

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations ix

List of Maps xi

List of Tables xiii

List of Abbreviations xv

Acknowledgments xvii

Introduction	1
1 The Multiple Heritages of Central Asia	17
EMPIRE	37
2 The Manchu Conquest of Eastern Turkestan	41
3 Khoqand and Qing Silver	52
4 A Kazakh Ethnographer in Kashgar	63
5 Imperial Conquests	75
6 A Colonial Order	96
7 New Visions of the World	114
8 Imperial Collapse	134

REVOLUTION	147
9 Hope and Disappointment	151
10 The Threshold of the East	167
11 A Soviet Central Asia	185
12 Autonomy, Soviet Style	199
13 Revolution from Above	215
14 A Republic in Eastern Turkestan	242
15 The Crucible of War	265
16 Another Republic in Eastern Turkestan	281
COMMUNISM	301
17 Development, Soviet Style	305
18 Soviet in Form, National in Content?	331
19 Xinjiang under Chinese Communism	356
20 On the Front Lines of the Cold War	377
POSTCOMMUNISM	393
21 Unwanted Independence	397
22 A New Central Asia	418
23 Nationalizing States in a Globalized World	433

CONTENTS vii

24	Are We Still Post-Soviet?	458
25	A Twenty-First-Century Gulag	475
	Conclusion	497

Notes 503

Suggestions for Further Reading 529

Index 539

INTRODUCTION

WHEN THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union hurled the republics of Central Asia onto the global stage, the region was all but unknown to the outside world. Its complicated modern history had transpired away from the gaze of that world, with its events little noticed and the sources hidden away under lock and key. There was little expertise on the region, and outside observers had few ways of making sense of it. Initial reactions cast the new states as artificial, weak, lacking in any history or legitimacy, and with a potential for insecurity and instability. Commentators pulled out references from the past to make sense of the unexpected present: hackneyed notions of the Silk Road and the Great Game were put to use to make sense of the newly emerged states, and exoticization was an easy fix. Commentary on Central Asia evoked vast, undulating grasslands filled with nomadic horsemen, the minarets and cupolas of medieval architecture, and natives in folkloric costumes. To be clear, this exoticization is not a peculiarly Western phenomenon. A Japanese documentary from the 1980s also cast the region in exotic light, with long shots of camels trudging into empty deserts to the New Age music of Kitaro. Today, Xinjiang is an exotic domestic destination for tourists from China proper, while in the wider Muslim world, the names Samarkand and Bukhara evoke medieval grandeur and luxury that again are not of the here and now. At its best, exoticism romanticizes Central Asia and places it beyond the reach of history. At its worst, it can render the region a blank slate on which one can inscribe anything one wishes. Central Asia has served as the locale of a number of Hollywood action movies featuring unsavory characters, while in the 2006 movie *Borat*, the British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen used the misadventures of a fictional Kazakh reporter visiting the United States to present a critique

of Western naïveté and gullibility. But the Kazakhstan represented in the film had nothing to do with the actual country. The ostensibly Kazakhstani scenes in the film were shot in Romania, and the film presented a completely made-up idea of Kazakhstan to its viewers. For Cohen, Kazakhstan's task was simply to embody the exotic, the inscrutable, the other.

Some of this was perhaps inevitable. For much of the modern period, Central Asia was invisible to the outside world. The Eurasian landmass had been divided up over the course of the nineteenth century between the two contiguous land empires of Russia and China. On the political map of the world, "Russia" and "China" appeared as singular entities. It was easy to see each of them as somehow homogeneous, rather than the highly variegated imperial spaces they were. This was indeed what happened. For most of the existence of the Soviet Union, the outside world knew it simply as Russia. On my first visit to Washington, D.C., I was surprised to see a sign in the metro pointing to "the Russian embassy." It was 1984 and the Cold War was getting quite hot, but American institutions—let alone the American public—could not tell the difference between Russia and the Soviet Union and remained oblivious to the multinational character of their main adversary. Xinjiang was, if anything, even more invisible, simply a part of an inscrutable (and exotic) domain called "China." Yet Central Asia was a distant backyard even within each empire, and little known even to those who specialized on one or both of the empires. The Tsarist regime treated Central Asia as a militarily sensitive region and restricted travel by foreign subjects there. Its Soviet successors were even more secretive, and for most of the Soviet period, Central Asia was inaccessible to outsiders. I grew up in Pakistan, on the other side of the Pamir Mountains from Central Asia. Tashkent, the biggest city in Central Asia at the time, was a mere 1,200 kilometers from my hometown of Lahore, but it might as well have been on a different planet. Travel was very difficult and news of current developments in short supply. It was this sense of wonder about a land so near, yet so far—one so familiar, yet very different—that first attracted me to Central Asia. The situation changed with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Central Asia is no longer isolated.

In fact, it occupies a pivotal place in the Belt and Road Initiative, China's hugely ambitious plan to remake the transportation and commercial infrastructure of Eurasia. Yet the view of the region as the distant heartland of Asia remains. Certainly in the public view, but also in policy circles, it remains an obscure place, the middle of nowhere, isolated from the rest of the world or caught in some sort of a time warp. This explains the constant invocation of the Silk Road, which heightens the sense that the region is best understood through its distant and exotic past, and the unstated assumption that its recent past and present are far less important or interesting.

Nothing could be further from the facts. Instead of being a place that time forgot and where one can forget time, Central Asia has been a crossroads of history. It has experienced every current of modern history, every achievement of modernity and every one of its disasters, and every extreme of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries. The conquest of the region by the Tsarist (or Russian) and Qing empires marked a rupture in its history that needs to be taken seriously. Since then, Central Asia has experienced in succession colonial rule; many projects of revolutionary nation and culture building and of remaking of the economy and society under Communism; and, more recently, neoliberal globalization. For much of the twentieth century, Central Asia was a laboratory of modernity and a showcase for the Soviet model of development. These experiences have transformed the region and its people in fundamental ways. Its landscapes have been put to industrial use; its vast spaces domesticated by roads, railways, and airports; its cities reshaped; and its countryside brought under the plow as never before. The worldviews of its peoples and their ways of thinking about themselves, their communities, and their states have undergone enormous changes. The idea of the nation transformed notions of community in significant ways. The modern period has also seen major demographic shifts. The population has increased manifold, and the region has witnessed the influx of new populations through migrations, deportations, or state-sponsored settlement. The large numbers of Russians and Han Chinese who now live in Central Asia are the clearest example of such movements, but many other groups—Germans, Poles, Ashkenazi Jews,

Tatars, Hui (also known as Dungans), Koreans, and Chechens—have appeared in Central Asia during the modern period. The twentieth century brought universal literacy and massive transformations in the position of women in society. It also brought environmental disaster. The nuclear programs of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were located in Central Asia, and both of them carried out open-air tests that had long-lasting effects on the population. In addition, the overuse of irrigation in Soviet Central Asia produced ecological disaster. The Aral Sea, once the fourth largest body of freshwater in the world, shrank drastically, transforming the climate and wreaking havoc on the health of those who live in its vicinity. For both good and ill, Central Asia is completely different from what it was in the middle of the eighteenth century. This book is an attempt to provide a coherent narrative of these transformations. Central Asia is not at all exotic or timeless. Rather, it is very much the product of history, a history it shares with all other societies that experienced colonialism, anticolonialism, modernization, and development in the past couple of centuries.

There are many ways to define Central Asia. The term coexists with others, such as “Inner Asia” or “Central Eurasia,” each of which has a different inflection and scope. We could define Central Asia expansively to include the entire Eurasian steppe and its neighboring regions, extending from Hungary to Manchuria and stretching south to Afghanistan and even northern Pakistan and India. This is the definition adopted by the United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In Soviet parlance, however, Central Asia comprised only the four republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. I have chosen a middle position that defines Central Asia as encompassing the five post-Soviet states and the Xinjiang region of the PRC. This Central Asia encompasses those predominantly Muslim societies that came under the rule of the overland empires of the Romanovs and the Qing from the late eighteenth century on. These

societies were interconnected before their conquest as well, but the conquest put them on a peculiar trajectory even as it distinguished them from those of their neighbors that were not conquered by those empires. In the twentieth century, of course, both the Russian and the Chinese empires underwent revolutionary transformations that transformed their Central Asian territories in significant ways. The experience of the past two centuries has left these societies with much more in common with each other than with their other neighbors. The historical contingency that the Russian conquest stopped at the Amu Darya River accounts for the radically different path that Afghanistan took in the twentieth century. For this reason, it does not belong in this story. For similar reasons, my Central Asia does not include the lands of the Tatars and Bashkirs, which are geographically connected to the steppe zone of Central Asia and inhabited by Turkic-speaking Muslims, but which have a much longer connection to the Russian state. I exclude Mongolia and Tibet from my purview for similar reasons. They are culturally quite different from the region that is the focus of this book, and their political histories have little in common with its history in the modern period.

For all that, the Central Asia that I examine is not homogeneous. It is a frontier zone between nomadic and agrarian populations, a division seen as axiomatic by the region's own peoples. The river valleys of Transoxiana and the oases of Altishahr boast some of the most ancient cities in the world. Much of the surrounding steppe was home to nomadic populations until the 1930s. Nomadic and sedentary societies interacted throughout history, but they had different trajectories in the modern period, with the imperial powers treating them differently and subjecting them to different policies. Another axis of difference was imperial. The "Russian" and "Chinese" parts of Central Asia have experienced regimes of power that were both similar and different. The PRC modeled many of its policies in Xinjiang on Soviet precedents in "Russian" Central Asia but took them in different directions. The book is an experiment in writing an integrated history of modern Central Asia. The different political regimes in the "Russian" and "Chinese" zones mean that most of the chapters focus on one or the other half of Central Asia. However, I do offer a comparison between Soviet and Chinese policies

of managing national difference, economic development, and social transformation as they affected Central Asia.

This book argues that imperial conquest thrust Central Asia into a new era of its history. That conquest marked a rupture with the past, which grew less important and less helpful in understanding the new era. Empires have been the most common form of political organization in human history, and there had been plenty of empires in Central Asia's history. The conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were different, however. They brought Central Asia under the control of large empires based outside the region. They completed the enclosure of the steppe that had been ongoing since the seventeenth century and reversed the long-term relationship between the region and its neighbors. In different ways, Russian and Chinese rule introduced new regimes of power to Central Asia. Imperial rule brought with it new institutional arrangements; tariff regimes; ways of entanglement in the world at large; and, ultimately, ways of seeing the world. The past did not disappear, of course, but the new order was significantly different. Central Asians related to the rest of the world in a different way. In the twentieth century, both empires were overthrown and replaced by regimes of social mobilization that aimed at modernization and development. Central Asia was swept into those processes. Its modern history tells us a great deal about modernity, colonialism, secularism, Communism, and development, some of the key phenomena that have shaped the world we live in. This book suggests that this modern history is worth understanding in its own right, and it offers a first attempt at such an understanding.

The period since the imperial conquests also produced new ways of thinking about self and community and created new forms of identification. The national labels with which contemporary Central Asians identify—Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Uyghur, and Uzbek—emerged over the course of the twentieth century, displacing other forms of community. The labels have long existed, but they acquired

new meanings in the modern age. The Uzbeks of the sixteenth century are not the same as those of the twenty-first, for instance, and the term “Turkmen” has a different meaning today than it did in the eighteenth century. The shifting meaning of these terms and the emergence of new ways of identification is a major concern in this book.

This book deals primarily with two imperial systems, those of Russia and China. They have shaped the context in which Central Asians have lived in the past two and a half centuries, but their mutual relationship has never been stable or symmetrical. Both systems have changed enormously. I trace the enormous transformations that the two polities experienced (imperial collapse, revolution, civil war, and state-led transformation), both individually and in relation to each other. In the middle of the eighteenth century, China’s was much the wealthier and more powerful empire. The situation flipped in the nineteenth century, when Russia gained a military advantage as well as extraterritorial rights in China itself, while China—beset with threats both internal and external—risked being “carved up like a melon” by foreign powers, as the saying went. For much of the twentieth century, China was the recipient of aid and advice from the Soviet Union. Today, China is a world power and more firmly in control of its Central Asian possessions than ever before, while the Russian rule over Central Asia is no more. This imperial history also casts a long shadow on how we think and write about Central Asia. Overland empires did not have a formal separation between metropole and colony in the manner of overseas empires, a separation that makes the relationship between the imperial center and the conquered territories more nebulous. It is easier to see overland empires as somehow more homogeneous than overseas empires. In the twentieth century, Soviet rhetoric, seeking to minimize the imperial origins of the Soviet state, asserted that various non-Russian territories had joined the empire voluntarily and that the Soviet Union existed on the basis of a deep “friendship of peoples.” Yet as we shall see below, Russia’s possessions in Central Asia were thoroughly comparable to

those of the overseas colonies of European empires. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Central Asians have questioned the narrative to one degree or another, while the Russian public has been less receptive to the challenges. Today, it remembers the Tsarist empire with fondness and pride but is allergic to any mention of colonies or conquest. Soviet-era concepts thus create a post-Soviet amnesia about empire in Russia.

China is a different matter altogether. From the late Qing on, all Chinese governments, regardless of their ideological orientation, have insisted that China is not an empire but an indivisible nation-state with inviolable boundaries. The Qing dynasty collapsed in 1912 and was replaced by a republic, which only heightened the insistence on China's unity. Today, the People's Republic asserts that China in its current boundaries is the apotheosis of a Chinese nation-state that has existed throughout history as a single nation. This means that, in the words of an official proclamation of the State Council of the republic, Xinjiang has, "since the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC–24 AD), . . . been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation."¹ According to this logic, Xinjiang is not part of Central Asia at all but constitutes the so-called Western Regions (*Xiyu*) of a transhistorical Chinese nation-state. This uncompromising and teleological view of China and its relationship to Xinjiang lies at the heart of the conflict in Xinjiang that is at a critical stage as I write these lines, with millions of Uyghurs in extrajudicial detention for not being loyal enough Chinese. Viewing China from Central Asia, as I do in this book, allows us to understand China in a new way. The "China" invoked by the Chinese government is a twentieth-century vision of the nation that subsumes a fraught history of numerous dynasties, many of which were established by peoples from Inner Asia, into a single narrative of an ever-present entity called China. This teleology does not fit well with the historical record, which is full of discontinuities and ruptures. One might equate China not with a single state, but with a political or cultural tradition—but even that continuity is problematic. Each new dynasty celebrated its novelty and its difference from its predecessors, rather than any continuity of a Chinese tradition. That tradition remained alien to lands beyond the central

plains of China proper (*neidi*). More importantly for our purposes, the territorial extent of the various dynastic states varied enormously, and few of them controlled the whole territory of China proper, let alone everything within the current boundaries of the PRC. The Tang dynasty (618–907) had extended its rule to what is now Xinjiang. After the collapse of the Tang, no dynasty based in China proper controlled any part of Central Asia until the Qing conquests of the 1750s. The novelty of Xinjiang to the Qing imperium was underscored by its name, which means “New Dominion.” The current boundaries of China were created by the eighteenth-century imperial conquests of a Manchu dynasty. It is with these conquests that I start this book.

Central Asia’s history in the past two and a half centuries has been affected by transformations that often originated elsewhere (imperial conquests, the Russian and Chinese revolutions, and the neoliberal revolution). This book is about the ways Central Asians dealt with these transformations. I seek their agency both within and beyond the official institutions of the states that ruled them. People act in given circumstances, but they act in their own ways. Those ways differ and are always singular. Different groups of Central Asians had different notions of what ought to be done and how society had to act. The period I cover in this book has seen several monumental transformations—imperial conquest, revolutions, and both the building of socialism and its collapse—and each has produced new claims to leadership from new groups in society. There was plenty of contention within Central Asian societies, and I wish to convey that very clearly. In this book, we will see Central Asians arguing with each other as much as they argue with the Russians or the Chinese.


Central Asia stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Altai Mountains in the east, and from the Köpet Dagħ Mountains in the south to deep into the steppe in the north. It is an extensive area, about the size of the United States west of the Mississippi, and it encompasses

TABLE 0.1 Contemporary Central Asia

State or region	Capital	Area (km ²)	Population (thousands)
Kazakhstan	Nur-Sultan	2,724,900	18,320
Kyrgyzstan	Bishkek	199,951	6,304
Tajikistan	Dushanbe	143,100	9,101
Turkmenistan	Ashgabat	491,210	5,851
Uzbekistan	Tashkent	448,978	32,476
Xinjiang	Ürümchi	1,664,897	24,870
Total		5,673,036	96,922

Source: Population figures for the five sovereign states are United Nations midyear estimates for 2018 (United Nations, *United Nations Demographic Yearbook 2018* [New York: United Nations, 2019], 693); figures for Xinjiang are for the end of 2018 (*China Statistical Yearbook 2019* [Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2019], table 2-6).

a great deal of geographic and environmental diversity. The fundamental fact about the region, however, is its great distance from open water. The continental pole—the point on the planet farthest from open water—lies at 46°17' N, 86°40' E, near the border between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, 2,645 kilometers from the nearest coastline.² The climate is continental, with extremes of heat and cold, and water is generally scarce. It means that large parts of the region are grassland or desert and that agriculture and urban life are often dependent on irrigation. The region consists of a series of internal drainage basins—that is, areas in which rivers flow into inland seas or lakes rather than draining into oceans. (The only exception is the northernmost reaches of Kazakhstan, which drain into the Irtysh River that flows into the Arctic Ocean.) Central Asia has some of the tallest mountains in the world, but the rest of the terrain is rolling hills or flatlands. Snowmelt from the mountains gives rise to the rivers, which flow westward to the Aral Sea. The river valleys create the possibility of irrigated agriculture. As noted above, they were the sites of some of the most ancient cities in the world. The aridity also creates large areas of desert and, to the north, vast stretches of grassland. Central Asia has both areas of dense population and vast tracts of sparsely populated or uninhabitable land. Its population of over ninety million is unevenly distributed (see table 0.1 and map 0.2).



MAP o.2. Central Asia: physical features and premodern geographic terminology

Before beginning the narrative, let us take a quick tour of the region to familiarize ourselves with the lay of the land and the geographic terminology used throughout the book. Let us fly west from the port city now known as Türkmenbaşy on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea (it was known as Kransovodsk or Kizilsu until the 1990s). A vast desert called Karakum (or Garagum, “Black Sands”) stretches out below us. To the south, running east to west is the Köpet Dagħ mountain range, across which lies the Iranian plateau. Soon we reach the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus to the Greeks and Jayhun to the Arabs). Once we cross it, we are in Transoxiana (the Land beyond the Oxus), which the Arabs called *Mā warā’ al-Nahr* (or *Maverannahr*, the Land beyond the River). The term was used in all Islamicate languages to denote the region between the Amu and the Syr Daryas. A great portion of Transoxiana is also desert, called *Kyzylkum* (or *Qizil Qum*, “Red Sands”), but lands along the banks of the two rivers and others that flow into them (Zer-afshan, “the Gold Bestower”; Vakhsh; Panj; and Surkhan Darya) support agriculture and have long supported urban life. Samarqand and Bukhara sit smack in the middle of Transoxiana. Downriver, where the Amu emptied into the Aral Sea, lies Khwarazm, another ancient city and for many centuries a major commercial and political center. Upriver, we find the fertile Ferghana valley, which today is the most densely populated part of Central Asia.

As we fly farther east, we spy the largest mountain system in the world. To the southeast lies the Pamir knot, called the “roof of the world,” where a number of mountain chains come together. The Darvaz chain comes in from the southwest, the Karakorum and Himalayas stretch out eastward, and the Tien-Shan (“Celestial Mountains” in Chinese) range strikes out northward. This is inaccessible terrain that separates Central Asia from South Asia. The Tien-Shan also cleaves Central Asia longitudinally into western and eastern halves. Let us stick to the west for a while longer. To the northeast of the Pamir massif lies the Ferghana valley, which is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The western foothills of the Tien-Shan chain are a lush area watered by a number of tributaries of the Syr Darya, which give the

area its name: Jettisuv in Kyrgyz and Kazakh and Semirech'e in Russian, meaning "seven rivers" in either case. North of the Syr Darya, we are on the steppe proper, a vast, mostly flat area of grassland or desert that stretches north until it blends into the Siberian taiga. In medieval Islamic sources, it was called the Dasht-i Qipchaq (the Qipchaq Steppe), named after a nomadic Turkic group that dominated it at the time. In the modern period, it makes sense to call it the Kazakh steppe, since in that era it has been inhabited by Kazakhs. Most of it is a plateau, the central part of which is known by the name Betpak Dala ("Hungry Steppe"), in testimony to the hardships that nature inflicts upon humans who try to live there. East of Jettisuv, however, we come upon another basin, called Zungharia after the nomadic people that occupied it until the eighteenth century. (The Zunghars play an important role at the beginning of the story this book relates.) They were Mongol and never became Muslim. Zungharia is a steppe grassland and the site of the continental pole of inaccessibility. Its southern boundary is formed by the Tien-Shan range, south of which is another large internal drainage basin—that of the Tarim River. The Tarim arises in the Karakorum Mountains and used to flow into Lop Nor Lake. Much of this basin is another desert, called the Taklamakan. It is dotted with fertile oases, which gave rise to cities in ancient times. The Tarim basin is also known as Altishahr ("Six Cities," a term for the oasis cities in the basin) as well as Eastern Turkestan. It is bounded on the south by the Kunlun Mountains, which separate it from the Tibet plateau. To its east lies the Turfan basin, a fault trough that houses the oases of Turfan and Qumul. Descending to 155 meters below sea level, it is one of the lowest depressions in the world. It has a very hot and dry climate, but the presence of underground water makes irrigated agriculture possible. Here we are at the other end of Central Asia, for to the east the Turfan basin connects to the Gansu corridor, a string of oases along a narrow path between the Kunlun Mountains to the south and the Gobi Desert to the north that leads down to the Yellow River (Huang He) valley and China proper. Central Asian sources used several terms for the lands beyond: Khitay for the area north of the Yellow River, once

the land of the Khitans; Chin for the area south of that river; and Machin for the territory south of the Yangtze River. The Turfan basin at the easternmost edge of Central Asia had long been in commercial contact with China. For the rest of Muslim Central Asia, China remained a distant and culturally alien region.

As noted above, the Tien-Shan Mountains divide Central Asia in two, although the division has never prevented travel or other kinds of interaction, and the two regions are tied together by numerous cultural and economic links. Yet the two halves have often operated in different geopolitical arenas. Central Asia was often called Turkestan, “the land of the Turks,” and its two halves referred to as western and eastern Turkestan. In the nineteenth century, after the imperial conquests, they were often called Russian and Chinese Turkestan. These were geographic terms, not names of political entities, of course, but they nevertheless acknowledged the commonality between the two parts. In addition to the east-west or Chinese-Russian division, we should also posit a north-south division between the steppe lands and the lands of the oases and irrigated agriculture. The division is very rough but nevertheless useful to keep in mind, for most the sedentary, agrarian population of Central Asia existed in Khwarazm, Transoxiana, Ferghana, and the oases of Altishahr, while the rest of the region—especially the steppe zone north of Transoxiana—remained predominantly nomadic until the 1930s.

This quick tour also confronts us with another important issue that everyone interested in Central Asia faces. Central Asian place names have changed over time, they often have more than one version, and there are numerous ways of spelling them. The same applies to Central Asian personal names. The spelling depends on whether one transliterates the name of a place or person from a Central Asian language or via Russian or Chinese. Transliterating names via Russian results in infelicities, so that *h* (which does not exist in Russian) becomes *kh*, and the sound represented by the English *j* is rendered by the unsightly (and, to non-Russian speakers, incomprehensible) jumble of *dzh*, while all sorts of vowels get bent out of shape. Chinese

versions of Central Asian names, based on a syllabic transcription, often render the originals completely unidentifiable: Ahmad becomes Aimaiti, and Ibrahim turns into Yibulayin. In this book, I use the names of people and places as they appear in Central Asian languages, spelled according to Central Asian conventions (thus, I use Khujand, not Khodzhent, and Ürümchi, not Urumqi), but use well-established English spellings when they exist (thus, Kashgar, not Qäshqär, and Ferghana, not Fergana or Farg’ona). Occasionally, I give two versions of a place name, when both are in use. For the names of people, I use a common transliteration scheme for the period before the 1920s, when specific orthographies became established for different Central Asian languages. For the period after that, I transliterate names according to the language the person in question identified with most, recognizing all along that complete consistency is neither possible nor desirable.

Finally, a note about the term “Turkestan” and its variants. Turkestan (literally, the land of the Turks) was a generic term used in Central Asia and beyond for the territory north of the Amu Darya, where Turkic-speaking peoples predominated. The term was widespread enough that the Russians adopted it for the new province they established in 1865. From 1865 to 1924, Turkestan referred to a concrete administrative entity, but the older, more generic, sense of the term never disappeared. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conventional usage both locally and in Europe divided Central Asia into western or Russian, and eastern or Chinese Turkestan, roughly along the Tien-Shan. In the early twentieth century, the Turkic-speaking Muslim subjects of the Qing began to use Eastern Turkestan as the name for their region. None of this would be worth a comment were it not for the insistence of the PRC that Eastern Turkestan is a term invented by foreign imperialists with the aim of dismantling China and used today by alleged “separatists” and “extremists.” The only term the Chinese government allows is Xinjiang. Even though the term contains the narrative of imperial conquest, it may not be translated into Uyghur. The Uyghur term for the region is Shinjang,

the transliterated form of the Chinese name. Today, most Uyghurs use the term only under duress. In this book, I use the term “Xinjiang” to refer only to the administrative entity of that name. When referring to the region in other contexts, I use “Eastern Turkestan” or “Altishahr,” and I usually follow the usage preferred by my sources.

INDEX

Italic page numbers indicate illustrations.

- 55 + 1 = 1 (PRC formula), 362, 426
 9/11, 420, 432, 460
- Abashin, Sergei, 313
- Abbasid caliphate, 20, 24
- Abdukhalik Abdurahman oghli. *See* Uyghur
- Abdullah Khan, 29
- Abdulqadir Damulla, 127, 128
- Abdurāhim, Abdulla, 446
- Abdusamadov, Nazarkhoja (Uyghur Balisi),
 207
- Abukin, Qanat, 144
- Abu'l Ala Khan, 80, 87
- Abulfayz Khan, 53, 102
- Abulkhayr Khan, 28, 30, 67, 68
- Achaemenids, 19
- Adalat (Justice) (Iranian party), 172
- Adat* (customary law), 107
- Adolat (Justice) (informal group), 430, 431,
 454
- Afaqis (Sufi order), 42, 43, 57, 80
- Afaq Khoja, 43, 488, 502; mausoleum of, 88,
 450
- Afghanistan, 5, 72, 82, 83, 84–85, 171, 234, 378,
 424; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
 in, 431; Soviet intervention in, 388–92;
 Uyghurs in, 478
- Ağamalı oğlu, Samed Ağa, 217
- Agzybirlik (Unity), 406
- Ahmed Kemal, 128–29, 139
- Aitmatov, Chingiz, 339, 369–71, 384, 408
- Akayev, Askar, 411, 416, 423, 425, 468–69
- Alash Orda, 158–59, 160, 166, 200, 205, 305;
 post-Soviet memory of, 436
- Alexander the Great, 19
- Āli, Abduvāli, 373
- Alikhan Tora Shakirjanov, 281–82, 288–89,
 291, 355
- Alim, Ömarjan, 446
- Alim Khan (ruler of Khoqand), 55, 77
- Alimkhan Shakirjanov, 288
- Alimqul, 78, 80, 82, 85, 88
- Almaty, 69, 182, 287, 298, 345, 283; domi-
 nated by Europeans in Soviet period,
 345; as bastion of anti-Chinese Uyghur
 sentiment, 368
- Alptekin. *See* Isa Yusuf
- Altishahr, 41–42; defined, 13; Qing debate
 over, 58–59; under Qing rule, 45, 48–51,
 57–60; under Zunghar rule, 42
- Amannisa Khan, 373, 375
- Amanullah Khan, 388
- Amin, Hafizullah Amin, 389–90
- Amu Darya, 12, 66, 79, 83, 327; attempts to
 change the course of, 105, 108
- Anand, Mulk Raj, 382
- Anderson, Benedict, 121
- Andijan: uprising of 1898, 124; uprising of,
 2005, 455–56
- Andropov, Yuri, 397
- Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission, 84–85
- Anna (empress of Russia), 67

- Annenkov, Boris, 180–81
- anticlericalism, 192–93
- anticolonialism, 168, 169–70, 242, 248–49, 282, 313; and Bolsheviks, 172; and Communism, 183; and Jadids, 185, 502; in the first ETR, 243, 248–49, 254; in the second ETR, 282; Stalin's lost interest in, 282; and United States, 383. *See also* anti-imperialism
- anti-imperialism, 242, 259–60; of PRC, 387
- antinuclear movements, 306, 407–8
- antireligious campaigns: in Soviet Central Asia, 218–20; in Xinjiang, 366, 370
- antiterrorism, 477, 482. *See also* Global war on terrorism
- Apresov, Garegin, 259
- Aq Masjid, 69, 77, 85. *See also* Perovsk *aqsaaqqal* (community headmen in Xinjiang), 60, 111
- Arab conquests, 20
- Arabic script, reformed, 190, 217, 371–72
- Aral Sea, 4, 327–28, 328, 329, 419
- architectural rectification, 449–50
- Arctic Ocean, 10, 328, 329
- Ashgabat, 438
- Astana, 438–39. *See also* Nur-Sultan
- Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 171, 195
- Atayew, Öwezgeldi, 466
- Atkin, Muriel, 424
- autonomy, 498; as political demand in 1917, 153; during perestroika, 415; proclaimed at Kokand, 157; proclaimed by Alash Orda, 159; in PRC, 360–64; Soviet version of, 200–201
- Avicenna. *See* Ibn Sina
- awakening, as metaphor, 121, 131–32, 245
- Awut, Chimängul, 487
- Ayni, Sadridin, 155, 336
- Äyup, Ablajan, 487
- Äzizi, Säypidin, 299, 358, 359, 362, 365, 370, 371–72, 427, 488; as writer, 373, 374–75; compared to Rashidov, 374
- Babakhan ibn Abdulmajid, Ishan, 267, 353
- Babayev, Suhan, 311
- Babur, Zahiruddin Muhammad, 29, 55, 336
- Bactria-Margiana Archeological Complex, 18
- Baikonur, 377
- bais*, as category, 216, 227; dispossession of, 222, 226, 236
- Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 425, 469
- Bakiyev, Maxim, 469
- Bäkri, Nur, 488–89
- Balkars, 278
- Baren uprising, 476–77
- Bashkirs, 5
- Basmachi, 161–62, 186, 252; term resurrected in 1930s, 225
- Baytursinov, Ähmetjan, 129–30, 130, 141, 405
- Becoming Family (PRC campaign), 489
- Begeldinov, Talghat, 277
- begs*, 45, 48, 51, 80, 375
- Behbudiy, Mahmud Khoja, 118, 118–19, 141, 202
- Beijing, 396, 416, 426, 452, 484; Olympic Games in, 478; as Qing capital, 24, 46, 49, 50, 51, 58, 68, 90, 91
- Bekovich-Cherkassky, Aleksandr, 66
- Belt and Road Initiative, 3, 473, 483
- Berdimuhamedov, Gurbanguly, 466
- Berlin Wall, 377, 395
- Beruni, Abu Rayhan, al-, 21
- Bibi Khanum mosque, 434–35
- bingtuan*, 357, 363, 428. *See also* Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
- Birlik (Unity), 405, 411
- Bogd Khagan, 136, 179
- Bökeykhanov, Älikhan, 129, 130, 141, 405
- Bolsheviks, 162–64; and anticolonialism, 164–65; project of transforming the world, 185–87; utopian vision of, 163
- Boriyar, Mämätjan Abliz, 487
- Bovingdon, Gardner, 375
- Brezhnev, Leonid, 314, 317, 324, 381, 397
- Brezhnev contract, 397, 400

- Britain and the British empire, 72–74, 78, 82, 98–99, 111, 170–71; and Afghanistan, 84, 171; and the Bolsheviks, 174; consulate in Ürümqi, 285; consulate in Kashgar, 111, 128–29, 256, 262–63; and ETR, 255–56; in post-Soviet Central Asia, 420; relations with Central Asia, 73, 75, 82, 88, 93, 111, 123; relations with the Qing, 91; and the Russian empire, 72–73, 75, 84, 88; and Yaqub Beg, 88, 92
- British Virgin Islands, 444
- Broido, Grigory, 179
- Bromlei, Yulian, 402
- Buddhism, 19, 20, 23, 42
- Bughra, Mehmed Emin, 245, 252, 491; collaboration with GMD, 292–93, 299
- Bukgoltz, Ivan, 66
- Bukhara, 61, 73; as “Bukhara the Noble,” 54; claimed by Tajiks, 409, 463; during Chinggisid invasion, 25; as “cupola of Islam,” 21; jubilee to celebrate 2,500th anniversary of founding, 435; as Samanid capital, 22; as Shibanid capital, 29
- Bukhara (state), 52–54; as protectorate, 99, 101–2, 118; defeated by Russia, 81; treaty with Russian empire, 82; in 1917, 154–55; Communist Party of, 175, 210; conflict with Khoqand, 61, 77–78; People’s Soviet Republic, 175–77
- Bukharan Jews, 206, 440
- Bukhari, Abu Isma‘il al-, 21, 454
- Burhanuddin Khoja, 45
- Buttino, Marco, 157
- Buzurg Khoja, 80, 85
- Byzantine empire, 20
- Canada, 348
- Catherine the Great, 70, 106, 267, 466
- Cayman Islands, 444
- CCP. *See* Chinese Communist Party
- Central Asia: defined, 5, 9–10; post-Soviet Russian views of, 8
- Central Asia Bureau, 177, 211
- Central Asians: as Soviet citizens, 391–92; as Soviet representatives in Cold War, 380–81
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 280, 391, 412
- Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims, 267. *See also* Muhammadan Spiritual Assembly
- Century of Humiliation, 71, 386, 484
- Chaghatay (Chinggisid ruler), 25
- Chaghatay (language), 28, 55
- Chaghatayism, 204, 208, 210–11, 241
- Chaghatay khanate, 26
- chantou* (pejorative term), 127, 244, 249, 261
- Chechens, 4, 278, 344
- Cherniaev, Mikhail, 77, 79, 92, 100, 123
- Chiang Kai-shek, 284–85
- Chicherin, Georgy, 182
- China: in Central Asian sources, 13–14; reimagined as a nation-state, 8–9, 138. *See also* People’s Republic of China
- China Ethnic Museum, 426–27
- China Islamic Association, 371
- China’s Destiny* (Chiang Kai-shek), 285
- Chinese Communist Party (CCP): absence of Uyghur political elite in, 232, 373–74; as Leninist party, 183, 475; as a nationalist party, 360, 484, 501; views of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 422–23; in Xinjiang before 1949, 263, 299–300; in Xinjiang after 1949, 297, 358
- “Chinese dream,” 483
- Chinese language, in Xinjiang, 448–49, 489
- Chinese nationalism, 135–39, 484; racist elements of, 135, 284–85, 483
- Chinese Soviet Republic (1931–1934), 360
- Chinggisid dispensation, 24, 27, 31, 52, 53
- Chinggisid restoration, 28, 31
- Chinggis Khan, 23, 24, 25, 26, 203
- Chiniy Türkistan avazi* (The Voice of Chinese Turkestan), 293
- Cholpan (Abdulhamid Sulaymon), 157, 189, 221, 235, 335, 405

- Choqay, Mustafa, 129, 211, 275, 405
- Churchill, Winston, 287
- civilizing missions, 98, 105, 109
- Cold War, 377–92; cultural front in, 382;
Sino-Soviet front, 378, 386–88, 392; and
Soviet foreign policy, 379–80
- collectivization, 224–29, 247; and cotton,
225–27; in Xinjiang, 386
- colonialism, 97–98; Soviet Union accused
of, 234, 283, 404
- Communism: and anticolonialism, 168–72,
183, 501; as internal critique of the West,
500; and nationalism, 360, 386, 411, 501.
See also Bolsheviks
- Communist International (Comintern):
and anticolonialism, 173, 183; and China,
183–84, 263, 360
- Communist Party of Kazakhstan, 216, 314,
401, 403, 410, 471; and Xinjiang, 258, 287
- Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, 197, 311,
401, 411; and Xinjiang, 258
- Communist Party of Tajikistan, 311, 380, 401,
409–10, 411; during the Tajik civil war, 424
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 186,
215, 306, 317, 329, 381, 387, 398; during per-
estroika, 410, 413; as a mass party, 314, 442;
and Sheng Shicai, 259, 263; Twenty-Second
Party Congress, 313–14; in Xinjiang, 358
- Communist Party of Turkmenistan, 401,
411–12, 464
- Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 197, 311, 316,
380, 381, 385, 410, 411, 430; purge of 1947,
307; during cotton scandal, 399–400,
402–3; and Xinjiang, 258, 287, 289
- Communists, Central Asian, 169–70, 188,
195–98, 196; disaffection among, 233–34;
and Jadids, 185, 189, 195; leading role in
national-territorial delimitation, 211;
postwar elites, 314–15, 333, 339–40; sur-
vival after dissolution of the Soviet
Union, 441–44
- Communist University for the Toilers of
the East, 174, 188
- Conference of Afro-Asian Writers, 382, 383
- Congresses of Muslims of Turkestan (1917),
152–53, 157
- Congresses of People's Representatives
(Xinjiang), 260
- continental pole, 10
- Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking
States, 420
- corruption, 398–99, 468–69; connected to
globalization, 443–44
- Cossacks, 65, 67, 104
- cotton, 102–3; collapse of cotton economy,
160–61; and chemicalization, 329–30; and
collectivization, 225–27; domination of
the economy, 233–34, 236–37, 266; and
irrigation, 319; not a reason for Russian
conquest, 76–77; as a plantation economy,
319–20; as a political issue during per-
estroika, 403–4, 410; in post-Soviet era,
459, 467; in postwar period, 306–7, 310–12,
318–21, 326–27; in Tsarist period, 102–3,
106, 109; Uzbek cotton scandal, 398–401
“cotton independence,” 226, 318
- Council for International Propaganda, 173
- Crimea, 28, 116
- Crimean Tatars, 278
- Crimean War, 77
- cults of personality, 229, 309, 464, 472
- cultural genocide, 495, 499–500, 501
- Cultural Revolution (in PRC), 369–70, 372,
494
- Curzon, Lord, 97
- Cyrillic script, 239, 371, 437
- Dalai Lama, 42, 137
- Dala wilayatifining gazeti* (Steppe Gazette), 103
- Daoud Khan, Muhammad, 389
- Dawut, Rahile, 487
- Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years, The*
(Aitmatov), 369–71, 408
- decolonization, 379; as imperative for devel-
opment in Soviet Central Asia, 312–13;
and Russian revolution of 1917, 168

- “de-extremification” campaign, 457, 485–87;
cemeteries demolished, 490; compared
to Cultural Revolution, 494; as detoxifi-
cation, 485; and forced labor, 495; as
high-tech totalitarianism, 496
- “demanapization,” 217
- Deng Xioping, 370, 395
- deportations of nationalities, 278–79, 310,
495; and Central Asian identities, 279
- de-Stalinization, 309
- détente, 389
- Dialogue between a European and a
Bukharan Professor* (Fitrat), 167
- diaspora, Central Asian, 279–80. *See also*
Uyghur: diaspora
- dual society, 100; persistence of during Soviet
period, 196, 324–25, 344; in Xinjiang, 445
- Du Bois, W. E. B., 382
- Dulotov, Mirjaqip, 130, 131
- Duma, 132–33, 141
- “Dunganistan,” 262
- Dungans, 4, 49, 87, 182, 207, 260, 295; emi-
gration to Russian empire, 93–94; and
first ETR, 249–53; flight to Xinjiang
(1918), 180; position in Altishahr, 253;
revolt against the Qing, 79–81, 91
- Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 388
- Dutov, Alexandr, 180
- Eastern policy, 167, 172–73, 381
- Eastern Turkestan, 13, 15; as Uyghur home-
land, 444
- Eastern Turkestan Association, 293
- Eastern Turkestan Life* (newspaper), 242,
253, 254, 255
- Eastern Turkestan Republic (1933–1934),
254–57, 262; in Chinese historiography,
255, 257; compared with Turkestan Au-
tonomy, 257; as Jadid republic, 254; pro-
claimed, 242–43; Soviet suspicion of, 256
- Eastern Turkestan Republic (1944–1949),
281, 356, 364, 378; anticolonialism in, 282;
in Chinese historiography, 300; differences
with first ETR, 282–83; differences with
the Three Gentlemen, 294–96; negotia-
tions with GMD, 290–91; and PRC,
298–300; shifting views of nation, 281–82,
295–96; Soviet support of, 286–90; Uyghur
memory of, 300. *See also* Ili National Army
- Eastern Turkestan Youth League, 291
- East India Company, 72, 73, 78
- East Turkestan Islamic Movement, 477–78
- education: abolition of Islamic education,
220; “bilingual education” in Xinjiang,
448–49; Confucian schools in Xinjiang,
109, 126; expansion of higher education in
postwar Soviet Central Asia, 306, 338–39.
See also new-method schools; Russian-
native schools
- Egypt, 72, 234, 252, 371, 384, 456
- Emin Khoja, 48, 50
- emirs, 30; defined, 26
- empires: as normal form of political life, 39;
overland *vs.* overseas, 7
- environmental degradation, 4, 327–30, 419;
as a political issue during perestroika,
401, 403–4
- epics, oral, 308, 335, 465
- Eredene Biy, 52
- Erk* (Liberty) (newspaper), 294
- Erk (political movement), 423
- Estonia, 414
- ethnogenesis, 240, 334
- ethnos*, theory of, 402
- Eurasian Economic Union, 473
- Eurasianism, 473
- European, as group identity in later Soviet
period, 345
- exoticization, 1–2, 231
- extraterritoriality, 7, 100; Bolshevik renun-
ciation of, 172, 182
- extremism, defined expansively (in PRC), 486
- Faiz, Faiz Ahmad, 382, 384
- famines, 160–61, 227–28, 366–67
- Farabi, Abu Nasr al-Muhammad al-, 12

- Farghani, Ibn Kathir al-, 21
- Ferdowsi, Abu'l Qasim, 20, 337
- First World War, 140–45; turbulent aftermath of, 170–72, 202; as a turning point, 167
- Fitrat, Abdurauf, 119, 121–22, 167, 176, 176–77, 210, 221, 235, 241, 335, 337–38, 405; conception of nation, 202–5; path from reform to irreligion, 193–95; radicalized by 1917, 188–89; as theorist of Chaghatayism, 204, 208
- Forbes, Andrew, 262
- Fourniau, Vincent, 332–33
- “Four Olds,” 369
- Fragrant Concubine, legend of, 450
- Friendship of Peoples, 7, 236–37, 308, 345, 347, 409, 499; in Xinjiang, 260
- Gagarin, Yuri, 377
- Galdan Khan, 42, 44
- Gansu, 42, 91, 137, 181, 246, 490
- Gapurov, Muhammetnazar, 315, 411
- Gasprinsky, Ismail Bey, 116–17, 122, 127, 253, 254, 294
- Germany, 279–80, 337, 471; Central Asian soldiers in, 277; as destination for students from Bukhara, 177; and Turkestan Legion, 274–76. *See also* First World War; Second World War
- Ghadar, 171
- Ghafurov, Bobojon, 380
- Ghopur, Halmurat, 488
- Ghulja, 43, 63, 127, 245, 246, 281; 1997 protest, 477
- Gilan, Soviet republic in, 175
- glasnost, 400, 408–10
- Global war on terrorism (GWOT), 432; new language of politics, 477, 482
- Gökdepe, massacre of, 83–84, 144
- Golden cradle, legend of, 55
- Golden Horde, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 64
- Goloshchekin, Filipp, 216, 221
- Gong Zizhen, 58–59, 109, 285
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 328, 347, 395–96, 397, 405, 411; reforms of, 400–401
- Gorchakov, Alexander, 97, 98
- governor-general, as *yorim podishoh* (vice-roy), 95
- Great Break, 215
- Great Ferghana Canal, 233
- Great Game, 1, 73–74, 419
- Great Leap Forward, 366–67, 369, 372
- Great Patriotic War, 266; as jihad, 268–69; letters “from the people,” 272–73; as node of Soviet identity, 277–78, 499; post-Soviet memory of, 459–60. *See also* Second World War
- Great Terror (1936–1938), 215, 234–35
- Great Wall of China, 17–18
- Great War, 140; impact on Central Asia, 141–42. *See also* First World War
- Great Western Development Strategy, 427
- Guantánamo Bay, 478
- Gulag, 230, 234, 236, 305, 309, 310, 339; as metaphor for Xinjiang’s political reeducation camps, 475
- Gülen, Fethullah, 420, 460
- Guomindang (GMD), 246, 356; and CCP, 360, 498; conception of nationhood, 360–61, 498; founding of, 183; as a Leninist party, 183; and Sheng Shicai, 284; in Xinjiang, 284–86, 289, 290–94, 296–99, 364
- haji, 231, 385, 454
- Hami. *See* Qumul
- Hamza Hakimzoda Niyoziy, 222
- Han Chinese: influx into Xinjiang, 357, 365, 424–29, 479; Islamophobia among, 491; as most advanced *minzu* in PRC, 362, 366; projects for settlement in Xinjiang, 59, 109, 285, 427; in Qing Xinjiang, 47, 48, 49–50, 79, 91, 109–10, 137; in Republican Xinjiang, 140, 180, 243, 246–51, 252, 257, 263, 281–82, 296, 299; as synonymous with China, 449–52, 483–84, 494, 501; in

- Xinjiang after 1949, 361, 362, 365, 366, 369, 428–29, 454, 489; privileged position of, 447–48, 479–80. *See also* Chinese nationalism
- Han dynasty, 8, 19
- Haydar (emir of Bukhara), 73
- Hayit, Baymirza, 279–80
- Hāzim, Erfan, 487
- Hesenli, Cemil, 287
- Heyit, Abdurāhim, 487
- Heyitgah (Idgah) mosque, 476, 481
- hijab, 454, 493
- Hikmet, Nazim, 382
- Hindustoniy, 354–55, 413
- historical novels, 336–37, 373, 375
- Hitler, Adolph, 265, 465
- Hizmet (Service) movement, 420–21, 460
- Hojiboyev, Abdurahim, 339
- Hojiboyeva, Baroat, 339
- Holodomor, 227
- homeland: as category, 121, 141, 157, 203–5, 294; in ETR, 242–43, 254–55, 282, 293–94; Eastern Turkestan as Uyghur homeland, 373–74, 444–45; PRC as, 483; Soviet Union as, 237, 266–67, 346–47. *See also* *vatan*
- Hughes, Langston, 232
- Hui, 4, 49–50; autonomous prefectures, 362; as base of support for Yang Zengxin, 137; multiple meanings of, 294; as one of China's "five races," 138; revolt against the Qing, 79–80; targeted by Sinicization campaign, 489–90. *See also* Dungans
- hujra*, 354–55, 413
- hujum*, 218, 219, 222–23
- Hülegü, 24
- Hungry Steppe, 108, 312, 330
- Hurriyat* (Liberty), 202
- Ibn Sina, Abu 'Ali, 21, 337
- ideological front, 215, 220
- Ikromov, Akmal, 234–35, 317
- Ili crisis, 39, 93–94
- Ili National Army, 282, 357
- Ili valley, 72, 282; Russian occupation of, 87
- Imanov, Amangeldi, 143
- India, 26, 29, 53, 66, 72–74, 77, 88, 171, 234, 252, 355, 376, 422, 463; as friend of the Soviet Union, 384; war with China, 386–87; relations with post-Soviet CA, 421
- Indian revolutionaries, 171, 173–74
- indigenization, 187, 196, 230, 332, 425
- Ingushes, 278
- Institute of the Red Professoriate, 188
- intellectuals: postwar cohorts, 333–40, 403; repression of, 220–21, 234–35, 370, 487–88, 495
- intermarriage, 345–46
- Iran, 83, 170, 175, 195, 456; and Tajikistan, 463; relations with post-Soviet Central Asia, 421
- Iraq, 384
- Irjar, battle of, 81, 82
- irreligion, 193–95
- irrigation, 10; and environmental degradation, 4, 327; in Khoqand, 55; Soviet-era projects, 226, 306, 311–12, 318–19, 321, 329; under Tsarist rule, 108–9
- Irtys River, 10
- Isa Yusuf, 292–96, 299, 491
- Islam: and cultural radicalism of 1920s, 192–95; and national identities, 352; antireligious campaigns, 218–20, 366, 370; as communal identity, 34, 344–45; as source of legitimacy, 85; as source of political authority, 31, 32, 43; conversion to, 21, 22, 25–26; conversion narratives, 32–33; in late Soviet conditions, 349–55; during the Mongol conquests, 24–25; in Soviet diplomacy, 383, 384–86; replaces Communism as perceived ideological threat, 430; Russian imperial policies toward, 106–7; seen as antidote to Communism, 390–91; seen as mental illness by PRC, 486; state control of, 195, 352–54, 454–55. *See also* proxy religiosity; Muslimness; SADUM

- Islamic militancy, fear of, 415, 424, 430–31, 452–54, 463
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 431
- Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, 424, 430
- Islamic revival: during perestroika, 412–13, 431, 453–54; in Xinjiang, 445
- Islamism, 413, 502
- Islamophobia, 491
- Ismail Samani, 22, 463
- Istanbul, 89, 118, 119, 127, 139, 167, 202, 208
- Ivan IV (“the Terrible”), 29, 30, 64
- Jadidism, 114–23, 372, 502; in eastern Turkestan, 127–28, 244–45, 254–55; views of Europe, 168, 177
- Jadids: conflict with the ulama, 125, 153–55, 169; critique of own society, 120–22, 125; and Communists, 185, 189, 195; cultural radicalism of, 188–90; fascination with revolution, 170, 175, 185; and modernity, 120, 177; Soviet attack on, 220–21; viewed as Uzbek national heroes, 436. *See also* Young Bukharans
- Jahangir Khoja, 57–58
- Jahan Khoja, 45
- Jalalidin, Abduqadir, 487
- Janibek (Kyrgyz warlord), 252
- Japan, 90, 173, 176, 297; as destination for Chinese students, 135, 257; invasion of Manchuria, 250; invasion of China, 360; war with Russia, 132; Soviet fear of, 250, 258, 264
- Jeltoqsan (political group), 406
- Jeltoqsan (protests), 403
- Jettisuv, 13, 69, 105, 211; settler violence in, 156, 159–60, 161, 178
- jihād, 60, 413; in 1916, 143, 477; Great Patriotic War as, 268–69; in Afghanistan, 410, 431
- jihadism, 391, 430, 431
- Jin Shuren, 246–47, 249–21, 296, 299
- Jizzakh, 143, 160
- Jochi, 24
- Juvaini, Ata Malik, 25
- Kalinovsky, Artemy, 402
- Kamolov, Sobir, 311
- Kamp, Marianne, 223
- Karachays, 278
- Karaganda, 236, 310
- Karakorum Highway, 376
- Karakorum Mountains, 12, 13, 376
- Karakum, 12
- Karimov, Islom, 410, 423, 425, 425, 430, 431, 454, 458–61; and GWOT, 477
- Kashgar, 43, 88, 376, 476, 481, 489, 490, 493; British consulate in, 111, 256, 262–63; demolition of old city, 450–52, 451; during ETR, 242, 251–56, 262–63; Jadidism in, 128; Khoja revolts and invasions, 57–58, 60–62, 80; Qing new city in, 49, 255; Russian consulate in, 93, 111; Walikhanov in, 63–64; and Yaqub Beg, 80, 88–89
- Kaufman, Konstantin, 100, 103, 106, 123–26; views of Islam, 106–7; of nomads, 106
- Kazakh autonomous republic (1920–1924), 211, 212; proclaimed, 166. *See also* Kazakhstan
- Kazakhs, 30; “Barefooted Flight,” 53, 67; during collectivization, 227–29; elites under Tsarist rule, 101; emergence of intelligentsia, 129–32; emigration to Soviet Union, 367–69; famine, 227–28; flight to Xinjiang in 1916, 144–45, 156, 228; growth of Islamic learning among, 126; land question, 104; national project of, 131–32, 158–59, 205–6, 211; oaths to Russian empire, 67–68; and the Qing, 68; under Russian rule, 68–69; in Xinjiang, 356–57, 364, 423, 435; wars with the Zunghars, 53, 67
- Kazakhstan: as autonomous republic, 212; collectivization in, 227–29; Jeltoqsan protests, 403; foreign relations, 472; as

- nationalizing state, 435; post-Soviet developments, 471–74
- Kazan, 29, 117, 127
- Keriyā, 252, 490
- KGB (Soviet political police), 317, 386, 397, 460. *See also* KGB
- Khiva, 60, 81; people's republic of, 174; Russian campaigns against, 66, 69; treaty with the Russian empire, 83
- Khoja Niyaz, 248–50, 251, 255, 256, 262, 263
- Khojas, 42, 50, 52, 56–58, 60, 61–62, 80, 85; invasions of Altishahr by, 57–58, 60, 61–62
- Khojayev, Fayzulla, 176, 210, 234–35
- Khoqand (khanate), 46, 52–57, 59–60, 77–78; connections to Altishahr, 54–58, 60, 61–62, 80–81; diplomatic overtures, 78, 82; invasion by Bukhara, 61–62; relations with the Qing, 52, 64, 56, 59–60; and Russian empire, 69, 77, 81; upheaval after 1842, 78, 84–85
- Khorgos, 368, 473
- Khotan, 245; protests in 1954–1956, 357; uprising of 1933, 252
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 309–11, 347, 359, 380, 381, 382, 438; and Central Asia, 320; cultural policies, 333; on Mao, 387
- Khudayar Khan, 78, 81, 82
- Khwarazm, 14, 23
- Khwarazmi, Muhammad ibn Musa al-, 21
- Kim Il-sung, 465
- Kizilsu. *See* Krasnovodsk
- Kobozev, Petr, 165–66, 169
- Kokand Autonomy. *See* Turkestan Autonomy
- Kolbin, Gennady, 401, 410
- Kolpakovsky, Gerasim, 87
- Komsomol, 224, 226, 306, 310, 346, 411
- Koreans, 345; deported to Central Asia, 278
- korenizatsiia*. *See* indigenization
- Kosygin, Alexei, 317, 324
- Krasnovodsk, 12, 81
- Krivoshein, A. V., 106
- Kucha, 79
- Kuchuk Khan, Mirza, 175
- kulak*, 179, 224, 225, 278; as category, 216, 495
- Kunayev, Dinmuhammed, 311, 316–18, 401, 403
- Kunitz, Joshua, 231–32
- Kunlun Mountains, 13
- Kunming, terror attack in, 481
- Kurokawa, Kisho, 438
- Kuropatkin, Alexei, 144, 155
- Kyrgyz: in Altishahr, 57, 61, 80; and Khoqand, 55, 78; in 1916, 144–45, 156, 180; language, 190; Kyrgyz national project, 206, 211–12; in Xinjiang, 252, 259, 362
- Kyrgyzstan: during perestroika, 406, 409, 411, 414; formation of, 212; post-Soviet, 467–70; “Tulip revolution,” 469
- Kyzylkum, 12
- labor migrations: from Altishahr to Russian Turkestan, 93, 112–13, 233, 244; from Tajikistan to Russia, 463–64; from Uzbekistan to Russia, 461–62
- Laden, Osama bin, 477
- Land of the Fathers* (film), 346–47
- land question (for Kazakhs), 131, 133
- language reform, 190, 371–73, 437
- language rights, 437; debates over, 405–6, 414, 415
- Latinization, 217–18, 239, 371, 437
- League of the Militant Godless, 351
- Lenin, Vladimir, 164, 167, 172, 237
- “Leninist moment,” 168
- Lenin yo’li* (Lenin’s Path), 316
- Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 105
- Libya, 384
- Li Dazhao, 183
- Ligachev, Yegor, 398
- Li Peng, 422
- Liu, Xiaoyuan, 360
- Lomakin, Nikolai, 83, 84
- Madali (Muhammad Ali) Khan, 56, 59–60, 61
- Madali Eshon, 124–25
- Ma Fuxing, 253

- mahalla* (urban neighborhood), 323, 340
- Ma Hushan, 262–63
- Mahkamov, Qahhor, 411
- Mahmud Kashgari, 28, 33, 335, 373
- Makhtumquli, 335, 337
- Mämetova, Mänshuk, 277
- Mamoor, Yousof, 230–31
- manap*, 217. *See also* “demanapization”
- Manas, 308, 335, 436, 470
- Manchurian Salvation Army, 251
- Manghits, 53, 61
- mankurt*, 408
- Mao Dun, 382
- Mao Zedong, 298, 299, 358–59, 360, 364, 370, 374, 375, 456, 494; and Khrushchev, 364–65, 386–87; and nationalities policies, 361; and Stalin, 386–87
- Mao Zemin, 284
- Marghinani, Burhan al-Din Abu’l Hasan al-, 21, 4
- Martin, Terry, 187
- Marx, Karl, 163, 183, 216, 434
- Marxism, in China, 183
- Ma Shiming, 250
- Masum Efendi, 127
- Mätniyaz, Jälil, 488
- mature socialism, 314
- Maturidi, Abu Mansur Muhammad al-, 21, 454
- Ma Zhongying, 249–52, 256, 262
- Meng Jianzhu, 485
- Merv, 20, 84, 108, 273
- Meskhetian (Ahıska) Turks, 278
- Mexico, 173
- Mikoyan, Anastas, 361
- military reform (before imperial conquest), 54, 55, 61, 81–82
- Millij Turkistan* (National Turkestan), 275–76, 279
- Millward, James, 46–47
- Ming (tribe), 55
- Ming dynasty, 23, 26, 31
- minzu*, 360; origins of term, 426
- Mirziyoyev, Shavkat, 425, 461
- mobilizational states, 186
- modernity: and authenticity, 205, 208, 333; Communism as a path to, 150, 168, 378; and empire, 101, 497–98; Han Chinese as embodiment of, 366, 429; and nationhood, 205, 206, 208, 257; as Soviet socialism, 224, 237, 238, 324, 333, 348, 383
- Moldaghülova, Äliya, 277
- Mongol dispensation, 43
- Mongol empire, 23–24, 25, 31, 64
- Mongolia, 5, 91, 136, 139, 179, 181; ETR mission to, 249
- Mongols, in Xinjiang, 282
- Moorcroft, William, 72–73
- Moscow, as Central Asian metropolis, 461–62
- mosques: attacks on, 220, 222, 351, 366, 451, 455, 490, 495; bar in, 490, 493; as part of Soviet diplomacy, 385; pigs in, 370; preserved as architectural monuments, 351; reopening of, 371, 412, 453; under state control, 352, 455, 490
- Mughal empire, 29, 53, 336
- Mugholistan, 26, 33
- Muhammad (Prophet), 21, 33, 289
- Muhammadan Spiritual Assembly (Orenburg), 70, 27, 267
- Muhammad Rahim Manghit, 53
- Muhammad Solih, 404, 423
- Muhitdinov, Nuriddin, 381, 385
- Muhiti, Mahmud, 249–50, 262
- Muhiti, Maqsut, 244
- mujahidin, Afghan, 390–91, 431, 421
- Munavvar-qori Abdurashidxon-oghli, 114, 118
- muqam* music, 372, 373
- Muqanna, 273, 308
- Murghab Imperial Domain, 108
- Musa, Ablet, 482, 488
- Musabayev brothers, 127, 128, 139
- Musburo (Bureau of Muslim Communist Organizations), 169
- Muscovy, 29, 65, 66

- Mushtum* (Fist), 192
- Muslim, as communal identity in later Soviet period, 344–45
- Muslimness, 352
- Muti'i, Ibrahim, 372
- Nabiyev, Rahmon, 401
- Nadir Shah, 53, 68
- Naqshbandis (Sufi order), 32, 43, 267
- Narbuta Biy, 56
- narcotics, 421
- Nasriddinova, Yodgor, 342–43
- Nasrullah (emir of Bukhara), 73, 78
- nation: as a new form of community, 121–23, 135, 244–46, 249, 254; as predominant language of post-Soviet politics, 440, 474; Stalin's definition of, 200; triumph of the idea in Soviet conditions, 212
- National in Form, Socialist in Content, 237–38, 238, 333, 341
- nationalities policies, in PRC, 359–64; changes after 1991, 425–29, 444–45; “second generation ethnic policy,” 483
- nationalities policies, Soviet, 165, 200–201, 336, 340, 347; debate over during glasnost, 408–10; as model for Xinjiang, 260–61
- nationality: as official category, 212–13, 260, 332, 340, 407, 433; folklorization of, 236–37, 238, 426–27
- nationalizing states, 433–47; defined, 234
- National Museum of China, 426
- national self-determination, 168, 202; and CCP, 360, 361; in ETR, 242, 254, 257; Guomindang and, 284, 294; in the Soviet context, 180, 212, 243, 317
- national-territorial delimitation, 199–202, 209–14; comparison with Central Europe, 202
- nationhood, 208–9; codification of national heritage, 334–35, 337–40; crystallization of national identities, 331–32, 444–45; and Islam, 282; as main form of organization during perestroika, 407; and modernity, 205, 206, 333; multiplicity of national projects in Central Asia, 202–8; national goods, availability of, 334; projected into the past, 240–41; and Sovietness, 241, 340–43, 346–49
- Nava'i, Alisher, 27, 28, 240, 331, 335, 336, 337
- Navoiy metro station, 331. *See also* Nava'i
- Nazar, Ruzi, 280
- Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 410, 423, 425, 435, 471–72, 474; as *Elbasī*, 472
- “neo-Soviets” (in Tajikistan), 424, 462
- neo-Timurid style, 434, 438
- Netherlands, 274
- Nevada–Semipalatinsk (antinuclear movement), 406–7
- new cities, 110; in Qing Xinjiang, 49; in Russian Turkestan, 96
- New Life* (newspaper), 259–60
- new-method schools, 116, 11617, 119, 152, 169; in eastern Turkestan, 180
- New Persian, 22, 337, 436
- new Qing History, 46–47, 532
- Nicholas II, 132, 133, 142, 149
- Nikolai Konstantinovich, Grand Duke, 108
- Nishanov, Rafiq, 410
- Niyazov, Saparmurat, 411–12, 423, 425, 438; styled as Turkmenbashi, 435–36, 464–66
- Nodira, 55, 61
- nomadism, 17; end of, 229
- nuclear testing, 305–6, 379. *See also* antinuclear movements
- Nurek Dam, 312–13
- Nur-Sultan, 438
- Ob River, 329
- Odilov, Ahmadjon, 399
- Oftobi Soghdiyov (Sun of Sogdiana), 406
- OGPU (Soviet political police), 221, 225, 234, 247, 258; immune to indigenization, 230. *See also* KGB
- Olimjon, Hamid, 308
- Opium Wars, 71, 79, 110
- oralman* program, 435, 473–74

- Orenburg, 81, 117
- Osman Batir, 286, 291, 356–57
- Ostroumov, N. P., 107
- Ostruppen* (Eastern Troops) (in Second World War), 274, 276
- Ötkür, Abdurāhim, 373
- Ottoman Empire, 26, 53, 88–90, 140, 167–68; claim to the caliphate of, 88–89, 118; as model for Central Asians, 89, 117–18, 119, 128–29; views of Eastern Turkestan, 88–89
- Otunbayeva, Roza, 425, 469, 470
- Övezov, Balyş, 315
- Özbek Khan, 28, 32
- Pakistan, 376, 422, 456, 463; and war in Afghanistan, 389, 412; relations with post-Soviet Central Asia, 421
- Pamir Mountains, 12, 85
- Panfilov and Panfilovtsy, 277
- pan-Islam, imperial fears of, 141
- Panjdeh crisis, 84
- pan-Turkism, 338, 477; different from Turkism, 123
- paranji-chochvon*, 190–92, 191, 218
- Paul I (tsar), 72
- “peaceful liberation of Xinjiang,” 297–98, 356–57
- People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, 388–89; factions, 389
- People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 297–98, 356–57
- People’s Political Consultative Conference, 298, 374
- People’s Republic of China (PRC): and Han Chinese, 299, 366, 483–84; military base in Tajikistan, 463; as a nationalizing state, 444; official views of Xinjiang and Uyghurs, 8–9, 449–50; relations with post-Soviet Central Asia, 463, 467, 473; response to Uyghur discontent, 447; state control of Islam, 456–57; use of GWOT language, 477–78; views of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 422–23, 425–26. *See also* “de-extremification”; Xinjiang
- “People’s War of Terror,” 482
- perestroika, 400; declarations of independence, 416–17; economic crisis during, 418–19; “parade of sovereignties,” 414; personnel changes in Central Asia, 410–12; political mobilization during, 405–7
- Perovsk, 69, 77, 129
- Perovsky, Vasily, 69, 77
- Persian, 28, 29; rebirth of, 22. *See also* New Persian
- Peter the Great, 65–66, 70, 466
- Pianciola, Niccolò, 156
- Pinyin, 371
- Pishpek, 77, 96.
- place name changes, 14–15, 437
- Poliakov, Sergei, 402
- Politburo, 226, 227, 286, 288, 389–90, 416; Central Asians in, 317–18, 398
- political reeducation camps (Xinjiang): and forced labor, 492–93; forced sterilizations of women in, 493; compared to Gulag, 494–95
- population and demography, 10, 227, 236, 310, 322, 325–27, 427–29, 435, 463–64, 499
- Pramoedya Toer, 382
- Prisoners of War (POW): Central Asians as, 275; in First World War, 142, 171; Soviet treatment of, 279
- protectorates: establishment of, 82–83; unique in Russian empire, 98–99
- Provisional Government (1917), 152, 154, 155, 157, 160, 162–63, 191
- proxy religiosity, 352
- Purdue, Peter, 45
- Qaeda, Al, 421
- Qahhor, Abdulla, 344
- Qara Khitay, 23
- Qasimi, Ākhmätjan, 290, 291, 295–96, 298
- Qayum-Khan, Vali, 274–75, 279

- Qenesari Sultan, 69
- Qianlong emperor, 45, 50
- Qing, 9, 41, 44–51; and China, 46–47; collapse of, 134–36; conquest of Altishahr, 45–46; debate over Xinjiang, 58–59, 90–91; extraterritorial rights for foreign subjects, 110–11; and Han Chinese, 109–10; as *Khaqan*, 50–51; nineteenth-century challenges, 71–72; rebellions in, 51, 57–58, 59–60; relations with the Russian empire, 72; and the rule of difference, 46–47; second conquest of Xinjiang, 91–93; unequal treaties, 71, 110–11; views of British empire, 91; views of Russia, 91; wars with the Zunghars, 44–45. *See also* New Qing History
- Qiyomat* (Resurrection) (Fitrat), 193–94
- Qizil O'zbekiston* (Red Uzbekistan), 316
- Qodiriy, Abdulla, 192, 221, 235, 335, 405
- Qodirov, Pirimqul, 336–37
- Qojanov, Sultanbek, 178–79, 211
- Qumul, 13, 23, 45, 91, 243, 449–50; uprising of 1933, 248–50
- Qutadghu Bilik* (Wisdom of Royal Glory) (Yusuf Khass Hajib), 27–28
- racism: in China, 375; in the United States, 232, 377–78
- Radio Liberty, 280
- Rahimov, Sabir, 276–77
- Rahmonov (Rahmon), Emomali, 424, 425
- Rashidov, Sharaf, 311, 315–18, 317, 339–40, 398, 401; as Soviet diplomat, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385; death, 399–400
- Rastokhez, 406
- Rasulov, Jabbor, 401
- Reagan, Ronald, 390
- red colonialism, 234, 283, 404
- Regulation on De-Extremification, 485, 486
- rehabilitation (process), 309, 335, 339, 405
- Resettlement Administration, 106
- Revolt of Muqanna*, 308
- revolution of 1905, 132–33
- Risqulov, Turar, 169, 178, 183, 188, 235; theory of colonial revolution, 169–70
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 287
- “rootless cosmopolitanism,” campaign against, 307
- Roy, Manabendra Nath, 173
- Rozenbakh, Nikolai, 100
- Rudaki, 22, 337
- Rudzutaks, Janis, 182
- Ruhnama* (Book of the Spirit) (Niyazov), 465
- Rus, principalities of, 24, 28, 64
- Russia: and the Soviet Union, 415; post-Soviet views of Central Asia, 8; ties with Central Asia, 421–22
- Russian civil war, 163–64; and Mongolia, 179–80; in Xinjiang, 180–81
- Russian empire: administration of Kazakh lands, 68–69; as a colonial empire, 97, 98–101, 237–38; conquest of Transoxiana, 75–79, 81–85; conquest of Turkmen lands, 83–84; economic dominance in Xinjiang, 110–13; emergence of, 64–66; and Khokand, 69, 77, 81; occupation of Ili, 87; relations with the British empire, 82, 84–85; relations with the Qing, 72, 87; and rule of difference, 69–70, 97–98; trade with Central Asia, 63; views of Islam, 106; and Yaqub Beg, 87–88
- Russian language: after the Soviet Union, 435; as common Soviet language, 336; as dominant in cities, 345; importance of, 100, 196, 238; and Uyghur, 372–72
- Russian-native schools, 100–101, 129, 130, 195
- Russians: after the Soviet Union, 406, 421, 440, 471; in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, 471, 473; and the Soviet Union, 238–39, 308, 347–48; as elder brothers, 238; as first among equals, 347
- Sabit Damulla, Abdulbaqi, 242–43, 252, 255
- Sabri, Masud, 245–46, 293, 296
- Sadr Ziyo, 339

- SADUM, 268–69, 288, 352–54, 385–86, 413, 455
- Sādwaqasov, Smaghül, 233–34
- Safarov, Georgy, 178–79, 211
- Safavids, 53
- Saidzimova, Tursunoy, 223
- Saidov, Abdulla, 413
- Saljuqs, 22
- Sāmādi, Ziya, 365
- Samanids, 22, 436, 463
- Samarqand: annexed by Russian empire, 82, 123–24; claimed by Tajiks, 409, 463; depopulated in eighteenth century, 53; jubilee to celebrate 2,750th anniversary of founding, 435; new city (Russian), 99; as Timurid capital, 26, 27
- Sarimsaq Khoja, 56–57
- Sarmatians, 18
- Sassanids, 20
- Satuq Bughra Khan, 32, 57, 373, 375
- Saudi Arabia, 279, 386; and war in Afghanistan, 390
- Säyypidin. *See* Äzizi
- Sayqal (Luster), 406
- Sayrami, Molla Musa, 50–51
- Schuyler, Eugene, 96–97
- scientific atheism, 351
- Scythians, 18
- Second World War: Central Asian prisoners of war, 274; coexistence of Soviet and national in, 273; early Soviet losses, 265; evacuation and evacuees, 270–72; impact on Central Asians, 272–73, 276–78; as liberation, 266–67; nationalization of, 272–73; numbers of Central Asians, 270; as node of Soviet identity, 346–47; post-Soviet memory of, 459–60. *See also* Great Patriotic War; Turkestan Legion
- secularization, 220, 337, 488
- Sembene, Ousmane, 382
- Semipalatinsk (Semey), 63, 96, 126, 244, 305, 407
- Semirech'e, 13, 87, 105, 112, 180. *See also* Jettisuv
- September 11. *See* 9/11
- settler colonialism, 104, 495
- settlers, Han Chinese, in Xinjiang, 110, 248, 285, 427–28
- settlers, Russian, 104, 105–6, 130–31, 142; in 1916, violence during revolution, 144–45, 158, 159–60, 161, 186; expulsion of, 178–79. *See also* Virgin Lands campaign; Gulag
- Shāhidi, Burhan, 291, 296–97, 358
- Shahnameh*, 20, 22, 203
- Shahrulkh, 52
- Shahrulkhids, 52, 55
- Shakirjanov. *See* Alikhan Tora
- Shakuri (Shukurov), Muhammadjon, 339
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 422, 460, 477
- shariat*, 25, 123, 222; under Tsarist rule, 107
- Shaykhzoda, Maqsud, 308
- Shaytonning tangriga isyoni* (Satan's revolt against God) (Fitrat), 194
- Shemeke (Shah Muhammad) Khan, 67
- Sheng Shicai, 251–52, 257–64, 294; and CCP, 263–64; and GMD, 284; new style of politics, 259–61; and Stalin, 259, 263; and the Soviets, 257–61, 263–64, 283–84
- Sheng Shiqi, 283
- Sherdiman, 357
- Shibanids, 29, 30
- Shibani Khan, 28
- Shing Jang gāziti* (Xinjiang Gazette), 261
- Sibe, 260, 282
- Siberian rivers diversion project, 328–29
- Sidqi, Sirojiddin Makhдум, 151
- Silk Road, 1, 3, 19, 31
- Sinicization, 456, 483, 489–90
- Sino-Soviet alliance, 356, 359, 365–36, 378–79; demise of, 386–88
- Skobelev, Mikhail, 84
- Small October (in Kazakhstan), 216
- Socialism in One Country, 224, 236, 237, 250, 258, 314; and Soviet patriotism, 266, 307
- Sogdiana, 19, 337, 436, 463

- Solih, Muhammad. *See* Muhammad Solih
- Soviet model of development, 3, 312, 378, 381–82
- Sovietness: as ethnically neutral, 499; and nationhood, 241, 340–43, 346–49
- Soviet patriotism, 237, 239, 266, 306, 307, 348
- Soviet Union: as alternate path to modernity, 231–33; dissolution of, 397, 417, 419; federalism in, 414; intervention in Afghanistan, 390; not seen as a Russian state, 348; putsch attempt, 416; referendum on the preservation of, 415–16; relations with PRC, 298–99, 356, 358–59, 365–66, 378–79, 386–88, 396; and Xinjiang, 181–82, 244, 250–51, 263, 283–84, 286–90, 298–99, 358–59, 364–65, 367–69, 379
- Space Race, 377
- Spiritual Administration for the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. *See* SADUM
- Stalin, Joseph, 164, 165, 186, 188, 215, 236, 292, 299, 307, 314, 465; and ETR, 288–89; and Islam, 267, 351; and Mao, 359, 386; and national-territorial delimitation, 199, 211; and Sheng Shicai, 259, 263, 283, 284; and Xinjiang, 250, 293, 287–89, 298–99; cult of personality, 229, 309; definition of nation by, 200; geopolitical goals after Second World War, 378; revolution from above, 224, 367; treaty of non-aggression with Nazi Germany, 265
- Stalinism, 229–35; postwar, 306–8
- State Administration of Religious Affairs (PRC), 457
- Statecraft school, 58, 109
- state-race (*guozu*), 483
- Statute on the Siberian Kazakhs, 68, 69
- Steppe, enclosed, 6, 65
- Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism, 481
- Sufis and Sufi orders, 31, 32, 33, 41, 41, 43, 57. *See also* Afaqis; Naqshbandis
- Sulaymonova, Khadija, 342
- Süleymenov, Oljas, 356, 407
- Sultanzadeh (Avetis Mikaelian), 171–72
- Sun, The* (newspaper), 114
- Sun Yat-sen, 136, 183, 362
- Suphi, Mustafa, 171, 172
- Sverdlov Communist University, 188
- Syr Darya district, 106
- Syria, 381, 384; civil war in, 478
- Taiping uprising, 71
- Tajik civil war, 423–25
- Tajikistan, 436; civil war, 423–25; control of Islam, 456; foreign relations, 463; founded, 212; post-Soviet developments, 463–64
- Tajik national identity/nationalism, 462–63; emergence of, 207–8; claims to Samarqand and Bukhara, 409, 463
- Talas, Battle of, 20, 46
- Taliban, 421, 477
- Tang dynasty, 9, 20
- Tao Xisheng, 285
- Tao Zhiyue, 297
- Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 389
- Taranchi, 44, 80, 87, 112, 207
- Tarmashirin, 25
- Tashkent, 2, 155, 345; as crossroads of revolution, 170–74; as proposed vassal state, 81; as Soviet showcase, 382–83; descriptions of new city, 77–78, 96; earthquake (1966), 318, 323–24, 331; metro, 331; urban redesign, 323–24
- Tashkentchilār* (Tashkenters), 258–59, 364, 374
- Tashkent Soviet, 155, 156–57, 165
- Tatars, 4, 5, 63, 66, 104, 106, 116, 117, 344; in Xinjiang, 127, 128
- Täyip, Tashpolat, 487
- Temur Malik, 273
- Tercüman* (Interpreter) (newspaper), 117, 122, 253
- Tevkelev, Muhammad, 67

- Thaw, 309, 336
- Third World, 313, 378; Soviet outreach to, 382–85
- “three evils,” 477, 485
- Three Gentlemen (*Üch äpändi*), 294–96, 299; differences with ETR, 295–96
- Tiananmen Square, massacre, 396, 483; terror attack in, 481
- Tibet, 5, 42, 137, 492
- Tien-Shan Mountain, 12, 13, 42
- Timur, 26–27, 31, 203–5, 434–35
- Timurids, 27, 28, 29, 55, 204
- Tirmidhi, Abu ‘Isa Muhammad al-, 21, 454
- titular nationals, 213, 239–40, 347; defined, 213
- Tohti, Ilham, 484–85, 487
- Toqayev, Qasim-Jomart, 474
- Toqmaq, 77, 144, 282
- Torghay, 143–44, 145
- traditionalism, Soviet ethnographers’ view of, 402
- Transoxiana, 12, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25–26, 28, 42, 60, 67, 68, 75; as a frontier zone, 20
- Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, 359
- Treaty of Ghulja, 72
- Treaty of Nerchinsk, 65
- Treaty of St. Petersburg, 39, 93–94, 110, 182
- Trotsky, Lev, 149, 172
- Tsarist empire. *See* Russian empire
- Tughluq Temür, 26, 33
- Turan, 20, 203–4
- Turfan, 13, 23, 45, 79, 81, 250
- Turkestan: defined, 14; as Russian province, 79, 82, 94–95, 211
- Turkestan Autonomy, 157–58, 159, 162, 200, 275, 276
- Turkestan Bureau, 177, 182. *See also* Central Asia Bureau
- Turkestan Commission, 166, 173, 177, 178, 216
- Turkestan Committee of National Unity, 275–76, 280
- Turkestan Committee (1917), 155–56
- Turkestan Islamic Party, 478
- Turkestan Legion, 273–76
- Turkey, 176, 177, 195, 255, 299; as destination of Central Asian diaspora, 279, 491; relations with post-Soviet Central Asia, 420. *See also* Ottoman Empire
- Turkism, 122–23, 128–29, 139, 254, 281, 293–96, 420; different visions of, 294–96, 420; as modernity, 208; not the same as pan-Turkism, 123
- Turkistan (city), 77
- Turkiston viloyatining gazet*i (Turkestan Gazette), 103, 115, 153
- Turkmenbashi (Türkmenbaşy), 464–66. *See also* Niyazov
- Türkmenbaşy (city), 12
- Turkmenistan: and China, 467; foreign relations, 467; permanent neutrality, 466; post-Soviet developments, 464–67; rebellion during collectivization, 225
- Tursun, Perhat, 487
- Tursun, Sänubär, 487
- Tynyshbayev, Muhammetjan, 129
- Ukraine, 227
- ulama*, 34, 43, 53, 192–93; in 1917, 153–55; accommodation to Tsarist rule, 123–25; in Afghanistan, 389; in ETR, 253–54; flexibility of interpretation of, 56, 501–2; minor role in Kazakh society, 132, 158; opposition to Jadidism, 123–26; during Second World War, 267–69
- Uljaboyev, Tursunbay, 311, 313
- Ulughbek, 27, 273, 336, 357
- Ulughzoda, Sotim, 337
- Umar Khan, 55
- Umayyad caliphate, 20
- UNESCO, 4, 470
- United Nations, 418, 424
- United States: in the Cold War, 377–78, 382; comparisons to, 96–97, 232, 319–20, 330; consulate in Ürümqi, 282, 285; entry

- into Second World War, 283; and global war on terrorism, 477; geopolitical presence in post-Soviet Central Asia, 420, 460; proxy war in Afghanistan, 389–91; racism in, 232, 377–78; support for Islamic militancy, 390–91, 412; views of Soviet Central Asia, 391, 412
- uprising of 1916, 142–45
- urban planning and redesign, 323–24, 437–38, 450–52, 451. *See also* architectural rectification
- Ürümchi, 49; made capital of Xinjiang, 109; as a Chinese city, 428, 448; U.S. consulate in, 282, 285; 2009 riots, 478–80; violent attacks in, 481
- uskorenie* (acceleration), 400
- Usmon Khoja, 176, 177
- Usmonxo'jayev, Inomjon, 401, 410
- Uyghur, Abdughaliq Abdurahman oghli, 244–45, 250
- Uyghur empire, 18, 20
- Uyghur ethnonym: modern emergence of, 206–7; in Eastern Turkestan, 245; officially recognized, 260–61
- Uyghuristan, demands for, 364, 365
- Uyghur language, 286, 371–73, 448–49; publishing banned, 493–94
- Uyghurs: absence of political elites, 474, 447; in Afghanistan, 478; diaspora, 257, 368, 422–23, 491–92; codification of cultural heritage, 371–72, 444–45; discontent with PRC, 264–65, 422, 444, 478–80; intelligentsia, 370, 372, 374–75, 487–48, 495; memory of ETR, 300; sense of nationhood, 444; not titular in Xinjiang, 362–63; resistance to PRC, 445–47; in Syria, 478; violence, 480–81. *See also* “de-extremification”; Uyghur ethnonym
- Uzbek: modern ethnonym, 204; *ulus* of, 28
- Uzbek cotton scandal, 398–400, 401
- Uzbekistan: control of Islam, 455; formation of, 210–11; as nationalizing state, 434–35; post-Soviet, 458–62; relations with Turkey, 460; relations with the U.S., 460
- Valikhanov. *See* Wälikhanov
- vatan* (homeland), 121, 141, 242, 294
- veiling, 190–92, 270, 342; campaign against, 218–19; prohibited in Xinjiang, 480. *See also* hijab
- Vernoe, 69, 77
- Virgin Lands campaign, 309, 310, 311, 325, 367, 406, 471
- Volga Germans, 278, 471
- Volga-Urals region, 28, 54, 70, 98, 117, 270
- Wali Khan Khoja, 62
- Wälikhanov, Shoqan, 63–64, 70–71, 74, 75, 128
- Wang Enmao, 358, 369
- wangs*, 50, 109, 248
- Wang Zhen, 358
- waqf, 219, 220, 357
- warlords, in China, 140, 243, 246. *See also* Ma Zhongying
- Washington, DC, 2, 438
- Western Han dynasty, 449
- Western Regions (*Xiyu*), 8, 449
- “Wild Pigeon” (Yasin), 446
- Wilson, Woodrow, 168
- women, 190–92, 218, 219; violence against, 222–23; concern over Qing treatment of, 51; and cotton, 320–21; double burden, 343; forced sterilizations of, in Xinjiang, 493; as guardians of tradition, 343; modesty as marker of national honor, 454; during Second World War, 270, 277
- World Uyghur Congress, 491
- Wulonga, 58
- Wu Zhongxin, 284, 290
- xiexiang* (“shared pay”), 58; Xinjiang cut off from, 140
- Xi Jinping, 473, 481, 482, 483
- Xinhai revolution, 135–36; in Xinjiang, 137, 138–39

- Xinjiang: campaign of incarceration in, 475, 475–76, 480, 485–87, 489; declared autonomous, 362; economic disparities in, 447–48; meaning of the term, 9; as province, 95, 109–10; Qing debate over, 59, 90–91; Russian civil war in, 180–81; as Soviet satellite, 258–59, 283
- Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, 357–58
- Xinjiang Regional Museum, 449
- Xiongnu, 18, 450
- Yakubovsky, Aleksandr, 240
- Yang Zengxin, 137, 140, 180, 207, 243–44, 246, 253, 293, 296
- Yaqub Beg, 75, 80, 85–90, 86, 242–43; relations with the British empire, 88, 92; relations with the Ottomans, 88–90; relations with the Russian empire, 87–88
- Yaqubov, Odil, 404
- Yarkand, 42, 43, 252
- Yashin, Komil, 384
- Yasin, Nurmuhämmät, 446
- Yengisar, 61, 128, 256, 263, 292, 370
- Yolbars Khan, 248, 249, 299, 513n12
- Yo'ldoshev, Nig'matulla, 461
- Yo'ldoshxo'jayeva, Nurxon, 223
- Yosh Turkiston* (Young Turkistan), 275
- Young Bukharans, 175–77, 176, 339
- Yuan dynasty, 24, 31
- Yusuf Khass Hajib, 335, 373
- Yusupov, Usmon, 289, 307, 316
- Zahir Shah, 388
- Zakir, Shöhret, 492
- Zhang Binglin, 135
- Zhang Chunxian, 481
- Zhang Zhizhong, 290–91, 294, 297
- Zhdanov, Andrei, 307
- Zhongguo, resignified as “China,” 138
- Zhonghua *minzu*, 138, 285, 360–61
- Zhou Enlai, 367
- Zoroastrianism, 19, 20
- Zou Rong, 135
- Zungharia, 13, 23, 25, 30, 41, 42, 92
- Zunghars and Zunghar empire, 30, 42–45, 48, 502; wars with the Kazakhs, 53, 67
- Zuo Zongtang, 90–91, 92, 109, 126, 128