CONTENTS

1

Introduction: The Origins of *Philosophia*

A History of *Philosophia*, Not of Philosophy

This book tells a new story of the origin of *philosophia*—the Greek name, and the discipline that it came to name. It begins around 500 BCE, with the coinage not of a self-lauding "love of wisdom" but with a wry verbal slight, and concludes a century and a half later, in the maturity of an institution that is continuous with today's departments of philosophy. This phenomenon—accommodating a name-calling name and consolidating a structured group around it—recurs through history, as the cases of the Quakers, Shakers, Freaks, and queer activists illustrate.[1] A norm-policing name, at first distasteful, gets appropriated, facilitates a new and ennobling self-understanding, and then governs a productive and tight-knit social enterprise. I argue that such is the origin of *philosophia*.

The name *philosophos* seems to have begun as "sage-wannabe," a bemused label for a person's repetitive and presumed excessive efforts to join the category of *sophoi*, the political advice-giving sages of the Greek world. The label stuck. Eventually, a fashion for etymological invention glossed *philosophos* as "lover of wisdom." The gloss caught on, but not because it had recovered a historical truth; rather, it sounded good, and provided a happy construction on what those called it were feeling. In this way, every philosophy instructor's class-opening exhortation to philosophy anachronizes, retrojecting fourth-century BCE linguistic play onto the term's coinage many generations earlier. Relatedly, most historians of ancient philosophy, guilty not of anachronism but of partiality to the fourth century, ignore the word's early years, treating it as an unremarkable term meaning "cultivator of one's intellect," a word that on

[1] For the Shakers, see Evans 1859, ch. 1, ¶26 (with ¶¶15–22): "Sometimes, after sitting awhile in silent meditation, they were seized with a mighty trembling, under which they would often express the indignation of God against all sin. At other times, they were exercised with singing, shouting, and leaping for joy, at the near prospect of salvation. They were often exercised with great agitation of body and limbs, shaking, running, and walking the floor, with a variety of other operations and signs, swiftly passing and repassing each other, like clouds agitated with a mighty wind. These exercises, so strange in the eyes of the beholders, brought upon them the appellation of Shakers, which has been their most common name of distinction ever since."

their reading happened to catch Plato's fancy, who then singlehandedly made it a technical term and a distinctive life-defining goal. Neither view—"lover of wisdom" or "intellectual cultivator"—squares with the evidence from the first century of the expression's use, and neither attends to the way reflection on the expression contributed to the very thing to which the fraught term applied. Just as a sand grain irritates the oyster into making a pearl, a once-irritating word, PHILOSOPHOS, helped bring about the discipline of *philosophia* among the pearls of fourth-century BCE Athens.

In its focus on the origin of *philosophia*, this book differs from studies that seek the origin of philosophy, whether in Greece or elsewhere. Such studies must start by deciding what counts for us moderns as philosophy, then figure out what kind of ancient evidence would justify our finding philosophy in some early practice, and finally gather whatever evidence is available and explain how this evidence could identify the origin of such practices.[2] These studies have cogent goals, to be sure, tracing back our distinctive reason-giving enterprise, studying the conditions under which it arose, and reconstructing the dialectical process by which familiar concepts, distinctions, and problems became salient. Their work is genuinely philosophical, because recognizing reasons *as* reasons means acknowledging and evaluating the normative force of various claims. But they confront serious methodological challenges when they encounter the equivocal evidence on which the issue of origins must rely. The basis on which we are to ascertain the existence of some "philosophy" way back when seems undecideable. After all, what counts as philosophy *now* is hardly obvious, given the complexity of our practices, not to mention the diversity and disagreements within the field. What counts as ancient evidence for (our idea of) philosophy is no easier to decide. Some might look for explicit dialectical engagement, others for explicit argumentative inference, and yet others for non-theistic explanation. Adding to the difficulty, our evidence for the earliest candidate philosophers comes to us pre-interpreted by later philosophers, such as Aristotle, who might perhaps have to take responsibility for *making* them philosophical in our sense. To be sure, the best such studies confront these methodological challenges explicitly and provide deep insight into the nature of philosophy, whatever it may be, in the ancient world. Yet none avoids a fealty to present-day ideas. Perhaps a rational demonstration is a rational demonstration, in 500 BCE as much as now. But was any particular case of rational demonstration philosophy? Was anything nondemonstrative or

[2] Sassi 2018 provides one of the clearest recent examples of this approach (see p. 277n50 below for her application of this method to Thales). Frede 2000 and Palmer 2009 contain subtle reflections on the historiography of the development of ancient philosophy. See also Lloyd 1970, "Preface" and 1–15; Collins 2000, 82–92.

nonrational philosophy? How many people had to share in this demonstrative practice for "philosophy" to become recognizable or count as a practice, institution, and discipline? These are intractable questions, and there is no ready criterion to which one might appeal.

Fortunately, there is a criterion for *something*, when we shift approaches. Rather than struggle to apply our own complicated concepts to a complicated past, we might study the concepts that our forebears used. This is the contextualist or historicizing approach. Unable to decide on the first "philosophers," we can still decide on the first "*philosophoi*." Whereas for historians of philosophy, the earliest known philosophers may have been Thales and Anaximander, for historians of *philosophia*, the earliest known *philosophoi* were those called *philosophoi* in the earliest attestations of the term: as it seems to turn out, people associated with Pythagoras or early fifth-century BCE Ionians. The history of *philosophia* eventually includes Thales and Anaximander, but only once early Academic (fourth century BCE) authors strove to identify and baptize precursors. The evidence we have allows us to see the development of a cultural phenomenon that the Greeks could themselves see, reflect on, react to, and consciously or unconsciously modify, one that may have begun in Magna Graeca rather than Asia Minor.[3] The Greeks certainly talked about *philosophia*; why they did so, and what effect on *philosophia* came about as a result, is the concern of this book.

A new approach to the origins of the discipline is encouraged not just by the desire to track ancient rather than modern concepts, to discuss social rather than purely rational phenomena. It is also encouraged by a puzzling feature of ancient histories of philosophy. Over more than a millennium of accounts, and with provocative regularity, ancient authors advert to the origin of the very word *philosophos*. No other discipline pauses with such care to reflect on the introduction of its name—not astronomy, not poetics, not mathematics. Not only that, but from at least the fourth century BCE, these historians, otherwise impresarios of disagreement, partisans of some school, or skeptics about all factions, took a single and unwavering view of that origin; we know of no rejections, suspicions, or alternative accounts.[4] The story they told of that lexical origin, the analysis of which provides a narrative thread for my book, took varied forms, and differences among them are important; but the striking consensus about the core claim is even more important. We find the account in Aristotle, and in his once-famous colleague Heraclides Ponticus; in a rig-

[3] Ionia may have had the conditions for coinage of the term (see Emlyn-Jones 1980, 97–111, 164–77), but we lack any evidence for the coinage of the term there.

[4] We do of course know of differing accounts of the *development* of the discipline; see, for example, Laks 2018.

orous second-century BCE historian of philosophers, Sosicrates of Rhodes; in the (conjectured) first-century CE encyclopedist of philosophy Aëtius; in the Roman philosopher-rhetorician Cicero and rhetorician-philosopher Quintilian; in the omnivorous historians Valerius Maximus and Diodorus Siculus; in the Platonist intellectuals Apuleius and Maximus; in the neo-Platonist scholars Iamblichus and Hermias; in the Christian-philosophical apologists Augustine and Clement; in the Church Fathers Ambrose and Isidore; and in two biographers of Greek philosophers who may have read more sources than anyone else, Diogenes Laertius and Eusebius.[5]

The version attributed to Sosicrates (fl. < 145 BCE) provides a conveniently compressed starting place.[6] We find it in Diogenes Laertius's *Life of Pythagoras*, one of the late chapters of his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (ca. third century CE), a sequence of biographies of earlier Greek thinkers and the essential extant source for ancient philosophy anecdotes. In his work, Sosicrates sets out the history of philosophical teacher-student relationships, and Diogenes generally relies on him for his rigorous historical skepticism.[7] Here he quotes or paraphrases Sosicrates's work on academic lineages, called *Successions*:

> [Pythagoras], being asked by Leon tyrant of Phlius what he was (τίς εἴη), said [he was] a *philosophos* (φιλόσοφον).[8] And he likened life to a festival, since some come to it to compete, some for business, some, indeed the best, as spectators; thus in life some are slavish, he said, born (φύονται)[9] as hunters after reputation and excess, but *philosophoi* [are hunters] after truth (ἀληθείας).[10] (DL 8.8)

[5] Aët. 1.3.7; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.3.8–9; Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.19; Val. Max. 8.7 ext. 2; DS 10 fr. 24; Apul. *Apol.* 4.7; *Flor.* 15.22; Max. Tyr. 1.2a; Iambl. *VP* 12 with *Pro.* 9; Hermias *In Phdr.* 278a; August. *De civ. D.* 8.2; *De trin.* 14.1.2; Clem. *Strom.* 1.61.4; Ambrose *De Abr.* 2.7.37; Isid. 8.6, 14.6; DL 1.12, 8.8; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 10.14.3; *Chron.* 14.2–4 Helm. See the Appendix for all texts.

[6] For the date, see Strabo 10.4.3, with discussion in Giannattasio Andria 1989 and *BNJ* 461.

[7] Contrarian views on life-dates: 1.38 (Thales), 1.49 and 1.62 (Solon), 1.68 (Chilon), 1.95 (Periander), 1.101 (Anacharsis); contrarian views on literary authenticity: 2.84 (Aristippus), 6.80 (Diogenes), 7.163 (Ariston of Chion); precise anecdotes: 1.75 (Pittacus), 1.106–7 (Myson's father), 6.82 (Monimus, a student of Diogenes), 6.13 (first cloak-doubler). See also Ath. 4.163f (a Pythagorean's fashion innovations), 10.422c (Crates, cf. DL 6.90). This Sosicrates may have written a famously rigorous *History of Crete* (DS 5.80; Ath. 6.263f; Σ Eur. *Hipp.* 47; Σ Ar. *Av.* 521).

[8] One version of this text (Φ, the Vatican excerpt) prints φιλόσοφος as direct speech; this presents Pythagoras as having actually used the term, and might present this brief account as abstracting from a longer dramatic version.

[9] Marcovich 1999 conjectures φαίνονται ("appear") for φύονται, against all manuscripts. The verb one chooses determines the degree of Pythagorean doctrine of soul-transmigration found in this passage, and may affect one's view of its sources.

[10] For the Greek of this passage, see Appendix, p. 321.

On the surface, this two-sentence tale is simple; but it also has important implications. Pythagoras calls himself a *philosophos*; uses an analogy to describe *philosophoi* and to differentiate them from other kinds of people; and says that *philosophoi* strive after an elusive truth. That Leon, from a city neighboring Corinth between the Peloponnese and Attica, has to ask what Pythagoras takes himself to be suggests that Pythagoras acts or speaks in an unfamiliar way. That the story takes place during Pythagoras's life, around the end of the sixth century or early in the fifth century BCE, and that Leon does not know the word *philosophos*, or at least not when applied to oneself, implies the word's coinage in that period. That Pythagoras has to provide an elaborate analogy to explain the term tells us that the meaning of *philosophos* is not transparent or apparent from its putative parts even to elite Greek speakers. That Pythagoras does not find it appropriate to define the word *philosophos* in terms either of love or of wisdom, but only in the rhyming terms of observation (*theatai*) and hunting (*thêratai*),[11] implies that he did not coin the term himself: were the implausibility of describing oneself with a private neologism not enough, he would need to explain why he created and used the word *philosophos* in particular. That *philosophoi* are compared as a group to Olympic athletes and traveling salespeople suggests that they could be recognized as a type.[12] Finally, that Pythagoras is the protagonist of this story means that Pythagoras was viewed as an archetypal *philosophos*.

Already we see reasons against accepting the standard accounts of "philosopher" as meaning (etymologically) "lover of wisdom" or (initially) "intellectual cultivator"; other versions of the Pythagoras story provide similar reasons. If the former meaning were obvious, Pythagoras would not have needed to explain who *philosophoi* are; at most he might have discussed the way his actions or speeches reveal his love of wisdom. If the latter were valid, again he would not have needed to explain who *philosophoi* are; Leon would have to be obtuse not to appreciate the basic idea of cultivating one's intellect. Nothing said here precludes people from *later* saying that *philosophos* means "lover of wisdom" or using it to mean "intellectual cultivator." In fact, we find both in the fourth century BCE, as early as the work of Plato and Alcidamas, and then more prominently in Aristotle. But calling *philosophoi* "lovers of wisdom" is

[11] One might wonder, given Sosicrates's late date, whether this metaphor relies on Plato's "hunting for what's real" (τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν, *Phd.* 66c2; cf. Iambl. *Pro.* 13.64,2 and 20.99,15), but since the metaphorical use of hunting for a quasi-abstract object exists from the fifth century BCE, this cannot be determined. Other important fourth-century BCE hunting references are at Xen. *Cyn.* 12–13; Pl. *Soph.* 218d–223b.

[12] It may be worth noting that Pythagoras's adopted hometown, Croton, enjoyed amazing success at athletic festivals (Dunbabin 1948, 369–70), and that Pythagoras's contemporary Xenophanes also vaunted his intellectual *sophia* over athletic glory (B2/D61).

a conscious achievement; of course, using the term to mean "intellectual cultivator" in a broad and undifferentiated sense is another achievement, though this one is perhaps less deliberate.[13]

This book's argument has two parts. The first concerns the coinage of the word *philosophos*. *Phil-* prefixed terms in the sixth and early fifth centuries BCE, at the time *philosophos* was coined, tend to be name-calling names. They tend to call out those so named for excessive activity related to a social practice referred to synecdochally by the word's second element; there is no evidence that the *phil-* prefix indicated the affection of "love." For example, *philaitios*, with the second element *aitia*, "cause," or in its social context, "legal motion," means excessive activity in lawsuits, or "litigious." This word has pejorative rather than laudatory valence, and it does not impute an *affection* for causes or legal motions.[14] The second element in *philosophos* is *soph-*, the root of *sophos*, which, as I argue later, referred at the end of the sixth century BCE particularly to "sages," culturally prominent, socially elite, intellectually wide-ranging civic and domestic advisers typified though not exhausted by the "Seven *Sophoi*" of the early sixth century BCE. So calling someone *philosophos* would seem to impute an excessive tendency to act like sages or to seek after the status of sages (broadly construed), presumably through advice-giving and study, where this practice or aspiration would seem dubious, problematic, or even ridiculous. Word invention would satisfy the impulse to label certain people who act in ways that are not adequately described by any other label. The political, intellectual, and religious circle of Pythagoreans in late sixth-century and early fifth-century BCE Magna Graeca provides the most plausible agent for occasioning this linguistic creation and subsequent diffusion (whatever the nature of that group's constitution).

The second part of my argument concerns the trajectory of the term *philosophos*. Through the fifth century BCE it was applied to people acting like those Pythagoreans: giving sage advice about ethical and existential

[13] The earliest extant Greek use known to me of *philein sophian*, "loving wisdom," is in the Septuagint *Prov.* 29.3 (second century–first century BCE); the earliest use of *philian sophias*, "love of wisdom," in Nicomachus's *Introduction to Arithmetic* 1.1.1.2 (60–120 CE—John Philoponus attributes to Nicomachus this definition of philosophy [*In Nic. Isag. Arithm.* 1.8; cf. 1.52, 15.2, 21.20]); and the earliest use of *philos sophias*, "lover of wisdom," in Euseb. *Vit. Const.* 4.2.8 (fourth century CE). Pl. *Lys.* 212d8 (. . . ἂν μὴ ἡ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλῇ) admittedly gets close.

[14] Aesch. fr. 326a.14 (attributed to the poet's voice); *Supp.* 485; there is a maxim, Μὴ φιλαίτιος ἴσθι ("Don't be litigious"), found in an addendum to the (fourth-century BCE) list attributed to Sosiades (Stob. 3.1.173, in the Brussels codex).

issues, making arguments that are grounded in hypotheses about the nature of the *kosmos*, and talking with erudition and precision about political matters of no immediate relevance. In time, the word could sometimes shake off the pejorative sense, becoming a sort of neutral label, for example for the self-constituting group of people who practiced formal debate about important matters for the sake of the debate, as an exercise of dialectical skill, rather than for political or forensic purposes, as an expression of Sage wisdom. As a neutral label, it could be self-applied, as increasingly it was around the turn of that century—but not universally so, since its original negativity had not yet been, and may never have been, entirely eradicated. Those being called *philosophoi* or calling themselves *philosophoi* sought to vindicate the appellation, and did so in various ways. Some gave new explanations for the very actions that led to the scornful name; some invented alternative etymologies of the term *philosophos*; and some looked backward and assembled a noble lineage of great thinkers, with whom they could carry on current debates, calling them the first and paradigmatic *philosophoi*. It is worth noting that a story of similar structure could perhaps be told about the *sophistai*, another group of people whose name is formed from the *soph-* root, perhaps around the same time and in parallel, though probably without significant interchange with the *philosophoi* until the end of the fifth century BCE.[15]

In brief, past scholarship has treated the word *philosophos* as definable by a phrase. I think we should treat it as defined rather more by application—"those people are akin to those we call *philosophoi*"—and the choice of word a result of name-calling name conventions. Treated this way, *philosophos* is defined, at the start, as in a family resemblance with the Pythagoreans, and the specific word *philosophos* serves to denote this family resemblance because the Pythagoreans were, in effect, *sophos*-wannabes. Only later could processes of abstraction liberate the term *philosophos* from its archetype.

Though this account of the origin of *philosophia* differs from an account of the origin of philosophy, it complements rather than replaces it. The name is reactive, not motivating. What got philosophy going may indeed have been wonder, or the leisured pursuit of scientific understanding, or the appreciation

[15] The word *sophistês* first appears in Pind. *Isthm.* 5.28 (after 480 BCE), and must have been in circulation before that. The *-istês* ending denotes a professional status, referring initially to clever advice-giving and musical instruction. There develops a canonical set of practitioners certainly by the early fourth century BCE (cf. Pl. *Prt.* 316c5–317c2), though probably by the late fifth century BCE, and gains a technical meaning by the time of Aristotle's works. Much more ought to be said, but space does not allow it here. See Edmunds 2006; Billings and Moore forthcoming, "Introduction."

of and confidence in large-scale claims defended by reasons.[16] Perhaps it was the moral seriousness that drove Socrates to avoid wrongdoing by learning what he could learn. Perhaps it was the fear of death and the Empedoclean quest for self-purification and psychic health. Perhaps nautical astronomy, or agricultural meteorology, or genealogical grandstanding played a role; perhaps it was influence from Egypt or Babylon or Chaldaea.[17] Scholarship on ancient philosophy has learned much from pursuing these hypotheses. But none alone explains why people got called *philosophoi*, and none explains the development of an enduring discipline—a mutually self-aware group of coordinated practitioners with a historical consciousness of their forerunners—named precisely *philosophia*. What they do aim to explain is why people like the Pythagoreans did what they did, what they did, and why and how others after the Pythagoreans did what they did. An account of the origins of philosophy takes an internal perspective, asking why, for example, Thales put water at the center of a unified cosmic account, whereas an account of the origins of *philosophia*, which I attempt to provide in this book, takes an external perspective, asking why someone would ever call Thales *philosophos*.

Internal and external accounts of origins both rely on thinner evidentiary bases than we would hope for. We no more have independent statements of Pythagoras's self-descriptions than we do of the reasoning that brought him to theorize the soul, life, or the *kosmos*. Our interpretation of the patterns of *phil-* prefixed names depends on infrequent uses at somewhat indeterminate moments after their coinage. My primary theses, which are my best explanations for the broad range of evidence that is mustered here, must still count ultimately as open to doubt and revision. In light of this weak evidentiary tissue, the story I tell may be judged a merely likely story. Even if so, it should appear likelier than the alternatives. My methodology is to study the meaning of a compound name by reconstructing the morphosemantic limitations and the historical occasions for its coinage; track the changes to its meaning with an eye to patterns of diffusion; and treat its ascendency to discipline-name on a parallel with other reappropriated names. At the book's conclusion, I reflect on the relevance of this study to our understanding of philosophy today. What I think seemed most incredible to contemporary observers of Pythagoreans or their look-alikes was their commitment to the precise discussion of (seemingly) background issues—issues that amount neither to urgent decisions nor to salacious social gossip—as instrumental for, even constitutive of, the good life.

[16] For the latter, see, e.g., Barnes 1982, 3–12; Osborne 2004, 133–35.

[17] For an ancient perspective on the non-Greek origins of or influences on *philosophia*, see, e.g., DL 1.1–11; for a more recent perspective, see West 1971.

The same incredulity, I believe, characterizes present-day popular attitudes toward philosophy.

Heraclides Ponticus's History of *Philosophia*

Sosicrates's version of the story about Pythagoras's self-appellation as *philosophos* provides key evidence about the origins of *philosophia*, with respect to both the word and the origin of the discipline it eventually came to name. To the extent that something about the story is true or plausible, we learn something important and distinctive about the earliest uses of the term *philosophos*. To the extent that people told the story—as we will see, by the fourth century BCE, just when we also see the formation of a recognizable discipline—we learn something important and distinctive about the uses of the term *philosophos* at the time that the discipline eventually came to be. Thus, this book addresses three questions about the story. What about it is historically reliable? Why would the term *philosophos* still be worth discussing in the fourth century BCE? And how did this story come to be told in this form?

The earliest name associated with the authorship of the Pythagoras story is Heraclides Ponticus, a member of Plato's Academy. Born around 390 BCE, Heraclides grew up in Heraclea, a town on the Pontus, the Black Sea. Now a city named Karadeniz Ereğli and Turkey's leading steel town, classical Heraclea forged intellectuals, including the mythographer Herodorus and his Socratic-aligned son Bryson.[18] Like many others, Heraclides moved to Athens in his youth, and rose to prominence; his school of choice was the Academy, by then a decade old.[19] Early school histories tell us that he served as acting director during one of Plato's sojourns to Sicily, and at Plato's death he was deemed a candidate for the permanent post.[20] The esteem may speak to his administrative skill or social graces, but it probably also reflects the breadth of his interests and his literary flair, insofar as he wrote philosophical dialogues and treatises with a Platonic vigor.[21] Dozens in number, they ranged from argumentative engagements with Heraclitus and Democritus to literary criticism of Homer, Hesiod, Euripides, and Sophocles, and from histories of invention

[18] On Heraclea's intellectual scene, see Burstein 1976, 5, 39–66; Desideri 1991, esp. 8–11, 14–15. Famous names include the Academic Chion, the Pythagorean Zopyrus, the Peripatetic Chamaeleon, and the Stoic Heracleotes.

[19] DL 3.46, 5.86; see Gottschalk 1980, 2–6; Mejer 2009.

[20] Acting director: *Suda* η 461, though doubt is expressed by Guthrie 1978, 483, and the claim is denied by Voss 1896, 11–13. Candidate for post: *PHerc.* 1021 col. vi.41–vii.10.

[21] Vigor: DL 5.89.

and discovery to political, legal, and ethical studies.[22] Cicero treated the dialogues in particular as vital models of the genre,[23] and others expressed their appreciation as well.[24]

Heraclides gave special attention to the history of Pythagoreanism. Diogenes Laertius attributes to him works of historical research (ἱστορικά), one of which is called *On the Pythagoreans*, and says that he studied with Pythagoreans.[25] In Porphyry's study of vegetarianism, Heraclides provides his earliest source for the gustatory and sacrificial practices of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, their most promiment and telling idiosyncrasies.[26] Clement of Alexandria cites Heraclides for Pythagoras's core ethical beliefs.[27] And the fact that several doxographers of philosophy cite Heraclides's remarkable cosmological view that each star is its own *kosmos* as a view of the Pythagoreans suggests that Heraclides himself cited the sharing and did so with approval.[28]

A version of the story of Pythagoras's self-naming elsewhere attributed to Sosicrates appears in Heraclides's work called variously *On Diseases*, *Causes of Diseases*, or, from a famous episode, *On the Woman Not Breathing*.[29] The work is lost, but Diogenes Laertius quotes or paraphrases parts of it throughout his *Life of Empedocles*; we also have secondhand citations in Galen, Pliny, and Origen.[30] None gives a plot summary, and none gives the context for the Pythagoras-as-*philosophos* episode. Nevertheless, these fragments hint at a work concerned with Empedocles and Pythagoras, and so (presumably) Pythagoras as an essential predecessor of Empedocles. This context provides clues to the provenance or plausibility of the Pythagoras story, and thus about the origin of the term *philosophia*. We begin with the material about Empedocles.

[22] List of works: DL 5.86–88.

[23] Cic. *Att.* 13.19.4, 15.4.3, 15.13.3, 15.27.2, 16.2.6, 16.11.3, 16.12; *QFr.* 3.5.1.

[24] E.g., Gell. *NA* 8 fr. xv; the extent of the reception of his work through antiquity is powerful evidence.

[25] DL 5.88, 5.86 (διήκουσε). *Suda* ε 1007 probably suggests that Heraclides wrote about Pythagoras himself.

[26] Porph. *Abst.* 1.26.2–4.

[27] Clem. *Strom.* 2.21.130.3 (~ Theodoret *Graec. aff. cur.* 11.8), namely, "knowledge of the perfection of the numbers of the soul is happiness" (or ". . . of the numbers is happiness of the soul").

[28] Aët. 2.13; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 15.30.8; ps-Gal. *Hist. phil.* 52; Theodoret *Graec. aff. cur.* 4.20.

[29] Source: Cic. *Tusc.* 5.3.9 with DL 1.12. Names: Αἰτίαι περὶ νόσων: DL 5.87; Περὶ νόσων: DL 8.51, 8.60; Περὶ τῆς ἄπνου: DL 1.12; Ἄπνους: Gal. *De loc. aff.* 6.5, *De diff. R.* 1.8. None are sure to go back to Heraclides.

[30] Fragments collected in Schütrumpf 2008, frr. 82–95 (A–D); Wehrli 1969, frr. 76–89; Voss 1896, frr. 67–78.

Diogenes treats *On Diseases* as historically authoritative about Empedocles's life.[31] As for its details of Empedocles's pyroclastic death in Mt. Aetna, he treats it as a plausible contender. In the dialogue, he says, Heraclides narrates what happened after Empedocles cured an intractable patient (the "woman not breathing"). Empedocles held a sacrifice and feast on the land of Peisianax, the patient's father. The attendees then left for the night's sleep, leaving Empedocles by himself. When they returned in the morning, nobody could find him. A servant reported having heard, in the middle of the night, an exceedingly loud sound calling to Empedocles, and then saw a heavenly light and the illumination of torches. Pausanias, a special friend of Empedocles's, started to tell people to resume their search, but then reversed himself, telling them rather to pray and to sacrifice to Empedocles "as to one having become a god" (καθαπερεὶ γεγονότι θεῷ, DL 8.67–68). In this way, Heraclides describes the origins of Empedocles's apotheosis and cult following. The fact that Timaeus of Tauromenium, a fourth-century BCE historian, is said to have taken issue with aspects of the story shows the extent to which contemporaries and successors took Heraclides's detailed account as a basically valid position in biographical debate. It also shows the centrality of Empedocles's death in understanding the sort of person—and thus perhaps what sort of philosopher—he really was.

As *On Disease*'s colloquial title, *On the Woman Not Breathing*, implies, a therapeutic marvel captured the attention of an audience—and, structurally, it led directly to Empedocles's disputed apotheosis. Heraclides says that Empedocles explained to Pausanias what was going on with the unbreathing woman (τὴν ἄπνουν), presumably at the feast celebrating his success in saving her (DL 8.60). He had preserved the body of this woman, Pantheia of Acragas, for thirty days despite a lack of breath or pulse (8.61). Other doctors had failed to understand the case.[32] It is on these grounds (ὅθεν), Diogenes says, that Heraclides calls Empedocles both a doctor and a seer, but also from the following lines (λαμβάνων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν στίχων, 8.61), which are ten of the first twelve lines of Empedocles's poem (or one of them):

> Friends, you who dwell in the great city beside the yellow Acragas 1
> On the lofty citadel and who care for good deeds

[31] DL 8.51. In the following paragraph (8.52), Diogenes may attribute to Heraclides Empedocles's death at 60 (the manuscripts print "Heraclitus," but F. W. Sturz conjectured "Heraclides" in 1805, and Dorandi 2013 thinks this may be right). That Diogenes actually first attributes the view to Aristotle, "and also" (ἔτι τε) to Heraclides, suggests that Aristotle may have cited Heraclides for the information.

[32] Gal. *De loc. aff.* 6 (they were greatly puzzled); DL 8.69 (citing Hermippus: the other doctors had given up hope).

. . .
I greet you! I, who for you am an immortal god, no longer mortal
I go among you, honored, as I am seen,
Crowned with ribbons and with blooming garlands.
Whenever I arrive with these in the flourishing cities,
I am venerated by men and by women; they follow me,
Thousands of them, asking where is the road to benefit:
Some of them desire prophecy, others ask to hear,
For illnesses of all kinds, a healing utterance,
. . .[33] (Empedocles B112/D4, trans. Laks and Most)

Empedocles says that people ask him to heal and predict the future (10–11). Diogenes seems to say that Heraclides includes these lines in his work—how else could he know that Heraclides relied on them?—but whether put in Empedocles's or another character's mouth, or presented by the narrator (Heraclides?) himself, we do not know. In any event, Diogenes treats the Pantheia episode as clinching the claim that Empedocles rather than other doctors knew both how to bring the woman back alive and how to foresee that she would return to the living. Diogenes does not, however, indicate why Heraclides wanted to show Empedocles's superiority, which he may well have taken to be factual.[34] We must turn to the two extant Pythagoras passages for information.

In his *Life of Pythagoras*, Diogenes says that Heraclides presented Pythagoras telling the following detailed story about himself.[35] He had been born a

[33] DL 8.62. See DS 13.83.1 for line 3: "Respectful harbors for strangers, inexperienced in wickedness," and Clem. *Strom.* 6.30.1 for line 12: "Pierced for a long time by terrible <*pains*>."

[34] As Origen (*C. Cels.* 2.15.40) observes, Plato's Myth of Er presents a similar situation; more convincingly, Aristotle speaks of suspended animation in his lost *Eudemus, or On the Soul* (frr. 9 and 11 Ross), and the phenomenon is not unknown in the contemporary world. In 2014, a Polish woman was declared dead, as having no pulse or breath, and left in a body bag for eleven hours (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30048087). Heraclides may have been inspired by Democritus's work, which was eventually called Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου (DL 9.46; *Suda* τ 1019; Procl. *In R.* 2.113.6–9; a work by the same name is attributed to Protagoras at DL 9.55, and Socrates in Pl. *Ap.* 29b4–5 says that he does not know sufficiently "about those [things] in Hades" [περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου], apparently a topic appropriate for *sophoi* to know), a collection of reports about seemingly dead people who came back to life. The symptomatology had recurrent interest (Tert. *De anim.* 43; Aët. 5.25.3 [Leucippus], 4.4.7 [Democritus]), and assertions of death remained challenging (Celsus *Med.* 2.6). For details see Leszl 2006.

[35] DL 8.4–5. Though Diogenes does not cite the work, all editors attribute this story to *On Diseases* (even if with reservations; Gottschalk 1980, 14, does not use it in his reconstruction of the dialogue) rather than to the book the title of which alone we know, *On the Things* [or: *Those*] *in Hades*; though Pythagoras is *said* to have narrated about Hades, this quotation or paraphrase includes no such narration itself, and this passage points to a work concerned with Pythagoras's retained memory and metempsychosis rather than with the events in Hades themselves.

man named Aethalides and was believed to be a son of Hermes. When Hermes came to him to grant him any wish he desired except for immortality, he chose to retain all his memories through both life and death. So when, having died, he ended up reincarnated as, or, literally, "came into" (εἰς . . . ἐλθεῖν) Euphorbus—the Trojan hero eventually struck by Menelaus—he reported his earlier experiences as human, as flora, and as fauna, both on Earth and in Hades. When he died as Euphorbus he went into (μεταβῆναι . . . εἰς) Hermotimus, who wished to make the curious history of his soul credible, and did so by identifying a relic from his run-in with Menelaus. Then he became a Delian fisherman and finally Pythagoras, who remembered everything. This story serves to prove Pythagoras's theory of metempsychosis, for Pythagoras's divine memory allows him to remember the transfers of his soul.

One passage definitively known from *On Diseases* tells of Pythagoras's self-application of the name *philosophos*. We have seen what looks like a loose abridgment in Sosicrates; also, we know a closer version with an explicit attribution, translated into Latin, from Cicero.[36] It comes in the final quarter of the preamble to Book 5 of his *Tusculan Disputations*. Cicero is explaining that philosophy does not get the credit it deserves because its benefits predate its naming. Cultural benefactors were once called "wise men" rather than philosophers, he says; only with Pythagoras did this change.

> This name [sc. *sapientes*] for them [sc. the descendants of the wise men] spread all the way to the time of Pythagoras. People say that he went to Phlius, as Heraclides Ponticus writes, the pupil of Plato and a man foremost in learning (*quem, ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, uir doctus in primis, Phliuntem ferunt uenisse*), and discussed certain issues learnedly and at length with Leon, the ruler of the Phliusians. When Leon marveled at his talent and eloquence, he asked him to which profession (*arte*) he most dedicated himself. He in turn said that it was not a profession that he knew, but that he was a "philosopher." Leon, astonished at the novelty of the term, asked what kind of people philosophers were and what the difference was between them and the rest of mankind. Pythagoras answered that he thought human life was similar to the kind of festival which is held with a magnificent display of games in a gathering from the whole of Greece. For there some people seek the glory and distinction of a crown by training their bodies, and others are drawn by the profit and gain in buying or selling, but there is a certain class of people, and this quite the most free, who look for neither applause nor gain, but come for the sake of seeing and look

[36] On differences between Cicero's and Sosicrates's versions that are irrelevant to the present argument, see YC 1.320n10.

> thoroughly with great attention at what is being done and how. In the same way, he said, we have arrived into this life from another life and nature (*ex alia uita et natura*), as if from some city into some crowd at a festival, and some devote themselves to glory and others to money, but there are certain rare people who count all matters for nothing and eagerly contemplate the nature of things (*rerum naturam studiose intuerentur*). These people call themselves students of wisdom (*sapientiae studiosos*)—that is, philosophers (*philosophos*)—and just as there it was most fitting for a free character to watch while seeking nothing for oneself, so in life the contemplation and understanding of things (*studiis contemplationem rerum*) far surpasses all other pursuits.[37] (*Tusc.* 5.3.8–9, trans. Schütrumpf 2008, modified)

So, Heraclides (in *On Diseases*; see below) has Pythagoras travel to Phlius, display to Leon his intellectual wares, attribute his acumen to his being a *philosophos*, differentiate *philosophoi* from profit- and honor-seekers with an "Olympic games" analogy, and say that *philosophoi* "have come into this life from another life and nature" to study the nature of things. Because this closing language reflects the "coming into" language found in the metempsychosis passage (reflected in Sosicrates's φύονται; see p. 4 above), the passages fit well together. Perhaps for Heraclides it is Pythagoras's telling his life story to Leon that incites Leon's astonishment, and since that story does not advance Cicero's account, Cicero glosses it as a "learned" discussion of "certain issues." Alternatively, Pythagoras's story of his soul's adventure might follow the description of *philosophoi* in the conversation with Leon, perhaps as a personal justification; in this case, the learned and lengthy conversation might have been about the soul more generally.[38] The apparent unity of the Empedocles story (cure, explanation, and apotheosis) suggests unity here as well.

In *On Diseases*, Pythagoras explains what *philosophoi* do: they understand the world as befits free people, which includes recognizing the immortality and peregrinations of the soul. Empedocles, elsewhere assumed to belong in the Pythagorean tradition (see chapter 5, pp. 140–42), understands the relation between immortal soul and mortal body from a medical and prognostic perspective. Empedocles surely is himself being treated as a *philosophos*. What

[37] For the Latin of this passage, see Appendix, pp. 321–22.

[38] The Academic Dicaearchus reports that the three best known Pythagorean doctrines (the rest being mysterious) were soul-immortality and transformation of living things, a universal life cycle, and kinship of all living things (Porph. *VP* 19); these were publicly known around the time of Pythagoras's life (Xenophanes B7/D64; Hdt. 4.95) (see chapter 4). If the conversation occurred at an athletic event, maybe Pythagoras's dietetics are at issue (see Guthrie 1962, 187–95, for references). Or might he be giving leadership advice (cf. Hdt. 1.30–32)?

we have in Heraclides's work, then, is a celebration of *philosophia*. This celebration asserts the following: *philosophia* befits noble people, seeks knowledge on its broadest construal, gives insight into the nature of death and the soul, cures otherwise hopeless patients, and contributes in a fashion to one's own immortality—as a recognition of it, or the purification that is a prerequisite to it. Given the vibrant prose formulation, the fascination of the episodes, and their historical relevance, this work appears to be a wholehearted exhortation to *philosophia*, an early instance of the *protreptikos logos* genre.

Admittedly, not all readers of the fragmentary *On Diseases* have judged it to be an exhortation to philosophy. Its most recent commentator, Philip van der Eijk, follows an interpretative tradition that puts it in the history of medicine.[39] He allows that it is an unusual medical text, one mixed with the lives and sayings of famous healers, and spiced by stories of the miraculous, but one that still asserts an intriguing physiological view. Galen treated the section on the unbreathing woman seriously as an analysis of seizures. Yet van der Eijk's view, like those of his predecessors, takes almost no account of the Pythagoras story.[40] Nor does his view show how many lines of the dialogue those who later cited it actually knew. I suspect that they had only brief excerpts or paraphrases, the latter suggested by their disagreement over basic facts.[41] The putatively medical sections of philosophical works were sometimes excerpted by later authors; if one should rely on the ancient citations of Plato's *Charmides*, for example, that dialogue would appear basically medical, even though it is in fact a protreptic to Socratic philosophizing.[42] A further point is

[39] Van der Eijk 2009, 239–40, 244–48; earlier, Lonie 1965, 133–43; Mayhew 2010, 460–61.

[40] Van der Eijk gives it only about a page, 243–44; neither Lonie 1965, Guthrie 1978, 483–90, nor Mayhew 2010 mention the *philosophos* story at all; and it plays no real role in Dillon 2003, 204–15. Seeing no clear relevance to the overall dialogue, though admitting that Pythagoras and Empedocles had medical interests, citing Celsus's *On Medicine* (proem 7–9), van der Eijk wonders whether the *philosophos* passage even comes from a different work, e.g., *On the Pythagoreans* or *On Those in Hades*.

[41] There is no evidence that sources other than Diogenes Laertius actually read the work (and he himself may not have). Origen (*C. Cels.* 2.16) cites Heraclides's story, along with Plato's myth of Er, about those who spend twelve days in Hades, as an example of resurrection that non-Christians believe, and Pliny (*HN* 7.52.175) cites Heraclides's "celebrated book" about the woman who revived after not breathing for seven days as an example of the curability of the feminine disease of "a turning of the womb." Galen cites Heraclides or his work (τὸ βιβλίον ἄπνους) three times: at *De trem.* 6 as a familiar reference point about shivering; at *De diff. R.* 1.8 for the unbreathing woman representing the condition, as opposed to fever, where breathing (and by parallel the pulse) slows so much as to make the person look dead; and at *De loc. aff.* 6 for one kind of hysteria, in which Heraclides's woman experiences the most puzzling kind of condition, having effectively no breath or pulse, only some core warmth. All these accounts could come from very short excerpts or paraphrases.

[42] The densest set of ancient references to the *Charmides* are to the "Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis" section (156d3–157b1), which we know was excerpted (at least in Stob. 4.37.23, under

that the excerpts suggest authorship for a lay audience rather than for technical practitioners.

The more plausible view, that *On Diseases* is a protreptic to philosophy, is found in H. B. Gottschalk's 1980 book, *Heraclides of Pontus*. He argues persuasively that Heraclides sought "to make propaganda for the contemplative life by drawing an idealized portrait of one of its greatest exponents [sc. Empedocles], who was shown on the last day of his life on earth which was also the day of his ultimate triumph."[43] He sees Heraclides's dialogue as combining the banquet format of Plato's *Symposium* with the death and exaltation format of the *Phaedo*: people talk about Empedocles's resurrection of the unbreathing woman at a festal celebration, and then Pausanias or others talk about Empedocles's disappearance at its conclusion. Both parts of the dialogue reflect on the nature of soul, as immortal and independent from the body, and present philosophy as the right way to understand it. The Pythagoras scene in particular "contains a statement of the ideals underlying Empedocles's way of life": the superiority of *philosophia*, as a reflection on the nature of things, over the mere medical skill of non-philosophical doctors.

What matters here is that Pythagoras's self-appellation fits a historical narrative about philosophy's power, and the story is read by Cicero and Diogenes Laertius as historically reliable about the sorts of things Pythagoras said as well as about the last days of Empedocles. The consequence is that the Pythagoras self-appellation story appears to be part of an ennobling account of the history of philosophy that, whatever poetic license Heraclides must have taken for *his* account to become read over the ensuing centuries, seemed basically true.

From Sosicrates's précis of this story, we have inferred a late sixth- or early fifth-century BCE coinage date for the term *philosophos*, the term's opacity, and Pythagoras's archetypal role in the image of the *philosophos*. Cicero's Heraclidean version confirms and expands these inferences. The word *philosophos* entered the vernacular around the time, and even the place, of Pythagoras; the word is new to Leon, but Heraclides appears not to say that Pythagoras invented it. Pythagoras's surprising self-labeling is occasioned by, and apparently explains, his talented and eloquent discussion of questions of interest to a political leader like Leon. Pythagoras does link the word *philosophos* to something

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the chapter heading "On Health and Considering One's Survival," immediately following a citation from Hippocrates): Apul. *Apol.* 26.4; Clem. *Strom.* 1.15.58.3; Jul. *Or.* 8.244a; *Caesars* 309c; Max. Tyr. 28.4; Hermias *In Phdr.* 274c, Maximus Planudes *Compendia e Platonis dialogis* 143. On the dialogue, see Moore and Raymond 2019.

[43] Gottschalk 1980, 32 (this quotation), 13–22 (structure of dialogue), 23–33 (Pythagoras passage).

like its roots, which may be expressed in Latin as *sapientiae studiosus*. And this apparently plausible story was told in the middle of the fourth century BCE, when Heraclides wrote *On Diseases*. Thus we have a reasonable account of a founding moment in the history of *philosophia*.

A Related Account of Pythagoras's Self-Appellation

A surprising fact about Diogenes Laertius's inclusion, in Book 8 of his *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, of the story about Pythagoras's self-naming that he takes from Sosicrates, is that he had already included a different version of the story in Book 1.[44] More remarkable again is that the Book 1 version, found in the treatise's Preface, mentions Heraclides's story—which Sosicrates's must ultimately have relied on—but then rejects it in favor of another source of information. The functions of the two versions of the story differ, to be sure: in the Book 8 *Life of Pythagoras*, Diogenes gathers anecdotes about Pythagoras, whereas in the Book 1 Preface he argues that *philosophia* began in Greece, on the grounds that *philosophia* is a Greek word. This is his evidence:

> Pythagoras first called *philosophia* by its name and himself *philosophos*, in Sicyon when talking to Leon tyrant of the Sicyonians, or of Phliusians as Heraclides Ponticus in the *Woman Not Breathing* says; for nobody is wise (σοφόν) but god. Previously (θᾶττον δέ),[45] people spoke of *sophia*, and a *sophos*

[44] The magnitude of the *Lives*, and the importance of the present story in two distinct contexts, perhaps excuses Diogenes here; the basic historical compatibility of the two stories (identified below) perhaps does too. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he is drawing from distinct archives at these two points, and he may not have completed an overall consistency-ensuring revision of his treatise; see Most 2018.

[45] There has been confusion about θᾶττον δέ. Hicks 1925 translates: "All too quickly the study was called wisdom and its professor a sage, to denote his attainment of mental perfection; while the student who took it up was a philosopher or lover of wisdom"—but it would be absurd to write that as soon as Pythagoras started calling *sophia* "*philosophia*," it started being called *sophia* again. Similarly Caponigri 1969, 5; YC 1.1, 1.318 ("rapidly"); Mensch 2018, 8 ("before very long"). Reale 2005, 17: "too readily [*troppo facilmente*] was the name 'wisdom' given," but this would need to be better relativized to the time of Pythagoras's self-naming. Reich 1967 argues for "all too quickly [*allzu schnell*]," which he then glosses "all too hastily [*allzu voreilig*]," in explicit contrast to "formerly [*ehedem*]," on the grounds that, from Pythagoras's perspective, people spoke of wisdom too hastily, without thinking enough about what they are doing; but this is overly nuanced and without evidence. Nor can θᾶττον δέ here mean "often," since it would not make sense of the linguistic advance marked by Pythagoras's self-appellation. θᾶττον [δέ] means "earlier, sooner, before," at DL 2.39, 2.120, 2.139, 5.39, 6.56 (Mericus Causobonus translating as *antea*, according to Dorandi 2013 ad loc., who refers to 1.12), and LSJ s.v. ταχύς C.i.2. The adverb is correctly translated by Anonymous 1758; Zevort 1847; and Yonge 1901.

> as the promulgator (ἐπαγγελλόμενος) of it—he who has a perfected soul in the highest degree—but [now in Pythagoras's time] the one eagerly welcoming (ἀσπαζόμενος) *sophia* is [called] a *philosophos*.[46] (DL 1.12)

The similarities with Heraclides's version are apparent. Pythagoras calls himself *philosophos* but does not invent the term, he does so famously in a conversation with Leon, he has to explain his use of the term, and the meaning of the term is basically the same: being receptive of truth and wisdom (though Sosicrates's telling provides a more active emphasis). The key difference with Heraclides's version is also clear. Aside from the geographical dispute, to which we will return, Pythagoras gives a different explanation for calling himself *philosophos*, using no festival analogy or reference to athletes, merchants, and spectators. Leon might have expected him to call himself *sophos*, presumably because people in the past treated those who spoke from and lived with *sophia*—as Pythagoras appeared to do—as *sophoi*.[47] But Pythagoras has come to find the name inappropriate, as befitting only a god. The name *philosophos* works better; it means "eagerly welcoming" or "following" *sophia*, which makes no epistemically hazardous claims about the possession of wisdom.[48] Heraclides's version emphasizes the *philosophos*'s differential objects of pursuit—truth rather than glory and profit—whereas this version emphasizes differential orientations toward one object—invitation rather than embodiment.

This story is obviously not the Heraclidean one we know from Cicero and Sosicrates. Nor should we assume it is from an otherwise unquoted section of *On Diseases*. Tiziano Dorandi's recent edition of Diogenes's *Lives*, adopted by the editors of the Loeb Classical Library's *Early Greek Philosophy*, rightly punctuates the passage such that Heraclides is cited only for the alternative citizenry over whom Leon might be tyrant, the "Phliusians."[49] Many earlier editors did not include a comma after "Sicyons," however, which leaves Heraclides saying, absurdly, that Leon was tyrant "over the Sicyonians or Phliu-

[46] For the Greek of this passage, see Appendix, p. 324. Indicating the importance ascribed to this passage, *Suda* σ 806 replicates this passage verbatim from καὶ σοφός ("and a *sophos* . . .").

[47] By the fifth century BCE, the verb ἐπαγγέλλω, which here in the middle I translate "promulgate," can mean "offer willingly" (LSJ s.v. A.4); only in the fourth century BCE can it also mean "profess" or "make a profession of," especially in description of Sophists (A.5). The story does not clarify which connotation is meant—the latter implies presentation of oneself as lecturer or even as professional, whereas the former does not—though perhaps Pythagoras himself could only have used the earlier connotation.

[48] Before the fifth century BCE, ἀσπάζομαι means "greet, welcome" (LSJ s.v. A.1); only in the late fifth and early fourth century BCE can the term mean "eagerly follow, cling to" (A.3); again, the story does not clarify which connotation is meant, and again perhaps Pythagoras himself could only have used the earlier connotation.

[49] See Dorandi 2013 ad loc. and LM 4.374.

sians." Yet Heraclides does not in fact say this according to Sosicrates or Cicero, and such ambivalence would quite gainsay the vibrancy and determinate detail of Heraclides's famous story.[50] Diogenes often cites authorities only for divergent details, even when there are major narrative differences between his sources (typified by his uses of Sosicrates, cited in note 3 above).

The existence of this non-Heraclidean version of the Pythagoras story has a fundamental consequence. There must be a core story shared by both versions, in which Pythagoras calls himself *philosophos* to Leon and has to explain its use. We see that for some reason Diogenes prefers the non-Heraclidean version, the one that includes the "not-*sophos*" explanation, since he quotes or paraphrases it and not Heraclides's in his Preface, even though both would support his claim about the Greek origin of *philosophia*. (As we will see in chapter 3, other fourth-century BCE authors follow the non-Heraclidean version rather than that of Heraclides.) There is no reason to believe that the non-Heraclidean version—whose author I will call the "Sicyon author" (i.e., "Sicyon-version author")—derives from Heraclides. There might even be reason to believe that Heraclides took a credible pre-existing story and adapted Pythagoras's reasons to suit his protreptic goals.[51] The Sicyon author's version emphasizes continuity with *sophoi*; as we will see in later chapters, the ambition to assemble lineages of *sophoi* dates back to the mid-fifth century BCE, and so we would expect some attempts to fit Pythagoras, Pythagoreans, and similar *philosophoi* into such "*sophos* lineages," as we might call them.[52] The disagreement about Leon's place of tyranny is not surprising: Phlius and Sicyon share borders near Corinth; political upheaval struck Sicyon during the relevant period, perhaps making the determination of rulership confusing; associates of Aristotle and Heraclides engaged in new research into Sicyon in the fourth century BCE; and Phlius played an important role in early Pythagoreanism.[53] The overwhelming sense is that Heraclides's version of the

[50] For the debate, see, e.g., Joly 1956, 21–28; Malingrey 1961, 30–31; Guthrie 1962, 164–45. Editors who attribute the disjunction to Heraclides rather than Diogenes include Cobet 1878a; Long 1964; Marcovich 1999; Schütrumpf 2008 ad fr. 84. Anonymous 1833 puts commas on either side of ἢ Φλιασίων, with unclear meaning. Genaille 1965 hides behind modern citation conventions, translating ". . . Leon, tyran des Sicyoniens, *appelés parfois* Phliasiens (*cf.* Héraclide du Pont, livre sur l'*Apnon*)" (my italics).

[51] Riedweg 2004 and 2005, 94–96, describes the sufficient fifth-century BCE materials available to such a historian; see note 67 below for fuller assessment.

[52] This is not especially controversial; see the opening paragraph of *OCD* s.v. "philosophy, history of."

[53] Leon is not otherwise known. The controversy over Phlius and Sicyon has much to do with Pythagorean history (similar controversies: Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 10.3.4.5–9), but in no simple way. The cities were neighbors on the Corinthian Gulf (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.20; Skalet 1928, 26–27; Lolos 2011, 22), whence settlers to Croton departed (Dunbabin 1948, 250, 269). Phlius

Pythagoras story is neither the only nor the first, even as his account is the longest, is the most detailed, and is distinguished as the only one attributed to an author. Because of the conflation in latter-day scholarship of all versions of the Pythagoras story to his account, the historical reality of any version—and thus any evidence about the origins of the discipline we might infer from one—tends to stand on the plausibility of Heraclides's exposition.[54]

Burkert against Heraclides: An Academic Fiction?

From the fourth century BCE to the sixth century CE, Heraclides's story was taken as fact. Now, however, it has little currency, and thus plays almost no role in attempts to understand the origins of *philosophia*. This is not altogether

had also sent settlers to Pythagoras's home island of Samos, among whom were Hippasus, a purported great-grandfather of Pythagoras (Paus. 2.13.2; DL 8.1; cf. Delatte 1922, 148; Burnet 1930, 87n5; Minar 1942); Porphyry also cites early views that Phlius was Pythagoras's hometown (*VP* 5). Phlius was the home place of at least four fifth-century BCE Pythagoreans, including Echecrates (Iambl. *VP* 35.251, 267; DL 8.46; *BNP* s.v. "Leon [2]"; Zhmud 2013, 148; this does not require, as Riedweg 2004 asserts, that any Pythagoras story must postdate their establishment there). Sicyon was Greece's oldest city (Euseb. *Chron.* 62), and in the early sixth century BCE it hosted the "best of the Greeks," in the form of the suitors of Agariste, daughter of its tyrant Cleisthenes, leading Greek of his generation, and mother of Athens's democratizer Cleisthenes (Hdt. 6.126–30; see Hammond 1956, 46; Griffin 1982, 52–56, 97; Parker 1994, 423–24). In the following decades, the city supported Greece's most consequential musical innovators (Skalet 1928, 178–80; Griffin 1982, 57, 158–62), a lineage of which appeared in Heraclides's history of music (Barker 2014, 50). Despite the cultural knowledge we have of these cities, we know nothing of their political histories at the time of Pythagoras, and thus cannot resolve the controversy. Sicyon might have had a tyrant after Cleisthenes's death around 569 BCE and before its last tyrant, Aischines, had the latter, in fact, been deposed by the Spartans at the end of the sixth century BCE; our source, *Rylands Papyrus* 18 (see BNJ 105 ad F1), is unclear. This possibility has its supporters (e.g., Cavaignac 1919; White 1958; Parker 1992; BNP s.v. "Sicyon"; Leahy 1968, 4n12, includes older bibliography), though others support an earlier date for the last tyrant, which would make a Pythagorean meeting with one impossible (e.g., Hammond 1956; Leahy 1968; OCD s.v. "Sicyon"). *BNJ* 105 ad F2 takes Aristotle to assert in the *Politics* that Cleisthenes was Sicyon's last tyrant (*Pol.* 1316a30–31), but this passage marks instead only a regime change between Myron and Cleisthenes. For general histories of the pertinent ("Orthagorid") period, see Skalet 1928, 52–62; Andrewes 1956, 54–61; Griffin 1982, 37–61; Lolos 2011, 61–65. Should Sicyon have had a tyrant during the maturity of Pythagoras, this fact would presumably have been recorded in Aristotle's lost *Constitution of the Sicyonians* (Poll. *Onom.* 9.77; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1315b10–21), though there were other likely sources for Sicyon's political history by the later fourth century (*POxy.* 1365, containing a work possibly by Ephorus of Cyme [ca. 400–330 BCE]). Should Sicyon not have had a tyrant during that time—if Aischines had been deposed in the mid-sixth century BCE, as some interpretations prefer—it still must have had rulers anyway, and they might still have been called "tyrants." If they were not, then Leon must have been tyrant not of Sicyon but of Phlius.

[54] Such conflation is found in, e.g., Burkert 1960 and Riedweg 2004; contrast Gottschalk 1980, 23–36.

surprising. The loss of almost all Heraclides's works except some fantastical excerpts establishes him as an impresario of myth.[55] His Pythagorean partisanship hardly helps, given the disfavor into which the man from Samos, demoted to cult leader, at best a symbol of mystical magniloquence and ostentatious erudition, has fallen, especially for philosophers proud of their discipline's modest rigor.[56] The decisive moment in the rejection of Heraclides's account of Pythagoras came in 1960. Walter Burkert (1931–2015) was at that time writing the century's most important book on Pythagoras, published as *Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon* in 1962, and in a revised translation as *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* in 1972. Burkert took as his task the reassessment of all ancient testimony for Pythagoras's philosophical acumen, attitudes, and endeavors—especially his purported mathematical, cosmological, and psychological discoveries—from the classical and Hellenistic periods through the Neopythagoreanism of Nicomachus of Gerasa (ca. 60–120 CE) and Iamblichus of Chalcis (ca. 245–325 CE). Burkert debunked practically all of it as mere retrojecting and idealizing fictions by later Pythagoreans. Among the lore he sought to reassess was Heraclides's Pythagoras story. Was it true, he asked, or pure hagiographical invention?

As a kind of advanced guard for his book, Burkert published, in 1960, an article titled "Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes 'Philosophie,' " arguing unqualifiedly for invention.[57] In this masterpiece of breadth, concision, and acuity, Burkert vindicates suspicions about the story that had occupied philosophers and philologists since Eduard Zeller's monumental *Philosophy of the Greeks in Its Historical Development* (1844–52), and had come to a head in Werner Jaeger's *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*.[58] Having assumed that the version discussed above, found in Diogenes Laertius's Preface (DL 1.12), also comes from Heraclides but in a part of his work not quoted in Sosicrates or Cicero, Burkert makes two interlocking claims: we have a strong reason against believing that Pythagoras could or would ever have defined *philosophos* as either "one spec-

[55] Ancient negative evaluations are found in the hypercritical Timaeus, who accuses Heraclides of "always being such a paradoxologist" (DL 8.72), though Polybius states that Timaeus was overly critical (Polyb. 12.4a6, 12.14, 25c2); in Plutarch (*Cam.* 22.2–4); and in Cicero (*Nat. D.* 1.13.34), though not in his own voice: in the voice, rather, of an Epicurean given to reviling Academics. Guthrie 1978, 484, redeems Heraclides's supposed "weakness for fantasy and superstition" by noting that Plato, too, tells far-fetched tales though always in appropriate contexts.

[56] Burnyeat 2007 captures the present-day tone.

[57] "Plato or Pythagoras: On the Origin of the Word 'Philosophy' ": this contribution was never translated into English nor included in the book, though Burkert cites its results at 5n11, 8, 65, 74, 77, and 106 (in the 1972 edition).

[58] Jaeger 1923, 2nd ed. 1948; Engl. in 1934, 2nd ed. 1962; see esp. 1962, 97–98, 432.

tating the universe" (from the Cicero version) or "one lacking but striving for *sophia*" (from the DL 1.12 version); and yet, by contrast, we have a strong reason in favor of believing that Heraclides could or would have concocted his story on inspiration from Plato's *Phaedrus* (for example), which in effect includes both definitions (at *Phdr.* 278d and 249b5–d3). I will address these claims in turn.

According to Burkert, a range of reasons tell against Pythagoras's defining the *philosophos* in either way. First, the biographical reasons. Pythagoras, full of self-conceit, would never have called attention to an abyss between himself and *sophia* or divinity—after all, as his successor Empedocles did, he vaunted his own immortality—and yet this is what the "not-*sophos*" definition would require.[59] Nor would it have been relevant for him to treat himself as a lover of observation or hunter after truth, for this would explain only his calling himself *theôrêtikos* or *philotheamôn*, not *philosophos*. Second, the evidentiary reasons. There is no independent evidence that Pythagoras invented the word *philosophos*, even if classical authors suggest that Pythagoreans used the term. And what evidence may exist for the fifth-century BCE use of *philosophos*, for example by Zeno and Heraclitus, has its own problems of authenticity and proves neither gloss on *philosophos* (as striving for an as-yet-unpossessed *sophia* or spectating the universe). Third, the linguistic reasons. A survey of the earliest *phil-* prefixed terms shows that *phil-* never meant "lacking and desiring *x*," but rather its (almost) exact opposite, "close acquaintance and familiarity, or habitual dealings, with *x*."[60]

In favor of a fourth-century BCE confabulation of Heraclides's Pythagoras story, Burkert has another set of assertions. Every version of the Pythagoras story goes back to Heraclides, he claims; Aristotle cannot be a source. The Academy and Lyceum actively debated Pythagoras's commitment to the practical or contemplative life, both as a historical/theoretical matter and in the context of broader ethical/metaphysical debates, familiar to all readers, from Plato's *Gorgias* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Heraclides's story looks suspiciously like a tendentious contribution to that discussion. Indeed, Burkert conjectures the coinage of the term *philosophos*, or at least its dissemination and popularization, in the (late) fifth century BCE, at a time when *phil-* prefixed terms (as illustrated by Aristophanes's *Wasps*, of 422 BCE, and Plato's *Lysis*, of the early fourth century BCE, discussed below, in chapters 3 and 8) proliferated to capture favorite pastimes, hobbies, and even

[59] Others are doubtful that Pythagoras would ever have said that he lacked wisdom: Morrison 1956, 136–38; Chroust 1964a, 427n17, 432–33; Kahn 2001, 2, 5–6; Riedwig 2005.

[60] Burkert 1960, 176–77, 161 (biographical reasons); 169–71 (evidentiary reasons); 172–73 (linguistic reasons).

life-determining passions. An expanding democratic middle class sought the former trappings of the elites and formulated *sophia* for itself—hence the idea of the *philosophoi* as amateur seekers of wisdom. Plato sharpened the idea of this "striving while lacking" to contrast the *philosophoi* with conceited "Sophists" and to describe Socrates's incessant questioning as phenomenologically akin to love.[61]

Burkert rejected Heraclides's account decisively,[62] and appeared to have put to rest a deep puzzle—what sense to make of an instance of philosophy's discussing its own essence at its very foundation—that engaged not only Zeller and Jaeger but also many other prominent scholars of philosophy's founding, including Erwin Rohde, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Isidore Lévy, Robert Joly, Augusto Rostagni, Fritz Wehrli, John Burnet, and J. S. Morrison. To a large extent his argument has been accepted, most notably in two of Andrea Nightingale's books, *Genres in Dialogue* (1995) and *Spectacles of Truth* (2004), which have been cited more times than any other work that addresses the early history of the word *philosophos*.[63] In her 1995 book, for example, Nightingale argues that "Plato appropriated the term 'philosophy' for a new and specialized discipline," which before him "did not have a technical sense that indicated a specific group of thinkers practicing a distinct discipline or profession," but instead "was used to designate 'intellectual cultivation' in a broad and unspecified sense." Nightingale allows that, even were Heraclides's "rather dubious claim" about Pythagoras true, it would not show that Pythagoras used the term in a "technical" way. Nor, looking at the other fifth-century BCE uses of *philosophos* and cognates, does Nightingale see any instance of a "special subgroup of intellectuals that had appropriated the title of '*philosophoi*' " or a "specific group of professional thinkers."[64] I qualify Nightingale's claim about Plato in chapter 8 and her claims about fifth-century BCE uses in chapter 5. What is particularly relevant here is her reaction to Heraclides's story, as assessed by Burkert: she takes it to be useless for understanding the early history of *philosophia*, and treats pre-fourth century BCE usage as having neither complexity, traceable origin, nor semantic diffusion. Burkert's claim that Heraclides's history of *philosophia* is a fourth-century BCE fantasy

[61] Burkert 1960, 166n1 (Heraclides as sole source); 166–69 (Aristotle not a source); 159–60 with Burkert 1972, 106–9 (Heraclides's tendentious contribution); 174–76 (Plato sharpened the sense).

[62] Burkert 1960, 175.

[63] See Burkert 1960 for older references and Riedweg 2004, 148nn6–8, for more recent ones. Notable doubters include Havelock 1963, 306n8; Chroust 1964a, 427–28; Kahn 2001, 68; Hadot 2002, 14n1. Guthrie 1962, 164–66, 204–5, not having seen Burkert's article, takes a mixed attitude; Lloyd 2009, 9n1, remains agnostic.

[64] Nightingale 1995, 14–15.

has had the effect of inaugurating the history of *philosophia* in the fourth century BCE.

Before evaluating this claim, we must determine precisely what Burkert has demonstrated. He says that Pythagoras would not have exposited *philosophos* as the one "striving after wisdom," whereas Heraclides, by contrast, could or even would have. True enough. But we also have reason to doubt that Heraclides himself attributed the "not-*sophos*" definition to Pythagoras. It looks rather as if Heraclides tells a version of a pre-existing story. Even if we grant Burkert's conflation of the two stories, contrary to evidence, we can see that Burkert's bolder move is to reject the whole of Heraclides's Pythagoras story because he can reject a part, the speech Pythagoras gives in response to Leon's question. Yet we can reject the part without rejecting the whole. The speech, indeed, has the least cause for acceptance: speeches are notoriously difficult to preserve or remember, and might provide the best occasion for invention, as Thucydides famously implies (Thuc. 1.22).

Even with the rejection of Pythagoras's speech of explanation, however, much remains untouched from Heraclides's account. I will mention three items. First, the dramatic context: a meeting between Pythagoras and Leon the tyrant. Burkert never doubts the plausibility of such an interaction; and while the tale may loosely fit the generic structure of the "sage advisor of tyrants" trope, it is no less likely for that.[65] Second, the historical claim: Pythagoras was the first to call himself *philosophos*. Burkert never doubts the possibility of the self-application, though he does think that Pythagoras is being said to "invent" the word and that he does so by explaining what it means. But the story need not imply invention of the adjective/noun, only its self-application (and, in some versions, invention of the abstract noun); the historical implication could be that the term was already used for other people, and that Pythagoras innovated with his self-application. Nothing holds him to applying it to himself to "mean" either of the things Burkert believes Heraclides put into his mouth. What remains after abandoning Pythagoras's speech, third, is a more general historical implication: fifth-century BCE Pythagoreans had good reason to allow themselves to be called *philosophoi*. They could, with truth or fiction, retroject this appellation onto their only slightly earlier representative, Pythagoras.[66] In sum, then, much of Heraclides's story of Pythagorean (redemptive) self-ascription might still be taken seriously.

[65] On the story's structure and on the wise advisor trope, see Hdt. 1.30, with Bischoff 1932; Lattimore 1939; Joly 1956; Gottschalk 1980, 23–27; Martin 1993; Sharp 2004; Riedweg 2005, 94; YC 1.113–18. Nevertheless, our fragments do not indicate that Pythagoras *advises* Leon.

[66] On such retrojection, see Burkert 1972, 91. I assume nothing in particular about the delineation of "Pythagorean," following the caution of Zhmud 2013.

The Structure of This Book

Why did Heraclides propound the Pythagoras story in particular, and why did so many ancient historians of philosophy find him believable? My answer is that the general historical implications that accompany the story may well be true. I thus break with Burkert and the past sixty-some years of scholarship on the origins of *philosophia*.[67] The two main implications of my answer are the following:

1. The word *philosophos* existed early in the Pythagorean movement;
2. That the Pythagoreans had reason to call themselves *philosophoi* and presented an explanation of their doing so suggests they were already being called it and that the name was neither obvious in meaning nor laudatory in application.

There are, then, secondary implications that one might expect. If these are sound, they would support the main implications.

3. The earliest non-Pythagorean uses of *philosophos* would develop from this original Pythagorean-derived meaning;
4. The uses of *philosophos* would show negative valence in the earliest cases, and then instances of neutral and redemptive valence later;
5. Plato's works themselves can be treated as instances of saving the appearances and redeeming the practices theretofore called *philosophia*.

These fifth- and early fourth-century BCE phenomena provide a context for the mid-fourth century BCE trends:

6. Heraclides's story contributes to ongoing protreptic efforts to redeem *philosophoi* by explaining their positive value, and does so, in part, in a way familiar from Aristotle, by displaying a historical disciplinary consciousness.

[67] The most thorough response to Burkert heretofore is, as I mentioned above, Riedweg 2004, an article that argues persuasively for the fifth-century BCE existence of all of Heraclides's story elements (meaning that the story *could* predate Heraclides's version), but who does not treat closely of the etymology, coinage, or fifth-century BCE uses of *philosoph-* words, etc. Mallan 2005 also argues for the Pythagorean heritage of the ideas found in Heraclides's version. I note that Aristophanes, by 423/17 BCE, could speak of "desiring wisdom" (ὦ τῆς μεγάλης ἐπιθυμήσας ἄνθρωπε, *Nub.* 412).

By this book's end, my hope is that the reader may see what allowed Heraclides to write the Pythagoras story in a way that convinced his readers. The result will be a clearer understanding of the origin of the word *philosophos* (and *philosophia*) and of the discipline called *philosophia*. The structure of the narrative falls into three parts.

Part One: Origins

The first part of the book, chapters 2–4, focuses on the origins of the term *philosophos*. In chapter 2, I argue for what we might call the "lexical precondition" for Heraclides's story: the existence of the word *philosophos* at the time of Pythagoras or at least in the period of the early Pythagorean generations. The evidence is a fragment from Heraclitus, quoted by Clement: "philosophical men really quite ought to be researchers into much" (B35/D40). Burkert accepted the familiar and casual skepticism about Heraclitus's authorship of this—after all, it predates the next earliest attestation of the word by at least several decades, and seems in conflict with Heraclitean fragments that decry polymathy (e.g., B40/D20, B129/D26)—and claimed that, even were it authentic, it would not support either definition of *philosophia* found in the Pythagoras stories.[68] I argue, first, that we have no reason to doubt Clement's accuracy of quotation for either source-critical or epistemological reasons. I show, second, that while Heraclitus's use does not support the "explanations" of *philosophos* found in the Pythagoras stories, it in fact supports the view that I have said the stories imply: that the term was applied, and perhaps with pejorative implication, to the Pythagoreans. Both positions have had their proponents in earlier scholarship, but with a full defense of those positions we can better see their centrality not just for Heraclitean epistemology but for the history of *philosophia*.

In chapter 3, I show what the term *philosophos* could have meant at the time for which it is attested, and thus what meaning Pythagoras or his followers would have sought to spin in accepting the term for themselves, had they done so. Burkert rejected the analysis of *phil-* prefixed terms as "striving for *x* which one lacks," suggesting instead "familiar with *x*."[69] For his purposes, that analysis sufficed, but it does not suffice for us. He did not pay close enough attention to the peculiar archaic use of *phil-* prefixed names, their normative valence, their application, or the contribution of their second element to the overall meaning. Nor did he pay close enough attention to the meaning of that

[68] Burkert 1960, 171; Burkert 1972, 131, 209–10.

[69] Burkert 1960, 172–74; confirming his negative argument, see Landfester 1966 and Cipriano 1991.

particular second element, *soph*-, at the end of the sixth century BCE. This chapter begins by turning again to Cicero's version of the Pythagoras story, and in more detail to a non-Heraclidean but probably still fourth-century BCE version, found in Diodorus Siculus, which in effect dramatizes the thesis of this book: that the word *philosophos* was formed in reference to *sophoi* considered as "sages." Important support for this ancient perspective comes from Aristotle's analysis, written in Heraclides's prime, of *phil*- prefixed names as usually having a negative valence; from the *phil*- prefixed names that surely predate the coinage of the term *philosophos*; from the precursors of those names in *Pi-ro*- prefixed Mycenaean (Linear B) names; and from, quite importantly, the sense of the term *sophos* in sixth-century BCE Greek.

In chapter 4, I pick up a claim made in the previous chapter, that a term like *philosophos* would have been coined in response to certain sorts of unusual activity. I accumulate the earliest evidence that the Pythagoreans would have been excellent targets of this term. This is because their public face was politically notorious and influential, with their cohesion and even efficacy seeming to depend on their pedagogical and research exercises. I thereby develop Burkert's acknowledgment of the organized political side of their existence.[70] Additional evidence comes from what looks to be Aristotle's support of Heraclides's account, if we can reconstruct Iamblichus's late citations of Aristotle correctly. Burkert asserts that Pythagoras was not really a philosopher; what concerns me is only the beliefs that observers had about him and the names that they had reason to call him—since, for his contemporaries, *philosophos* hardly meant what academic philosophers now mean by "philosopher."

Part Two: Development

The next part of the book, chapters 5–7, focuses on the development of uses of the word *philosophos* before and outside of Plato's Academy. In chapter 5, I draw on the fifth-century BCE uses of *philosophos* and cognates for two purposes: as corroboration for the coinage meaning set out in chapter 3 and the connection to Pythagoreans set out in chapter 4, and as description of the drift in meaning the term underwent across several generations of use. I focus on six authors, each of whom use the term once: Herodotus, Thucydides, the Hippocratic author of *On Ancient Medicine*, Gorgias, Aristophanes, and Lysias. (An appendix to the chapter assesses some less reliable but still possible evidence for early usage.) Burkert already referred to these authors in his observation that *philosophos* did not first mean "lacking

[70] Burkert 1972, 113–19, 132.

wisdom" or "spectating the universe."[71] Treated, however, in their respective literary and rhetorical contexts, they provide significant information about the fifth-century BCE career of the idea of being *philosophos*. It appears that at the end of that century, we see the term sometimes losing its wry implication and naming a quite specific mode of dialectic exchange about matters of abstract or broad significance.

In chapter 6, I turn to a fifth-century BCE figure as yet unmentioned, but whose importance to the later understanding of *philosophia* cannot be underestimated: Socrates. Many scholars, including Burkert and Nightingale, believe that Socrates's students inaugurated new thinking about *philosophia*; presumably Socrates's life, or at least his death, galvanized them to do so. This would be a central ingredient in the recipe for the redemptive story told by Heraclides, a grand-student of Socrates's. In fact, at least Xenophon and Plato, for whom we have the most evidence, never or only rarely call Socrates *philosophos*, even if we now think that, for both, Socrates modeled the philosophical life. This chapter makes this observation in part by focusing on both authors' attitude toward Socrates's connection to Anaxagoras, considered by later historicans to be the first to philosophize in Athens, and by focusing on Xenophon's hesitation to use the word *philosophos* with respect to Socrates. This suggests again that the term *philosophos* had a negative valence during Socrates's life and even, in some quarters, after his death. Plato and other Socratics do use the term *philosophia* positively, even putting it in Socrates's mouth. Their doing so in the fourth century BCE tracks the neutralizing trend we saw in chapter 5; it may also, however, reflect conscientious efforts to redeem a term that had been applied to Socrates. Socrates's discussion circles, which is what Plato most recurrently calls *philosophia*, were probably formalized in the "schools" of the so-called Minor Socratics and as the Academy, where Heraclides matured in his understanding of *philosophia*.

In chapter 7, I address non-Academic uses of *philosophia* in the fourth century BCE, which provides the background against which we can understand Heraclides's use of the term. We can see how *philosophia* became a discipline in the Academy only by understanding how the term *philosophia* was being used elsewhere. The key context comes from the educators Alcidamas, Isocrates, and the author of the *Dissoi Logoi*. I show that we have less reason to say that these educators competed over "ownership" of the term *philosophos* (even

[71] Burkert 1960, 173. Nightingale 1995, 14–15, treats the uses only as evidence that the authors did not know of *philosophia* as a professional discipline.

if at times they may have) or its true and universal meaning than that they gave varying retrospective reconstructions of the term's usage, differing, for example, in the relative emphases they give to practical teaching over the defensibility of research outcomes. To the extent that the Academic view of *philosophia* "won," this is not because that view was truer or more convincing, but because the Academy instigated a continued *discipline* that called itself *philosophia* more than Alcidamas or Isocrates did, neither of whom appear to have had success or interest in developing the sort of well-populated discipline crucial for maintaining a name.

Part Three: Academy

The final part of the book, chapters 8–10, focuses on the disciplinary development of the word *philosophos* in Plato's Academy. In chapter 8, I confront the use of *philosophia* by Heraclides's teacher, Plato. Burkert—and many others—views Plato's appropriation of *philosophia* as part of his effort to contrast Socrates's and his own practice with that of Sophists, rhetoricians, and other claimants to wisdom; he describes the etymological play, defining *philosophia* as "love of wisdom," as Plato's attempt to fit Socrates's interrogative approach. This may be so. Nightingale and, for example, John Cooper argue in particular that Plato creates a technical and professional formulation of *philosophoi* and *philosophia*, as though *ex nihilo*. This is less certain. I show that across his dialogues, Plato treats *philosophia* as a term in common parlance, and thus that he is, in effect, saving the appearances (of Thucydides and Gorgias, among others) when he presents it as conversations that conduce to virtue and flourishing. The dialogues dramatize or narrate just those conversations. Plato's reconstruction of past usages differs from Isocrates's, for example, in emphasizing the conversationality and the tendency to self-consciousness of its logic and argumentative rigor; but this is not expressly new—it is just a plausible interpretation of the past. Plato does provide something new, but it is not a new "meaning" of *philosophia*. It is, rather, a new explanation for the possibility that *philosophia*-style conversations could actually conduce to their end, human happiness. The epistemological and metaphysical considerations mooted in the dialogues concerning knowledge and universals do not determine what *philosophia* is (namely, conversations) but how *philosophia* could actually work (namely, by getting clearer about what is really true). Given how unappealing *philosophia* has been made out to be, a proponent needs to vindicate this apparently lazy pursuit. The Academy, an institution devoted to this pursuit, needed a defense. Yet, in most of Plato's dialogues—from the *Charmides* to

Protagoras, *Phaedrus* to *Republic*, *Lysis* to *Symposium*, and even from the *Parmenides* to the *Philebus*—*philosophia* still refers to person-to-person interactions, not to anything beyond those conversations; *philosophia* is not yet a discipline, a historically extended, increasingly distributed, and impersonal, concerted enterprise.

In chapter 9, proceeding from the belief that Heraclides's Pythagoras story implies a historical account of the development of the discipline of *philosophia*, I describe the rise of this historiography of philosophy, one that materializes only in the Academy. Aristotle's writings provide the clearest evidence. When in the intellectual-historical mode, Aristotle circumscribes *philosophia* as an engagement with the ideas of others, living or dead, whom one takes also to be or have been engaged in *philosophia*. This includes Thales's views, for example, since Aristotle can reconstruct them as addressing certain questions and open to critique by successors, including himself in particular, but not those of Hesiod, Orpheus, or other admittedly wise authors, who are not as amenable to this kind of virtual conversation. Aristotle does not explain his departure from Plato's interpersonal picture of *philosophia* to a disciplinary one, but the density of conversations, memories, texts, and positions found in the Academy probably prompted his new view. Since progress in philosophy matters, and is possible, one should bring to bear everything of relevance to any possible question, not just the ideas of one's immediate interlocutors.

In chapter 10, I focus on a set of fourth-century BCE cultural attitudes about *philosophia* different and on average later than those on which chapter 7 focused, a set that serves expressly as context and occasion for the versions of the protreptic story about Pythagoras told by Heraclides and by other fourth-century BCE writers. Positive and negative perceptions of *philosophia* coexisted. The positive feelings are most strikingly manifest in the Dephic maxim *philosophos ginou* ("be philosophical"), the existence for which comes from a 1966 discovery in Afghanistan. The negative feelings are best appreciated from fragments of the comic dramatist Alexis, from an anti-philosophical "apotreptic" found in a recently published Oxyrhynchus papyrus, and from apotreptics found in familiar philosophical texts. What becomes clear is that two ideas about *philosophia* operate simultaneously, one quasi- or fully disciplinary, the other mundanely ethical. Equivocation between these two ideas is prominent in certain parts of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and in the Platonic *Rival Lovers*.

In an epilogue, this book concludes with a brief discussion of the relevance of this study to the way we might now think about *philosophia* and the history of philosophy in contemporary discussions of philosophy.

(continued...)

INDEX

INDEX LOCORUM