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Sunni Islam, Roman Catholicism, and the Modern State

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS have passed since the opening frenzy of Islamist attacks targeting the symbols and civilians of Western democracies, and it has been nearly sixty years since the Second Vatican Council aligned Church doctrine with modern society in those same countries. The riveting scenes that unfolded around the Mediterranean Sea in the twenty-first century might therefore appear predestined, or at least unsurprising. In Syria, a rogue Islamic Caliph exhorted Muslims to revolt against nation-states and the international order. He executed infidels in his desert redoubt and dispatched masked assassins to silence apostates across the globe in editorial offices and nightclubs, from Paris to Istanbul.[1] Midway across the Mediterranean, meanwhile, the Roman Catholic pope fielded invitations to address the European Union Parliament and United States Congress, prayed alongside a rabbi and an imam in the Vatican gardens, and urged secular legislators to "keep democracy alive" (see figure 1.1).[2]

This striking divergence in religious attitudes toward the state is unexpected. Just 150 years ago, the interested observer would have predicted opposite trajectories for Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam. In the 1860s, Pope Pius IX barricaded himself behind Vatican walls, angrily asserting personal infallibility and his prerogative to depose princes and potentates. His encyclicals condemned religious pluralism, banned books, and forbade Catholics from voting in democratic elections. Pius enlisted 18,000 irregular fighters from Europe and North America to fend off "the accursed infidels in red shirts"—the Italian patriots unifying the country—leading several countries to bar the international travel of young men seeking martyrdom in defense of the Holy Father's earthly rule.

While the pope "recoiled from the appeal of the times," the *New York Times* reported in 1859, the Ottoman caliph in Istanbul "appears as the champion and nearly as the martyr of Progress."[3] The figurehead of Sunni Islam exhibited

FIGURE 1.1 Twenty-First Century: Pope Francis at the European Parliament (2014); Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in Mosul (2014)

FIGURE 1.1 (*continued*)

worldliness and toleration while fulfilling the guardianship of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina (see figure 1.2). He inaugurated legislative sessions, toured European capitals, and expanded religious tolerance across a multiconfessional empire.[4] Sultan Abdülmecid (1823–1861) sent the American republic a tribute of friendship etched in marble for inclusion in the Washington Monument, and he received Persian dignitaries for shared Sunni-Shi'a prayer in the Hagia Sofia Mosque.[5] As caliph, Abdülmecid and his six successors projected a layer of religious uniformity over the Sunni Muslim world, embodying the ideal of political independence, self-determination, and glory to God at a time when more than 80 percent of Muslims worldwide lived under European rule in the British, Dutch, French, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires.

The last half-dozen sultan-caliphs sat atop a growing international network of clerics, seminaries, and religious schools, providing spiritual leadership and hundreds of daily fatwas from Istanbul to most of the world's Sunni Muslims—from Sarajevo, Cairo, Damascus, and Tunis to Java and Hyderabad. But Muslims under siege by European empires had no illusions that the Islamic cavalry was on its way. The Ottomans compensated for political loss with spiritual gains, transforming a regional sultanate into a global caliphate. Well into the twentieth century, by contrast, many Roman Catholics, holding out hope that



FIGURE 1.2 Nineteenth Century: Sultan Abdülmecid with British Royals; Pope Pius IX at Vatican Council I

the Prince of Rome would be restored to his rightful place in temporal power, defied democratization and secular efforts to build up new nation-states.

By the twenty-first century, however, the international Catholic and Muslim religious institutions had abandoned their earlier approaches to executive power and switched roles. The Roman Catholic Church abruptly relinquished its 1,000-year claim to political rule and focused instead on advocacy, global spiritual influence, and its evangelizing mission. Catholic positions on social and political issues became increasingly progressive while the worldview of Islamic jurists regressed in the direction of Rome's antimodern *Syllabus of Errors* (1864).[6] The controversial and inconsistent acceptance by Islamic authorities of the modern nation-state—and thus their renunciation of political office-holding—opened up an enduring fracture in Muslim communities worldwide. The epicenter of the fragmentation is the Mediterranean core of the old Ottoman Empire, rippling outwards from Turkey, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. The unresolved political-religious divide is at the heart of today's "Islamic Question."[7]

This book makes two arguments to decipher religious politics in countries with significant Catholic and Muslim populations. First, today's theological disunity within Sunni Islam can be traced to Europeans' decisions to undermine the caliphate in lands they briefly ruled across the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. That set the conditions for two fateful events: Turkish nationalists' abolition of the caliphate and the Saudi Wahhabi takeover of Mecca and Medina, Islam's two holiest cities. Ironically, the British, Dutch, French, and Russian empires, while occupying powers over two centuries, did everything short of kidnapping or assassinating the caliph to ensure this outcome instead of the alternative—the caliphate's survival as a spiritual figurehead. As a result, it is bearers of Islamic extremism who travel the Pan-Islamic path furrowed by Ottoman religious diplomacy.

The second argument concerns the contrast between Rome's and Istanbul's respective experiences with turn-of-the-century European governments. While European nations strong-armed, expropriated, violated, and humiliated the Catholic hierarchy, they never disbanded it. When Italian nationalists invaded the Papal States and made Rome their new political capital, the Red Shirts halted at the Vatican's bronze gates. European powers in the early 1900s considered relocating the pope abroad but ultimately spared the Roman Catholic Church the destabilizing experience of having either no pope—an empty see (*sede vacante*)—or an illegitimate one. Within national borders, the Church came under the administrative control of European states, which usurped clerical appointments and religious education. But the Vatican had the time and space to build up organizational resources and compete for religious authority. The defeats and shocks of modernity guided Church actors

and activities away from the unrealistic goal of political office-holding and toward advocacy, missionary work, and ritual uniformity.

Two sets of related consequences are crucial to the state-religion divide today. First, the Vatican returned from exile a changed organization. The diplomatic isolation of the Church's desert-crossing—also known as the "Roman Question"—lasted nearly seventy years (1861–1929) before the Lateran Accords with Italy resurrected independent statehood for the Vatican. It entered the new world order as a sovereign state, with its global community united under pontifical guidance—albeit on a strictly symbolic basis. The pope has hundreds of millions of followers and admirers, but he governs over fewer than 1,000 citizens. Resolving the Roman Question granted the Church a spiritual afterlife in the nation-state era. Governments along the northern and western shores of the Mediterranean restored organizational independence to Catholic officialdom on their soil. In one country after another, the Church won back autonomy over its internal affairs—from clerical training to bishop nominations—even in places that had banned the hierarchy for centuries. The soft restoration of Roman Catholicism reverted control over religious matters from state oversight to independently appointed community leaders, despite their foreign ties to the Vatican. A city-state under Roman Catholic rule was a face-saving solution that provided a model Catholic polity where God's shadow on earth could rule in sovereignty. This outcome, at once triumphant and circumscribed, mitigated the kind of politicization of religion that took root in the Muslim world.

No such bridge to the past was projected on the Mediterranean's southern and eastern banks. Since the Turkish republic exiled the last caliph and abolished the institution in 1924, the question of which Muslim ruler would receive the pledge of loyalty (*bai'a*) and the *umma*'s daily benediction has remained wide open. The other consequence is that the leadership once exercised by Istanbul—in the Balkans, down the Arabian Peninsula, and across North Africa—is now siloed within national Islamic affairs ministries. More than half of the world's Muslims reside in countries where Islam is partly or fully established, as is the case for around half of the fifty or so Muslim-majority nation-states globally. But it is true for virtually all who live in former Ottoman territories across North Africa and the Middle East, where religion has become a third rail of national politics. Each of these ministries' religious legitimacy is actively contested by nongovernmental movements, from the elections-oriented Muslim Brotherhood as well as from violent rivals like al Qaeda and and the Islamic State.

The caliph's empty seat set off a century-long supernova of pretenders and Islamists spanning the Islamic Crescent, intensifying in the decades leading up to the abolition's centenary (2024). The popularity of Islamist parties

whose leaders question the state's basic legitimacy attests to the ongoing politicization of religion in North Africa and Turkey. Yet even when the circle of eligible candidates and officeholders was expanded to include Islamists in Turkey (2002), Tunisia (2011), and Egypt (2011), the state did not revert autonomy to traditional religious authorities. Despite minimal gestures toward soft restoration—such as delegating civil powers of marriage to clerics or allowing the local election of state *muftis*—none has seriously considered spinning off religious affairs to nonstate actors. Instead, it is governments that license and train imams, oversee mosques, and remain the arbiters of acceptable religious expression.

The tension between nonstate transnational Islamic actors and official Nation-State Islam feeds political instability around the globe. The Islamist dissidents, for whom Islam stands above all (including the nation), resemble the fervent romantics of interwar Europe. For Islamists, the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne (1920–1923) formalized the evisceration of the last Muslim empire. As with the Treaty of Versailles for German nationalists, a century-long narrative has built up that internal foes in alliance with external enemies have delivered the proverbial stab in the back. In a similar way to the idealized vision of German empire superseding all other subnational political units ("Deutschland über alles"), the missing ingredient that could rescue political systems for Islam was a greater God ("Allahu Akbar").

The existential challenge to regimes in the Muslim-majority world has been mirrored in the disrupted religious lives of millions of immigrant-origin communities residing across the sea in western Europe. The missing caliphate trapped Muslim communities in a purgatory populated by colorful transnational pretenders like the Egyptian doctor Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Yemeni sheikh Osama bin Laden, and the Iraqi theologian Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, on the one hand, and the state-appointed *ulema* and national ministers of Islamic affairs in Muslim-majority nation-states, on the other. Absent the rudder of a robust sense of affiliation, some in the diaspora drifted away from the distant winds of their ancestral religious references—and toward the gales of dissident and politicized Islam, which emanated, ironically, from the outer frontiers of the former European empires. Afghanistan and Somalia, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, were staked out as "authentic" Islamic enclaves in defiance of the rule of law and the international state system.

Essential Differences?

After a long and winding road, international Catholic and Muslim religious institutions effectively traded political positions vis-à-vis the state. How have these once omnipotent religions contended with displacement by the state in

their customary realms of prestige and power? Even if there is no precise formula for the transition of religious authorities to the rule of law, it is urgent to identify the factors that promote the mutual acceptance of religious communities and the modern state. How should the evolution of religious authorities' attitudes toward the modern state be understood? How should those attitudes be placed in the context of today's configuration of state-Islam relations? Under which conditions do the less zealous win out? What fosters the paradoxical result wherein religious leaders endure state subjugation yet retain their dignity?

Many fail to see the puzzle. They point to the underlying unity of faith and politics in Islam (religion and state, *din wa dawla*), on the one hand, while insisting that Christianity was always destined to comply with contemporary norms separating church and state. For Sunni Muslims to catch up with Saint Augustine's vision of two cities—one earthly and the other heavenly—the argument goes, contemporary governments would need to start by giving up their current religious monopoly. Much of the scholarship on Islam and politics today either implicitly or explicitly argues that Islam needs to undergo a Protestant Reformation style of political theology or asserts that such a development is intrinsically impossible. Yet the initial shift of fourth-century Christians from preaching to governing was also unexpected. The maxim to "render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's" pertained only for as long as Christian believers were in the minority. "Once Caesar is Christian," Harvard divinity scholar Shai Cohen writes, "things lined up differently."[8] A closer look at history in this book reveals a host of contingencies for why the papacy survived intact into the twenty-first century while the caliphate succumbed. Moreover, Protestant and Catholic churches and their associated political regimes resisted religious pluralism and liberalism for centuries yet still ended up as proponents of democracy.

This is not a study of essential differences or of historical destiny. The key ingredients are to be found in neither the scripture nor the stars. There are so many strains of religious interpretation and historical cases from which to choose that defining state-religion *compatibility* can be selective and ad hoc. The direct comparison of Sunni Islam and Roman Catholicism—notwithstanding geographic divergences and differences in doctrine and prayer—can be justified by shared traits like creeds, codes of conduct, and notions of a global confessional community.[9] Both faiths have proselytized across many cultures, and at different historical moments both have allowed for degrees of separation between divine and secular rule. In theory, Western Christendom was a monolithic spiritual realm governed by the pope, whose authority transcended all boundaries. In practice, national Catholic churches reflected the political map of Europe in the nation-state era, and secular rulers

required their clergy to be loyal subjects. In the words of one scholar, Catholicism rested upon "a reasoned legal framework that links God and humankind" with ideas and norms that implicated the state, political systems, and public policy.[10] Catholicism, etymologically traceable to mean "all-concerning," was unlikely to embrace religious pluralism and democracy. The Roman Catholic Church's renunciation of political office-holding and its embrace of democracy seemed remote as recently as the 1950s.

Then the unimaginable started happening. The Church underwent a series of modernizations at the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). To the surprise of observers like Samuel Huntington, a towering scholar of twentieth-century state-society dynamics, the pope became a leading global human rights actor and an engine of democratization. "Cultures evolve, and historically are dynamic, not passive," Huntington concluded. To argue otherwise, he said, was no "more viable than the thesis that Confucianism prevents economic development" against the evidence of China's bustling global marketplace. Quite unpredictably, then, rigid cultural communities can suddenly acknowledge defeat and "reinterpret their traditions so as to make them compatible with the democratic political practices—Catholicism made that adjustment."[11]

How and why did that take place? The Second Vatican Council forged the final link in a chain of interlocking defeats stretching back centuries. By gathering data from eight national states and two transnational empires over several centuries, this book weaves a tapestry of religious authorities' path to political disempowerment and transformation. The evidence suggests that similar dynamics are under way within Sunni Islam, which in all of its global diversity may yet follow the path of Catholicism. A historical-institutional portrait of Roman Catholic and Sunni Muslim religious authorities emerges over time, as they have coped with defeat in geographic, political, and demographic terms.

The Argument: Modernity's Three Defeats

It may baffle the reader to evoke religion's defeat amid a global spiritual renaissance. Around the world, believers wage godly battles both figurative and literal. Many seek to insert their faith into electoral politics and constitutions. In dozens of countries, terrorists inflict violence on nonbelievers. But violent idealists have spilled over borders to threaten public safety *because* they have been defeated and forced out of somewhere else. They are not the triumphant envoys expanding a successful revolution. In the domestic sphere of the nation, Islam and Catholicism have been roundly subdued by modern states. On a daily level, the state took on roles previously held by religious authorities, from education to legal codes and the regulation of diet, birth, burial, marriage, and

divorce.[12] Since around 1800, Western political leaders have displaced the authority of religious leaders and devalued traditional institutions through a process often described as functional differentiation. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim was the first to recognize that the modern state would take over religion's role in structuring social cohesion.[13] The German theorist Max Weber assumed that science would eventually obviate the need for religion. Historical accounts of secularization single out the roles played by capitalism, nationalism, the scientific revolution, and the Reformation.[14] Indeed, modernization theory presumed that separation of religion and state would be one of its natural outcomes. The reality, however, was not a unilinear, teleological story of religious decline and privatization.[15] It is a difficult and long journey from religious preeminence over the state to the soft restoration of legal subjecthood, going from a position of omnipotence to the realms of civil society and family law.

This book's central argument is that three shocks, or defeats, eroded the political ties between the last major Christian and Muslim political-religious empires—the Papal States and the Ottoman Empire—and their believers. The shocks differed in timing for Catholics and Sunnis but have had the same revolutionary effect of gradually binding religious authorities to the rule of law. Three parts of the book are organized around these critical junctures: Part 1, "The End of Empire," part 2, "The Nation-State Era," and part 3, "The Era of Believers without Borders." Each historical shock moved religious authorities further along the spectrum of state-religion relations—from a position of supremacy to the semi-autonomy of the contemporary state-religion bargain.

Each defeat erected new legal borders between the religious leadership and the faithful and ground their political sovereignty down to a nub. Surrender to state supremacy (civilian rule) was the cost paid by religious authorities to preserve uniformity of rite in territory they did not physically control. They strengthened three aspects of their organization: infrastructure, educational institutions, and hierarchy. The expansion of Catholic dioceses, colleges, and seminaries took place to *counteract* the efforts of religious rivals and modernizing nation-states. The Ottoman development of formal religious training and standardized religious content—occasionally customized for local constituencies—also took place in reaction to European efforts to replace it. The result was that priests, prelates, imams, and ulema went from being an uneven bunch—some educated, some ignorant, some mendicant, some noble—to a professional corps. These institutions had always existed in some shape, but infrastructure, clerical training, and religious education were highly informal, irregularly distributed, and subject to little quality control. Some of the best-known features of the caliphate and the papacy—and their most intense periods of internationalization—were relatively recent developments.

Engaging this argument requires a willingness to reinterpret state-religion relations since the sixteenth-century Counter-Reformation and the advent of nineteenth-century Pan-Islam. Although the first centuries of the spread of Islam and Christianity were characterized by aggressive expansion and subjugation to Christian or Muslim religious-political authority, the institutions forged in the modern era were *defensive* and depended on the recognition of other states for their existence and operations. A good place to start reinterpreting is by questioning the assumptions underlying this unusual comparison. The evidence arrayed suggests significantly more overlap than might be expected. The initial evangelizing mission central to both Christianity and Islam drove each to spread over the same southern and southeastern shores of the Mediterranean basin, just a few centuries apart. That was the period during which the geographical heartlands of Western Christendom and the Islamic Crescent took their familiar shapes.

The book traces the path of these two "political" religions toward peaceful cohabitation with the modern state. It is the history of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam in the long descent from their most recent apex of political and spiritual power. Popes and caliphs have served as chief apostles and defenders of their respective faiths. The pontiff is Guardian of the Two Swords of Saint Peter and Bishop of Rome, while the caliphs have been Holy Warriors (*ghazi*), Custodians of Mecca and Medina, and Guardians of the Holy Relics.[16] For the latter half of their existence, the Papal States (Stato Pontificio, 752–1870) and the Ottoman Caliphate (Osmanlı Devleti, 1299–1924) were the preeminent religious authorities and the longest-reigning dynasties of the world's two largest religious denominations. Yet each had only four centuries of spiritual and political hegemony: Western Christendom between the Great Schism (1054) and the Protestant Reformation (1517), and Sunni Islam from the taking of Baghdad (1517) to the exile of the last caliph (1924).

Wasn't Catholicism always centralized? And isn't authority within Islam diffused and not concentrated in any single institution? On the one hand, compared to Roman Catholicism's firm organizational chart, Ottoman Islam had a lower grade of centralized institutionalization. The sultan-caliphs left room for local religious authority, maintaining looser control in southeastern Europe, North Africa, and Arabia. Nonetheless, Sunni Islam was more centralized than is generally acknowledged, and Roman Catholicism's hierarchical monopoly was less airtight than its reputation. The Ottomans were one of a small handful of Islamic regimes in history with custodianship of Islam's holiest sites in Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. As measured by the extent of land and people under the rule of a unified religious-political hierarchy, the Reformation marked the precipitous decline of the Papal States, and the rise of the British and French empires spelled the end of the caliphate. At their moment

of political extinction, the pope (1870) and the caliph (1922) ruled over territorial states with relatively small populations: 2.5 million Papal States citizens and 14 million Ottoman citizens. As supreme religious leader, however, each man had a *spiritual* influence over believers whose numbers greatly exceeded these population figures.

The sultan-caliphs inspired hundreds of millions of Muslims living under British, Dutch, French, and Russian rule. Although their political influence had peaked in the seventeenth century, in the first quarter of the twentieth century the sultan-caliph became the spiritual leader for around 80 percent of the world's 350 million Muslims.[17] The last time the Roman Catholic pope could claim similar projection power as a religious beacon within Christianity was before the Reformation. But he cultivated influence over a similar number of Catholics in Europe and the Americas. More than half of the 500 million Christians worldwide in 1925 were Roman Catholic. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, there was a dramatic increase in the global share of Muslims who included the Sunni caliph in their prayers or lived in states at least nominally aligned with his authority. If the religious necessity of a caliphate is hotly debated, its historical persistence is unavoidable. The attempt of modern nation-states to fulfill the role makes its absence that much more felt.

A close examination of modern Muslim-majority states, moreover, shows that the widespread understanding of Islam as a radically decentralized religion without a clergy is fundamentally inaccurate. The widespread notion among many Muslims and non-Muslims that there is "no Islamic hierarchy to fix doctrine, combat heresy or compete for power" is belied by the reality of Sunni ulema and religious authorities who vie with or accommodate political rulers.[18] The American scholar Jonathan Brown compares state ulema to a priestlike class of scriptural guardians who, despite the lack of an international ordination procedure, maintain an "interpretive monopoly" over law and dogma within Sunni Islam.[19]

In the course of my extensive interviews in each country under examination—Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey—religious affairs officials, from the minister down to the neighborhood imam, volunteered the view that state control prevented a situation of *fitna* (intracommunal strife)—shorthand for dividing the community with competing mosques and imams. One Turkish observer referred to the danger of being "pulverized by the destructive millstone" of sectarianism.

The national religious affairs ministries and agencies of the Ottoman and post-Ottoman world are not exact equivalents to the Catholic hierarchy, but they have played a comparable role as the exclusive administrators of spiritual affairs and religious education and the arbiters of scriptural interpretation. It turns out that the process of professionalization played a critical role. Formal-

TABLE 1.1. Standardizing Religion

Roman Catholicism	Sunni Islam
Infrastructure	
Churches and Priests	Mosques and Imams
Roman Catholic Europe: 1550–1648 Protestant states and New World: 1650–1830 Americas: 1830–1940	Ottoman Empire: 1826–1924 Ottoman successor states: 1950–2000 Western Europe: 1980–2015
Education	
Catholic Universities, Seminaries, Colleges, and Parochial Schools	Islamic Theology Faculties, Seminaries, and Schools
Europe: 1555–1700 Europe: 1820–1960 Americas: 1820–1980	Ottoman Empire: 1900–1924 Ottoman successor states: 1970s– Europe: 1980–
Hierarchy	
Apostolic Delegates, Bishops, and Cardinals	Ambassadors, Ulema, and Ministries of Islamic Affairs
Europe: 1650–1850 Europe: 1850–1960 Americas: 1800–1960	Ottoman successor states: 2000– Europe: 2000–

ized training drastically changed the clerical corps from a motley assortment of clerics to a professional body with uniform training and a standardized liturgy. The religious-administrative revolution marks the shift from providing small, decentralized services to training a large standing religious bureaucracy. The resulting Catholic and Sunni institutional infrastructure—schools, seminaries, and *madrassas*—survives in every formerly Ottoman or Catholic state today (see table 1.1).

Nation-State Islam, for Now

The relationship between Islamic authorities and the modern state in the twenty-first century appears to be stuck in a phase where national governments guard a close monopoly on religious expression. The liberal demand to do away with Islamic affairs ministries and official muftis in the twenty-first-century Muslim world—to disestablish official Islam—is more likely to harm, not help, democratization. Even proponents of secular liberalism acknowledge that the state cannot retreat entirely and will always have "to regulate the role of religion in order to maintain its own religious neutrality."[20] State oversight

of religious affairs comes in many forms, but it arguably represents the most plausible attempt to reconcile Islamic organizations with the national rule of law in the absence of consensual religious leadership. Instead of seeing bureaucratization as a fatal weakness, it should be seen as part of a sequence of professionalization that is indispensable to any religion's coexistence with the nation-state. Establishment can be found almost everywhere in the Muslim-majority world, where *waqf* departments, Islamic affairs ministries, state theology faculties, and government-appointed ulema form a barrier to movements or political parties aspiring to enter the religious marketplace or to link up with a transnational umma.

Nation-State Islam should not be rushed offstage before progress is made in repairing the breach of political and religious legitimacy of Islamic authorities across the former Ottoman Empire. To dissolve the public bureaucracy and dismiss the corps of imams and religious officials would be the spiritual equivalent of disbanding the army and devolving national security to unregulated militias. The desire to erase the symbols of a preceding order is understandable, but the political abuse of public religious institutions by some actors should not be permitted to discredit the whole enterprise. Denial and repression tend to leave vacuums filled by shadowy alternatives. Just as democratic nation-states struggled to find the right balance of power in civil-military relations, an apolitical framework for civil-religious relations is required for democracy to thrive. Paradoxically, establishment—despite its discrimination against religious minorities—may be more compatible with democratization than disestablishment.

Measuring Defeat

The experience of the Roman Catholic Church as a civil society actor in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries demonstrates that religion and secularism are not fixed categories.[21] It also shows that there is no clear relation between adapting to church-state relations, on the one hand, and accepting the liberal precepts of most of the states where it operated, on the other.[22] The distinction between this world and the next one is not always clear-cut.[23] Augustine, the first to coin the term *saeculorum,* had in mind a temporal imperative toward such collective action. The real-world policy of providing for the poor, for example, may be based on religious convictions. The political scientist Anna Grzymala-Busse has shown that, in the absence of establishment, the Church has been able to transcend its circumscribed roles and achieve a "specifically political form of moral authority" in several contemporary European countries. Her recent study asks how churches influence policy if they have no formal legislative role.[24] Whereas Grzymala-Busse and others look at politicization, this book, by contrast, is interested in *depoliticization* and the dethrone-

ment process itself. Why did religious authorities lose their legislative role, and how did political exile shape their current organizational stances? Churches did not reemerge intact in the contemporary nation-state and pick up where they left off. The defeats described herein—the decline of empire, the spread of nationalism, unruly diasporas—are a subset of larger problems that religions face in their encounter with a modernizing world. Who dispenses grace?[25] Who can conduct or has access to modern-day sacraments? The three phases of defeat all conspired to shape the operations and aims of religious organizations in the era of nation-state sovereignty.

When considering such apparently dissimilar cases, this book will engage in systematic paired comparison to argue that they share a common progression of the state-religion relationship. This adopts what the political sociologist Sidney Tarrow defines as an analytical strategy "to work through complex empirical and historical materials,"[26] distinct from large-N analyses and single-case studies.[27] The strategy is to identify nearly identical processes in a broad range of cases.[28] Only by "going inside the process to specify its connective mechanisms," Tarrow writes, "can we understand how the chain of causation operates."[29] What are the mechanisms and processes that translate defeat into depoliticization—what Tarrow calls the "sources of intra-systemic behaviors"?[30] This approach embraces the proper names of case studies and its intimacy and attention to empirical detail depart from regression analysis and methodology-driven political science.

This book pairs comparative-historical cases and process-tracing with the experiences of officials charged with managing contemporary politics and religion. There is abundant evidence of a connection between political defeat and institutional expansion, as demonstrated in charts and tables compiled from my unique database containing archival research on Roman Catholic institutions (in western Europe and the Americas) and two centuries of institutionalized Islam in the Muslim-majority world formerly under the sway of the Ottoman Empire. Parts 1 and 2, on the end of empire and the rise of the nation-state, present original research from Vatican and Ottoman archives aggregating records of institutional growth and budgetary lines for religious affairs. Parts 2 and 3 focus on the experiences of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey in comparison with those of Italy, France, Germany, and Spain. Part 3 draws on interviews and conversations that I conducted in North Africa, Turkey, and western Europe from 2011 to 2019. I interviewed more than 100 officials responsible for Islamic affairs or public religious education in Algiers, Ankara, Casablanca, Istanbul, Oran, Rabat, and Tunis and another fifty with interior ministry and foreign ministry officials in Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, Madrid, Paris, and Rome who were responsible for relations with Islamic affairs representatives.

Despite its aim for completeness, the book does not tackle the development of Nation-State Islam in Libya and Egypt or of Nation-State Catholicism in Ireland and Poland. There are reasons for this: Libya stands apart for its relative underdevelopment of formal religious institutions, and Egyptian Islam's multiple internal layers of authority proved too unwieldy to fit neatly into this comparative work.[31] I also shied away from fieldwork in Egypt or Libya during the turbulent decade of the 2010s. The consolation for these missing cases is that they are less relevant to the argument than the featured countries. Religious affairs and scholarly life in both Libya and Egypt were far less Ottomanized than in other corners of the empire.[32] Similarly, although Poland and Ireland were both majority-Catholic states, they were governed by non-Catholic regimes (in Moscow, Vienna, and London) during the period under examination. The book does contain references to both the Cairo-based Al-Azhar and Muslim Brotherhood, however, in addition to Libyan and Egyptian leaders whose influence on twentieth-century Islam is impossible to escape. And the arrival of immigrants on US shores pulls key figures from Ireland and Poland into the book's narrative.

The central focus here is on religious professionalization and institution-building as the concrete expression of political defeat. These processes—the construction of houses of worship and the hiring of clerics, the establishment of educational organizations, and the creation of religious hierarchies—took place over centuries. Several years of field research allowed for their enumeration here, and an exhaustive review of contemporary histories permits this book's correlation of their growth with other political developments.[33] My implicit premise is in harmony with the comparative historical notion that institutions structure politics by influencing actors' calculations, shaping their identities and preferences.[34] The book's illustrations contain charts to provide a clear and relatively objective measure of the connections between state development and the formalization of organized religion. At its extreme, such an exercise can become a rigid, structuralist model of explanation that is dismissive of purposive action. The empirical sections of this book therefore strive to describe these processes with rich detail and address why similar situations do not always lead to the same outcomes. The comparison shows where things stand and also how they might realistically develop, beyond the political uses of religion by national governments.

The most important parallel that the two religions share—with a time lag—is visible in their institutional responses to the three great shocks. At the same time that Rome's and Istanbul's religious legal authority became null and void in their former territories—and ultimately even in their immediate surroundings—they fashioned ways to bring their spiritual influence across borders in a clerical and hierarchical capacity. The only way for Rome and

Istanbul to resist without force of arms was to rationalize and improve their houses of worship, preachers, and teachers. The methodical expansion of infrastructure, education, and hierarchy was undertaken by the Roman Catholic Church after the sixteenth-century Council of Trent and by the Ottoman Empire beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.

Roughly a century of Counter-Reformation (starting around 1540) and Pan-Islam (starting in 1826) would leave a strong institutional legacy and mark the first stage of the modern professionalization of Catholicism and Islam. The shock of the Reformation and the tribulations it imposed made the papacy and the Church what they are today. Both periods provoked a transformation and renewal of religious institutions to battle heretical movements encroaching on their remaining territory—and to protect their believers trapped under infidel rule. The political displacement of the Prince of the Papal States and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire had the effect of *spiritually* reinforcing them as divine or prophetic emissaries. Being weakened politically reinforced their cross-border ethereality as truly the Shadows of God on Earth.

Part 1: The First Defeat—and the Counterpunch

Part 1, comprising chapters 2, 3, and 4, picks up the history of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam when their dominant political systems featured spiritual-temporal fusion: the religious and political authorities were rolled into one, the pope guarding the Two Swords of Saint Peter while the caliph served as guardian of the Sword and Flag of the Prophet. Their first shock in the modern era—the Protestant Reformation and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire—inflicted territorial losses and introduced sectarian competition. In the space of one generation, the Protestant Reformation and European colonial expansion deprived Rome and Istanbul, respectively, of access to vast reservoirs of land, people, and religious authority. Lutheranism and other Protestant movements in the mid-sixteenth century spread wildly across northern and western Europe—from Germany to England, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and a large chunk of the Low Countries, Switzerland, and France.[35] In the words of one nineteenth-century historian, the revolt "thrust its sickle into the Pope's harvest."[36] Within fifty years, schismatic churches had swallowed up one-third of Europe's Catholic population and half the landmass under Rome's dominion. This crisis, the worst for the Church in half a millennium, reduced it from a realm of 64 million followers spread over 4.2 million square kilometers to 45 million people on half that much land (see figure 1.3).[37] The movement that traversed northern Europe stranded Catholic minorities in Protestant countries, which banned or severely restricted the presence of the Church and its hierarchy on their national territory.



FIGURE 1.3. The First Defeat: The Ottoman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church

At the summit of Ottoman might, the sultans boasted of ruling over 40 million subjects "in seven climates." Starting in the late eighteenth century, the Ottomans' European nemeses clawed back influence and direct rule around the Adriatic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas. European military might reduced them to one-quarter of the population—the biggest losses came in 1868—in one weather zone. In the early twentieth century, nearly 90 percent of the world's Muslims lived under colonial rule. France, Britain, Italy, Russia, Austria, and the Netherlands had a combined Muslim population of 230 million. The Ottomans' spiritual authority was disputed in Central Asia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa through warfare and diplomatic pressure from the French, British, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. Just as the new Lutheran and Protestant governments rejected the notion of a princely pope—and made life miserable for loyalist holdouts—the new rulers in the former Ottoman realm also went to great lengths to undermine the caliphs' claim to the mantle of the Prophet. Occupiers cultivated alternative religious leadership to replace the caliph: France and Britain in Africa and Arabia, and Russia and Austro-Hungary in Europe.[38] The Ottoman caliph's realm diminished from 30 million souls on 4.5 million square kilometers in the year 1862 to 13 million on 780,000 square kilometers in 1922 (see figure 1.3).[39]

None of the territories flipped from Christianity to Islam during these contractions, or vice versa. Instead, each religious community was separated from its traditional center of authority—the pope or the caliph—in new institutional

arrangements. The results ranged from sectarianism to schism. In a sectarian outcome, the new authorities offered an alternative national path to the same God and heaven—for example, the Anglican and Swedish churches, or Bosnian and Bulgarian Islam. Catholic and Muslim communities' spiritual parting of ways from Rome and Istanbul appeared to be political disputes cloaked as a latter-day crisis of investiture. By contrast, schismatic cases, such as the Lutheran, Wahhabi, and other Reformist movements, were based on substantive differences over religious ritual and meaning. In such cases, two sets of beliefs were exclusive and contradictory, and conflict could rise to the level of mutually assured damnation. The serial declarations of religious supremacy by new national actors raised new barriers between Rome, Istanbul, and tens of millions of followers.

The barriers were raised by rivals who stood to inherit a lot. Reformation and occupation sparked Henry VIII–style reasoning, and there was no shortage of would-be local sovereigns. Every Henry, Frederick, John, and Philip spotted the chance to be pope in his own court. In the Middle East, the Sauds, Hashemites, and Alaouites saw an opportunity to cooperate with a European invader for the ultimate power grab. Other challengers who stood to gain were Mahdists in the Sudan, Sanussiyas in Libya and Wahhabis in Arabia. Why settle for *sharif* when you could run your own emirate? The European empires were entertaining applications for leadership of the umma and the custodianship of Islam's holy cities.

The history of Rome's decline as the capital of Western Christendom and that of Istanbul's demise as the center of global Islam are shrouded in self-serving legends and contradictory lore. In the narrative that emphasizes the power of leadership and ideas, men like Martin Luther and T. E. Lawrence advanced the causes of individual and collective self-determination in a victory over the forces of corruption and despotism. Lutheranism and its ilk spread wildly across northern and western Europe as national churches swallowed up one-third of Europe's population and half the landmass of Rome's former dominion.[40] Luther and Lawrence and others pushing for spiritual secession from Rome or Istanbul peddled persuasive arguments, but they were taking battering rams to crumbling walls.

The dysfunction and abuses imputed to the Ottomans were not cooked up. The Ottoman ulema, like the clergy of late medieval Europe, were so patronage-laden that they formed an aristocracy. They became a patrimonially encrusted, opulent, and tax-exempt class apart.[41] In Europe, priests and bishops were exempt from lay jurisdiction.[42] Against the original intentions of their founding fathers, church leaders and ulema had become a self-reproducing elite. Family connections and nepotism determined the religious careers of Ottoman officialdom.[43] Certain families came to dominate the senior mollah positions in Istanbul and cardinals' seats in Rome.[44]

Despite the universalist rhetoric and dogma, neither religious capital was very good about integrating its own communal periphery. Unequal representation within the religious hierarchies left many unsatisfied customers open to new management. With 15 million inhabitants, Germany was the largest land—nearly one-quarter of Western Christendom—yet going into the 1500s it had virtually no representation in the College of Cardinals and thus virtually no influence in Rome. Similar complaints accumulated in the Arab provinces about the Ottomans, whose hereditary dynasty had always named a Turk to the position of Sheikh-ul-Islam. In the 400 years preceding Martin Luther, 90 percent of the popes were Italian—there were also six French and Spanish popes. In Germany, the Lutheran Reformation overlapped with the pursuit of sovereign statehood.[45] In North Africa, similarly, the European conquests emboldened Islamic Reformists, some of whom cooperated with the occupiers to pursue a social and intellectual agenda independent from the declining caliphate.[46]

In the late nineteenth century, the French and British empires replaced their makeshift, regional Islamic authorities with more serious efforts to enduringly capture global Sunni religious authority. It was a fight to the spiritual death, and Europeans reached deep, all the way into the key seminaries, mosques, and holy cities that formed the heart (and rump) of the Ottoman Empire. Possible solutions ranged from the establishment of a "Mahometan Vatican" to the convening of major international conferences to designate a successor caliph. The tug-of-war over the caliphate was a critical precursor to state-Islam relations in the post-colonial Middle East and North Africa. European efforts to weaken the sultan-caliph and to build up their own alternatives had an enduring impact on the geopolitics of Sunni (and Shi'a) Islam well into the twenty-first century. For the first time in centuries, widespread confusion reigned over the spiritual direction of the Muslim caliphate. This created a chaotic transition from Ottoman to British and French rule that implicated the religious lives of hundreds of millions.

In contemplation of the sultan-caliphs' formal disappearance, western European capitals intensely debated who should follow in Ottoman footsteps. Part 2 of the book unearths this incredible saga of colonialist chutzpah. Newly released documents from diplomatic archives chronicle the interference by London and Paris—and by Rome, Vienna, and Moscow—in the spiritual affairs of the global umma. They denigrated the Ottomans and promoted substitutes. Vienna appointed its preferred grand mufti (*rais ul ulema*) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the British invented a mufti of Jerusalem and inflated the sharif of Mecca; and the French considered installing the Moroccan sovereign atop a Western caliphate.

More than a half-dozen prominent individuals and regimes—from Syria, Jordan, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to India—expressed interest in filling

the position. Major international caliphate conferences were held in Cairo and Jerusalem, producing much intrigue but no consensus to achieve something like the Vatican city-state to replace the defunct Islamic dynasty.[47] The fall of the last Sunni bastions that were still free of European rule spelled the end of the Muslim state as a unified spiritual and political entity, in the same way that the fading of the Papal States prefigured the death of political Catholicism as an executive power. But whereas the caliphate expired, the papacy got a new lease on life.

The Church Responds to Defeat

When considering which leader was most influential for the Church's relationship with the modern state, one might first think of Constantine, who made Christianity the religion of state, or Charlemagne for his unification of European empire through mass conversions, or perhaps John XXIII for convening the Second Vatican Council. But it was Pope Paul III who set in motion an institutional revolution that expanded and standardized the way the Church was run—that is, with catechism, dioceses, seminaries, priests, and bishops. Paul commissioned the Jesuits to undertake a major educational expansion, and he convened a monumental gathering of church leadership at the Council of Trent. The council's July 15, 1563, session marked the beginning of the professionalization of clergy and educational institutions, notably with the law that coined the word "seminary," incorporating the metaphor of a seedbed, and instituted a requirement that every diocese be equipped with one to provide formal clerical education.

Despite losing a quarter of its population and nearly half its territory, the Holy See nearly doubled the number of episcopal sees (dioceses) worldwide, from 206 in 1500 to 378 in 1600. The creation of a system of national colleges in Rome—such as the Collegio Romano, Collegio Germanico, English College, and French College—professionalized the cadre of priests destined to serve in countries where Catholicism had come under political and spiritual attack (see table 1.2). The colleges introduced highly organized religious instruction and codified oral catechism in writing.[48] The most emblematic office was the Propaganda Fide (1622), the Vatican congregation devoted to minority Catholic populations and missions to oversee the propagation of the faith. Missionaries and church officials chartered Catholic universities and theology departments at home and abroad. For example, my analysis of Vatican records revealed that the share of German bishops increased from 8 percent of all bishops worldwide in 1431 to 18 percent in 1788—a reflection of the importance that Rome assigned to manning the front line against Lutheranism. Church officials also significantly increased the number of cardinals coming

TABLE 1.2. The First Defeat: The End of Empire

	Protestant Reformations	European Imperial Expansion
Who	Rome-based curia and papacy	Istanbul-based ulema and caliphate
What	Counter-Reformation: Churches, priests, dioceses, bishops, seminaries, and schools	Pan-Islam: Mosques, imams, muftis, qadis, ulema, and schools
Where	Western Europe and Central Europe (Americas, Asia)	Balkans, North Africa, and Arab countries (South Asia)
When	sixteenth century to eighteenth century	nineteenth century to twentieth century

from *outside* Italy and enlarged the body to seventy papal electors—modeled after the Sages of Zion—from a pre-Reformation average of twenty-five. These national dynamics are illuminated in country shares of dioceses and seats in the episcopate and the College of Cardinals, signaling the rise and fall of national influences over its most important policymaking bodies. Over time, the centralized organisms became more responsive to the new periphery and integrated their concerns into the decision-making center.

The Ottoman Response to Defeat

With each territorial loss in North Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East—from Algeria (1830) to Bosnia (1882) to the Hejaz (1916) and Jerusalem (1918)—"the sovereign writ of the Sultan" became an "unexecuted right" (*nudum jus*).[49] Abdülaziz and his successors did not have the military capacity to reclaim the legal authority and political jurisdiction undermined by "hectoring [from] Europe," L. Carl Brown observes, so they aimed to exercise *spiritual* leadership over Muslims "wherever they [may] be."[50] As the Ottoman Empire shrank, the caliphs made Islamic lemonade from European lemons. From their perspective, their failure at the head of a *political-military* project did not preclude their continued viability as *spiritual* stewards of the global umma. The House of Osman hoped to emulate the nineteenth-century papacy, whose last grains of earthly power were also slipping into the lower bulb of the hourglass.

The caliphs incorporated stranded followers in North Africa and the Balkans into a larger spiritual umma that spanned the Sunni Muslim world. The most significant caliphs for the contemporary state-Islam relationship were the pair who ruled for seven decades of Islamic *grandeur*, Abdülmecid (1839–1861) and Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), who professionalized the ulema, established a religious education system, and chartered an Islamic hierarchy of



FIGURE 1.4. The Relationship between Loss of Territory and the Ottoman Religious Affairs Budget, 1864–1924

qadis, naïbs, and muftis. They brought courts and schools under bureaucratic oversight.[51] This included Counter-Reformation-style activities as the Ottomans "competed for the souls, minds and bodies of [their] subjects" by constructing mosques and assigning teachers of religion in the rural countryside.[52] William Ochsenwald says that they "transformed the system of state patronage of religious activities and informal religious acceptance of the state authority into a state-dominated version of Islam [with] high standards and credentials for teachers, judges and interpreters of the faith."[53]

As more Muslims lived outside the empire, Istanbul exponentially increased spending on imams, muftis, and qadis—in response, it said, to requests from those under assault by Christian and Wahhabi missionaries (see figure 1.4). They founded schools and mosques and hired ulema to shore up legitimacy at home and in restive Arab territories like Syria and the Transjordan. In the late nineteenth century, refugees increased the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire from 2.5 million to 6.3 million. Spending on the religious apparatus followed the arrival of refugees and the stranding of former Ottoman subjects outside imperial borders. By the turn of the century, the effort had borne fruit: scholars document 188,000 imams, *muezzins*, and *hafizler*, 1,700 Qur'an schools, and 12,000 madrassa students across the empire.[54]

My compilation of original data from Ottoman archive sources shows that the shrinking empire increased religious spending from 1 percent to over 4 percent of total budgetary expenditures (see figure 1.4). The eminent centers

of Islamic learning in Fez, Cairo, Tunis, and elsewhere continued to be respected, but since those were under European occupation, Istanbul increasingly sought to replace them. In the tradition of the Counter-Reformation, the sultan not only built theological seminaries and mosques and maintained holy sites but also devised a system of local rais-ul-Islam (Islamic chieftains) and other preachers and sheikhs to serve in missionary territories as diverse as the Balkans, Cape Town, and the United Kingdom, as well as in Muslim-majority Indonesia, North Africa, and the Levant. These endeavors began as a defensive maneuver against frontal assault but ended up provoking significant institutionalization.

For both Rome and Istanbul, the projection of religious influence aimed to strengthen what remained of empire, and above all to project spiritual hegemony abroad. The pope, like the caliph, maintained pretensions of deposing sovereigns and aimed to exercise more than merely symbolic executive powers. Ambition should not be mistaken for self-delusion: the concept of defunct *legal* jurisdiction was already familiar to both dynasties. The insertion of weekly prayers honoring the caliph or the pope's spiritual leadership—recited by citizens with standing political allegiance to their national rulers—shifted believers' religious loyalty toward the metaphorical and metaphysical. The success of modern popes and caliphs at enhancing their role in believers' rituals of faith, however, underscored their political irrelevance at home and abroad.

The denouement of the relationship between the Great Powers' colonial empires and the Ottoman caliph unspooled from the 1880s to the 1920s. In almost exactly the same period, another religious head of state would not go quietly as the papal drama and the Roman Question played out.

The Church and Islamic institutions were hostile to the nation-state as a political unit, and both declared holy war on the nationalist armies closing in on them. By the time Pope Pius IX (in 1860) and Ottoman Sultan Mehmed V (in 1914) called for holy war on Western democracies in a last-ditch attempt to save their two empires, their appeals fell on largely deaf ears. The thousands of volunteers the pope mobilized were only a small fraction of 1 percent of military-age Catholic men in Europe. The irregular fighters nonetheless played a critical role at the margins by buying time at a crucial juncture. The papacy itself survived thanks in part to the paramilitary mobilization of Zouaves, who held off assault on Rome. For Ottomans, the Indian Khilafa movement was less militarily accomplished, but it diplomatically persuaded the British and French not to invade the caliph's palaces. The failure of both Rome and Istanbul to rally their usual allies or more foreign fighters is rightly seen as proof of political impotence, and it reinforced the shift in their role from political to spiritual leaders. Pius IX's encyclical advising against Catholic participation in Italian

elections illustrated the growing preeminence of citizenship over religious affiliation. But it was as ineffective as the later Ottoman fatwa declaring nationalist Turks to be infidels.[55] Turkish nationalists terminated and scattered the religious power of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, but Amsterdam, Vienna, London, Paris, and Rome had already undermined and emptied it of meaning for the preceding half-century.

Part 2: The Second Defeat: The Rise of the Nation-State

After the nationalists' military victory, the founding fathers of the Italian and Turkish nation-states—home to the religious capitals of Rome and Istanbul, respectively—terminated the remnants of their religious rivals' *temporal* power and pondered the cost of keeping them intact. Eventually, the religious hierarchies were evicted from all independent roles in public life.[56] This is consistent with Michael Walzer's 2017 book about the "disturbing pattern in the history of national liberation": the militancy of the liberationists.[57] Governments disowned most of their religious heritage but coveted religious holdings on their territory. It is estimated that as much as half of Rome and three-quarters of Istanbul, including holy sites, were seized and nationalized. The new nation-states swept away centuries-old religious establishments in a matter of decades, taking actions such as closing universities and high schools, eliminating theology chairs, and prohibiting teaching religion to children. Finally, they imposed a top-down subservience of the hierarchies to fashion Nation-State Catholicism and Nation-State Islam, with official control over their internal organization. The insecurities of early nationalists led them to engage in retributive behavior.

As detailed in chapters 5 and 6, the Church experienced almost a century and a half of political subordination (1790–1929) in Spain, France, and Italy, while authorities in the Republic of Turkey (1923–) and the North African states (1950s–) established state control of Islam that remains open-ended to this day. The behavior of independent governments in postcolonial North Africa and Turkey (1925–2000) was strikingly similar to actions taken by their Catholic predecessors. They consolidated their nation-states by enforcing a secular monopoly over general education and eliminating the remaining clerical or ulema privileges from the premodern era. Unlike during the first defeat, these changes did not represent a schismatic challenge. Sometimes known as Caesaro-Papism, Josephism, or Nasserism, the state simply substituted itself at the traditional apex of the hierarchy and demanded loyalty from the clergy. These were not sectarian rivals: the majority-Catholic and Muslim-majority populations brought their own religion to heel. The role played by the ministries of Islamic affairs upon national independence was

strikingly similar to that of national governments in the nineteenth-century Catholic world. One commentator in 1896 wrote wistfully, "In such cases where church and state occupy but a single sphere, the lion and the lamb lie down together it is true, but the lamb is inside the lion."[58]

For example, European capitals forced Rome to submit names to the government for approval, and all bishops and clerics were required to take an oath of loyalty to nation, law, and constitution.[59] In 1866, the Italian king nationalized all Church property and decreed the end of all religious corporations; his royal consent, frequently withheld, was required before any bishop or archbishop could assume office.[60] In Prussia, the crown monopolized the appointment of all priests and bishops. The Spanish court also cut Rome out of the process of bishop nomination. France renamed the months of the year, slashed the number of bishoprics by 40 percent, and turned parish priests and bishops into elected positions.[61] Catholic states were vicious in suborning the Church because they considered the papacy virulently antimodern. In Catholic states, the Church was not necessarily treated worse than it was in Protestant lands—like Britain and Scandinavia—that banned the Catholic hierarchy and outlawed the religious sacraments.

The religions could not be banned outright—although Robespierre, Atatürk, and Bourguiba arguably tried—because many citizens remained faithful, and many still revered the ancestral birth, marriage, and death rituals. The fear of revanchists who espoused ultramontanism or Islamism, respectively, led nation-states—first across western Europe, and later in the Arab world and North Africa—to demote and humiliate religious authorities on what was left of their home turf. The religions' preservation by the state was accompanied by severe restrictions on their activities. Church bells and muezzins' calls were silenced, and heretics were enshrined in place of saints. The new national governments in North Africa and Turkey banned Muslim religious orders, seized their property, nationalized the ulema and fatwa councils, centralized education and the justice system, and tightly restricted the activities of Muslim theologians and clergy (see table 1.3). Each postcolonial head of state arrogated to himself the role of guardian of the national religion and appointed a civilian leader atop the religious hierarchy. There is a direct parallel between nineteenth-century constitutional bishops in the large Catholic countries and the twentieth-century muftis of the republic in North Africa. The state religion survived under a new regime, but under strict control. Bureaucracies of the era have persisted and thrived, in the central religion offices in the European ministries of the interior or justice and, of course, in the ministries of Islamic affairs.

The repression in these periods was marginally more civilized than during antiquity or the Middle Ages. In lieu of bonfires and the gallows, there were

TABLE 1.3. The Second Defeat: The Rise of the Nation-State

	Nation-State Catholicism	Nation-State Islam
Who	France, Italy, Germany, Spain, etc.	Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, etc.
What	Central religion offices in ministries of the interior versus ultramontanes	Ministries of Islamic affairs versus Islamism
Where	Former Catholic heartland	Former Ottoman heartland
When	Nineteenth century	Twentieth century

restrictions on political participation and religious brotherhoods were suppressed. For a period of time after the French Revolution, priests were forced to marry. The early Republic of Turkey opened farms to raise halal pork. But for the most part, in the succinct formulation of the religion scholar Ani Sarkassian, "rather than throwing Christians to wild animals in the arena," modern states made laws to keep them out of political power.[62] At the extremes, however, the governments harassed religious officials with anticlerical legislation and made religious exercise more cumbersome and sometimes impossible.

Notwithstanding the eventual occupation and annexation of the Papal States and Rome, the Vatican itself was preserved in its native location and the pope's person left alone. Nineteenth-century Italian nationalists decided to ignore the pope, stopping short at his palace gates and granting the Church a final clerical exemption. That allowed for a critical and difficult adjustment by the pope and the curia. The Vatican experienced a full decade of complete political impotence before Italians conquered Rome in 1870, and it enjoyed another sixty years of institutional reorganization before independent statehood. During that time, Rome remained a beacon of religious reference. The popes held the First Vatican Council, signed the Lateran Accords, and in other ways laid the groundwork for coexistence with democracy and with other religions to come in Vatican Council II. With the pontiff denied a state to govern, however, there were no longer any Catholic states. As one observer wrote in 1915, "Catholicism has become an individual attitude, and ceased to be a corporate fact."[63] The only European governments professing Catholicism as an official religion were statelets like Andorra, Lichtenstein, Malta, and Monaco. The Roman Question was resolved when the pope was given full political and legal sovereignty on his own piece of land. The sovereign Roman Catholic Church is now encompassed on 140 hectares of Vatican City, around the size of New York's Central Park.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, there would be no such thing as a Sunni Muslim state anymore either. The key difference between current-day Sunni Islam and Roman Catholicism, ironically, is that the caliph received no such reprieve. There was no equivalent to the Vatican's happy-enough ending, with sovereignty restored to the Holy See and a Via della Conciliazione paved outwards from St. Peter's Square. The twentieth-century Turkish republic and successor states to the Ottoman Empire did to Islam what the nineteenth-century French, Italian, and Spanish republics had done to Catholicism—but they never walked it back. In Turkey, the imperial palaces were seized and the Ottoman dynasty was banished. The National Assembly abolished the caliphate, leaving the Prophet without a Shadow on Earth. This marked the first time in Islamic history that Muslims had no Islamic epicenter or Defender of the Faith, disputed or otherwise, around which to rally, and hundreds of millions were left in the lurch. The world's Muslim populations were pressed into the outlines of the Westphalian state system, itself an outcome of a centuries-old Christian internecine war, and compelled to live according to the colonialists' norms of interstate rules and borders. The Roman Question and the issue of the missing caliphate dogged Catholic- and Muslim-majority nation-states for generations. The caliphate's embers also ignited a slow-burning conflagration in the former colonial periphery, which gradually spread *inwards* to the European capitals through labor migration—compounding one irony upon another—at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Part 3: The Third Defeat: Believers without Borders

Chapters 7 and 8 discuss the great westward migration of Catholics to the United States (1850–1930) and of Muslims to western Europe roughly one century later that led to the massive, unplanned, and voluntary settlement of minority diaspora communities outside the religious heartland. Their movement coincided with a range of threats that were felt both at home and abroad. For the Muslim countries of origin with an operational monopoly over religion, just as for the Roman Catholic hierarchies, the development of such large minorities in diaspora presented a new missionary front full of dangers and opportunities. For centuries, the United States did not figure in the Catholic Church's strategic growth plan, and Europe was considered an unlikely locus of expansion of Sunni Muslim communities. Suddenly, millions of Catholic and Muslim nationals lived permanently beyond "enemy lines," vulnerable to secularization, proselytism, and doctrinal dilution within oases of free expression. Religious adaptations and dispensations existed for Catholics and Muslims who found themselves living outside of their communities, but only for believers who were forced to stay under infidel regimes against their will. The voluntary, self-initiated nature of Mus-



FIGURE 1.5. Catholic and Muslim-Origin Populations in the United States and Europe, 1850–1930 and 1950–2030

lims' minority status in the United States and western Europe was uncharted territory.

The influxes reflected the relative positions of the Global South and the Global North. American gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the year 1900 was far ahead of European economies. Twentieth-century western European countries in postwar economic expansion, similarly, had an average GDP valued at multiples of those of Turkey and North Africa. Emigrants were invited by entrepreneurs who were searching for cheap labor and who stimulated emigration via steamships and charter planes.[64] The United States absorbed a transatlantic population transfer of 35 million immigrants, including 15 million (43 percent) from majority-Catholic countries, as rural Europe emptied out and its birth rates plunged between 1820 and 1920. Catholics went from being virtual nonexistent among the US population in 1800 to 17 percent in 1900. Despite immigration restrictions, moreover, the Catholic population continued to grow for another century: between 1820 and 2020, their absolute numbers rose from 100,000 (1 percent) to 75 million, or 23 percent of Americans. The immigrant-origin Muslim population in twenty-first-century western Europe is only fifty years into its permanent settlement (see figure 1.5). Nevertheless, the sudden growth of Muslim immigrant communities surprised their host societies. The population of Muslim Europeans similarly rose from several hundred thousand (0.4 percent) to 20 million between 1965 and 2015, or around 5 to 10 percent in Europe circa 2020.[65]

Two types of emigrants were most significant for the purpose of religious planners: labor migrants and their families, and political refugees who adhered to a dissident political, social, or religious ideology (for example, anarchists or Islamists). The first century of Catholics' experience in the United States transpired at a moment of ideological turmoil and halting democratization in western Europe. Emigration was spurred by a combination of "crisis, revolutions, famines and financial panics."[66] In the second half of the nineteenth century, the region was throwing off empires and old caste systems, slowly entering the modern economy and the era of democratic citizenship. In the mid to late twentieth century, Turkey, North Africa, and the Arab world were shaking off the colonial and secularist yoke. European Muslims' fifty-year experience as a new religious minority also coincided with chaos and instability that have yet to be resolved. Religious-political control over territory and scriptural interpretation in the Middle East and North Africa remain highly politicized and contested.

The governments of the United States and western Europe did not lament the end of the formal political powers of both the Roman Catholic papacy and the Ottoman caliphate, and in fact many hastened it. But they would pay a price for the demise of these powers by reaping political instability in affected diaspora populations one generation later. The groups repressed in the predominantly Muslim late twentieth-century Middle East and North Africa—and those in the predominantly Catholic late nineteenth-century western Europe cropped up in immigrant settlements. The spread of the modern "-isms"—nationalism, anarchism, socialism, fascism, Islamism, Wahhabism—was aided by a sociopolitical landscape that had been cleared of religious brush. Southern Europe was a reliable wellspring of anarchists, and North Africa later provided a disproportionate share of Islamists.

The effect that migration would have on religious authority was not immediately apparent. Religious capitals did not initially adapt their institutions to the new demographic situation. Rome put off accepting the permanence of the American minority, keeping the United States in the "missionary" category and without direct representation in the church hierarchy, all while it sanctioned the spread of schools and seminaries. Similarly, the Turkish, Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian governments did not at first pay much attention to migrants in western Europe. Islamic scholars debated their juridical status and the temporary or permanent nature of their presence in Europe. The delay fostered an infrastructural deficit in the diaspora. The dearth of prayer spaces, clergy, and sites of religious education was leaving citizens open to other influences. Compared to a homeland rate of one cleric for every 1,000 of the faithful, sending governments mustered only modest contingents to face down

(continued...)

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