## CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix

Introduction: How Discrimination Haunts Western Democracy 1

1 Edward Augustus Freeman and the Dawn of Comparative Politics 19

2 Race Development, Political Development 40

3 Society and Polity, Difference and Inequality 65

4 Racial and Ethno-National Regimes in Liberal Polities 112

5 Conclusion: Reconfiguring Comparative Politics and Democracy 168

Postscript: From Athens to Charlottesville 207

Appendix 217

Notes 225

Bibliography 245

Index 257
Introduction

HOW DISCRIMINATION HAUNTS WESTERN DEMOCRACY

This book is principally intended for two audiences, one within the discipline of political science, and a broader audience interested in understanding the interrelationship of racism, institutions, and modern politics. One central concern is the importance of comparison as a fundamental endeavor in human deliberation. Another is the implications of comparative analysis for both scholarship and public deliberation about the capacity for people in diverse societies to convene productively and creatively in a political community. Goethe, the great German writer, once proclaimed that idiots compare, his way of contrasting in-depth assessment of a singular event to produce universal meaning with what he considered a superficial gloss on a range of disparate phenomena. Goethe’s proclamation notwithstanding, however, people across the spectrum of human intelligence necessarily engage in some form of comparison as a means to identify an object on its own and to distinguish that object from other objects.

In political science, comparative politics is the field that specializes in identifying, classifying, and distinguishing the myriad forms of political life. Many students of comparative politics trace the origins of the field to Aristotle. He, along with Plato, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Socrates, were among the first students of politics to compare and contrast forms of political community and render judgments about them. Their conclusions had normative implications along with scholarly and analytic ones. Comparisons were also judgments that produced hierarchies of value—in determinations regarding the best form (or forms) of political community and in the
distinction between political and social subjects. The ancient philosophers also had a personal stake in protecting their polity from outsiders who, if granted access to citizenship, would lessen its value for the polity’s original citizens and their descendants.

Athenian leadership recognized that democracy had to be nurtured, and it had to be protected from both exogenous and endogenous threats. foreigners, whether through invasion or peaceful settlement, could negatively impact Athenian civic culture if they grew too powerful in economic and political life. Athens fought off several invasions by outsiders, most notably the Persian Army. Within Athens itself, metics (foreigners), along with Athenian women, were restricted from full participation in the polity. After the fifth-century Greco-Persian Wars, restrictions upon citizenship acquisition were tightened for Athenian women and foreigners. Before these wars, neither foreigners nor women held the right to vote, though they could participate in formal public rituals. After the Persian Wars, autochthony became a requirement for citizenship, even though its premise—that citizens could only be male descendants of original Athenian males who literally sprang from the soil—was entirely mythical. In this sense, the citizenship regime of Athens after the Persian Wars was a gendered, ethno-national regime, with a myth of autochthony (male descendants who were, figuratively, of the soil) as the first order criterion for political membership.

Among the ancients, Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato rendered judgments about the capacity for diverse peoples to forge political communities based on their sociocultural priorities and emphases. The views of the ancients on the best form of government and polity were summoned by modern thinkers to justify the importance of culture, education, and positive political socialization in human development, but also to compare and contrast civilizations, societies, and polities and their relative capacities and potential for modern governance. David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, Marx, and most famously Thomas Hobbes compared and contrasted various human communities. Hierarchy, however, was comparison’s companion, usually lurking in the background, just a few steps or sentences behind.

Despite the restrictions imposed upon their political participation, metics and Athenian women had at least some political rights, public duties, and responsibilities. The enslaved had none. Slavery was rationalized as a necessary institution that allowed citizens to fully participate in civic life without material constraints. Slavery, according to its proponents, made Athenian democracy practicable.
The complexities of Athenian democracy, citizenship, and civic culture require far more detail and expertise than this author can provide, and in any case, are not the focus of this book. Nevertheless, important lessons can be extracted and ultimately, abstracted, from these facts of Athenian citizenship and democratic practice before and after the Greco-Persian wars; these lessons are relevant not only for the book but for a better understanding of the relationship between the practice of democracy and political inequality in the contemporary world. Despite the absence of historical, cultural, and social continuities between the demos of classical Athens and contemporary democratic polities, there are nevertheless certain political continuities. Gender, nation ethnicity, and nationality mattered in the constitution of Athenian citizenship and voting rights. Citizenship, like democracy itself, was not static, but underwent permutations and transformations in moments of crisis, whether in the city-states of the ancient world now associated with the West or in the nation-states of the contemporary world system.

Part of my contention is that autochthony, designed to naturalize and restrict membership in the Athenian polity, became a prototypical form of differentiation intended to rationalize limitations upon citizenship or formal membership in the political community. This political mythology served to naturalize citizenship, making it inaccessible to those who could not prove that they descended from Athenian soil. Additionally, since citizenship descent was patrilineal, a woman, even one descended from autochthonous parents, could not become a citizen. Thus, a law designed to exclude male foreigners from acquiring and deploying citizenship consequentially excluded women who were actually (rather than figuratively) born in Athens. In this sense, autochthonous criteria for political membership also served as a form of immigration policy that excluded the majority of non-Athenians from citizenship after 451 BC.

In sum, although the Athenian polity was constituted by its citizens, Athenian society (to the extent it could be considered a society in any contemporary sense) contained not only citizens, but foreigners, women, and slaves (noncitizens). Given the disparity between the number of polity members and the number of social subjects, Athenian elites were faced with a series of questions with political import that resonate in the contemporary world: How should democratically empowered citizens interact with members of their society who are not citizens, namely foreigners, minorities (both women and men), and in some (not all) instances, women? How
INTRODUCTION

does a democratic polity (namely, relations between government and the
governed that are premised upon democratic principles) exist within a so-
ciety that is not founded upon democratic principles, but upon hierarchies? Must its laws, norms, and rules of exclusion be deliberated upon by the
excluded, as well as those included, in the demos, for those laws to be truly
democratic? In ancient Athens as well as in modern political communities of
Western nation-states, groups of people were excluded from political partic-
ipation through law, normative reprobation and, when necessary, coercion.
The legal, juridical, and institutional empowerment of citizens has been dy-
namically related to limiting second class citizens or prohibiting noncitizens
from access to citizenship, as well as certain key economic and political
institutions. In classical Athens, no less than in contemporary nation-states
founded upon democratic principles, democratic institutions and practices
coexist with antidemocratic ones.

An inquiry into the history of politics—any politics—requires an un-
derstanding of the practices of human actors and the institutions they seek
to forge or dismantle, not just comprehension of the ideas and concepts
that inspired or revolted them. Part of this book’s mission is to represent
democracy not only as a concept and ideal, but as a practice, a particular
combination of norms, institutions, and actors. One of the key questions this
book explores is how the practice of democracy produces—and is affected
by—political inequality.

Democratic institutions and practices of classical Athens were often in
tension with tyrannical, oligarchic, and imperial tendencies within its polity.
Athenian democracy did not exist in a bubble, but in a larger geopolitical
context with internal and external threats to its existence. Thus, democracy
has not evolved in isolation, but in relation to other forms of social organi-
zation and administration that have often been fundamentally unequal, but
nonetheless part of the same social ecology. The Athenian polis relied heavily
upon slave labor for citizen subsistence and wealth. Territorial expansion
and subjugation of non-Athenian populations (what we would now refer to
as colonization), along with the threat of invasion, also influenced how de-
mocracy and, most importantly, differential citizenship regimes developed.
The most robust, long-standing democratic polities in the contemporary
world—France, Britain, and the United States—have been housed in soci-
eties that have profited from slave labor, empire, and colonialism.

A fuller appreciation of the legacy of the Athenian democratic polis
in contemporary democratic polities requires the recognition of the pol-
yarchic character of ancient Athens as well as the contemporary societies
categorized as liberal democratic polities. Common to both is how emphasis on distinctions and variations in human collectivities were rendered politically salient. A core concern of this book is how difference, figured as race, was rendered politically salient in modern politics.

As sociologists have reminded us, race, like power, is a relational concept. A so-called race is invariably defined in distinction to other presumed races. Where racial reasoning and the practice of comparison have combined in modern politics is in the rendering of judgments about the relative merits of groups of people distinguished by race, and subsequently, through the codification of categories and the attempt at regulation of populations, especially their interactions. In essence, apartheid and other forms of segregation can be boiled down to this more abstract formulation. Comparison, judgment, codification, hierarchy, and ultimately, inequality are the keywords that help characterize the process and relationship between the race construct, politics, and institutions in modernity.

In a more dynamic understanding of the relationship between democratic and nondemocratic institutions in societies with democratic polities, we can also explore how those excluded from citizenship in both ancient and modern eras sought and in some cases demanded participation in the democratic polities around them, or alternatively, sought to create polities of their own. Political and economic exclusion is often manifested in laws, norms, and coercive sanctions that delimited or outright prohibited non-citizen populations (slaves, women, serfs, and peasants among them) from participating in formal civic life. The combination of formal and informal institutions designed to limit political participation of the excluded can be conceptualized as mechanisms or institutions of political inequality.

Most contemporary scholarship on inequality has focused on economic manifestations and disparities in life expectancy, health care, education, and stress-related diseases. Known as “the social question” in the 18th century in the aftermath of the French and US revolutions, the roots of social inequality are often traced to the economic sphere. While not discounting the economic and material sources of social inequality, many aspects of social inequality have political roots. Gendered disparities are perhaps the most obvious manifestations of inequality. Neither the socially constituted character of gender roles, and certainly not nature, can explain why women, across the ages and spaces, have been subordinated in economic, social, and material relations. The ability to own property and access to wealth, education, and suffrage have their origins in law and custom that have privileged males in most societies.
Political and social inequality are often dynamically related, insofar as exclusionary and inclusionary criteria for citizenship formation and participation invariably emanate from the same source: state power. Yet one of the core lessons of this book is that political inequality is not simply an epiphenomenal feature of social and economic inequality. Instead, political inequality is often the result of deliberate decisions to exclude specific groups from participation in a polity and to deny their access to the same social and economic opportunities afforded to members of dominant groups. Whether by gender, social class, ethno-nationality, religion, or other forms of distinction, the administration and management of political inequality has varied by society and regime, and it has been based upon distinct criteria depending upon the marginalized groups in question and their demands for inclusion.

Racial, gendered, religious, and ethno-national chauvinism are among the forms of evaluative differentiation which, when embedded in political institutions, provide an interpretive means for governments to codify their preferences in law, edicts, and constitutions that then regulate people and their interactions. Moreover, these forms of differentiation, functioning as informal and formal institutions, have impacted the practice of democracy in three Western polities in particular: France, Britain, and the United States. Part of my contention in this book is that such forms of political inequality are not anomalous features of certain Western polities, but rather are the modern manifestations of the combination of democracy, difference, and inequality first invented and implemented in classical Athens.

The Race Concept, Institutions, and Politics

One of the claims in this book is that the race concept became the modern equivalent of the Athenian myth of autochthony in many Western and Western-influenced nation-states. Athenian autochthony and the race concept both emphasize a mythology of origins. In the realm of modern politics, the race concept enabled political actors to project the need for homogeneity among a citizen populace, making race an organizing principle for governments and popular movements alike.

A key distinguishing feature of the race concept’s application within the nation-state system in modernity was its portability and not, as in the case of the ancient idea of autochthony, its sedentariness. Autochthony linked a specific territory to a particular set of rights. Nations, or more precisely, nationalities, were identified with a particular territory, but also by traditions, culture, and language, all portable. By the 19th century, race became a marker
of portability as well as origins. An Anglo-Saxon could be an Anglo-Saxon whether they resided in Saxony or not. A Negro was a descendant from Africa, even though there is no Negroland in Africa (or anywhere else) and human species originated in Africa.

Where races were once treated as nations—the terms were often used interchangeably—through a combination of language, culture, territorial fixity (the land of . . .), and often associations of kinship (blood), the race concept grew detached from territory to denote populations regardless of their location in the world, with an emphasis on appearance (phenotypical and somatic traits).

For those who believed in a world organized by races and by implication, polygenesis, populations displayed their alleged “racial” characteristics wherever they appeared. They believed superior races such as the Teutonic or Aryan were predestined to rule, especially in the presence of lesser races, whether they were in Germany, England, the United States, or Africa and South America. Thus, an Italian, for example, determined through racist judgment to be of inferior stock, was doomed to either outright exclusion or circumscribed citizenship status in countries other than Italy, especially if the Italian lived among races judged to be his or her so-called racial superior.

Taken to its extreme, the belief in a world racial order articulated by the Third Reich, in its propaganda and prosecution of war domestically and internationally, constituted a threat to the very idea of a nation-state system with discrete entities composed of sovereign states, national populations, and territory. Hannah Arendt identified the threat that race-thinking posed not only for the internal composition of an individual nation-state, but of the nation-state system as a whole: “Racism deliberately cut across all national boundaries, whether defined by geographical, linguistic, traditional or any other standards, and denied national-political existence as such.”1 Arendt’s conclusion about the spectre of race in Western politics urges readers to consider the relationship between race-thinking, modernity, and politics more broadly, not as a fascist anomaly but as constituting the body politic of Western nation-states.

The emergence of fascism—and the Third Reich its most virulent manifestation—is generally considered to one of the major crises in Western politics in the 20th century and a fundamental crisis of political modernity. The brutal emphasis on racial singularity in Nazi politics and society threatened the very idea of national populations created from a diversity of peoples. If not contained, the Nazis’ ruthless quest for racial homogeneity could have had disastrous consequences for minority populations the world over.
Hannah Arendt’s broader commentary on the spectre of race and racism in Europe, however, warns against treating Nazi policy as the only case of conjoining racism to state power in Europe. Other nation-states, even Allied ones, utilized state power to formulate and implement policies designed to differentiate populations according to racial and ethno-national criteria in their own societies, and in places under their territorial dominion (colonies, protectorates, or even other nation-states). Indeed, as this book will demonstrate, many Western democratic nation-states, as well as states in Latin America and Asia, devised racial and ethno-national regimes that combined selective immigration controls, literacy, birth, and wealth requirements designed to limit the access of specific groups to political life.

Upon close examination, traces of the Athenian practice of combining *ethnos* (naturalized political membership) with democracy (a set of institutions and practices) can be found in the laws of the most prominent democratic societies. In these societies, racial and ethno-national hierarchy provided the rationalization for the institutionalization of political inequality, based on the premise that racially and ethno-nationally divergent groups could not share the same state.

There is a dearth of comparative politics research on the role of ethno-national and racial subordination in the formation of Western polities, ideas, and practices of citizenship. There are several notable exceptions to this tendency. These exceptional works notwithstanding, however, laypersons and specialists alike could be forgiven for assuming that the relationship between racial and ethno-national hierarchy and political institutions has never been central to the study of comparative politics. And yet, as I will demonstrate, the earliest developments in the creation of a comparative politics method in the modern era were devoted to marshaling evidence proving that racial and ethno-national hierarchy was central to modern political development and institutions.

A dust encrusted treasure chest of the field and discipline’s history begs to be dusted off by students of comparative politics. Its lid has barely been lifted since the last quarter of the 19th century, more than three generations removed from the field’s formal founding in the 1950s. Edward Augustus Freeman, Oxford historian and Euro-Aryan advocate, devised the first methodology for the comparative study of ancient and modern political institutions, in a series of 1873 lectures titled *Comparative Politics*.

In Freeman’s view of politics both modern and ancient, the idea of race was central to political life; to the formation of a polis, commonwealth, and institutions; and ultimately, to the conjuncture of nation and state. The
power of race lay not in its biological provenance, but in commonly held beliefs and assumptions shared by groups who join to form political communities. Freeman’s influence is evident in the development of seminars and Ph.D. programs devoted to the study of political institutions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and in the scholarship and policy recommendations of Woodrow Wilson, 28th president of the United States. For Freeman and his interlocutors, the race concept—alternating between historical and biological definitions—was central to understanding the development of political institutions and their variations. Freeman, like the Johns Hopkins University historian Herbert Baxter Adams, believed that presumed racial origin and nationality were fundamental factors in assessing group prospects for the development of a modern political community and ultimately, the modern state. Race, then, was a key variable in understanding political modernity, the capacity for self-rule, and institutional developments among the world’s populations. Racial homogeneity was considered central to political development and democracy. As comparativists, Freeman, Baxter Adams, and other members of the Teutonic or Euro-Aryan school believed that racial difference enabled students of comparative politics to identify correlations, if not draw inferences, between populations and their political development.

The first formal seminar at a US research institution devoted to what was then referred to as “historical and political science,” founded and taught by Johns Hopkins University professor Herbert Baxter Adams, combined an emphasis on the development of research methodologies for the examination of political and social institutions, with an empirical focus on the administration and management of subordinate, often servile, populations. The Teutonist explanation of differences in the capacity of distinct populations to produce democratic political communities and institutions can be understood as a midway point between biologically determinist arguments and culture-based explanations of distinctions among the political cultures of the modern world.

Up to now, there is no disciplinary or field account of these developments in the study of comparative politics on the cusp of the 19th and 20th century. Among several objectives in this book is to connect comparative politics’ preprofessional past to the official narrative of its formation and subsequent development. Common to the 19th century and mid-20th century discussions about comparative politics was a core preoccupation: how could distinct peoples with varying capacities for self-governance participate in the same polity? A cursory examination of political events in the second decade of
the 21st century will reveal to the interested observer that this question is a recurrent one, on the minds of state and nonstate actors throughout the West and other parts of the world.

Three Iterations of a Comparative Politics Discipline

This book provides the first assessment of comparative methodologies for the study of politics that encompasses the neglected period of 19th century innovation. With a broader, more historically sensitive view of comparative politics as method and field, this study has three identifiable moments or iterations of a comparative politics discipline: the late 19th century, the mid-20th century, and the cusp of the 20th and 21st centuries. As will be detailed across several chapters, comparative politics’ preprofessional past has continued relevance for the study of comparative politics. In all three eras, nationalism, ethnicity, xenophobia, migration, and the rights of minority groups figured prominently in world politics, if not so prominently on the research agendas of leading practitioners of the field.

The book’s chapters account for the three iterations of comparative politics across these epochs. The first iteration in the development of a method for the comparative study of politics was part of a broader movement among linguists and students of comparative literature, anthropology, and the natural sciences in the late 19th century, which explored the possibilities for cross-spatial and cross-temporal comparison. By the late 19th century, scholars across the social sciences and humanities began devising and deploying what were then considered more scientific approaches to the study of human phenomena across space and time. In this “prehistorical” era, students of comparative politics were not motivated by professional dictates; comparativists could not be members of a profession (political science) that did not yet exist. Research questions (however spurious) drove methods, not the other way around. Perceived crises and problems, whether in the study of language, a people, a bureaucracy, law or set of norms, prompted the development of comparative studies. In this sense, a discipline of comparative politics predated the field of comparative politics, as well as the profession of political science.

The second iteration in the history of comparative politics is the inaugural moment of formal recognition and legitimation of the field of comparative politics within the discipline of political science. Comparativists in political science appropriated concepts, methods, and scholarly literature from history, sociology, anthropology, and psychology as the basis for a seemingly
new field of concentration. The Social Science Research Council’s (SSRC) Committee on Comparative Politics was founded in 1955 at a moment when political scientists had direct experience with world war, the subsequent Cold War, and the rise of nationalism in the areas of the world that were once under Western colonial domination. Along with social scientists from other disciplines, the committee became a pivotal cross-disciplinary research nucleus known as “the politics of the developing areas.” The SSRC initiative was important not only for its legitimation of a new field, but in its material support for affiliated research initiatives and the institutionalization of core thematic interests in civic foundations and governmental agencies. Governmental agencies would prove critical in the funding of regional specialization (area studies) and language training for social scientists of the era who were interested in conducting research in the so-called developing areas. During this epoch, statecraft overlapped significantly with scholarly trends.

Political scientists like Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond recognized the need for new concepts and approaches to explain political phenomena that were unrecognizable to them in under-studied parts of the world, and the need to rid political science and comparative politics in particular of Eurocentric and Anglo-American biases. By the mid–20th century, race all but disappeared as a key theme in the study of comparative politics, despite the fact that presumed racial or ethno-national distinction was acknowledged as a key organizing principle for politics by several prominent political scientists well into the first two decades of the 20th century. Although traces of racial reasoning found their way into some cultural explanations of political behavior in both anthropology and political science, biological and essentialist understandings of race were largely absent in the conceptual and methodological tool kit of this group of social scientists. To be sure, part of the rationale for the scholarly shift in the approach to examining so-called developing areas of the world was due to an altered geo-political climate, along with a genuine shift in thinking about concepts such as race and civilization after World War II. The emergent anticolonial and nationalist movements in Asia, Africa, and parts of the Caribbean and Latin America prompted decolonization policies by the British and US governments, which ranged from peaceful, negotiated transitions to counterinsurgency and sabotage of several newly independent, sovereign governments in the so-called developing world. If Western nation-states wanted economically and politically advantageous relations with the new nation-states, they could no longer openly refer to the elites and masses of the so-called developing world as colonial minions and racial inferiors.
The third moment in the history of the field of comparative politics coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent reconfiguration of global politics. Known within political science as the Perestroika movement, with obvious reference to the opening and attempted transformation of Soviet politics and culture under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning years of the Soviet Union, historically and qualitatively minded political scientists provided a critique of the increasingly narrow and positivist approaches to the study of political phenomena. Among these critics were students of comparative politics who, having waged their own battles with positivism and behavioralism at earlier points in the field and discipline's history, joined the small but influential group of actors who sought to remind their colleagues that history, culture, language, and context (in a word, difference), remained fundamental for comprehending politics in the contemporary world.

Chapter Overview

The chapters of this book provide a chronological outline of the field of comparative politics in its three iterations. The conceptual link connecting these discrete epochs is how racial and ethno-national regimes are present—or absent—in the most significant scholarship and reviews of the field and in world politics. I have little interest in highlighting the origins of the comparative politics field in race thinking for the purpose of suggesting a distinct starting point or alternative genealogy for the study of modern comparative politics. More fruitful, in my view, is to bring the preoccupations of the three iterations in dialogical tension with one another to identify continuities and discontinuities in race-thinking among students of comparative politics.

Chapter 1 situates the genesis of a comparative politics field or discipline not in the mid–20th century, as most accounts of comparative politics do, but in the late 19th century, beginning with the writings of E.A. Freeman, Herbert Baxter Adams, and Woodrow Wilson. Freeman's pioneering efforts can be understood as the first moment in the development of a more systematic approach to the comparative study of political institutions in the social sciences and humanities.

Freeman is entirely absent, however, from the historiography of comparative politics, as well as the accounts of the history of political science as an academic profession. Despite Freeman's absence from both canonical and revisionist accounts of the subfield, however, his combination of racist ideology, cross-spatial and cross-temporal comparison, and methodological
innovation reveals a set of scientific and normative concerns that have endured in contemporary politics, if not in the field of comparative politics itself. Previously ignored primary materials, normative perspectives, and methodological approaches examined in this chapter are significant for enabling current and future students of comparative politics to take a longer view of their field as a disciplinary formation.

Chapter 2 tracks the change from the first to the second iteration of comparative politics: the replacement of concepts of race with concepts of culture, what came to be known as the “politics of the developing areas.” This moment in the history of comparative politics’ disciplinary and professional formation is far more recognizable to students of the field. The Committee on Comparative Politics at the Social Science Research Council is generally considered the foundational moment for the instantiation of a field of comparative politics at major research institutions, in government and political science departments across the United States, and in the major foundations that provided crucial financial and institutional support for the training of graduate students and the reproduction of the profession.

The horrors of World War II, decolonization, and the geo-politics of the Cold War served as the backdrop for deliberations about the development and institutionalization of new approaches to the study of political institutions. For many Western social scientists, the new nation-states and political communities of the so-called Third World bore little resemblance to the ideal nation-states of the modern world. Culture and ethnicity were the operative concepts deployed to identify potential obstacles to political modernity in Africa and Asia, particularly in the former Western colonies that had achieved nominal independence.

The race concept and the phenomena of racial hierarchies were casualties of the positivist turn in the study of comparative politics, beginning with the politics of the developing areas movement. In anthropology and sociology, the idea of race rooted in some biological, essential form had been largely debunked by the early 20th century, even if examples of essentialist reason could be found in scholarship from both disciplines. By the 1950s, the culture concept supplanted the race concept as a key intervening variable (along with capitalism, industrialization, and modernization) for the development of non-Western nations.

The culture concept, however, as utilized by students of political development and comparative politics, was often deployed in ways similar to how the race concept was used in earlier iterations of comparative politics. While the culture concept supplanted the race concept, the associations of
a people’s “ways of life” with institutional variation harbored traces of E.A. Freeman’s and other racialists’ and nationalists’ ultimately faulty correlations between people and political institutions.

Chapter 3 examines the idea of difference as a form of political distinction in democratic polities, ranging from classical Athens to the contemporary period. Students of comparative politics from the late 19th century to the present have often invoked the Greek polis as the first site or prototype for modern politics, as well as the first opportunity for speculation and support of democracy (*demos*) as the best, or least unequal, form of political practice. In this sense, Edward Augustus Freeman shares with Edward Vogelin, Charles Merriam, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, David Laitin, and Robert Bates the invocation of Aristotle as inspiration and justification for a more positivist approach to the study of comparative politics and for a normative preference for democracy out of a range of possible forms of political community. Often neglected in these invocations, however, is the first-order relationship between democracy and *political* inequality, and how political inequality is both related to and distinct from social or material inequality.

Idealizations of the Greek polis as the cradle of democracy within political science and philosophy often obscure how central slaves were to the practice of freedom, and how the omission of several categories of people from citizenship and the polis required exclusionary regimes. The first documented instance of democracy was also an *ethnos*, with mechanisms and institutions designed to restrict, not universalize, political participation. While most students of contemporary and ancient democratic experiments have focused on an *ethos* of democracy, the concern here is to explore the *ethnos* of ancient and contemporary democracies, the manner in which the practice of a democratic politics, in most instances, has combined inclusionary and exclusionary regimes and value judgments regarding the prospects of citizenship for differentiated populations. Common to the city-states of the ancient and medieval worlds and nation-states of modernity was the governmental necessity of providing answers to the following questions: by what criteria do we choose citizens, and by what criteria shall we determine who shall not, or cannot, become a citizen?

Surprisingly little scholarship exists within comparative politics on the impact of slave regimes within nominally democratic societies and their political institutions. The institution of slavery influenced the institution of citizenship in classical Athens, particularly when it became clear that citizenship law would have to be changed to protect Athenian citizens who were faced with the prospect of enslavement if they could not pay their debts.
Thus, an institution founded upon and maintained by coercion influenced the development of an institution founded upon deliberation and citizen participation.

Comparative politics, on the whole, has largely invoked commentary by ancient philosophers, historians, and playwrights—intellectual commentary about Athenian democracy among classical contemporaries rather than examinations of Athenian political institutions—to render cross-temporal judgments about how democracies evolve and why they matter. This chapter draws upon scholarship in political theory, American politics, comparative history, and comparative politics to further probe the nexus of slavery and democracy.

Moving from classical Athens, chapter 3 situates racial hierarchy in a line of politically salient distinctions institutionalized by Western nation-states to distinguish societal from political membership. Racial hierarchy, from the birth of the nation-state system to its present-day composition, has influenced state formation and expansion, immigration and citizenship law, interstate relations, and the conquest and withdrawal of government intervention into national and colonial societies. Leaders of national independence movements in Haiti, Gran Colombia, Brazil, and the United States all struggled with the question of slavery and the status of slaves in new republics, but also with the status of poor and nonelite whites and creoles who stood to lose the most if citizenship was not based on racial and ethno-national hierarchy. Race or color, along with gender, literacy, and property ownership, informed the criteria of citizenship in all the new republics.

With the historical and critical realignment of the comparative politics field and its range of methods in which racial and ethno-national hierarchy are fundamental factors for the study of democracy and political development, chapter 4 provides a reinterpretation of Britain, France, and the United States as polyarchies with racial and ethno-national regimes. In these and other societies with democratic politics, racial and ethno-national regimes have been responsible for the maintenance of population differentiation that enables governments and citizens to distinguish among citizens, or between citizens and noncitizens. While racial and ethno-national regimes in US political history have been identified and analyzed in the scholarship of Ira Katznelson, Desmond King, Matthew Holden, and others, rarely have these regimes been identified and analyzed within comparative politics as features of nominally democratic polities more broadly.

Much of the analysis in this chapter is a revisionist account of existing scholarship in political science, history, sociology, and anthropology, to
provide further evidence of how the three countries have incorporated ethno-national and racial regimes within democratic polities. These are more contemporary examples of ethnos-based democratic polities, as in the case of ancient Athens after the Persian Wars, that have rationalized the relationship between democracy and political inequality.

Racial and ethno-national regimes did not first emerge as fully articulated, coherent, and coordinated policies. Rather, they emerged in response to the actual or anticipated encounters between dominant and minority populations (whether through marriage or sex, commerce or conflict, or sport) that prompted the creation of laws and policies to administer the relationship between citizens and noncitizens. Fears and anxieties about the presence of minoritized and racialized populations with access to both society and polity led to the earliest forms of institutional discrimination.

Immigration and resettlement of former colonial populations in the case of France and Britain, and the agitation for rights among marginalized populations in the United States resulted in many governmental crises in the post–World War II period and into the first decades of the 21st century. Each national government utilized administrative tactics and strategies to manage and in some cases to repress populations deemed threats to national security: US African Americans, particularly those engaged in civil rights and left politics; Afro-Caribbean and other black populations in Britain; and Arab populations in France during the era of anticolonial struggle. In each society, domestic unrest—youth movements, feminism, war protests, labor conflicts, civil rights struggles for nonwhite minorities—led to the reformulation of domestic and foreign policy to attend to immigration flows and to surveil protest groups. Strategies and techniques of population management, counterintelligence, and repression first deployed upon noncitizens in colonial and imperial spheres were often adapted for use in the metropole. This aspect of political management and rule further demonstrates the entanglements of democratic and antidemocratic modes of political authority, and how population categorization and classification within racial and ethno-national regimes blurs the boundaries between domestic and foreign populations, and between citizenship rights and noncitizen restrictions.

The concluding chapter, chapter 5, reviews the spectre of race in comparative politics across the three disciplinary moments outlined in this introduction and then considers their implications for how students of politics undertake comparative political analysis in the contemporary world. Moment one is the Euro-Aryan perspective on political institutions; moment two is the “politics of the developing areas” movement of the 1950s to rid
Western political science from the parochialism of its concepts and methods of inquiry. The Perestroika movement within political science is the third moment, with divergent implications for the field of comparative politics and the discipline of political science remaining unclear. After reviewing these distinct yet related moments, the chapter will elaborate upon the implications of a difference-centered approach to the study of comparative politics for contemporary students of the field and in the contemporary world.

This final chapter engages most fully with the implications of this book for an expanded research agenda within the field of comparative politics, as well as for contemporary politics. A core argument is that the contemporary iteration of comparative politics as a field within political science is also the most neglectful of the legacies of colonialism, racism, and imperialism within Western nation-states, and their combined implications for how students of comparative politics might examine racial and ethno-national regimes. Intraspatial comparison, especially in plural societies, is one of the most promising research streams for further examination of how racial and ethno-national regimes function in modern democratic polities.

In addition to a methodological emphasis on induction, interpretation, concept tracing, history, and context, this study also has implications for how students of politics understand difference as a factor or variable at the juncture of racial hierarchy and formal and informal institutions. A research topic common among 19th and 20th century students of comparative politics was pluralism in both people and politics: was it possible for distinct peoples with varying capacities for self-governance to participate peaceably in the same polity? This question has been posed by a diverse array of political actors and scholars across the ideological spectrum, including Edward Augustus Freeman, Woodrow Wilson, and Samuel Huntington, but also W.E.B. Du Bois, Indira Gandhi, and Ho Chi Minh. For Freeman and Wilson, and to a lesser extent Huntington at the end of his career, democracy and diverse populations do not mix. By contrast, the great challenge and promise of more radical and liberal visions of the nexus of cultural pluralism and democracy is to create societies, polities, and norms that allow all members of a given society to participate equally as members of the polity, to strip away barriers imposed by distinctions of gender, social class, religion, ethnicity, origin, and presumed racial distinction. Both Western and non-Western societies continue to struggle with the conflict between relatively recent egalitarian ideals and inegalitarian social and political orders designed by prior generations of government and leadership to maintain dominance of a particular ethno-national group, religion, or presumed race.
The most durable and enduring democratic polities have nurtured an ethnos within them, often at the expense of minoritized and racialized groups. The United States, France, and Britain—but also contemporary Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Scandinavian nations, Ghana, South Africa, Indonesia, and many other countries classified as democratic—have exhibited this tendency. The larger number of studies of these countries and the likelihood of particular groups or subgroups attaining the most preferable positions in the economy, polity, and society attest to this bias in the most democratic and societies in the contemporary world. How to make societies less ethnocentric, and more ethos-centric, is one of the great challenges of balancing cultural difference and democracy in contemporary nation-states.
INDEX

Adams, Herbert Baxter, 9, 12, 32, 33, 34
Africa, 7, 13, 19, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 60, 62, 76, 77, 85, 88, 91, 93, 95, 127, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 137, 164, 175, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 190, 192, 194, 197, 198, 199, 201, 220, 228n13, 228n14, 228n15, 229n24, 235n15; African-descended populations, 7, 79, 86, 87, 98, 136, 144, 161, 163, 164; African independence, 11, 48, 111, 121, 127, 151, 152, 153, 155, 201, 228n15, 229n24; African immigrants, 124, 135, 136, 153, 160, 161; African slaves, (see Slaves); African politics, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 58, 59, 174, 199, 200, 228n13, 228n15; Algeria, 50, 84, 117, 121, 130, 143, 146, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 167, 171, 194, 201, 202, 203; African Studies, 180; colonies (see Colonialism); Congo, 151, 167, 195, 44; Ghana, 18, 28, 48, 167, 170, 194; Kenya, 46, 50, 51, 121, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 166, 167, 194, 236n24; nation-states of, 62; North Africa, 121, 146, 153, 154, 155, 165, (see also Maghreb); Pan-Africanism, 43; Rhodesia, 117, 127, 132; Scramble for, 19, 228n14; South Africa, 18, 92, 109, 121, 133, 167, 170, 195, 196, 207; Sub-Saharan, 124, 133, 154, 155, 158, 163, 185; West Africa, 125, 197, 200
African Americans, 14, 98, 101, 103, 110, 114, 144, 151, 160, 184, 186, 188
Akan, 49; Golden Stool, 48
Algeria (see Africa)
Arendt, Hannah, 7, 8, 75, 76, 77, 81, 109, 187, 192
Aretxaga, Begoña, 204, 205, 206; “Madden-ing States,” 204
Athens, 2, 3, 6, 30, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 80, 102, 106, 208, 211, 212; ancient, 4, 14, 23, 28, 73, 77, 80, 101, 109, 110; classical, 3, 4, 6, 15, 16, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 104, 106, 169, 187, 193, 207, 208, 210, 211
Athenian democracy, 2, 3, 4, 16, 68, 69, 73, 104, 112
Balandier, Georges, 53, 227n13, 229n24; Political Anthropology, 53 (see also Anthropology)
Baldwin, James, 71
Barkey, Karen, 147,
Bennett, Huw, 127, 130, 235n9 and 18
Boix, Carles, 193, 194, 195
Bolivar, Simon, 79, 92, 93
British Commonwealth, 117, 128, 129, 131, 133, 162, 202, 236n24, (see also, Britain)
Capitalism, 13, 75, 76, 195, 196, 234n76; democratic capitalism, 195; growth of, 195; industrial capitalism, 197; print, 78; rise of, 75

Caribbean, The, 11, 46, 51, 55, 60, 62, 82, 85, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 911, 129, 134, 135, 136, 175, 176, 182, 183nA, 184, 194, 217, 218, 219, 235n15; Afro-Caribbean, 15, 114, 141, 192; colonies in (see also Colonialism); francophone, 83, 144, 150; Guadeloupe, 83, 146; Haiti (see also Haiti); immigration from, 124, 135, 136, 161; Jamaica, 92, 117, 130, 162, 218, 223, 226; Martinique, 83, 146; Saint-Domingue, 83, 84, 85, 89, 94, 95, 96, 117, 143, 214; Trinidad, 162; Virgin Islands, 162

Chebel, Ariane d’ Appollonia, 154

Citizenship, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 76, 85, 86, 93, 97, 98, 104, 106, 107, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 141, 146, 151, 157, 160, 161, 164, 165, 167, 174, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 219, 220, 221, 222; active, 85, 86, 93; French, 151, 157; jus sanguinis, 72, 73; jus soli, 144, 151, 157; law(s), 71, 73, 82, 107, 154, 159; regime(s), 66, 74, 104, 106, 107, 118, 159, 186, 194, 208; rights, 15, 66, 67, 104; status, 69

Civil Rights, 14, 15, 83, 102, 111, 114, 121, 124, 167, 171, 205; movement(s), 77, 102, 122, 171, 172, 194, 203, 211; workers, 202

Code Noir, 148, 149, 150

Coded Language, 138, 139, 147

Colonialism, 69, 117, 125, 146; Colonized, 19, 121, 129, 130, 143, 171; Colonizer(s), 19, 129, 143, 171, 200 (see also, Colonialism, Colony(-ies))

Color, 16, 73, 82, 86, 89, 91, 100, 107, 179, 180; color blindness, 185, 237n40; color-racial continuum, 92; (see also Race)

Comparative politics, 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 71, 72, 100, 101, 102, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 129, 147, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 180, 181, 186, 188, 189, 194, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206; Committee on, 118; Comparative political science, 1, 8, 10, 12, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 38, 39, 41, 54, 57, 59, 60, 93, 103, 106, 108, 109, 110, 119, 154, 156, 197, 203, 228n13; 229n22; comparativist(s), 9, 10, 22, 23, 44, 46, 60, 98, 119, 126, 156, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 188, 189, 203, 206, 228n13; (see also Methods, Political Science)

Condorcet, 52, 83

Congo, The, (see also Africa)

Creole, 16, 77, 78, 81, 92, 93, 180; elites, 92, 93, 108; nationalists, 79, 139; pioneers, 77, 78; white, 92

Culture, 2, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 22, 24, 26, 39, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 77, 136, 142, 143, 172, 190, 192, 193, 210; British, 136, 139; civic culture, 2, 3, 57; concept, 14, 38, 57, 189; French, 143; difference culture, 17; human culture, 27; political culture, 35, 38, 48, 57, 58, 60, 118, 128, 137, 173, 175, 189; public culture, 73
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>INDEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Gender, 2, 3, 5, 6, 16, 17, 31, 63, 66, 73, 74, 77, 85, 91, 105, 106, 112, 146, 149, 168, 169, 188; bias, 103; dynamics, 130; equality, 111; racism, 130; relations, 179; roles, 5; transgender rights, 107; men, 3, 27, 30, 74, 85, 97, 107, 130, 142, 143, 149, 211; women, 2, 3, 5, 31, 47, 67, 70, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 85, 90, 92, 103, 111, 130, 143, 149, 164, 179, 193, 194, 205, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Ghana, (see Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Glissant, Édouard, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Global North, 63, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Global South, 59, 111, 194, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Gramsci, Antonio, 179, 213, 233n75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Gran Colombia, 16, 79, 92, 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Greco-Persian Wars, 2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Guyana, 44, 50, 88, 89, 90, 110, 117, 126, 127, 129, 166, 167, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Haiti, 16, 79, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 92, 94, 95, 108, 110, 143, 162, 167, 195, 197, 204, 217, 218, 221, 223, 229n24; Boyer, 86, 88; constitution, 86, 87; Dessalines, 88; Duvalier, 204; Hispaniola, 95; King Christophe, 88; Pétion, Alexandre, 88, 92; republic of, 87, 88; Revolution, 31, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 92, 94, 95, 110, 111, 150, 171, 194, 23In22; state, 86, 88; Toussaint Louverture, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Hall, Peter, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Hall, Stuart, 65, 139, 141, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Herodotus, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Hobbes, Thomas, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Huntington, Samuel, 17, 189, 190, 191, 192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Imagined community, 86, (see also, Anderson, Benedict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Imperialism, 17, 39, 51, 64, 125, 169, 173, 174, 175; British, 39, 128, 129, 235n5, 236n24; European, 47; French, 155; New Imperialism, 228n14; Western, 44, 46, 60, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Indochina, 44, 143; the French in, 50, 121, 125, 235n9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Jews, 147, 148, 150, 151, 178, 192, 201, 210, 211, 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Johns Hopkins University, 9, 20, 25, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Katznelson, Ira, 14, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Kenyatta, Jomo, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Kikuyu, 121, 128, 130, 235n18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Laitin, David, 15, 191, 192, 193, 228n13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Latin America, 8, 11, 31, 46, 47, 51, 55, 58, 59, 60, 62, 78, 82, 92, 93, 133, 139, 146, 177, 178, 179, 180, 194, 209, 217, 218, 219, 229n24, 234n76; Afro-descendants in, 82; decolonization in, 11, 194; democracy in, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181; immigration from, 97; independence (movements) in, 31, 92, 111; Latino(s), 184, 191, 192, 211, 212; nation-states in, 8, 55, 178, 210; poli-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ties (politics) in, 47, 51, 170, 178, 180, 201; racial regimes in, 82; revolutions in, 77
Lawrence, Stephen, 141, 142
League of Nations, 33, 35, 133 (see also, United Nations)
Lenin, Vladimir, 43, 44
Liberalism, 34, 88, 93, 138; conservative, 139, 234n76
Longstreth, Frank, 188
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 52
Maghreb, 46; Maghrebi(s), 115, 124, 144, 154, 155, 157, 184, 185, 186
Mahoney, James, 166, 188
Marx, Karl, 2, 62, 75; Marxism, 43, 44, 45, 55, 158, 159
Mau Mau, 46, 121, 127, 128, 171, 235n9, 235n18; revolt, 121, 127, 171, 235n9
Methods, 10, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 40, 41, 45, 52, 55, 61, 144, 171, 173, 174, 175; comparative, 21, 25, 61, 115; research, 40, 55, 57, 62, 174, 175
Migrated Archives Controversy, 90, 126, 128, 131, 166, 201, 236n24
Migration, 10, 37, 49, 96, 98, 131, 146, 147, 161, 165, 207, 213; Great Migration, 124; mass migration, 66; (see also Immigration)
Mill, John Stuart, 2, 198
miscegenation, 78, 149, 211, 213, (see also, Mulatto)
Montesquieu, 35, 52
Mulatto(-es), 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 91, 96, 149, 161, 214
Multiculturalism, 37, 145, 147, 172, 189, 191, 213 (see also Difference)
National Front, 138, 142
Nationalism, 10, 11, 14, 29, 34, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 78, 80, 82, 92, 108, 128, 151, 152, 172, 192, 202, 207, 210, 212, 214, 232n57; Algerian nationalists, 156 (see also, Afrika: Algeria); anticolonial nationalism, 81, 205; creole nationalism(s), 79, 139; Haitian, 79, 87; Nationalist movement(s)/ revolution(s), 11, 42, 43, 53, 77, 78, 79, 111, 129, 171, 205; white nationalism, 210, 211, 212
Naturalization, 115, 151, 154, 161; law(s), 161, 165; policy(-ies), 154, 164, 174; (see also Citizenship)
O’Donnell, Guillermo, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 193
Oligarchy, 4, 70, 109, 110, 177; oligarchic regimes, 110
Pacification, 49, 54, 151, 152
Passenger Cases, 97
Perestroika, 172; movement, 12, 17, 172
Plato, 1, 2
Political science, 1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 23, 25, 36, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 54, 62, 65, 72, 118, 168, 172, 173, 175, 177, 180, 188, 189, 227n13 (see also, Comparative Politics)
Polity, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 36, 37, 38, 40, 49, 60, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109, 114, 116, 119, 120, 122, 125, 140, 160, 163, 165, 166, 170, 180, 187, 190, 191, 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 232n57, 236n24; apolitism, 86, 109; democratic, 4, 31, 40, 69, 71, 74, 104, 106, 109, 129; membership, 3, 17, 73, 81, 86, 109, 110, 113, 114, 209, 210, 213; participation in, 2, 6, 30, 31, 101, 106; race and, 25, 31, 36, 37, 60, 169; society and, 14, 74, 38 81, 99, 103, 105, 115, 120, 147, 158, 164, 165, 179, 190, 206, 18; US, 31, 164
Polyarchy, 4, 72, 100, 101, 102, 103, 114, 165, 177, 179, 180, 187; polyarchy-democracy, 103, 179; polyarchic regimes, 101, 103
Polygenesis, 7, 51
Positivism, 12, 13, 21, 38, 45, 61, 172, 173, 195
Postcolonialism, 44, 128, 172, 199, 205
Race(s), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 25, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50, 57, 58, 60, 63, 65, 67, 73, 77, 89, 91, 98, 100, 107, 108, 113, 116, 118, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 139, 156, 159, 163, 170, 182, 183, 189, 192, 209, 210; Race Action Group, 138; Aryan, 27, 29, 34, 37, 133; Race-based immigration policy, 161 (see also, Immigration: policy(-ies), law[es]); concept, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 30, 38, 40, 41, 51, 57, 58, 66, 113, 189, 190; idea(s) of, 8, 13, 25, 27, 36, 40, 41, 42, 100; mixed, 149 (see also Mulatto); prejudice, 42; Race relations, 98, 137, 164, 196; Race Relations Act(s), 137, 164; Race Relations Boards, 136; racialism, 24, 31, 38, 58, 59; riots, 136; as social construct, 27, 30, 38; spectre(s) of, 7, 8, 16, 26, 102, 207; thinking, 7, 12, 30; war(s), 44, 55, 83, 130, 133, 229n24; (see also, [Anglo-]Saxon)

Wilson, Woodrow, 9, 12, 17, 32, 44, 58, 154, 211
Winters, Jeffrey, 109, 110
Xenophobia, 10, 43, 148, 157, 185, 207

Vichy Regime, 143, 151, 154
Zimbabwe (see Africa: Rhodesia)