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Introduction

DREAMWORLDS OF RACE

Axes of the Angloworld

The late nineteenth century was a time of social dreaming in Britain and the United States. Thousands of novels, songs, poems, and sermons flowed from printing presses, reshaping the sense of the possible. Speculative fiction proselytizing concrete programs for remaking the world jostled with political commentary articulating fantastical visions of the future. New conceptions of society, of cultural life, and of humanity itself proliferated.\(^1\) Political imaginaries as well as literary genres were refashioned. The implications of emerging scientific knowledge and innovative technologies stood at the heart of this intellectual ferment.

The burst of utopianism at once reflected and helped to constitute debates over the future of global order. It found powerful expression in dreams of imperial and racial union. Encompassing the British settler empire and the United States, the Angloworld was a popular source and subject of utopian desire. Coalescing during the early nineteenth century, by the late Victorian age it formed a “politically divided but culturally and economically united intercontinental system.”\(^2\) The ambition to forge political unity animated various groups during the closing decades of the century. Imagining a vast


\(^2\) James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth* (Oxford, 2009), 9. Belich coined the term “Angloworld.” Noting the Anglophone “propensity to gigantism” and “elephantiasis” (9, 14), he argues that the great “Anglo divergence”—the growing economic gap between the Angloworld and the...
Angloworld political community, these efforts were driven by a fissile mix of anxiety and hope—anxiety that unless action was taken, and taken soon, the Angloworld would fragment, fatally undermining its transformative potential and condemning the British Empire to inevitable decline; hope, that the resulting combination would dominate and lead humanity. Though emanating principally from Britain, Angloworld advocacy was at once transatlantic and transcolonial in scope, drawing contributors from all the lands its proponents aimed to amalgamate. It assumed two principal forms. One focused on the consolidation of Britain and its remaining settler colonies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and (more ambivalently) southern Africa. Flowering in the 1880s, and echoing through the twentieth century and into the present, this debate unfolded under the sign of “imperial federation.”3 The other main axis focused on relations between Britain and the United States. This was the discourse of Anglo-America. These distinct but overlapping projects were often seen as compatible, although there was much disagreement over which should be prioritized and how they might be coordinated. They could also conflict. Some of the leading acolytes of Anglo-America recommended the dissolution of the British Empire, and showed little interest in the claims of the remaining settler colonies, while many imperial federalists regarded the United States as a threat to British primacy.

This book explores some of the most ambitious ideas about the unification of Anglo-America, concentrating on the years between 1880 and the First World War. During that tumultuous period, numerous members of the intellectual elite on both sides of the Atlantic—scholars, journalists, novelists, preachers, and politicians—encouraged closer cooperation, even political integration, between the two powers. Such arguments fused hard-headed geopolitical and economic reasoning with bombastic declarations about racial destiny, grounded in a fervent belief in the superiority of the “Anglo-Saxon race” or “English-speaking peoples.” They were often framed in utopian terms: yoking together Britain and the United States would inaugurate an era of perpetual peace and global justice. Or so it was maintained. But while Anglo-American unionists concurred about the world-historical significance of the race, they diverged significantly over the constitutional form the emergent community should assume, the best political strategies to pursue, the value of

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imperialism, and the ultimate ends of union. The object of competing claims and fantasies, the racial dreamworld was fractured, contested, and unstable. 

_Dreamworlds of Race_ can be read both as a stand-alone monograph and as the third volume of a loose trilogy dedicated to analyzing the metropolitan settler imaginary. In _The Idea of Greater Britain_, I dissected the discourse of imperial federation.⁴ _Reordering the World_ expanded my account of imperial ideology, stressing the intricate entanglement of liberal political thought and settler colonialism. _Dreamworlds of Race_ turns to the other main axis of Anglo-world debate. Diplomatic and political historians have written extensively about the “rapprochement” between Britain and the United States, often divining in it the roots of the “special relationship” that did so much to shape twentieth-century geopolitics.⁵ Cultural historians and literary scholars have probed the transatlantic intellectual worlds of the fin de siècle, mapping flows of people, images, and texts, as well as the lines of influence connecting writers and artists on either side of the ocean.⁶ An impressive body of writing has tracked the wide circulation of ideas about domestic social and political reform.⁷ Scholars of International Relations return incessantly to the era, attempting to explain the dynamics of “hegemonic transition,” as one great power relinquished predominance to another without sparking war between them.⁸ Work on the political thought of Anglo-America is rarer. Ideas of inter-imperial cooperation have drawn some attention, as has the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism and the recurrent use of British exemplars by American

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⁴. On other aspects of the British settler empire, see Cecilia Morgan, _Building Better Britains?_ (Toronto, 2016); Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson, _Empire and Globalisation_ (Cambridge, 2010); Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, _Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance_ (Cambridge, 2014).


⁶. Genevieve Abravanel, _Americanizing Britain_ (Oxford, 2012); Christopher Mulvey, _Transatlantic Manners_ (Cambridge, 1990); Paul Giles, _Atlantic Republic_ (Oxford, 2009), chs. 3–6; Brook Miller, _America and the British Imaginary in Turn-of-the-Twentieth-Century Literature_ (Basingstoke, 2010).


imperialists.9 Yet the intellectual currents, concerns, and frameworks that underpinned and structured arguments for union remain poorly understood. My aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of the unification debate or pinpoint its impact on specific government policies or decisions. Rather I seek to analyze the boldest arguments about Anglo-America, the dreams that motivated and shaped them, and the discourses in which they were embedded, with the intention of illuminating a pivotal moment in both the intellectual history of world order and the development of modern utopian thought. In particular, I want to suggest that they can be read productively as expressing a potent form of racial utopianism.

Four extraordinary individuals stand at the center of the book: Andrew Carnegie, Cecil J. Rhodes, W. T. Stead, and H. G. Wells. I focus on this quartet because they were the most high-profile and influential advocates of Anglo-American integration. Moreover, they constituted a loose network, bound to varying degrees by personal ties, professional connections, and a shared belief in racial destiny. One of the richest men in the world, Carnegie promoted the “reunion” of Britain and the United States tirelessly for over three decades, believing that the “English-speaking peoples,” if combined politically, could serve as the engine of global industrial progress. Rhodes was the most prominent imperialist of the age, a man at once vilified as a megalomaniacal jingo and celebrated as a world-making colossus. Fulminating against the incompetence of the late eighteenth-century British statesmen who had driven the United States from the imperial embrace, he dreamt of a future Anglo-Saxon polity that adopted the American constitution as a model. Wells was renowned for both his speculative fiction and social prophecy. He predicted that Britain and the United States would fuse together during the twentieth century, creating a “New Republic” that would dominate an unruly planet and lay the foundations of a universal world-state. The American political scientist and editor Albert Shaw anointed Stead “the man who above all others proclaimed the gospel of a world redeemed through the prevailing influence of the English-speaking race.”10 The most famous journalist in the British Empire, as well as a best-selling author in the United States, he believed that providence would deliver “one vast federated unity,” an “English-speaking United States of the


World,” to redeem humanity. A friend and collaborator of both Rhodes and Carnegie, and a man who helped to launch Wells on his astonishing literary career, Stead utilized his editorial talents to spread the gospel of racial destiny through the media networks of the Angloworld. All four of them argued that Anglo-American union would inaugurate an era of perpetual peace. In the following chapters, they are joined by, and put into dialogue with, a large cast drawn from the intellectual and political elites on both sides of the Atlantic.

To capture the contours of the discourse, I mix fine-grained analysis of individual writers with more expansive discussions of themes and concepts. The former allows me to delve into the intellectual development and commitments of some of the key unionists, tracing the evolution of their thinking, its subtilities, confusions, targets, and sources. The latter allows me to locate unionist arguments in wider patterns of social and political thought, identifying the genealogy of some of the core ideas and the ways that the champions of Anglo-America intervened in and reshaped political debate. The first half of Dreamworlds of Race anatomizes the visions of Carnegie, Stead, Rhodes, and Wells. In chapter 2, I examine Carnegie’s shifting ideas about union from the 1880s until the outbreak of war in 1914, reading them in the context of debates about war and peace, international law and empire, theology and race. Chapter 3 turns to Stead and Rhodes. I analyze the theological basis of Stead’s account of the “English-speaking peoples,” explore how he thought about the relationship between Anglo-America, imperial federation, and European union, and unpack his resolute belief that journalism was an ideal vehicle for proselyting racial union. I contend that Rhodes’s ambiguous proposals for Anglo-America were developed in dialogue with Stead, who subsequently used his editorial platform to craft a public image of Rhodes as a fierce unionist. Chapter 4 offers a new interpretation of Wells’s political thought, arguing that he should be read as a philosophical pragmatist. When combined with an abiding belief in the explanatory power of evolutionary theory, his philosophical commitments shaped his views about race, nation, and state, as well his conception of the “English-speaking peoples.” At the turn of the century, Wells both predicted and embraced the future “synthetic” fusion of Britain and the United States, though he later argued that the United States was not yet ready to participate in such an ambitious state-building project.

The second half of the book analyzes some of the key themes that ran through Anglo-racial discourse. Chapter 5 argues that late Victorian science fiction was a pivotal site for the articulation of racial utopianism. Focusing on literary imaginings of future war, I discuss general trends in the popular

11. Stead has even been called (with some exaggeration) “the most important journalist of all time”: Tristram Hunt, “Foreword,” W. Sydney Robinson, Muckraker (London, 2012), xi.
transatlantic genre and read a variety of notable texts as paradigmatic expressions of the racial dreamworld. In Chapter 6, I track how ideas about citizenship and patriotism were recoded in debates over Anglo-America. Advocates of union often promoted a regime of “isopolitan” (or common) citizenship that would bind all the members of the Angloworld, and argued for the importance of “race patriotism,” a fractal mode of political belonging that encompassed the totality of the “English race.” I also discuss how unionists sought to build a globe-spanning racial community by crafting new historical narratives, symbols, and rituals. Chapter 7 turns to ideas about war and its supersession, delineating the assorted ways that empire and the Angloworld were presented as agents of global peace and order. As faith in the pacific character of democracy faded, it became increasingly common to suggest that Anglo-America could underwrite global stability, even perpetual peace. This was the dream of racial Pax. The conclusion examines two forms of writing that challenge the historical and conceptual assumptions of racial unionism. Staging a transhistorical encounter, I turn first to late twentieth-century neo-Victorian speculative fiction, investigating how the British-American relationship is recast in counterfactual historical narratives. I finish by discussing how fin-de-siècle Afro-modern thinkers, in particular the American sociologist and historian W. E. B. Du Bois and the Jamaican pan-Africanist T. E. S. Scholes, rebutted or reoriented claims about civilization, racial supremacy, and progressive historical development.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I sketch the (geo)political context in which the debates occurred, consider the self-consciously visionary character of many unionist claims as well as the conceptual elusiveness of racial categorization, and explore the centrality of communications technology in imagining the destiny of Anglo-America.

The Shape of Things to Come: Empire, War, Racial Union

I believe that the twentieth century is par excellence “The Anglo-Saxon Century,” in which the English-speaking peoples may lead and predominate the world.12

(John Dos Passos)

The transition from a world of empires to a world of states has often been presented, whether implicitly or explicitly, as a largely seamless, perhaps even

inevitable, movement from one form of political order to another. Yet it was contested bitterly throughout the decades in which it unfolded. During the mid-twentieth century, as Or Rosenboim shows, a loose network of thinkers in Europe and the United States—Raymond Aron, Friedrich Hayek, Owen Lattimore, Jacques Maritain, David Mitrany, Lionel Robbins, and Barbara Wootton, among others—elaborated contrasting political visions for the postwar years. A revitalized nation-state, European federalism, developmental accounts of empire, international federations, a world-state: all these and more were canvased. From the interwar period and through the era of decolonization, as Adom Getachew shows, a global network of anticolonial thinkers—Nnamdi Azikiwe, Du Bois, Michael Manley, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, George Padmore, and Eric Williams, among others—sought to combine arguments for political self-determination with ambitious plans for reformatting the international system, moving beyond a restrictive view of the nation “to insist that the achievement of this ideal required juridical, political, and economic institutions in the international realm that would secure nondomination.” Their favored projects included the institutionalization of a right to self-determination at the United Nations, the establishment of regional federations, and ideas for a New International Economic Order to replace the systemic capitalist exploitation of the Global South.

The organizing principles of sociopolitical life were also in flux as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The future spatial configuration of politics was deeply uncertain, provoking widespread debate and a stream of creative speculation about the contours of the world to come. Imperial and regional federations, the rapid multiplication of nation-states, even a universal polity, were considered feasible options. So too were massive associations built around racial or linguistic identity. Pan-Africanism, Pan-Asianism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Latinism, and Pan-Slavism all flowered in the shadow of geopolitical uncertainty, as thinkers throughout the world imagined new sources and modalities of political affiliation, legitimacy, and belonging. Expressions of transnational whiteness, Anglo-Saxonism foremost among them, were among

the most prominent of numerous attempts to rethink the norms, values, and territorial patterns of global order. The Prophets of “the religion of whiteness,” as Du Bois once called it, galvanized efforts to institutionalize racial supremacy within and beyond the borders of Europe and the Angloworld.16

The debate over Anglo-America bloomed in the final two decades of the nineteenth century and continued until the First World War. It was overdetermined, with multiple tributaries feeding the stream. Many British observers felt anxious about the power and prestige of the imperial state in a world apparently fated for domination by massive omnicompetent polities. Germany was emerging as a military and industrial giant, while France sought to reclaim its previous status, principally by challenging British imperial supremacy in Africa. On the eastern flank of the continent, Russia posed a threat to the empire in Asia. Far larger than Britain, and with an economy that was already pulling ahead, the United States looked set to assume its long-heralded role as a great power.17 The twentieth century would be an American one. Britain was in danger of ceding both its global preeminence, and the leadership of the English-speaking world, to its colonial offspring. Translatio imperii would accompany geopolitical demotion.

I use the term “unionist” in a broad sense, to refer to those who sought to coordinate or integrate Britain and the United States, and to do so principally on the basis of their shared racial identity. Arguments for union drew on a variety of intellectual trends, precedents, and exemplars. The development of new transport and communications systems was an essential ingredient. Instantiating the very thing it celebrated, debate over Anglo-America was catalyzed and reproduced by powerful infrastructural technologies that facilitated the rapid transatlantic circulation of information, commodities, and people. Articles, pamphlets, books, speeches, telegrams, poems, novels, sermons, and a flood of personal correspondence—all flowed throughout Anglo-America, spreading information, sparking debate, provoking excitement, endorsement, and rejection. Moreover, as I discuss later in this chapter, interpretations of those same technologies, above all the electrical telegraph, led to a reassessment of the size and form of viable political communities. This recoding of space was amplified by widespread interest in the political technology of


federalism. It was, Ernest Barker wrote later, the “note of the hour.”18 Federal structures offered a way to reconcile vast geographical expanse, political dynamism, and individual liberty, allowing the rescaling of polities.19 The United States in particular, but also Canada, Australia (from 1901), and South Africa (from 1910), demonstrated to many that it was an ideal form of political organization for consolidating the Angloworld.20 Just as many imperial federalists were drawn to the idea, so too were some of the most ambitious devotees of Anglo-America. Moreover, a slew of racial theories, grounded in a confused admixture of philological speculation, evolutionary argumentation, and folk assumptions about hierarchy and difference, underwrote the belief that the scattered population of the Angloworld constituted a single superior people.

British observers had long been fascinated by the United States, often viewing it with a toxic mixture of arrogance and disdain that served to fuel Anglophobia.21 In Democracy in America, Tocqueville had written that “nothing can be more virulent than the hatred which exists between the Americans of the United States and the English.”22 The tone and the terms of engagement shifted dramatically during the late Victorian years, as the American economy boomed, its universities and cultural life thrived, and its elites came into ever closer contact—through business, travel, intermarriage, and intellectual exchange—with those in the British world.23 “English travellers and writers

23. Hugh Tulloch, “Changing British Attitudes towards the United States in the 1880s,” Historical Journal, 20/4 (1977), 825–40; Robert Frankel, Observing America (Madison, 2007); David
used no doubt formerly to assume airs of supercilious condescension which must have been offensive to Americans,” James Bryce admitted in 1896. “But those airs were dropped twenty or thirty years ago, and the travellers who return now return full of gratitude for the kindness they have received and full of admiration for the marvellous progress they have witnessed.”

Given American suspicion of “entangling alliances,” and sensitive to the virulent strain of Anglophobia coursing through public debate, British race unionists recognized that they faced a formidable task. Their response was to insist either that union was inevitable due to a combination of deep racial connections and prevailing economic, political, and technological trends, or that the governments in London and Washington had to act swiftly and decisively because transatlantic integration was in their national interests. They found some ready allies in the United States, including historians such as George Burton Adams and James Hosmer, who drew sustenance from Teutonic interpretations of transatlantic racial development, theologians such as Josiah Strong and Lyman Abbott, who preached a form of racial providentialism, and British emigrants seeking to (re)unify their two homelands, Carnegie among them. Most American unionists favoured increased co-operation with Britain rather than full political integration.

The “vortex of militarism,” as Carnegie termed it, bolstered unionist discourse. Impetus was provided by three geopolitical crises: the Venezuela border dispute (1895–96), the onset of the Spanish-American War (1898), and the British war in South Africa (1899–1902). The Venezuelan crisis briefly set Britain and the United States on a diplomatic collision course, generating a fresh wave of Anglophobia in the United States and a spirited response from those horrified at the prospect of an Angloworld civil war. It spurred efforts to establish cooperation on a firmer footing: campaigning groups were formed, transatlantic networks assembled, impassioned speeches delivered, articles, pamphlets, and books published. In February 1896, the “Anglo-American Union” was launched in London to agitate for an arbitration treaty between


the two countries. By the outbreak of the First World War, it was flanked by a series of other organizations, including the Anglo-American Committee (1898), the Anglo-American League (1898), the Atlantic Union (1901), and the Pilgrims Society (1902). A rich institutional ecology fostered personal connections and built a sense of solidarity between members of the transatlantic elite. It played an important role in the fabrication and dissemination of unionist projects.

The two imperial wars proved more divisive for unionists. Many Britons welcomed American efforts to carve out an extra-continental empire in Asia, assuming their fair share of Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden.” Embracing a form of inter-imperialism, they anticipated a joint mission to force open new markets and “civilise” swaths of the earth. Talk of a formal military alliance was rife. But other observers recoiled in horror. One of the most powerful ripostes came from Benjamin Harrison, the former President. “Are not the continuous good and close relations of the two great English-speaking nations—for which I pray—rather imperiled than promoted by this foolish talk of gratitude and of an alliance, which is often made to take on the appearance of a threat, or at least a prophecy, of an Anglo-Saxon ‘paramountcy?’” The danger of racial exceptionalism loomed:

If the nations are to be friends, if they are to live together in amity and work together in their foreign policies, must it not be upon a basis that does not repel but invites the participation of all other nations, in every project for the development and peace of the world—and not upon the pernicious and futile project of an Anglo-Saxon world? The moral quality of public acts must be taken account of; greed of territory and thoughts of political paramountcies enforced by the sword must be eliminated.

While many racial unionists welcomed the conflict, others worried that American imperialism threatened rather than cemented authentic integration. Carnegie, for example, became one of its foremost critics. The violence in


South Africa likewise triggered a burst of affirmation and critique. In Britain, a cacophonous debate raged over the legitimacy and conduct of the war, with race unionists found on both sides. Stead and Rhodes railed against each other, with the former emerging as one of the most vociferous opponents of a war that the latter had helped to foment. In the United States, the neutral stance adopted by the Republican administration was lambasted by those who sided with the Boers against British aggression.30 Even as the wars spurred support for rapprochement, they highlighted the political obstacles confronting unionism. Nevertheless, the general political trajectory was clear. While the Edwardian years were punctuated by a succession of fraught episodes—a second Venezuelan crisis in 1902–3, the rumbling Alaskan boundary dispute, tensions in the Caribbean, even squabbles over the 1908 Olympic Games—relations between Britain and the United States were far better than they had been a generation before. The foundations for deeper cooperation had been laid.

Racial unionism was a broad church, encompassing a variety of different positions. Its scope, as well as its indistinctness, was expressed in a resolution passed at the inaugural London meeting of the Anglo-American Committee in July 1898:

> Considering that the peoples of the British Empire and of the United States of America are closely allied in blood, inherit the same literature and laws, hold the same principles of self-government, recognize the same ideals of freedom and humanity in the guidance of their national policy, and are drawn together by strong common interests in many parts of the world, this meeting is of the opinion that every effort should be made in the interests of civilization and peace to secure the most cordial and constant cooperation between the two countries.31

Eliciting numerous expressions of support in the British and American press, the declaration contained some of the key themes—and ambiguities—that pervaded the discourse.32 Multiple vectors of identity were posited: racial,
linguistic, historical, legal, moral, and political. A harmonious combination of sentiment and shared interests was asserted. The urgency of the situation and the need for collective action was postulated, as was the universal significance of the endeavor. And the document was intentionally vague about the form union might assume. Like the imperial federalists, Anglo-American unionists were divided sharply over the best arrangements to seek. Three basic accounts can be discerned, each encompassing various strands. While all unionists accepted as an article of faith the fundamental unity and world-historical destiny of the race, they differed over the extent of institutionalization required. At one end of the spectrum were maximalists who propounded some kind of formal political (re)unification, typically either confederal or federal. They hoped to go much further than the Anglo-American Committee resolution presaged. This stance was adopted by all of my main protagonists. Wells hailed the emergence of a New Republic, while Rhodes imagined a day when the capital city of Anglo-America would alternate between London and Washington. During the 1880s and 1890s, Carnegie called for both the federation and the confederation of Britain and the United States, before switching gears to argue that Britain should be subsumed into an expanding United States. Following a similar trajectory, Stead championed the relentless “Americanization” of the world, moving from advocacy of confederation to the full absorption of Britain within an American-dominated “United States of the English-speaking World.” At the other end of the spectrum, minimalists rejected the need for any substantial institutional engineering, trusting the underlying motive power of racial kinship to bind Anglo-America. At most, they were willing to countenance an arbitration treaty, designed to eliminate the possibility of internecine violence and cement geopolitical cooperation. Arrayed between the two poles could be found various proposals for institutionalizing union short of full political integration. The two most popular were an alliance, usually centered on a defensive or offensive treaty, and the

Committee, An American Response to Expressions of English Sympathy (New York, 1899). The latter includes membership lists for the American and British branches of the Committee.

33. On the variety of imperial federal plans, see Bell, Greater Britain; Ged Martin, “Empire Federalism and Imperial Parliamentary Union, 1820–1870,” Historical Journal, 16/1 (1973), 65–92; Seymour Cheng, Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire (New York, 1931).

establishment of a system of common ("isopolitan") citizenship. Proposals for the former were especially popular in the wake of 1898. I return to the latter in chapter 6.

An intellectual history of Anglo-America could be written about the leading political actors in London and Washington. It would encompass a remarkable group of politicians, including William Gladstone, Lord Salisbury, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, John Hay, Joseph Chamberlain, and Arthur Balfour. While an illuminating exercise, it would look rather different from the story that I chart. True believers in racial kinship, they all endorsed minimalist proposals—chiefly international arbitration and closer diplomatic cooperation—despite rhetorical flourishes that suggested more ambitious commitments. This is hardly surprising given their political roles. Roosevelt is exemplary. Embedded in a dense transatlantic network of correspondents and friends, he was keen to consolidate relations between what he regarded as the two main homes of the most “civilised” race on earth.35 “It must always be kept in mind,” he wrote in The Naval War of 1812, “that the Americans and the British are two substantially similar branches of the great English race, which both before and after their separation have assimilated and made Englishmen of many other peoples.”36 Underpinning his Anglophilia was a Lamarckian account of acquired racial characteristics that posited dynamic action—manifested in part as imperialism—as necessary to maintain the vigorous, manly qualities of the “English race.” His multivolume The Winning of the West, published in 1889, opened with a famous chapter on “the spread of the English-speaking peoples” that tracked the historical continuities between Britons and Americans, and heralded their epochal role. “During the past three centuries,” he boasted, “the spread of the English-speaking peoples over the world’s waste spaces has been not only the most striking feature in the world’s history, but also the event of all others most far-reaching in its effects and its importance.” Constituting a single race, they now held “in their hands the fate of the coming

35. On Roosevelt’s positive attitude to Britain, see William Tilchin, Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire (London, 1997). Tilchin argues that until 1905 Roosevelt’s positivity was accompanied by some ambivalence, but that afterwards his support was unqualified. See also David Burton, “Theodore Roosevelt and His English Correspondents,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 63/2 (1973), 3–70.

years.” Yet even as Roosevelt gushed about racial destiny, and pursued Anglo-American cooperation intently when in office, his ardent nationalism militated against projects for political integration.

Chamberlain and Balfour were the senior British politicians most closely associated with Anglo-America, but like Roosevelt their proposals rarely went beyond encomiums to the glory of kinship and support for cooperation or an arbitration body. Proclaiming that Americans and Britons were “all of the same race and blood,” Chamberlain argued in Toronto in 1887 that the mighty “Anglo-Saxons” were “infallibly destined to be the predominant force in the future history and civilisation of the world.” This racial vision at once motivated his support for the “great dream” of imperial federation and his passionate support of Anglo-American rapprochment. Extolling American imperialism, in May 1898 he floated the idea of an “alliance,” though he meant close cooperation rather than any formal institutional connection. A few months later, he invoked George Washington’s farewell address to argue that Britain and the United States were better off without entangling alliances, while avowing that the two countries should collaborate to civilize “the Tropics.” Balfour likewise hymned the glory of racial unity without committing to political integration. “I am nothing if not an apostle of the English-speaking world.” A supporter of an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, he summarized his position in an address to the Pilgrims Society in 1905.

There has grown up a sense of solidarity, a sense of common origin, and common objects, which, despite certain temporary and negligible fluctuations, leaves us to contemplate a time, not far distant, when, without engagements, without treatises, without any formal declaration, there will arise between this country and the United States that community of feeling which is more powerful than any diplomatic instrument, and which will make all men who speak the English language, in whatever part of the world

they dwell, feel they do indeed belong to a community which transcends national limits, and in whose fortunes perhaps the greatest interests of civilisation are bound up.43

Many unionists saw bold institutional solutions as either unrealistic (even if desirable) or as impediments to authentic racial union. Charles Dilke, the eminent liberal politician, discerned scant support in the United States for a “startling” departure from its isolationist tradition, but he reiterated the argument he had made originally in Greater Britain, that the countries formed the “two chief sections of our race.” “Common action will . . . be increasingly probable,” he concluded, “but of permanent alliance there is as yet no sign.”44 Racial utopianism was not restricted to institutional maximalists, however, for many of those who spurned formal reunification still invested race with transformative potential. The American theologian Lyman Abbott is a case in point. “[B]y the mere fact of their cooperation,” Britain and the United States, “embodying the energy, the enterprise, and the conscience of the Anglo-Saxon race,” would be “[i]nvincible against enemies, illimitable in influence, at once inspiring and restraining each other.” Acting in concert, they could “produce a result in human history which would surpass all that present imagination can conceive or present hope anticipate.”45 Institutional minimalism could underpin utopian dreams of racial destiny.

Those skeptical about the necessity or viability of institutional change in the present were often open to unification in the future. They counseled patience, fearing that premature action would endanger fragile support for integration. History should be left to run its course. “There is no need to talk of any formal conventions or declarations,” wrote the distinguished legal scholar Sir Frederick Pollock. “If the spirit is there, the letter can be provided when the


time calls for it.”46 This cautious position was encapsulated the following year by the historian J. Stanley Little. Any alliance “would have to come about by gradual processes, as I believe it is coming about.” Neither an imperial federation nor Anglo-American unification “could be arranged on lines which give to the structure that symmetry and homogeneity on which the makers of paper constitutions dream.” The “impatient doctrinaires” were hopelessly misguided if they thought that the “Anglo-Saxons” would accept drastic reforms to their constitutions.47 The maximalists, in contrast, wagered that the time was ripe for substantial change.

It was often unclear where the boundaries of a future polity would be drawn. Although Wells’s argument implied the unification of the whole Angloworld, he wrote almost exclusively about Britain and the United States, rarely mentioning the settler colonies. Stead promulgated both imperial federation and Anglo-American union, but from the 1890s onward the latter was his clear priority. Rhodes’s vision encompassed the United States and the British Empire, while Carnegie favored the dissolution of the empire, focusing his attention on securing the union of Britain and the United States. Nor was theoretical precision a virtue of unionist discourse. The novelist and historian Walter Besant exemplified both the grandiose ambition and the argumentative slipperiness of unionist projects. Enumerating the territories occupied or administered by the “Anglo-Saxons,” he yearned for “one United Federation of States,” the “greatest, the richest, the most powerful empire, republic or state that history has ever recorded.”48 The six “nations”—Australia, Britain, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa—should “form a firm alliance, offensive and defensive,” controlling a navy that would outmatch all possible competitors. They would constitute “a great federation of our race, an immense federation, free, law-abiding, peaceful,” yet nevertheless ready to fight if threatened.49 A year later, Besant hailed the glorious future of the “United Federation of the English-Speaking States.” Adamant that the “Congress” of this magnificent polity would not infringe legislatively on the sovereignty of its constituent units, that none would have authority over any other, he said little about how to reconcile autonomy with a functioning federal structure, the specificity of constitutional arrangements, or how state, nation,


47. J. Stanley Little, Progress of British Empire in the Century (London, 1903), 103.


republic, and empire should be differentiated conceptually. What he lacked as a political theorist, Besant made up for as a eulogist. “I can see no limit to the boundary or power that will be possessed by such a Federation. It will be a power exerted altogether in the interests of peace.” Unionist advocacy was characterized by a mixture of conceptual ambiguity and grandiose claims about racial destiny.

Anglotopia: Racial Futurism and the Power of Dreams

This may all seem Utopian, but we have had many prophetic voices, more than fulfilled, which at the time of their inspired utterance much wilder than anything herein suggested. It may be all a dream but I am a dreamer of dreams. So be it. But if it be true that he who always dreams accomplishes nothing, so also is it none the less true that he who never dreams is equally barren of achievement.

(A ndrew Carnegie)

Utopias are engines of world-making, a nowhere that signals the possible future instantiation of a somewhere. A diagnostic probe of the present as well as a call to act, their imaginative power is generated by the simultaneous identification of pathology and the elaboration of a hypothetical resolution. Through imagining and meditating on potential futures, utopianism can motivate action by inspiring people to realize their desires. As Jay Winter observes, it has been “the core, the driving force of many social and political movements.” The projected site and form of utopia has morphed over time. Reinhart Koselleck argues that classical utopias, including those of More and Plato, were “spatialized”—located in historically contemporaneous yet alien places. Absent from such accounts, he averred, was the “temporal dimension of utopia as a site of the future.” As the finite world was mapped and conquered

51. Besant was a key figure behind the creation of the “Atlantic Union,” a transatlantic association formed in 1901 to promote cooperation between the “English-speaking peoples.” See here Besant, Autobiography of Walter Besant (New York, 1902), ch. 16; Besant, “Object of Atlantic Union,” New York Times, 4 June 1900. He served as the Treasurer of the Union.
by the Europeans, room for the imaginative projection of such places was gradually exhausted. Utopia was increasingly transposed into the future. During the long nineteenth century, it was “temporalized,” representing “the metamorphosis of utopia into the philosophy of history.” Utopias came to be seen as potentially realizable through collective action.

Utopian desire pervaded late nineteenth-century intellectual life. More utopian tales were written in the three decades following the publication of Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward, 2000–1887 (1888) than in the previous several centuries combined. They were consumed ravenously across the Angloworld. “[S]ocial dreams are once more rife,” declared the British journalist G. W. Foote in 1886. The value of such thinking was widely acknowledged. Defending Bellamy against his detractors, the radical political economist J. A. Hobson wrote,

Just as there is a sense in which history is stranger than fiction, so there is a sense in which fiction is truer than history; that is to say, the constructive imagination of man is able so to order outward and inward events of life that deep essential truths shine forth more clearly than in the grosser and more complicated order of “real” life which is not designed primarily for their disclosure.

Well-designed ideal societies were not “opposed to the present real society,” he argued, but instead constituted a “furtherance and completion of that reality” by conjoining the “strong and permanent” features of a given sociopolitical order with invented yet plausible modifications. Utopian thinking was a legitimate, even necessary, dimension of political thought and activism.

Observing the appearance of “so many prophets and so many prophecies,” G. K. Chesterton recognized the distinctiveness of the times. In The Napoleon of Notting Hill, his cutting satire on the genre, he observed that wherever one 

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56. Robertson, Last Utopians, 4.
57. Kenneth Roemer, The Obsolete Necessity (Kent, 1976); Claeys, “Reshaping of the Utopian Genre.”
58. G. W. Foote, “Social Dreams,” Progress, 6 (1886), 190. Foote was a well-known advocate of secularism.
59. J. A. Hobson, “Edward Bellamy and the Utopian Romance,” The Humanitarian, 13 (1898), 179. The publication of Looking Backward, he suggested, was “one of the most important literary events of the century” (179).
looked there were “clever men” plotting the future of humanity, “all quite clear, all quite keen-sighted and ruthless, and all quite different.” There was Wells, “who thought that science would take charge of the future,” and Edward Carpenter, who yearned for a return to the virtuous simplicity of Nature. There was Tolstoy and a band of “humanitarians” ceaselessly preaching the creed of universalism and peace on earth, even as another vocal group were predicting the opposite, that the “lines of kinship would become narrower and stern.” Rhodes loomed large among them, a man “who thought that the one thing of the future was the British Empire, and that there would be a gulf between those who were of the Empire and those who were not, . . . similar to the gulf between man and the lower animals.” Stead, meanwhile, “thought that England would in the twentieth century be united to America.” Although he missed the substantive convergence between Rhodes, Stead, and Wells, Chesterton saw clearly the interweaving of utopian visions of society and projects for world order. While fantasies of the future were expressed in different idioms and genres, they were a product of the same febrile milieu and they expressed many of the same anxieties and hopes.

Advocacy of Anglo-America was shot through with the imagery and language of dreams. Proud to call himself a “dreamer of dreams,” Carnegie declared racial union the grandest of them all. Rhodes once observed that “[i]t is the dreamers that move the world,” and he was only too happy to sport the badge, an estimate shared by many of his devotees, who acclaimed him as a visionary genius. Stead routinely assumed the mantle of social prophet, even purporting to act as an agent of providence, while Wells quickly established a reputation as one of the most important speculative thinkers of the age. Critics of the idea also recognized its utopian dimensions. The eminent positivist Frederic Harrison observed in 1906 that

[T]his dream of welding into one the whole English-speaking people is a dangerous and retrograde Utopia, full of mischief and false pride of race. It is a subtler and more sinister form of Jingoism. We all need to have our national faults and weaknesses corrected by friendship with those of different ideals and without our special temptations. The English race is already
too domineering, ambitious, and self-centred. Combination with America would stimulate our vices, our difficulties—and our rivals.65

Those utilizing the language of dreams did not regard projects for Anglo-American unification as hopelessly unrealistic—indeed, they claimed that racial union was either a feasible political ambition, given appropriate political will, or that it was inevitable. They regarded dreaming, with Hobson, as an essential feature of reality—not antithetical to it. The invocation of dreams was simultaneously an acknowledgment and a celebration of the power of the imagination to remake sociopolitical order. To motivate and direct action, and to build support for significant change, it was necessary to escape the constraints imposed by present circumstances and conventional styles of thinking. While not all unionists were utopian, it is hard to make sense of much of the discourse, or comprehend its more radical expressions, without recognizing the self-consciously visionary ideas and hopes that pulsed through it. Seeking to confront or defuse economic, political, and social anxieties through establishing novel forms of association, racial utopians placed the latest technoscientific discoveries at the heart of their projects, seeing in them the material and symbolic means through which their grand aims could be achieved. By reading debates over Anglo-America in the context of fin-de-siècle utopianism, I seek to recover their transformative ambition and locate them in the wider cultural matrix that both produced them and rendered their claims intelligible.

Political commentary on Anglo-America also borrowed heavily from the repertoire of tropes, images, figures, and rhetorical gestures that characterized other forms of utopian writing. Poetry and speculative fiction were invoked routinely to communicate the grandeur and the glory of racial destiny. The most common literary reference point had been penned by Tennyson, an unmatched imperial dream weaver. Often cited as inspiration and guide, a passage in his numinous 1835 poem “Locksley Hall” captured attention.

Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight dropping down with costly bales;

65. Frederic Harrison, The Positivist Review (1906), cited in Review of Reviews, 202 (October 1906), 397. Hereafter this journal is cited as RoR. Pointing to the universalism of Comte, Stead retorted, “To oppose the reunion of the English-speaking race is hardly the line which we ought to expect from those who believe in the unity of mankind. What is more natural than that those who seek the larger unity should wish to secure as a stepping-stone the union of all those who speak the same language, read the same literature, and are on the same plane of civilisation?” Stead, RoR, 202 (October 1906), 397.
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain’d a ghastly dew
From the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue;
Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,
With the standards of the peoples plunging thro’ the thunder-storm;
Till the war-drum throb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.66

Furnishing unionists with evocative imagery, a sense of cultural anchorage,
and a claim on intellectual authority, this passage was elusive enough to be
yoked to competing ends. It was cited frequently, especially by those who
envisioned Anglo-American union as an initial step on the road to far grander
forms of political association. We shall encounter it repeatedly in the following
pages. Tennyson was not the only writer of fiction to be conscripted—as I
discuss in chapter 6, Shakespeare, Milton, Kipling, Lowell, and the King James
Bible were all called upon for support. Nor was the traffic one way. Novels and
short stories were written to present idealized visions of imperial order and
racial supremacy, run thought experiments about alternative geopolitical sys-
tems, and imagine future sociopolitical trajectories. Speculative literature was
regarded as an effective medium of political thought and persuasion. Science
fiction (as I discuss in chapter 5) proved an especially fruitful genre for racial
utopianism. The “impulse to look ahead is universal,” Stephen Kern observes,
“but the quantity of science fiction in this period and its success in the mar-
ketplace suggest that this generation was especially eager to do it.”67 The future
exerted a hypnotically powerful attraction. The line between fictional extrapo-
lation, political manifesto, and social analysis was blurred, even dissolved, in a
genre-straddling Anglo-America intertext.

“Utopia” is a term loaded with conflicting meanings.68 It is worth drawing
a distinction between two modes, one anthropic, the other programmatic. The
former views utopianism as a ubiquitous aspect of the human condition. From
this perspective, most human practices contain fugitive traces of utopia, for it

66. Alfred Tennyson, “Locksley Hall,” in Poems of Tennyson (Oxford, 1910), 166. It also in-
spired the title of Paul Kennedy’s history of the United Nations: The Parliament of Man (New
York, 2006).
68. For discussion of the concepts, see Frederic Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future (Lon-
don, 2007); Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse, NY, 1990); Frank Manuel and Fritzie
Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World (Cambridge, 1979); Philip Wegner, Imaginary
Communities (Berkeley, 2002); Lyman Tower Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revis-
ited,” Utopian Studies, 5/1 (1994), 1–37; Gregory Claeys, “News from Somewhere,” History,
is nothing less than a longing for an improved world. It is human, all too human. The most influential elaboration of this conception can be found in the writings of Ernst Bloch. In his ornate dialectical account, written to salvage Marxism from the shadow of Marx, utopianism is expressed in a spectacular array of phenomena, including religion, architecture, art, fairy tales, and poetry, as well as social and political philosophies. “So far does utopia extend, so vigorously does this raw material spread to all human activities, so essentially must every anthropology and science of the world contain it.” In a less metaphysically freighted sense, utopia can be defined simply as “the envisioning of a transformed, better world.” On such accounts, the utopian impulse can be harnessed to a wide range of political goals, including deeply reactionary ones. Most advocacy of empire, and of Angloworld union, was an expression of anthropic utopian desire: it projected a vision of a supposedly better world—one more “civilised,” one more in tune with the dictates of destiny, one that upholds the purported superiority of one political community or form of life over others—onto the drama of history. The problem with this picture (at least in its cruder renderings) is that it is too all-encompassing: the category of utopia is stretched so thinly that it loses distinctiveness and analytical purchase.

The programmatic form is more restricted. On this account, I argue, a political project can be considered utopian if, and only if, it invokes or prescribes the radical transformation, transcendence, or elimination of one or more pervasive practices, structures, or ordering principles that shape human collective life. This includes poverty, socioeconomic inequality, organized violence, political authority, the biochemical composition of the environment, and the ontological constitution of human beings, including death itself. Utopianism of this kind is predicated on a fundamental change in the order of things. It encompasses a spectrum of ambition, from positions that seek to address only


70. Bloch, Principle of Hope, I, 624. For Bloch, most instantiations of utopianism are “abstract” in form; what differentiates Marxism—contra Marx—is its focus on “concrete” utopias.

71. Robertson, Last Utopians, 6. Note that my distinction does not map onto Jay Winter’s conceptualization of “major” and “minor” utopias; his is chiefly an argument about ambition, not different modalities of the utopian imagination: Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom, ch. 1.
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one of those phenomena through to more totalizing visions that aim to transcend several of them.

Gregory Claeys is right to argue that late Victorian utopianism was shaped chiefly by the intersection of socialist ideas and Darwinism. The most popular topic of speculation was the “social question,” triggered by the widespread poverty and despair that accompanied the voracious expansion of industrial capitalism. But the dream of perpetual peace also suffused utopian visions. Even those texts read principally as answers to the social question charted an escape from a world of organized violence. In Looking Backward, Bellamy’s regimented socialist state is presented as an agent of global peace. “The great nations of Europe as well as Australia, Mexico, and parts of South America,” Dr Leete informs Julian West, “are now organized industrially like the United States, which was the pioneer of the evolution.” The “advanced” parts of the world solve the problem of war through socioeconomic coordination and building international institutions, while the “backward” zones were developed and incorporated in a new civilizing mission.

The peaceful relations of these nations are assured by a loose form of federal union of world-wide extent. An international council regulates the mutual intercourse and commerce of the members of the union and their joint policy toward the more backward races, which are gradually being educated up to civilized institutions. Complete autonomy within its own limits is enjoyed by every nation.

In News from Nowhere, William Morris imagined a bucolic socialist world at peace, while in Wells’s “modern utopia” the emergence of a functioning world-state ensures that the “peace of the world is established forever.” They disagreed, though, over the question of transition, of how to escape from the current world and build a future one. In contrast to Bellamy, both of the British writers suggested that revolution and war were necessary. As I explore at

72. Claeys, “Reshaping of the Utopian Genre.” For a contemporary account of the genre, tying utopianism to socialism, see Moritz Kaufmann, Utopias, or Schemes of Social Improvement, from Thomas More to Karl Marx (London, 1879). On the large number of dystopian texts produced at the time, see Gregory Claeys, Dystopia (Oxford, 2017), ch. 5.

73. For a fascinating discussion, placing it in the context of other nineteenth-century questions, see Holly Case, The Age of Questions (Princeton, NJ, 2018).

74. Bellamy, Looking Backward, 82.

75. William Morris, News from Nowhere and Other Writings, ed. Clive Wilmer (London, 1993), ch. 17; H. G. Wells, A Modern Utopia, ed. Gregory Claeys (1905; London, 2005), 36 and ch. 8. Thomas More’s utopians were not pacifists. While they regarded war as an “activity fit only for beasts,” and saw no glory in military victory, they did not reject it entirely. More listed a
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various points in the following chapters, disagreement over transition, and in particular whether it would require violence, ran through the discourse of Anglo-America. This is a fundamental challenge for any kind of utopian political thought.

Anglo-America was often figured as a programmatic utopian space. Although some prophetic writing on the subject discussed the abolition of poverty and the reduction of socioeconomic inequality, the primary utopian aim (shared by my main protagonists) was perpetual peace. Unification would, in the words of Carnegie, “end the murder of men by men.” Mastering the flux of the modern world, Anglo-America was imagined as a racial-political order capable of bringing peace to a violent planet. The human condition could be reconfigured, bringing once distant peoples into close communion with one another and eradicating the age-old scourge of war. This was the Anglotopian dream. It represented the divinization of the political, a theological master-narrative infused with ideas about destiny and providence. It was also, and equally, an expression of technological fetishism, the belief in the transformative powers of the machine that pervaded the era.

Biocultural Assemblage: A Note on Race

[just now, the world is in a sort of delirium about race and the racial struggle.]

(H. G. Wells)

Providing an authoritative rationale for manifold forms of exclusion, oppression, and violence, race was often viewed as the basic ontological category of society and politics. It offered an interpretive grid to categorize and evaluate peoples, underwriting what Paul Gilroy refers to as the “raciological ordering of the world,” and it was manifested in a range of legal, political, and social structures, a “racial nomos.” Claims about race played a fundamental, though often ambiguous, role in the Anglo-American dreamworld. All the main


76. Wells, Modern Utopia, 218.

protagonists of this book insisted on its centrality, though they—as with so many of their contemporaries—diverged over its meaning and implications.

The prevailing historical view is that race/racism is largely an invention of Western modernity, emerging simultaneously (and not coincidentally) with the Spanish conquest of the Americas, although some scholars seek to locate its protoforms in the ancient world. The racial order was transcontinental in reach from the outset, and subsequent centuries of imperialism both spread and consolidated it. By the nineteenth century it was an insidious feature of the Western political imaginary. But identifying the precise meanings of the term during the Victorian and Edwardian years is a thankless task. Racial thinking formed a shape-shifting amalgam of theories, vocabularies, practices, assumptions, and desires, and it both intersected and competed with other ways of conceptualizing human groups, most notably civilization and nationality. Folk racial classifications vied with elaborate theoretical accounts, themselves divided along numerous dimensions. A phalanx of historians, including Henry Maine, E. A. Freeman, James Bryce, and Herbert Baxter Adams, claimed that over the centuries the Teutonic people had migrated from the forest clearings of Germany into Britain and onward to the United States, in a grand westward sweep of racial destiny. Though most popular in the mid-Victorian years, this style of thinking resonated powerfully in the Anglo-American discourse (I return to it in chapter 2). Others drew from the expanding catalogue of evolutionary theories to ground claims about racial development in the authoritative idiom of biological science. Lamarckian views about inherited characteristics jostled and overlapped with multifarious


readings of Darwin. Many thinkers blended evolutionary and philological arguments in an unstable racial bricolage, while yet others bypassed scholarly strategies of racial identification, relying on assertion and appeals to vernacular notions of hierarchy and difference. Nascent scholarly disciplines, including anthropology, history, and political science, incubated and helped to legitimate racial discourses.

Scholars often distinguish biological and cultural conceptions of race. An implicit normative evaluation underpins the distinction: due to their essentialism, biological accounts are viewed as more problematic than the purportedly fluid culturalist variants. Yet while this binary highlights the elusive character of racial vocabulary—the fact that it was often used synonymously with nationality or civilization—it obscures some important aspects of fin-de-siècle discourse. Conceptions of racial variability were almost always delimited by what Du Bois, speaking at the inaugural Pan-African Conference in 1900, famously termed the “colour line.” Debates over mutability almost always took place within the horizon of whiteness. Even as the nature and number of “races” continued to vex scholars, the existence of a color line was widely accepted. The liberal philosopher and sociologist L. T. Hobhouse was recycling a commonplace when in 1911 he wrote that “much of the future of the modern state, particularly of my own country, must depend on the relation of the white to the colored and non-European races.” Race demarcated boundaries of identification, conflict, and solidarity within and between states and empires. Despite widespread disagreement over its definition, history, and entailments, as well as its ethico-political valence, both unionists and their critics almost invariably employed race as a core category of analysis. Privileging it as an


ontological category was a potent form of what Mark Jerng terms “racial worldmaking,” the “narrative and interpretive strategies that embed race into our knowledge and expectations of the world.”85 Such practices organize the perceptual field so that race is regarded, explicitly or implicitly, as a fundamental organizing principle. Centering race in a narrative or explanatory scheme has the cognitive effect of constructing “new ways of seeing, new objects of attention, and new ways of connecting diverse experiences such that one cannot frame the world without instituting racial difference in its composition.”86

Race was typically figured as a biocultural assemblage, a hybrid compound of “cultural” and “biological” claims about human evolutionary history, individual and collective character, comportment, mental capacity, and physiognomy.87 The racial identity of Anglo-America was most commonly described as “Anglo-Saxon.” The term was usually employed to designate a human collectivity defined by a vague admixture of mythology, historical experience, shared values, institutions, language, religious commitments, and cultural symbolism, all circumscribed (but not fully specified) by whiteness.88 Individual thinkers diverged chiefly over how they ranked and configured the various elements. Political liberty, free enterprise, a shared literary and religious heritage, the English language: all could be assigned priority. Lawyers tended to stress the centrality of the common law. Pollock asserted that neither biological descent nor “material interest” could adequately explain the rapprochement between Britain and America. “Beyond the facts of speech and kindred, deeper than all our occasions of difference, is the common stock of traditions and institutions, the ideal of political and intellectual freedom which was framed in England by centuries of toil and conflict, and has gone round the world with the law happily called by a name neither distinctively English or American—our Common Law.”89 For James Bryce, the law was a cherished

86. Jerng, Racial Worldmaking, 34.
87. Note that I use “biocultural assemblage” as a descriptive category intended to capture a prominent way that race was conceptualized at the time, not a normative concept for how we should think about it today.
88. For the long and shifting history of ideas about Anglo-Saxons, see Allen Frantzen and John Niles (eds.), Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity (Gainesville, 1997); Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny. For a rare exception, suggesting that “Africans” can become Anglo-Saxon, see Frederick William Chapman, “The Changed Significance of ‘Anglo-Saxon,’” Education, 20 (1900), 368–69. For accounts of Anglo-Saxonism and rapprochement, see Anderson, Race and Rapprochement; Vucetic, Anglosphere, ch. 2.
“common possession” of Britain and the United States, and in no other domain, he argued in 1907, “does the substantial identity of the two branches of the old stock appear so much as in the doctrine and practice of the law, for the fact that many new racial elements have gone to the making of the American people causes in this sphere very little difference.”\(^{90}\)

As we shall see in chapter 6, A. V. Dicey adopted a similar argument to promote a system of common citizenship between Britain and the United States.\(^ {91}\) But the color line delimited the space in which variability could be expressed. Not all whites were Anglo-Saxon, but all Anglo-Saxons were white. The fusion of biological and cultural arguments created an unstable compound that helped structure the political imagination. Late Victorian whiteness was, as Bill Schwarz puts it, an “entire, fantasized discursive complex.”\(^ {92}\)

The character of the “Anglo-Saxons,” and the reasons for their economic and political domination, attracted interest from a variety of continental European observers. Some of this work was translated into English, feeding the very debates it sought to comprehend. The most popular—for obvious reasons—was the French social reformer Edmond Demolins’s extended hymn to \textit{Anglo-Saxon Superiority}, an elevated status that he attributed to their “particularistic formation,” wherein the “individual is made to prevail over the community.”\(^ {93}\) This was a variation on the self-congratulatory theme that Britain, alone among the European powers, properly understood and enshrined individual liberty. Not everyone was convinced. In the early twentieth century, Karl Peters, a German politician, writer, and zealous imperialist, declared that Britain was showing signs of degeneration, although he finished his analysis by commending the “immense civilizational work performed by the Anglo-Saxon race on our planet.” He predicted the future integration of the British Empire and possible union with the United States. “And if the Anglo-Saxon world firmly resolves organisationally to consolidate itself over this planet into


a great federal state, it is difficult to see what power could prevent it from doing so."94 For Peters, the only viable response was a German-led European union.

Advocacy of transnational whiteness, and Anglo-Saxonism in particular, was popular across the Angloworld. In Canada, claims about shared racial identity underpinned support for both imperial federation and (far less commonly) incorporation within the United States.95 In 1901, the Immigration Restriction Act came into force in Australia, giving legal expression to the “White Australia” policy that persisted until the 1970s.96 Both “global in its power and personal in its meaning, the basis of geo-political alliances and a subjective sense of self,” the transnational ideology of white supremacism infused political culture in the United States and the British Empire.97 People excluded from the embrace of whiteness were largely absent from the unionist discourse, except when they were figured as a problem or threat. African-Americans rarely appeared in fantasies of a future Anglo-racial polity, their supposed inferiority and political subordination accepted as a given. The indigenous populations of North America and the Pacific were assumed to be either irrelevant—due to their relatively small numbers—or heading for eventual extinction, and thus not worth sustained discussion.98 As Sinclair Kennedy put it in his 1914 tract The Pan-Angles, “The aborigines of the United States and Canada, of New Zealand and Australia, are now problems of the past, solved according to nature’s rule of the survival of the fittest.”99

The “Anglo-Saxon” variant of whiteness was popular but contested. Some critics highlighted terminological imprecision. Dismissing the idea as historically illiterate, Freeman preferred to talk of the Teutons, or the “English


98. On the latter discourse, see Patrick Brantlinger, Dark Vanishings (Ithaca, NY, 2003).

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