# CONTENTS

**Preface · ix**  
*Note on Spelling and Translation · xv*  
*Abbreviations and Foreign Terms · xvii*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 1</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2</td>
<td>Preconditions</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3</td>
<td>Pretext</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5</td>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6</td>
<td>The Army’s Role</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 7</td>
<td>“A Gleam of Light in Asia”</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 8</td>
<td>Mass Incarceration</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 9</td>
<td>Release, Restrict, Discipline, and Punish</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 10</td>
<td>Truth and Justice?</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 11</td>
<td>Violence, Legacies, Silence</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes · 315**  
**Bibliography · 391**  
**Index · 413**

[ vii ]
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting would be an essential preliminary to effective change in Indonesia; but it makes me sad to think that they have begun with the wrong people.

—SIR ANDREW GILCHRIST, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA, OCTOBER 5, 1965

IN A LITTLE OVER SIX MONTHS, from late 1965 to mid-1966, an estimated half a million members of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI) and its affiliated organizations were killed. Another million or so were detained without charge, some for more than thirty years, and many of them were subjected to torture and other inhumane treatment. Few, if any, of the victims were armed, and almost all those killed and detained belonged to what were at the time lawful political and social organizations. This was not a civil war. It was one of the largest and swiftest, yet least examined instances of mass killing and incarceration in the twentieth century.

The consequences of the violence were far-reaching. In less than a year, the largest nongoverning Communist party in the world was crushed, and the country’s popular left-nationalist president, Sukarno, was swept aside. In their place, a virulently anticommunist army leadership seized power, signaling the start of more than three decades of military-backed authoritarian rule. The state that emerged from the carnage, known as the New Order, became notorious for its systematic violation of human rights, especially in areas outside the heartland, including East Timor (Timor Leste), Aceh, and West Papua, where hundreds of thousands of people died or were killed by government forces over the next few decades. The violence also altered the country’s political and social landscape in
fundamental ways, leaving a legacy of hypermilitarism along with an extreme intolerance of dissent that stymied critical thought and opposition, especially on the Left. Perhaps most important, the events of 1965–66 destroyed the lives of many millions of people who were officially stigmatized because of their familial or other associations with those arbitrarily killed or detained. Even now, more than fifty years later—and some twenty years after the country began its transition to democracy—Indonesian society bears deep scars from those events.

In its sweep and speed, and its profound political and social implications, the violence of 1965–66 was comparable to some of the most notorious campaigns of mass killing and imprisonment of the postwar period, including those that occurred in Bosnia, Cambodia, and Rwanda, and it far surpassed other campaigns that have become iconic symbols of authoritarian violence in Latin America, such as those in Argentina and Chile. “In terms of the numbers killed,” the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) wrote in 1968, “the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders of the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s.” And while there is still no consensus on the matter, some scholars have described the Indonesian violence as genocide. Yet half a century later, this violence remains virtually unknown.
internationally. Thus, the World History Project website entry for the year 1965 includes the fact that “Kellogg’s Apple Jacks Cereal First Appears,” but fails to mention the killing of half a million people in Indonesia.4

Even inside the country, the events of 1965–66 are still poorly understood, having only recently become the focus of serious discussion by historians, human rights activists, and the media. The massive production of testimony, memoir, truth telling, and forensic investigation—to say nothing of reconciliation, memorialization, and justice—that has followed virtually every genocide in the twentieth century has scarcely begun in Indonesia. Moreover, in contrast to most of the great mass killings of the past century, these crimes have never been punished or even properly investigated, and there have been no serious calls for any such action by international bodies or states. In this respect, Indonesia is arguably closer to the Soviet Union, China, and the United States than to any other country.

This book aims to disturb the troubling silence. Its first aspiration is to clarify some basic historical questions: How many people were killed and detained? Who were the victims, and how did they die? Who were the perpetrators, and what motivated them? What happened to the hundreds of thousands who were detained and their families? These basic questions—testament to the significant gaps in our knowledge—need to be answered as a matter of urgency, especially as the number of reliable witnesses and participants declines with every passing year. The book also explores a number of deeper analytic puzzles elaborated below. Most important, it asks the following questions: How and why did this extraordinary violence happen? What have been the consequences of the violence for Indonesian society? And why has so little been said or done about it in the intervening years?

With a few exceptions, scholars have viewed the events of 1965–66 as distinctively Indonesian, explicable mainly in terms of Indonesian culture, society, and politics. The implication has been that the dynamics at play are somehow unique and not comparable to other cases. While there is certainly much that is distinctive about the Indonesian case, my sense is that it shares many features with other instances of mass killing and detention, and that a more broadly comparative approach would be productive, both for understanding Indonesia’s experience and enriching the general debate on such questions. And so while focusing substantively on Indonesia, this book also seeks to engage wider debates about the dynamic of mass killing and incarceration, about the long-term legacies of silence and inaction in the aftermath of violence, and about the history of
human rights. To that end it asks: Under what conditions are mass killing and incarceration most likely to occur? Why are some such serious crimes remembered, condemned, and punished, while others are forgotten and left unpunished? What are the political, social, and moral ramifications of such acts and silence—for victims, for perpetrators, and for a society as a whole? My expectation is that a close examination of the mass violence of 1965–66 in Indonesia will provide insights into all these questions.

The Story in Brief

The immediate trigger—by some accounts, the pretext—for the violence came on October 1, 1965. Early that morning, six senior Indonesian Army generals and one lieutenant were detained and then killed by a group of lower-ranking officers belonging to a group called the September 30th Movement (Gerakan 30 September, or G30S). The movement claimed that it had acted to prevent a planned coup d’état by a CIA-backed “Council of Generals” and that it remained loyal to President Sukarno. Ignoring those claims, the surviving army leadership, led by Major General Suharto, insisted that the movement had been masterminded by the PKI, and began a campaign aimed at destroying the party and forcing President Sukarno, whom they regarded as too sympathetic to the PKI, from power. By mid-1966 Sukarno’s authority had been gravely diminished, the army had effectively seized power, the PKI and all leftist organizations had been decimated, and Marxist-Leninist teachings had been formally banned.

The army leadership used a variety of strategies—political, judicial, and military—in its assault on the Left. Within days of the alleged coup attempt, for example, it set in motion a sophisticated propaganda campaign blaming the PKI for killing the generals, accusing it of attempting to seize power by force, and calling on the population to assist the army in crushing the traitors “down to the very roots.” The most important strategy by far, however, was a campaign of violence that entailed outright killing as well as mass detention, ill treatment, torture, and rape. There were distinctive patterns to that violence that when taken together, point strongly to the army leadership’s central role in its planning and implementation.

There were broad commonalities, for instance, in the manner of arrest, interrogation, and execution. Most victims were first arrested without warrant by the army, police, or local paramilitaries, and many were subjected to harsh treatment and torture while under interrogation. Following interrogation, they were sorted into three broad categories based on their alleged degree of involvement in the September 30th Movement
and leftist organizations. After screening, some detainees were released, some remained in detention, and some were selected for killing. Those targeted for killing were typically transported to execution sites by military vehicle, or handed over to local vigilante and paramilitary groups. Bound and gagged, they were then lined up and shot at the edge of mass graves, or hacked to pieces with machetes and knives. Their remains were often thrown down wells, or into rivers, lakes, or irrigation ditches; few received proper burials. Many were subjected to sexual abuse and violence before and after their killing; men were castrated, and women had their vaginas and breasts sliced or pierced with knives. Corpses, heads, and other body parts were displayed on roads as well as in markets and other public places.

There were also clear patterns in the identity of those arrested and killed. In marked contrast to many other cases of mass killing and genocide, the victims in Indonesia were not targeted because of their ethnicity, nationality, or religion. On the contrary, with only occasional exceptions, they were selected for arrest and killing primarily on the basis of their real or alleged political affiliations. Moreover, while those killed and imprisoned included a number of high-ranking PKI officials, the vast majority were ordinary people—peasants, plantation workers, day laborers, schoolteachers, artists, dancers, writers, and civil servants—with no knowledge of or involvement in the events of October 1. In other words, the attack on the PKI and its allies was not based on the presumption of actual complicity in a crime but rather on the logic of associative guilt and the need for collective retribution.

The perpetrators also shared crucial commonalities. While arrests and executions were frequently committed by the army and police, many were carried out by armed civilians and militias affiliated with political parties on the Right. In such cases, one or more individuals were selected as special executioners—sometimes referred to as algojo. The involvement of such local figures and groups has led some observers to conclude that the violence was the product of spontaneous “horizontal” conflicts among different social and religious groups. As I will elaborate below, that view ignores—and perhaps deliberately obscures—the fact that such groups and individuals almost always acted with the support and encouragement of army authorities. In the absence of army organization, training, logistical assistance, authorization, and encouragement, those groups would never have committed acts of violence of such great scope or duration.

Despite these broad similarities, there were significant variations in the pattern of the killing. Geographically, they were most concentrated
in the populous provinces of Central and East Java, on the island of Bali, in Aceh and North Sumatra, and in parts of East Nusa Tenggara. By contrast, they were relatively limited in the capital city of Jakarta, the province of West Java, and much of Sulawesi and Maluku. The timing of the killing was also distinctive. It began in Aceh in early October, and spread to Central Java in late October and to East Java and North Sumatra in early November. In December 1965, a full two months after the alleged coup attempt, the violence finally started in Bali, where an estimated eighty thousand people were killed in a few months. Meanwhile, on the largely Catholic island of Flores toward the eastern end of the archipelago, it did not begin until February of the following year. The violence started to slow significantly in March 1966, shortly after the army seized power, but continued intermittently in some parts of the country through 1968. As discussed below, one of the enduring questions about the violence has been how to explain these variations.

There was also significant variation in the levels of political detention in different parts of the country, and in the relative levels of detention and killing. For example, it appears that long-term detention was greatest where the levels of mass killing were lowest, such as in Jakarta, West Java, and parts of Sulawesi. The reverse was also true: where the killing was
most intense, as in Bali, Aceh, and East Java, the overall levels of long-
term detention were relatively low. In other words, long-term political
detention and mass killing seem to have been inversely related. One pos-
sible explanation for that pattern is that the military authorities in differ-
ent regions adopted different strategies for implementing an overall order
to destroy the Left. In some areas they opted for a strategy of mass incar-
ceration, while in others they chose mass killing.⁶

Acute political and social tensions were a critical part of the story, too.
Some of these tensions were shaped by the Cold War, which fueled and
accentuated a bitter split between the Left and Right inside the country.
On the Left was the popular and powerful PKI that had roots dating to
the early twentieth century. After an impressive fourth-place finish in
the 1955 national elections—the last national elections before the alleged
coup—the party grew dramatically in size and influence over the next de-
cade. By 1965, it had an estimated 3.5 million members, and 20 million
more in affiliated mass organizations—for women, youth, peasants, plan-
tation workers, cultural workers, and other groups. Arguably the most
powerful and popular political party at the time, it also had the ear of
President Sukarno, increasingly friendly ties with Beijing, and even some
support inside the Indonesian armed forces, especially in the air force.

Ranged against the PKI were most of the Indonesian Army and a
number of secular and religious parties. The most important and power-
ful of these were the Council of Islamic Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama, or
NU) and the right wing of the secular Indonesian Nationalist Party (Par-
tai Nasional Indonesia, or PNI). While these groups differed on many is-
sues, they shared a deep hostility to the PKI. Like the PKI, moreover, the
parties on the Right all had affiliated popular organizations that were
routinely mobilized for mass rallies and street demonstrations—as well as
armed militia groups that played a central role in the violence of 1965–66.
In short, by 1965, Indonesia was deeply divided, largely along a left–right
(or more precisely, communist–anticommunist) axis, and politics was in-
creasingly being played out on the streets by rival mass organizations and
their armed counterparts.

These internal divisions were exacerbated by the wider international
conflict and heated rhetoric of the Cold War. Although it was an early
proponent of nonalignment, by the early 1960s Indonesia was shifting
markedly—and in the view of Western states, dangerously—to the left. Be-
tween 1963 and 1965, for example, President Sukarno sought increasingly
cordial relations with Beijing, launched blistering attacks on US interвен-
tion in Vietnam, withdrew from the United Nations, and began a major
military and political campaign—called Confrontation (Konfrontasi)—against the new state of Malaysia, which Sukarno claimed had been created by the United Kingdom and other imperialist powers to encircle and weaken Indonesia. For all these reasons, the United States, the United Kingdom, and their allies saw Indonesia as a major problem. Indeed, by summer 1965, US and British officials were convinced that Indonesia was set to fall to the Communists. As CIA director W. F. Raborn wrote to President Lyndon Johnson in late July 1965, “Indonesia is well embarked on a course that will make it a communist nation in the reasonably near future, unless the trend is reversed.”

Such anxieties were not new. From the late 1940s onward, the US government had worked assiduously to undermine the PKI, and weaken or remove President Sukarno. It did so, for example, by covertly supporting anticommunist political parties in Indonesia’s 1955 national elections, through a covert CIA operation supplying arms and money to antigovernment rebels in 1957–58, and when that operation failed, through a program of military assistance and training designed to bolster the political position of the army at the expense of both Sukarno and the PKI. Under the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the United States and its allies welcomed the army’s campaign against the Left and Sukarno after October 1965. Nor should it come as a great surprise that these and others major powers eagerly assisted the army in that campaign and its seizure of power.

Capturing the heady mood of optimism of the period, Time magazine described the decimation of the PKI and the rise of the army as “the West’s best news for years in Asia,” and a New York Times story on the subject was headlined “A Gleam of Light in Asia.” The reason for these jubilant assessments is not hard to discern. In the context of the Cold War and against the looming backdrop of the war in Vietnam, the mass killing and arrest of hundreds of thousands of people was a small price to pay for the destruction of one of the world’s largest and most successful Communist parties. Thus, after noting that “at least 300,000 Indonesians were killed” in the violence, a US State Department postmortem from 1966 concluded that “all in all, the change in Indonesia’s policies has been a major ‘break’ in the Southeast Asian situation, and a vivid example to many other nations of nationalist forces rising to beat back a Communist threat.”

Over the next few decades, the United States and its allies remained stalwart supporters of Major General Suharto’s New Order regime, lavishing it with economic and military assistance, and loyally defending it in the face of domestic and international criticism of its abysmal human
rights record. The US government also went to extraordinary lengths to disguise its own role in the violence. In 1968, the CIA wrote and published an account of the alleged coup, *Indonesia—1965: The Coup That Backfired*, which largely embraced the dubious army version of events. Likewise, a succession of former US government officials, including Ambassador Marshall Green as well as the Jakarta CIA station chief, Hugh Tovar, and his agency colleagues J. Foster Collins and John T. Pizzicaro, published memoirs and articles that sought to divert attention from any possible US role, while questioning the integrity and political loyalties of scholars who disagreed with them.\(^\text{10}\)

Although the mass killings subsided in mid-1966, the campaign against the Left continued—most notably in the program of arbitrary mass detention. Of the estimated one million people detained following the alleged coup attempt, only a few thousand were ever charged with a crime, and they were sentenced in conspicuously unfair show trials. The rest were held without charge in appalling conditions—some of them in forced labor camps and penal colonies—with no idea when or whether they might ever be released. While many of those detained were released after a few months or years in custody, a fair number were subsequently rearrested, and some thirty thousand uncharged political detainees remained in prisons or work camps until the late 1970s. In the face of unusual pressure from a newly credible transnational human rights movement and the administration of US president Jimmy Carter, Indonesia finally released most of the remaining detainees in 1979. Even after their release, however, former detainees and their families continued to be subjected to egregious restrictions on their civil, economic, and political freedoms, and suffer an officially fostered social stigma. In addition, over the years hundreds of political prisoners who had been sentenced in show trials were executed or died in custody, while dozens remained in prison until President Suharto finally stepped down in May 1998.

Suharto’s resignation in the face of widespread protests stimulated lively demands for investigation into the events of 1965–66, a reassessment of the history of the period, apologies and compensation to the victims, and reconciliation and justice. In the intervening years there has been some progress on all those fronts. In 1999, then-president Abdurrahman Wahid, a former head of the NU, apologized for that organization’s role in the killings and called for a revocation of the New Order law banning the PKI. In 2004, a bill was passed establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and in 2012 the country’s National Human Rights Commission issued a detailed report on the violence of 1965–66, calling on
the attorney general to conduct further investigations and bring charges against those deemed responsible. Unfortunately, these and many other initiatives have been met with angry resistance from members of the government, retired army officers, and civil society groups, and the most promising—including all the items mentioned above—have either failed to materialize or been rolled back. The backlash has made it clear that the New Order’s dogmatic approach to the question of 1965 remains deeply entrenched not only in the Indonesian state but also in society as a whole. The same is true of the various mythologies that were the product of the army’s anti-PKI propaganda campaign. Meanwhile, Western and other states that abetted the violence of 1965–66, and roundly supported the New Order regime, have remained predictably silent about their role or the need to remedy those crimes so many years later. As a result, the prospects for truth, justice, and reconciliation in Indonesia remain elusive, more than fifty years after the violence began.

Explanations and Puzzles

Those who have examined the events of 1965–66 in depth have offered a wide range of explanations for them, focusing variously on psychological and sociopsychological dynamics, cultural and religious divisions, socio-economic conflicts, army planning, and international meddling. Indeed, the available scholarship on these events is now so rich that it is possible to draw on it to develop a more comprehensive account of the violence and its legacies. That scholarship is discussed in some depth in later chapters, but it may be helpful to outline here some of the main contributions, while also highlighting questions and puzzles that remain unanswered.

Many accounts of the Indonesian violence, both scholarly and popular, emphasize the personal and psychological motivations of the perpetrators. Like Christopher Browning in his seminal study of the “ordinary men” of a German reserve police battalion and Alexander Hinton in his work on the Cambodian genocide, they stress factors like peer pressure, fear, compliance with authority, and cultural norms in motivating participation and acquiescence. Such motives were undoubtedly important in Indonesia; it would otherwise be difficult to explain why so many people took part in the violence. They may also help to explain the extraordinary societal silence that followed the violence; few were prepared to risk speaking out against it. But as we know from other cases, and as the Indonesian experience confirms, such personal motivations alone cannot
account for the onset and trajectory of mass violence. Crucial as personal motivations are in understanding those dynamics, they are necessarily shaped by other structural conditions, especially at the national and international levels.

Other accounts seek to explain the violence of 1965–66 by reference to ostensibly distinctive features of Indonesian cultural and religious life. The most persistent of these interpretations suggests that the killings were rooted in exotic cultural patterns like “running amok.” An article in *Time* magazine from mid-1966 was typical: “Amok is a Javanese word, and it describes what happened at the collapse of the Communist coup. In a national explosion of pent-up hatred, Indonesia embarked on an orgy of slaughter that took more lives than the U.S. has lost in all wars in this century.” This sort of explanation is favored by Indonesian officials and their closest allies, but it is generally not taken seriously by scholars—or at least it shouldn’t be. Apart from its problematic cultural reductionism and the way it fudges the vital question of responsibility, it does not account for even the most rudimentary facts of the case. Perhaps most obviously, it offers no explanation for the program of mass arbitrary detention that lasted more than a decade; by definition, a program of detention that extends across a vast country and lasts for years cannot be the product of spontaneous or pent-up rage. Nor does it offer any plausible explanation for the long years of silence and impunity that followed the mass detention and killing.

More sophisticated analyses stress the importance of deeply rooted cultural and religious differences—for instance, between more pious (*santri*) and less pious (*abangan*) Muslims in Java—in laying the foundations for the violence. Such accounts provide insight into the kinds of grievances that may have driven enmity and conflict in certain areas, and help to explain why some of the language and symbolism of the violence varied as it did from one place to the next. At the same time, like most accounts that locate the origins of genocide in long-standing conflicts and tensions, they do not really explain why such tensions should have suddenly escalated to mass killing when and where they did. If the differences between the groups were so bitter and intractable, why had they not led to more than a few isolated instances of violence before the alleged October coup? Why was there such a long delay before the onset of violence in some of the most conflict-ridden areas? And why did comparable tensions elsewhere in the country not also result in mass killings?

Some authors locate the root of the violence mainly in the socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to bitter conflicts among Indonesians in
different parts of the country. Such tensions do appear to correlate with observed patterns of violence, with some of the worst violence occurring in Central Java, East Java, and Bali, where the conflict over land (and land reform) had been most intense in the years before the alleged coup, and the plantation belt of North Sumatra, where tensions between labor and capital had reached a critical peak in 1965. Still, like analyses that seek to explain mass killings by reference to deeply rooted cultural and religious tensions, those based on underlying socioeconomic conflict fail to explain why such tensions should have escalated to the point of mass killing and incarceration. Nor do they offer a satisfactory account of the distinctive temporal patterns of the violence.

A handful of scholars have argued that the mass killing should be understood as the result of planning and coordination by army and political leaders. Jess Melvin has recently made that case for Aceh on the basis of a rare trove of Indonesian Army documents, and I have elsewhere made the argument for Bali. Other scholars, including Douglas Kammen, John Roosa, and Robert Cribb, have likewise stressed that earlier studies overstated the importance of local social and cultural conditions, while underplaying the role of the army in fomenting and organizing the violence. Others, however, have resisted this assertion, mainly on the grounds that significant geographic and temporal variations in the violence make it impossible to generalize. While accepting that the army may have played a significant role in some areas, they point to the variations as evidence that in other areas, horizontal social and cultural conflicts were the primary drivers of violence. As elaborated below, my own view is that this latter interpretation is mistaken—and that the marked temporal and geographic variations actually point to a wider national pattern.

Finally, a number of authors have contended that the killings were mainly the result of a conspiracy, masterminded by foreign intelligence agencies like the CIA and the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), in coordination with a handful of Indonesian Army figures like Generals Suharto and Abdul Haris Nasution. While there is no doubt that foreign agencies encouraged the army to act against the PKI and Sukarno before the supposed coup, and facilitated the violence after it (arguments I will discuss in some detail in this book), there are reasons to doubt that the entire affair was the result of a foreign conspiracy. Perhaps most important, that scenario probably attributes too much importance to a handful of CIA and MI6 operatives of doubtful competence, while ignoring the ample motives and capacities of Indonesian actors, chief among them the Indonesian Army leadership. As such, it perpetuates a
simplistic, neocolonial narrative in which crucial political changes in the non-Western world, whether good or bad, are routinely attributed to the influence of the United States and other powerful outside actors. In any case, as I will elaborate later, the most careful studies on the subject do not support the claim of international conspiracy.

These explanations clearly offer important insights, and without them we could scarcely begin to make sense of the violence that followed the alleged coup. Still, as I have suggested, they leave some key questions unanswered: What accounts for the distinctive geographic and temporal patterns and variations in the violence? That is, why was it concentrated in certain regions—Bali, Aceh, Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra, and parts of East Nusa Tenggara—and why did it begin and end at markedly different times in different parts of the country? Why, despite those variations, did the violence take broadly similar forms across the country? Why, for instance, did vigilantes or death squads everywhere play such a central role, why did the violence so often seem to pit one social, cultural, or religious group against another, and why were methods like disappearance, bodily mutilation, corpse display, and sexual violence so common? How and why did deeply rooted cultural, religious, and socioeconomic tensions escalate to mass killing and incarceration? What was the relationship between the mass killing and program of mass detention? Who was ultimately responsible for the violence? What role, if any, did foreign powers play in it? And finally, what have been the consequences of the violence for Indonesian society, and why has so little been said or done about it over the past fifty years?

**Wider Perspectives**

In answering these questions, I have found it fruitful to think of Indonesia’s experience in a comparative way, by contemplating the events and legacies of 1965–66 in light of the wider literatures on genocide, mass violence, human rights, and the Cold War. Considering the near absence of Indonesia from much of that literature, moreover, it seems to me that the Indonesian example might also help to refine and enrich those discussions. A number of insights from the wider literature are especially germane to the Indonesian case. Among the most significant is the argument that genocide and mass killing are inherently political acts, initiated by actors (people but also institutions) with political motives and objectives. That is to say, genocides do not simply happen—they are not the “natural” by-product of socioeconomic or cultural conflicts—but instead are the result
of deliberate and conscious acts by political and military leaders. This insight, compellingly argued by Benjamin Valentino, Scott Straus, Helen Fein, and others, usefully shifts the focus away from purely psychological and social dynamics that explain popular participation and acquiescence in mass killing, to the intentional political acts of those in positions of authority who set mass killings in motion, and provide the encouragement and means through which they can be carried out. That shift helps to train our attention on the structural conditions that permit mass killings to happen, and the vital question of legal and political responsibility for such acts.

A related observation is that the capacities and character of states and state institutions are vital in creating the conditions for, and carrying out, programs of mass killing and incarceration. State capacity in the fields of logistics, propaganda, administration, and control over the means and organization of violence arguably mark the difference between isolated outbreaks of violence and sustained, geographically dispersed programs of mass killing and incarceration.

Although it may seem self-evident, among the most important of these is the existence of institutions—such as armies, police forces, paramilitaries, and militias—with the logistical wherewithal and inclination to organize and carry out systematic violence. A critical feature of such bodies is what I call their “institutional culture,” shorthand for their internal norms and patterns of behavior, which depending on their historical experience and training, may be more or less violent. An important dimension of an institution’s culture is its “repertoire of violence,” by which I mean the routines of violence learned and employed by all of those associated with the institution. I believe that such institutional cultures and repertoires help to account for certain distinctive patterns of mass violence that are not easily explained by reference to personal psychology or peer pressure.

The wider literature also points to the importance of ideology in fueling genocide and mass violence. Eric Weitz has argued, for example, that a unique conjuncture of mass politics, ideas of racial purity, and revolutionary utopian ideologies fueled four of the twentieth century’s worst genocides. Other scholars have similarly highlighted the significance of ideologies rooted in racism, nationalism, and modernity—together with fears of an existential threat to the state—in explaining the onset and dynamics of genocide. While the importance of state ideology can scarcely be denied, the Indonesian case raises some doubt about the significance of revolutionary utopianism and racial purity as the key elements in the
equation. The ideology of Indonesia’s New Order could hardly be charac-
terized as utopian or revolutionary, and it was not in any obvious way
rooted in ideas of racial purity. The existential threat to the nation imag-
ined by the army leadership and its allies did not come from a particular
racial or ethnic group but rather from a political group and ideology—the
PKI and communism. And the remedy lay not in racial purification or
even revolutionary transformation but simply the excision of the offend-
ing political category through execution, incarceration, reeducation, re-
pression, and propaganda. Thus, if any ideology can be said to have driven
the mass violence in 1965–66—and the later violence in Aceh, East Timor,
Papua, and elsewhere—it was an ideology of strident, even hysterical anti-
communism and militarism, informed by a narrative that portrayed the
Left as an existential threat to the state and nation.

Another insight from the literature on genocide is that local conditions
—along with the relationship between local and national actors—influence
the trajectory of mass violence and genocide in significant ways. As Straus
has argued, for example, local actors play a crucial role in implementing
the plans and orders initiated by national leaders by identifying, detain-
ing, categorizing, and killing designated enemies.27 Mass violence may
accelerate or slow depending on the willingness and ability of those local
allies to carry out national plans, and the capacity of national leaders to
mobilize and manage local allies and networks. Meanwhile, local socio-
economic and political conditions matter because they shape what kinds
of tensions—for instance, land, political office, wages, or religion—become
politically salient, and supply the language, symbols, and relevant collective
memories through which such conflicts may be escalated or restrained.

Existing studies also point to language and visual representation as
crucial in setting the stage for genocide and other kinds of mass violence.28
Depictions of a targeted group as less than human, threatening, treacher-
ous, immoral, or sexually depraved—together with explicit or implicit
incitement to violence against members of the group—effectively serve to
place it, in Fein’s apt phrase, “outside the universe of obligation of the
perpetrator,” and make mass violence far more likely.29 Whether in the
context of mass rallies, print and electronic media, religious edicts, works
of art, or carefully devised propaganda and psywar campaigns, pejorative
representations of a target group help to create frameworks within which
acts of violence against it are seen as justifiable, legitimate, and even
necessary. The association between language and violence appears to be
especially strong where the negative portrayals resonate with preexisting
perceptions of the group, and where they are voiced or clearly condoned
by powerful military, political, or religious figures. By removing the moral restraints on violent action, such representations help to forge the social consensus or at least popular compliance that is an essential component of mass violence.

Turning to a wider canvas, several scholars have made the case that genocide and other kinds of atrocities tend to emerge in the context of war, offering a variety of explanations for that connection. Some have argued, for example, that the experience of modern war results in a general brutalization of both soldiers and society at large, and the emergence of a culture of violence that makes the turn to mass violence more likely. Others have stressed the way in which the binary “us versus them” mentality of war, together with the fear of an existential threat to the nation, lays the rhetorical and political groundwork for mass violence and killing. While recognizing the importance of war in the logic of genocide, historians of international human rights have taken a somewhat broader view, showing how international legal regimes, normative environments, and transnational networks can serve both to facilitate and to constrain mass violence. These contributions show, in other words, that war is only one of many ways in which international actors and context can contribute to genocide and mass violence. In addition to explaining why genocides may happen, moreover, they offer clues as to how they may be prevented, ended, or remedied once the violence has ceased.

Likewise, historians of the Cold War have highlighted the many ways, short of all-out war, in which powerful states have historically helped to create the conditions for mass violence. Crucially, the best of this scholarship does not claim that Cold War calculations determined the course of events in other countries in a linear fashion, or that the military coups, wars, and rebellions of those years were solely the product of foreign conspiracy. They show instead that the overthrow of neutralist or leftist leaders, and the rise of military regimes and violence that often followed, were shaped by a complex array of local interests and by the interplay of those interests with regional and international objectives and developments. These findings suggest that there is a need for caution in attributing outbreaks of mass violence directly to foreign states and covert agencies. Still, as Greg Grandin has argued so powerfully for Guatemala, Cold War logic and interventions did have real, sometimes-grievous consequences for governments and populations in these years. That was certainly the case in Indonesia, where foreign intervention formed a crucial element of the wider context within which politics took shape in the years before and after 1965.
Finally, genocide scholars have underscored the pivotal role of historical processes, events, and contingencies in understanding the onset, dynamics, and end of genocide and mass violence. They show, for example, how historical experiences, particularly as they are recalled in collective and official memory, may either encourage or constrain mass violence. They also argue that genocides and mass killings unfold in response to historically specific and changing conditions on the ground. This historically contingent and process-driven understanding of genocides is vital in explaining their geographic and temporal variations as well as how they end. One might add that historical memory along with official histories can have an especially profound effect on the ways in which mass violence is remembered, memorialized, and remedied. Where those responsible for the violence remain in power, they are in a strong position to write its history, and thus to construct a social memory that diverts blame, obscures responsibility, and obstructs all efforts at redress.

A New Account

Based on these insights and building on the rich body of existing work by Indonesia scholars outlined earlier, I want to suggest here a new approach that addresses many of the questions posed above—and accounts for the variations and particularities of the Indonesian case—while also making possible its comparison to other instances of mass killing and detention. That approach entails three broad claims, each of which is spelled out briefly below and which together form the basis for the discussion in the remainder of this book.

THE ARMY

My first claim is that the violence of 1965–66—its patterns and variations—cannot be properly understood without recognizing the pivotal role of the army leadership in provoking, facilitating, and organizing it. I do not mean that the army single-handedly carried out all the killings or acted alone; that was not the case. It faced pressure from a variety of social, religious, and political groups for “firm action” against the Left, and the success of its campaign depended on the often-willing collaboration of a great many Indonesians. What I am arguing, rather, is that the resort to mass killing and detention was neither inevitable nor spontaneous, but was encouraged, facilitated, directed, and shaped by the army’s leadership. In other words, without the army leadership, those pressures—and
the personal, socioeconomic, religious, and cultural tensions that fueled them—would never have resulted in mass killing or incarceration on such a wide scale, and would not have been followed by five decades of silence and inaction.

The army’s decisive role had five crucial dimensions. First, in the immediate aftermath of the alleged coup attempt, the army developed and disseminated a discourse of existential threat to the nation that provoked and valorized acts of violence against real and alleged leftists. Through a carefully crafted media and propaganda campaign, it demonized and dehumanized the PKI and its affiliates, and called for them to be “destroyed down to the very roots.” In doing so, the army leadership gave license to the party’s enemies to do the same, and provided an essential ingredient in transforming underlying tensions and conflict into actual violence.

Second, the army leadership took a series of decisions and gave orders to detain, transport, categorize, register, interrogate, and prosecute vast numbers of people. To implement those decisions, it had to build and manage a network of local allies, and then sustain that network over an extended period of time. In the absence of such central planning, and without the army’s unique organizational and logistical reach, the mass violence could not have extended to so many different areas of the country and could not have been sustained for so long. The army’s central role
also helps to explain the distinctive features of that campaign; disappearance, bodily mutilation, corpse display, sexual violence, and torture were elements of the army’s repertoire of violence, shaped by its institutional culture.

Third, to carry out its plans, the army leadership mobilized an extensive network of civilian militia groups—like the NU’s Banser and PNI’s Pemuda Marhaen—and encouraged them to do the essential groundwork for the campaign of mass violence, such as identification, detention, transportation, and killing. While it is true that some groups occasionally acted without explicit army sanction, notably in East Java, such instances were localized and limited. In the vast majority of cases, militia forces operated with the full knowledge, and usually under orders from, local or regional army commanders. As a consequence, they were deeply influenced by the army’s institutional culture, and the violence they committed drew on the army’s standard repertoire. It was through these officially sanctioned militia groups, moreover, that long-standing tensions were transformed into mass violence, that violence was sustained for long periods over wide stretches of the country, and that so many people became complicit in the crimes committed.

Fourth, while the army alone had the unique organizational and logistical capacity to implement this plan, its capacity was not unlimited. In some areas, it was unable to mobilize local allies or even met resistance from local authorities, thereby delaying or derailing the implementation of the plan. In Bali, for instance, the central army leadership met resistance from the governor and regional military commander, resulting in a two-month delay in the onset of killings. By contrast, in Aceh, where the local civilian and army leadership were united in their support of the central army command’s plan, the violence began almost immediately. Thus, the army leadership’s uneven capacity to mobilize local allies helps to explain both the geographic and temporal variations in the violence.

Finally, by virtue of seizing power, the army leadership was able to write and disseminate its own history of the violence while silencing alternative versions. The army used various methods to do that, including public rituals, show trials, popular education, films, and other propaganda that evoked the “latent threat of Communism” and reminded potential critics of the dire consequences of being labeled a leftist. The result has been a profoundly misleading, but also remarkably resilient, account that has been crucial in enforcing the more than fifty years of silence and inaction that has followed the violence.
My second principal claim is that the actions of powerful foreign states—especially the United States and the United Kingdom—together with aspects of the international context were instrumental in facilitating and encouraging the army’s campaign of mass violence in 1965–66. I am not suggesting that the United States or other foreign powers plotted the supposed coup or violence in advance. The evidence does not support such a claim. But I think it can be shown that in the absence of support from powerful states and in a different international context, the army’s program of mass killings and incarceration would not have happened. An account that highlights the international context, and the acts and omissions of powerful states, also explains better than most others how the army got away with it, and why there has been such deafening silence and inaction over the five decades since it ended.

This claim is based on five main observations. First, contrary to blanket denials that the United States and its allies played any role in toppling Sukarno and destroying the PKI, there is now abundant evidence that they did. In fact, for more than a decade before the alleged coup, the United States and other Western powers worked assiduously to undermine Sukarno and the PKI through the provision of covert assistance to anticommunist parties and military backing to anti-Sukarno rebels. After 1958, moreover, they encouraged anticommunist elements in the army to act forcefully against the PKI and to play a leading role in politics by providing them with increased military assistance as well as secret assurances that they would support such a move. And in the final year before the supposed coup, the United States and its allies carried out a covert campaign designed to tarnish the reputation of the PKI and Sukarno, and supply a pretext for the army to act against them.

Second, the available evidence shows unequivocally that in the weeks and months after the alleged coup, the United States and United Kingdom encouraged and facilitated the violence that followed. They did this through a covert campaign of disinformation and propaganda designed to further “blacken the name” of the PKI, a policy of deliberate silence in the face of what they knew to be widespread army-instigated violence against civilians, and the provision of covert economic, military, and logistical assistance to the army leadership. These interventions, set in motion within days of the purported coup, provided vital assurance to Suharto and his allies that they could move against the PKI without fear of criticism, and buttressed the army’s violent campaign at a critical juncture.
Third, the violence was crucially shaped by the broad international political context and more specifically the Cold War. As noted above, that context dominated the Indonesian political scene and helped to create the highly polarized left–right division that was arguably a precondition for mass violence. The Cold War was also essential in influencing the substance and style of Indonesia’s international relations, especially after 1963, driving it ever closer to China while alienating it from the United States and other Western powers as well as the Soviet Union. It was Sukarno’s drift to the left, after all, that led the United States, the United Kingdom, and their allies to view Indonesia as a major problem, and therefore to support the army leadership’s move against the PKI and Sukarno, regardless of the cost in human lives. And it was Indonesia’s (and the PKI’s) decision to side with China after the Sino-Soviet split that led the Soviet Union to do so little to protect the PKI once the killing began.

Fourth, I think it can be shown that the violence was facilitated by the prevailing weakness at the time of international norms, institutions, and networks related to human rights. Perhaps most important was the near absence in 1965–66 of the transnational human rights and civil society networks that from the mid-1970s began to play an important part in efforts to prevent or stop mass violence. In the absence of such networks, the United Nations took no notice of the violence, most states expressed satisfaction or said nothing at all, and the mass media largely parroted official views. By contrast, the rapidly growing credibility of international human rights organizations and discourse in the 1970s, and the brief conjunction of that new authority with the administration of US president Carter, help to explain the anomalous success of the campaign on behalf of Indonesia’s political prisoners leading to the release of most by the end of 1979.

Finally, powerful international actors facilitated the Indonesian Army’s work of rewriting the history of the violence. Through their economic, political, and military support for the regime that came to power in the wake of the killings of 1965–66, and their almost-total silence about them ever since, Western governments have helped to ensure that the official version of events prevailed, and have prevented the proper investigation and prosecution of what, by any measure, were among the worst crimes of the twentieth century. These conditions have also meant that unlike the survivors of some genocides—most notably the Holocaust—the survivors of 1965–66 have had neither the opportunity nor power to generate world attention about those events in the half century since they happened.
Lastly, this account highlights the role of historical conditions and antecedents in understanding the dynamics of the mass violence of 1965–66. More specifically, I argue that in addition to the underlying cultural, religious, and socioeconomic tensions that shaped the violence, five crucial historical conditions related to Indonesian political life made the mass killings in Indonesia much more likely to happen. They did so by influencing political ideas and conflicts, shaping key political institutions and structures, and providing the basis for politically powerful historical reconstructions and memories.

The first of these conditions was a colonial and anticolonial history that made bitter ideological differences between the Left and Right a key fault line of Indonesian politics after independence. Notwithstanding its enormous linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity, by the 1920s Indonesia’s anticolonial politics had begun to crystallize as much along ideological lines as on the basis of ethnic or cultural identities. Within that political constellation, the Left was unusually strong, and the PKI held an especially prominent position. The position of the Left was repeatedly challenged, however, not only by those who favored colonial rule but also by those who saw it as antithetical to Islam, and some who believed it represented a threat to national unity and stability. Those lines of tension survived into the postindependence period and laid the foundations for the deepening left-right conflicts that culminated in 1965.

The second condition was the emergence of a perception within the army and the political Right more generally that the PKI represented an existential threat to army unity and to the nation. That perception dated back at least to September 1948, when an armed group supported by the PKI, sought to establish an autonomous political command around the provincial town of Madiun in East Java. Alarmed by this apparent threat to their authority, the army and the national (Republican) leadership acted quickly to crush the movement, detaining and executing its principal leaders. From that point onward, the army and its allies on the right portrayed the events in Madiun as an armed rebellion by the PKI, and evidence of the party’s essentially treacherous inclinations. As such, they became a rallying point for the goal of suppressing the PKI, especially after October 1, 1965, when the army and its allies repeatedly invoked the memory of Madiun as a reason to crush the PKI once and for all.

The third crucial historical condition for the violence was a process of state formation in the context of war and revolution that gave rise to a
conservative and politically powerful army along with a highly militarized state after independence. If the idea of an Indonesian “nation” had already been articulated in the 1920s, the sinews of a new Indonesian state only began to form in the course of Indonesia’s wartime occupation by Japan (1942–45) and in the four-year fight for independence from the Dutch known as the National Revolution (1945–49). Notwithstanding certain outward concerns with democracy and human rights, and a nominally civilian leadership, the state that emerged during these years was underpinned by a national army whose commitment to civilian rule and democracy was superficial at best. In the postindependence period, the army repeatedly asserted its right to be directly involved in political life, and with the president’s declaration of martial law in 1957, it secured both substantial political and economic power that it was reluctant to relinquish. Over the same period, the state itself became increasingly militarized, both in style and substance.

The fourth condition was the early development of an army doctrine and practice of mobilizing civilian militia forces to combat domestic enemies. Influenced by the Japanese occupation forces with whom its members had trained during the wartime occupation, and in response to the challenges of fighting returning Dutch and Allied forces on Indonesian territory after 1945, the army relied to a great extent on the support of local populations and their “struggle organizations” known as lasykar. That strategy was eventually formalized into a doctrine of “total people’s defense,” which in essence called for the mobilization of local militias to fight domestic and foreign enemies. The strategy was used to considerable effect not only against the Dutch and their allies but also against domestic groups that in the army’s view, threatened its preeminence or the nation. The strategy as well as the particular tactics and repertoires that were used in that campaign were employed again after independence, and formed an essential foundation for the mobilization of militia groups to detain and kill leftists after October 1, 1965.

The final condition was the consolidation by the early 1960s of a politics notable for its militancy and high levels of mass mobilization. That condition was accelerated by the polarizing logic of the Cold War, the compelling but sometimes-belligerent language of Sukarno’s anticolonial nationalism, and the often-obnoxious behavior of the United States and other powerful states both in Indonesia and elsewhere. US support for regional rebellions in the late 1950s and its armed intervention in Vietnam were especially provocative; British support for the newly formed state of Malaysia over Sukarno’s objections did nothing to relieve tensions.
On the other side, increasingly strong ties with China in these years encouraged militancy on the left, while heightening anxieties on the right. Together, these factors accentuated existing left-right divisions inside Indonesia, and a growing sense of crisis in which rumor, suspicion, and hostility flourished, providing a crucial backdrop and stimulus for mass political violence.

In short, the account presented here, and elaborated in the rest of the book, stresses the critical role of the army leadership, the influence of international actors and context, and the impact of historical conditions in shaping both the mass violence and the long silence that followed. In making these arguments, I do not mean that personal motives, social psychology, cultural and religious tensions, and socioeconomic conflicts were unimportant in generating mass violence—only that their significance was always shaped and circumscribed in decisive ways by the broader historical and political context.

Similarly, in stressing here certain “structural” conditions for the violence of 1965–66, and referring to the intentional acts of the army leadership, I do not mean to suggest that the mass killing and incarceration were preordained, or planned from start to finish. On the contrary, it is worth emphasizing that the violence emerged and changed in response to conditions on the ground. That is to say, this account leaves room for contingency and mere happenstance as essential parts of the explanation. The most important of these contingencies, though certainly not the only one, was the alleged coup of October 1, 1965, itself. Whoever the architects of that action were, the killing of the six generals provided a crucial opportunity for the army and its allies to move forcefully against the Left. In the absence of that event, and without the army leadership’s decision to turn it to its political advantage, one cannot say with any certainty that the political tensions in Indonesia, profound as they were, would ever have resulted in violence on such a massive scale.
Note: Page numbers in italic type indicate illustrations.

abangan (nominal Muslims), 13, 141–42
abduction, as tradition in Indonesian politics, 72, 78
Abdulgani, H. Roeslan, 261–62
Aceh: army posture and capacity in, 150; army's role in, 14, 21; Chinese Indonesians as victims in, 144; detentions in, 9, 226–27; explanations of violence in, 14; human rights violations in, 3; Indonesian use of violence in, 303; Islamic actors in, 35; mass killing in, 8, 63, 134, 140, 150, 162–63, 226–27, 345n58; rebellion in, 45; vigilante groups in, 162–63
The Act of Killing (documentary). See under Oppenheimer, Joshua
Adam, Asvi Warman, 272
Adisumarto, 213
Adjie, Ibrahim, 103, 150–51
Adjitorop, Jusuf, 330n66
Afro Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 188
Against Forgetting: Stories of the 1965 Park Community (anthology), 275
Ahmadis, 302
Aidit, 43, 44, 57, 69–71, 78–80, 114, 122, 189, 322n45, 330n66
air force. See Indonesian Air Force
aksi sepihak (unilateral land seizures), 45, 48, 51, 145
Alamsjah, 335n62
Albania, 88
algojo (executioners), 7
Allende, Salvador, 85, 303
Ambar, Sri, 216, 367n30
Ameroro prison camp, 223
Amnesty International, 185, 188, 210, 222, 235, 239, 243–46, 260, 269, 310
amok culture, 13, 138–39
Angkatan Bersendjata (newspaper), 57, 82, 166, 169
animism, 141, 302
Anson, 48, 130, 133, 142, 154, 159, 161–62, 173, 212
Antara (news service), 169, 191
apartheid, 251
Api (newspaper), 194–95
Api group, 203–4
Api Pancasila (newspaper), 169
apologies, government-issued, 11, 266, 267, 279, 282–83
Arbenz, Jacobo, 85
Arendt, Hannah, 231
Argentina, 4, 212, 306, 311
Arief, Dul, 328n47
Armenia, 298
arms, US provision of, 201–2
army. See Indonesian Army
arrests. See mass incarceration
Arto, Sugih, 219, 243
Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR), 269
Asian-African Conference, 85
atheism, 36, 47, 52, 139–40, 142–43, 166, 172
Australia, 107, 177, 185–86, 193–94, 195
Aziz, Imam, 271
Bahasa Indonesia, 29
Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional), 254–55, 385n66
Bali: army posture and capacity in, 151; army's role in, 14, 21; detentions in, 8, 9, 226; explanations of violence in, 14; land reform in, 51; map of, 2; mass killing in, 8, 14, 63, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 145–46, 151, 152, 154–55, 162, 173–74, 226; religion in, 142–43, 173–74; socioeconomic conditions in, 13–14, 144–46; vigilante groups in, 162–63
Ball, George, 103, 177, 179, 195–96
Bandar Betsy plantation, 52
Bangkok Accord, 362n80
Banser (Barisan Ansor Serbaguna), 21, 48, 130, 133, 155, 159, 161–62, 172, 173, 212, 228
Baperki (Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia), 63, 122, 144
BBC. See British Broadcasting Corporation
Beding, Marcel, 233
Beek, Josephus (Joop), 62
Bell (US ambassador), 104–5
Benson, George, 67, 98, 106, 334n59
Berita Yudha (newspaper), 57, 169
Berkeley Mafia, 62, 99
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 110
black magic, 141, 142, 172
black operations. See psywar
Blitar, East Java, 64, 326n19
Bolivia, 85
Borneo, 86
Bosch, Juan, 85
Bosnia, 4, 306
Boven Digul penal colony, 31, 42
Bowen, John, 163
BPS (Body to Promote Sukarnoism), 104, 111, 336n85
Brantas River, East Java, 128
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 193
British Embassy, 89, 112, 128, 150, 155, 192–93, 195
Browning, Christopher, 12, 133, 137
BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia): and land reform, 48, 51–52, 144–45; violence directed against, 122, 139
Buddhism, 302
Budiardjo, Carmel, 216
Budiardjo, Suwondo, ix, 222
Bundy, McGeorge, 90, 101, 103
Bundy, William, 101, 203
Bunker, Elsworth, 90, 105–6
Buru Island My Homeland (documentary), 276, 290
Buru prison island, 223, 226, 228–35, 243, 244
Calcut, 51, 89, 335n62
Cambodia, 4, 86, 123, 217, 298, 303, 306, 311
Canada, 184
Carter, Jimmy, 11, 23, 239–40, 244, 309, 373n5
castration anxieties, 167
Castro, Fidel, 85
Catholic Party. See Partai Katolik
Catholics, 132, 174–75, 302
Catholic Youth. See Pemuda Katolik
censorship, 260, 287. See also media: army’s control of
Central America, 303
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): covert operations of, 10, 85, 86, 92–95, 105, 192, 194, 309, 333n40; denials of involvement by, 11, 356n1; involvement of, in Indonesian politics, 6, 10–11, 14, 103–4, 116; and 1965–66 events, 4, 120, 179–80, 183; official version of events supported by, 11, 326n22; and September 30th Movement, 76–78, 188
Central Java: detentions in, 228; mass killing in, 8, 14, 63, 133, 134, 145–46, 152, 228; militia groups in, 159, 160–61; opposition in, to reappraisals of 1965–66 events, 287–88; militia groups in, 159, 160–61; opposition in, to reappraisals of 1965–66 events, 287–88; September 30th Movement linked to, 71; socio-economic conditions in, 13–14, 144–46; support for September 30th Movement in, 60
CGMI (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia), 122
Charney, K. L., 124–25
Charter of Universal Struggle. See Permesta
Chile, 4, 85, 212, 303, 306, 311
China: Cultural Revolution in, 256, 307; Great Leap Forward in, 307; ideological underpinning of, 298; Indonesian relations with, 9, 23, 26, 42, 84, 87–88, 91–92, 113–16, 178; mass incarceration in, 212; mass killing in, 4, 310; and 1965–66 events, 185, 187–88; September 30th Movement, 66, 70, 82–83, 114–15, 117, 190–91; silence in face of crimes against humanity in, 307; Soviet relations with, 187, 201
Chinese Indonesians, as victims of mass killing, 121–22, 143–44, 187–88
Chou En-Lai, 49, 87
Christianity. See Catholics; Protestants
Chudori, Leila, Pulang, 274
Civic Action (US program), 98–99, 101
Civil Air Transport, 333n40
civil defense units, 153–54, 159. See also militia groups
clean environment campaign, 253–54
Colby, William, 116, 336n80
Cold War, 82–117; communism during, 86–90; effects of 1965–66 events on, 303; as factor in mass violence, 18, 23, 25, 84, 171, 295; foreign interventions during, 85; Indonesian politics and, 9–10, 23, 115–17; international context of, 83–92, 159–92; political divisions during, 89–92; US involvement during, 89–113
Collins, J. Foster, 11
colonialism and anticolonialism, 24–25, 28–32, 84–86
communism: alleged threat of, posed by ex-tapols, 252–60, 262; banning of information about, 65, 279, 286–88; ideological screening for, 252–56; Indonesian leanings toward, 9–10, 86–90, 94, 97–98, 103; as “latent danger,” 238, 243, 254, 285; mass violence attributed to hatred of, 139–40; persistence of hostility to, 278–91, 307; plantation workers linked to, 348n97; propaganda campaigns against, 256–60; religious leaders’ condemnation of, 173–75; US opposition to, 76–77. See also PKI
confessions, 60, 69, 73, 122
Confrontation (Konfrontasi), 10, 39, 50, 91–92, 101, 104, 107–8, 113, 186, 196, 199, 362n80
Congo, 85
constitution, 34–35, 37–38, 242
Cornell Paper, 70–72, 260
corpse display, 7, 15, 21, 128–31
corvée labor, 223
Council of Generals, 50–51, 55–56, 70, 75, 78, 111–13, 323n67
Council of Islamic Scholars. See NU
covet campaigns, US-led, 10, 85, 86, 92–95, 98–99, 105, 192, 198–99, 303, 309. See also propaganda; psywar
Cribb, Robert, 14, 315n3
crimes against humanity, 178, 189, 267, 269, 281–82, 295, 306–7
Crouch, Harold, 53, 112, 329n63
Cuba, 85
Cultural Revolution (China), 256, 307
Cumming, Hugh, 93
D & R (magazine), 272
Dake, Antonie, 72
Darjatmo, 151
Darul Islam, 35, 45, 150. See also Islamism
death lists, 155–56
death squads, 15, 33, 126–27, 131, 139, 146, 159–63, 303
dehumanization of political enemies, 17, 20, 125, 127, 166, 223–24, 231, 258, 297. See also demonization of political enemies
democracy, 37–40
demonization of political enemies, 20, 153, 166–67, 257. See also dehumanization of political enemies
Derian, Patricia, 241
detention. See ex-tapols; mass incarceration
Dhani, Omar, 47, 49–50, 57, 61, 63, 87, 92, 190, 211
Diah, B. M., 336n85
disappearances, of political enemies, 15, 21
Discussing the 1965 Tragedy (symposium), 267–68, 283, 287
Djahurup, 328n47
Djakababa, Yosef, 272
Djalal, Abdul, 349n12
Djuarsa, Ishak, 150, 162, 170
documentary films, 276–77
Dominican Republic, 85
Duta Masjarakat (newspaper), 169, 171, 199
Dwifungsi/dual function, 46, 98
East Java: army posture and capacity in, 151; detentions in, 9, 226, 228; Islam in, 172–73; land reform in, 51; mass killing in, 8, 14, 63, 104, 134, 145–46, 151, 172–73, 226, 228, 345n60, 345n61; militia groups in, 161–62; socioeco-
nomic conditions in, 13–14, 144–46
East Nusa Tenggara, 8, 134, 135, 139. See also Flores
East Timor (Timor Leste), 3, 281–82, 303, 306, 311, 373n5
index

Eisenhower, Dwight, 93–96
Elections, US efforts to influence, 10, 48, 92–93
Edelstam, Harald, 125, 174, 184, 186–87
Edhie, Sarwo, 152, 160, 168
Editor (magazine), 272
ELSAM (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat), 268, 270, 381n16
Ennals, Martin, 243, 246–47. See also Amnesty International
Ericsson-Indonesia, 184
Edelstam, Harald, 125, 174, 184, 186–87
Edhie, Sarwo, 152, 160, 168
Editor (magazine), 272
Eisenhower, Dwight, 93–96
Elections, US efforts to influence, 10, 48, 92–93
ELSAM (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat), 268, 270, 381n16
Ennals, Martin, 243, 246–47. See also Amnesty International
Ericsson-Indonesia, 184
Farid, Hilmar, 272
Fein, Helen, 16, 17, 297
Feith, Herbert, 238
Fence of legs, 35
Fifth Force, 49–50, 87, 92, 113
Le Figaro (newspaper), 138
Film, 276–77, 287–90
Film Censorship Institute, 287
Flores, 8, 151, 174–75
Food, prison, 221, 230, 369n49
 Forced labor, 223, 228, 230
Foreign Assistance Act (US), 100
40 Years of Silence (documentary), 276
Forum Komunikasi Purnawirawan
TNI-POLRI (Communications Forum of Military and Police Veterans), 286
Foucault, Michel, 225
FPI (Front Pembela Islam), 285, 287–90, 301
France, 86
Franco, Francisco, 212, 217, 299
Freedom of Information Act (US), 309
Front Anti-Comunis, 285
Front Pembela Pancasila (Pancasila Defenders Front), 162
Galbraith, Francis J., 183, 246–47
Geertz, Clifford, 139
generals, abduction and execution of, 6, 54–56, 58, 61, 72–73, 75, 98, 165, 167, 179, 193, 196, 257–58
Genjer-Genjer (song), 257, 275–76, 288
Genjer-mania (documentary concert), 276
Genocide: characteristic features of, 164, 166, 296, 297; comparisons of, 298; defined, 310; in East Timor, 281, 311; effects of war on, 299; hindrances to, 298–99; Indonesian violence as, 4–5, 148, 269, 283, 295, 298, 310, 315n3; local actors’ role in, 317n27; role of international actors in, 298; targets of, 389n2; in US, against indigenous peoples, 307, 310. See also mass killing
Germany, 177, 193–94, 205, 306, 363n92. See also Nazi Germany
Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia): alleged role of, in generals’ killing, 61, 165, 167, 168, 217, 257, 288, 354n86; demonization of, 153, 167, 288; persistence of hostility to, 287–88; and September 30th Movement, 57–59, 68, 71; violence directed against, 122, 139, 153
Gestapo, 166
Gestapu (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh), 61, 166, 354n77. See also September 30th Movement
Gestok (Gerakan Satu Oktober), 61, 166
Gilchrist, Andrew, 3, 50, 182, 227–28
Gilchrist Letter, 50–51, 78, 112, 184, 193, 197, 339n18
GNPI (Gerakan Nasional Patriot Indonesia), 286–87
Golkar, 248
Goodyear, 51, 89
INDEX [417]

GPI (Garda Pembela Islam), 289
Grandin, Greg, 18
Great Leap Forward (China), 307
Green, Marshall, 11, 76, 82, 91, 103, 139, 180, 183, 184, 197, 200, 203–4, 205, 336n80, 351n36, 364n109
group psychology, 136–37
Grundinski, Ulrich, 194
G30S/ PKI. See September 30th Movement
Guatemala, 85, 311
Guided Democracy, 39–49, 62, 141, 164, 171

Hadibroto, Yasir, 122
Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base, 54, 56, 57, 68, 71, 73
Halpern, Sam, 333n36
Hanra (Pertahanan Rakyat), 46, 153–54, 159, 212
Hansip (Pertahanan Sipil), 46, 153–54, 159, 212
Harian Rakyat (newspaper), 68–69, 170
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (Sacred Pancasila Day), 258–59
Harmoko, 262
Hasan, Bob, 335n62
Hasan, Fuad, 235
Hatta, 72
Hendropriyono, 249
Heryanto, Ariel, 256, 276, 290, 301
Hinduism, 132, 141, 142, 173–74, 302
Hinton, Alexander, 12, 137
Hiroshima, 307
Hitler, Adolf, 298, 299
Hizbullah, 34, 36
HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), 48, 52, 134, 284–85
Holocaust, 298
Holt, Harold, 177
horizontal social and cultural conflicts, 7, 14, 352n44, 368n43
HSI (Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia), 122
Hughes, John, 139, 140, 162
L’Humanité (newspaper), 188
Human Rights Watch, 269
ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross
identity cards, 250–51, 261–62
ideology/politics: centrality of, in Indonesian national identity, 29–30; in Guided Democracy, 164; indoctrination of prisoners in, 221, 225, 230, 232; mass violence motivated by, 15–17, 132, 141–42, 156, 298–99; the media and, 169; national revolution’s influence on, 34; New Order’s enforcement of, 252–56; polarization of, 24, 164; religious groups’ affiliations with, 141–43; screening of ex-tapols for, 249, 252–56
Ilias, Tom, 289
ILO. See International Labour Organization
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
incarceration. See mass incarceration
Indonesia: formation of, 28–29, 318n1
map of, 1
Indonesia Committee, 188
Indonesian Air Force, 46, 49–50, 58, 60, 113, 190
Indonesian Army, 148–76; account of 1965–66 events by, 11, 21, 23, 55, 66–70, 81; assurances from foreign powers to, 178–88; civic mission policy of, 99; civilian allies of, 62–63; criticisms of, 187–88; divisions/tensions within, 60, 70–71, 323n54; dual function doctrine of, 46, 98; economic foundation of, 38–39, 45, 145; ideological factors in formation of, 31, 34; and information about 1965–66 events, 11, 21, 23, 61 (see also information about 1965–66 events: in official version); internal security focus of, 46; interrogation conducted by, 215; Japanese influence on practices of, 31–32; key role of, 45–47; and labor relations, 145; martial law rule under, 38–39, 45, 322n46; mass incarceration directed and undertaken by, 208, 212, 218, 226–36, 241–47, 293–94; mass killing directed and undertaken by, 133, 148–76, 293–94, 352n43; media controlled by, 55, 57, 61, 68, 169, 191–95, 259–60; mobilization of militias and mass organizations by, 21,
Indonesian Army (continued)
25, 157-63, 212; national revolution’s influence on, 33-34, 37; and 1965-66 events, 6-7, 14, 19-21, 20, 293-94; PKI relations with, 6, 9, 20, 22-24, 35-36, 39, 43-44, 46-47, 49-50, 53, 60-61, 79-80, 180; political power of, 25, 65, 198; pre-Movement political role of, 9, 25, 45-46; pretext for anti-PKI violence of, 83, 103-12, 116; propaganda sponsored by, 6, 12, 20, 61, 114, 163-71, 191-95, 240-41, 354n90; purge of, 61; and September 30th Movement, 56, 68, 70-72, 74-75; Sukarno’s relations with, 46, 60, 72, 180; territorial structure of, 34, 46; timing and location of mass killing linked to, 149-57; total people’s defense doctrine of, 25, 34, 46; US and other western support of, 10, 22-23, 46, 91-92, 95-101, 177-88, 196-204, 206, 363n92. See also institutional culture; repertoire of violence

Indonesian Communist Party. See PKI

Indonesian Daily Mail (newspaper), 192, 193

Indonesian History Teachers Association, 274

Indonesian Nationalist Party. See PNI

Indonesian Socialist Party. See PSI

informants, 212-13, 218

information about 1965-66 events:
absence/ignorance/forgetting of, 4-5, 292, 308 (see also silencing of); army’s role in, 11, 21, 23, 61 (see also in official version); backlash against reappraisal of, 278-91, 308; competing interpretations affecting, 66-81; dissenting voices on, 312; distortion of, 11, 21; firsthand accounts as contributions to, 272-74; gathering and dissemination of, 11-12; mass killing, 120; in official version, 23, 66-71, 120, 240-42, 256-58, 278-91, 311-12, 326n21, 326n22; reappraisal of, 264-77; recommendations for action on, 312-13; silencing of, 5-6, 12-13, 20-23, 249-50, 256, 290-91, 292, 301, 306-9, 311-12 (see also absence/ignorance/forgetting of); western powers’ role in, 11, 22, 23. See also media; propaganda; psywar

institutional culture: defined, 16; events of 1965-66 as reinforcement of, 303; as factor in mass violence, 16, 21, 133, 296; Japanese influence on, 32; of military and paramilitary groups, 133; national revolution’s influence on, 33-34

Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, 206

International Commission of Jurists, 239, 244, 260

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 232, 234-35

international human rights law, 310-11

International Labour Organization (ILO), 188, 239, 243

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 205, 206, 241

International People’s Tribunal on 1965 (IPT), 269, 283, 310, 382n20

interrogation and torture, 21, 31-32, 69-70, 122, 214-18

IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia), 133, 159, 212

IPPI (Ikatan Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia), 122

IPT. See International People’s Tribunal on 1965

Iran, 85

Irian Jaya, 39, 46. See also Papua/West Papua

Islam. See Muslims and Islam

Islamic Defenders Front. See FPI

Islamism, 29, 35-37, 287-88, 301-2. See also Darul Islam

Jakarta: detentions in, 8, 226, 227-28; mass killing in, 8, 134

Jakarta Charter, 35

Jakarta Post (newspaper), 272

Jamsiah, 130

Japan: influence of, on incarceration practices, 31-32, 229-30, 236; military and economic support from, 178, 199, 205; response to crimes against humanity, 306; wartime occupation by, 25, 37-32

Java, map of, 2. See also Central Java; East Java; West Java

Jawa Pos (newspaper), 285

Jenkins, David, 152, 224-26
jihad, 172, 173, 289, 302
Johnson, Lyndon, 10, 77, 90, 100–101, 105, 179–80
Jokowi. See Widodo, Joko
Jones, Howard, 67, 100, 103, 105, 107, 109
judicial apparatus, quasilegal, 63, 72
judicial executions, 259
justice. See restorative justice; truth and justice initiatives
Kadane, Kathy, 203, 363n96
Kahin, George, 67, 68
Kalla, Jusuf, 283
Kalong detention center, 221
Kalsum, Oerip, 130
KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia), 62, 158–59
KAMPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia), 62, 158–59
Kasdi, Aminuddin, 285
Kasi (Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia), 158–59
Katamso, 354n90
Katjasungkana, Nursyahbani, 269
Kejawen (belief system), 302
Kelana, 288
Kemaro Island prison camp, 223
Kennedy, John F., 86, 107
Khurshchev, Nikolai, 100
Kiai (Islamic teacher), 47, 141, 172
Kidnapping. See abduction
King, Jerry, 196
KINKONAS (Komisi Pencari Kebenaran untuk Rekonsiliasi), 266
Kirk, Donald, 173
KKPK (Koalisi Keadilan Pengungkapan Kejahatan), 269, 381n17
Koalisi Masyarakat Anti Komunis Indonesia, 288
Kolaga (Komando Mandala Siaga), 108
Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia), 11, 265, 266–67, 280, 285, 286, 288
Komnas Perempuan (Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan), 268–69, 274, 276, 288, 381n16
Kompas (newspaper), 257, 272
Komunitas Taman 65 (1965 Park Community), 275
Kontras (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan), 268, 381n16
Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban), 58, 63, 170, 215, 220–21, 225, 229, 254
Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat), 56, 74, 79, 324n67
KUN-2 Project, 226, 370n70
Kurniawan, Eka, 290, 384n46
Kusumaatmadja, Mochtar, 244–45
Labour relations, 145
land reform, 45, 48, 51–52, 143, 144–45
language: inadequacy of, for expressing traumatic experience, 308; national, 29; persistence of virulent, 284–86; religious leaders' use of, 171–72; virulence of, 17–18, 163–72, 297, 354n82
Laos, 86, 303
Lasri (film), 287–88
lasykar (struggle organizations), 25, 31, 34
Latief, Abdul, 69, 74–75, 79, 211, 325n5
Law No. 27 of 1999, 279, 284, 286
Lay, James, 44–45
Left, the: actions against, as result of September 30th Movement, 6–12, 28, 34, 58–60, 63, 158, 163, 178, 181, 183, 185, 197, 207, 210–12, 236; Chinese Indonesians associated with, 143; demise of, 65, 197; mistreatment resulting from alleged association with, 211, 251, 274; Muslims associated with, 143; and national revolution, 35–37; persistence of hostility to, 288; political parties associated with, 35–36, 65; pre-Movement political role of, 9, 38–40; psywar against, 107, 110–12, 170; the Right vs., 24, 38, 64, 84, 89, 113, 115–16, 295; silencing of, 301; Sukarno associated with, 9–10, 50, 58–59, 88, 95; as threat to state and nation, 17, 20, 24, 63, 111. See also communism; PKI
Leimena, Johannes, 73
LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat), 62, 122, 276
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute), 261
Index

Lentera (magazine), 289
literature, about 1965–66 events, 274
litsus regime, 254–55, 385n66
LKK (Lembaga Kreatifitas Kemanusiaan), 276
local conditions and actors: colonial armies and, 31; as factor in mass violence, 17, 297, 371n27; resistance of, to reappraisals of 1965–66 events, 284–88
Lockheed, 335n62
The Look of Silence (documentary). See under Oppenheimer, Joshua
Lubis, Mochtar, 62
Lukman, 44, 122, 330n66
Lumumba, Patrice, 85
Madiun uprising, 24, 33, 36–37, 42, 48, 86, 124, 125, 190, 219
Magnis-Suseno, Franz, 382n28
Mahmillub (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa), 63
Majapahit, 28
Majelis Ulama (Ulama's Council), 280
Malang, 161
Malaya, 86
Malaysia: Confrontation campaign against, 10, 39, 45, 52, 186, 199; covert operations of, 106–8, 178, 189, 194; formation of, 86, 89, 116; Indonesian Army relations with, 104, 108; UK support of, 25, 89, 116; UN membership of, 42; US support of, 89–91, 116
Malik, Adam, 104, 159, 203, 205, 336n83–85
Maluku, 8
Manek, Gabriel, 174–75
Mao Tse-tung, 4, 84, 114, 212, 298, 299
Marhab, Rahim, 214
Marhaenism, 41
Martadinata, 104
Martens, Robert, 201
martial law, 38, 45, 322n46
Marxism-Leninism, 41, 65, 248, 279
massacre, as cultural phenomenon, 13, 138–39
Mass Grave (documentary), 276
mass killing, 118–47; army role in, 133, 148–76, 293–94; beginning of, 58, 63–64; characteristics of victims of, 219–20; comparisons of, 4–5, 123, 133, 187, 298; critics of, 185–88; cultural interventions concerning, 271–77; deliberate and organized character of, 123, 131, 133, 148–50, 152–53, 156, 175–76; denials of, 120; ethnic factors in, 143–44; explanations of, 15–19, 135–47, 296; eyewitness accounts of,
INDEX [421]

124–31; general issues concerning, 5–6; geographic locations of, 7–9, 134–35, 144, 149–57, 347n86; government apologies for, 11, 266, 267, 279, 282–83; identity of victims of, 121–23; Indonesian investigations of, 267–68; information about, 118, 120; international factors in, 297–98; lists compiled for, 155–56, 203; mass incarceration integrally related to, 209, 226–28, 294; memorials and reburials for victims of, 264, 270; methods of, 7, 123–32, 124, 125; mobilization of population for, 157–63; number of victims of, 3, 118, 120–21, 184, 187; patterns of, 6–9, 119–35, 160–62; perpetrators of, 132–34; political/ideological factors in, 15–17, 132, 141–42, 156, 298–99; propaganda as factor in, 163–71; pseudolegal bodies related to, 63; psychological effects of, on perpetrators and witnesses, 300–301, 304–5; psychological explanations of, 136–37; questions concerning, 146–47; religious factors in, 140–43, 171–76; socioeconomic conflicts as factor in, 144–46; timing of, 8, 134, 135, 149–57; transportation of victims of, 154–55; western condoning of, 183–85. See also genocide; mass incarceration; 1965–66 events; perpetrators, of mass violence

mass politics and organizations: as factor in mass violence, 17, 209, 236, 238, 299

media: army's control of, 55, 57, 61, 68, 169–70, 191–95, 260–61; foreign, 195–96; political affiliations of, 169; reappraisals of 1965–66 events using, 271–72, 273, 275. See also information about 1965–66 events; propaganda; psywar

medical profession, and detention facilities, 222, 226, 235–36

Melson, Jess, 14, 140, 315n3

memories, of ex-tapols and other survivors, 272–73

mental screening, 252–56

M16. See Secret Intelligence Service of the UK

Mikoyan, Anastas, 187

militarism, foundation of mass violence in, 17, 209, 236, 238, 299

military training programs, 97–98, 101

militia groups: army's control and mobilization of, 21, 25, 46, 212; and detentions, 212; and mass killing, 159–63; role of, in 1965–66 events, 7, 21. See also death squads; paramilitary groups

Mobil, 89

Moong Loe prison camp, 223

Moenaf, Darmawan, 204

Mokoginta, Ahmad, 150, 164–66, 351n35

Mosaddeq, Mohammad, 85

Moser, Don, 129, 140

MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara), 65, 279

MPRS Resolution No. XXV of 1966, 65–66, 266, 279, 284, 286–88, 290

MSI (Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia), 285

Mukdar, Pak, 129

Murba Party, 104, 111, 336n85

Murdani, L. B., 108

Murtopo, Ali, 108, 243, 324n67, 328n47, 339n118

Muslims and Islam: animists' shift to, 302; army relations with, 34; and mass killing, 132, 171–73; Masyumi and, 48, 323n57; more vs. less pious, 13, 141–42; NU and, 47; opposition of, to reappraisals of 1965–66 events, 282, 284–85, 287–88; propaganda appeals to, 166. See also abangan; Darul Islam; Islamism; santri

Musso, 36, 320n19

For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu
Mutaiqim, Abdul Ghofur, 172
mutilation, of political enemies, 15, 21, 130, 131. See also repertoire of violence
Mutual Security Act (US), 96
Nagasaki, 307
Nahdlatul Ulama. See NU
Nanga-Nanga prison camp, 223
Nasakom (Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme), 30, 40, 42, 50
Nasser, Gamal, 84
Nasution, A. B., 159, 204
Nathan, Andrew, 294
National Front Government, 36
National Human Rights Commission. See Komnas HAM
nationalism: during Cold War, 84–85; and formation of Indonesia, 29; and independence, 33; under Japanese occupation, 31; Sukarno’s, 25, 29–30, 33, 40–41, 85
nationalization of industries and properties, 38–39, 45, 51, 89, 145
National Revolution (1945–49), 25, 31, 32–37, 86
Nazi Germany, 4, 133, 166, 187, 251, 298, 311, 389n2
Nefos (New Emerging Forces), 40
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 84
Nekolim (Neokolonialisme, Kolonialisme, Imperialisme), 40, 42, 44, 204
Netherlands: advocacy of, for political detainees, 239; colonial rule by, 25, 28–31, 33, 39, 42, 86; economic aid provided by, 205; and 1965–66 events, 187–86, 188; and psychological testing of prisoners, 226
New Order: disciplinary practices of, 252–60; effects of rule by, 3–4, 12; ideological screening and protocols of, 252–56; order as obsession of, 57, 58, 63, 209, 238, 263, 300; persistence of mind-set of, 264–65, 278–91, 307; propaganda sponsored by, 256–60; reappraisal of, 264–77; resistance and dissent under, 260–63; rise of, 3; treatment of ex-tapols under, 247–63; US support of, 10. See also mass incarceration; mass killing; 1965–66 events
New York Review of Books (magazine), 246
New Zealand, 107, 110, 177, 195, 337n104
Njono, 69, 211
Njoto, 44, 122, 330n66
Nkrumah, Kwame, 84
nonalignment, 9, 85
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 238, 240, 262, 265–66, 268–71
Noor, M., 163
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 111
North Korea, 88
North Sulawesi, 226, 227
North Sumatra: army posture and capacity in, 151; land reform in, 51–52; mass killing in, 8, 63, 134, 139, 151, 162, 345n58; militia groups in, 162
North Vietnam, 83, 90, 116, 190
NSC. See US National Security Council
NU (Nahdlatul Ulama): hostility of, to PKI, 9, 48, 62, 142, 171, 173; and land reform, 48, 51, 144–45; management affiliated with, 145; and mass killing,
Index [423]

Index: 11, 142, 266; Muslims affiliated with, 141–42; after October 1st events, 62; paramilitary groups of, 21, 48, 133, 157–58, 159, 212; in pre-Movement politics, 9, 37, 47–48; and reconciliation initiatives, 271, 280, 386n75; US support of, 104

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 87

nuclear weapons, 84, 87, 92, 113–14

Nugroho, Bambang Isti, 379n87

Nusa Kambangan prison, 223

October 1st Movement. See Gestok; September 30th Movement

Oei Tjoe Tat, 61, 211

Oka, Ida Bagus, 174

On the Origin of Fear (documentary), 276

Operation Rolling Thunder, 83

Oppenheimer, Joshua, 129; The Act of Killing, 121, 137, 277, 300, 301, 352n43; The Look of Silence, 136–37, 258, 274, 277, 278, 287, 300, 301, 352n43

oral histories, 273–74

order and discipline, New Order’s obsession with, 57, 58, 63, 209, 238, 263, 300

Orwellian mindset, 224, 254

Pakistan, 110

Pamuntjak, Laksmi, Amba, 274

Pancasila (Five Principles), 37, 40, 42, 225, 232, 243, 258–59, 320n23

Pancasila Front, 287

Panjaitan, Luhut B., 283

Papua/West Papua, 3, 303

paramilitary groups: army’s mobilization of, 36; during Japanese wartime occupation, 31; and mass killing, 133; mobilized against rebels, 34; NU-connected, 48. See also militia groups

Parman, 104, 105, 338n112

Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), 62, 134, 144–45, 158, 175

Partai Komunis Indonesia. See PKI

Partai Nasional Indonesia. See PNI

Partai Sosialis Indonesia. See PSI

Partindo (Partai Indonesia), 122, 143

Pauker, Guy, 99, 139, 338n112

Paz Estenssoro, Victor, 85

PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), 249

Peck, Edward, 109–10

Pembela Rakyat (People’s Defenders), 162

Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia. See PRRI

Pemuda Demokrat (Democratic Youth), 133

Pemuda Katolik (Catholic Youth), 134, 175

Pemuda Marhaen (Marhaenist Youth), 21, 49, 119, 133, 159, 162, 212

Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), 133–34, 159, 212, 280, 287, 288, 301

Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth): alleged role of, in generals’ killing, 165; PKI affiliation of, 48; propaganda about, 168; and September 30th Movement, 57–59, 68, 71, 113; violence directed against, 121, 131, 153

Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September/ PKI (The treachery of the September 30th Movement/Indonesian Communist Party) (film), 257, 275

People’s Daily (newspaper), 187–88

Permak (Persatuan Masyarakat Anti-Komunis Jawa Barat), 285–86

Permesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta), 38, 94

Permina, 335n62

perpetrators, of mass violence: bringing to justice of, 268, 270–71, 277; characteristics of, 7, 132–34; psychology of, 12, 17, 136–37, 212–13, 300–301; silence of, 290–91; testimonies from, 124–31, 169, 273–74

Pertamin, 335n62

Pertamina, 241

pesantren (Islamic boarding school), 141, 172

Pesindo, 34

Peta (Pembela Tanah Air), 31

Philippines, 86, 98, 303

Piagam Perdjuangan Semesta. See Permesta

Pietikainen, Petteri, 226

Pizzicaro, John T., 11

PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia): army relations with, 6, 9, 20, 22–24, 35–36,
PKI (continued)
39, 45–46, 46–47, 49–50, 53, 60–61, 79–80, 180; atheism imputed to, 36, 47–48, 140, 142–43, 166, 172; Balinese affiliated with, 143; banning of, 219, 252, 255, 256, 266, 279; detentions and political restrictions justified by alleged links to, 214, 219–20, 236, 243, 245–46, 248–60; history of, 42–44; informers among, 212–13, 218; key role of, 42–45; and land reform, 47, 51, 143, 144–45; Muslim attitudes toward, 47, 142; and national revolution, 36; number of members killed or mistreated, 315; outlawing of, 65; persistence of hostility to, 278–91, 307; political achievements of, 44; popularity of, 42–44; in pre-Movement politics, 9, 37–38, 42–45, 49–53; pretext for acting against, 83, 103–12, 116; prisoners categorized based on alleged links to, 219–20; propaganda and psywar campaigns against, 106–13, 116, 163–71, 191–95, 240–41, 354n90; demonization as component of, 166–67, 354n90; New Order–sponsored, 256–60; role of, in mass killing, 163–71; schoolchildren as target of, 257–58, 379n81; US-led, 22, 92–93. See also information about 1965–66 events; psywar

Prison Songs: Nyanyian Yang Dibungkam (song collection), 275
propaganda: army-led, 6, 12, 20, 61, 114, 163–71, 191–95, 240–41, 354n90; demonization as component of, 166–67, 354n90; New Order–sponsored, 256–60; role of, in mass killing, 163–71; schoolchildren as target of, 257–58, 379n81; US-led, 22, 92–93. See also information about 1965–66 events; psywar

Proper Justice Party, 287
Protestants, 132, 174, 302
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia), 38, 94
PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia): Balinese affiliated with, 142; in pre-Movement politics, 37, 38; Sukarno’s banning of, 95; US support of, 93–94
spsychological warfare. See psywar

psychology: and ideological screening, 252–56; of mass incarceration, 212–13, 221, 225–26, 231–33, 235–36, 300–301, 304–5; of mass killing, 136–37, 300–301, 304–5; and testing of political detainees, 225–26
psywar: Indonesian, 170–71, 191–95; of US and other foreign powers, 106–13, 116, 188–96. See also propaganda

public executions, 130
punishment: collective, 32, 247, 256, 378n74; Japanese influence on, 32; in prison camps, 230; restrictions on detainees as forms of, 247

Putih Abu-Abu: Masa Lalu Perempuan (documentary), 274, 276
Index

Raborn, W. F., 10, 77, 103
race. See ethnicity/race
Rachmat, Basoeki, 151
Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), 55, 169, 191–92
Radio Jakarta, 192, 193
Radio Malaysia, 193
Radio Peking, 187
Rahim, J. A., 110–11
Ramlı, 131
rape. See sexual violence
Ratih, Ayu, 272
rebels and rebellions, methods of dealing with, 31, 34, 35
reconciliation initiatives, 264, 268, 269–71, 281–82, 305–6, 308, 382n28
Reksosamudro, Pranoto, 57
religion: and anti-PKI sentiment, 171–75; effects of 1965–66 events on, 302; as factor in mass killing, 7, 132, 140–43, 163, 171–75; ideological affiliations in relation to, 141–43; orthodoxy vs. heterodoxy in, 302; political role of, 29–30; propaganda appeals to, 166; and reconciliation initiatives, 270; as remedy for psychological trauma, 301 reparations, 267, 270–71
repertoire of violence: defined, 16; events of 1965–66 as reinforcement of, 303; as factor in mass violence, 16, 21, 133, 296; Japanese influence on, 32; massacre as component of, 138–39; national revolution’s influence on, 33–34; state use of, 305; used in mass atrocities, 131–32 representation, as factor in mass violence, 17–18, 297
Republicans, and national revolution, 33–37
Reston, James, 195–96
restorative justice, 271, 281
restrictions, on released detainees. See ex-tapols
Revolutionary Council (Dewan Revolusi), 56
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. See PRRI
rice, 197, 198–99, 205
Ricklef, Merle, 301
Right, the: army associated with, 42, 43, 53, 88, 91, 295; the Left vs., 24, 38, 64, 84, 89, 113, 115–16, 295; Muslims associated with, 142–43; opposition of, to Sukarno, 91–92; political parties associated with, 142, 145; pre-Movement political role of, 9
Rochijat, Pipit, 131, 142
Rookmaker (Dutch official), 186
Roosa, John, 14, 78–80, 114, 123, 280, 329n63
RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat), 151, 155, 160–61, 350n15–16
Rusk, Dean, 100–101
Rwanda, 4, 123, 298, 306, 311
Ryacudu, Ryamizard, 282–83
Sabilillah, 36
Said, Salim Haji, 72
Sakirman, 122, 339n65, 339n66
Saleh, Chaerul, 104, 111, 335n62, 336n85
Salemba prison, 223
Sang Penari (film), 276
Santikarma, Degung, 272
Santri (devout Muslims), 13, 141–42
Sarban, 103
SARBUPRI (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia), 51, 145
Schaefer, Bernd, 194
school curriculum, 257–58, 274, 280, 379n81
Scott, Peter Dale, 76, 303
Secret Intelligence Service of the UK (MI6): covert operations of, 194; involvement of, in Indonesian politics, 14; and September 30th Movement, 76, 78, 329n62
Seda, 205, 364n112
Sekber 1965 (Sekretariat Bersama 1965), 270–71
September 30th Movement: army support for, 152; as army undertaking, 70–72, 74–75; events precipitated by, 6, 54–57, 324n4; evidence concerning, 68–70, 73, 168, 170, 217–18; foiling generals’ coup as purpose of, 111–12; foreign role in, 76–78, 82–83, 107–17; interpretations of, 66–81, 272; official version of, 66–71, 242, 326n21, 326n22; popular support for, 60; Sukarno’s role in, 56–61, 72–74; treatment of individuals based on alleged links to,
September 30th Movement (continued)  
219, 254–55; words and actions  
directed against, 152, 164–67. See also  
generals, abduction and execution of;  
1965–66 events  
Seventh-Day Adventists, 302  
sexual violence: in army’s repertoire of  
violence, 21; attributed to Gerwani,  
167, 217; in detention, 216–17;  
instances of, 7, 15, 130–31; Japanese  
introduction to Indonesian Army of,  
32; women subject to, 130, 216–17, 302  
The Shadow Play (documentary), 276  
Shell Oil, 51  
show trials, 11, 21, 63, 69, 220, 238  
Sihanouk, Norodom, 303  
silence/silencing, 306–13; authorities’  
enforcement of, 21, 256, 259–60,  
306–9, 311–12; legacies of, 5–6, 305;  
other countries’ responses to crimes  
against humanity, 306; of political  
dissent, 301; popular reinforcement of,  
284–91; questions concerning, 12–13,  
20, 22, 306–7; resistance to, 260–63,  
265–77, 306; of US and other interna-
tional actors, 22, 23, 120, 178–85,  
206–7, 295, 306, 309; of victims and  
witnesses, 12, 231, 249–50, 301, 308–9  
Simatupang, Tomi, 276  
Simpson, Bradley, 89, 356n2  
Sitepu, Ulung, 151  
Sjaafiuddin, 151  
Sjam, 66–67, 69–70, 78–80, 329n62  
SKP-HAM (Solidaritas Korban Pelangga-
ran Hak Asasi Manusia), 270  
Slamet, Bing, 275  
Smith, Joseph, 93  
Sobiran, 151  
SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh  
Indonesia), 145  
socioeconomic conditions, as factor in  
mass violence, 13–14, 144–46  
Soedjono, Welly, 161  
Soegandi, 192  
Soe Hok Gie, 261  
Soetarmadjii, 151, 349n12  
SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan  
Sosialis Indonesia), 145  
South Africa, 251, 306  
South Kalimantan, 35  
South Korea, 98  
South Sulawesi, 35, 226  
South Vietnam, 83, 91, 98, 103, 116  
Soviet Union: Chinese relations with, 187,  
201; in Cold War, 23, 84; ideological  
underpinning of, 298; mass incarcera-
tion in, 212, 214; mass killing in, 4,  
310; military support from, 96, 100,  
113, 197, 201; and 1965–66 events, 178,  
185, 187; silence in face of crimes  
against humanity in, 307  
Spain, 212, 217  
Srivijaya, 28  
Stalin, Joseph, 35, 212, 214, 298, 299  
Stannard, Ted, 196  
Stanvac, 51, 89, 335n62  
state: capacity, 16; competing conceptions  
of, 35; democracy in, 37–40; effects of  
1965–66 events on, 303–5; formation  
of, 24–25, 318n1; militarization of, 25,  
31 (see also militarism, foundation of  
mass violence in); national revolution  
and the formation of, 32–37. See also  
Indonesia; postcolonial state  
Strait Times (newspaper), 195  
Straus, Scott, 16, 17, 297  
struggle organizations. See lasykar  
student groups, 158–59, 285, 289  
Suara Islam (newspaper), 68  
Suara Malaysia (radio station), 194  
Subandrio, 50–51, 61, 63, 73, 87, 107, 112,  
204, 210–11, 272–73  
Subchan, Z. E., 62, 158, 165, 204  
Subekti, Iskandar, 329n63  
Subianto, Prabowo, 301  
Subono, Bambang, 379n87  
Subroto, 166  
Sudiman, 103  
Sudisman, 69, 208, 211, 213, 215, 238,  
260–61  
Sudjatmoko, Iwan Gardono, 272  
Sudomo, 121, 244, 248  
Sugama, Yoga, 108  
Sugandhi, 196, 354n77  
Suharto: background of, 31; command  
of army assumed by, 56–57; and  
Malaysia, 108; and mass incarcera-
tion, 219, 229, 236; and mass killing,  
148–49, 153, 156, 175, 299; and  
1965–66 events, 6, 14; and official
account of September 30th Movement, 71; photograph of, 180; political network of, 99; political power assumed by, 61–66, 177, 183, 204; regime of, 66, 209, 249, 307; resignation of, 11, 208, 257, 263, 264–65; rhetoric of, 164; and September 30th Movement, 56–57, 74–75, 79, 328n47; US and other western support of, 10, 22, 103–4, 180–81, 183–84, 199, 201, 204–6
Sukarni, 336n85
Sukarno: abduction of, 72; alleged plot against, 50–51; army relations with, 46–47, 60, 72, 180; Dutch detention of, 31, 40; Guided Democracy declared by, 39–40; health of, 52–53, 55, 88, 114; key role of, 40–42; Left-leaning politics of, 9–10, 50, 58–59, 88, 95; martial law declared by, 38; and mass incarceration, 219; nationalism of, 25, 29–30, 33, 37, 40–42, 85; and 1965–66 events, 150, 156, 183; photographs of, 30, 41, 90; PKI relations with, 6, 9, 41–42, 53, 67, 322n45; politics of, 41–42; presidency assumed by, 37; reputation and popularity of, 40, 59–60; on revolution, 27; and September 30th Movement, 56–61, 72–74, 78–79, 167, 193; undermining and deposition of, 3, 6, 60, 65–66, 72–73, 83, 94, 106–12, 116, 184–85, 188, 189, 196, 198, 321n34; US relations with, 10, 22, 42, 89–91, 94–96, 102–4, 116, 178–80, 204
Sukendro, 194–95, 201, 338n112, 361n69
Sulami, Ibu, 272
Sulawesi, 8, 38, 45, 94. See also North Sulawesi; South Sulawesi
Sulistiyono, Hermawan, 272
Sumatra, rebellion in, 38, 45, 94
Sumber-Rejo prison camp, 223, 244, 304
Sumitro (armed forces psychologist), 225
Sumitro (Kopkamtib commander), 234, 235–36
Sumiyarsi, 214, 216, 224
Supardjo, 211, 325n5, 329n63
Supersemar (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret), 65
Suprapto, 338n112
Suroto, 218
survivors’ needs, 264, 268, 269–71
Suryaman, Asep, 329n63
Suryani, Lilis, 275
Sutari, Luh, 248
Suteja, Anak Agung Bagus, 143, 151
Sutjipto, 351n36
Sutowo, Ibu, 335n62
Sutrisno, Try, 237, 254
Suwarto, 71, 99, 334n59, 338n112
Sweden, 178, 185–87
Syarikat (Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat), 271, 274, 276, 386n75
Tameng Marhaenis. See Pemuda Marhaen
Tan Swie Ling, 224
Tangerang prison, 211, 223
Tanjung, Feisal, 261, 262
Tanks/armored personnel carriers, 153
Tanter, Richard, 193–94
Tapol (human rights organization), 239, 260, 269
Taylor, Maxwell, 98
Taylor, Ross, 128, 155
Templeton, M. J. C., 110, 337n104
Tempo (magazine), 257, 272, 273
Tentara Islam Indonesia, 35
Terlena: Breaking of a Nation (documentary), 276
Territorial Warfare, 98, 99
Thailand, 178, 199, 303
Thomson, James, 90
Time (magazine), 10, 13
Tim Indoktrinasi (Indoctrination Teams), 170
Tim Komando Operasi Mental (Operation Mental Command Teams), 170
Tim Operasi Kalang, 215
Timor Leste. See East Timor
Tim Penerangan Operasi Mental (Operation Mental Information Teams), 170
Tjidurian 19 (documentary), 276
Topping, Seymour, 362n78
torture. See interrogation and torture
Tovar, Hugh, 11
tower Amendment (US), 100, 101
trauma, 300–301
Tritura (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat), 62
For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu
trucks, 154–55
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 11, 266, 267, 279
Tsai, Yenling, 227
Turkey, 187
TVRI (television station), 169
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 310
UN Human Rights Council, 269
Union of Catholic University Students, 134
United Nations: Indonesian involvements of, 33; Indonesian withdrawal from, 9, 42, 185; and 1965–66 events, 23, 185, 269, 310
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 240
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 37
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 269
Untung, 54–57, 60, 63, 69, 70, 73, 74, 79, 189, 194, 211, 320
Untung, Bedjo, 288–89
US Army Service Schools, 97–98
US Congress, 100–101, 239–40, 244, 262
US Embassy, 91, 95, 105, 110, 118, 153, 159–60, 179, 181–84, 190–93, 196, 198–203, 201, 205, 206, 228
US Information Service (USIS), 93, 183, 190
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 97
US Rubber Company, 51
Utami, Ayu, 38, 46
utopianism, 16–17, 298
Valentino, Benjamin, 16
Van der Kroef, Justus M., 253
Van Klinken, Gerry, 130, 163
Vietnam, 86, 90–91, 303. See also North Vietnam; South Vietnam
Vietnam War, 25, 52, 77, 83, 90, 116
vigilantes: army’s provision of weapons to, 154; and detentions, 212; and mass killing, 133–34, 162–63; mobilized against PKI, 155; mobilized against rebels, 34. See also death squads; militia groups
violence. See genocide; mass killing; repertoire of violence
Voice of America (VOA), 190–92
voting rights, 248
Wahid, Abdurahman, 11, 266, 279
Walendouw, Jan, 121
Walujo, 218
war, mass violence as outgrowth of, 18, 299
Wardaya, Baskara, 272
Watch Indonesia, 269
weapons. See arms, US provision of
Weitz, Eric, 16, 299
Wertheim, W. F., 78
West Java: army posture and capacity in, 150–51; detentions in, 8, 150–51, 226–27; Islamic actors in, 35; mass killing in, 8, 132, 134; rebellion in, 45
West Kalimantan, 64, 326n19
Wibowo, Pramono Edhie, 259, 259
Widjanarko, Bambang, 73
Widodo, Joko (commonly known as Jokowi), 267, 271, 281–83, 288
Wieringa, Saskia, 167
Wilson, Harold, 102
Wirahadikusuma, Umar, 57
Wiranto, 281–82
women: atrocities against, 130, 216–17, 217, 302; effects of 1965–66 events on status of, 302–3. See also Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia)
The Women and the Generals (documentary), 276
Woolcott, Richard, 195
World Bank, 206, 241
World History Project, 5
Yani, 51, 56, 57, 72–73, 75, 95, 100, 104, 106, 111–12, 194, 323n54, 323n67
Yap Thiam Hien, 224–25, 247
Young, Ken, 123, 162
YPKP (Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965–66), 268, 286–88
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 280
Zhou, Taomo, 114–15
Zurbuchen, Mary, 290, 308, 385n66