CONTENTS

Preface · ix
Abbreviations · xi

PART I INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER 2 Rule and Office: Figures, Vocabularies, Stances 42

PART II RECONFIGURATIONS OF RULE AND OFFICE 85

CHAPTER 3 Rule and the Limits of Office (Laws) 87

CHAPTER 4 Rethinking the Role of Ruler and the Place of Office (Statesman) 115

CHAPTER 5 Defining the Telos of Rule (Republic, Book 1) 140

CHAPTER 6 Guarding as Serving: The Conundrum of Wages in a Kallipolis (Republic, Books 1–5) 172

CHAPTER 7 Philosophers Reigning: Rulers and Officeholders in a Kallipolis (Republic, Books 5–7) 213

PART III DEGENERATIONS OF RULE AND OFFICE 247

CHAPTER 8 The Macro Narrative: Flawed Constitutions within Cities (Republic, Book 8) 249

CHAPTER 9 The Micro Narrative: Flawed Constitutions within Souls (Republic, Books 8–9) 318
PART IV
THEMATIZATIONS OF RULE
AND OFFICE  351

CHAPTER 10
Against Tyranny: Plato on Freedom, Friendship,
and the Place of Law  353

CHAPTER 11
Against Anarchy: The Horizon of Platonic Rule  381

Acknowledgments  · 411
Glossary of Selected Greek Terms  · 417
Bibliography  · 419
Index  · 439
Chapter One

Overview

Why Rule and Office? Why Plato?

Six centuries after Plato, the polymathic Greek geographer Pausanias would recount a folk history of archaic Athens, contending that it was the stripping of the Athenian king of most of his unaccountable powers that had “transformed the kingship [basileia] into an accountable office [archē hupeuthunos].”¹ Spelling out kingship as unaccountable, office as accountable, Pausanias’s folk-historical claim both connects and contrasts them.² The implication is that kingship is absolutely, or relatively, free of the kinds of procedural limits and controls that could enforce accountability. Office, by contrast, is accountable, underscored here by the adjective hupeuthunos, which is one signal that the noun archē—translatable as either “rule” or “office,” depending on contextual clues—is being used by Pausanias in the sense of “office.”³

¹. Pausanius, 4.5.10, trans. Jones and Ormerod, modified; the same phrase is cited in Caillemer’s “ARCHONTES” (383), where it is translated as “les Athéniens changèrent alors la royauté en une magistrature responsable” (the Athenians thus changed the kingship into a responsible magistracy [this being the French equivalent of “accountable office”]).

The reference is to the purported transformation of the archaic kingship into the figure of the so-called “king-archon” (archon basileus), also known as simply “the archon” in his unique function of giving his name to a calendar year. More broadly, Hall’s “Rise of State Action” (12), dates “a shift towards authority based on ascribed status, where emphasis is given to the office itself rather than the person who holds it as with the Homeric king,” back to the seventh century BCE. While Luraghi, in “Ruling Alone” (13, 15n17), calls this a “story-pattern” that lacks historical validity, he acknowledges that it “derives directly from Greek historiography.”

². Whereas Pausanias contrasts kingship with (accountable) office, other ancient Greek authors (like many medieval European ones) would treat it instead as a nonstandard kind of office itself, an issue discussed further in chapter 2.

³. Sometimes (as here by inclusion of the adjective hupeuthunos), ancient Greek uses of archē and archein clearly signal which idea is meant. For example, the noun in the plural almost always signifies “offices” (or, by extension, their holders), especially when used with
The accountability of political officeholders was conventionally understood as central to what it was for them to hold office at all, just as much in Pausanias’s time as in Plato’s, and indeed as at the time of this writing.

Introducing an overarching category of rule helps to capture the connecting transformation of kingship into office of which Pausanias speaks. A king is one kind of ruler, described by Pausanias as an unaccountable kind; an officeholder is another kind of ruler—broadly speaking, the accountable kind, in the sense of one subject to limits and control by another agent or agents. To be sure, Pausanias does not use a separate word for rule as such a category. However, the noun archē, translated here as “office,” is exactly the same word that in both his Greek and that of Plato would in other contexts be translated as “rule”: namely, where it was not glossed or signaled to incorporate accountability (broadly conceived). The relationship between rule and office was understood by the Greeks not only in folk-historical terms but also in terms of a range of linguistic affordances of the noun archē and the cognate verb archein. The nuances of these intertwining significations are what originally sparked this inquiry into the ideas of rule and office in Plato in the context of ancient Greek thought in dialogue with modern political theorizing.

Why start an account of rule and office in Plato with Pausanias’s much later dictum? To start, it has Platonic antecedents. Plato had included a more iconoclastic version of the same folk history in his Menexenus (containing a long speech about Athenian history attributed by Socrates, who tells it, to a female

certain verbs and prepositions. Other uses are more ambiguous, depending on context, which may not offer decisive signals either way. For example, the noun in the singular can signify either “rule” or “office”; the verb in participial forms such as archontes can signify either “rulers” or “officeholders.” Further rules of thumb for interpreting the affordances of this vocabulary, which constituted common ground for Attic Greek authors who wrote mainly from the mid-fifth through the fourth centuries BCE (as well as some writing in other dialects of Greek and other time periods) are provided in chapter 2.

4. Office is on my analysis a kind of rule. When I speak of “rule and office,” I use “rule” in that expression to indicate other kinds of rule (or sometimes rule in general, treated abstractly) as contrasted with the kind of rule that is embodied in office.

5. I cite an infinitive form of this verb as it provides a clearer visual contrast with the noun, and follow suit by citing most other Greek verbs in an infinitive form as well (but generally refer to entries for verbs in the Greek lexicon LSJ according to the first-person conjugations by which such entries are listed).

6. The vocabulary (by which I mean to refer also to its syntactical deployment) of rule and office was common ground, part of the language in a more literal sense than what the historian of ideas J.G.A. Pocock calls the “languages” that offer various “idioms, rhetorics, ways of talking about politics, distinguishable language games,” each of which “may have its own vocabulary” (Pocock, “Concept of a Language,” 21). By contrast, Plato’s development of ideas of rule and office is well characterized as such a Pocockian “language”; it builds on the same vocabulary and linguistic affordances common to other authors at the time, but develops distinctive idioms (such as the strict evaluative, versus loose descriptive, uses of these and related terms, explained below).
associate of Pericles named Aspasia). Rather than contrasting kings then and accountable officeholders now, Plato puts the accent on continuity between the archaic Athenian kings and the office of the “king-archon” that featured in the constitution of his own time. But more importantly, Pausanias’s claim about how an unaccountable ruler might be transformed into an accountable one bears as much on politics today as it did on the Roman-dominated Greece of his day or the classical landscape of the polis in that of Plato. Both the value and the vulnerabilities of accountable offices as a way of organizing political rule have posed recurrent challenges for political theory and practice.

The value of making rule accountable in the form of political office (or, rather, offices, since the very nature of offices in being constituted by limited powers makes them typically plural) lies in the aspiration to ensure that rule is carried out for the benefit of those ruled. This aspiration is evident in the structure and exercise of accountable offices in ancient Greek polities, as in constitutional polities of later times. Accountability was not a vague term in ancient Greek thought or practice. Used most specifically (call this a narrow use), it referred to a widespread family of procedures (generally termed euthunai) by which those subject to an officeholder’s powers were able to hold that officeholder to account. Those procedures consisted at a minimum in demanding the rendition of a set of accounts in the literal sense: a financial accounting of any public monies handled while in office. Sometimes (as in democratic Athens) they extended to demanding defense of a fuller account of one’s conduct in office.

Beyond that narrow understanding of accountability as a matter of procedural audit, the aspiration to political accountability came more broadly in ancient Greek contexts, as today, also to stand for an overall ideal of limited constitutional government. Accountability broadly understood encompassed not only the euthunai but also a wider family of limits and procedures that conventionally regulated the offices more generally, usually through law. I refer to these as a family of conventional parameters of office—including term limits, selection methods, and the like—which contributed to making officeholders accountable in a broader sense than their subjection to the euthunai alone.

If one asks what the purpose of making officeholders accountable might be, the implicit but indisputable answer must be that of ensuring the good of those for whose sake officeholders’ powers were meant to be exercised. Officeholders were expected not to exploit their powers for their own aggrandizement but rather to be accountable to fellow citizens (understood more widely in a democracy than in an oligarchy) for their proper use. That said,

7. Plato, Menex. 238d2–3: “We [Athenians] have always had kings; at one time they were hereditary, later elected” (trans. Ryan). All quotations of Plato are from the most recent edition of the relevant Oxford Classical Texts; all translations of Plato as well as other ancient and modern authors are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
conventional accountability procedures in ancient Greek constitutions (*politeiai*) were targeted at avoiding the most obvious bads (such as corruption) that would negate and undermine the good of the ruled.\(^8\)

However, if the good of the ruled is the purpose (*telos*) of accountability measures broadly conceived, those measures—as part of an order (*taxis*) of accountable offices—were (and are) vulnerable to potential flaws. These put constitutional rule at risk. The most notorious expression of such vulnerability has long been associated with the name of the Roman poet Juvenal in the guise of the tag “Who shall guard the guardians?” The Juvenal conundrum, as I shall call it, one that Plato recognized in a particular context before him,\(^9\) is in fact an ensemble of related vulnerabilities that threaten not only accountable officeholding but also any kind of political rule. Each of these vulnerabilities targets one aspect of a constitutional order: the design of its roles (including the roles of its various officeholders), the relationship between the role and the natural person who holds it, and the safeguarding of the first two aspects (to ensure that they are correctly maintained).

The first vulnerability lies in the procedures and norms associated with a given role. What are the optimal parameters for a given office, for example? The second asks about the availability and selection of persons capable of meeting the demands of each role. Are there procedures and norms to ensure that such persons emerge through the societal system of education, are selected to fill appropriate roles, and remain oriented to the purposes for which they will be held accountable? This vulnerability spans the motivation and competence of such persons as well as the orientation they display in their official actions. Rulers must care about playing their roles properly, meaning both that their roles require them to be oriented to the good of the ruled and that those who serve as rulers must be motivated to maintain that caring orientation.

The third vulnerability, for its part, reiterates the Juvenal conundrum with respect to the prior two. However the political roles of officeholders and other

---

8. I generally use “constitution” to translate *politeia* (singular), in line with many scholars, though others would translate it as “regime,” and Arlene Saxonhouse has asked me in conversation to defend my choice in terms of its seeming to help itself to modern constitutional connotations. While I am aware of that risk, the articulation of *politeiai* (plural) in terms of offices and laws in much ancient Greek political thought from the sixth century through the fourth century BCE, as argued by Bordes (*Politeia*), offers support for my choice, and I discuss the similarities as well as differences from modern constitutions at points throughout this study. There were, however, also other significant ways of describing and categorizing constitutions, especially before the fourth century BCE. I return to the question of “constitutionalism” in ancient Greek politics in chapter 2.

9. Plato identifies this conundrum in the *Laws* (12.945b5–c2) with respect to the role envisaged there for the *euthunoi* (the officeholders who in that dialogue, as in some existing Greek constitutions at the time, carried out the *euthunai* procedures), as discussed further in chapter 3.
rulers are defined, however their incumbents are chosen, who can ensure that the defining limits of these roles are respected, that the accountability procedures are carried out properly, that the officeholders or other rulers act as they should? To what extent can any set of roles and procedures fully protect against a clever incumbent who is prepared to exploit them (or to make use of their loopholes) for their own benefit?

What do these concerns have to do with Plato? Beyond the folk history to which both he and later Pausanias refer, Plato’s political thought in the high noon of his Republic is generally taken to be an effort to circumvent the theoretical force of the Juvenal conundrum. “Who shall guard the guardians?” is assumed to be a question that Plato’s Republic—in prescribing that philosophers should rule—seeks not to answer but to reject as inapplicable, the assumption being that Plato’s so-named “guardians” do not need any further oversight because they are wise.10 So construed, his political thought is taken not to have participated in any kind of realist vein in the projects of constitutionally limited officeholding and institutional design that preoccupied democrats (and others) of his day, but rather to have stood aloof from all such projects on the ground that wise rulers would make them unnecessary. (Even though Plato’s Laws—the third in the trio of major works that constitute the focus of this study—canvasses a political constitution that is articulated in terms of offices and laws in great detail, this is usually understood to be a late turn in his theorizing that takes his politics in a very different direction from the central thrust of the other two dialogues in question, the Republic and Statesman.)11

The thesis of this study is that Plato has much more to say about the Juvenal conundrum—including the nature of rule, the value and vulnerabilities of political office as a kind of rule, and the exploration of various ways in which both rule and office might be reconfigured so as to better address the conundrum—than has been previously recognized. The titles of his dialogues are clues to the different ways in which each tackles the conundrum in what I refer to broadly as their constitutional projects (meaning the constitutions that are laid out in detail in the Republic [composing much of books 2–7] and Laws [books 4–12], and the account of political rule that is laid out in detail in the Statesman).12 The Laws does so in terms closest to ancient Greek
constitutional practices, doubling down on the aspiration to make all offices and positions of political power accountable (and so notably eschewing any political positions called “kingship” in the laws that it canvasses as a model for a newly founded city in a post-heroic human era), while infusing the content of the laws with the wisdom that good rule requires. By contrast, while both the Statesman and the Republic do, as I shall demonstrate, include offices in their main constitutional projects, both dialogues address the Juvenal conundrum by also positing rulers described as “kings” to reign over, and so safeguard, those who hold offices under them.

When I say that both the Republic and the Statesman (as well as the Laws) include offices and officeholders in their constitutional projects, I mean that Plato sometimes in the contexts of those projects (as well as in other passages of those dialogues) deploys the vocabulary of archē and archein in ways that his Greek contemporaries would conventionally have recognized as signaling the specific sense of “office” rather than the more general one of “rule.” However, in neither the Republic nor the Statesman (in contrast to the Laws) does the institutional design of the offices so projected include mention of the euthunai, which were a conventional hallmark of accountable offices in his day. Whereas the Statesman’s mention of office in its constitutional project is so brief that it is hard to infer anything from this silence, the Republic envisages offices that have been radically reconfigured in various ways that seem deliberately to exclude this conventional parameter of accountability to those ruled. In chapters 6 and 7, I take up the challenge of explaining in what sense these remain “offices” and how the function of accountability (or a functional equivalent to accountability) is in this dialogue, as in different ways in the Statesman and the Laws, to be secured.

It is because I take seriously the questions of how political rule might be organized to secure the good of the ruled, the extent to which some kind of constitutional order of offices is the best way of doing so, and the Juvenal conundrum of who shall guard the guardians (understood figuratively as the rulers) in any such order, that I take seriously Plato’s varying explorations of these questions. It is because thinking about rule and office is so important that I seek in Plato a neglected guide in doing so, even though one might ultimately reject, as blueprints sufficient unto the modern day, any and all of the constitutional projects he explores. While Pausanias’s later dictum would emphasize a historical contrast between unaccountable rule (which he describes as archaic kingship) and accountable office, Plato’s dialogues suggest that one

in chapter 8; the discussion of constitutions and rule generally in Laws 1–2 and historically in Laws 3, considered in chapter 3; and the excursus on flawed constitutions and the role of law in the Statesman, considered in chapters 4 and 11. These references are not exhaustive; much can also be learned about the Platonic idea of rule from other aspects of each of these three dialogues (including their myths), as well as from other Platonic dialogues.
must think through the function that accountable office is meant to serve, reflect on the extent to which conventional accountability procedures succeed in achieving that function, and explore potential reconfigurations of both office and other kinds of rule as ways to do so. In so doing, it will turn out that although neither the Republic nor the Statesman makes use of euthunai procedures in characterizing the offices envisaged in their constitutional projects, they do explore other kinds of limits both for those offices and for other kinds of rule, in seeking to keep rulers (including officeholders) oriented toward the good of the ruled.

Notwithstanding these differences between Plato and Pausanias, another reason to take the latter’s dictum as a useful starting point is that the language of kingship—the relationship between not just any kind of rule but specifically kingly rule and (accountable) officeholding—was itself central to Plato’s political theorizing in certain dialogues.13 Think not only of the philosopher-kings and philosopher-queens of the Republic, but of the figure variously described as the “kingly ruler” and the “statesman” in the Statesman. Plato’s interest in kingship, and in an idea of rule mediated through that image, is situated within a broader Greek discourse going back to the Homeric image of the king as the “shepherd of the people.”14 That figure epitomizes the expectation that a king should serve the good of the ruled, while wider discussions of kingship treated kings as orderers of their domains, caring for the ruled by establishing forms of order. A Homeric king could be described as kosmētōr laōn, “orderer of the people,”15 and while in context this described mainly the military role of ordering an army, the king’s role in establishing a kosmos (a word for order) would have broader resonance also in later authors.

While Plato was interested in rule and the figure of the king, he was also, as this study contends, interested in officeholding as a distinctive kind of rule, one sharing overlapping vocabulary and developing a family of recognizable procedural limits in order to realize an aspiration of accountability broadly conceived. Office too had a long history in Greek thought and practices already by Plato’s time, stretching back to seventh-century BCE Crete, from which survive the earliest known Greek laws regulating officeholders. Not only in the Laws but also in certain key passages of the Republic and Statesman, Plato discusses

13. I ascribe certain views to “Plato” despite the largely dialogical character of his writings. To introduce my approach to doing so, which is further developed in chapter 2: I identify “Plato” for the purposes of this study primarily with an overlapping set of repeated and broadly consistent positions, sometimes expressed through questions or converse denials, which certain protagonists—whom I characterize as “avatars” of Plato—adopt. Doing so is an interpretative choice that clearly comes at some costs, and has some limitations, as does any such choice.
15. Il. 1.16, 1.375, 3.236; Od. 18.152. See Attack, Discourse of Kingship.
archē and archein in terms that sometimes unambiguously or arguably signal “offices” (usually found in the plural) by the conventions of the time, while at other times unambiguously or arguably signaling “rule” in a different or more abstract sense to be explored. In fact, Plato’s discussion of office, and his sensitivity to office as a kind of rule, must be identified as a textual fact hiding in plain sight.16

Putting together kingship as a figure of rule oriented to the good of the ruled and office as a kind of rule, it emerges that Plato was (like Pausanias after him) grappling with the question of whether office can suffice to realize the purpose of rule, or whether office and rule need to be reconfigured in order to better enable them to do so, whether by reconfiguring the offices themselves, supplementing them in some way with a further kind of rule or with a special kind of law, or both. This, of course, is to speak only of rule and office in the political domain. While that is the primary concern of this study, it cannot be discussed without attention also to the question of rule within the soul (and, indeed, also that of divine rule within the kosmos). Political rule is described by Plato as necessary wherever, and for those for whom, psychic self-rule cannot be sufficiently achieved. This makes Plato an opponent of anarchia (anarchy) in the political domain in virtually all circumstances; his occasional rumination on whether psychic self-rule might be achieved without, and so not require, political rule, is considered in the final chapter of this study.

While Plato is an opponent of anarchy, however, the dialogues show him to be equally an opponent of tyranny. One way to appreciate the profundity of that opposition is to consider the often-overlooked valorization of office and law (law being the standard way in which offices are limited and controlled) in the Republic, as well as in the Laws (alongside the critique, but also the deployment, of office and law in the Statesman as well). The ultimate refutation of the putative happiness of the tyrant in Republic 9 is made by appeal to what I call the garden-variety constitutionalism of office and law; while rule need not always take this form, there are distinctive values of civic freedom and friendship that office and law are particularly well suited to foster. To understand Plato on (political) rule, one must understand what he has to say

16. To illustrate: archai is used twice in Resp. 5.460b6–8, denoting first the officeholders and then the offices assigned a task of supervising early childhood education. (Hansen [Athenian Democracy, 226] notes that the noun archē was “used with just about equal frequency of the person holding the magistracy,” a point he made about Athens but which applies to other Greek constitutional polities as well.) As documented in chapters 2 and 7, translators of this passage into multiple languages correctly take the plural Greek noun to signal that “offices” and “officeholders” are meant, rather than abstract “rule,” which would not here make sense in the plural. Yet scarcely any scholars have discussed the political or theoretical significance of these and other references to offices in books 5–7 of the Republic, as I do in chapter 7.
about the variety of ways in which rule can be ordered, which include but are not limited to office.

This project is insufficiently pursued in the discussions of “rule” in Plato offered by scholars such as Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière, each of whom is primarily interested instead in drawing a broad binary opposition between rule and democracy.17 When, for example, Arendt glosses the Greek “concept of rule” as “the notion that men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to command and the others forced to obey,”18 her insistence that rule entails its subjects being “forced to obey” fails to recognize the role played by office in Plato’s writings as a kind of rule distinguished by its limited and accountable parameters and associated thereby with willing obedience. Indeed, for Plato in Republic 8, the democratic constitution features rulers who are officeholders within a constitutional framework of law, though their unwillingness (and that of those whom they rule) to act according to the constitutionally specified limits turns their roles into a kind of shadow play.

Arendt’s effort to drive a wedge between democratic ideas and practices of politics (drawing especially on Athens) and Plato’s idea of rule—followed by Rancière in accusing Plato of failing to grasp what is properly political at all—must be reconsidered once one recognizes Plato’s subtle and varied grappling with office as well as rule, and with the relationship between them.19 On my

17. Rule is a relatively neglected idea not only in Plato but in democratic theory more generally, as observed by Markell (“Rule of the People,” 1), who writes: “In mainstream democratic theory, the term ‘rule’ has received relatively little attention, not because it has been thought to be unimportant, but because its meaning has seemed comparatively straightforward. . . . [T]he thought that politics is at bottom a matter of ruling, and that ruling consists in the exercise of authoritative control, remains part of the taken-for-granted background.”

18. Arendt, Human Condition, 222. See also pages 8–9 and passim for her development of a connection between “beginning” and a notion of “natality” as part of the human condition and as arguably the “central category of political . . . thought” (9); at 224, she mentions a passage in the Laws (without giving a precise citation) holding “that only the beginning (archē) is entitled to rule (archein),” perhaps thinking of 6.775e3, a passage she cites in both On Revolution and “What Is Authority?” I have argued in Eco-Republic for a related opposition between “initiative” and “inertia” as a neglected but fundamental axis of political life.

19. While influenced by Arendt, Sheldon Wolin’s recognition of the importance of the language of rule for the Greeks and in Plato differed from her in valorizing its institutional realization in the form of constitutionalism. Wolin (Fugitive Democracy, 81) writes: “Ancient Greek theorists were the first to conceive the idea of codifying both the practices of ruling and the competing claims to rule while, at the same time, enclosing the dynamics of politics within a determinate structure and designated political space,” one which he calls (as I do here) a project of “constitutionalism.” Unlike Arendt, Wolin also recognizes and discusses, briefly but illuminatingly, what I call the characteristic limiting parameters of office, specifically in the context of Athens.
view, Plato's choices of language show him to have been keenly attuned to the variations of officeholding in existing Greek constitutions, democratic as well as oligarchic. His political theorizing involves working out the extent to which existing models of office could succeed in realizing their implicit purpose. And it involves reconfiguring those models in varied roles of office and (other kinds of) rule, designed to better grasp and realize that same purpose.

Having said that, Arendt's further diagnosis of Platonic politics as resting on mastery in the household, “where nothing would ever be done if the master did not know what to do and did not give orders to the slaves who executed them without knowing,” raises an issue that must be confronted in Plato's willingness to use the language of slavery in describing rule—I take this up in chapter 10. The fact that virtually all ancient Greek accounts of rule, and of freedom, presupposed a society in which some were and would remain enslaved casts a profound shadow on them with which this work, like other studies of Plato, must contend. Setting aside Aristotle's theory of “natural slaves,” virtually all such accounts likewise presupposed that actually existing Greek slavery was the domination and exploitation of those enslaved for the benefit of their enslavers. In using the language of slavery to describe certain relationships of rule among people not legally enslaved, Plato harnessed only the epitactic dimension that masters of slaves shared with political rulers; he yoked this to an inversion of the telos of legal slavery, insisting that political rulers must qua rulers seek to serve the good of the ruled. This abstraction of a dimension of slavery to characterize rule keeps his theorizing within the ambit of the slave society within which it arose, but does not pretend that such legal enslavement was anything other than exploitation (a point which I find to be recognized in a passage of Republic 9, as argued below in chapter 10).

In following Arendt, Rancière, and others in speaking of “rule” in Plato, but understanding it as encompassing not only the register of Herrschaft (rule in the sense of mastery or domination) as it were, but also that of Regierung (rule in the sense of government or administration), I owe the reader also a brief word as to why I have chosen the English word “office” as its complement in my title (and as one of the kinds of rule). The word “office” is derived from the Latin officium, glossed as “service, duty,” and related to opificium, “the performance of constructive work”; officium connotes the “duty and

21. This is complicated by the emphasis in Ismard's Démocratie contre les experts (74–79) on the fact that the actual powers of physical coercion were wielded in the Athenian democracy by enslaved people (such as the Scythian archers who served as a police force).
22. I draw this contrast from the observation in Markell's “Politics against Rule” that when Arendt writes of “rule” in German, she translates it with the vocabulary of Herrschaft rather than Regierung.
service attached to a role.”24 These Latin terms were not limited to politics—Cicero’s De officiis is an account of the virtues and duties attached to the role of a good man, albeit that for him the good man would also be the citizen;25 likewise, the Greek archē was not limited to the sense of office or rule (it could also mean more generally a “beginning,” as Arendt emphasized, though in so doing she neglected the sense of “office”).26 More challenging for my choice of “office” to capture an ancient Greek (and Platonic) idea is the fact that even when focusing on political offices, there have been significant historical shifts in various epochs. For example, historians of English law trace a shift from an eighteenth-century regime of offices understood as individually embodying distinct assignments of public trust to “a model of salaried employment and managerial control.”27 Nevertheless, contemporary administrative law in common-law systems includes reference to “offices” often treated broadly as positions of public powers delineated by legal limits and controls, which comport reasonably well with the “offices” that characterized the archai (and the roles held by archontes) in Greek constitutions of Plato’s day.

24. J. Allen, “Office of the Crown,” 307. Schofield (Cicero, 185) observes, “Officium is in fact a Roman moralizing transformation of the Greek to kathēkon, ‘what it belongs to us to do,’ or ‘what accords with our nature,’” noting further that “the transformation accordingly makes behaving virtuously also a matter of performing those actions that are required of us . . . a matter of doing our duty (as a requirement conceived in that way)” (emphasis original). Neither officium nor to kathēkon in its central role in Stoic thought was limited to political offices alone.

25. For Cicero on magistrates (to use another Latinate term in its sense of “office”), see De officiis 1.124 (on the magistrate bearing the persona [literally, a mask, in the sense of a particular role or character] of the people); see also De officiis 1.97–115.

26. Arendt (Human Condition, 222–23) emphasizes the related verb archein in its sense of “beginning” in discussing the Statesman:

The problem, as Plato saw it, was to make sure that the beginner [the ruler] would remain the complete master of what he had begun, not needing the help of others to carry it through. In the realm of action, this isolated mastership can be achieved only if the others are no longer needed to join the enterprise of their own accord, with their own motives and aims, but are used to execute orders, and if, on the other hand, the beginner who took the initiative does not permit himself to get involved in the action itself.

There were also other senses of archē, including to designate empire or imperial domination, a sense related to that of “rule.”

27. J. Allen, “Office of the Crown,” 308. See also McLean’s “Authority of the Administration” and Manners and Menand’s “Three Permissions” for different aspects of the legal history of office, as well as Condren’s Argument and Authority for a broader historical and conceptual account. In accounts of what is called a great shift “from office to contract,” office is contrasted with a model in which bureaucrats are subsumed in a hierarchical chain of command, with only those at the top typically being publicly accountable. But while this restricted usage can be historically illuminating when so delineated, it does not negate the survival of the broader and more flexible concept of office as I use it.
To focus in particular on ancient Greek officeholders: they were rulers who exercised epitactic and other powers, but whose roles in so doing were limited and constrained by a family (or a subset thereof) of conventional parameters. Each of these parameters (which have to be reconstructed from a variety of texts and material evidence) can contribute to controlling the officeholders and so making them accountable in the broad sense. As I noted earlier, accountability in a narrow sense revolved around the end-of-term audits (euthunai), which counted as limits on performance and could also be invoked as symbols of the whole of accountability (with Pausanias’s adjective hupeuthunos already a key way of characterizing accountability in the classical period, being cognate to the word euthunai). In the broader sense of accountability as meaning limited constitutional government, the parameters can be grouped into three further sets: limits on the powers of each office (often as a collegial member of a board), limits on the eligibility to serve (including term limits; specified selection procedures usually by means of lottery, election, or some combination thereof; and, mainly in Athens, scrutiny of those chosen before they were allowed to take up an office), and other potential parameters, sometimes including (of special interest in chapter 6) the payment of wages.

While procedural and institutional details differ, each of these parameters has parallels in many constitutions outside ancient Greece as well. Conversely, the parameters could in practice be filled out and combined in a wide variety of ways, and with some latitude, meaning that whether a role counts as a political office will ultimately be a matter of family resemblances requiring judgment and interpretation. Plato invites such interpretation by continuing to use the recognized vocabulary of office while pushing the bounds of these family resemblances to the extreme, exploring alternative ways in which offices might be limited and configured that diverge significantly, and some will think decisively, from those that could count as “offices” according to the standards of his time or ours.

Yet the laws and procedures of offices are not guaranteed to protect the good of the ruled. Accountability mechanisms sanction officeholders for corruption; term limits, rotation, collegiality, eligibility requirements, and so on, seek to prevent the abuse of power. Such procedures are likely to do better in warding off the worst abuses than in ensuring officeholders who fully grasp, reliably care for, and can effectively realize the good of the ruled. Moreover, the procedures themselves can break down or be abused by the persons who get into office, or by others able to manipulate them from the outside. These

28. The significance of being hupeuthunos or its opposite (aneuthunos or anupeuthunos) was drawn to my attention as relevant for this study by Kinch Hoekstra (“Athenian Democracy”).
roles are not immune to the qualities and aspirations and habits—in short, the virtues—of the individuals who operate in and by them.29

How then might one address the Juvenal conundrum for constitutions predicated on offices? Fourth-century BCE Athenian appeals to an idealized “ancestral constitution” (patrios politeia) idealize the Areopagus Council, composed of selected former holders of offices, in playing a safeguarding role for current officeholders and for the constitution and city as a whole.30 Indeed, an Athenian decree of 403 BCE, in the wake of the ousting of the Thirty, charged the Areopagus Council to “take caring charge of (epimeleisthai) the laws, so that the officeholders (archai) may employ the laws that have been passed.”31 Such a two-level model, in which officeholders are safeguarded by a higher body that does not itself hold or constitute an office, is comparable to the explorations that Plato would make in the Republic and the Statesman of ways in which superordinate rulers could safeguard the officeholders proper. Indeed, the language of ruling, caring, and safeguarding, which Plato develops, resonates more broadly with the patrios politeia debate and other interventions into ways of thinking about rule and office in his time and beyond, especially in the contributions of Isocrates.32

29. I adapt this sentence from my Eco-Republic (30).
30. In Plato’s wake, for example, the late fourth-century Constitution of the Athenians (transmitted in Aristotle’s corpus, though whether its authorship should be ascribed to Aristotle himself or others in his circle is a matter of scholarly debate) described the Draconian-era Areopagus Council as “guardian (phulax) of the laws,” who “watched over the officeholders (tas archas) to see that they ruled (archōsin) in accordance with the laws” (4.4; see also 3.6 on the Areopagus’s pre-Draconian taxis of “watching over (diatērein) the laws”); my translation, drawing on discussion in Wallace’s Areopagus Council (esp. 39–47).
31. Wallace, “Councils in Greek Oligarchies,” 200, so translating Teisamenos’s decree as reported in Andocides, 1.83–84; [Ath. Pol.] 8.4. Wallace there also notes a presumably short-lived (if not entirely invented) institution, mentioned by Philochorus, who “reports that, probably after 462/461, the Athenians instituted a board of nomophylakes [nomophulakes in my preferred transliteration] to ‘force the archai to abide by the laws,’” citing Jacoby (Fragmente der griechischen Historiker 328 F 64).
32. Isocrates in the Areopagiticus, in particular, stresses the epitactic role of the ancestral Areopagus Council (composed of selected and tested ex-officeholders) as a supervisor (epistatouēs; Isoc., 7.51), and conjoins this with the function of the epimeleia (care) which that Council exercised over adults and not only youths (Isoc., 7.37), in its overall role of caring for the good order of the city (tēs eutaxias epimeleisthai) (Isoc., 7.39). As has long been noticed in different currents of scholarship, Plato and Isocrates use mutually resonant language in this regard (setting aside the vexed debate over priority and influence, which goes back to Werner Jaeger and others). Socrates in the Republic describes the role of a philosopher-king or philosopher-queen as that of being a “supervisor” (epistatēs) whose role is necessary if the “constitution is to be safeguarded” (ei mellei hē politeia sōizesthai) (3.412b1), using language which recurs at crucial moments in the Statesman and the Laws; likewise, he refers to the need for philosophers to be compelled by chance to “care for” (epimelēthēnai) a city, using the same verb as Isocrates in 7.39, one which will play an
To be sure, in speaking of ancient Greek offices, it is significant that Greek polities did not distinguish between political offices (such as elected members of the legislative or executive) and administrative offices (appointed through a civil service) as many modern polities have variously come to do. Neither did a sharp distinction between executive, judicial, and legislative powers apply. In fourth-century BCE Athens, for example, every officeholder had the power to preside in certain kinds of court proceedings (a kinship of executive and judicial roles that Plato echoes in the Laws); as to legislative powers, these were transferred from the plenary Assembly to a judicial-like board of nomothetai who heard and judged motions to make any change to any of the codified laws. With these caveats, however, one may loosely treat ancient Greek archai as more or less comparable to modern executive offices, being more like political offices in their modes of accountability but administrative offices in their typical sets of duties.33

To compare ancient Greek offices to modern executive offices is to confront a new set of challenges, however, since, as Joseph Heath has remarked of modern states, “given that the state is constituted largely by the executive, it is surprising how undertheorized this branch of government is.”34 It has been

33. There was also an important group of administrators in ancient Greek cities who were so-called public slaves—enslaved persons owned by the city itself and deployed in civic tasks, many of them requiring considerable expertise—as has been emphasized by Ismard in Démocratie contre les experts. As he points out, this violates the very nexus between expertise and rule on which Plato would insist, and which modern societies have in some circumstances come to expect (though in fact that intuition is more fraught today than he admits). Notably, Ismard opens his second chapter (63–64) with a scene from Plato’s Statesman in which “the group of slaves and servants” appear as rivals claiming the mantle (and title) of statecraft, a scene to which I shall return in chapter 4. However, his broader argument (30) that the role of public slaves challenges the sense in which the Greek state (say, the Athenian democracy) was in fact a state, to my mind goes too far in downplaying the role of the citizen officeholders (who could be designated by the term, archai, that could also designate their offices).

34. Heath, Machinery of Government, 19–20. One instructive exception, which appeared in the same year as Heath’s study, is Cordelli’s Privatized State, though the latter’s discussion of “officeholders” (esp. 85–86, 102–13), focuses on administrative bureaucrats without theorizing the broader role of the executive per se. An earlier exception is Tuck’s Sleeping Sovereign, although this is focused on the theoretical contrast between sovereignty and government (which includes constitutional officeholding) rather than on the nature of the latter. Several historians of early modern England have emphasized the role of office as a fundamental organizing political vision in that period, while noting its later retreat; here I have learned from Dauber’s State and Commonwealth, Goldie’s “Unacknowledged Republic,” and Withington’s Politics of Commonwealth, among others.
regarded by many political theorists and ancient historians alike as involving “mere administration,” as it were, being overshadowed by interest in the powers of legislative and judicial bodies—in the case of scholars of democratic Athens, in the Assembly and the popular law courts. Officeholders have been of interest to many students of ancient Greece largely insofar as many of them were chosen by lottery, neglecting consideration of the significance of their powers once chosen (not to mention the fact that some were always, even in democratic Athens, chosen by election). Meanwhile, office has been regarded by some political historians and scientists to be a remnant of scholarly focus on the wrong kind of institutionalism, one that is too static and legalistic to illuminate political life in the ways that studies of ideologies and game-theoretic approaches can do.35

Thus office as a form of rule, and the idea of rule more broadly, is ripe for reconsideration from the perspective of the present work. Even those persuaded of the interest of office and rule as topics may be surprised to find Plato taken as a guide to development of what Heath calls “a philosophy of the executive,”36 again using that modern vocabulary as a gloss on the roles of the officeholders and rulers who figure in classical Greek texts, and pointing to certain overlapping institutional formations then and now, such as the role of law in limiting and controlling officeholders so as to make them accountable. Yet Plato has a great deal to say about the proper role of rulers, the extent to which officeholders (who constitute one kind of ruler) can adequately fulfil the purpose of that role, and how both rule and office might be reconfigured so as to better realize that purpose. Or so it is the burden of this study to show.

To do so, I put some terms of art on the table, while noting that this overview makes many claims for which evidence can be given only in subsequent chapters. These terms of art are designed to capture Plato’s ideas of rule and office, while also situating those ideas in a broader family of such ideas. Rule is a relationship between a ruler and one or more persons ruled, which can

35. See the discussion in Beck’s introduction to the Companion to Ancient Greek Government (1–2), noting that recognition of the “anachronistic” presupposition of “a normative state law” in ancient Greek cities led scholars to turn away from what he calls “an overtly constitutionalist approach,” and toward cultural and social scientific studies instead. The latter are well represented by the immense contribution made by the multifaceted works of Josiah Ober, including both his early work on the performative and ideological role of rhetoric in Athenian democracy and his more recent role in the turn to a game-theoretic “new institutionalism.” I have learned much from these approaches as pursued by Ober and others, including his many students (among them Federica Carugati, Matthew Simonton, David Teegarden, and others). Yet the study of the constitutional structure of Greek offices, together with the practices associated with them, still has something important to teach us about the ideas and normative expectations implicit within them—not least because of the ways in which these came to animate (and be criticized and renovated) in the work of Greek philosophers, as I show in this study for the case of Plato.

be characterized in terms of two dimensions: a telos (purpose) and a taxis (order). A taxis is an ordered set of roles and relationships (including institutions and procedures) through which a telos might be achieved.

A constraint on the taxis of any kind of rule is that the ruler have in principle the epitactic power of issuing orders (epitaxis, singular) to the ruled; Aristotle would observe that “issuing orders is most characteristic of office.” What is essential to this epitactic power is, at least in principle, the form of a directive order: not the particular means of persuasion or coercion that a ruler may use to enforce it, nor the basis on which someone ruled may or may not be actually bound to obey the directive. Whether all those issued such an order are bound to obey, as well as whether they do or do not actually obey, does not affect the standing of a ruler as a ruler on this account. Plato is no Weberian in this respect. He does not treat coercion as fundamental to rule, a point discussed in chapter 11.

Within a significant tradition of thinking about ancient Greek rule, which can be traced from Homer to Plato, there is likewise a constraint on the telos of rule: that this should be the good of the ruled. Plato is no Weberian in this respect either, in not treating rule as an evaluatively neutral idea. That will undoubtedly seem tendentious. Why not take rule to describe a relationship in which a ruler may adopt any telos that they choose, including one that exploits

37. While Plato does not spell out these ideas in the way that I schematize them here, he uses both telos and taxis in the relevant senses of “purpose” and “order,” though sometimes also using other words as well. Consider an illustration of each such use: on the one hand, his reference to “the telos (purpose) toward which . . . a man’s appetites are directed” (Resp. 9.575ε1, though this is not a reference to a political telos); on the other hand, his reference to “order [taxis] and law [nomos]” as virtues of a second-best form of rule that is contrasted with the case of someone engaged in “unaccountable and autocratic rule in a city (anupeuthunos te kai autokratōr arxēi poleōs)” (Leg. 9.875d4 and b3–4 respectively, parts of a difficult passage that is discussed further in chapter 3).

38. An order in the sense of a command is in Greek an epitaxis, which is part of an overall ordered arrangement (taxis), and thus contributes to realizing a state of kosmos (a fine arrangement); both taxis and kosmos can signify order in general. Rulers may also exercise other powers of ordering, through speech acts of persuasion, creation, and so on, as is noted by Landauer in “Drinking Parties Correctly Ordered,” who criticizes my emphasis on ordering or commanding as essential to rule (expressed in an earlier publication of mine, “Antianarchia”) by arguing that there are multiple “modalities of rule,” such as negotiating and agenda setting. While this is true, my point remains that the capacity to issue orders remains central in principle to a relationship of rule. This is also the case with Raz’s definition of practical authority, which hinges on the issuing of authoritative directives.

39. Arist., Pol. 4.1299a27–28, emphasizing this as most characteristic among a trio of powers of officeholders [archai], namely: “to deliberate and to judge and to issue orders.” This passage is cited in Hansen (Athenian Democracy, 229), who also remarks of the fourth-century Athenian democracy in which Plato wrote: “the ephebic oath [taken by young men upon successfully attaining the status of adult citizen] included a promise to obey the magistrates [in my parlance, officeholders],” on pain of being fined.
the ruled rather than seeking to serve their good? Rule as inherently oriented
to serving the good of the ruled might seem to be merely stipulative, not only to
Weberians but also to Marxists, and indeed to many political scientists and
some political theorists of various stripes. In fact, some of Plato’s own con-
temporaries used the very vocabulary of rule that I have introduced (as well as
other linguistic terms and idioms) to describe rulers who aimed at their own
good instead. Plato too shows himself to be well aware of the existence of such
cases, showcasing characters who describe or endorse self-serving rulers in
several dialogues.

Nevertheless, Plato’s adoption of this approach in context should not be
taken as a novel philosophical intervention. Rather, he was working within
a deeply ingrained evaluative nimbus of long-standing Greek approaches to
the figuration of rulers, especially of kings. The Homeric trope of the king as
shepherd, expected (if often failing) to care for the good of his flock, opened a
source of imagery to which Plato would explicitly respond. Language of caring
for the good of ruled, as would a caretaker put in charge of them, and of serv-
ing their good, as would a servant, can be found in idealizing depictions of
the Athenian Areopagus in fourth-century BCE orators, and more generally
in certain portrayals of politics in fifth-century BCE playwrights and tragedi-
ans (some of which will be quoted at later points in this study). Plato was in
step with many of his predecessors and contemporaries in portraying rulers
as expected to care for the good of the ruled, just as he was in emphasizing the
epitactic dimension of rule (which clearly characterized, for example, portray-
als of kingship).

Of course, some authors in ancient Greece (like many today) dissented
from the assumption that kings and other rulers should serve the good of the
ruled. Plato explicitly responds to such challenges as well, presenting them as
voiced by the likes of Thrasymachus and Callicles in his dialogues. Moreover,
many figures in power then (as now) dramatically flouted this expectation, yet
their power was sometimes still described as “rule” (using arche or archein)
in a looser use of language, showing that the evaluative nimbus of rule was a
matter of clustered expectations rather than strict definition. My claim here
is not that tyrants (say) were not sometimes described by Plato’s contempo-
raries or predecessors as ruling in the vocabulary of archein and its cog-
nates; indeed they were—for example, by Xenophon in presenting his version
of Socrates.40 “Rule” could sometimes be used to describe bad rule as well as
good rule (though there was little effort made by Greek authors to develop an
evaluatively neutral category). Notwithstanding all these caveats, Plato was
far from isolated in taking the telos of rule to be the good of the ruled. He did

40. To illustrate: Xenophon (Mem. 4.6.12) ascribed the view to Socrates that “kingship
and tyranny . . . were both kinds of rule (arches)” (an unusual instance in which a plural
form of the noun arche should in context be translated as “rule” rather than “office”).
so within a broadly shared social horizon of evaluative expectations, not as an isolated flourish or fetish of his own philosophical idealism.

The telos of rule as the good of the ruled, which for the Greeks was captured in the image of the king or ruler as shepherd, can also be picked up in modern philosophical vocabulary. Call this a service conception of rule, an expression that I adapt from the philosopher Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority (focusing on his account of practical authority). A service conception is explicitly evaluative: it is oriented to the good of those persons whom it is the role of the party in question to direct (issue directives, for Raz, or orders, for Plato). Accordingly, both delineate a role—the role of ruler (Plato), the role of being a (practical) authority (Raz)—in terms of what it would be to perform the role rightly and well. It is consistent with this approach that any given natural person seeking to perform such a role might do so badly; that the persons whom they seek to direct should reject their direction, or that they should fail in some other way; and indeed that such a role might never be properly filled or recognized at all. Both also independently take there to be objective grounds for those parties to accept directives or orders that are genuinely oriented to serving their good. Conversely, neither Plato nor Raz defines rule or authority in terms of its potential use of coercion.

With regard to the service conception and the telos of rule in particular, this was in context far less controversial (which is not to say not at all controversial) as a stance for Plato than it is for Raz. That politics should serve the good of the ruled appears to have been a view shared by a far greater number of Plato’s predecessors than those relatively few iconoclasts who may have challenged it. That said, of course Plato would develop a profoundly original and counterintuitive account of the true nature of the good of the ruled, rooted in the Good as such—that is, the Form of the Good. A study of Platonic political thought without an account of his theory of goodness risks being Hamlet without the prince. Yet providing such an account, integrating the metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and politics of even just the three dialogues on which I focus in this study, is beyond the scope of what this work can do. Fortunately, it

41. Plato does not discuss as explicitly as does Raz whether a measure of de facto power is needed for someone to count as a practical authority (which Raz says [Morality of Freedom, 56] there is “a strong case” for answering in the affirmative). The Statesman insists that someone with the requisite expertise is a statesman even if they are serving as an advisor to a ruler rather than ruling themselves, but invokes the closely related role of king to indicate someone with the same expertise who is actually engaged in ruling. As to the questions of feasibility and possibility: while Raz says little about these in Morality of Freedom, Plato addresses them explicitly in the Republic in books 5–7. I see Plato as similar to Raz in emphasizing the success conditions for a service conception, while separating this from the question of whether and how a constitution realizing such a conception could come into existence. In my “States of Nature,” I discussed Raz’s relative silence on the related question of the marks by which a genuine practical authority might be recognized.
is possible to draw on some basic presuppositions of Platonic ethics to explain the telos of rule, while also appreciating that the ways in which he presents the Good as operationalized in making political arguments do not always require a full account of the nature and content of that Good.

Among the basic presuppositions of Platonic ethics is that virtue is good for each individual, and that living virtuously is necessary for happiness (and probably also sufficient, though I leave that problem aside). Virtue consists in a proper ordering of the soul, and so of a person’s life, toward that good. Thus rule within the soul is the ultimate aim of any kind of rule. Political rule aims at fostering rule within the souls of those who are unable to ensure such rule for and within themselves. Those who are sufficiently similar in having rule within their souls, whether achieved through self-rule or through political rule, are capable of participating in and so enjoying further relational goods: civic freedom and friendship. These are depicted in the dialogues especially as fostered by rule through office and law.

That said, the logics of self-rule and political rule are necessarily different. Self-rule aims to secure the good of the whole person; the only part that is capable of doing this—namely, the rational part of the soul—is part of that whole, and so seeks to realize its own good as part of the good of the whole. Political rule, however, requires someone to take up the role of ruler over another person. A natural person who plays the role of ruler has a different good from the good of the ruled in principle, in that each of them has their own virtue to pursue and realize, without which their individual life cannot be happy. A natural person who plays the role of ruler also has a different good from the good of the ruled in practice, in that their separateness as natural persons means that there is always a risk of the former using the powers of rule to pursue what they take to be their private good at the expense of the good of the latter.

On the one hand, this gap between the person(s) whose good constitutes the telos of political rule and the person(s) whose role is that of ruler is what makes a service conception of rule necessary. The role of the ruler is to serve the good of the ruled. On the other hand, this gap also makes it possible to discuss that service conception without invoking a full account of the content of the Good. For the Good can be operationalized in politics as “the good of the ruled,” in the sense that the role of ruler be taken to be oriented to serving the good of the ruled as opposed to exploiting the ruled for the sake of the good of the ruler. This operationalization provides a helpful test, insofar as exploitation can often be assessed in mundane terms—personal financial enrichment, for example—without requiring a full grasp of the Form of the Good to determine.42

42. An even more literal test has long been applied by the town of High Wycombe in England, which annually weighs its officeholders to determine whether they have fattened
Of course, Plato also has in his repertoire the more fundamental ethical point that a ruler who seeks to exploit the ruled is making a mistake about their own good. Such a ruler is getting their own good wrong: the goods that exploitative political rulers take themselves to be pursuing will turn out not to be genuine goods at all (or, at least, not insofar as they are pursued by unjust means, and not insofar as they are to be used without knowledge of the true Good). But the account of rule offered in the Republic, as in the Statesman and Laws, does not hinge on that point. The point is that qua ruler, one must serve the good of the ruled, whatever that turns out to be (even though in fact its content will be Platonically determinate).

Considered as a natural person, one may derive some individual benefit from taking up the role of ruler. Those who rule so as to avoid being ruled by others less knowledgeable and virtuous than themselves do thereby derive a benefit. But while that benefit may be their motivation as natural persons for taking up the role of ruler, it cannot constitute the telos that orients their actions in that role. That telos, Plato argues explicitly in Republic 1 and in the Statesman, is the good of the ruled. In other words, the aim of one's actions as a ruler must be the good of the ruled, even if the aim for which one takes up the role of ruler may be different. Qua ruler, one must pursue a service conception of rule all the way down.

To be concerned with a role that is directed toward a telos, one must be concerned with who will fill that role. Institutional design involves at least three interlocking issues (corresponding to the cluster of vulnerabilities associated with the Juvenal conundrum): design of the role; design of the selection procedure for identifying and assigning someone capable of meeting the demands of the role; and design of safeguards to ensure that, once installed in the role, the role holder will indeed pursue its proper purposes. Plato, on my view, is equally interested in each of these issues, not only in choosing the natural persons to serve as rulers, an issue that is too often taken to have exhausted his political thought. Each of the trio of Platonic dialogues considered in this study explores one or more of these issues (the Republic and Laws addressing each of them, the Statesman focusing especially on the first) and explores possible reconfigurations of the roles of rule and office to address them. Each such reconfiguration can be understood as exploring a way to keep the taxis of rule

---

43. This distinction is drawn in a related context by Viehoff in “Authority and Expertise.”
44. I seek to respond here to comments made by Josiah Ober on another part of this study in draft.
45. The point is analogous to a point often made about rule utilitarianism: one may have a utilitarian aim in designing an overall system of punishment, say, but insist that liability to punishment within the system be based on desert, even if that fails to maximize overall utility in any given case.
(which may include office) properly oriented toward its telos, in terms of both the shape of the roles and the orientation of the persons playing those roles. This is what I mean by “safeguarding”: to arrange for the maintaining, so far as possible, of the orientation of those playing roles within a given political taxis toward the telos of the good of the ruled.

Republic 1 draws attention to a potential tension between the role of ruler, as there described, and any natural person who might take it up. Qua ruler, one must seek to serve the ruled. Yet the only natural person who can be trusted to take up that role is someone who does not want to rule but will take it up so as to avoid being ruled over by someone worse than themselves. The same underlying psychology that can make someone a suitable candidate to rule—subject to development by the right kind of education and experience—is what makes them naturally disposed to avoid becoming corrupted while doing so. This psychology marks out those who are philosophers by nature (as described in Republic 6), rooted in a hydraulic flow of their psychic energies away from physical appetites and toward the love of learning. The moral and intellectual virtues of these philosophers arise from this same root.46 Nevertheless, Plato does not appeal to these natural virtues, as I call them, as a basis for untrammeled rule. To the contrary, these very candidate philosophers, and moreover the fully cultivated philosophers who are to rule as kings, are still to be subject to various kinds of legal and procedural safeguards (imposed by the reigning philosophers on others, and by their predecessors on themselves), some of them very drastic, as explained in chapters 6 and 7.

Putting together the role and its proper incumbent leads me to a final set of terms of art, building on ones used by Plato himself. For Plato sometimes speaks of true rulers, officeholders, constitutions, cities, and citizens as the only ones worthy of their respective names, speaking thus in a strict sense (sensus stricto is a useful Latin tag) that is inherently evaluative. A true ruler, citizen, and so on, is one who pursues the purpose proper to that role or entity.47 This strict

46. Lane, “Virtue.”
47. E.g., for constitutions, referring to the single orthē politeia, Plt. 293c5–6 (cf. 302b5–303c2), calling those in political power in all others “not statesmen, but experts in faction”; for constitutions and citizens, Leg. 4.715b5–6, arguing that certain kinds of putative constitutional regimes are not politeiai at all but rather stasiōteiai (factional regimes) (though here the contrasting reference to laws not being orthous nomous may mean only that these laws are not correct but not that they are not laws at all, as Jiseob Yoon has suggested to me), and Leg. 8.832c1–2, again renaming putative politeiai as stasiōteiai and claiming that none of them (oudemia) is a constitution at all; for a similar point about rulers and ruled, Resp. 8.552b9–11. These passages have been catalogued as making a discrete gesture of this kind by a number of scholars of Plato’s works, as by Schöpsdau (“Nomoi” (Gesetze) Buch IV–VII and Buch VIII–X, respectively, ad loc. to the Laws passages cited in this note). But it has not been linked by these scholars, as I link it here, to Plato’s following of existing patterns of usage distinguishing between rule and office; to his systematic analysis of office, rule, and the related idea of a constitution that could be articulated in terms of
sense contrasts with an alternative loose sense (*sensu lato*), which is merely descriptive. A ruler or citizen may be described as such in loose everyday terms even though they fail to be oriented to their proper *telos*. In the strict sense of “ruler,” the everyday political figures with whom Plato or any of his contemporaries would have been familiar—imagine a statue gallery of kings, tyrants, officeholders, and so on, an image that is explored in chapter 2—reduces to just one genuine ruler, who may in fact have never yet existed, with the existing crew being largely or entirely imitations not worthy of the name.

While I am supplying “strict” and “loose,” as well as “evaluative” and “descriptive,” as terms of art for this distinction, I also follow Plato in making use of the vocabulary of “*ālethōs*” (“truly”) or *ontōs* (“really”) or *orthos* (“correct”) or *dikaiōs* (in one of its senses, “really and truly”) to mark the strict evaluative side of the distinction. This vocabulary can be used when one wishes to deny that someone or something who may descriptively seem to count as an X is in reality an X at all, because they are not capable of fulfilling the proper evaluatively laden function of their role. This kind of move is not made by Plato alone. On the contrary, modern linguists refer to the “dual character” of certain concepts, which can be deployed either descriptively or evaluatively, with the latter use capable of invalidating the former in certain contexts. For example, one might describe someone with a PhD in biology working in a lab as a scientist, but also say (depending on whether they were flouting norms of research) that they are not a true scientist—that is, not truly a scientist at all. Similarly, just

48. LSJ, s.v.

49. For the Platonic concept of proper function, see the *ergon* discussion of *Republic* 1 (352d9–353e6). For all the scorn often heaped by modern political theorists on Platonic naturalism, many philosophers today make ready use of the concept of a goodness-fixing kind, one such that “merely by understanding what the kind is, we can order things of that kind from best to worst,” and so are capable of “knowing a standard merely by knowing a kind.” Examples of such kinds are typically drawn from the same sets as those of Plato—namely, artifacts on the one hand and biological kinds on the other. The notion of a goodness-fixing kind was introduced by Thomson in *Normativity* (21) and called to my attention by Michael Smith.

50. On such concepts, I follow Knobe, Prasada, and Newman’s “Dual Character Concepts,” an earlier version of which was drawn to my attention by Stout in “Religion since Cicero,” with thanks to Emily Foster-Hanson for further advice. Leslie (“Hillary Clinton,”116) also invokes this formulation of dual-character concepts in discussing those social kinds that are also labeled “normative generics” in possessing a normative sense in which they are an “exemplifier of the ideals associated with being a [member of that kind].” In earlier versions of this study, I used the label “dual character concepts” more liberally in what follows, but I have been persuaded by Ian Walling that this could be misleading insofar as Plato is not making a point about concepts as distinct from reality, and have been further helped to think about these matters by Shapiro’s “Essentialism” and by conversations with Gabriel Shapiro more generally.
as some of Plato’s contemporaries could use “rule” to describe tyrants (even though Plato and others emphasized the positive evaluative nimbus of “rule”), so Plato could himself sometimes deploy the language of office and rule descriptively (referring to oligarchic officeholders, corrupt rulers, and so on). For Plato, however, the two alternative uses (strict and loose) are not on a par, nor is the character of a concept all that is at stake. He employs the strict sense when averring that only the evaluative use of certain ideas—such as ruler and constitution—correspond fully to the contours of reality. And while he sometimes in other contexts employs the loose sense, the implication of his work (so I argue) is that even seemingly everyday descriptive uses are ultimately illuminated by the underpinning evaluative expectations with which they cannot break altogether (as I show in part III, in chapters on Republic books 8 and 9).

Plato’s drawing out, in this way, of the implicit evaluative presuppositions of existing models of rule and office, and his philosophical renovations of them in the shape of reconfigured roles, are not radically distinct activities (contrary to what modern-day “practice positivists” would posit). Instead, as I reconstruct his line of thought, Plato starts from the kind of investigation

51. Cf. Aristotle in Pol. 1276a2–3; I owe this reference to Josiah Ober.

52. While I use the word “implicit,” I find Amanda Greene’s approach to reconstructing the notion of the “implicit claim” made by an institution to be less helpful, remaining as it does ambiguous between the actual claim and the philosophically reasonable claim to be made. (Compare her account of a single [and implied normatively adequate] “implicit claim” made by the institution of a library [“When Are Markets Illegitimate?,” 214–15] with Applbaum’s reflections [Ethics for Adversaries, 57] on an old-fashioned librarian whose view of the institution rejects the transition from print to electronic collections.) Instead, I follow the political theorist Michael Rosen, who has observed (in “Liberalism” [2], while explicating the thought of Michael Sandel) that “philosophies carry within themselves assumptions that are expressions of particular forms of life while institutions are animated by practices within which political theory is already implicit,” adverting to Sandel’s Democracy’s Discontent (4), which defines the “public philosophy implicit in our practices and institutions.” In a similar spirit, I seek in this study to put text and context on a par: treating texts as contributions to a context, even as the vocabulary involved in articulating those practices serves also to structure a given text.

53. Defending “practice positivism,” Arthur Applbaum (Ethics for Adversaries, 51 and 48–58 more generally), argues that “the rules of a practice are simply what they are, not what they ought to be or what we want them to be”; on which view, “we cannot criticize the schmoozer [a doctor who views themselves as free of some of what a philosopher might consider the best case for the ‘reasonable’ moral duties associated with the role of doctor] on grounds that are internal to the concept of a professional practice or role.” Applbaum insists that his own view does not reduce to the laxity of allowing that “a role is . . . simply whatever role occupants happen to do”—a position that he dubs “role realism”—because he takes it that a role can indeed be betrayed, traduced, and so on by a particular occupant (58). But he asserts that the evaluative criteria for determining whether an occupant is betraying or traducing their role are to be drawn from the social facts of how any such betrayal, and the role itself, are understood, not from the philosophical reconstruction (as
that another scholar has recommended in seeking to reconstruct the social norms, including the implicit evaluative criteria that they include, obtaining at any given time. In particular, Plato identifies the telos of the good of the ruled as being implicit in the institutions and practices defining such offices, especially in the accountability mechanisms attached to them, which could potentially fail, however, to adequately protect the realization of that good. Accountability is a particularly sore spot, since this was part of the taxis of office meant to orient it toward a proper telos, but could fail in practice (as I take the dialogues to suggest) to do so with sufficient robustness. It is the recognition of such failures that leads Plato, in his sensu stricto moods, to claim that existing constitutions fail to count as genuine constitutions at all.

In each of the major dialogues that are the focus of this study—Republic, Statesman, and Laws—I show that Plato included variously reconfigured offices in constitutional and civic models of well-ruled cities. At the same time, he also reflected in various ways on their limits (pun intended) and vulnerabilities. Moreover, in so doing, he went a further step beyond existing models of how such Achilles’ heels might be safeguarded against by considering how safeguarding might be achieved all the way down, or rather, up: not just how some further group of rulers might safeguard some subordinate officeholders, but also the further iterative question of how those superordinate rulers can be safeguarded themselves. The Republic in particular will contend that ruling at any level cannot be entirely unbounded or unlimited, entirely disordered, on pain of being unable to play its part in ordering others. The lack of any limits does not render rule pure; it negates rule altogether, yielding anarchy (literally, the privation of archē). At the same time, tyranny, which may seem to be an excrescence of epistatic power rather than its absence, turns out to count as a kind of anarchy as well. Tyrants undermine the order that is constitutive of any kind of rule.

So construed, Platonic political thought is exhausted neither by stating that the telos of rule must be the good of the ruled nor by identifying the knowers of that good or of the Good in itself. It is no simple epistocratic program of handing over absolute powers to such knowers. On the contrary. The rule of knowledge in Plato is the rule of knowledge. Plato has as much to say about the nature of rule, including the value and limits of office, as he does about the nature of knowledge. And he is as interested in ways in which offices can be reconfigured as in the reconfiguration of other kinds of rule.

---

54. Rehfeld, “On Representing”: a reference I owe to Darius Weil. The specific aim of Rehfeld’s discussion is to formulate criteria for determining when someone is to be counted as “representing” someone else in a political sense.

55. I am grateful to Lisa Disch for suggesting the epistocratic framing in comments on a version of this chapter (Disch, “Comments on ‘Rule’”).
The trio of dialogues on which I focus each models such reconfiguration in different ways. Plato’s *Laws* focuses on the limits (pun intended) of a *taxis* of offices; the *Statesman*, on the *taxis* of rule, with a subordinate role therein for offices—an inquiry matched by that of *Republic* 1 into the telos of rule as the good of the ruled; and the *Republic* as a whole, on constructing an elaborate mosaic in which two kinds of rule are reconfigured and related so that the philosophers reign as kings by safeguarding those in roles junior to them, including a cohort who are unambiguously linguistically signaled to be holding offices. To be sure, whether what are linguistically signaled to be “offices” in each of these reconfigurations should count as offices against the conventional standards of his time, or ours, is a matter for each reader of Plato to judge. Some will deny that they should count, taking their divergences from narrow mechanisms of accountability to be too profound for them to do so. My point is that Plato’s deployment of the vocabulary of office and rule in all three dialogues implies that readers must at least ask themselves that question, and recognize it to be a genuinely Platonic one.

It may help to place the stakes of my reading of Plato in context by situating this between two poles, a Scylla in the shape of Karl Popper and a Charybdis in the shape of Adrian Vermeule. For his part, Popper famously proposed that political theorizing must “replace the question: *Who should rule?*”—a question that he ascribed to Plato—“by the new question: *How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?*”56 On my reading of the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws*, by contrast, Plato was far from limiting himself only to the question “*Who should rule?*” Neither did he rely upon what Popper ascribes to him as “the . . . general assumption that political power is practically unchecked, or . . . the demand that it ought to be so; together with the implication that the main question left is to get this power into the best hands.”57 Rather, he explored various models of offices and their relationship to other kinds of rule, so as to test how their *taxis* could prevent bad or incompetent rulers from coming into positions of rule at all. To illustrate with the *Republic*: the constitutional project thereof imposes limits of various kinds (including deprivation of any accumulation of wealth and dependence on wages, both limits that are said to be imposed by law) on the powers of the rulers, including those who are to hold various offices. Even the supreme philosopher-kings and philosopher-queens, who are described as reigning within the constitution (in a verb cognate with kingship), are shown to be subject to certain limits necessary to safeguard them in their very role of guarding others (the officeholders and others subordinate to them) and so of the city as a whole.

57. Popper, 1:121.
Whereas Popper criticized Plato for (in effect) failing to attend to a project of liberal procedural limitation of power, the legal scholar Adrian Vermeule has recently advanced a theory of what he calls “common good constitutionalism,” which puts a telos of the good of the ruled at the heart of a constitutional project. Vermeule's project may seem in keeping with that of Plato, in that it is fair to say that the latter shares the view that (as Vermeule puts it), “the end of the community is ultimately to promote the good of individuals.”58 As Vermeule attributes his own view to a broad classical tradition (drawing especially on Aristotle, Cicero, Roman law, and their later reception, while not in his book mentioning Plato), it is worth assessing the extent to which Plato's ideas of rule and office might be similar to or different from those of Vermeule, both for its own sake and as a way of clarifying the Platonic view.

Take first the content of the telos of the good. Vermeule argues that a “common good” must be “unitary and indivisible,” 59 and further, that “common goods are themselves the highest good for individuals.”60 On my reading in part IV of this study, Plato does identify certain common goods, such as the relational goods of civic freedom and friendship. These are fruits of certain kinds of taxis of rule, when those ruled obey the rulers willingly and more generally exhibit a cooperative disposition. And he speaks generally sometimes of the good of the city as a whole, as at the beginning of Republic 4, a passage discussed in chapter 6. But the primary telos of political rule is fostering the virtue (requiring ordered rule within the soul) of each of those who is ruled, virtue which for each of them is necessary to their individually enjoying a happy and flourishing life (a life of eudaimonia). Because the virtue of each embodied individual is, while not rivalrous, countably distinct from the virtue of another, the good as the telos of political rule must include the summation or aggregation of individual virtue.61 Yet for Vermeule, any kind of aggregative approach counts as an antonym of the true “common good.” Thus Plato's approach would fail Vermeule's test; conversely, Vermeule's approach fails to be in keeping with the Platonic source of any later classical tradition.

It is also worth noting that Vermeule's conservative approach to the content of common goods over time is very different from Plato's willingness to countenance breaking with long-standing social and political traditions where

59. Vermeule, 7. This is an introductory characterization, which is explained more fully as part of “the classical theory” as follows: “A genuinely common good is a good that is unitary . . . and capable of being shared without being diminished. Thus it is inherently non-aggregative” (28).
60. Vermeule, 29.
61. Vermeule, 26. It must be noted, however, that while Platonic virtues can be both separated and summed up across individuals, they are not to be reduced to “the sum of separate private utilities,” which is specifically what Vermeule decries under the heading of “aggregation.”
philosophical insight can justify doing so. Consider, for example, the arguments in the *Republic* for qualified women to serve as rulers, and likewise Socrates’s remark therein about a change in Greek male customs of exercising (from clothed to unclothed): “what reason had proved best lost its absurdity to the eye.”62 This is Plato summing up the process of bootstrapping changes in the political imagination, a process that Plato deploys in ways that were far more challenging to many practices of his own time than Vermeule’s approach for its part generally countenances.

What of the *taxis* of the Platonic idea of rule, as compared with the *taxis* of Vermeule’s common good constitutionalism? Again, there is an important shared starting point: both reject what Vermeule calls “ruling for private benefit.”63 But whereas Vermeule seeks to combat this by asserting a strong substantive account of the common good, I have argued that Plato does not simply fall back on his own metaphysics to make this point, but rather reconfigures the role of the ruler as being to serve the good of the ruled. For Plato, it is the role of ruling itself that puts constraints on the commonness of the good that ruling is to serve in its direct aims.

Moreover, Plato takes the risk of abuse of power far more seriously than Vermeule (and likewise more seriously than Popper allowed him to have done). Acknowledging that allegations of “abuse of power” are “a stock concern about political rule, under robust authority directed to the common good,” Vermeule sketches two brief lines of response. He observes, first, that “the bad is privative and thus defined by the good”; second, that “the risks of abuse of power created by state organs” can overlook “the risks of abuse of power that public authorities prevent through vigorous government.”64 Neither of these responses, nor indeed Vermeule’s downplaying of the concern altogether, is especially Platonic.

Plato’s response to the risk of abuse of power explicitly attends to the nature, education, and selection of the persons who will hold constitutional roles of rule, simultaneously with applying safeguards of multiple kinds (including legal ones) to the ruling done by such persons.65 To be sure, as Vermeule says of what he calls the classical tradition, the Platonic idea of rule too must finally rest “on the overarching principle of *bona fides* [good faith],” such that “where such good faith is systematically absent, the law may misfire.”66

62. Resp. 5.452d5–7, trans. Lee, as quoted in my *Eco-Republic* (185), from which I adapt part of this paragraph.
64. Vermeule, 49 (first pair of quotations), 50 (second pair).
65. It is true that Plato does not concern himself with seeking to prevent risks of abuse of power by those who are not political rulers, even when those risks are obvious to modern eyes—as in the risks of abuse of power by slaveholders over their slaves. I confront this issue again in chapter 10.
66. Vermeule, 70.
Yet this is true of any form of rule, including liberal institutions as well. Moreover, Plato is far more concerned to find ways in which good faith can be both cultivated and safeguarded in those filling the roles of different kinds of rulers than Vermeule shows himself to be. Systematic explorations of the relationship between those roles and the natural persons who serve them, and also among those roles as one can be deployed to safeguard another, shows Plato to have put prevention of corruption of the rulers and exploitation of the ruled at the very heart of his politics (as opposed to relegating it to a briefly rehearsed objection, as does Vermeule).

Pace Popper and Vermeule alike, a fundamental concern of Platonic political thought is how to prevent the abuse of power by political rulers, including explorations of various models of the kind of taxis of rule and office that could successfully prevent this: partly by precluding bad rulers from coming into those roles at all, but also by safeguarding the orientation to the good as the telos of those who hold them. At a deeper level, Plato recognizes that any procedurally delineated political role risks being corrupted, if the person installed in that role (be it office or another kind of rule) is either by nature incapable or unwilling to carry it out for the good of the ruled, or is allowed owing to lack of limits and safeguards to exploit the ruled rather than serve them. This recognition has as much to say to radical critiques of legalism and proceduralism (call it liberalism if you wish) as it does to conservative ones. Plato has no greater elective affinity with conservative than with radical politics; there are elements in his thought that can speak to both.67

Time to confront some objections. First, the tone and approach of this study will be rebarbative in several ways to a number of scholars whose rival approaches I very much respect. I unabashedly attribute views to “Plato” despite the fact that he is not writing assertorically in his own voice, but rather writing different dialogues with different characters. I have adopted the method of treating some of these characters (in particular, in the three dialogues on which I focus, Socrates, the Eleatic Visitor, and the Athenian Visitor) as avatars of Plato, and in taking these three dialogues to be broadly complementary in the architecture of their treatment of the topics that interest me here (rule and office), even though they develop diverse models of how those roles might be organized (so taking up what one may call a complementarist position on the relationship among these dialogues, in between the traditional alternatives of unitarianism and developmentalism).68 And I take the cities founded “in speech” in the Republic and the Laws, together with the city sketched briefly at the end of the Statesman, to be in their different ways propounded as models of

67. The reception history of Platonic political thought bears this out, as I argued in a selective survey in Plato’s Progeny.

68. These interpretative stances involving avatars and complementarity are elaborated in chapter 2.
good cities (with the city of the Laws avowedly “second-best”), rather than as antitypes or critiques. All these views will be controversial, and are undoubtedly in certain respects flat-footed. My defense is that it is impossible to do justice to the vast subtleties of these three Platonic dialogues (let alone all others) in a single study. By tracing the guiding thread of rule and office among them, I hope to derive insights that are relevant even to those starting from different assumptions, using different methods, or concerned with different questions.

Finally, committed democrats of many stripes will be normatively unsatisfied, indeed profoundly disturbed, by the picture of rule and office that emerges in Plato, and most intensively in the Republic, with its functional separation of roles between rulers and ruled that the rulers at any given time maintain by supervising the selection of their own successors. Democrats will object that it is impossible for a taxis of rule to achieve the postulated telos of the good of the ruled so long as that taxis does not include the participation of the ruled themselves. Such participation by the ruled is necessary, on this objection, both to determine the precise content of their own good and to contribute to constituting it in and through their own active engagement in politics. That might include potentially serving as rulers themselves, but in any case it must include being able to hold rulers accountable. For, on this line of objection, in dispensing with accountability mechanisms that are controlled by the ruled themselves, the very function of accountability is rendered moot.

The function of accountability simply cannot (they would contend) be achieved through any of the reconfigured institutional models that I take Plato to be exploring (at least, not through those of the Republic and Statesman; scholars are more divided on how to assess the democratic credentials of the Laws).

In response, let me clarify that my aim in this study is not to endorse the value of the constitutional project outlined by Plato in the Republic or in any other dialogue, nor to defend its adequacy in seeking to address the challenge of how to keep a political order oriented toward the good of the ruled. It is, however, to insist that Plato recognized that challenge as one inhering in any kind of political constitution, including the proceduralist and institutionalist organization of rule through offices, which is broadly common to liberal democratic constitutions today. Those challenges are, for any kind of political constitution, ones to which Plato was not oblivious, any more than democrats today can afford to be. Consider the predicament of liberal democratic constitutions when those at the apex of the judicial order refuse to recuse themselves in

69. Here I am especially conscious of diverging from the erudite and challenging reading of the Republic offered by Frank in Poetic Justice.
70. This challenge has been pressed on me by a number of colleagues, among whom I am especially grateful to Jill Frank (“Comments on ‘Rule’”) for framing it in ways that I seek to capture here.
71. For a defense of the democratic nature of the constitutional project of the Laws, see Bobonich’s Plato’s Utopia Recast.
cases of conflict of interest, which Plato would consider a sign of rule oriented to the good of those in judicial office rather than the good of the ruled; when those at the apex of the executive branch refuse to uphold the fundamental constitutional duties of their office, including taking care that the laws be faithfully executed; when those at the apex of the legislative branch support the violation of the prescribed electoral procedures on which the constitution depends. It is far from clear that the existing remedies of accountability in liberal democratic constitutions today are capable of resolving that predicament.

Indeed, Plato recognizes the ways in which the procedures of office can be corrupted from within, if and when those seeking and holding them do so in a spirit of zero-sum rivalry rather than being animated for the good of those whom they rule. As I have asserted much about Plato in this overview while leaving its substantiation to subsequent chapters, let me introduce here a remarkable passage in book 4 of the Laws in order to give the flavor of the Platonic concern with such institutional corruption caused by the breakdown of the orientation of officeholders toward the telos of the good of the ruled. In that passage, the Athenian Visitor demonstrates that offices cannot fulfill the constitutional purpose that they are institutionally designed to achieve if their denizens themselves flout that very purpose. Moreover, he connects such potential abuse of office by its holders to their mistaken and dangerous views of the nature and role of law, and in so doing clarifies the interweaving of rule, office, and law in Plato’s ideas of the political.

The Athenian Visitor makes his point by imagining a group (whom I shall call the “disputants”) who object to the account of the purpose of office and the broader genus of rule that he has been laying out. In disputing the claim that one could aim at good laws simpliciter, as opposed to good laws relative to the interest of a certain party, these imagined figures bring a veiled confrontation with the position defended by Thrasymachus in the Republic into the heart of the Laws. This moment in the latter dialogue is accordingly important for the complementary reading of these two dialogues (together with the Statesman) that the present work undertakes.

The Athenian describes the position of the disputants by attributing to them use of several words that significantly mark Thrasymachus’s position in the Republic as well. The disputants (it is claimed) hold that laws are relative to a given kind of politeia (4.714b3–5). Accordingly, they reject any assumption that the purpose of law should be “attaining complete virtue” (the telos of legislation that had been proposed by the Athenian himself in book 1). Instead, the disputants insist that the laws should be entirely relativized to the advantage of the politeia, a view that in context turns out to be operationalized in terms

72. Compare Thrasymachus’s language in Republic 1.338d9–e3 and passim in book 1 of that dialogue.
INDEX

abuse of power or office, 29–32, 29n65, 167–69, 171, 186–87, 205, 239, 243, 294. See also accountability; corruption; exploitation of the ruled; flawed constitutions in cities accountability, 3–7, 3n1, 9, 15, 15n30, 19, 26, 31–32, 44, 53–54, 60, 60n47, 63–64, 97, 97n29–30, 103–6, 109, 114, 188, 214–15n3, 214–15, 241, 336, 345n37; accountability to superordinate rulers, 15, 38–39, 53, 64, 218, 231, 244, 263, 273; accountability to the ruled, 54, 64, 69–70, 218; in Athens (see under Athens); of auditors (euthunoi), 97, 99–102, 102n38; in constitutional systems other than democracies, 59n42; in Laws, 36, 53, 97–98, 103–6 (see also Laws); and philosopher-kings/senior rulers, 27, 219–22, 244, 246; and practice of philosophical dialectic, 220–22; principal-agent model of, 207–9, 211, 398–401, 399n31, 403; in Republic, 9, 53, 218–22, 244, 246 (see also Republic); in Statesman, 9, 37 (see also Statesman); unaccountable rulers, 3, 4, 5, 8, 18n37, 95–96, 368; and wages (see wages). See also euthunai; Juvenal conundrum; office, parameters of/limits on Achilles, 49, 281n60 Adam, James, 235, 251n4, 278n55 Adeimantus, as interlocutor in Republic, 42, 75n87, 140, 161n54 (see also Republic; specific topics) Aeschines, 57–58, 58n39–41, 68n68, 69, 190, 200, 217, 235 Aeschylus, 49, 60, 60n46, 305 Agamemnon, 49, 274 age cohorts of guardians in Republic, 38–39, 178, 179n14, 201, 210, 214–16, 218–20, 222–44, 250, 263–64, 275–79; eldest cohort as rulers/reigning, 38–39, 176n8, 178, 183, 215, 218–19, 225, 232–44, 263 (see also philosopher-kings/queens); middle-aged cohort as apprentice rulers (officeholders, military commanders), 38–39, 213, 216–18, 225, 227–31, 246, 262 (see also officeholders); youngest cohort as auxiliaries (soldiers, procreators, students), 39, 178, 223–27 (see also auxiliaries). See also guardians Allen, Danielle, 107, 292 anarchos, 303–4, 303n108 anarchy/anarchia, 10, 26, 40–41, 72, 253, 305–6, 328, 388, 405, 405n46, 409; and absence of rule in the soul, 254, 327, 329; anarchia defined, 305n116; and democracy, 303–6, 328, 404–8; and freedom, 305, 328, 374; and lawlessness, 305n116, 306; modern and post-modern ideas of democracy and anarchism, 404–8; philosophical anarchism, 382–84, 408–9; and the tyrannical man, 327–29, 327n17, 331; tyranny as form of anarchy, 39, 40, 47, 253, 306, 316–17 amax, 48n11 anomia, 327, 329, 405. See also lawlessness antianarchia [English coinage by author], 40–41, 383–84, 409 anupeuthunos/aneuthunos, 14n28, 18n37, 60n47, 95–97, 97n29, 99, 215n4 appetitive part of the soul, 253, 266, 320, 321, 323–27, 323n9, 330, 332–34, 336–37, 339–42, 346, 353 Appelbaum, Arthur, 25nn52–53 apprentice rulers. See under officeholders Aquinas, Thomas, 407n49 archai (plural of archē), 43, 44, 65n56, 67, 124, 209, 216, 216n6; in Republic, 213, 216–17; in Statesman, 124, 136. See also officeholders archē, 3n3, 4, 8, 10, 16, 33n73, 42–43, 45, 62, 62n49, 65–71, 65n57, 68n68, 142, 147, 193n48, 194, 213, 216–17, 229; as “empire,” 52n26, 67n67; history of
archê (continued)
term use, 65; in Laws, 9–10; as “office,” 4, 101n6, 53, 68n68, 155, 162, 163, 172, 229, 332; in Republic, 9–10, 142, 147, 156, 158, 162, 163, 172, 179, 201, 213, 246; as “rule,” 4, 65, 136, 142, 143, 147, 156, 158, 328; as “rule” or “office,” 3, 42, 67, 179, 213; in Statesman, 9–10, 116, 136, 137, 138, 147n21

archēn (participle of archein, also commonly transliterated as archon), ho archon, 62, 62n49, 67, 68, 113, 113n73, 117n5, 126, 126n29, 127; archon basileus (see under Athens: king-archon in). See also archontes/archontos (other frequently used participles of archein)

archontes/archontos (participles in nom. pl./gen. sg.), hoi archontes, 42, 42n1, 44, 62n49, 67, 68, 69, 69n72, 121, 121n14, 183n28, 201, 202, 232, 237, 273n45, 294, 297n92; board of archontes in Athens, 62, 68n68, 69, 127. See also terms of address [ho] archos (military leader/ naval commander), 65n57

Arendt, Hannah, 11–13, 11n17, 13n26, 148n25, 386n10


Aristotle, 15n30, 18, 28, 59n45, 68n68, 93n20, 134, 175, 283n62, 295, 298–99, 316

Arruzza, Cinzia, 270n42, 324n10, 354n3 Assembly, 60, 97n29–30, 209n72, 299, 311, 312

Attack, Carol, 46n7, 48, 48n10

Athenian Visitor (protagonist in Laws), 30, 74–76, 80, 81, 88, 88n4 (see also Laws; specific topics)

Athens, 15, 51, 55, 59n45, 60–61, 100, 162–63, 191, 191n42, 191n44, 193–94, 228, 242, 298–99, 300n100, 312, 336, 375–77, 379; accountability of officeholders in, 5, 55, 60–61, 100, 100n34, 187n35, 214 (see also euthunai); Aeschines and, 57–58, 58n39–41; ancestral constitution, 15, 62, 184, 215, 298–99, 376–78; and Areopagus Council, 15, 15n30, 214–15n3, 214–15, 241; Assembly (see Assembly); board of archontes, 62, 68n68, 69, 127; codification of laws, 387; degeneration of ancestral constitution, 378; as democracy, 5, 17, 55n33, 57, 58n39, 89, 100, 108n59, 121, 134, 172n1, 181, 189, 199, 209, 214, 226, 228, 242, 298–99, 301, 329, 336, 378; eligibility criteria for officeholders, 226, 301; euthunai (end-of-term audit procedures), 57–59, 100, 100n34, 208n67, 214 (see also euthunai); folk histories of Athenian political evolution, 3–5, 44, 209–10, 375–79; the Four Hundred, 61, 184n29, 189; king-archon (archon basileus) in, 3n1, 5, 102, 117; limits on offices and officeholders, 55–61, 55n32–34, 230–31; nomophulakes (law guardians) in, 103; oligarchic regimes in, 61, 184n29 (see also the Four Hundred; the Thirty under this heading); Peisistratid dynasty, 46, 46n7; powers of offices, 16, 36, 56n35; scrutiny of chosen officeholders prior to taking office, 14, 55–57, 89; selection of officeholders, 57, 226, 297n92, 312; the Thirty, 15, 58n39, 161n53, 184n29, 189, 193–94, 193n48; transformation from kingship to accountable office, 3–5, 3n1, 44; unaccountable jurors and assemblymen, 60, 60n47, 97n29–30; use of archon as title for officeholder(s), 3n1, 68–69n68–69, 68–69; wages paid to officeholders, 55, 61, 89, 161n53, 175, 184n29, 189 auditors (euthuoi), 36, 88, 97, 99–103, 101n36, 102n38

For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu
audit procedures in Greek polities. See euthunai auxiliaries (younger guardians in Republic), 178, 193–94, 214, 223–27, 270n41, 271, 275, 276, 278–83; and education, 39, 224, 227, 243 (see also education); and failures of scrutiny, 275–76; prohibited from having wealth, property, and kinship ties, 196–97 (see also under guardians); safeguarded by superordinate rulers, 38, 218, 243; as soldiers and procreators, 183n28, 223, 224, 226, 246; and terms of address, 199; wages for, 196–98. See also guardians

Bakunin, Michael, 406
Balot, Ryan, 220
Bambrough, Renford, 146
Barney, Rachel, 173n2
Bartels, Myrthe L., 77n91
basiileuein, 38, 47, 178, 213, 219, 235–36. See also reigning basileus, 46n7, 47–48, 48n11. See also kings
Beck, Hans, 17n35
Bekker, Immanuel, 215n4
Berlin, Isaiah, 380
Biden, Joseph R., 119n8
Billings, Joshua, 73n82
Blok, Josine, 65n56
Bloom, Allan, 42n1, 43n2, 216n6, 304n112
Bobonich, Christopher, 80, 372–73, 384
Bordes, Jacqueline, 36, 62, 62n49, 71 boule, 108
Brock, Roger, 211, 211n76
Brown, Eric, 166n65
Brunschwig, Jacques, 96
Burnyeat, Myles, 274n46, 321n5
Butler, Judith, 405
Callicles (interlocutor in Gorgias), 19, 51, 173, 245
Camman, Daniela, 68n68, 208n71, 233n29
Camp, J. M., 191n44
caring, 37, 58n41, 95, 106, 119, 19n9, 131, 382; caring for the good of the ruled, 19–20, 37, 49–51, 382 (see also good of the ruled); and defining mark of correct rule, 390, 391; and guardians (phulakes), 181–82, 223–24 (see also guardians); intertwining of ruling, caring, and weaving in Statesman, 132–33; and kings as shepherds, 49–51, 119–20 (see also shepherds); in Laws, 106; and philosopher-kings/senior rulers, 15n32, 237, 238; in Republic, 37, 106, 149–52, 237; in Statesman, 37, 106, 117, 119–20, 123, 131, 382. See also good of the ruled; therapeutic technai
Carugati, Federica, 63n53
character of representative men in Republic books 8–9. See democratic man; flawed constitutions within souls; oligarchic man; timocratic man; tyrannical man
Cicero, 379n41, 389n13
cities: all cities except for a kallipolis as unstable, 249n2; city-man comparison, 319, 319n2, 320, 335, 337–38, 342, 347; city “of good men,” 164–65; city-soul analogy, 257–58, 257n18–19, 262; and civil war/revolution, 295–97, 312, 314; distinctions and parallels between rule in the soul and rule in a city, 254–55; divided into rich and poor, 288–89, 296–97; and drone imagery, 292–93; dystopian cities, 33–34, 34n74 (see also anarchy/anarchia; tyranny); and flawed constitutions (see democracy; flawed constitutions in cities; oligarchy; timocracy; tyranny); founding and establishment of constitutional order, 180–83, 206; happiness within, based on type of ruler, 236; and internalization of civic forces and externalization of psychic forces, 257n18, 259n22; lack of proper membership in, 290–92; and terms of address, 197–207; and Thracians principle, 265–67. See also Athens; Dreros; kallipolis; Magnesia
citizens of Greek polities, 70, 120, 123, 125, 132–35, 197–207, 246n49, 298–99, 366. See also dēmos; obedience of the ruled; officeholders; subjects of rule
Cleinias (interlocutor in Laws), 80, 81, 88, 88n4 (see also Laws)
coercion/force, 81, 332, 371n26, 384–89, 392–95; and double theory of law in Laws, 80, 89, 93, 93n19, 381, 384–86, 407; relationship between law and coercion, 381–82, 384–89, 406–7; rule as not necessarily coercive, 18, 388, 397, 401, 406–8; and rule in the soul, 320, 347; and unwilling subjects, 380

common good constitutionalism, 28–30

competitive emulation, 285–87, 335

compossibility, 355, 357–62, 375, 376, 378–80, 384; defined, 356–58

Condren, Conal, 66n60

constitutions (politeiai), 26, 34, 51, 61–63, 90, 122n18, 137, 188, 228; accountability procedures in, 6, 55–56, 55n33, 137, 231 (see also accountability; euthunai; office, parameters of/limits on); articulated in terms of offices and laws, 71, 72, 213, 231, 244; Bordes and, 62, 62n49; classification of, 245; constitutional project for a kallipolis (see kallipolis; Republic); constitutional project for Magnesia (see Magnesia; Laws); constitutional project in Statesman, 72, 120–23, 133–39, 383, 390–92 (see also Statesman); and discursive legislation, 77–82 (see also discursive legislation); flawed constitutions and degeneration of rule and office, 39–40, 116n4, 136–39, 171, 219, 249–317 (see also flawed constitutions in cities); garden-variety constitutionalism, 10, 40, 356, 358, 361, 367–69, 388, 397; and Juvenal conundrum, 6–7, 15 (see also Juvenal conundrum); Lane and, 63n53; noocracy, 92; and parameters of office (see office, parameters of/limits on); Plato’s Politeia translated as “Republic,” 71; sequence of flawed constitutions in Republic, 39, 250–51, 271–317; and Statesman, 116n4, 136–39, 390–92; Straumann and, 63n53; translation issues, 6n8, 63n53; vulnerabilities of constitutional rule, 6–7, 32–34, 64, 114, 187 (see also Athens; Crete; democracy; flawed constitutions in cities; Juvenal conundrum; kallipolis; oligarchy; Sparta; timocracy)

Cooper, John M., 166n65

corruption, 30, 32–34, 64, 90, 155, 169, 187, 286, 295, 376, 379; and euthunai procedures, 55n33, 99; and human nature, 95–96, 96n27; and philosophical nature of rulers, 187, 205; and prohibition of wealth, property, and kinship ties for guardians in Republic, 177–78, 185–87; and psychology of the suitable candidate for role of ruler, 23, 168–69; rulers exploiting the ruled/pursuing their own good, 7, 18–19, 21–22, 40, 47, 145, 148, 153, 173, 192–93, 200, 245, 263, 279, 282–83, 317, 348, 349, 373, 396; safeguarded against by the rational part of the soul, 348; safeguarding against corruption of superordinate rulers, 187, 219–20; and under- and overidentification of a person with their professional role, 171; and wages, 219–20. See also abuse of power or office; accountability

Crete, 54, 61, 260, 281–82

Critias, 62

Ctesiphon, 58, 58n40, 68

Cyrus, 200, 202, 375–76

Daily Meeting, 94, 106–14, 107n54, 176n8
degeneration of rule and office, 39–40, 249–350; transition from democracy to tyranny, 301, 306, 309–16, 330; transition from kallipolis to timocracy, 272–79; transition from oligarchy to democracy, 293–97; transition from timocracy to oligarchy, 283–88. See also democracy; Disunity principle; education; flawed constitutions in cities; oligarchy; Predominance principle; timocracy; tyranny

Delian League, 51
democracy, 138n54, 301, 304–14, 377–80; and accountability to the people, 214, 218; and anarchia, 303–6, 328, 404–8; and aversion to obeying officeholders or holding office, 302, 304–6; and city-man comparison, 335; conflation
of democratic city and democratic man, 257n18; constitution described, 297–310; democratic Athens, 5, 17, 553c3, 57, 58n39, 89, 100, 108n59, 121, 134, 172n1, 181, 189, 199, 209, 214, 226, 228, 242, 298–99, 301, 329, 336, 378; and Disunity principle, 306, 308–9, 311–12, 314; and drone imagery, 260, 310–13; and education, 299; emergence from an oligarchy, 295–97; and epitactic dimension of rule, 378; faults of, 187, 290, 300–310, 313–14, 329; and freedom/permission, 300–301, 301n103, 306, 309–11, 328; and hierarchical nature of rule, 398; kingly reign within, 235; Kolodny and, 383, 387–404, 398–99nn29, 31; and language of slavery, 378; and lawlessness, 138n54, 306, 309; Lefort and, 405; and modern and postmodern ideas of anarchism, 404–8; as “no rule,” 383; and obedience to officeholders, 377–80; and oligarchs, 307, 313; and power gained by the dēmos, 209–10, 312–13; and Predominance principle, 298, 300, 311–12; problematic relation of democratic majority to officeholding, 301–4; proximate causes of constitutional change, 306–9; Rancière and, 405; and rule by the multitude, 70, 246n19; selection of officeholders, 297, 297n92, 300, 301n101; and sequence of flawed constitutions, 251, 259n20; and sharing in the constitution, 297–99, 298n6, 301–2; social classes in, 311, 312; and telos and taxis of rule, 302–4, 308–9; and terms of address, 198; and transition to tyranny, 301, 306, 309–16, 330; and wages paid to officeholders, 56, 89, 174–75, 178, 184; way of life in a democracy, 299, 301. See also Assembly; Athens; degeneration of rule and office
democratic man, 40, 251, 258, 260, 320, 322, 322n7, 324, 327–28, 332–35, 334n27; character of, 334–35; cityman comparison, 257n18, 333; genesis of, 324, 328, 332–34, 334n25; and rule in the soul, 334, 334n26, 347; way of life, 321, 324, 334, 334n26
democratic theory, 11n17, 31–32, 70n73; Honig and, 387n28; Kolodny’s relational egalitarian theory, 383, 387–404, 398–99n29, 31 démōs, 33, 60, 62, 68n68, 97, 97n29, 147, 178, 198, 209–10, 209n72, 233, 313, 314. See also citizens of Greek polities; subjects of rule
Demosthenes, 58, 58n40–41, 60, 182, 200
despōtēs, 118n6
dialectic, 39, 220–22, 227
dialogues of Plato: author’s approach to study of, 9n13, 30–31, 71–83; certain characters in dialogues as avatars of Plato, 9n13, 30, 74–76; cities in, 30–31 (see also kallipolis; Magnesia); commonalities, 72–73; as complementary to each other, 30, 73–74, 73n81; and constitutional project (see constitutions); developmentalist approach to, 73; and discursive legislation, 77–82 (see also discursive legislation); interpretive stances regarding, 71–83; political figures in, 44–64 (see also guardians; kings; officeholders; philosopher-kings/queens; statesman; tyrants); titles discussed, 71, 71n77; unitarian approach to, 73
Diogenes Laertius, 71n77, 74n85
doctors, 145n14, 150, 180, 242, 386n8, 401n36; and analogies/examples/metaphors of ruling, 131, 136–37, 144, 146, 146n18, 151, 170, 170, 384–86, 385n6, 391–94, 401–2; and therapeutic technai, 149, 393–94, 401
dokimasia, 55, 56, 89, 89n8, 215, 219. See also scrutiny
Dreos, 54, 61
dual-character concepts, 24–25, 24nn49–50
dunamis (power, capacity), 123, 125, 125n25, 130, 136, 160, 234–35
dunasteia, 233, 233n31

Ebrey, David, 305n116, 306n116


Eleatic Visitor (protagonist in Statesman), 30, 74–76, 75n86

election of officeholders. See officeholders, selection of

El Murr, Dimitri, 73n81, 370

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 39, 319

Emmet, Dorothy, 389n13

Engels, Friedrich, 58n39, 58n41

epikouroi, 173, 193–94, 196. See also auxiliaries

epimeleia/epimeleisthai, 106, 119, 119n9, 131, 181. See also caring

epitactic powers (power of issuing commands/orders), 18, 18n38, 109, 114, 127–28, 132, 309, 355, 371n26, 378–79, 400–402; as central to ruling, 124, 141, 381–83, 397–98, 404; double theory of laws as orders prefaced by persuasion, 80, 89, 93, 93n19, 381, 384–86, 407; and expert knowledge, 118–19, 123, 124, 126; and hierarchical nature of rule, 381, 383, 397–98, 401; and kings, 52–53, 118, 119, 124, 134; and master builder example, 127–28; political expertise as “command-apt,” 119, 153, 401; slavery as synecdoche for epitactic dimension of rule, 373–75, 377–79, 378n39; and statesmen, 117, 124, 130, 132, 401; and the rule, 381–83; and tyranny, 317; and willing obedience, 377 (see also obedience of the ruled)

epitaktikē, 126, 153

epitaxis, 18, 18n38, 52–53. See also epitactic powers

epitrepein, 120, 120n12, 135

Eratosthenes, 193

erōs/erotic love, 321, 324–25, 325n11, 327, 329, 331, 348, 353, 354n3, 364

Euben, J. Peter, 220

eunomia, 50

Euclid, 384

Euripides, 405

euthunoi (auditors), 6n9, 36, 88, 97, 99–102, 102n38

evaluative vs. descriptive sense of words and concepts, 23–25

exploitation of the ruled, 7, 18–19, 21–22, 40, 47, 153, 154, 173, 177, 187, 200, 263, 279, 283, 348, 349, 355, 373

fractional division (stasis) among officeholders. See Disunity principle; stasis

fractional regimes. See stasiōteiai

Ferrari, G. R. F., 257–60, 257n19, 259n22, 260n23, 264n27, 314, 328n19, 330, 344, 346

Feyel, Christophe, 57n38

flawed constitutions in cities, 39, 249–317; city-man comparison, 319, 319n2, 320, 335, 337–38, 342, 344; and city-soul analogy, 257–58, 257n18; and
civic- and individual-level (macro and micro level) dysfunction, 256–57; constitutions other than a kallipolis as flawed, 256, 263; and distorted taxis and telos of rule (see under taxis of rule; telos of rule); and Disunity principle, 264–65, 269–72 (see also Disunity principle); and dynamic relationship between individual and constitution, 286; and flawed education, 136, 171, 261, 276–77, 293, 299–300, 344; instability of flawed constitutions, 348–49; and lack of safeguarding by rulers who are not officeholders, 261–62, 270–71, 281–82; and Predominance principle, 264–69, 272 (see also Predominance principle); proximate causes of constitutional change, 265, 270, 272, 277–79, 294–96, 306–9; sequence of flawed constitutions, 39, 250–51, 271–317; as stasiōteiai (factional regimes), 23n47, 361, 380; and transvaluation of values, 284, 293, 300, 313. See also degeneration of rule and office; democracy; Disunity principle; oligarchy; Predominance principle; timocracy; tyranny flawed constitutions within souls, 318–50; and city-man comparison, 319, 319n2, 320, 335, 337–38, 342, 344; and city-soul analogy, 257n18; and dominant parts of the soul, 320–21 (see also appetitive part of the soul; rational part of the soul; rule in the soul; spirited/thumotic part of the soul); and flawed education, 319, 324, 337, 338, 342–45, 349; genesis of flawed characters, 321, 349 (see also specific flawed character); and rule in the soul (by force or persuasion), 320; and transvaluation of values, 319, 328, 333, 336, 340. See also democratic man; oligarchic man; timocratic man; tyrannical man Form of the Good, 20–21, 67, 104n45, 159, 166n65, 205, 220–21, 225, 227, 238. See also Good, the Frank, Jill, 72n80, 170, 206, 206n66, 249n3, 371n26 Frede, Michael, 274n46, 321n5 freedom, 12, 21, 28, 304n12, 356, 358, 360, 367, 370, 371, 374–77, 382; and anarchia, 305, 328, 374; as benefit of office and law, 40, 41, 356, 362–69, 388; composibility of freedom and rule, 357–62, 375, 376, 380, 384; and democracy, 300–301, 301n103, 306–7, 309–11, 328; and disobedient citizens, 304n112, 309 (see also anarchos; anarchia/anarchia); and genesis of the tyrannical man, 324; and Magnesia, 384; nominal free status of the tyrant, 364–65, 367–69; political freedom, 374, 375; relationship among rule, freedom, and slavery, 355–80; and second-best constitution in Laws, 397; and the tyrannical man, 259, 335; and tyranny, 360; and tyrants, 354, 356, 364–69; and a tyrant’s subjects, 369 friendship, 21, 28, 376, 382; as benefit of office and law, 40, 41, 356, 362–69, 388; and cooperative disposition among the citizens, 356, 358; lack of friendship for the tyrant/tyrannical man, 259, 331, 363, 365–69; and second-best constitution in Laws, 397 Fröhlich, Pierre, 55n34, 59 Gellius, Aulus, 74n85 Gerson, Lloyd, 72n80 Geuss, Raymond, 261n24 Gigon, Olof, 322n7 Girard, René, 286 Glaucias, as interlocutor in Republic, 42, 75n87, 140, 161n54. See also Republic; specific topics Good, the, 20–22, 67; dēmos acting out of ignorance of the Good, 313; flawed conception of, 293–94; good of the soul, 254–55; known by philosopher-kings, 220–21, 236, 238, 255; operationalization in politics, 21; and philosophical study by potential rulers, 220–21; and the soul, 254–55, 320; and telos and taxis of rule, 255–56, 261; tyrants’ inability to discern their actual good, 317; and understanding the actual good of the ruled, 52. See also Form of the Good
good of the ruled, 5–6, 18–23, 52, 63, 64, 98–99, 116, 129, 153, 188, 203–4, 355, 366, 378, 401–2; common goods, 28–30; and cultivating virtue in the citizens, 90, 100, 245; and debate in Republic over the meaning of rule, 144–58; and defining mark of correct rule, 390–91, 395–97; and fostering psychic self-rule, 371; and guardians in a kallipolis, 214, 231, 263; and Homeric king as "shepherd of the people," 9, 19 (see also shepherds); misunderstanding of, 245; and philosophers as rulers, 157; and political expertise, 123, 382, 391–92; and professions other than political rule, 149–53, 391; ruling for the good of the ruled as normative expectation in Plato's time, 19–20, 37, 52, 140, 141, 170, 243, 244, 245, 372, 382, 383, 390, 395; a true ruler as caring for the good of the ruled, 37, 131, 140, 145, 153, 158, 164–65, 382, 390–92; Vermeule and, 28–30. See also caring; Good, the; therapeutic technai

Görgemanns, Herwig, 385n7

Gorgias (Plato), 51, 146n18, 173, 245, 313, 317, 356, 358, 359

Greene, Amanda, 25n52

Grube, G. M. A., 42n1, 43n2, 144n12, 151n35, 190n41, 193n46, 232, 234n27, 241n43, 269n37–39, 296n89, 297n92, 310n125, 318n1, 322n7, 326n13, 334n25, 346n40

Guardians (phalakes), 38–39, 174, 176n8, 177, 178, 183, 185–87, 192, 193, 199, 213–20, 218n8, 223–44, 242n46, 246, 252, 263, 270n41, 271–72, 275, 276, 278, 279, 281, 409; and age cohorts, 178, 222–27, 243 (see also age cohorts of guardians in Republic); and breakdown of hierarchical safeguarding system leading to timocracy, 275–79; and caring orientation/good of the ruled, 181–82, 214, 223–24, 231, 243, 244; "complete" guardians and rulers, 179n14, 193, 201, 222, 223, 225, 238, 241, 263 (see also philosopher-kings/queens; reigning); dependence on wages, 173–77, 183–85, 214, 218, 244, 246 (see also wages); divided into senior rulers and junior auxiliaries, 178, 201, 214, 223–25; divided further (among senior rulers) into eldest rulers and middle-aged officeholders, 218, 222; female guardians, 252; function of, 179–83, 218, 223–24; and hierarchical safeguarding, 38–39, 218, 244, 246; and Juvenal conundrum, 219; as mercenaries, 173, 175; military function, 182–83, 217, 225, 228, 230, 231, 246; philosophical education of, 215–16, 220–22, 224, 244n18, 227, 238; and prohibition of kinship ties, 177, 196, 242n46; and prohibition of wealth and property, 38, 174, 177, 185–87, 191, 196–97, 218, 242n46, 244, 246, 252; and rulers who are not officeholders, 230, 242, 273; scrutiny of potential guardians, 219, 275–77; and service conception of rule, 214, 224; in a timocracy, 279–83; and transition from kallipolis to timocracy, 273–79. See also age cohorts of guardians in Republic; archontes/archontos; auxiliaries; epikouroi; officeholders; philosopher-kings/queens

Habash, Nicolas Lema, 405

Haireisthai, 121, 135

Hall, Jonathan, 3n1

Hansen, M. H., 10n16, 18n39, 184n29, 189–90, 189n37, 192, 195, 214–15n3, 217n7, 226n19

Happiness: in cities, based on type of ruler, 236; of guardians, 174, 192; of kingly man, 318; and living a maximally unjust life, 251; and self-discipline, 358; and the tyrannical man, 259, 315, 323; and the tyrant, 251, 253, 258, 259, 316, 318–19, 323, 362, 365, 368, 369

Harel, Alon, 150n30

Harte, Verity, 150n33

Haubold, Johannes, 49n18, 51n23, 156n46, 281n60

Hawke, Jason, 270n40

Hawthorn, Geoffrey, 261n24
INDEX

Heath, Joseph, 16, 17
Helmer, Étienne, 16n32
Herodotus, 46n7, 48–49, 65, 69–70, 69n70–71, 143n10, 193, 210n74, 297
Hesiod, 48, 48n11, 49, 267n33, 292
Hippias, 281n60
history/folk history of rule and office in Greek thought and practice, 3–5, 9, 16, 44, 50–51, 53–54, 209–10
Hitz, Zena, 270n41
Hobbes, Thomas, 130, 140, 171
Hoekstra, Kinch, 233n29
hoi en telei (those in power), 66, 66n60
Homer, 210, 267n33, 274, 274n46; Iliad, 49, 50, 50n19, 267n33; Odyssey, 49, 50
Homeric kings, 48, 48n11, 49; as shepherd of the people, 19, 49–51, 49n18, 51, 120, 154, 210
Homeric society, 50–51
Honig, Bonnie, 398n28
honor, 161–63, 273, 294, 299, 336, 337, 342, 343
horos, 395–96, 395n25
Hulme Kozey, Emily, 83n112, 142n4, 149n28, 182n23
Hunter, Richard, 325n11
hupeuthunos, 14, 56
Ismard, Paulin, 16n33
Isocrates, 15, 15n32, 184, 210, 305n116, 306n116
Johnstone, Mark A., 303n108, 334n26
Jordović, Ivan, 73n82, 233n31
justice, 181, 181n18; and happiness, 322n8; and institutional corruption, 31–33; justice serving the stronger (Thrasymachus’s account), 141, 143–44, 150, 165n62, 373; Socrates’s response to Thrasymachus, 165n62
just life, 251, 252n10, 253n11, 258–59, 318, 331, 338, 362, 363, 368; disadvantages of being a just person (Thrasymachus’s account), 154–55
Juvenal conundrum (“Who shall guard the guardians?”), 6–8, 6n9, 15, 22, 41, 99, 100, 114, 219; and Laws, 6n9, 7–8, 87–88, 93, 99–100; and Republic, 7–8, 176, 218–19; source of quotation, 8n72; and Statesman, 7–8
kairos, 116, 129, 275n51
kallipolis (beautiful city in Republic), 38, 43, 60, 80, 141, 159, 173n12, 175, 183–88, 219, 236, 252n8, 275–77, 275n49, 310, 320, 345, 371–73; absence of euthunai (audit procedures) in, 186–87, 218, 230, 231, 244, 246; age-differentiated taxis of roles in, 201, 214, 218, 223–43 (see also age cohorts of guardians in Republic; auxiliaries; guardians; officeholders; philosopher-kings/queens); constitution of, 140, 245–46, 249–50, 250n3, 263, 274, 279, 348; and corruption, 169, 185–87; education and selection of future rulers, 219, 220 (see also education); function of guardians, 179–83; and the good of the ruled, 214, 231, 263; guardians (phulakes) (see guardians); legal prohibitions on wealth and property (see wealth and property); and obedience of the ruled, 205, 371n26; political offices, 227–31, 244–46; rulers as senior cohort of guardians, 176n8, 178, 183, 232–43 (see also philosopher-kings/queens); and rulers who are not officeholders, 230, 242, 273; selection of officeholders, 218 (see also officeholders, selection of); and service conception of rule, 231; and taxis of rule, 219–20, 244, 263; and terms of address, 197–207; transition to timocracy, 271–79, 283; and wages, 172–212 (see also wages). See also Republic
kings, 44, 47–53, 118, 135, 175, 336; attack and, 48, 48n10; contrast to officeholders, 56–57, 63; contrast to tyrants, 46n7, 47; distinction between kingship and tyranny, 316; eldest guardians reigning as kings, 225, 232–43 (see also philosopher-kings/queens; reigning); epitactic powers, 52–53, 118, 119, 124, 134; happiness of the king, 318; Homeric kings, 19, 48–51, 48n11, 49n18, 51, 120, 154, 210; king as knowledgeable ruler, 47, 118, 129, 133, 135, 136, 140 (see also statecraft/political expertise); king as oriented to the good of the people, 48, 52; king as political weaver, 48, 120, 130, 132–33;
kings (continued)

king as shepherd, 48–51, 49n18, 119–20, 210; king as steward, 210; king as unaccountable kind of ruler, 4; kingly man ruled by the rational part of the soul, 348; ordering role of, 46n7, 48, 49, 237–39; in Republic, 47, 232–43, 245 (see also philosopher-kings/queens); rivals to title, 117, 119, 130; senior guardians (see philosopher-kings/queens); and service conception of rule, 130; in Statesman, 47–48, 115–20, 129, 130, 135, 136, 140; statesmen identified with, 115–16, 130, 137, 139; transformation from kingship to accountable office in Athens, 3–5, 44. See also philosopher-kings/queens

Klosko, George, 377n37

knowledge, 72, 72n78, 91n14, 112, 116, 118, 129, 149–52, 242, 313; and epitactic powers, 123, 126; expertise in caring, 131; expertise needed by rulers, 391–92; kingly expertise, 118, 129, 133, 135; offices requiring specific expertise, 122; political expertise (see statecraft/political expertise); rule of knowledge, 26, 52, 64, 115, 119, 138; types of expertise, 125n25, 126, 126n28, 134; and virtue, 74, 91, 167–68; wisdom, 91, 98–99, 255–56, 261, 379
to koinon, 125, 125n24
koinōnia, 356, 359
Kolodny, Niko, 383, 387–404, 398–99n29, 31
kosmoi, 54, 59
kosmos, 9, 18n38, 54, 93n20
Kraut, Richard, 166n65
kritikē, 126n28
Kroll, J. H., 191n44
kurios, 219, 232–33, 233n29, 299, 312

Laks, André, 73n81, 76n89, 81, 92n17, 96, 96n27, 107n53, 184n31, 269n37, 297n92, 362n20, 373n30, 381n1
Landauer, Matthew, 18n38, 59n42, 101nn36–37, 187n35
Lane, Melissa [also M.S./Melissa S.], 63n53, 76n89, 119n9, 304n112, 305n116, 346n39, 360n15, 364n22, 371n26, 373n30, 377n34; approach to study of dialogues, 91n13, 30–74; law guardians. See nomophulakes
lawlessness (anomia), 282–83, 305–6, 305n116, 309, 327, 329, 339–40, 405. See also anarchy/anarchia
laws, 54n30, 61–62, 90, 94–98, 138, 239, 294, 295, 309, 361–62, 386–88; codification in Athens, 387; and coercion, 381, 382, 384–89, 406–7 (see also coercion/force); and cooperative disposition among the citizens, 387–89; and discursive legislation, 206 (see also discursive legislation); divinely inspired law, 36, 50, 64, 91, 116n4, 358; double theory of laws as orders/coercion prefaced by persuasion, 80, 89, 93, 93n19, 381, 384–87, 407; and founding a city, 206; freedom and friendship as benefit of office and law, 40, 41, 356, 362–69, 388; and Greek constitutions, 61–63 (see also constitutions); incorrect laws, 362; lack of institutional legal framework in Homeric society, 50; law guardians (nomophulakes), 91, 103–6; law as master of officeholders, 92; law not necessary as a criterion or instrument of rule, 386, 389; in Laws (see Laws); legislation “in deed,” 92n17; legislation “in speech,” 39, 77–82, 92 (see also discursive legislation); loss of respect for laws, 300, 302–6, 304n112 (see also anarchy/anarchia); obedience to (see obedience of the ruled); in Republic, 39, 77–82, 140, 141, 186–87, 383; safeguarding through the content of the laws, 176n8; senior guardians as lawmakers, 218, 241; spirit of the laws, 94, 106–14, 176n8; unwritten laws, 309, 309n124, 388; written laws, 382, 388. See also accountability; constitutions; office, parameters of/limits on Laws (Plato), 35–36, 40, 79, 87–114, 89n9, 90n11, 91n14, 136n49, 161, 183n28, 282n61, 283n63, 359, 378, 407; and accountability, 53, 97, 99–102; age requirements and term limits for officeholders, 88; Athenian Visitor as avatar of Plato in, 74–76 (see also
Athenian Visitor); and coercion, 384–89, 408; compared to other dialogues, 184–85; and compossibility of freedom, rule, and friendship, 357–61, 375, 376; constitutional laws (laws setting up offices), 54n30; constitutional project of, 53, 61–62, 72, 87–114, 183–84, 187, 282, 371n26, 383; and corruption, 32–34, 95–96; Daily Meeting, 36, 94, 106–14, 176n8; and discursive legislation (legislation “in speech”), 77–82, 88, 92, 104, 107, 109, 111, 111n67; double theory of laws as orders/coercion prefaced by persuasion, 80, 89, 93, 93n19, 381, 384–87, 407; establishment of offices, 54n30, 93n20; and euthunai procedures, 59, 88, 97; and euthunoi (auditors), 36, 88, 97–99–103; and freedom, 360, 397; and friendship, 376, 397; and garden-variety constitutionalism, 40, 358, 361; guarding the spirit of the laws, 36 (see also Daily Meeting under this heading); and initial establishment of new polis, 94; and interpretive stances, 72–83; and Juvenal conundrum, 6n9, 7–8, 87–88, 93, 99–100; lack of superordinate rulers overseeing officeholders in, 94; and language of caring, 106; and language of slavery, 40, 92; law guardians (nomophulakes), 91, 93–94, 101, 103–6; and limits of a taxis of offices, 27; and noocracy, 92; and obedience of the ruled, 359, 371n26, 375–80, 384; office and law in, 10, 35–36, 53, 88, 91–92, 94–98, 383 (see also specific topics under this heading); and penalties for rulers or officeholders, 84, 184n31; and political freedom, 375, 377n32; protagonist and interlocutors in (see Athenian Visitor; Cleinias; Megillus); and relationship among rule, freedom, and slavery, 355; and rulers and statesmen, 113–14; safeguarding through the content of the laws, 176n8; and second-best constitution/city, 18, 18n37, 31, 80, 96–97, 387, 397; selection of auditors, 100–101; selection of guardians of the laws (nomophulakes), 101; selection of officeholders, 88, 89, 91, 170, 170n73; and service conception of rule, 175, 184–85; and telos and taxis of rule, 27, 90, 100, 105; title discussed, 72; use of archê and archein, 9–10, 91n14, 378n29; wages not paid to officeholders, 61, 89, 161n53, 183, 187; women as rulers, 115n1. See also Magnesia

Lear, Jonathan, 249n2, 257, 257n18, 259n21

Lefort, Claude, 405

Leibniz, G. W., 356–57

Lenin, V. I., 142, 142n37, 404, 406, 406n48, 408

leôs, 50, 105n49

Leslie, Sarah-Jane, 24n50

Leviathan (Hobbes), 171

Levin, Saul, 65n54, 148n23, 228nn23–24, 232n28

Lewis, V. Bradley, 107n54, 108, 108n58

logistai, 100n34

logos, 78–79, 79n97

Long, Alexander, 179, 182, 185

Lorenz, Hendrik, 347n41

lotteries. See officeholders, selection of

Luraghi, Nino, 3n1, 48n11

Lycurgus (Athenian orator), 62, 62n52

Lysias, 193–94, 193n48, 297n93

MacCallum, Gerald C., Jr., 360

macro narrative of flawed constitutions within cities, 249–317; connection between macro and micro narratives, 259–60, 286, 314–15, 328, 328n19, 330–31, 344–46; and Disunity principle, 264–65, 269–72, 270n41, 349 (see also Disunity principle); and political science, 260–62; and Predominance principle, 264–69, 272, 349 (see also Predominance principle); sequence of flawed constitutions, 39, 250–51, 271–317; and social psychology of drone imagery, 292–93, 313, 341, 342 (see also drone imagery). See also democracy; flawed constitutions in cities; oligarchy; timocracy; tyranny

Magnesia (colony envisaged in Laws), 53, 77n91, 80, 98–102, 112, 184n30, 383, 384; auditors (euthunoi), 99–103; and Cnossians, 105–6; Daily Meeting,
Magnesia (colony envisaged in Laws) (continued) 106–14; and discursive legislation, 80, 81, 88, 88n5, 92, 96, 104, 107, 109, 111, 111n67; and double theory of law, 384–86 (see also under laws); education of the citizens, 91, 104, 387; founding and establishment of constitutional order, 93n20, 105; and lack of wages, 161n53; law guardians (nomophulakes), 103–6; office and law in, 94–98, 383 (see also specific topics under this heading); and prelude to laws, 384; proposed constitution (see Laws); selection of officeholders, 170n73. See also Laws

March, James G., 54n29
Markell, Patchen, 11n17
Mates, Benson, 356–57
McCabe, M. M., 75, 75n88

Menexenus (Plato), 4–5, 209
Menn, Stephen, 62n50, 72n79
metechein, 298–99
Meyer, Susan Sauvé, 357, 357n10, 375n32
micro narrative of changing character of individuals, 251, 256–57, 261–62, 283n63, 318–50; and city-man comparison, 319, 319n2, 320, 335, 337–38, 342, 344; and city-soul analogy, 257n18; connection between macro and micro narratives, 259–60, 286, 314–15, 328, 328n19, 330–31, 340, 342, 344–46; representative man as son of preceding stage’s father, 319, 324; and social psychology of drone imagery, 260–62, 292–93, 341, 342 (see also drone imagery); and three parts of the soul, 262, 283n63, 319. See also democratic man; oligarchic man; timocratic man; tyrannical man

Minos (Cretan king), 90, 90n13
misthōtoi (mercenaries/hired hands), 173, 173n2, 180–81
misthos (wage), 172, 184n30, 188–92, 195, 197. See also wages

Möllers, Christoph, 210n73
money, 191, 191n44, 278; and guardians in a kallipolis (prohibited to), 185–87, 191; monetary wages, 189, 191–92; moneymaking appetites, 266, 321, 332–33, 336–37; and oligarchs, 294–96, 336–37, 342; and timocrats, 282–84, 299, 343, 344; and the tyrannical man, 325–26. See also wealth and property

Moore, Christopher, 168n68
Morrow, Glenn, 88n7, 97n29, 103, 103n44, 110, 161n53, 184n31
Muses, 274–75, 274n46, 277, 283, 283n63, 310

Nails, Debra, 300n100
Nicolay, René de, 83n112, 301n103, 309n23
Nocturnal Council. See Daily Meeting
nomoi, 50, 62, 62n50, 71, 72, 78
nomophulakes (law guardians), 91, 93–94, 101, 103–6, 104n47, 112–13, 182n25
nomos, 183n37, 50, 72, 79, 82, 97, 186, 242n46
noocracy, 92

obedience of the ruled, 40, 343, 369–75, 371n26, 378, 383, 403, 404; breakdown in, 304n112, 309, 328, 378–80, 383 (see also anarchy/anarchia); and compossibility of freedom and rule, 357, 359 (see also compossibility); and cooperative disposition among the citizens, 40, 358, 368; and doctor analogy, 384–86; and friendship, 359, 368; and hierarchical nature of rule, 404; and language of slavery used to describe rule, 355, 369–75; paradox of willing obedience in Laws, 375–80, 384; and persuasive prelude to laws, 384–86; Raz and, 383; Rousseau and, 380; taxis and telos of rule composable with willing obedience, 355; unwilling obedience of slaves, 366, 374; willing obedience described as voluntary slavery, 308, 361, 375, 377

Ober, Josiah, 17n35, 246n49, 251n5
Oedipus, 315n132
office, 7, 14, 17, 40, 41, 44, 54n30, 61–62, 106, 108–9, 122, 134, 228, 230, 242, 273, 356, 358, 361–69, 378, 400; and accountability, 4–6, 53 (see also accountability); and Aeschines’s
dispute with Ctesiphon, 57–58, 58n40–41; and age cohorts (see age cohorts of guardians in Republic); author’s use of term, 4n4, 12–13, 217; and corruption, 32–34 (see also abuse of power or office; corruption); and democracy, 302, 304–6; and flawed constitutions, 136–39 (see also flawed constitutions in cities); history in Greek thought and practice before the time of Plato, 3–5, 9, 16, 44, 53–54, 209–10; lack of distinction between ancient Greek political and administrative offices, 16, 54, 103; in Laws, 88–99; material benefits of, 160–61, 361–62 (see also abuse of power or office; corruption); and oligarchy (see oligarchy); parameters of office (see office, parameters of/limits on); powers, in Athens, 16, 56, 56n35; powers, in Laws, 88; powers, limits on, 14, 55, 56, 215, 217, 230, 231; reconfiguration of offices in the constitution of a kallipolis, 230–31, 244–46; relationship between rule and office, 4, 11–12, 38, 42–43, 117, 120–23, 164; in Republic (see kallipolis; Republic; specific topics under this heading); in Statesman, 120–23, 133–39; and timocracy, 281–82, 286–87; and the timocratic man, 343; and tyranny, 253, 315; vulnerabilities of, 7, 114, 138 (see also Juvenal conundrum). See also archai; archē; vocabulary of rule and office office, parameters of/limits on, 6, 14, 54–61, 55n34, 95n25, 217, 230–31, 244–46; and accountability, 5 (see also accountability); in Laws (see Laws); limits on eligibility to serve, 14, 54–57, 104n45, 215, 217, 230, 231, 284, 288, 301–2; limits on powers of each office, 14, 55, 56, 215, 217, 230, 231; performance audits (euthunai), 55, 55n32–33, 57–60, 217 (see also euthunai); and prohibition of wealth and property, 38, 174, 177, 185–87, 191, 196–97, 218, 242n46, 244, 246, 252; and reconfiguration of offices in the constitution of a kallipolis, 230–31, 244–46; in Republic, 230–31, 244–46 (see also kallipolis; Republic); rotation of officeholders, 239; scrutiny of chosen officeholders prior to taking office, 14, 55–57, 89, 89n18, 217, 219, 275–77; and wages (see wages) officeholders, 4, 44, 53–64, 117, 155, 160–63, 210–11, 263, 294, 301–4, 328, 335–36, 378, 382–83, 400; and accountability enforced by auditors (see euthunai; euthunoi); accountability to the ruled, 54, 64, 214; accountable to/ safeguarded by superordinate rulers in a kallipolis, 15, 26, 27, 37, 38, 53, 57, 64, 136, 139, 213–15, 218–19, 244, 254, 263, 273; accusations against, 55, 55n34, 60–61, 217; apprentice rulers (middle-aged cohort) as, 213, 216, 217, 225, 227–31, 246; character thereof shaping constitutions (see Predominance principle); combined executive, legislative, and judicial functions, 16, 18n39, 56, 103; contrast to kings and tyrants, 56–57, 63; and corruption (see corruption); and democracy, 56, 89, 174–75, 178, 184, 297, 297n92, 300–306, 300n101; distinction between “reigning” and rule by officeholders, 213, 218, 236; distinction between statesman and officeholders, 124; and Disunity principle, 264–65, 269–72, 281 (see also Disunity principle); education of potential officeholders (see education); as epictatic rulers, 54, 400, 404 (see also epictatic powers); exploitation of the ruled, 294, 349, 361–62 (see also abuse of power or office; corruption); exploitation of the ruled; oligarchy; timocracy); inducements for good service, 161–64 (see also honor; penalties for officeholders and rulers; wages); lack of safeguarding in flawed constitutions, 261–62, 270–71, 281–82; in Laws, 53; obedience/disobedience to, 308–9, 378–80 (see also obedience of the ruled); and oligarchy, 89, 283–91, 294–96, 342, 349; as paradoxical kind of rulers, 63–64; and parameters of office (see office, parameters of/limits on); penalties for, 161–64, 166, 172, 184, 184n31; and Predominance principle, 264–69, 268n36, 272 (see also Predominance principle).
officeholders (continued)
and principal-agent model, 208–9, 398–401; and prohibition on wealth and property (see wealth and property); in Republic, 213–46 (see also guardians; kallipolis); and “rule over none,” 400, 404 (see also democratic theory); selection of (see officeholders, selection of); in Statesman, 53; and terms of address, 197–207; and timocracy, 279–83, 349; and under- and overidentification of a person with their professional role, 171; unity among, 273; wages paid or not paid to, 56, 61, 89, 160–63, 161n53, 172–212, 218, 244 (see also wages); women as, 43, 216. See also accountability; euthnai; rulers
officeholders, selection of, 6, 57, 91, 98–100, 99n33, 104, 135, 136, 217; in Athens, 57, 226, 297n92, 312; and breakdown of selection system leading to timocracy, 276–77; and democracy, 297, 297n92, 300, 300n101; eligibility criteria, 14, 54–57, 104n45, 215, 217, 226, 230, 231, 284, 288, 301–2; in Laws, 88, 89, 91, 170, 170n73; officeholders chosen by combination of lottery and election, 14, 55, 57, 69, 101n36, 226, 300n101; officeholders chosen by election, 55, 57, 91, 135, 286–87, 297n92, 312; officeholders chosen by lottery, 14, 17, 55, 57, 69, 91, 297, 297n92; offices requiring specific expertise, 134; and oligarchy, 284, 286–88, 296; and Predominance principle, 268; preparation/education of potential officeholders, 64, 91, 104, 135–36 (see also education); in Republic, 38–39, 215, 218, 225–27, 243–44; scrutiny of chosen officeholders prior to taking office, 14, 55–57, 89, 89n38, 217, 219, 275–77; selection of auditors, 100–101, 101n36; selection of guardians through education and testing, 38–39, 215, 218, 225–27, 243–44; selection of law guardians (nomophulakes) in Laws, 101, 104–5, 104n47; selection of superintendent of education in Laws, 101n37; in Statesman, 121, 134–36; and timocracy, 281, 286–87; and wealth, 99, 284, 286–87
officium, 12–13, 13n24
oikonomos, 118n6
oligarchic man, 40, 251, 320, 322n7, 332–33, 335–42; character of, 338–40; and city-man comparison, 337–38, 342; and drone imagery, 260, 333, 337–39, 341–42; genesis of, 335–37, 341, 342; and rule in the soul, 342, 347; way of life, 333, 338, 341
oligarchy, 39, 251, 287–97, 300, 307, 309, 311, 312, 332, 340–42, 349, 380; absence of wages for officeholders in, 89, 184n29; in Athens (see under Athens); and city-man comparison, 337–38, 342; constitution defined/described, 284, 288–93; and Disunity principle, 295–96; and drone imagery, 260, 292–93, 310–12, 333, 342; emergence from timocracy, 283–88, 339–40; euthnai in, 59; and failure of lawmaking, 294, 295, 309; faults of, 288–93, 294–97, 310, 349 (see also specific faults under this heading); and Predominance principle, 294, 311; property valuation and officeholding, 284, 288; proximate causes of constitutional change, 294–95, 309; and revolution from below, 295–96; and selection of officeholders, 284, 286–88, 296; and telos and taxis of rule, 291, 294, 295; transition to democracy, 293–97; value placed on wealth and moneymaking, 286–87, 294–95, 300; way of life in an oligarchy, 300
Olsen, Johan P., 54n29
orders (commands). See epitactic powers
Otanes, 69–70, 69n72
Panathenaea, 51n23
paradeigma, 133, 133n44
parameters of office. See office, parameters of/limits on paranomos, 323, 324, 325, 326–27n16 patrios politeia (ancestral constitution), 15. See also under Athens Pausanias, 3–5, 8, 209 Peisistratid dynasty, 46, 46n7
penalties for officeholders and rulers, 161–64, 166, 172, 184, 184n31
permissiveness. See freedom
Persia, 40, 49, 336, 347, 375–76, 378
permissiveness. See freedom
Pettit, Philip, 403n42
Philochorus, 15n31
philosopher-kings/queens (senior rulers in a kallipolis), 9, 47, 48n10, 213–46, 273; accountability of officeholders to, 38–39, 53, 218, 231, 244, 263, 273; accountability of/safeguards on, 27, 39, 219–22, 244, 246; and breakdown of selection system leading to timocracy, 275–79; and caring orientation, 237, 238; and corruption, 219–20; and deliberation, 241, 243; and discursive legislation vs. actual legal frameworks, 206; and failures of scrutiny, 276–77; and gold nature, 276, 279; as judges, 219, 241–42; and Juvenal conundrum, 219; and knowledge of the Good, 220–21; and lack of motive for corruption, 205, 219–20, 243; and love of learning, 167–68; and moral and intellectual virtues of, 23, 167–68; and ordering for the good, 157; philosopher as a better kind of person, 252n8, 320; and psychic self-rule, 350; and psychology of the suitable candidate for role of ruler, 23, 159, 165–70; and temperament for rule, 165–70; and wages, 205–6
philosophical anarchism, 382–84, 408–9
philosophers, 38; and asceticism, 168, 176; and bodily desires, 168; and education, 169; as full knowers, 167; and happiness, 174, 318; inducements for ruling, 161–64; intrinsic motivations of persons with philosophical natures, 167–68; and lack of motive for corruption, 205, 219–20, 243; and love of learning, 167–68; and moral and intellectual virtues of, 23, 167–68; and ordering for the good, 157; philosopher as a better kind of person, 252n8, 320; and psychic self-rule, 350; and psychology of the suitable candidate for role of ruler, 23, 159, 165–70; and temperament for rule, 165–70; and wages, 205–6
philosophical anarchism, 382–84, 408–9
phulakes, 111, 173, 182–83. See also guardians
Pindar, 50, 210, 233n32
Plato: characters in dialogues as avatars of, 9n13, 30, 74–76; dates of dialogues, 45n5; dates of lifespan, 45n5; development of ideas of rule and office, 4n6, 11–12; and discursive legislation, 77–82; and expectation that rulers care for the good of the ruled, 19–22, 26; influence of Greek poetry and prose on, 48–49; and interpretive stances on, 9n13, 30–31, 71–83; and Juvenal conundrum, 6n9, 7–8, 41; and language of kingship, 9, 47–48; as law theorist, 387; as opponent of anarchia, 10, 40–41, 72, 382–84, 388, 409; as opponent of tyranny, 10, 47, 72, 408; and philosophical anarchism, 382–84, 408–9; and preventing abuse of power/institutional corruption, 29–34; as realist, 41, 83, 171, 260, 288, 296, 297, 299, 306, 317, 389; and rule of knowledge, 26; schema of rule, 48, 52, 73, 78, 124–31, 153, 192, 222–23, 253, 362, 381; and strict evaluative sense vs. loose descriptive sense of words and concepts, 23–26; and terms of art in present study, 17–26, 35–44, 193; terms possibly coined by, 155, 251n5, 345; theory of goodness, 20; virtue and Platonic ethics, 21; vocabulary of rule and office (see vocabulary of rule and office). See also vocabulary of rule and office.
Platonic Forms, 52n27, 67. See also Form of the Good
Plutarch, 50, 51, 51n23
Pocock, J. G. A., 4n6
Poddighe, Elisabetta, 269n37
Polemarchus, 193
pòlitéia. See constitutions
political expertise. See statecraft/political expertise
political figures, 44–64. See also auditors; guardians; kings; nomophulakes; officeholders; philosopher-kings/queens; statesman; tyrants
political predominance, 264n27, 268, 281, 311. See also Predominance principle
pòliti[k]ê, 71, 125. See also statecraft/political expertise
pòliti[k]os. See statesman
Polus (interlocutor in Gorgias), 173, 245
Popper, Karl, 27, 29, 212
principal-agent model of accountability, 207–9, 211, 398–401, 399n31, 403
Pritchett, W. Kendrick, 189, 191, 195
private property. See wealth and property provisions, as a kind of wages, 188–92, 195
pseudo-Xenophon, 62
Raaflaub, Kurt A., 54n31
Rancière, Jacques, 11, 405
rational part of the soul, 255, 255n15, 262, 266, 323, 337, 343, 346, 349, 370
Raymond, Christopher, 168n68
Raz, Joseph, 20, 204, 214, 381, 382, 383, 393, 401–2
reason, 91, 92, 220–22, 262
Reeve, C. D. C., 42n1, 43n2, 144n12, 151n35, 190n41, 193n46, 232, 233, 234, 241n43, 269n37–39, 296n89, 297n92, 310n125, 318n1, 322n7, 326n13, 334n25, 346n40
Rehfeld, Andrew, 26n54
Reid, Jeremy, 97n29, 101n36, 102n38, 107, 108n56, 110, 110n63, 170n73
reigning, 38, 176n18, 178, 179n14, 183, 193, 201, 215, 219, 222, 223, 225, 232–43, 263, 318; distinguished from rule by officeholders, 213, 218, 236. See also philosopher-kings/queens; rulers
"representative men" in Republic, 39–40, 319. See also democratic man; flawed constitutions within souls; micro narrative of changing character of individuals; oligarchic man; timocratic man; tyrannical man
Republic (Plato), 43, 43–44n4, 141, 184–85, 357, 396n27; absence of euthunai (audit procedures) in, 8, 9, 186–87, 218, 230, 231, 244, 246; and age cohorts (see age cohorts); and anarchy/anarchia (see anarchy/anarchia); and avoiding corruption, 185–87 (see also accountability; corruption); and caring orientation/good of the ruled, 9, 22, 37, 106, 140, 149–53 (see also telos of rule under this heading); constitutional project of, 37–39, 53, 72, 177n13, 178, 186–87, 207–9, 213–14, 222–23, 244–46, 383; and degeneration of rule and office (see degeneration of rule and office); and discursive legislation (legislation "in speech"), 39, 77–82, 140, 141, 186; and drone imagery (see drone imagery); and education (see education); and epikouroi (see auxiliaries); and flawed characters (see flawed constitutions within souls); and flawed constitutions (see flawed constitutions in cities); and founding a city, 180–83; and freedom and friendship, 353–56, 359–60, 362–69; and garden-variety constitutionalism, 358, 358n10, 397; and guardians (see guardians); interlocutors (see Adeimantus; Glaucon; Socrates; Thrasyrndamus); and interpretive stances, 72–83; and Juvenal conundrum, 7–8, 176, 218–19; and language of slavery, 40, 355, 369–75 (see also slavery); and the limits of office, 27, 215, 244 (see also office, parameters of/limits on); and macro narrative of flawed constitutions, 249–317 (see also flawed constitutions in cities); and the meaning of rule, 142–58; and micro narrative of changing character of individuals, 318–50 (see also flawed constitutions
INDEX

within souls); motivation of rulers/officeholders, 38, 157–65; and natural person’s temperamental fitness to rule, 165–70; and obedience of the ruled, 369–75; and natural person’s temperamental fitness to rule, 369–75, 371n26 (see also obedience of the ruled); parable of the transported slaveholder, 362–63, 365–67, 369; and philosopher-kings/senior rulers (see philosopher-kings/queens); and philosophical anarchism, 408–9; and reconfiguration of offices, 230–31, 244–46; and selection of officeholders, 38–39, 218, 225–27; and sequence of flawed political constitutions, 39, 250–51, 271–317; and service conception of rule, 142, 175–76, 185, 187–88, 204, 207–12, 214, 224, 231, 245; Socrates as avatar of Plato in, 30, 74–76, 140; superordinate rulers safeguarding officeholders, 15, 26, 27, 38–39, 64, 213–15, 236–37, 243, 244, 254, 263, 273; and taxis of rule, 170, 179, 202, 212, 214, 219–20, 222–23, 243, 244, 263; and telos of rule, 27, 140–71, 214, 243, 263, 396n26 (see also telos of rule); and tension between role of the ruler and the natural person who takes up role, 23, 166–67, 170–71; and terms of address, 197–207; title discussed, 71, 71n77; and tyranny (see tyranny; tyrants); use of archē in, 9–10, 142, 147, 156, 158, 162, 163, 172, 179, 201, 213, 246; use of archein in, 9–10, 163–64, 179, 180n15, 201, 228, 302; and wages paid to rulers and officeholders, 27, 38, 61, 160–63, 172–212, 214, 244 (see also wages); and women (see women). See also kallipolis

Rhodes, P. J., 55n32, 129n36
Roberts, Jennifer Tolbert, 55n33, 59n42
Robinson, D. B., 118n6
Rosen, Michael, 25n52
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 380, 403, 403n40
Rowe, Christopher J., 129n24, 155, 391n16, 393n18, 20, and 21, 402n38
rule, 494, 7, 17–26, 18n38, 22n45, 29–30, 44, 51, 67, 118, 126, 225–26, 317, 350, 358, 370, 371, 374, 378, 382, 388; Arendt and, 11–12; bad rule, 19, 316–17, 389 (see also abuse of power or office; anarchy/anarchia; corruption; exploitation of the ruled; tyranny); benefit of rule, 10, 370–71, 373, 384; and coercion, 18, 384–89, 384n5 (see also coercion/force); compossibility of freedom and rule, 357–62, 375, 376, 380, 384; core elements, 122 (see also epitactic powers; taxis of rule; telos of rule); defining mark/horos of correct rule, 136–37, 389–97, 395n25; and definition of statecraft, 125–26; and democratic theory, 383; distinction between “reigning” by safeguarding rulers and rule by officeholders, 213, 218, 236, 254; distinctions and parallels between rule in the soul and rule in a city, 254–55; and doctor analogy, 136–37, 384–86, 391–93, 401–2; epitactic nature of rule, 18, 18n39, 124, 141, 381–83, 397–98, 404 (see also epitactic powers); and flawed constitutions, 136–39, 294 (see also flawed constitutions in cities); hierarchical nature of rule, 381, 383, 397–98, 401, 404; and Homeric society, 50–51; intertwining of ruling, caring, and weaving, 132–33; and kings (see kings; philosopher-kings/queens); language of slavery used to describe rule, 12, 40, 210–11, 355, 369–75; law not necessary as a criterion or instrument of rule, 386, 389; “no rule”/“rule over none” theories, 383, 397–404; obedience of the ruled (see obedience of the ruled); Plato’s schema of, 48, 52, 73, 78, 124–31, 153, 192, 253, 362, 381; and political expertise, 119, 123, 153, 234–35 (see also statecraft/political expertise); political rule ideally obviated by self-rule (philosophical anarchism), 382, 384; political tyrant as not truly ruling, 317, 325, 354, 390; Popper and, 27; post-modern idealization of “no rule,” 383; and principal-agent model, 207–9, 399–401; and professions other than political rule, 141, 146–49, 148n25, 401; and psychic self-rule, 10, 41; Rancière and, 11; Raz and, 381, 382, 383, 401–2; relationship
rule (continued)

between law and coercion, 382, 384–89; relationship between political rule and psychic self-rule, 10; relationship among rule, freedom, and slavery, 355–80; relationship between rule and office, 4, 11–12, 38, 42–43, 117, 120–23, 164; in Republic, 142–58; role of knowledge, 26, 52, 64, 115, 119, 138 (see also statecraft/political expertise); rule as maintaining order, 46, 48, 49, 237–39; rule by the multitude, 69, 69n69, 70, 246n49; rule not necessarily coercive, 388, 401, 406–8; rule within the soul as ultimate aim of any kind of rule, 21, 41, 370, 371; service conception of rule, 20, 20n41, 21, 38, 117, 123, 128, 130, 173–76, 184–85, 207–12, 214, 224; and serving the good of the ruled (see also good of the ruled; telos of rule); in Statesman, 118–36, 389–97, 401–2; and strict evaluative sense vs. loose descriptive sense of words and concepts, 23, 25, 153–54; technē and, 142–58, 401; telos and taxis of (see taxis of rule; telos of rule); temperamental fitness to rule, 165–70; turn-taking or rotation by rulers, 238–41; and tyranny (see tyranny); willingness to rule, 157–65; Wolin and, 11n18. See also archē; vocabulary of rule and office

ruled, the. See subjects of rule

rule in the soul, 254, 320–21, 347, 350, 374; absence of, and anarchy, 254, 327, 329; absence of, and the tyrannical man, 254, 327–29, 332, 348, 353, 364, 365; benefit of, 10, 370–71, 373, 384; and the democratic man, 334, 334n26, 347; distinctions and parallels between rule in the soul and rule in a city, 254–55; guardian within the soul, 41, 370–71; and the kingly man, 318, 348; dysfunction of rule in the soul, 254 (see also democratic man; oligarchic man; timocratic man; tyrannical man); and the oligarchic man, 342, 347; political rule obviated by sufficient self-rule, 41, 382, 384, 408–9; proper telos of, 254–55, 320; psychic self-rule, 10, 21, 41, 327, 329, 350, 354; and rational part of the soul, 370; taxis of rule in the soul, 320, 329, 332, 334, 338, 350; and the timocratic man, 343, 347; as ultimate aim of any kind of rule, 21, 41, 370, 371

rulers, 21, 113–14, 124, 141, 142n7, 144–46, 173, 174, 183, 183n26, 193, 390–91, 394–95, 397, 407; and age cohorts (see age cohorts of guardians in Republic; guardians); apprentice rulers as officeholders, 213, 216–18, 225, 227–31, 246, 262; defined in precise sense introduced by Thrasymachus, 145, 153; distinction between “reigning” by safeguarding rulers and rule by officeholders, 213, 218, 236, 254; education of potential rulers, 141, 157, 159, 215–16, 219; eldest guardians as “reigning” 232–43, 263 (see also reigning); eldest guardians as rulers overseeing education and selection of their juniors, 39, 176n8, 178, 183, 215, 218–20, 223, 225–26, 232–44, 263; and issuing orders (see epitactic powers); lack of safeguarding by rulers who are not officeholders in flawed constitutions, 261–62, 270–71, 281–82; in Laws, 113–14, 407; master builder example, 126–28, 408; motivation of persons capable of ruling, 141, 157–65, 166; nature of persons capable of ruling, 23, 141, 159, 165–70, 219; obedience to (see obedience of the ruled); officeholders as rulers receiving a wage, 174–75; and principal-agent model, 207–9, 399–401; professionals (e.g., doctors) and examples of rule, 126–28, 144–48, 408; reluctant rulers as the best rulers, 159; role defined, 141; ruler as occupying a role, 389–97; rulers exploiting the ruled or pursuing their own good, 7, 18–19, 21–22, 40, 47, 145, 148, 153, 173, 177, 187, 192–93, 200, 245, 263, 279, 282–83, 317, 348, 349, 355, 373, 396; rulers as having professional expertise, 146 (see also statecraft/political expertise); rulers as safeguarders of a constitution, 15n32, 176, 215, 218, 263; rulers in the strict
evaluative sense vs. the loose descript-

ive sense, 23–24, 153–54; rulers who

are not officeholders, 230, 242, 273;
safeguarding against corruption of

highest/superordinate rulers, 187,

219–20; and service conception of

rule (see service conception of rule);

statesmen as rulers, 115, 124, 130,

132–33, 136; subordinates safeguarded

by rulers, 15, 27, 38, 136, 139, 244

(see also under philosopher-

kings/queens); tension between role of

the ruler and the natu-

ral person who

takes up role, 23, 166–67, 170–71; and

terms of address, 179, 197–207; in

a timocracy, 279–81; a true ruler as
caring for the good of the ruled, 37,

131, 140, 145, 153, 158, 164–65 (see also
caring; good of the ruled); unaccount-
able rulers, 3, 4, 5, 8, 18n37, 95–96,

368; and wages (see wages); willing-

ness to rule, 157, 158–65;

women as

rulers/philosopher-

queens, 9, 15n32,

27, 29, 115n1,

228, 236, 246, 255. See also

archontes/archontos; guardians;
kings; philosopher-kings/queens;
reigning; statesman

Saunders, Trevor J., 80, 111n65, 379n43
Saxonhouse, Arlene, 6n8, 267n33
Schofield, Malcolm, 13n24, 83n111, 87n1,

122n18, 373, 377, 384, 384n5
Schöpsdau, Klaus, 379
Scott, Dominic, 161n54
scrutiny (dokimasia/dokimazein), 14,

55–57, 89, 89n8, 217, 219, 275–77
Sedley, David, 76n89, 166n65
selection of officeholders. See officehold-
ers, selection of

self-rule. See rule in the soul

service conception of authority (Raz’s con-

ception), 20, 20n41, 204, 214, 381, 396
service conception of rule, 20n41, 21, 38,

117, 123, 128, 130, 142, 173–76, 179,

184–85, 187–88, 194, 197, 205, 207–12,

224, 231, 245, 381–83, 401–2
Seto, Ken-ichi, 373n30
Shapiro, Gabriel, 24n50
shepherds, 19, 49–51, 49n18, 120, 149n28,

154, 156, 157, 160, 174, 180, 210
Shorey, Paul, 42n1, 43n2
Sikkenga, J., 267n35
Silverman, Allan, 409
Simonton, Matthew W., 270n40, 293n84,

296, 296n91, 307n120
Sissa, Giulia, 223n14
sitēsis, 189. See also provisions, as a kind

of wages; trophē; wages

slavery, 12, 16n33, 29n65, 40, 117, 130,

198, 355, 362, 363, 365, 366, 372,

374; 377–78, 385, 406; language of

slavery used in describing rule, 12,

40, 200, 210–11, 355, 369–75; par-
able of the transported slaveholder,

362–63, 365–67, 369, 374; as rejected

by relational egalitarian democratic

theory, 403–4; relationship among

rule, freedom, and slavery, 355–80; as

synecdoche for epitactic dimension of

rule, 373–75, 373n30, 377–79, 378n39;
telos of exploitation of the slave, 372,

374; and transition from kallipolis
timocracy, 278, 278n55; and the tyrani-

tical man, 329–30, 353, 363; and tyr-

anny, 310, 316; tyrant as a slave, 354,

364–67; willing obedience described

as voluntary slavery, 308, 361, 375, 377
Socrates, as avatar of Plato in Republic,

30, 74–76, 140. See also Republic;
specific topics

Socrates, Young. See Young Socrates

Socrates ( Xenophon’s version), 19, 19n40,

47, 51
Solon, 50, 55n32, 59n45, 70n73, 100, 209,

209n72, 299
Sophist (Plato), 123, 123n20
Sophocles, 66n59, 303–4
Sørensen, Anders Dahl, 137–38, 137n51,

138n56
sōtēria (safeguarding), 106, 109, 110,

110n64
soul: city-soul analogy, 257–58, 257n19,

262; flawed rule within the soul,

39–40 (see also flawed constitutions

within souls; rule in the soul); psychic

self-rule (see rule in the soul); and

Thracians principle, 265–66, 265n30;
three parts of, 262, 266, 283n63, 319,

320, 323 (see also appetitive part

of the soul; rational part of the soul;
soul (continued)
spirited/thumotic part of the soul; types of souls, 252, 276; types of souls and unsuitable candidates for rule and office, 276, 278, 279. See also flawed constitutions within souls; rule in the soul
sovereign rule. See kurios; reigning Sparta, 90nn11–12, 97n29, 191n42, 260, 278n55, 281–82, 282n61, 283n62, 304n112
spirited/thumotic part of the soul, 262, 265–66, 320, 336, 337, 346, 347
stasiōteiai (factional regimes), 23n47, 361, 380
stasis, 219, 250n3, 265, 269–72, 270n41, 359; Simonton's game-theoretic account, 296–97; and transitions between constitutions, 273, 275–77, 295–96, 311–12. See also Disunity principle
statecraft/political expertise (politikē), 71, 95, 118, 119, 122–26, 125n25, 128–33, 135, 136, 153, 234, 382, 391–92; defined, 125–26, 152–53
Statesman (Plato), 8, 9, 36–37, 52–53, 64, 81–82, 115–39, 122n18, 123, 128–30, 136, 138n56, 141, 155, 242n45, 382–83, 389–93, 396, 396n26–27, 408; Arendt and, 13n26; and caring orientation, 37, 106, 117, 119–20, 123, 131, 382, 390–92; constitutional project of, 72, 120–23, 133–39, 383, 390–92; defining mark of correct rule, 136–37, 389–97; definition of a statesman, 37, 133; definition of statecraft, 125–26, 152–53 (see also statecraft/political expertise); distinction between advisors and kings, 401; and distinction between kingship and tyranny, 47; and doctor analogy, 392–94; and flawed constitutions, 116n4, 136–39; and genuine constitutions, 390–92; and the good of the ruled (see telos and taxis of rule under this heading); Hobbes and, 130; identification of statesman and king, 47–48, 115–16, 130, 137, 139; and interpretive stances, 72–83; and Juvenal conundrum, 7–8; and office and officeholders, 53, 120–23, 133–39, 383; and political expertise, 20n41, 72, 72n78, 118, 234, 382; and political weav, 48, 120–21, 123, 130, 132–35; and relationship between rule and office, 117; rule connected to kingship, 47–48, 51; and rule of knowledge, 115, 119, 138 (see also statecraft/political expertise); and schema of rule, 124–31; Schofield and, 122n18; and service conception of rule, 117, 128, 130, 175; superordinate ruler(s) safeguarding officeholders, 15, 37, 136, 139; and telos and taxis of rule, 22, 27, 116–17, 119, 123–24, 126, 131, 133, 382, 389–90, 392, 395–97; title discussed, 71–72; use of archē and archein in, 10, 116, 117, 121, 121n14, 124, 136, 137, 139, 147n21. See also Eleatic Visitor
statesman (politikos), 37, 72, 115, 117, 119, 122n18, 124, 125, 125n25, 128–31, 136; and caring orientation, 117, 131; as cipher in Statesman, 37, 38, 64, 124, 141, 161, 166, 170; defined, 37, 72, 133; epistemic powers, 117, 124, 130, 132; and expert knowledge, 72, 133, 139 (see also statecraft/political expertise); identification with a king, 115–16, 130; as nonsubordinate/superordinate, 117, 136, 139; as political weaver, 120, 121, 130, 132–33; politikos as term possibly coined by Plato, 155; rivals to title, 117, 119, 130, 396; as ruler, 115, 124, 130, 132–33, 136–37; and service conception of rule, 117, 128, 130; and temperamental fitness for rule, 165–70
Steiner, Hillel, 356n5
Stout, Jeffrey, 24n50
Straumann, Benjamin, 63n53
subjects of rule, 200, 201, 356, 360; cooperative disposition among the ruled, 40, 41, 356, 358, 361; and democratic theory, 387–404; exploitation of the ruled, 7, 18–19, 21–22, 40, 47, 153, 154, 173, 177, 187, 200, 263, 279, 283, 348, 349, 355, 373; and freedom and friendship (see freedom; friendship); good of the ruled (see good of the ruled; telos of rule); and interpersonal freedom, 360, 370, 371 (see also freedom); lack of freedom and friendship for tyrant's
subjects, 369; language of slavery used in describing rule, 12, 40, 210–11, 355, 369–75; and obedience (see obedience of the ruled). See also citizens of Greek polities; dēmos

sullogos, 108, 111

sumpitnein, 233, 233n32

taxis, 18nn37–38

taxis (order) of rule, 6, 18, 28, 30, 37, 41, 49, 52, 116, 119, 123, 179, 240, 255–56, 263–64, 302–3, 308–9, 327, 376; age-differentiated taxis of roles in a kal-liopolis, 214, 244 (see also age cohorts of guardians in Republic); and caring orientation, 116, 157; compared to taxis of Vermeule’s common good constitutionalism, 29; and compossibility of freedom and rule, 357; as composable with willing obedience, 355; as core element of rule, 122, 141, 243; and defining mark of correct rule, 389–90; distortion of, 39, 40, 255–56, 261, 264, 286, 294, 295, 302, 317, 348–50; as flawed conception of exploitation of the ruled, 18–19, 40, 177, 200, 245, 263, 283, 349, 355–72; as the good of the ruled, 18–23, 27, 41, 49, 52, 72–73, 90, 170, 243, 244, 245, 382, 383, 390, 395; and language of slavery, 372, 374; and Laws, 90, 100; and oligarchy, 294, 295; and Republic, 27, 140–71, 214, 243, 263, 396n26; and Statesman, 22, 116, 123–24, 126, 131, 133, 382, 389–90, 392, 395–97; and timocracy, 282–83, 286; and tyranny, 316–17; and tyrants, 46
telos of rule in the soul, 254–55, 320, 330, 337, 338, 343, 350
terms of address, 179, 197–207
terms of art, 17–26, 35, 44, 193

Thebes, 56–57n36

Theophrastus, 343n35

therapeia, 119n9, 131
therapeutic technai, 141, 149–52, 391, 393–94, 396, 401, 402
Theseus, 50, 51n23

thesmophulakes, 103

Thomas, Rosalind, 309n124

Thomson, Judith, 24n49

Thracians principle, 262, 265–67, 265n30, 268n36

Thrasyllus, 71n77


Thucydides, 51, 65, 68, 189, 194, 261n24, 306n117
timē, 65n56, 172n1; timai (plural), 122, 163
timocracy, 39, 79–80, 251, 260, 273, 278–83, 283n62, 284n65, 299, 309, 339–40, 347, 348; and absence of distinction between senior guardians and
timocracy (continued)
officeholders, 281–82; and city-man
comparison, 344, 347; and city-soul
analogy, 257–58, 257n19; and com-
petitive emulation among timocrats,
285–87; constitution described, 273,
278–83; and Disunity principle, 284,
287–88; emergence from a kallipolis,
271–79, 281; faults of, 349 (see also
specific faults under this heading);
and Predominance principle, 279–81,
285–87, 339; proximate causes of con-
situtional change, 277–79, 309; and
secret accumulation of wealth, 282–84,
299, 309; selection of officeholders,
281, 286–87; and telos and taxis of
rule, 282–83, 286; as term possibly
coined by Plato, 251n5; timarchy as
alternative name, 251n5, 273, 281n59;
transition to oligarchy, 283–88, 339–40;
way of life in a timocracy, 299
timocratic man, 40, 251, 320, 322n7,
335–36, 339–40, 342–48, 345n37; char-
acteristics of, 343, 347; and city-
man comparison, 344, 347; and rule in the soul, 343, 347
titai, 59
titles of rulers and officeholders. See
terms of address
Todd, S. C., 68n69, 194, 194n49
Trivigno, Franco V., 395n25
trophē, 189, 196, 197, 197n53. See also provisions, as a kind of wages; wages
Trump, Donald, 304n110
Tuck, Richard, 16n34
turannos, 46, 46n7, 65n58. See also tyrants
tyrannical man, 40, 251, 258, 320, 322–32,
326n13, 326n16, 333; and absence of
rule in the soul, 254, 327–29, 332, 348,
353, 364, 365; and anarchy/anarchia,
327–29, 327n19, 331; and anomia/law-
lessness, 327, 329; and civic freedom
and friendship, 259, 332, 345–47; dangers of numerous tyrannical men in a city,
329–30; and Disunity principle, 330; and drone imagery, 260, 324–25; genesis of, 258–59, 322, 324–25; genesis of a political tyrant, 314–15; and lack of friendship, 259, 331, 353, 363; and lack of order in the soul, 353; as a
master or slave, 353, 363; and maxi-
mally unjust life, 251, 258–59, 331; as
not necessarily becoming a political
tyrant, 315, 322; political tyrant (see
tyants); as ruled by erōs, 327, 329,
331, 348, 354n3; and tyranny in a city,
258, 329; unhappiness of, 259, 315,
323, 331; way of life, 325–26, 329. See also tyrants
tyranny, 10, 39, 52n26, 72, 143, 143n9,
236, 251, 258–59, 315, 317, 380; absence of constitutional order in, 253,
329, 368; and anarchy/anarchia, 26,
39, 40, 47, 253, 306, 316–17, 329; and
anomia/lawlessness, 305n116, 329;
distinguished from kingship, 47, 316;
and drone imagery, 260; emergence from democracy, 301, 306, 309–16,
320; faults of, 356, 368; oppositional
relationship to anarchy prior to Plato,
305–6; Plato as opponent of, 10, 47,
72, 408; and telos and taxis of rule,
316–17, 408; and tyrannical man, 258,
259; as unstable form of rule, 317;
Xenophon and, 47
tyrians (political tyrants), 44, 46–47,
46n7–8, 47, 56–57, 175, 236, 251–52,
259n22, 260, 314–17, 323–25, 354, 360,
364–69; happiness or unhappiness of,
251, 253, 258, 259, 315, 316, 318–19,
323, 331, 362, 365, 368, 369; inability to
rule themselves, 365 (see also under
tyrranical man); as lacking actual
power/not truly ruling, 317, 325, 354,
390; lack of freedom, 354, 360, 365–69;
lack of friendship, 363, 365–69; lack of
trust in others, 366–67; and maximally
unjust life, 258–59, 331, 362, 363, 368;
origin and growth of a political tyrant,
314–15; and parable of the transported
slaveholder, 362–63, 365–67, 369;
relationship to their subjects, 317, 354,
360, 365, 366; as ruled by erōs, 325,
354n3, 364 (see also under tyrannical
man); tyrannical man not necessarily
becoming a political tyrant, 315, 322;
way of life, 323, 325
Vegetti, Mario, 224n16
Vermeule, Adrian, 28–30, 28n59

For general queries, contact webmaster@press.princeton.edu
Villacéque, Noémie, 301n104

virtue, 21, 28n59, 64, 90, 91, 91n14,
98–101, 103, 167–68, 245, 249, 250n3,
266, 278, 286–87, 348, 384–87. See also wisdom

vocabulary of rule and office, 3–4, 4n6,
8, 10, 14, 18n37, 23–27, 35, 42–43, 45,
65–71, 68n68, 121, 121n14, 210–11,
216–17, 229

wages, 14, 55, 56, 61, 89, 156, 160–64,
172–212, 173n2, 184n29, 219–20; in
Athens, 61, 175, 184n29, 189; content
of wages for guarding (foodstuffs,
housing, monetary wages, provisions,
etc.), 188–98; conundrum of wages in
a kallipolis, 172–212; and dependence
on a paymaster, 197; justifications
for, 61, 174–77, 183–88, 218, 230; and
Laws (wages not necessary), 61, 89,
183–84; and reluctant rulers, 160; and
Republic, 27, 38, 61, 160–63, 166n65,
172–212, 214, 244; and service concep-
tion of rule, 173–74, 184–85, 197, 204,
207–12, 214; and terms of address,
197–207; theoretical implications,
197–212. See also misthos; penalties
for officeholders and rulers; trophē

Waldron, Jeremy, 207, 208n67–68

Wallace, Robert, 15n31, 215n4

Walling, Ian, 24n50

Walzer, Michael, 82, 83n12, 245

wealth and property, 174, 278, 279,
282–87, 295–97, 326, 336; and eligibil-
ity for officeholding in Greek polities,
301; and the oligarchic man, 336–41;
prohibition of wealth and property

for guardians in a kallipolis, 38, 174,
177, 185–87, 191, 196–97, 218, 242n46,
244, 246, 252; property valuation and
officeholding in an oligarchy, 284, 288;
secret accumulation of, in a timocracy,
282–84, 299, 309; and selection of
officeholders, 99, 286–87; and transi-
tion from oligarchy to democracy,
294–96; and value placed on wealth in
an oligarchy, 286–87, 294–95, 300. See also money

weaving, 120–21, 123, 130, 132–35

Weber, Max, 18, 19

White, Nicholas, 253n10

White, S., 141n3

Williams, Bernard, 257n18, 264n27, 344,
346

wine, cultural ritual of diluting with
water, 307, 307n118

wisdom, 91, 98–99, 255–56, 261, 379

Wolin, Sheldon, 11n18

women, 9, 15n32, 27, 29, 43, 115n1, 216,
225, 228, 236, 246, 252, 255, 271, 285,
285n67, 339–40, 367

Xenophon, 19, 47, 51, 67–68, 72n79,
194n50, 200, 202, 304n112

Xerxes, 49, 153

Yoon, Jiseob, 23n47, 79n96

Young, Carl, 364n22

Young Socrates (interlocutor in Statesman),
137, 137n50, 389, 392, 393

Yunis, Harvey, 58n40

Zeus, 48, 50n21, 90n13, 210, 314

Zhang, Alex, 283n63