45
- Adams, Thomas, 45
- Adams, V. L., 396n104
- ad hoc disaster response, 16, 281, 344n45
- adjustment. *See* governmental adjustment
- administrative devices, xii, xvii, 16–25, 33, 334; climate change response and, 340; constitutional democracy and emergency powers and, 17–25, 32; elements of, 23–24; ICAF and, 2; norms established, 6–7, 85–87, 123, 356n11; WWII mobilization planning and, 98–99. *See also* executive authority; facility ratings; Office for Emergency Management (OEM); Progressive reformers; reorganization authority; resource management, material flows analysis
- administrative machinery. *See* administrative devices
- administrative readiness, 24–25; test exercises, 222–223, 225, 237, 241, 267, 379n128, 382n180. *See also* test exercises
- administrative readiness, ODM and, 23, 244, 256–268, 303, 321, 364n207; defined, 24–25, 385n33; emergency action documents and, 286; emergency action steps project, 263–265, 267, 386nn53–54, 387nn55, 57; essential wartime functions analysis, 261–263, 267; executive authority issues, 257–261, 268–275; NPA study and, 275, 389n91; Operation Alert exercises and, 265; Paul and, 271, 278, 279, 285, 384n30, 389n91; wartime agencies, creation and functions, 257–263. *See also* Operation Alert exercise (1955); preparedness
- administrative state, term, 344n53
- AEC. *See* Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
- aerial bombardment. *See* target selection
- Agamben, Giorgio, 27
- aiming point analysis, 371n135; by AEC, 206; analog methods, 142, 163–166, 169, 170–171; computerized methods, 142, 178; by EOU, 75, 79; in industrial planning, 205; in local planning, 170–171, 184; NSRB on, 184, 205, 206, 221, 222, 235–236, 379n124. *See also* damage assessment; target selection
- Air Annex to the Victory program, 71
- Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), system vulnerability analysis at, 192; instruction and lectures, 14, 39, 41, 61, 63–70; target selection and, 74, 80, 140–141, 160, 353n95, 367n49. *See also* system vulnerability analysis; target selection
- air force, establishment of US, 63, 68–71, 79–80, 82, 367n56
- Air Force Interindustry Research Program, 175–176, 255–256, 291, 307–309; *Bomb Damage Problem*, 176–181, 342n16. *See also* Project on the Scientific Computation of Optimum Programs (Project SCOOP)
- Air Force Management Analysis Directorate, 371n144
- Air Force mobilization specialists, 173–174
- air intelligence, 35, 41, 61, 177–179, 221, 307, 325–326; under Army's intelligence service, 69, 70; event modeling and, 177–178; Hughes, 70–71, 74–75, 79; New Deal economists in, 15, 60, 71–79; Salant, 60, 75–76, 354n142, 358n66; SVB, 154–159, 166, 325, 367nn55, 56; USSBS on importance of updating, 82, 154; USSBS post-war analysis and, 80–81, 82; vulnerability specialists in, 142, 180, 186. *See also* Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), system vulnerability analysis at; area analysis; Coker, Joseph; Enemy Objectives Unit

- air intelligence (*continued*)
(EOU); industrial analysis; Joint Target Group (JTG); Strategic Vulnerability Branch (SVB, Army Air Corps); target selection
- Air Intelligence Directorate (US Air Force), 157, 163, 325
- airplanes: industrial production issues, 64, 103, 105, 113, 116, 173–174; invention of, 39–40; as weapons, 62–63, 143, 353n91
- “Airplanes in National Defense” (Mitchell), 62
- airpower strategists, 166–168, 192, 374n37;
area analysis by, 142, 160, 162, 163, 369n84;
Douhet, 40, 140, 141, 353n91; enemy industrial production and, 152–159; Fairchild, 14, 65–68, 79, 80, 353n106; George, Harold (Hal), 61, 70; Hansell, 63–64, 67–70, 79, 160, 353n119, 367n49, 368n80; Hughes, 70–71, 74–75, 79; LeMay, 79, 160, 196; Mitchell, Billy, 40, 62–63, 70, 140, 141, 143; precision bombing, 80, 140–141; Sherman, 39–41, 62, 64, 77; system vulnerability analysis by, 15, 142. *See also* Lowe, James T.; target selection
- air targeting. *See* target selection
- Air Warfare* (Sherman), 39–41
- Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1), 68–71
- alert planning (NSRB), 237–239, 241, 382n180.
See also Operation Alert exercise (1955); test exercises
- Allied Combined Bomber Offensive, 79
- all-outers (mobilization planners), 101–103, 106–111, 112
- aluminum industry, 103, 105, 116, 121, 152
- American Construction Council, 350n51
- American Economic Review*, 399
- amortization. *See* rapid amortization; taxation
- Anderson, Frederick L., 79
- Anshen, Melvin, 84, 105, 116, 122, 135, 384n21, 389n91
- anticipatory knowledge, 20, 24–25, 29, 391n120;
climate change, xix, 333, 337–340, 364n8;
flexibility in, 85; mobilization planning, 102–103, 106–107, 135; pandemic response, 335–337, 398nn14–16. *See also* administrative readiness; casualty assessments; damage assessment; expertise; knowledge infrastructure; models and simulations; nuclear preparedness; postattack industrial rehabilitation; preparedness; resource management; science of flows; target selection; test exercises
- Archambault, Raoul, Jr., 280–281, 282, 391n120
- area analysis, 140–141, 159–173; blast damage, 142, 159, 160–161, 163, 164–165; in civil defense planning, 168–173; industrial analysis linked with, 142, 159, 161, 369n84, 380n150; in JTG, 160–161, 369nn84, 85; maps in, 159–160, 161–162, 163–166; in SVB, 157, 166–168. *See also* air intelligence; damage assessment; dispersal; target selection
- Army: intelligence service, 69, 70; resistance to air force creation, 63, 69. *See also* military; Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG)
- Army Corps of Engineers, 67; Manhattan Project control by, 369n90, 376n66
- Army-Navy Munitions Board, 103, 111, 121, 359n83, 362n177
- Arnold, Henry “Hap,” 69–70, 124, 160, 367n57, 368n81
- atomic attack. *See* nuclear preparedness
- Atomic Bomb, The* (Atomic Scientists of Chicago), 196
- “Atomic Bomb Explosions—Effects on an American City” (Lapp), 182–184
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 163, 206–207; creation of, 369n90, 376n66; *Effects of Atomic Weapons*, 379n124; postattack functions of, 236; on radiation effects, 298, 301. *See also* nonmilitary defense; nuclear preparedness
- Atomic Scientists of Chicago, 374nn35–40; *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 182, 195–196, 197, 211, 226–227
- atomic weapons. *See* nuclear weapons
- attack simulations: enemy attack patterns, 201, 312–313; feasibility testing and, 201, 205, 315; mobilization plan testing, 180–181; by National Damage Assessment Center, 309, 311–314, 331; by ODM, 180, 394n54; one-shot, 312–313; randomness in, 178; resource management and, 294, 311–316, 322; by SRI, 394n54; war games, 15, 179, 255, 265–266, 267, 277, 379n128. *See also* computer simulation; damage assessment; models and simulations
- Attorney General, 272–273
- Augur, Tracy, 207, 381n159
- Austria, 91
- avian flu, xiv
- AWPD-1 (Air War Plans Division-1), 68–71
- balance of power, 24
- balance sheet planning, 99, 108; budgetary shortfalls, 109–111; civilian

- mobilization planning and, 114, 115, 217, 219, 221–222, 379n126; computerization of, 326–329; damage assessments in, 179, 243, 307; decentralized authority over, 131; feasibility testing in, 114, 115, 116, 128; military-industrial production and, 108–114, 187, 221, 321; by NSRB, 127, 128, 134, 217; by OCDM, 321, 322; ongoing influence of, 115, 116, 123, 134, 187, 250, 337; in pandemic response, 337; supply-requirements balance sheet, 322–328, 397n138; for survival and recovery, 180, 294, 301, 304, 306–307, 321–328, 397n138. *See also* feasibility testing; Production Requirements Plan (PRP); resource management
- Baldwin, Hanson, 187, 375n50
- Ball, George, 80–81
- Barnett, Harold, 75
- Baruch, Bernard, 225
- basic human needs, 5
- Bassie, V. Lewis, 60, 352n81
- BDSA (Business and Defense Services Administration), 263, 310, 322–325, 386n51
- Beck, Ulrich, 9, 26–27, 340, 346n78; *Risk Society*, 341n2, 346n81, 347n87
- Bedsheet report (MPAC), 254–255, 384n25
- Beers, Barnett W., 279, 281–282, 373n28
- Beers, Barnett W., OPMG report, 193–194, 271, 374n30, 391n125
- Berlin Blockade, 207
- Biddle, Eric, 379n128
- Biden, Joseph, xviii
- Binger, Walter, 378n109
- biopolitics: biopolitical government, regularization and, 350n50; biopolitical modernity, 11, 13–14, 331, 332, 335; biopolitical security, 5, 13; Foucault on, 10–11, 331; reflexive, 8, 10–16, 41–42, 335. *See also* health system; manpower, as resource category; population security; population survival; vital systems security
- Blaisdell, Thomas, 112
- blast damage. *See* damage assessment
- blockade tactics, 13, 40, 143
- Blue Book (NSRB), 184–185, 225–227, 295, 373n24, 379n136
- blueprint planning, 25, 129, 287. *See also* mobilization planning
- Board of Economic Warfare, 59
- bomb damage. *See* damage assessment
- Bomb Damage Problem, The* (Interindustry Research Program), 176–181, 342n16, 371nn135, 136, 384n27
- Bombing Encyclopedia of the World, 156–159, 368n70
- bomb targets. *See* target selection
- Borden, William, 372n14
- bottlenecks, transportation, 46, 66, 100, 199, 202
- bottlenecks and shortages: balance sheet planning to avoid, 128; BDSA assessment, 323; dispersal to avoid, 212; industrial vulnerability and, 103, 113, 146–147, 212, 230, 366n29; during Korean War, 131, 201, 236; of manpower, 291, 315; in pandemic response, xvii–xviii, 335–336; of survival resources, 317–318; target selection and, 62, 66, 76, 82, 100; during WWI, 20, 43, 67, 349nn13, 18, 353n107; during WWII, 100, 104–105, 106, 113, 114, 146–147, 201, 366n26. *See also* industrial vulnerability assessment; resource management
- bridges, 64, 151, 319
- Brigante, John E., 104, 109, 110, 111, 114, 360n98
- Brinkley, David, 133, 349n33, 356n18, 358n56
- Britain: American military products purchased by, 104, 359n86; British military, 62, 74, 79; information exchange between US and, 108; resource management and, 108–109, 110; war games in, 379n128
- British Emergency Powers Act (1920), 20
- British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 74–75
- British Supply Council, 104, 108
- Brodie, Bernard, 372n14, 374n45, 375n51
- Brookings Institution, 125
- Brownell, Herbert, 272
- Brownlow, Louis, 88, 93–94
- budget issues: airpower advocacy and, 174, 370n114; balance sheet planning and, 109–111; defense spending, Korean War, 130; fallout shelters, 317; New Deal planning and, 133; procurement and, 102, 103–104, 174; stockpiling programs, 103, 297, 299, 304, 319, 325, 330, 359n84, 396n115; systems analysis approach to budgeting, 362n157, 366n41
- Bull, Harold, 204, 252
- Bull Board report (on civil defense), 204, 217–218, 252–253, 375nn60, 61, 383n12
- Bull Committee (on continental defense), 252–253, 266, 383n12
- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 182, 195–196, 197, 211, 226–227. *See also* Atomic Scientists of Chicago
- Buna-S (synthetic rubber), 148
- Bureau of Municipal Research, 88

420 INDEX

- Bureau of Public Roads, 52
Bureau of Statistics, 101
Bureau of the Budget, 95–96, 175
Bureau of the Census, 263
Business and Defense Services Administration (BDSA), 263, 310, 322–325, 386n51, 397n131
business cycles, 50–52, 350n44
- calculative rationality, 26
Calhoun, Craig, 25
California wildfires, 333
capitalism, 209–210, 213, 347n90
Capital Parks Commission, 349n32
capital theory, 77
Capitol, US, 206. *See also* Washington, DC
Carbon Democracy (Mitchell), 351n64
Carter, Jimmy, 9
Carter administration, 333
Castle Bravo H-Bomb test (1954), 298, 393n20
casualty assessments: *Bomb Damage Problem* on, 179–180; casualty maps, 173, 221–222; by Continental Defense Planning Group, 274; Covid-19 deaths, 337; medical stockpiling resource evaluation based on, 297, 330; by NDAC, 291–293, 326; nuclear weapons’ increasing power, 300; in Operation Alert, 276, 298–299; in Plan D-Minus, 287–288; in supply-requirement analysis, 318, 324–325. *See also* damage assessment; health resources; population survival
catastrophe modeling. *See* attack simulations; computer simulation; models and simulation; test exercises; vulnerability assessment, models and simulations for
catastrophism rhetoric, 340
CDUA (Civil Defense Urban Analysis), 168–173, 221
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8
Central Statistical Board, 56, 59
Central Task Force (NSRB), 239–242, 381n175, 382nn178, 180, 183
certificates of necessity, 209–210
chain of command, 234, 251, 269–275; Attorney General on legal issues, 272–273. *See also* responsibility and authority issues
Charles, Daniel, 369n87
Chazeau, Melvin de, 120
checklists, 129, 257, 263; emergency action steps project and, 264, 386n54; in Plan D-Minus, 288; for test exercises, 266
chemical industry, 318
Chicago, Illinois, 42–44; civilian mobilization planning in, 223–224, 235–236; postattack industrial rehabilitation and, 235–236; power utilities in, 152
Chicago Plan Commission and Chicago Plan (1909), 42–44, 45
Churchill, Winston, 110
cities. *See* regional planning; urban vulnerability assessment
City X (civil defense study), 182–184
Civil Defense Act (1950). *See* Federal Civil Defense Act (1950)
Civil Defense National Survival. *See* Holifield Committee (House Subcommittee on Government Operations)
civil defense planning, xiv–xv, xvii, 33–34, 341n6. *See also* nonmilitary defense
Civil Defense Urban Analysis (CDUA), 168–173, 221
Civil Defense Vulnerability Manual, 168, 369n101
civil engineers, 42–44, 45. *See also* regional planning; urbanization
civilian authority, military governance techniques used in, 184–185. *See also* military-civilian authority issues
Civilian Mobilization Office (NSRB), 219–220, 225, 237, 379n128; Health Resources Division, 220–221, 379n122
civilian mobilization planning, NSRB’s role in, 217–229, 363nn183, 185; aiming point analysis and, 221, 379n124; Blue Book and, 184–185, 225–227, 295, 373n24, 379n136; calls for action; impatience with planning, 225, 379nn134, 136; Central Task Force and, 239–242, 381n175, 382nn178–180; civilian protection and relief, 188, 208, 217–219, 225; emergency resource management conceptualization, 219–224; federal-state relations, 208, 217–218, 219–220, 221–227, 379n136; health resources evaluation, 220–221, 294–295, 392n6; local planning guidance, 220–224; ODM merger ensures continuation, 249; PAIR and, 228–229; political challenges, 224–227, 379n136; resilience and, 380n153; Special Security Programs Office, 227, 228, 382n183, 383n13; test exercises for governmental readiness, 222–223, 225, 379n128; Truman administration direction, 168, 219, 225, 243, 244, 364n207, 379n134. *See also* National Security Resources Board (NSRB); non-military defense, NSRB’s role in; postattack industrial rehabilitation

- Civilian Production Administration, 110
civilian protection and relief, 188, 208, 217–219, 225, 304, 316. *See also* population survival; postattack survival requirements
civilians, effects on. *See* casualty assessments; damage assessment; health system; population survival; postattack survival requirements; radioactive fallout
civil liberties, 29–30
Clark, John Maurice, 50, 52–53, 56, 58, 350n58, 380n150
classical sovereignty, threats to, 10–11
Clifford, Clark, 123
climate change, xix, 333, 337–340, 364n8
climate emergency, 339, 340
Climate Mobilization (advocacy group), 339–340
CMP (Controlled Materials Plan), 111–112, 121–123, 124–125, 132
coal, 43, 100. *See also* oil and fuel systems; power and electricity systems
Coale, Ansley, 199–203, 375nn50, 51, 397n141
Coker, Joseph: on area bombing, 162–163; on attack simulations, 312, 313; career trajectory, 325–326; Horton and, 307, 325–326, 331; Kahn and, 396n108; on ODM’s computerized damage assessment work, 307, 308, 326; on power systems, 355n147; on radioactive fallout, 395n92; on target selection, 72, 154, 158, 354n123. *See also* economics of target selection; National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC, later National Resource Evaluation Center)
Cold War: administrative readiness during, 24; civil defense planning during, xiv–xv, xvii, 33–34, 34In6; Gaither Committee and, 316, 319; preparedness and, 185–186. *See also* civilian mobilization planning, NSRB’s role in; nuclear preparedness; Soviet Union
Collett, Merrill J., 254, 257, 269–270, 271, 278, 281
Commerce Department. *See* Department of Commerce
commissarial dictatorship, 21–22. *See also* Schmitt, Carl
Committee on Administrative Management (1936–1937), 23–24, 93–97, 344n55, 357n47, 358n52
Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board, 376n66
Committee on Control of Flow of Materials, 120–123
Committee on Interindustry Economics, 175
Committee on Social Trends, 90, 356n25
commodity flows, 56
communication systems, 12–13, 149, 207, 232, 286, 288. *See also* vital systems security
communism, NSC 68 study on, 130
community support. *See* essential services
computers (human “computers” in data handling), 118–119
computer simulation, 7, 173–181; balance sheet planning, 326–329; event modeling, 177–178, 292; feasibility testing and, 173–175; Gaither Committee and, 317; NDAC models, 312–314, 324, 326–328; Project SCOOP, development of, 173–175, 369n112, 370nn113–114; resource management and, 176, 250, 292, 294; UNIVAC and, 175, 177, 263, 308, 394n54; vulnerability assessment development, 15, 25, 142–143, 173, 180–181, 369n112, 370nn113–114. *See also* damage assessment, computerization of; models and simulations
Conference on Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation (NSRB), 235–237, 381nn158–160
Congress, 24; defense spending, appropriations for, 105, 106, 109–110, 130, 174, 370n114; delegatory statutes and, 357n32; dispersal debates, 209–210, 214, 238; emergency powers for, 282–283; executive authority and, 91–93, 96–97, 99, 103–104, 123, 133, 251, 357nn32, 47; Holifield Committee, 209–210, 280, 282–283, 299–300, 317, 320, 396n105; Kefauver Subcommittee, 280; National Security Act debates, 127, 128; New Deal planning and, 48–49, 85, 87, 102, 104, 133–135; NRPB and, 133–134; NSRB and, 16, 127, 128, 135, 208, 209, 225–226, 238, 363n183; Operation Alert hearings, 278, 281–282, 390n107; Rains amendment to DPA, 210, 211, 212; Reorganization Act legislation, 97, 358n56; stockpiling programs, appropriations for, 103, 297–300, 324
Connery, Robert Howe, 93, 125
conservative criticism: of executive authority, 9, 87, 92, 93; of national security state, 130, 134–135; of Roosevelt-era changes to reorganization authority, 96, 99–100, 123, 135, 357n35, 358n60; of welfare state, 133, 134
conservative libertarian economics, 380n153

422 INDEX

- constitutional democracy, emergency powers and, 8, 17–29, 32–33, 83, 85–87, 334; Attorney General on legal questions of resource coordination, 272–273; Beck on, 26–27, 340; climate change and, 340; garrison state critiques, 130, 131, 187, 208; Karl on, 358n51; martial law declaration, 251, 276, 282–283; Merriam and Progressive reformers on, 89–91; OEM and, 85; Plan D-Minus and, 287; Rossiter on, 17, 19, 22, 340, 345n67; Schmitt on, 20–22, 345nn63, 64, 67, 358n60; scholarship on, 20–22, 26–28. *See also* dictatorship; executive authority; reorganization authority
- Constitutional Dictatorship* (Rossiter), 17, 21, 22, 86, 346n71, 357nn32, 35, 359n68
- construction industry, 51, 52
- continental defense, 244, 251–253
- Continental Defense Planning Group, 274
- continuity of government. *See* government continuity
- controlled materials allocation plans, 115–123, 126, 199, 236; CMP, 111–112, 121–122, 124–125, 132; PRP, 116–120, 122, 360n89, 361nn140, 145, 150, 362n156; vertical control of plan, 120–123, 310; WPB data collection for, 113, 116–120. *See also* Production Requirements Plan (PRP); resource management
- Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), 111–112, 121–122, 124–125, 132, 362n157
- Cooper, Christopher, 343n28
- copper industry, 103, 121
- Cornell, Douglas B., 280
- Council of Economic Advisers, 175
- Covid-19 pandemic, xvii–xviii, 333, 335–337, 398nn14–16
- critical infrastructure, xi, 13, 14, 240, 336; protection of, xiii, xviii, 4, 334, 337, 343n30. *See also* essential services
- critical target areas, 215, 230, 296–298, 301, 392n12. *See also* dispersal; target selection
- Critique of Security* (Neocleous), 27–28
- Cuff, Robert, 111–112, 128, 130, 135
- Curley, Tyler, 356n10
- Currie, Lauchlin, 56–57, 60, 75, 352nn72, 73, 80
- cushion, 76–77, 80, 82–83, 155, 157–158, 192, 199. *See also* depth; resilience; substitution
- Cutler, Robert, 262, 396n104
- damage assessment: analog methods, 142, 159–163, 165–166, 169, 170–173; balance sheet planning and, 179, 243, 307; *Bomb Damage Problem* report on, 178–180, 181, 371nn135, 136, 384n27; catastrophe modeling evolved from, 334; City X speculations, 182–184; economics of target selection and, 74, 76–77, 80–81, 142; EOU, 74–75, 76, 354n140; expertise in, 163, 165, 180; Gaither Committee and, 316, 317–319; influence on survival requirements planning, 306, 315–319, 324; by JTG, 153, 160; maps in, 165, 171–173, 306; MPAC and, 385n33, 394n51; NSRB and, 188, 205–207, 209, 221, 222–223, 241, 243, 382n178; Plan D-Minus on, 288–289; postattack analysis, 141, 164, 205; radioactive fallout, 301–302, 312–315, 395nn78–79; resource management and, 291–293; speed of, 305; urban analysis, 140, 169–173, 369n91; of US attacks in Japan, 82, 160–161, 163, 164, 205; UTM system, 177, 371n127. *See also* casualty assessments; dispersal; feasibility testing; fire damage assessment; models and simulations; National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC, later National Resource Evaluation Center); Project on the Scientific Computation of Optimum Programs (Project SCOOP); radioactive fallout; target selection
- damage assessment, computerization of, 142, 173–175, 178–180, 306–314, 371nn127, 135; FCDA and, 308, 394n54, 396n109; Gaither Committee and, 319; Horton and, 291–293, 301, 306, 307–309, 331; industrial vulnerability and, 173, 176–177, 292, 310; NDAC models, 312, 314, 324, 326–328; ODM and, 34, 180, 255–256, 306–309, 394n54; Operation Alert use of, 315–316; survival requirements and, 306–307, 317–318, 324; UNIVAC and, 263, 308, 394n55. *See also* computer simulation; National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC, later National Resource Evaluation Center); Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM); Project on the Scientific Computation of Optimum Programs (Project SCOOP)
- damage assessment, industrial vulnerability, 142, 154, 201, 306–307; BDSA's vertical analysis of, 323; computerization of, 173, 176–177, 292, 310; facility owners' analysis of, 205–206; facility ratings, 146–147; interdependencies, 157–158; SRI report, 229–230, 234, 236; vertical analysis, 310–311. *See also* industrial dispersal;

- industrial production; industrial vulnerability assessment; vulnerability assessment
- damage assessment specialists, 308, 311, 317.
See also Horton, H. Burke
- Dantzig, George, 174, 370n113
- data collection and analysis. *See* knowledge infrastructure
- Dauber, Michele Landis, 16
- DeCoursey, Elbert, 291
- Defense against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians* (OPMG report), 193–194, 217, 373n24
- defense expenditures. *See* military spending
- Defense Mobilization Orders (DMO), 260–261, 264, 385n39
- Defense Production Act (DPA, 1950), xviii, 130–132, 210, 286–287, 336, 389n86
- Defense Production Administration, 132, 235
- Delano, Frederic, 43, 45, 47, 90, 349nn8, 32
- delegatory statutes, 23–24, 133, 268, 346n71; chain of command coordination issues and, 272; in Congress, 357n32; executive authority, 357nn32, 37; in Korean War mobilization planning, 131–132; in New Deal planning, 92, 357nn35, 37; by NSRB, 238; in nuclear preparedness, 238, 243; in ODM’s administrative readiness plans, 260–261, 269, 303, 321, 364n207; in WWII mobilization planning, 98–99, 103, 106, 123, 269. *See also* administrative device; executive authority; reorganization authority
- Dembitz, Lewis, 199
- demobilization, of wartime agencies and offices, 86, 87, 123, 248, 251; OPMG studies, 189–193, 203–204, 377n96
- democracy. *See* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and
- Department of Agriculture: inventorying by, 324; Plan D-Minus on, 288–289; rationing, 270, 289; wartime operations of, 258, 260, 265, 270, 288–289. *See also* food supply
- Department of Civil Defense, legislation proposing, 396n105
- Department of Commerce, 56, 265, 351n71; BDSA and, 263, 310, 322–325, 397n131; Bombing Encyclopedia data and, 156; Facilities Protection Board, 214, 377n98; IEB, 214, 215, 310, 377n98–99; Industrial Economics Division, 100; industrial vulnerability assessment, 156, 177; on Operation Alert (1957), 322
- Department of Defense, 241, 363n180, 367n56; damage assessment work by, 308; wartime operations of, 258, 284–285, 288
- Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 263, 324
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS), xii–xiv, 4, 333, 336
- Department of State, military and foreign relations oversight by, 258
- Department of the Interior, 288, 324
- depth, 76–77, 80, 82–83, 155, 157–158, 199.
See also cushion; resilience; substitution
- despotism, 345n63
- Detroit, Michigan, 152
- Dickinson, Edward T.: emergency action steps project and, 386n54; on Korean War mobilization, 132, 208, 364n207; PAIR leadership by, 235, 239, 241; on WPB, 112
- Dickinson, Matthew J., 93, 357n35, 358n56
- dictatorship, 92–93, 345n63; defined, 21–22; martial law and, 280; reorganization controversy, 87, 92, 97–98, 340, 357n33, 358n56. *See also* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and; executive authority; reorganization authority; Schmitt, Carl
- Dictatorship* (Schmitt), 20–22, 345nn63, 64, 391n120
- Diner, Stephen, 356n15
- Directorate of Intelligence, 368n70
- Directorate of Management Analysis, 368n70
- Disaster Experts, The* (Knowles), 5
- disasters. *See* natural disasters
- dispersal, 184–188, 190–191, 194–216; Bull report on, 252; Coale on, 199–203, 375nn50, 51; critical target areas, 215, 230, 296–298, 301, 392n12; “dispersal areas,” 213, 216, 376n81; economic incentives, 195, 199, 202, 207, 209, 213, 376n74; expertise, 194–203; federal government, 188, 202–203, 204, 205–207, 237–238, 247, 377n83; location decisions, 202, 213, 216, 376n81; NSRB on, 127, 184–185, 188, 189, 204, 209, 211–212, 375n63; as policy, 213–216, 378n105; political challenges and criticism, 200, 209–213, 214, 238, 247; radioactive fallout and, 301; resource evaluation and, 192, 195, 198, 214, 378n102; satellite settlements, 185, 197, 207; selective dispersal, 195–198, 200, 206, 208–215, 227, 376n81; SSRC Committee and, 197–199, 199–203; total dispersal, 195–197; Truman

- dispersal (*continued*)
administration and, 210, 212–213, 215, 237–238; urban, 184–185, 186, 195, 196, 200, 374n34. *See also* government dispersal; industrial dispersal; nonmilitary defense; passive defense measures
- distributed preparedness, xiv, xvi, 23, 24, 32, 239–242, 362n160; climate change and, 338; Emergency Action Task Force and, 284; martial law and, 251; nonmilitary defense and, 218, 378n107; NSRB and, 131, 188, 225, 241; ODM influence on, 34, 260–262, 264, 304; OEP functions, 333; pandemic response and, xviii; reorganization authority and, 97; Truman administration and, 131
- distribution of supplies. *See* resource management; stockpiling programs, essential supplies
- D'Olier, Frank, 80
- domestic preparedness, 3, 32, 34, 35, 168, 271
- Donovan, William J., 72
- Dorwart, Jeffrey M., 125
- Douhet, Giulio, 40, 140, 141, 353n91
- DPA (Defense Production Act, 1950), xviii, 130–132, 210, 286–287, 336, 389n86
- Dunaway, Edward, 174, 370n113
- Duncan, Joseph, 54–56
- DUSTY (NDAC computer modeling routine), 312
- Eberharter, Herman P., 210
- Eberstadt, Ferdinand, 121, 124–125, 362nn177, 179
- Eberstadt report, 124–127, 128
- Eccles, Mariner, 352n72
- economics of resource management. *See* balance sheet planning; resource management; science of flows
- economics of target selection, 2, 15, 72–80, 232, 325, 344n40, 355n145, 397n141; damage assessment in, 74, 76–77, 80–81, 142; “economics of target selection,” term use, 354n123; EOU and, 74–75, 76, 77, 80, 354n142–143; expertise in, 72, 80, 141–142; influence on domestic vulnerability assessment, 198; system vulnerability analysis in, 61. *See also* target selection economy, national. *See* national economy; New Deal Economics
- economy of force, 40, 64
- Eden, Lynn, 165–166, 367n56, 368n58
- Edwards, Paul, 31, 364n8. *See also* knowledge infrastructure
- Effects of Atomic Weapons* (AEC), 379n124
- Eggan, Fred, 374n35
- Eighth Air Force (London), 74, 79
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.: declares martial law during Operation Alert, 276, 277–283, 340, 390nn102, 111; on test exercises, 266
- Eisenhower administration, 227; chain of command coordination issues and, 271–272; continental defense measures instituted, 244, 251–252; mobilization planning during, 180; NSRB-ODM merger during, 249, 383n5; response to Gaither report, 320
- electricity. *See* power and electricity systems
- Elliott, William Y., 252, 383n9
- emergency action steps project (ODM), 263–265, 267, 386nn53–54, 387nn55, 57
- Emergency Action Task Force (1955), 391nn125, 132; creation of, 271; emergency action documents, 284–287, 288, 391n134; martial law planning and, 278–279, 283; responsibilities of, 271, 283, 285–286, 390n111
- emergency declarations, 19–20, 25–28, 29, 131, 357n36, 359n68; climate emergencies, 339; labor unrest and, 20, 345n58. *See also* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and
- emergency government, 1–8, 20–25, 28–30, 333; climate change and, 338–339; diagram of, 242–244, 330–331, 332, 337; ICAF volumes on, 1–3; political technology of, 8, 18, 21–24, 86–87, 99; Schmitt on, 20–22. *See also* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and; New Deal Planning; preparedness
- emergency government, elements of, xix, xvi, 2, 5–6, 18–25, 87, 88–91, 123, 125, 356n15. *See also* administrative devices; executive authority; expertise; knowledge infrastructure; planning procedures, mobilization and preparedness; regulatory devices
- emergency government, genealogy of, 5–8, 28–29, 332, 334; climate change and, 339; damage assessment, 180; genealogy of resilience, 343n28, 380n153; NSRB and, 185. *See also* genealogical method
- emergency government organization, xv–xvi, 127, 129, 258, 294; OEM as model for, 84–87. *See also* nonmilitary defense; Progressive reformers; reorganization authority; resource management; responsibility and authority issues

- emergency management, xiv–xvi, 2–5, 29, 33–35, 287, 333–334. *See also* Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); National Security Resources Board (NSRB); Office for Emergency Management (OEM); Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM); vital systems security
- Emergency Management of the National Economy* (ICAF), 1–3, 341n1, 342n3
- emergency powers, use of. *See* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and; executive authority
- emergency preparedness, 2, 4–5, 8, 228–229, 249–250, 256; emergency government redefined as, 124, 294; as NSRB statutory mandate, 238–239, 243; organizational shifts and failures, 16, 32–33, 333–334. *See also* Mobilization Plan D-Minus; mobilization planning; nuclear preparedness; Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM); Office of Emergency Planning (later Office of Emergency Preparedness); passive defense measures; vital systems security
- emergency relief planning, 16; FCDA and, 261, 273–274, 284–285, 299–300, 308; local organizing, 193, 217, 221, 226–227, 270–271, 274, 300, 333, 388n77; manpower as resource, 302–303; military-civilian authority issues, 270, 273–275, 393n19. *See also* administrative readiness; emergency resource management; essential services; federal-state relations, emergency relief planning; Mobilization Plan D-Minus; mobilization planning; nonmilitary defense; nuclear preparedness; responsibility and authority issues; stockpiling programs, essential supplies; vulnerability assessment
- emergency resource management, 7, 243, 249–250; attack simulations and, 294, 311–316, 322; Bedsheet report on, 254–255, 384n25; business cycle relationship, 50–51; computer simulation in, 176, 250, 292, 294; emergency action documents on, 284–287, 391n134; emergency relief, tension between, 334; federal-state relations in, 294, 295–296; FEMA and, 333; Interagency Committee on Essential Survival Items and, 305–306, 314, 394n44; martial law and, 277; military-civilian relations in, 277; MPAC and, 302–303; by NSRB/Office of National Mobilization, 257–258; nuclear preparedness and, 180–181, 188; OCDM employs national resource surveys, 322; ODM-FCDA merger, 294; OEP and, 332–333; in pandemic response, xviii–xix, 335–336, 398n16; Plan D-Minus and, 283–290; population security and, 331; priority ratings for industrial production, xviii, 104–105, 111, 116, 118, 131, 360n89; Project SCOOP and, 370n114; PRP influence, 116; rationing, 233, 270, 289; regional planning in system vulnerability analysis, 45; technical experts' authority in, 105–107; technology and, 8–9. *See also* balance sheet planning; bottlenecks and shortages; controlled materials allocation plans; feasibility testing; food supply; health resources; housing and shelter; inventory of resource data; National Security Resources Board (NSRB); nonmilitary defense; Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM); Office of War Resources (wartime name of ODM); oil and fuel systems; population survival; power and electricity systems; stockpiling; water systems
- emergency services, 221–222; *Bomb Damage Problem* on, 179–180; nonmilitary defense and, 170, 172–173. *See also* essential services
- Emmerich, Herbert, 88, 91, 93, 97, 125, 358n63; on OEM, 84, 359n69
- Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU), 74–82, 355nn149, 157; target selection and, 74–75, 76, 77, 80, 354nn140, 142–143. *See also* air intelligence
- energy. *See* power and electricity systems
- Energy Resources and the National Economy* (NRPB study), 54
- Engelhart, George, 144–149, 365n17, 366n26, 373n20
- England. *See* Britain
- EOU. *See* Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU)
- essential functions, of emergency agencies, 261–263, 267, 385n43, 386nn46, 49
- essential services, 238, 267, 334, 381n170, 385n43, 386nn46, 51; *Bomb Damage Problem* on, 177; dispersal and, 202–203, 205, 212; essential survival items, 293, 301–306, 319, 322–323, 335–336; facility ratings in, 149–152, 192; Gaither Committee on, 318–319; health services in civilian mobilization planning, 220–221; NSRB evaluation, 188, 385n43; Operation Alert

- essential services (*continued*)
and, 276–277; OPMG and, 190, 191–192;
in pandemic response, xviii, 336; SRI
report on postattack industrial rehabilita-
tion, 230–232, 233. *See also* critical infra-
structure; stockpiling programs, essential
supplies
- Europe and European Union (EU), 14, 108;
Allied Combined Bomber Offensive, 79;
government in, 27–28, 90. *See also* Brit-
ain; Germany
- European war summary (USSBS), 80–81
- evacuation plans, 172–173, 190, 297; *vs.* mass
shelter proposals, 316–317. *See also* dis-
persal; housing and shelter
- event modeling. *See* computer simulation;
models and simulations
- Ewald, François, 26–27
- exceptionalism, scholarly research on, 29
- executive authority, xvii, 20–21; congressional
debates, 91–93, 96–97, 99, 103–104, 123,
133, 251, 357nn32, 47; conservative criti-
cism, 9, 87, 92–93, 97; defensive agencies
creation and, 359n69; delegatory statute
for, 357nn32, 37; dictatorial power cri-
tiques, 87, 92–93, 97; DPA and, xviii, 130;
emergency action documents as standby
executive orders, 284–287; emergency
action steps project on, 264; executive
orders assigning emergency responsibili-
ties, 385n39; executive orders by Truman/
on alert planning, 238–239; executive
order to protect national defense materi-
als during WWII, 143–144; expansion
of, 133, 344n53; Hoover administration,
344n53; interagency committees for rec-
ommending actions of, 241; martial law
controversy, 276, 279–283, 391nn125, 127;
national survival obligations, 272–273, 281;
Nixon administration, 333; ODM creation
through, 131; ODM examination of prob-
lems of, 268–275; in pandemic response,
xviii; Progressive reformers on, 87, 91–98;
Rossiter on, 248, 251, 346n71, 357n32;
Schmitt on, 21; Truman administration,
123; War Powers Act, 23, 129, 130, 359n69;
WPB creation, 112; WWII mobilization
planning and, 98–111. *See also* adminis-
trative devices; administrative readiness; con-
stitutional democracy, emergency powers
and; reorganization authority; reorganiza-
tion authority, Roosevelt administration
- Executive Order 8428, 97, 98, 100, 103,
358nn59, 63, 359n68
- Executive Order 10421, 378n102
- expertise, 29, 31–32, 72; Committee on
Administrative Management on, 93,
95–96; controversy and, 32; damage
assessment specialists, 308, 311, 317;
Kaysen on, 141, 142; Merriam on, 89, 90,
93; Progressive reformers on, 87–89;
risk avoidance and, 26–27; vulnerability
expertise, 13–15, 34, 141–143, 342n16. *See
also* air intelligence; airpower strategists;
mobilization specialists; science of flows;
vulnerability expertise
- extinction events, 9
- Facilities Protection Board (Interagency
Committee on Internal Security), 214,
377n98
- facility ratings: Bull report on, 252; for dis-
persal analysis, 209, 213–215, 377n95; for
essential services, 149–152, 192; IEB critical
facilities list, 214, 215, 310, 377n98–99; for
military-industrial production, 144–149,
192, 373n20; priority ratings, xviii, 104–105,
111, 116, 118, 131, 360n89. *See also* priority
ratings for industrial production; resource
evaluation
- Fairchild, Muir, 14, 65–68, 79, 80, 353n106
- Fairman, Charles, 281–282, 391nn125, 127
- fallout. *See* radioactive fallout
- Farish, Matthew, 185
- feasibility testing: of Air Force mobilization
plans, 179, 180; attack simulations and, 201,
205, 315; by BDSA, 310; computerization
in, 173–176, 306; by OCDM, 322, 330;
ongoing influence of, 123, 322, 363n187;
stockpile programs and, 293–294, 315.
See also balance sheet planning; exper-
tise; knowledge infrastructure
- feasibility testing, WWII mobilization
planning, 99, 112–116, 123, 310, 321, 330,
363n187; balance sheets and, 114, 115, 116,
128; Committee on Feasibility (WPB),
112–115, 120; New Deal economists on,
60, 111, 115, 361n134; by NSRB, 128, 175;
OEM and, 112–115; in Project SCOOP,
175–176; Victory Program and, 110, 113.
See also mobilization planning, WWII
- Federal Civil Defense Act (1950), 130, 226,
227, 373n24, 379n136, 380n142, 391n134;
on coordination of emergency relief,
273–274; DPA, compared, 389n86
- Federal Civil Defense Administration
(FCDA), 33–34, 227, 235, 379n136,
380n142; damage assessment work by,

- 308, 394n54, 396n109; Defense Mobilization Order to, 260–261; emergency relief and, 241, 261, 273–274, 284–285, 299–300, 308; functions and authority of, 236, 241, 260, 263, 279, 283, 284–285, 382n180; on limited martial law, 390n100; local test exercises run by, 241, 382n180; mass shelter recommendations by, 317; merges with ODM, 294, 304, 320–321; on NSRB Central Task Force, 239; packaged disaster hospitals, funding for, 299; resource inventorying data, 311; stockpiling essential supplies and, 294, 296–301, 392n14. *See also* nonmilitary defense; Operation Alert exercise (1955); stockpiling programs, essential supplies
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), xiv, xviii, 4, 24, 130; creation of, 9, 333; regional subdivisions of, 388n77
- federalism. *See* federal-state relations
- Federal Power Commission, 67, 353n106
- Federal Reserve, 56–57, 60
- federal-state relations: civilian mobilization planning, 218–219, 219–220, 225–226, 379n136; nonmilitary defense responsibility, 217–218, 225, 273–275, 374n30, 379n136; nuclear preparedness and, 269, 295–296, 300; resource management and stockpiling, 294, 295–297, 388n77. *See also* governors; local government; responsibility and authority issues
- federal-state relations, emergency relief planning, 333–334; FCDA and, 241, 273–274, 300, 308, 382n180; FEMA and, 333, 388n77; NSRB and, 208, 217–218, 219–220, 221–227, 379n136; ODM and, 269–271, 273, 308; Office of Civilian Defense and, 193; Operation Alert and, 276–277; OPMG and, 193, 374n30; Plan D-Minus and, 283–284, 391n132. *See also* civilian mobilization planning, NSRB's role in; emergency relief planning; responsibility and authority issues
- Federal Works Agency, 207
- Fesler, James, 1–2, 19, 112, 124, 342n2; on Committee on Administrative Management, 93, 344n55
- Finan, William, 320
- fire damage assessment, 160, 164–165, 172, 178–179, 207, 368n81. *See also* damage assessment; radioactive fallout
- Flemming, Arthur, 249, 266, 301, 321, 382n183; on authority and coordination for emergency relief, 269, 271–272, 303; on balance sheet for survival, 301, 304; on damage assessment, 306–308, 310, 311; on emergency resource management, 258, 286, 303–304, 305, 306, 307–308, 310; forms Interagency Committee on Essential Survival Items, 305–306; on martial law and Operation Alert, 278, 280, 283, 390n107; on mobilization planning assumptions, 253–254, 257, 384n16, 385n31; MPAC and, 254, 256, 303, 307; on nuclear preparedness, 3, 269, 303–304; on ODM functions, 256, 258, 385n34; on organizations' essential functions, 260, 261, 386nn46, 49; on Plan D-Minus, 256, 257, 303; on stockpiling issues, 303–304, 305, 306. *See also* Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM)
- flow charts, 230
- flow of materials. *See* emergency resource management; resource management, material flows analysis; science of flows
- food supply, 288–289, 324, 331–332; coordination of emergency relief, 270, 274–275, 285; emergency action steps and, 265; stockpiling and, 305, 317; system vulnerability analysis and, 60, 66; War Food Administration, 258, 260, 270; WWI shortages, 20, 43. *See also* Department of Agriculture; emergency resource management; stockpiling programs, essential supplies; vital systems security
- Ford, Henry, 44
- foreign intelligence. *See* air intelligence
- forms of security, compared (table), 13
- Forrestal, James, 187–188, 218, 219, 377n96
- Foucault, Michel, 342n14, 347n98, 350n50; on biopolitics, 10–11, 331; on problematization, 348nn102, 107
- Fowler, John G., 158–159, 368n78
- Fox, Bertrand, 135, 384n21
- Frank, Adam, 337–338
- Friedrich, Carl, 125
- Full Employment Act (1945), 133
- Funigiello, Philip, 319
- Gaither, Rowan, 316
- Gaither Committee, 34, 316–320, 397n138; damage assessment and, 317–319; establishment of, 317; Gaither Report (1957), 306, 312, 319–320, 396n115, 396nn107–108
- Galbraith, John Kenneth, 57–59, 60, 80–81, 352n76
- Galison, Peter, 369n100
- Gallagher, Hubert, 271, 279

428 INDEX

- Garrison, Dee, 387n61
garrison state (Lasswell), 187
garrison state, critiques, 130, 131, 187, 208
gasoline production, 159
Gates, Bill, 337
genealogical method, 5–8, 28–29, 332,
343n34, 347n98; genealogy of resilience,
343n28; research methods, 30–35. *See*
also emergency government, genealogy of
Gentile, Gian, 368n80, 369n84
geographic information systems (GIS), 15,
34, 181
George, Edwin B., 25, 108, 110, 134–135,
360n101; on Gaither Committee, 317;
materials control program and, 120, 121;
on MPAC, 254–255; on Requirements
Committee, 117, 120; on vertical analy-
sis in vulnerability assessment, 310; on
WPB, 112, 117, 120
George, Harold (Hal), 61, 70
Germany, 22, 74, 89, 91, 345n67, 355n147;
air intelligence on, 58, 69, 70–71, 79,
353n119; resilience of industrial economy,
81–82, 163, 188–189
Gilman, Nils, 340
Global War Plan, 267
Gordon, Lincoln, 120, 135, 384n21
Gorrie, Jack, 235, 238, 263, 376n81
governmental adjustment, 19, 94, 132–133,
248, 358n51; Merriam on, 18, 21, 88–91,
125. *See also* reorganization authority,
Roosevelt administration
government continuity, 186, 200, 267, 375n51;
Bull report on, 252; climate change and,
338; delegation plans, 238; dispersal
and, 202–203; early NSRB reports on,
205–207; essential functions for, 261–262;
NSRB alert planning, 237–239; NSRB
PAIR program and, 237–239, 240, 243, 249,
254, 381nn165, 170; Rossiter on, 247–248;
state of preparedness and, 233–234. *See also*
emergency government
government dispersal, 188, 202–203, 204,
205–207, 247, 377n83; alert planning and
relocation, 237–238; relocation sites for
Washington operations, 237–238, 261,
267–268, 386n44. *See also* dispersal
governors, 202, 271–272, 284, 285, 336,
398n15; martial law and, 275, 279–280.
See also federal-state relations
Gray, Gordon, 321, 322, 332
Great Depression, 3, 5–6, 88, 91, 380n150.
See also under New Deal
Great Transformation, The (Polanyi), 351n64
Greenbaum, Edward S., 366n26
greenhouse gas reduction, 339
ground zeros, 140, 164, 170, 177–178, 292,
371n136, 373n28; in attack simulations,
312–313. *See also* damage assessment
Guglielmo, Mark, 355n145
Gulick, Luther, 17, 88, 93, 98, 112, 388n77
Gullion, Allen W., 144, 365n15
Hacking, Ian, 6, 11, 30, 331, 342n14
Haig, Robert Murray, 45, 46, 47
Hansell, Haywood, 63–64, 67–70, 79,
353n119, 367n49; precision bombing
campaign and, 160, 368n80
Harris, Innis, 257, 266, 322; on Operation
Alert, 276, 278, 304–305, 316
Hayes, George T., 229
health resources, 294–301, 303–306, 392n10,
393n19; BDSA and, 324–325; Gaither
Committee on, 317–318; in NSRB civilian
mobilization planning, 220–221, 294–296,
392n6; packaged disaster hospitals, 297,
299, 325, 330; in pandemic response,
xvii–xviii, 335–337, 398nn14–16. *See*
also casualty assessments; emergency
resource management; medical facilities;
population survival; stockpiling programs,
essential supplies; vital systems security
Health Services and Special Weapons Defense
(Health Resources Office manual), 221,
295–296, 392n12
health system, 4, 41, 233, 270, 291; in civilian
mobilization planning, 220–221; Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare,
263, 324. *See also* emergency resource
management; health resources; medical
facilities; population survival; stockpiling
programs, essential supplies
Henderson, Leon, 101, 106, 110, 123, 359nn70,
81; balance sheet planning and, 108; on
WPB, 112
Herring, E. Pendleton, 125
Hill, David L., 196–197, 374n38
Hillman, Sydney, 112
Hiroshima bombing, 79, 188; damage assess-
ment, 82, 163, 164, 205; health services
response breakdown following, 221
History of the Theory of Sovereignty since
Rousseau, The (Merriam), 21
Hitch, Charles, 120, 121, 362n157, 370n113
Hitchcock, Dal, 381n159
Hobbs, Edward Henry, 134
Hogan, Michael, 130, 134, 363n199
Holifield, Chester, 280

- Holifield Committee (House Subcommittee on Government Operations), 209–210, 280, 282–283, 299–300, 317, 320, 396n105
- Hoover, Herbert, 89, 344n53, 350n51, 360n101
- Hoover Commission, 297–298, 393n19
- Hopley, Russell, 218
- Hopley report, 218–220, 225, 226, 378n109
- horizontal vs. vertical systems of materials control, 120–123. *See also* vertical analysis
- Horton, H. Burke, 178, 256, 311–314, 370n122, 371n132; Coker and, 307, 325–326, 331; on computerized damage assessment, 291–293, 301, 306, 307–309, 331; feasibility testing and, 175; on Gaither Committee, 317, 396n108; Interindustry Research Program and, 175, 180, 308–309; on manpower resource and population survival, 292–293, 311, 314; on NDAC attack simulations, 312, 313, 314, 331; on NDAC resource inventory, 309, 311; on Project SCOOP, 175–176; on radioactive fallout effects, 301, 312, 313. *See also* National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC, later National Resource Evaluation Center)
- Hosken, William, 229
- hospitals. *See* medical facilities
- household supplies, 305
- House Subcommittee on Government Operations (Holifield Committee), 209–210, 280, 282–283, 317, 320, 396n105
- housing and shelter: evacuation plans, 12–13, 190, 297, 316–317; Gaither Committee on, 317, 318, 319, 320; legislators ignore proposals, 330; mass shelter proposals, 316–317, 319; as resource category, 288, 289, 305
- Hughes, Richard D., 70–71, 74–75, 79
- Huglin, Harold, 271, 279, 286, 307, 371n144, 396n108
- human resources. *See* manpower, as resource category; population survival
- Hurricane Betsy (1965), 333
- Hurricane Katrina (2005), xiv
- Hurricane Sandy (2012), 333
- hydration, feeding, and sheltering systems. *See* emergency resource management; food supply; housing and shelter; water systems
- IBM, 118, 154, 156
- ICAF (Industrial College of the Armed Forces), 1–3, 341n1
- Ickes, Harold, 47–48
- IEB (Industry Evaluation Board, Department of Commerce), 214, 215, 310, 377n98–99
- Impact of War, The: Our Democracy under Arms* (Herring), 125
- income, 56, 351n71
- industrial analysis, 364n3; target selection and, 40, 69, 140–141, 152–159, 166–168, 369n84; urban area analysis linked with, 142, 159, 161, 369n84, 380n150. *See also* air intelligence; vulnerability assessment
- Industrial Classification Code, 179
- Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), 1–3, 341n1
- industrial dispersal, 184–185, 187, 195–210, 363n182; Bull report on, 252; climate-risk relocation and, 339; economic incentives, 195, 202, 209, 376n74; facility ratings and, 209, 213–215, 377n95; NSRB on, 185, 204–210, 212–213, 227–229; political challenges and criticism, 23, 195, 209–213, 339; Project East River Review Committee on, 302; projected sites for new construction, 205–206, 213; radioactive fallout and, 301–302; USSBS on, 81, 190. *See also* damage assessment, industrial vulnerability; dispersal; industrial vulnerability assessment; nuclear preparedness; passive defense measures
- industrialization, xvii, 89–90. *See also* urbanization
- Industrial Mobilization Plan, 363n192
- industrial production: of airplanes, 64, 103, 105, 113, 116, 173–174; business cycle relationship, 50–51; of emergency essential supplies, 306, 322–323, 335–336; Gaither Committee on, 318; labor organizing, 343n36; pandemic response, xviii–xix; transportation systems' importance, 45–46, 61, 149, 150; WWI effects on, 20, 41, 43. *See also* facility ratings; military-industrial production; New Deal planning; Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation (PAIR); science of flows; target selection
- industrial vulnerability assessment, 41, 45, 61, 146–148; aiming point analysis, 205; blast damage assessment, 172, 229; bottlenecks and shortages and, 103, 113, 146–147, 212, 230, 366n29; Bull report on, 252–253; civilian mobilization planning and, 235–236; electricity and, 67–68; facility-level security measures and, 195, 214, 229, 377n96; inventory of resource data, 176–177, 191, 309–310; National Security Act on, 332. *See also* damage assessment, industrial vulnerability; industrial dispersal; target selection; vulnerability assessment

- Industry Evaluation Board (Department of Commerce, IEB), 214, 215, 310, 377nn98–99
infrastructure, 12–13. *See also* critical infrastructure; housing and shelter; power and electricity systems; public works projects; transportation systems; urban vulnerability assessment; vital systems security; water systems
infrastructure, term use, 343n32
input-output study, 76, 79, 117–118, 351n70.
See also emergency resource management; knowledge infrastructure; resource management, material flows analysis; science of flows
Insull, Samuel, 43
insurance, 346nn78, 81
intelligence agencies, 72
Interagency Committee on Essential Survival Items (ODM), 305–306, 314, 322, 394n44
interdependencies, 142, 157–158, 323; ACTS study of, 63–64; dispersal and, 202; labor organizing and, 343n36; in military-industrial production, 148–152, 229–230; regional planning and, 42, 44–45, 49, 52.
See also vital systems security
Interindustry Research Program (Air Force), 175–181, 255–256, 291, 307–309; *Bomb Damage Problem*, 176–181, 342n16.
See also Project on the Scientific Computation of Optimum Programs (Project SCOOP)
International Climate Emergency Forum, 339
internment camps, 144
inventory of resource data: BSDA work on, 324; *CDUA* on inventorying urban features, 169; industrial vulnerability and, 176–177, 191, 309–310; Interindustry Research Program and, 175–176, 308–309; inventory of national assets, 14–15, 31, 53–56, 175, 219, 292; manpower, 292–293, 311; NDAC work on, 292, 308–311, 316; NSRB work on, 126–127, 223, 295; survival items, 219–220, 294, 322–324, 326, 328; system vulnerability analysis and, 14, 31, 53–54, 168–169, 173, 176–177; WPB work on, 201. *See also* balance sheet planning; emergency resource management; facility ratings; resource management, material flows analysis; science of flows; stockpiling programs, essential supplies
Is Your Plant a Target? (NSRB pamphlet), 213
Jackson, Donald L., 211, 212
Jamieson, Dale, 340
Japan: area analysis and, 160–161, 163; industrial intelligence on, 153–154; industrial resilience to bombings in, 188–189; nuclear testing exposure to Japanese fishing vessel, 393n20; US bombing of, 79, 187, 193
Japanese-Americans, internment of, 144
Jasanoff, Sheila, 27, 346n80, 347nn85, 86, 348n99
jobs and employment: business cycles and, 51; unemployment rates, 102; WWII mobilization planning and, 100
Johnson, Louis A., 219
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 124, 128, 271, 367n57; Continental Defense Planning Group, 274; establish JTG, 153; establish Strategic Vulnerability Branch, 154, 367n55
Joint Committee on Defense Production, 329, 394n44
Joint Target Group (JTG), 325, 367nn48, 56, 368n58; area analysis by, 160–161, 369nn84, 85; industrial analysis by, 153–154, 160–161
Jones, Byrd L., 352n82
Jordan, Nehemiah, 225–226, 364n207, 379n136, 380n142
JTG. *See* Joint Target Group (JTG)
JUMBO (NDAC simulation model), 314
Kahn, Herman, 35, 294, 316, 317, 396n108
Karl, Barry, 92–94, 358n51
Katz, Barry, 71, 76
Katznelson, Ira, 356n11
Kaysen, Carl, 75, 139–142, 227, 354n144, 375n50, 397n141
Kefauver, Estes, 274–275
Kefauver Subcommittee, 280
Kendall, Charles, 129, 273
Kennedy, John F., 4, 225
Kennedy administration, 332–333, 362n157, 370n113
Keynesian economics, 351n71, 352nn72, 74, 82
Keyserling, Leon, 131
Kiefer, Norvin C., 221, 294–295
Kindleberger, Charles, 74, 77
Klein, Lawrence, 197
knowledge infrastructure, xvii, 30, 31, 334; Edwards on, 31, 364n8; human “computers” in data handling, 118–119; lack of data, 53, 106, 108, 299, 304–305, 322, 335; for national economy study, 53–59; in pandemic response, 335–336; population

- security concept and, 331; raw data, analysis of, 155–156, 157; statistical analysis, 11, 101, 351n66; in urban analysis, 168–173; WPB data collection, 116–120. *See also* air intelligence; airpower strategists; balance sheet planning; computer simulation; damage assessment; emergency resource management; expertise; facility ratings; maps; models and simulations; national economy; overlay technique; punched cards system; resource evaluation; resource management, material flows analysis; tabulating machines; United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)
- Knowles, Morris, 44, 333
- Knowles, Scott, 5
- Koistinen, Paul A. C., 102, 103, 111, 115, 120, 358n59, 359nn76, 81; on mobilization planning, 360n97; on Planning Committee termination, 123; on PRP, 361n150; on stockpiling, 359n83
- Korean War: bottlenecks and shortages during, 131, 201, 236; feasibility testing and, 330; military-industrial production during, 131, 208–209, 236; mobilization planning and, xviii, 130, 131–132, 175, 208, 234, 364n207, 386n53; NSRB and, 364n207; ODM and, 3, 257; offices overseeing emergency responsibilities regarding, 235, 236; outbreak of, 207–208, 212, 225
- Krock, Arthur, 280
- Krug, J. A., 190, 372n12
- Kupperman, Robert, 8–9, 14
- Kuznets, Simon, 56, 60, 101, 329, 351n71, 352n81; on WPB, 112, 114
- labor. *See* manpower
- labor organizing, 343n36, 345n58
- Lacey, Jim, 101
- LaGuardia, Fiorello, 373n26
- Lancaster, Presley, Jr., 382
- Lapp, Ralph E., 163–164, 182–184, 189, 211–212, 226–227, 376n66
- Larsen, Paul, 219, 225, 379n135
- Lasswell, Harold, 125, 372n8
- Lawrence, William, 307, 324
- legal mechanisms for emergency government, 2, 31, 87, 334, 346n74; Committee on Administrative Management on, 357n47; legislative acts during Great Depression, 92; local authority, 88; standby legislation, 129; for vital systems security, 332
- LeMay, Curtis, 79, 160, 196
- Lend-Lease Act (1941), 23, 104, 108
- Leontief, Wassily, 72, 79, 351n70
- Lerch, Archer L., 366n26
- Leuchtenberg, William, 92, 357n34
- liberal constitutional government. *See* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and
- liberalism, 88–89
- libertarianism, 380n153
- Light, Jennifer, 184–185
- Lincoln, Abraham, 17
- Lincoln, George, 369n112
- Linkert, Rensis, 374n45
- Livermore, Shaw, 134, 228–229, 242, 382n183; on damage assessment, 394n51; emergency action steps project and, 386n54; on manpower resource, 302–303; on MPAC, 254, 256, 384n28, 389n91; on NPA study, 389n91; on NSC Planning Board, 383n185; on PAIR Central Task Force, 239, 381n175; on WPB, 112
- local government: critique of centralized authority, 208; emergency action documents on, 285; in Germany, 89; preparedness planning, 184, 193, 234; Progressive reformers on, 88; vulnerability assessment by, 184. *See also* civilian mobilization planning; federal-state relations, emergency relief planning; governors; nonmilitary defense; responsibility and authority issues
- local planning: aiming point analysis in, 170–171, 184; for civilian mobilization, 220–224; coordination issues for emergency relief, 270–271, 285, 388n77; dispersal and, 211, 215, 376n81; FCDA and, 241, 273–274, 300, 308, 320–321, 382n180; Office of Civil Defense focus, 217. *See also* regional planning
- Lowe, James T., 197, 368nn60, 63, 369n94; on data for target selection, 153, 155–156, 157, 166; Hansell recruits, 69, 367n49; at SVB, 154–157, 166–167. *See also* target selection
- Luhmann, Niklas, 347n93
- macroeconomics, 57, 350n44. *See also* New Deal Economics
- Manhattan Project, 195, 196, 313, 369n90, 376n66
- manpower, as resource category: air war requirements of, 70; balance sheet planning and, 128; coordination and

432 INDEX

- manpower, as resource category (*continued*)
authority issues, 303; feasibility testing and, 176; Gaither Committee on, 318, 319; inventorying, 126–127, 128, 220; medical personnel, 299; military-industrial production and, 2, 202, 255; mobilization planning and, 126, 176, 186, 269; MPAC on, 302–303; national economy reliance on, 2, 54; NDAC assessment, 292–293; NDAC SURVIVAL model analysis, 326; postattack rehabilitation and, 253, 261–262, 284, 286, 288, 292–293, 303, 314–315, 318–319; radioactive fallout and, 311, 314–315; resource evaluation and, 192; shortages, 291, 315; vertical analysis, 311. *See also* casualty assessments; population survival
- maps, 15, 75; area analysis use, 159–160, 161–162, 163–166; in civilian mobilization planning, 221–222, 224; for damage assessment estimates, 165, 171–173, 306; dispersion policy standards and, 215–216; in non-military defense, 168–169, 170, 171–173; for nuclear preparedness, 182–184; Sanborn maps, 177, 371n126. *See also* knowledge infrastructure; overlay technique
- Marschak, Jacob, 197, 374nn35, 45
- Marshall, George, 369n101
- Marshall, T. H., 342n22
- martial law, 32, 273–275, 389n91; definition, 278, 390n107; Fairman and, 281–282, 347n90, 391nn125, 127; limited martial law, 277, 390n100, 111; Operation Alert (1955) and, 276–283, 340, 390nn102, 107, 111, 391n127; Plan D-Minus and, 285; response to Eisenhower’s declaration, 251, 276, 279–283, 391nn120, 125, 127; Rossiter on, 388n85; Schmitt on, 281, 391n120. *See also* military-civilian authority issues; responsibility and authority issues
- Masco, Joseph, 185
- Mason, Edward S., 60, 101
- Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, 280
- Master Inspection Responsibility List, 144, 145–146
- material flows. *See* emergency resource management; resource management, material flows analysis; science of flows
- materiel, WWII mobilization planning and, 62, 104, 109–110. *See also* emergency resource management; military-industrial production; mobilization planning; resource management, material flows analysis
- May, Stacy, 101, 112, 123, 329, 365n22; balance sheets and, 108–109, 110–111, 113, 114; Victory Program and, 339, 360n110
- McCormick, John, 345n61
- McCoy, H. B., 323, 329
- McCrea, Roswell C., 46
- McDermott, Edward, 3–4, 32, 342n5
- McDonough, Leo, 210–211
- McKinsey and Company, 337
- McNamara, Robert, 370n113
- McReynolds, William, 24, 85, 359n69
- medical facilities: dispersal and, 184, 190; emergency action steps and, 265; packaged disaster hospitals, 297, 299, 325, 330; in pandemic response, 335, 398n15; post-attack survival requirements for, 222, 232, 295, 325, 328. *See also* health resources; postattack survival requirements
- medical supplies, stockpiling of. *See* postattack survival requirements; stockpiling programs, essential supplies
- Merriam, Charles, 187; on Committee on Administrative Management, 93; on governmental adjustment, 18, 21, 88–91, 125; Lasswell and, 372n8; on NRPB, 47, 90–91, 356n27; regional planning by, 43; scholarship on, 356nn15, 18, 23; on “strategic points in a working system,” 123, 188. *See also* Progressive reformers
- metallic sodium, 148–149, 150
- metals, resources, 117; aluminum industry, 103, 105, 116, 121, 152; CMP on, 121; copper industry, 103, 121; steel industry, 54, 77, 103, 121, 199, 229. *See also* military-industrial production; resource management, material flows analysis
- Metcalf, Evan, 50, 51
- metropolitan growth. *See* urban vulnerability assessment
- military, capacity to retaliate, 200, 375n51. *See also* postattack industrial rehabilitation
- military-civilian authority issues: emergency relief, 270, 273–275, 393n19; nonmilitary defense, 193, 203–204, 218, 273–275, 373nn23, 26, 378n113; procurement and, 102, 106, 144–145, 358n59, 360n90, 1488; resource management, 105–107. *See also* martial law; responsibility and authority issues
- military governance structure, 184–185
- military-industrial complex (term), 59
- military-industrial production: balance sheet planning in, 108–114, 187, 221, 321; facility-level

- security measures, 195, 214, 229, 377n96;
interdependencies in, 148–152, 229–230;
Korean War, 131, 208–209, 236; New Deal
economists on, 59–60, 99–100, 105–108,
358nn65, 66; postattack industrial reha-
bilitation and, 228–235; preparedness
assumptions about, 16, 104, 106–107, 109,
187; Soviet, 158; WWI, 20, 41, 43, 106. *See also* controlled materials allocation plans;
dispersal; facility ratings; industrial pro-
duction; industrial vulnerability assess-
ment; mobilization planning; resource
management, material flows analysis
- military-industrial production, WWII: bot-
tlenecks and shortages, 100, 104–105, 106,
113, 114, 146–147, 201, 366n26; continuity
of production, 143–144, 204, 365n12;
facility ratings, 144–152, 192, 373n20;
stockpiling issues, 103–104, 187; Victory
Program, 110, 111. *See also* facility ratings;
mobilization planning, WWII; War Pro-
duction Board (WPB); World War II
- military procurement, 103–106; bills of
materials in, 105–106; budget issues in,
102, 103–104, 174; feasibility testing in,
112, 115; military authority issues, 102,
106, 144–145, 148, 358n59, 360n90;
NSRB direction of, 127; OPMG Internal
Security Division, 190; priority ratings
in, 104–105, 106; procurement agencies,
105, 116, 118, 120, 122–123; WPB direction
of, 112, 115, 118, 123. *See also* controlled
materials allocation plans; emergency
resource management; military-industrial
production; resource management, mate-
rial flows analysis
- military spending, 109–111, 352n81; con-
gressional appropriations for, 105, 106,
109–110, 130, 174, 370n114; peacetime
preparedness and, 82, 134, 173–174
- military strategy. *See* Air Corps Tactical
School (ACTS), system vulnerability
analysis at; air intelligence; airpower
strategists; war-planning assumptions,
shifts in
- military unification. *See* National Security
Act (1947)
- Miller, Alton C., 191, 192, 193, 374n30
- Mitchell, Timothy, 351n64
- Mitchell, Wesley, 47, 50, 90, 350n53
- Mitchell, William “Billy,” 40, 62–63, 70, 140,
141, 143
- Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH)
units, 297
- Mobilization Plan C, 385n31
- Mobilization Plan D-Minus (1957), 7, 32,
250, 283–290, 303, 315–316; emergency
action documents in, 284–287; Emer-
gency Action Task Force questions lead-
ing to, 283–284; manpower resource and
population survival issues, 315; naming
of, 385n31; planning leading to, 256–257,
263, 384n30, 385n31
- mobilization planning, xv–xvi, 6, 11–12, 15,
123–136; anticipatory knowledge in,
102–103, 106–107, 135; attack simulations,
180–181; AWPDP-1, 68–71; blueprint
planning, 25, 129, 287; *Bomb Damage
Problem* report on, 176–181; civil defense
merges with, 302, 320–321, 332; climate
mobilization, 339; computerization of,
34, 173–181, 369nn112–114; DPA and,
xviii, 130–131, 132; Eberstadt report and,
124–127; Flemming on assumptions for,
253–254, 257, 306–307, 384n16, 385n31;
ICAF volumes on, 1–3, 341n1; interval of
time for, 124, 155, 256, 384n30; Korean
War and, xviii, 130, 131–132, 175, 208, 234,
364n207, 386n53; legislation ignores,
329–330; manpower and, 126, 176, 186,
269; military-industrial conceptualization
of, 7, 16, 320; New Deal planning influ-
ence on, 134; troop levels, 102, 108–109,
110. *See also* emergency resource manage-
ment. *See also* balance sheet planning;
civilian mobilization planning, NSRB’s
role in; demobilization, of wartime agen-
cies and offices; emergency resource man-
agement; industrial production; martial
law; models and simulations; National
Security Act (1947); National Security
Resources Board (NSRB); Office for
Emergency Management (OEM); Office
of Defense Mobilization (ODM); passive
defense measures; resource management;
resource management, material flows
analysis; test exercises; war-planning
assumptions, shifts in
- mobilization planning, WWII, 98–111, 124–127,
329; all-outers in, 101–103, 106–111, 112;
Army-Navy Munitions Board, 103, 111,
121, 359n83, 362n177; British influence,
359n86; delegatory statutes in, 98–99,
103, 106, 123, 269; economic mobiliza-
tion, 98–101, 352n78; executive author-
ity, 98–111; expertise, 99, 101, 105–111;
influence on nuclear preparedness, 198,
199–200, 321–322, 375n47; material

434 INDEX

- mobilization planning (*continued*)
flows analysis and, 100, 102–103, 111–123;
military spending, 109–111; New Deal
economists and, 59–60, 98–103, 105–108,
359n79; regulatory devices and, 84, 99,
101–103, 129; Rossiter on, 248. *See also*
feasibility testing, WWII mobilization
planning; military-industrial production,
WWII; World War II
- Mobilization Program Advisory Committee
(MPAC), 253–256, 307, 384n28, 385n33,
394n51; on emergency resource manage-
ment, 302–303; members on, 254–255,
366n41, 384n21; NPA study and, 275,
389n91; on test exercises and war games,
265–266
- mobilization specialists, 132, 134–135, 230,
254, 275, 321; Air Force mobilization
specialists, 173; Anshen, 84, 105, 116, 122,
135, 384n21, 389n91; digital computers
and, 142, 173; Elliott., 252, 383n9; Fox,
135, 384n21; Gordon, 120, 135, 384n21;
Lincoln, 369n112; Skuce, 135, 384n21. *See also*
expertise; George, Edwin B.; Liver-
more, Shaw; Truppner, William
- models and simulations, xiii, 311–316; in area
analysis, 142; *Bomb Damage Problem* pro-
posals, 176–179; for emergency resource
management, 322–328; event modeling
in civil defense planning, 170–171; Gaither
Committee and, 317–319; ODM and,
180, 250, 255–256, 265–268, 332; “pos-
sibilistic” and “probabilistic” knowledge,
343n31; for scientific rationalization of
“unthinkable” outcomes, 34–35, 292, 329;
for unprecedented catastrophic scenarios,
15, 25, 267, 332, 334, 344n43. *See also*
attack simulations; computer simulation;
knowledge infrastructure; National Dam-
age Assessment Center (NDAC, later
National Resource Evaluation Center);
National Damage Assessment Center
(NDAC, later National Resource Evalua-
tion Center), modeling and simulation by;
test exercises; vulnerability assessment,
models and simulations for
- modernity, “first” and “second” phases
(Beck), 26. *See also* urbanization
- modernization risks, reflexive, 26–27, 28
- modernization risks (Beck), 9
- Monnet, Jean, 108
- monopolies, 88
- Monte Carlo simulation, 313
- Morse, Chandler, 75
- Moss, Malcolm, 69
- Mount Weather, Virginia, 268, 308, 386n44
- Munitions Requirements of the Army Air
Force for the Defeat of Our Potential
Enemies* (AWPD-1), 70
- Muscle Shoals power plant, 44, 48
- Nagasaki bombing, 79, 188, 373n28; damage
assessment, 82, 163, 164, 205; health ser-
vices response breakdown following, 221
- Nathan, Robert, 56, 60, 101, 102–103, 329;
balance sheets and, 108, 110–111, 113, 114;
on income statistics, 351n71; Victory
Program and, 339, 360n110; on WPB,
112, 120
- national assets, inventory of, 14–15, 31,
53–56, 175, 219, 292. *See also* inventory of
resource data; resource management
- National Bureau of Economic Research, 56
- National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), 351n70
- National Damage Assessment Center
(NDAC, later National Resource Evalua-
tion Center), 324–328, 384n27; becomes
NREC, 325, 342n21; creation of, 256, 292;
influence on Gaither Committee, 316, 318;
inventory of resource data by, 292, 308–
311, 316; postattack survival requirements
analysis, 324, 326–328; Systems Evalua-
tion Division, 342n21; vertical analysis,
310–311. *See also* Coker, Joseph; damage
assessment; Horton, H. Burke; Office of
Defense Mobilization (ODM)
- National Damage Assessment Center
(NDAC, later National Resource Evalua-
tion Center), modeling and simulation
by, 292–293, 309, 311–314, 331; compu-
tational models, 312–314, 324, 326–328;
Operation Alert (1957), 315–316; radioac-
tive fallout modeling, challenges, 311–312,
314–315, 395nn78–79; UNIVAC installed,
308. *See also* attack simulations; damage
assessment, computerization of; models
and simulations
- National Defense Advisory Committee
(OEM), 84, 103–105, 359nn72, 73,
360n90; creation of, 101; on stockpiling,
359n84. *See also* Office for Emergency
Management (OEM)
- national economy, 2–3, 5, 53–59; capitalism
and, 209–210, 213, 347n90; electricity
and, 66–68; NRPB study of, 49, 57–59,
350n57; NYC importance in, 65; reorgani-
zation, as climate response, 339; WWII

- mobilization planning, 98–101, 352n78.
See also New Deal Economics; science of flows; vital systems, continuous operation of
- national income accounting, 56
- National Military Establishment (later Department of Defense), 127, 363n180
- National Plan for Emergency Preparedness* (1964), 256
- National Planning Association (NPA), 275, 389n91
- National Planning Board (later National Resources Planning Board, NRPB), 47, 90–91, 356n27. *See also* National Resources Planning Board (NRPB)
- National Preparedness Goal* (FEMA, 2015), 4
- national preparedness program (1962), 4
- National Resource Committee, 351n70
- National Resource Evaluation Center (NREC, formerly NDAC), 325, 342n21
- National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), 47–60, 83, 96, 133–135; Clark’s study for, 52–53; data collection by, 53–59; economic stimulus analysis by, 52, 53, 350n57; functions of, 54, 349nn34, 35; Galbraith’s study for, 57–59; incarnations of, 47, 90–91, 349nn31, 33, 34, 356n27; science of flows, 49–60; substantive economy study by, 57–59; termination of, 123, 134, 190, 372n12; WWII mobilization planning and, 100. *See also* New Deal Economics; regional planning
- National Security Act (1947), 130, 218; NSRB creation and, 16, 204; NSRB functions outlined by, 16, 127–128, 189, 204, 332; unification study and, 125, 127, 362n179, 363n182, 375n61; US Air Force established through, 367n56. *See also* National Security Resources Board (NSRB)
- National Security Council (NSC), 251–253, 287, 317, 390n111; Bull Committee and, 252–253; continental defense and, 244; creation of, 127; essential functions analysis and, 261, 385n43; facility-level security planning by, 214, 377n96; NSC 68 study, 130, 363n199; NSRB and government continuity planning, 237; Planning Board, 252, 254, 382n185, 396n104; resource evaluation oversight by, 377n96
- National Security Factors in Industrial Location* (NSRB pamphlet), 184, 204–208, 212
- National Security Resources Board (NSRB), xv–xvi, 33–34, 83, 127–132, 134–135, 364n207; balance sheet analysis, 127, 128, 134, 217; Blue Book of, 184–185, 225–227, 295, 373n24, 379n136; Bull report on, 204; Central Task Force (PAIR project), 239–242, 381n175, 382nn178–180; City X study, 182–184; Coale’s work used by, 375n50; Congress and, 16, 127, 128, 135, 208, 209, 225–226, 238, 363n183; creation of, 127, 134, 363n183; distributed preparedness and, 131, 188, 225, 241; Division of Post-Attack Rehabilitation survey, 236–237, 381n165; Eberstadt report on, 126–127; emergency action steps project originating in, 263–264, 386n53, 387n55; essential functions analysis and, 188, 385n43; functions of, 16, 127–128, 184, 189, 204, 232, 238–239, 243, 332, 375n63; Health Resources Office, 294–296, 392n12; industrial dispersal work by, 185, 204–210, 212–213, 227–229; inventory of resource data and, 126–127, 223, 295; merges with ODM, 244, 249, 348n109, 382n180, 383nn5, 13; *National Security Factors in Industrial Location*, 184, 204–208, 212; as Office of National Mobilization, 257–258; Project SCOOP and, 175; Special Security Programs Office, 227, 228, 382n183, 383n13; staff transfer to ODM and FCDA, 380n143, 382n183; statutory mandate, 189, 204, 208, 217, 238–239, 249. *See also* civilian mobilization planning, NSRB’s role in; nonmilitary defense, NSRB’s role in; nuclear preparedness, NSRB’s role in
- natural disasters, 5, 64, 347n95; ad hoc responses, 344n45; climate emergencies, 339, 340; hurricanes, xiv, 333
- Navy, US, resistance to air force creation, 63
- NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research), 351n70
- NDAC. *See* National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC, later National Resource Evaluation Center)
- Nelson, Donald, 102, 108–109, 110, 123; facility ratings and, 145; PRP and, 361n150; on WPB, 112–114, 120
- Neocleous, Mark, 27–28, 347n90
- New Aspects of Politics* (Merriam), 89
- Newcomb, Robinson, 214–215, 377n95, 378n103
- New Deal agencies, 44, 47–48
- New Deal Economics, 6, 15, 31, 351n64; all-outers, 108; business cycles and, 50–51, 350n44; on controlled materials allocation plans, 115–123; data collection by, 53–59; feasibility testing and, 60, 111,

- New Deal Economics (*continued*)
115, 361n134; flow charts by, 230; income statistics, 56, 351n71; Keynesian economics, 351n71, 352nn72, 74, 82; national economy conceptualization and, 53, 54; system vulnerability analysis, 41; targeted government interventions, 56–59; taxation and, 350n57, 352n74; on WPB, 112–115; in WWII mobilization planning, 56–60, 98–103, 105–108, 359n79. *See also* national economy; National Resources Planning Board (NRPB); resource management, material flows analysis; Roosevelt administration; science of flows
- New Deal economists: military-industrial production advocacy by, 59–60, 99–100, 105–108, 358nn65, 66, 359n79, 361n140; move to work in target selection, 15, 60, 71–79, 101
- New Deal Planning, 6–7, 47–49, 61, 349n8, 357n34; congressional debates, 48–49, 85, 87, 102, 104, 133–135; delegatory statutes in, 92, 357nn35, 37; governmental adjustment, 88–91; influence on Plan D-Minus, 289; material flows analysis, 42–43, 48, 52–53, 55, 57–58, 100, 117–118, 231; public works projects, 18, 47–49, 61, 350nn42, 58; targeted government interventions, 56–59; welfare state, 133. *See also* Progressive reformers; Roosevelt administration
- New Democracy and the New Despotism, The* (Merriam), 21
- Newsom, Gavin, 398n15
- New York City, system vulnerability analysis of, 63, 65–67
- New York Plan, 45
- New York region, 44–47
- New York Times*, 187, 280
9/11, xii, 27, 333
- Nitze, Paul, 80–81, 244, 252, 396n104
- Nixon administration, 333
- nonmilitary defense, xiv–xv, 2, 32; advocates for, 374n40; *Bomb Damage Problem* on, 179; Bull report on, 217–218; *CDUA* and, 168–173, 221; “civilian” vs. civil defense, terms, 374n30; federal-state relations and, 217–218, 225, 273–275, 374n30, 379n136; Gaither Committee on, 312, 396n108; maps in, 168–169, 170, 171–173; military vs. civilian oversight of, 193, 203–204, 218, 273–275, 373nn23, 26, 378n113; mobilization planning and civil defense merge, 302, 320–321, 332; NSC and, 252; ODM-FCDA merger, 320; ODM oversight, 253, 256–257, 302, 307, 320, 383n13; OEP oversight, 9, 333; OPMG, Beers’s report, 193–194, 374n30; OPMG demobilization studies, 190–192, 193, 203; political debates on, 208, 273–275, 389n87; population survival as resource management, 315, 320, 329, 331–332; Project East River on, 302, 374n40; radioactive fallout and, 301; RAND Corporation cost-benefit research, 396n108; in unification study, 375n61; for unprecedented events, 331–332; USSBS on, 82, 189, 193. *See also* Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); civilian mobilization planning; dispersal; Federal Civil Defense Act (1950); Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA); Mobilization Plan D-Minus; Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM); passive defense measures; Project East River; stockpiling programs, essential supplies
- nonmilitary defense, NSRB’s role in, 34, 127, 168, 380n143, 383n13; *Civil Defense Vulnerability Manual*, 168; government acceptance of, 244; government continuity, 249; government planning and policy in, 189; health resources and, 294; PAIR project, 241–242, 249, 375n50; political pressures in, 208; programs in scope of, 188; Progressive reformers’ influence on, 188; Project East River, 244, 382n184; as statutory mandate, 189, 204, 208, 217, 238–239, 249; test exercises, 255, 387n65. *See also* civilian mobilization planning, NSRB’s role in; National Security Resources Board (NSRB)
- North Korea, 130, 225
- Norton, Charles, 43, 45
- Norton, C. McKim, 382n184
- Notestein, Frank, 374n45
- Novick, David, 84, 117, 135, 363n185, 370n113; CMP and, 121, 122, 362n157; on MPAC, 366n41, 384n21; priority ratings and, 105, 116
- NPA (National Planning Association), 275, 389n91
- NSC 68 study, 130, 363n199
- NSC 159 (Bull Board report), 204, 217–218, 252–253, 375nn60, 61, 383n12
- nuclear preparedness, xv–xvi, 3, 11, 34, 99, 182–244, 334; Beers’s OPMG report, 193–194, 271, 374n30, 391n125; City X study and, 182–184; climate change and, 338; dispersal proposals and, 184–185,

- 194–203; essential services analysis and, 149–150; feasibility testing in, 115, 322; federal-state relations and, 269, 295–296, 300; local governments' role in, 184, 193, 234; militarization of society and, 185, 189–194; military powers of retaliation questions, 372n14; mobilization specialists for, 135; political issues in, 187–188, 208; RAND corporation and, 35; resource management and, 180–181, 188; skepticism about, 329–330; WWII mobilization planning influence on, 198, 199–200, 321–322, 375n47. *See also* aiming point analysis; area analysis; Atomic Energy Commission (AEC); damage assessment; dispersal; industrial dispersal; passive defense measures
- nuclear preparedness, NSRB's role in, 204–210; aiming point analysis in, 184, 205, 206, 221, 222, 235–236; damage assessment, 188, 205–207, 209, 221, 222–223, 241, 243, 382n178; dispersal proposals and, 127, 184–185, 188, 189, 204, 209, 211–212, 375n63; government dispersal and continuity, 205–207; *National Security Factors in Industrial Location*, 184, 204–208, 212; pamphlets by, 184, 204–208, 212, 213. *See also* civilian mobilization planning, NSRB's role in; National Security Resources Board (NSRB); nonmilitary defense, NSRB's role in; Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation (PAIR, NSRB program)
- nuclear weapons, 162–168, 369n90, 393n20; advances in, 300, 301, 302, 320; *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* on, 182, 195–196, 197, 211, 226–227; damage assessment of US attacks in Japan, 160–161, 163, 164, 205; *Effects of Atomic Weapons*, 379n124; stockpiling, 196, 274, 319, 374n37; testing, 139, 184, 207, 247, 298, 393n20. *See also* damage assessment; target selection
- Oakes, Guy, 268, 389n95
- Office for Emergency Management (OEM), 23, 84–86; creation of, 24, 84–86, 100–101, 356n10; Emmerich on, 84, 359n69; feasibility testing and, 112–115; functions of, 84, 85, 248; National Defense Advisory Committee, 84, 101, 103–105, 359n84, 359n72, 73, 360n90; reorganization authority and, 97, 100–101, 106, 107, 112; Rossiter on, 24, 248, 355n2; termination of, 86, 248; visions for permanence of, 86, 248
- Office for the Coordinator of Information (later Office of Strategic Services, OSS), 72
- Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), 320–321, 322, 330, 332
- Office of Civil Defense (1960s), 332
- Office of Civil Defense Planning (1940s), 218, 378n109
- Office of Civilian Defense (WWII), 193, 203, 217, 373n26
- Office of Civilian Mobilization (NSRB), 219–221, 225, 237, 379n128; Health Resources Division, 220–221, 379n122
- Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM, later Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization; Office of Emergency Planning; Office of Emergency Preparedness), xv–xvi, 12, 33–34, 83, 130, 366n41; attack simulations, 180, 394n54; Bull report on, 253, 383n12; Coker and, 307, 308, 326; creation of, 3, 131–132, 258, 348n109, 364n207, 386n53; Damage Assessment Division, 301, 307–308; damage assessment work by, 34, 180, 255–256, 306–309, 317, 386n44, 394n54; dispersal issues, 210; distributed preparedness and, 34, 260–262, 264, 304; Emergency Action Task Force, 271, 278–279, 283–285, 390n111, 391nn125, 132; on executive authority problems, 268–275; executive order to transform to OWR, 288; federal-state relations in emergency relief planning, 269–271, 273, 308; functions of, 131–132, 253, 256, 258, 383n12, 385n34, 386n53; Interindustry Research Program and, 307; Korean War-era, 3, 257; Manpower Division, 303; martial law plans, 278–279; merges with FCDA, 294, 304, 320–321; mobilization planning, underlying assumptions, 253–254, 257, 306–307, 383n13, 385n31; models and simulations work by, 180, 250, 255–256, 265–268, 306, 332; Newcomb and, 378n103; New Deal planning origins, 135; nonmilitary defense oversight by, 253, 256–257, 302, 307, 320, 383n13; on NSRB Central Task Force, 239; NSRB Conference on Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation and, 235, 381n158; NSRB merges with, 244, 249, 348n109, 382n180, 383nn5, 13; NSRB staff transfer to, 380n143, 382n183; OEM as prototype, 24; organizational shift in, 252, 253, 256, 260, 304, 385n34; Plan C, 385n31; postattack survival requirements and, 299, 301–306, 320, 394n44; preparedness approach

- Office of Defense Mobilization (*continued*)
of, 382n183. *See also* administrative readiness, ODM and; Flemming, Arthur; Gaither Committee; Horton, H. Burke; Mobilization Plan D-Minus (1957); Mobilization Program Advisory Committee; National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC, later National Resource Evaluation Center); Office of War Resources (wartime name of ODM)
- Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), damage assessment. *See* National Damage Assessment Center (NDAC)
- Office of Emergency Planning (later Office of Emergency Preparedness), xvi, 3, 32, 256, 332–333, 34In8
- Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), xv, 3, 9, 342n21; as Office of Emergency Planning, xvi, 34In8
- Office of Industrial Mobilization (BDSA), 310
- Office of Inquiry into the Social Aspects of Atomic Energy, 374n35
- Office of National Mobilization (wartime name of NSRB), 257–258
- Office of Price Administration, 84
- Office of Statistical Planning, 367n50
- Office of Strategic Services (OSS, formerly Office for the Coordinator of Information), 60, 72–82, 354n128; EOU, 74–82
- Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG), 190–191, 365n13, 372n14, 373nn19–20; Beers's report on civil defense planning, 193–194, 373n28, 374n30; “civilian” vs. civil defense, 374n30; *Defense against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians*, 193–194, 217, 373n24; demobilization studies by, 189–193, 203–204, 377n96; Internal Security Division, 145, 149–150, 190, 203; postwar nonmilitary defense planning by, 193–194
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, 296
- Office of War Resources (OWR, wartime name of ODM), 258–259, 268, 270–271, 272–273, 283; emergency action documents on, 284–285, 286–287, 288. *See also* Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM)
- Ogburn, William, 374n45
- oil and fuel systems, 68, 77, 81; EOU on, 355nn149, 157; as essential services supporting military-industrial production, 149–150, 151; Gaither Committee on, 318–319; gasoline production, 159; Soviet Union, 158. *See also* power and electricity systems
- Oliver, Wallace B., 326
- Olmstead, Frederick Law, Jr., 44
- Olson, Mancur, 354n123
- Operation Alert exercise (1955), 251, 265, 275–283, 382, 387n61; health resources management and, 298–299; limited martial law and, 277, 390n100, 111; martial law declaration, 276–283, 340, 390nn102, 107, 111, 391n127; ODM integration with, 268; participants in, 276, 389n95
- Operation Alert exercise (1956), 304–305
- Operation Alert exercise (1957), 312, 315–316, 322
- Operation Alert exercises, conclusions from, 330
- Operation Readiness, 266–268
- OPMG. *See* Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG)
- OSS (Office of Strategic Services), 60, 72–82, 354n128
- Our Missing Shield* (Yoshpe), 374n30
- overlay technique: in aiming point analysis, 142, 171; in area analysis, 142, 159–160, 161, 162; computers replace, 15, 178, 181; damage assessment, 142, 159–160, 161, 162, 170–172; German-developed, 369n87, 372n146; target selection, 142, 162, 166, 170, 177; vulnerability assessment, 15, 45, 142. *See also* damage assessment; maps; target selection
- Pacific war, 79, 82, 154, 179; target selection and, 160–162. *See also* World War II
- packaged disaster hospitals, 297, 299, 325, 330. *See also* medical facilities
- PAIR. *See* Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation (PAIR)
- Paley Commission, 381n175
- pandemic response, xvii–xix, 335–337, 398nn14–16
- passive defense measures, 81, 82, 143, 184, 293; active defensive measures, 193, 244, 251, 374n39, 389n87; Gaither study, 316–320, 322, 396n107, 397n138; political challenges of, 187–188. *See also* dispersal; emergency preparedness; mobilization planning; nonmilitary defense
- Patterns of Resource Use* (NRPB study), 54
- Patterson, James T., 210
- Patterson, Robert, 190, 372n12
- Paul, Willard S., 257, 258, 384n30; administrative readiness and, 271, 278, 279, 285, 384n30, 389n91; Collett memo to, 269, 271

- peacetime preparedness, 7; agencies' wartime incarnations, 258, 260, 265, 286–287; air intelligence and, 154, 155; dispersal and, 195; Hopley report on, 218; military expenses, 82, 134, 173–174; OPMG recommendations for oversight of, 191. *See also* administrative readiness, ODM and; National Security Act (1947); National Security Resources Board (NSRB); New Deal Planning; nuclear preparedness
- Pearl Harbor attack, 111
- Pentagon, 206
- Peterson, Val, 276, 277–278, 279–280, 299, 300
- petroleum. *See* oil and fuel systems
- Pettee, James C., 154, 307, 367n49
- Pierpaoli, Paul, 130, 131
- Plan D-Minus. *See* Mobilization Plan D-Minus (1957)
- Plan for New York and Its Environs*, 45, 66
- Planning Committee (WPB). *See* War Production Board, Planning Committee
- Planning for Control and Direction of Total Wartime Resources by Non-Military Authority* (MPAC Bedsheet report), 254–255, 384n25
- planning procedures, mobilization and preparedness, 87, 220, 241, 250, 264, 266, 288; impatience with, 225, 379nn134, 136. *See also* emergency relief planning; mobilization planning; nuclear preparedness; resource management
- Plan of New York and Its Environs* (1929), 42
- Platt, Harold L., 20, 42, 43, 349n18, 380n148
- Platt, William J., 229, 382n183
- Polanyi, Karl, 342n22, 351n64
- Polenberg, Richard, 357n33, 358n52
- political rationality, 6, 332–340, 343n34
- political technology of emergency government, 8, 18, 21–24, 86–87; elements of (tables), 23, 99
- population dispersal. *See* dispersal; evacuation plans
- population security, 11–13, 18–19, 331, 335, 337; civilian protection and relief, 188, 208, 217–219, 225, 304; forms of security, compared, 13. *See also* biopolitics; emergency relief planning; postattack survival requirements; vital systems; vulnerability assessment
- population survival, 200, 212, 291–328, 375n51; balance sheet planning in, 180, 294, 301, 304, 306–307, 321–328, 397n138; damage assessment and, 291–293; manpower, as resource, 302–303; ODM mobilization planning for essential survival items, 301–306; as resource management problem, 314–321, 329, 331–332; supply-requirement analysis, 306–307, 315–319, 322–328, 397n138. *See also* casualty assessments; emergency resource management; postattack survival requirements; stockpiling programs, essential supplies
- positive government, 96, 98, 133, 344n52
- postattack industrial rehabilitation: Bull report on, 252–253; manpower and, 253, 261–262, 284, 286, 288, 292–293, 303, 314–315, 318–319
- Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation (PAIR, NSRB program), 228–242, 255, 290, 380n145, 382n185; Central Task Force, 239–242, 381n175, 382nn178, 180, 183; Conference, 235–237, 381n158–160; Dickinson leads, 235, 239, 381n175; government continuity and, 237–239, 240, 243, 249, 254, 381nn165, 170; SRI report, 229–235, 375n50, 380nn148–149, 381n165; termination of, 243. *See also* National Security Resources Board (NSRB)
- postattack survival requirements, 188, 301–306; balance sheet planning in, 180, 294, 301, 304, 306–307, 321–328, 397n138; BDSA analysis of, 322–325, 397n131; damage assessment influence on, 306, 315–319, 324; electricity needs, 288; feasibility testing of, 315; Inter-agency Committee on Essential Survival Items, 305–306, 314, 322, 394n44; medical facilities and, 222, 232, 295, 325, 328; NDAC analysis of, 324, 326–328; ODM and, 299, 301–306, 320, 394n44; ODM-FCDA merger and, 294; supply-requirements balance sheet, 322–328, 397n138. *See also* health resources; population survival; stockpiling programs, essential supplies
- Potts, Ramsay, 213, 227, 228, 238, 377n83, 380n145
- power and electricity systems: emergency action steps for, 264–265, 270, 288; Germany, 355n147; regional planning and, 43, 44, 47, 48; Soviet Union, 158; test exercises in civilian mobilization planning, 223; WWI power shortages, 67, 349nn13, 18, 353n107. *See also* oil and fuel systems; system vulnerability analysis; water systems

- power and electricity systems, vulnerability assessment of: ACTS studies on, 66–68; by Department of the Interior, 324; Interagency Committee on Essential Survival Items on, 305; by NRPB, 100; by OPMG, 145, 149–150, 192; by Resources Protection Board, 150–151, 151–152; SRI report on, 230–232, 233. *See also* vulnerability assessment
- precision bombing, 63–64, 160, 163, 167, 368n80. *See also* target selection
- “Preparation by Federal Agencies of Civil Defense Emergency Plans” (Truman executive order), 238–239
- preparedness exercises. *See* models and simulations; test exercises
- preparedness ideology, 2, 124, 185–187, 362n167. *See also* distributed preparedness; mobilization planning; nonmilitary defense; nuclear preparedness; passive defense measures
- presidential powers. *See* executive authority
- President’s Committee on Unemployment and Business Cycles, 51
- primary loss, 229–230, 380n150
- priority ratings for industrial production, xviii, 104–105, 106, 111, 116, 118, 131, 360n89. *See also* facility ratings
- private firms, postattack industrial rehabilitation and, 234
- problematization, 348nn102, 107, 371n145
- Problem of Reducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs, The* (Coale), 199, 375n50, 397n141
- production programming systems. *See* controlled materials allocation plans; military-industrial production; resource management, material flows analysis
- Production Requirements Plan (PRP), 116–120, 360n89, 361nn140, 145, 150, 362n156; CMP builds on, 122. *See also* controlled materials allocation plans; War Production Board, Planning Committee
- Progressive reformers, 17–25, 29, 44, 122–123, 188; on executive and reorganization authority, 18–19, 87, 88, 91–98, 132–133, 340. *See also* Merriam, Charles; New Deal Planning; Roosevelt administration
- Project Charles, 227, 251
- Project Congreve, 157
- Project East River, 34, 227, 251, 274, 374n40, 380n142; NSRB staff on, 244, 382n184; radioactive fallout assessment by, 301–302. *See also* nonmilitary defense
- Project on the Scientific Computation of Optimum Programs (Project SCOOP), 173–181, 369nn112–114, 384n21; *Bomb Damage Problem*, 176–181, 342n16, 371nn135, 136, 384n27; Interindustry Research Program (Air Force), 175–181, 255–256, 291, 307–309; termination of, 180, 371n144
- “Proposed Statement of Industrial Dispersal Policy” (NSRB), 211
- Provost Marshal General, 204
- PRP. *See* Production Requirements Plan (PRP)
- Public Administration Clearing House, 88, 125
- public health, 331, 335–337. *See also* health system
- Public Health Service, 263, 325
- Public Works Administration (PWA), 47–49; science of flows study, 52, 57–58. *See also* New Deal Planning
- Public Works Planning* (NRPB study), 54
- public works projects, 18, 47–49, 61, 350nn42, 58
- punched cards system, 146, 329, 367n50; area analysis and, 161, 166; Bombing Encyclopedia and, 156, 157; IBM, 118, 154, 156; Project SCOOP and, 174–175. *See also* knowledge infrastructure; tabulating machines; target selection
- Quesada, Elwood, 367n57
- Rabi, Isidor, 374n45
- Rabinow, Paul, 31, 348n103
- Rabinowitch, Eugene, 196–197, 226, 374n38
- Radford, Arthur, 279
- radioactive fallout, 165, 172, 207, 369n109; AEC on, 298, 301; Coker on, 395n92; damage assessment, 301–302, 312–314, 395nn78–79; fallout shelters, 317; Horton on, 301, 312, 313; NDAC modeling of, 311–312, 314–315, 395nn78–79; nuclear testing and, 298, 393n20; stockpiling locations and, 300, 330. *See also* damage assessment; fire damage assessment; nuclear weapons
- railroads, 62, 64, 66, 149, 150; regional planning and, 43, 44; Soviet Union, 158, 354n128. *See also* transportation systems
- Rains, Albert, 210, 211, 212
- Ramsay, Colonel F. A., 308, 371n127
- RAND Corporation, 121, 157, 366n41, 369n112, 384n21, 396n108; PAIR program

- and, 228–229, 239, 375n50; systems analysis development at, 15, 35, 370n113
- Rankin, Lee, 272–273
- rapid amortization: for industrial dispersal, 195, 202, 209, 375n74; for industrial production of essential goods, 392n10; for military-industrial production, 99, 103, 129, 131, 210, 359n81. *See also* taxation
- rationing, 233, 270, 289
- Reagan, Patrick, 89, 349n8, 15, 23, 25
- Reagan administration, 9
- Redfield, Robert, 374n35
- reflexive biopolitics, 8, 10–16, 41–42, 335
- reflexive modernization, 26–27, 28
- regional planning, 14, 61, 349n32; Chicago, 42–44; interdependencies and, 42, 44–45, 49, 52; New Deal planning, 47–49, 52; New York, 44–47; system vulnerability analysis, 41, 42–49. *See also* federal-state relations; local government; National Resources Planning Board (NRPB); science of flows
- Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs*, 45
- regulatory devices, 31–32, 87, 209, 236, 359n76; mobilization planning, 84, 99, 101–103, 129, 360n97. *See also* administrative devices
- relocation sites, 237–238, 261, 267–268, 386n44. *See also* dispersal; government continuity
- Reorganization Act (1939), 23, 24, 87, 96–98, 103, 344n55, 358nn56, 63; expiration of, 359n69; OEM creation and, 101; passing of, 97
- reorganization authority: Carter administration, 333; Eisenhower administration, 383n5; Karl on, 358n51; Kennedy administration, 332, 333; after 9/11, 333; nonmilitary defense and, 320, 332; NSRB and, 129; NSRB-ODM merger, 249, 383n5; OCDM creation, 332; ODM creation and changes, 253, 260, 304; OEM and, 97, 100–101, 106, 107, 112; Rossiter on, 357n33; Truman administration, 130. *See also* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and; delegatory statutes
- reorganization authority, Roosevelt administration, 103, 357n37, 358nn51, 56; Committee on Administrative Management, 23–24, 93–97, 344n55, 357n47, 358n52; conservative criticism, 96, 99–100, 123, 135, 357nn33, 35, 358n60; intelligence agencies, 72; within OEM, 106, 107, 112; OEM creation and, 85–86, 97, 100–101; Progressive reformers and, 18–19, 87, 88, 91–98, 132–133, 340. *See also* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and; executive authority; Reorganization Act (1939); Roosevelt administration
- Reorganization Plan (1953), 260
- Requirements Committee (WPB), 116–117, 120, 121
- Research and Development Board (military), 227
- resilience, 11, 325; cushion and, 76–77, 80, 82–83, 155, 157–158, 192, 199; depth and, 76–77, 80, 82–83, 155, 157–158, 199; genealogy of, 343n28, 380n153; in Germany, 81–82, 163, 188–189; resource evaluation used for designing, 192; SRI report on, 229, 232; USSBS on, 189–190, 232. *See also* substitution
- resource evaluation: concentration problem, 146–148, 191, 195, 230; data sources used for Bombing Encyclopedia, 156; dispersal and, 192, 195, 198, 214, 378n102; by IEB, 214; influence on emergency resource management, 243; influence on NDAC, 325; influence on preparedness, 187; influence on vulnerability assessment, 192, 195, 198, 205, 214, 328, 373n20; NSC and, 377n96; OPMG on, 189, 190, 191–192, 373n20, 377n96; resilience and, 192; by Resources Protection Board, 190, 191; urban analysis and, 169; by WPB, 142, 143–149, 152, 159. *See also* facility ratings
- resource evaluation specialists, 146, 148–149, 152–153, 191, 230, 325, 365n17. *See also* Coker, Joseph
- resource management, material flows analysis, 40, 87, 99, 126, 310; CMP and, 121–123; by EOU, 76–77; facility ratings in, 144–150; flow charts, 230; military-civilian authority issues, 105–107; by OSS, 60, 72, 73; by PWA and New Deal planners, 42–43, 48, 52–53, 55, 57–58, 100, 117–118, 231, 361n140; SRI report, 229–230; WWII mobilization planning and, 100, 102–103, 111–123. *See also* emergency resource management; feasibility testing; mobilization planning; science of flows; stocks and flows; vulnerability assessment
- Resources Protection Board, 145–146, 150–152, 191, 214, 366n43, 377n99; Krug orders shut down of, 190, 372n12

442 INDEX

- responsibility and authority issues in emergency government, 239–242, 285, 288–289, 388n77; Blue Book on, 295; chain of command, 234, 251, 269–275, 278, 283; decentralized authority in balance sheet planning, 131; DHS/FEMA, xiii–xiv; for health resources, 298–299, 393n19; *Health Services* manual on, 295; in military procurement, 102, 106, 144–145, 148, 358n59, 360n90; in pandemic response, 336; in stockpiling, 294, 295–297, 303–304. *See also* constitutional democracy, emergency powers and; executive authority; federal-state relations; military-civilian authority issues
- Riefler, Winfield, 56, 59, 75, 197–198, 375n47
- RISK (NDAC hazard analysis model), 313
- risk assessment, II, 12, 26–27, 346nn78, 81
- risk management, 346n78
- Risk Society* (Beck), 341n2, 346n81, 347n87
- Roback, Herbert, 299–300
- Rock, Vincent, 257, 265, 389n91, 396n108
- Roman model of commissarial dictatorship, 21–22
- Roosevelt, Eleanor, 373n26
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 350n51; “limited national emergency” declaration, 359n68; on national asset inventory, 14, 54
- Roosevelt administration, 69–70, 204, 361n140; business cycle study during, 50–52; Currie as special advisor, 57, 60, 352n73; OEM creation, 84–86, 355n2, 359n69; PWA creation, 47–49, 52, 57–58; Victory Program, 110, 111, 113, 339, 360n110. *See also* New Deal Economics; New Deal Planning; Progressive reformers; reorganization authority, Roosevelt administration
- Rose, Nikolas, 6
- Rosinger, Kurt E., 214
- Rossiter, Clinton, xvii, 132–133, 346n72, 379n134; constitutional democracy and, 17, 19, 22, 247–248, 251, 269, 340, 345n67; *Constitutional Dictatorship*, 17, 21, 22, 86, 346n71, 357nn32, 35, 359n68; on executive authority, 248, 251, 357n32; on Executive Order 8248, 97, 98; on government in the atomic age, 247–248, 250, 269, 388n85; on martial law, 388n85; on OEM, 24, 248, 355n2; on Operation Alert, 278; on positive state, 133, 344n52
- Rostow, Walt, 74, 75, 77–79
- rubber industry, 148, 150, 230, 231
- Russia, 104, 110. *See also* Soviet Union
- sabotage, 214
- Salant, Walter, 60, 75–76, 354n142, 358n66
- Salant, William, 75
- Sanborn maps, 177, 371n126
- sanitation systems, 305
- satellite settlements, 185, 197, 207. *See also* dispersal
- Savage, Carlton, 244, 252
- Sawicki, Jana, 347n98
- scale, questions of, 90
- scenarios. *See* models and simulations; test exercises
- Scheppele, Kim Lane, 22, 339, 346n70, 398n21
- Scheuerman, William, 345n61, 346n74
- Schmitt, Carl, 86, 91, 345n58, 358n60; on anticipatory knowledge, 24–25, 391n120; *Dictatorship*, 20–22, 345nn63, 64, 391n120; martial law and, 281, 391n120; on political technology, 21, 24, 86; rational-technical characteristic of dictatorship, 21–22, 345nn63, 64; scholarship on, 345nn61, 64, 347n96; on Weimar constitution, 22, 345n67. *See also* dictatorship
- Schultz, T. W., 374n35
- science of flows, 49–60, 71–72, 99–100; business cycle study, 50–52; in CMP operations, 122–123; data collection in study of, 53–59; Galbraith on, 57–59; influence on SRI report, 230; regularization in, 51, 331–332, 350n50; target selection and, 72, 76, 77–78. *See also* emergency resource management; New Deal Economics; resource management, material flows analysis
- Scott, Mel, 44, 45
- Searls, Fred, Jr., 112, 113
- Seattle, Washington, 376n81
- secondary loss, 122, 230, 380n150
- second-order observation (Luhmann), 347n93
- securitization, xiii, 28, 29
- security, forms of, compared (table), 13
- Security, Work, and Relief Policies* (NRPB), 133
- “Selection of Industrial Bombing Targets, The” (EOU memo), 75–76
- selective dispersal, 195–198, 200, 206, 208–215, 227, 376n81. *See also* dispersal
- Senate Armed Services Committee, 274–275
- September II, 2001, xii, 27, 333
- shelter. *See* housing and shelter
- Shelton, William, 54–56
- Sherman, William C., 39–41, 62, 64, 77
- Sherry, Michael S., 362n167
- Shils, Edward, 374n35

- shock waves, 207
- shortages. *See* bottlenecks and shortages
- Simpson, John A., 196–197, 374n38
- simulations. *See* attack simulations; models and simulations; test exercises; vulnerability assessment, models and simulations for
- sites of technical practice, 30, 31–32
- Skuce, Walter, 135, 384n21
- slack, economic concept, 58, 102
- Smith, R. Elberton, 118
- Social Science Research Council (SSRC), 88, 197–203, 374n45
- Social Security Administration, 263
- social welfare, 41, 133, 134
- South Korea, 130, 225
- sovereign dictatorship, 22
- sovereign state security, 10–11, 12, 19–20, 343n30, 345n58; forms of security, compared, 13. *See also* vital systems security
- Soviet Union: air intelligence on, 163, 166, 178, 368n60; Bombing Encyclopedia on, 156, 158; nuclear stockpile of, 274, 319, 374n37; nuclear testing by, 207, 247; railroads and, 158, 354n128; SVB on, 155, 166. *See also* Cold War
- Sputnik launch, 319
- SRI. *See* Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
- SSRC (Social Science Research Council), 88, 197–203, 374n45
- Stanford Research Institute (SRI), 215–216, 236, 378n105, 394n54, 396n109; PAIR report, 229–235, 375n50, 380nn148–149, 381n165
- state of emergency, 27–28, 29, 131. *See also* emergency declarations
- state of preparedness. *See* preparedness
- Stead, William H., 228, 235–236, 381n175, 389n91
- steel industry, 54, 77, 103, 121, 199, 229
- Steinberg, Ted, 5
- Steiner, George A., 117
- stockpiling, 359n83; all-outers on, 102, 103; budget issues, 103, 297, 299, 304, 319, 325, 330, 359n84, 396n115; dispersal and, 191–192, 195, 202; location issues, 202, 229; military-industrial production and, 103–104, 187; NSRB and, 127, 128, 219, 220, 228; nuclear weapons, 196, 274, 319, 374n37; regulatory device of, 99, 102, 103; SRI report on postattack industrial rehabilitation, 229, 233; USSBS recommendations, 190; wartime oversight, 265, 270, 275
- Stockpiling Act (1939), 23, 363n181
- stockpiling programs, essential supplies, 82–83, 293–294, 296–305, 316–326, 393n16; balance sheet planning in, 294, 301, 304, 306; BDSA assessment of, 322–325, 397n131; congressional issues, 103, 297–300, 324; cost estimates, 319, 325, 330, 396n115; difficulties in, 293, 300, 304, 320, 322, 330; distribution issues, 300, 304; FCDA initiates, 294, 296–301, 392n14; feasibility testing, 293–294, 315; federal funding for, 297, 299–300, 392n14; federal-state relations and, 294, 295–297; Gaither Committee on, 317–319, 320; location considerations, 296, 297, 300, 301, 330, 392n12; MPAC advises on, 302–303; NSRB proposes, 296–297; objectives defined, 297; Operation Alert reveals shortcomings, 298–299; in pandemic response, 336, 398n16; responsibility and authority issues, 294, 295–297, 303–304; supply-requirements balance sheet for, 301, 304, 306; surgical supplies, 296, 305; system vulnerability analysis in, 293; vertical analysis in assessing requirements, 323, 397n131. *See also* emergency resource management; food supply; health resources; population survival; postattack survival requirements
- stocks and flows: balance sheet planning and, 108, 109, 187; economic assessment, 50–51, 53; vulnerability assessment, 64, 76, 81–83, 159, 173, 199. *See also* resource management, material flows analysis
- Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act (1946), 23, 127
- strategic bombing theory, 14, 62, 71, 140. *See also* target selection
- Strategic National Stockpile, 336
- strategic points, 123, 188, 191; for selective dispersal, 198–199, 200–201
- strategic relocation. *See* dispersal
- Strategic Vulnerability Branch (SVB, Army Air Corps), 154–159, 166, 325, 367n56, 369n91; Bombing Encyclopedia, 156–159; creation of, 154, 367n55; East-West Section, 155, 158–159, 368n60
- Strategic War Materials Act (1940), 103
- Strauss, Lewis L., 298
- strikes, labor, 343n36, 345n58
- Strope, Walmer, 317, 396n109
- Structure of the American Economy* (NRC), 351n70
- style of reasoning, 30. *See also* Hacking, Ian
- styles of reasoning, 30–31

- subsidiarity, 378n107
- substitution, 76, 80, 81, 205, 233, 354n144;
in personnel of government operations,
124. *See also* cushion; depth; resilience
- suburban communities, regional planning
and, 42. *See also* regional planning;
urbanization
- Summary Report* (USSBS), 80–83, 154
- supply and demand, 51, 106, 121–122, 337;
balance sheet for, 108–111; foreign demand
for American military products, 104. *See
also* emergency resource management;
resource management, material flows
analysis
- Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, 24,
84, 361n140
- supply-requirement analysis, 306–307,
315–319, 322–328, 397n138. *See also* bal-
ance sheet planning; population survival;
postattack survival requirements
- Supreme Court, on New Deal legislation,
92–93
- surveys. *See* knowledge infrastructure
- survival. *See* casualty assessments; population
survival
- Sutermeister, Oscar, 213, 381n159
- Swinton, Ernest, 62
- Symington, Stuart, 168, 227
- Symposium on the Management of Mass
Casualties (US Army Medical Service
School), 291
- systems analysis, development of, 34, 344n41;
budgeting approach, 362n157, 366n41;
RAND corporation, 15, 35, 370n113
- Systems Evaluation Division (NRAC), 342n21
- system vulnerability analysis, xii, 42–49, 61,
142, 342n20; essential services, 149–152,
293; facility ratings in, 144–149; inven-
tory of resource data and, 14, 31, 53–54;
by local government for civilian mobiliza-
tion planning, 220–224; by OEP, xv. *See
also* Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS),
system vulnerability analysis at; vulner-
ability assessment
- tabulating machines, 327, 367n50; for military
procurement, 118–119; in target selection,
142, 146, 153–154, 157, 161, 166. *See also*
knowledge infrastructure; punched cards
system
- target potentiality reports, 75, 77–78
- target selection: ACTS and, 74, 80, 140–141,
160, 353n95, 367n49; area attacks criticism,
140–141, 368n81; AWPDP-1 and, 68–71;
Bombing Encyclopedia, 156–159; data
handling in, 142, 146, 153–157, 161, 166;
EOU on, 74–75, 76, 77, 80, 354nn140,
142–143; industrial analysis, 40, 69,
140–141, 152–159, 166–168, 369n84;
industrial bottlenecks and shortages
and, 62, 66, 76, 82, 100; influence on
NDAC resource inventory, 309–310;
influence on supply-requirements analy-
sis, 328; interval of time for, 154, 155,
367n53, 368n63; “mobile target” analysis,
371n129; New Deal economists’ work in,
15, 60, 71–79, 101; overlay technique in,
142, 162, 166, 170, 177; power systems,
66–68; precision bombing, 63–64, 160,
163, 167, 368n80; rationalized annihila-
tion, 166; science of flows and, 72, 76,
77–78; Strategic Air Intelligence Section
(Army), 367n49; vertical bombing, 121.
See also aiming point analysis; Air Corps
Tactical School (ACTS), system vulner-
ability analysis at; airpower strategists;
area analysis; damage assessment; disper-
sal; economics of target selection; Joint
Target Group (JTG); Lowe, James T.;
Office of Strategic Services (OSS, formerly
Office for the Coordinator of Information);
overlay technique; resilience; Strategic
Vulnerability Branch (SVB, Army Air
Corps); United States Strategic Bombing
Survey (USSBS); vital systems disruption,
as offensive military tactic
- Taureck, Rita, 28
- taxation: New Deal and, 350n57, 352n74;
rapid amortization and benefits for
military-industrial production, 99, 103,
129, 131, 210, 359n81; rapid amortization
for industrial dispersal, 195, 202, 209,
376n74; rapid amortization for industrial
production of essential goods, 392n10
- technical rule, 21–22, 345nn63, 64
- Technological Advances and Consequent Dangers*
(Kupperman), 8–9
- technological advances in nuclear weapons,
300, 301, 302, 320
- technological progress in modernity, 8–9, 34,
89. *See also* computer simulation; damage
assessment, computerization of;
urbanization
- technopolitics, 348n105
- Teller, Edward, 197
- Tennessee Valley Authority, 44, 49
- terrorism, xii–xiii, xiv, 63, 347nn87, 95; 9/11
attacks, xii, 27, 333

- test exercises, 175–176; administrative readiness, 222–223, 225, 237, 241, 267, 379n128, 382n180; for civilian mobilization planning, 222–223, 225, 379n128; for government continuity, 267; for industrial mobilization planning, 175; MPAC on, 265–266; NPA study on, 275; NSRB development of, 255, 387n65; nuclear weapons tests, 139, 184, 207, 298; ODM and, 250, 265–268; standardization of, 334; for state of preparedness, 234. *See also* feasibility testing; Mobilization Plan D-Minus (1957); models and simulations; Operation Alert exercise (1955)
- Tharin, Frank, 271
- thermonuclear war. *See* nuclear preparedness; nuclear weapons
- Tilly, Charles, 19
- Tiverton, Lord, 62
- Tobin, James, 227
- total dispersal, 195, 200, 247
- total war, 10–11, 17, 25, 39, 71–79; Beers's OPMG report, 194; mobilization planning assumptions and, 59–60, 62, 253. *See also* nuclear preparedness
- transportation systems, 12–13; bottlenecks, 46, 66, 100, 199, 202; bridges, 64, 151, 319; in feasibility testing, 114; food supply and, 66; Gaither Committee on, 318–319; as industrial production support, 45–46, 61, 149, 150; local civilian mobilization planning for, 172; OPMG on, 192; Plan D-Minus and, 288; regional planning, 43, 45–46; roadside industry, 48; SRI report on post-attack industrial rehabilitation, 230–232; in stockpiling location considerations, 296; WWI and, 349n26. *See also* railroads
- Truman administration, 362n163, 363n199; alert planning and, 238–239; civil defense planning by, 168, 193, 218–219, 363n199, 378n113, 379n134; dispersal issues, 210, 212–213, 215, 237–238; DPA and, 130–131; executive authority controversy during, 123, 378n102; Hopley report and, 225; military spending and rearmament during, 130; mobilization planning decisions, 130–132, 208–210, 219, 378n102, 379n134; NSRB civil defense plans and, 168, 219, 225, 243, 244, 364n207, 379n134; ODM and, 210, 364n207; PAIR project and, 243
- Trump, Donald, xviii
- Truppner, William, 84, 117, 135, 351n71; BDSA and, 310, 323, 324; CMP and, 122; on MPAC, 384n21; priority ratings and, 105, 116
- Tupper, Ernest, 101, 384n21
- Tyler, Lyon G., 375n50
- Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security* (Eberstadt report), 124–127, 362n179, 363n182, 375n61. *See also* National Security Act (1947)
- United Kingdom, resource management in, 108–109, 110. *See also* Britain
- United States Civil Defense* (NSRB civil defense Blue Book), 184–185, 225–227, 295, 373n24, 379n136
- United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), 30, 34, 58, 79–83, 271, 355n147; area analysis and, 141, 162; Hiroshima and Nagasaki studies, 163; on industrial resilience, 189–190, 232; nonmilitary defense and, 82, 189, 193; postwar analysis by, 80–81, 82, 154, 189–190. *See also* target selection
- UNIVAC computers, 175, 177, 263, 308, 394n55
- Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) system, 177, 371n127
- unprecedented events, 255, 331–332, 333. *See also* anticipatory knowledge
- urban area analysis. *See* area analysis; nonmilitary defense; target selection
- urban dispersal, 184–185, 186, 195, 196, 200, 374n34. *See also* dispersal
- urbanization, 18–19; Progressive reformers on city government, 88–89; urban reform, 343n35, 356n15. *See also* population security; regional planning
- urban vulnerability assessment, 166–173, 244, 251, 374n34, 383n12; Atomic Scientists of Chicago on, 196, 374n38; *CDUA* on, 168–173, 221; City X and, 182–184; damage assessment, 140, 169–173, 369n91; NYC, 63, 65–67; SRI report, 230–232; target selection and, 166–168; utilities and, 61, 192, 230–232; vulnerability specialists on, xvii, 41, 61; WWI and, 41, 43
- US Air Force. *See* air intelligence; airpower strategists
- US Army Medical Service School, 291
- USSBS. *See* United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)
- utilities. *See* power and electricity systems; transportation systems; urban vulnerability assessment; vital systems security; water systems
- UTM (Universal Transverse Mercator) system, 177, 371n127

446 INDEX

- vertical analysis: BDSA uses technique of, 323, 397n131; Gaither Committee uses, 318; NDAC vulnerability assessment, 310–311
- vertical systems of control of materials, 120–123, 310, 362n156
- Victory Plan (Climate Mobilization advocacy group), 339
- Victory Program, 110, 111, 113, 339, 360n110
- Viner, Jacob, 352n72, 374n35
- vital flows. *See* resource management, material flows analysis
- vital systems, continuous operation of, 7, 86, 186, 203–208, 217; as basic government obligation, 10, 15–16, 29; dispersal and, 127, 188, 198–199, 209; technical mechanisms developed for, 29; vulnerability assessment for, 150, 189, 332. *See also* government continuity; national economy
- vital systems disruption, as offensive military tactic, 60, 61–83, 141, 353n119; airpower's importance in, 62–64, 152–159; analysis of US systems in absence of data on enemy nations, 65–69; enemy nations, data collection and analysis on, 69–71, 152–153; EOU and, 74–82, 354n140, 355nn149, 157; resource evaluation of, 152–153; Soviet systems, 158; US vulnerabilities exposed in study of, 79–83, 158–159. *See also* Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), system vulnerability analysis at; airpower strategists; resilience; target selection
- vital systems security, 4–5, 8–16, 136, 293, 343n30; biological conceptualization of, 41, 42, 62, 63, 65; biopolitical modernity and, 335; *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* on, 226–227; climate change and, 337–340; communication systems, 12–13, 149, 207, 232, 286, 288; emergency action steps and, 264–265; forms of security, compared, 13; pandemic response and, 335–337; as political rationality, 332–340; “possibilistic” knowledge in, 343n31; as reflexive biopolitics, 8, 10–16; sovereign state security and, 343n30; for unprecedented events, 331–332. *See also* dispersal; emergency resource management; food supply; health resources; Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM); population survival
- vulnerability, to enemy attack in US, 79–83, 139–142, 168–173, 354n144; area analysis, 140–141, 142; Atomic Scientists of Chicago on, 196, 374n38; NSRB and, 127–128, 135; SRI report, 229–230; SVB's East-West Section, 155, 158–159, 368n60. *See also* nuclear preparedness
- vulnerability assessment, xi–xii, 79–83, 140, 168–181, 342n20, 364n3; climate change and, 338; continuous operation of vital systems and, 150, 189, 332; by Gaither Committee, 316–319; inventory of resource data, 14, 31, 53–54, 168–169, 173, 176–177; NDAC and, 310; nonmilitary defense planning, 168–173; Operation Alert (1957), 316; OPMG on, 192, 373n20; resource evaluation influence on, 192, 195, 198, 205, 214, 328, 373n20; SRI PAIR report, 229–233; stocks and flows and, 64, 76, 81–83, 159, 173, 199; supply systems, 40, 46–47, 64, 76, 77, 103–104; technology and, 8–9; Washington, DC, 167, 203, 205–207, 237, 262. *See also* damage assessment; damage assessment, industrial vulnerability; dispersal; industrial vulnerability assessment; interdependencies; resource evaluation
- vulnerability assessment, models and simulations for, xiii, 12, 170–171, 177–178, 188, 328; computer models, 15, 25, 142–143, 173, 180–181, 369nn112–114; overlay technique in, 15, 45, 142; population survival and, 292–293, 322. *See also* models and simulations; Project on the Scientific Computation of Optimum Programs (Project SCOOP)
- vulnerability expertise, 141–143; elements of, 143; vulnerability specialists, 13–15, 34, 342n16. *See also* expertise
- “Vulnerability of the United States to Enemy Attack, The” (Kaysen), 139–141
- vulnerability reduction, 7, 11, 29–30, 82, 83, 199, 229; climate change and, 338; forms of security, compared, 13. *See also* dispersal; nonmilitary defense; passive defense measures; population survival; preparedness; stockpiling programs, essential supplies
- Waldo, Dwight, 344n53
- Walker, Jeremy, 343n28
- war. *See* Cold War; Korean War; total war; World War I; World War II
- War Department, 163, 165, 372n12, 373n23; Internal Security Division, 143–144, 145
- warfare state, 134–136

- War Food Administration, 258, 260, 270
war games, 15, 179, 265–266, 267, 277; Bed-sheet proposals, 255; in Britain, 379n128. *See also* attack simulations; models and simulations; Operation Alert exercise (1955); test exercises
- War Health Administration, 260, 265
- war mobilization. *See* demobilization, of wartime agencies and offices; military-industrial production; mobilization planning
- war-planning assumptions, shifts in, 342n21, 383n13; Beers's report, 194; Coale on, 200, 375n51; damage assessment modeling, 178, 306–307; MPAC and, 255; by NSC, 251–252, 253, 287; ODM and, 253, 256–257; Plan D-Minus and, 256–257, 283; total war and, 59–60, 62, 253; unprecedented events, 255; urban and industrial vulnerabilities, 190, 200, 205, 213
- War Powers Act (1942), 23, 129, 130, 359n69
- War Production Board (WPB), 83, 84, 131, 370n113, 377n99, 384n21; creation of, 24, 112; data collection by, 116–120, 145, 201; facility ratings and, 145; flexible organization chart (image), 107; influence on ODM, 257; military-industrial production and, 201; postwar systems analysts and, 366n41; Requirements Committee, 116–117, 120, 121; resource evaluation by, 142, 143–149, 152, 159; Resources Analysis Branch, 146; Resources Protection Division, 365n22; vertical controls in, 310
- War Production Board, Planning Committee, 101, 112–123, 132, 361n131; civilian experts, 116–123; Feasibility Committee formed under, 112–115; Feasibility Committee reconstituted as Committee on Control of Flow of Materials, 120–123; production requirements plans by, 115–120; termination of, 123. *See also* controlled materials allocation plans; Production Requirements Plan (PRP)
- war strategy. *See* Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), system vulnerability analysis at; air intelligence; mobilization planning; target selection
- Washington, DC: relocation sites, 237–238, 261, 267–268, 386n44; vulnerability of, 167, 203, 205–207, 237, 262
- Washington Post and Times Herald*, 280
- Waste in Industry* (study, 1921), 51
- water systems, 149, 305, 366n43; Gaither Committee on, 317; OPMG on, 192; SRI PAIR report, 230–232, 233. *See also* power and electricity systems
- Watkins, Ralph, 128, 129, 375n63
- Weapons System Evaluation Group, 375n50
- Weimar Germany, 22, 345n67
- welfare, national social, 41, 133, 134
- White House, 206
- Whitney, John, 296, 299–300
- Wilgus, William J., 46
- William Yandall Elliott, 93
- Wilson, Charles E., 132, 239, 254, 365n22
- Wilson, Donald, 64
- Wood, Marshall K., 174, 370n113–114
- World War I, 8, 92, 357n32; bottlenecks and shortages during, 20, 43, 67, 349nn13, 18, 353n107; military-industrial production during, 20, 41, 43, 106; power shortages during, 67, 349nn13, 18, 353n107; transportation systems and, 349n26; urban provisioning and industrial production during, 41, 43, 106
- World War II, 3, 5, 6, 15, 41; bottlenecks and shortages during, 104–105, 106, 113, 114, 146, 366n26; OEM creation and, 24, 84–86, 100–101; postwar analysis of, 104, 110, 154, 161, 163–164; reorganization authority and, 97; US entry into, 59, 69, 74, 101–102, 111. *See also* military-industrial production, WWII; mobilization planning, WWII; target selection
- Yoshpe, Harry, 128, 129, 131; on emergency action steps project, 386n54, 387n57; on NSRB-ODM merger, 249; *Our Missing Shield*, 374n30